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TATTVASAṄGRAHA

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Vol. I

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THE TATTVASAṄGRAHA OF ŚĀNTARAKṢĪTA

with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla

Translated into English by

GANGANATHA JHA

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I

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PREFACE.

Vol. I of the English Translation of *Tattvasaṅgraha* is being sent out. The talented editor of the Gaekwad Series has supplied all the information available regarding the Authors of the Original and the Commentary,—in the extensive and lucid Introduction to the original Sanskrit Text.

The texts translated are difficult—linguistically as well as philosophically. In the latter aspect, my past work on Kumārila's *Shlokavārtika* and Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārtika* has enabled me to follow the trend of the arguments; as these two writers form the principal targets for attack in the work; and the work is entirely polemical.—In the linguistic aspect of the work, I have not always felt quite sure, specially in regard to the technical terms in which Buddhistic literature abounds and my knowledge of these had all been derived from 'Brahmanical' Sources. But as the work progressed, I felt surer of my ground, and I hope that in the final result, I have not gone far wrong in my interpretations. For the slips that there are bound to be there, I apologise to Buddhist Scholars and hope that they will correct me wherever I may be found to have gone astray.

In that hope, I send forth this work of mine with thankfulness for having been given the strength of mind and body to do it.

My thanks are due to the Editors of the Sanskrit Text, whose introduction has been helpful in the understanding of the text.

ALLAHABAD,
July 23, 1937

GANGANATHA JHA

TATTVASAṄGRAHA.

Volume I.

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Examination of other forms of Cognition—

Chapter XIX (A)—*Verbal Cognition.*

,, XIX (B)—*Analogical Cognition.*

,, XIX (C)—*Presumptive Cognition.*

,, XIX (D)—*Negative Cognition.*

Chapter XX—Examination of ‘ *Syādvāda* ’.
„ XXI— „ „ ‘ Three Points of Time ’.
„ XXII— „ „ Materialism.
„ XXIII— „ „ the ‘ External World ’.
„ XXIV— „ „ ‘ Revealed Word ’.
„ XXV— „ „ ‘ Self-validity ’ of Cognitions.
„ XXVI— „ „ the ‘ Person with Superhuman Powers of Perception ’.

manent? Mere Being is said to be their sole function as well as Cause'.—This points to the section on the *Permanence of Things* (Chapter 8, below).

Objection :—" If this is so, then the *Intervolved Wheel of Causation* cannot be regarded as the basis of any adjustments regarding Act, its Fruit and the Connection between them, and such other things; as *ex hypothesi*, the said Wheel is *mobile* (momentary)."

The answer is supplied by the second line of the first verse of the Text—' *Karma*, etc.', 'It is the basis of such notions as *Actions*, etc.'—What the Text means is that this shall be explained later on. In this connection '*Actions*' are good and bad, their 'fruits' are desirable and undesirable, and the 'connection' between them is that of *the product and the produced* (cause and effect); the 'notion' of this is its adjustment, usage, arrangement.—The term '*ādi*' ('and the rest') in the Text includes all such notions as those of Remembrance, Recognition, Uncertainty, Certainty, the Following up of a self-appointed Task, Eagerness for perceptible things, Cessation of such eagerness, the Relation of Cause and Effect, the Cogniser of these, the Means of Cognition, Bondage, Emancipation and so forth. The said 'Wheel' is the 'basis' of all these ;—such is the analysis of the compound.—To this effect there is the following declaration of the Blessed Lord—" O *Bhikṣus* the Action is there, the Fruit is there, but the Actor is not found,—apart from the 'indication' (*Saṅkēta*) of the 'Principles and Practices' (*Dharmas*), —who renounces these 'Sensorial Phases' (*Skandhas*) and takes up others. So that it is due to the indication of the 'Principles and Practices' that a certain thing comes about when another thing is there (as its cause)." —This points to the Chapter on Actions, their Fruits and the Connection between these (Chapter 9, below).—This *Intervolved Wheel of Causation* should be understood as appertaining to the Sensorial Phases (*Skandhas*), 'Phenomena' (*Dhātus*) and the 'Receptacles' (*Āyatanas*); as it is these that are produced by the *Intervolved Wheel of Causation*.—(1)

[*Text* 2.] *Question*—" There are many such things as Substance, Quality, Movement and the rest; why does not the *Wheel of Causation* apply to these?"

The answer is given by lines 1 and 2 of *Text* 2, beginning with the term '*guṇa, etc.*', '*It is devoid of all such concepts as Quality, etc.*'—The term '*guṇa*— . . . *samavāya*' is a Copulative Compound ;—the term '*jāti*', 'universal', includes both kinds of Universal, the Higher (Wider) as well as the Lower (Narrower) ;—the term '*ādi*', 'and so on', includes the (1) 'Specific Individuality' subsisting in ultimate substances (as postulated by the *Vaishēṣika*), (2) also those characteristics which some people describe as distinct from the things possessing those characteristics,—e.g. the character of 'Being' as subsisting in all the Six Categories (of the *Vaishēṣika*), the character of being apprehended by all such Means of Cognition as bring about the apprehension of existing things, and so forth. The compound between the term '*guṇa . . . samavāya*' and '*upādhi*' is *Karmadhāraya*, one between the qualification and the qualified [the '*upādhi*' being the qualified, and the preceding term the qualification] ;—of these *upādhis*, concepts, (in the

shape of *Substance*, etc.] the *wheel* is *devoid*; i.e. it is free from all this. In regard to this, the Blessed Lord has declared as follows :—" O *Brāhmaṇa*! All is All; i.e. the five '*Skandhas*' (Five Sensory Phases), the twelve '*Āyatanas*' [Twelve Sensory Receptacles—consisting of Mind, five Sense-organs and the external objects apprehended by these six], and the eighteen '*Dhātus*' [*Elements* or Ingredients, consisting of the aforesaid *twelve*, along with the six elements of Visual Sensation, Auditory Sensation, Olfactory Sensation, Gestatory Sensation, Tactile Sensation, Mental Sensation]."—This points to the Section on the Examination of the *Six Categories* (Chapters 10 to 15).

Question—" In the absence of the said concepts, how does the *Intervolved Wheel of Causation* become the object of Verbal Expression and Conception? And when it does not become the object of these two, it cannot be spoken of; as a matter of fact Verbal Expression and Conception cannot operate apart from the concepts in question. How then is it that the Blessed Lord has propounded it?"

[*Page* 12.] The answer to this is contained in the second line of *Text* 2, beginning with the word '*āropita*', '*It is amenable, etc.*'.—The compound '*āropita, etc.*' is to be explained as follows—'*āropita ākāra*' is the *imposed* or *assumed form*; and this 'assumed form' is the character of the *Wheel of Causation*, as forming the object of Verbal Expression and Conception; i.e. that which forms the subject of the *Wheel of Causation* is that which is amenable to Verbal Expression and Conception in an assumed (superimposed) form.—The term '*pratyaya*' (Cognition) here should be understood in the sense of the particular form of Cognition which appears in the form of a verbal concept,—as is indicated by the proximity of the term 'verbal expression'; specially as these two are invariably associated in regard to any single object. Thus the sense of the Text comes to this—Though the said concepts are not there (in the *Wheel*), yet through the fact that things are always perceived as distinguished from each other, the Conception is understood to appertain to something external; so that the amenability to Verbal Expression, in the form of invariable association, is present (in the said Wheel). In reality, however, it is not amenable to Verbal Expression, because all sorts of Conceptual Content have disappeared from it. But, just as the denotation of words is admitted in common parlance as something nice, though not justified by reason,—in the same manner, with a view to introducing the True Teaching, the Blessed Teacher, closing his eyes, in the manner of the elephant, to the true character of things, sought to express the true idea, through a sort of illusion; and this simply because there is no other way of doing it.—Even though the form of the denotation of words is really superimposed upon it (as an illusion), yet, by reason of invariable association, it becomes indirectly related to the thing to be spoken of, and thus becomes the means of expressing it; and the thing, thus expressed, does become manifested, by virtue of the powers of the Teachers; hence there is no chance of being deceived (regarding the true nature of the thing spoken of).—This is what has been thus declared by *Tāyin*—" By whichsoever name is a Phenomenon (or Entity or Manifestation) spoken of,—this Phenomenon does not really exist there; such is the *phenomenal* character of all phenomena".—(2)

[*Text* 3.] *Question*—" Is this (Wheel of Causation) a mere verbal jugglery indulged in on account of the paucity of valid reasons in support, —just as has been done by other philosophers assuming (without sufficient proof) their Categories ? Or is there any valid reason for accepting it ? "

The answer that there *is* such valid reason is given in *Text* 3.—' *Spaṣṭa*, etc.', '*It is definitely cognised, etc.*'—The compound '*Spaṣṭalakṣaṇa*' is *Karmadhāraya*, meaning 'whose *definition*, character, is *clear*, i.e. well-defined'; the 'clearness' of the 'definition' is due to the fact that it is free from the three defects of being *impossible* (inapplicable), or *too narrow* or *too wide*; the definition of the Means of Right Cognition provided by other philosophers, on the other hand, is not 'clear'; the Text therefore has characterised its own Means of Cognition as 'clear'. Endowed with this character of being '*clearly defined*' are the '*two Means of Cognition*',—Sense-perception and Inference;—by these is the *Wheel of Causation* '*definitely cognised*'; this will be explained under all the sections (as occasion presents itself). This also is approved by the Blessed Lord, who has declared thus—' O *Bhikṣus*, my word should be accepted after due investigation, not merely through regard for me; just as gold is accepted as real only after heating, cutting and rubbing on the touch-stone'.—As regards *Sense-perceptions*, its definition is that it should be free from 'mistake' and 'conceptual content' or 'determination'; this is exactly as declared by the Blessed Lord—who has said that 'one who has the visual cognition cognises the Blue all right, but not as *blue*'; the phrase 'cognises the Blue' implies that the cognition does not apprehend an object other than its own, which indicates the fact of its being *not mistaken* (or wrong); and the other phrase '*not as blue*' denies the presence in the Cognition of any connection with the definite name 'blue'; which indicates the fact of its being *non-conceptual* or *not-determinate* (free from all association with words). As regards *Inference*, the definition of that also has been set forth by pointing out the nature of the *Liṅga* (Inferential Indicative, 'Middle Term', Probans); which has been thus set forth—'The *Liṅga*, Probans, is that which is (*a*) never non-concomitant with the Probandum, and (*b*) which is definitely known,—only then does it become the means of inferential cognition; this Probans, O *Bhikṣus*, is sometimes Constructive, in all cases it is Destructive'. Here the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum is clearly asserted. This same condition has been stated in the dictum that 'The Probans is the basis of Inference, when it is characterised by invariable concomitance'; in this statement the Probandum has not been mentioned, because it is clearly indicated by the mention of the 'invariable concomitance of the Probans' (which can only be with the Probandum).—This Probans is divided into three kinds, distinguished according to such peculiarities as those of (1) *nature*, (2) *effect* and (3) *non-apprehension*; the Probans called 'nature' has been indicated by the term 'Constructive' in the phrase 'O *Bhikṣus*, that which is Constructive';—as for the Probans styled 'Effect' it has been illustrated in the following statement—' The presence of Fire is known through Smoke, the presence of Water is known through the line of White Cranes flying above; and the *Race* (*Gotra*) of the Wise *Bodhisattva* is known through certain signs'.—Lastly, the Probans styled as 'a particular form of non-apprehension' has also

been explained in course of the denial of mere Non-apprehension by itself being a Means of Cognition; this has been declared in the following words —'O *Bhikṣus*, a Living Being cannot validly cognise a Living Being, or find a means of knowing it; if a Living Being validly cognises a Living Being, he becomes destroyed; I alone would cognise a Living Being, or someone else if he were like me'. Herein we have the denial of the validity of mere Non-apprehension in general in regard to things beyond the ken (of ordinary men); the sentence 'I alone, etc.' clearly shows the validity of particular cases of Non-apprehension.—All this points to those sections of the Text that deal with *Sense-perception* (Chap. 17), *Inference* (Chap. 18) and *other Means of Cognition* (Chap. 20).

Question—"This *Intervolved Wheel of Causation*,—is it concomitant with any such generic character as 'being an entity', as declared by the *Syādvādins* (Jainas)? Or is it entirely unmixed (pure) in its essence?—'What if it is the one or the other?'—If it is concomitant with anything, then there would be a cross-division between the definition of the Wheel and that of Sense-perception and the rest;—there would also be the incongruity that the cause would cease to bring about the effect, as there would be no difference between the Cause and Effect; and in that case the Wheel would *not* be '*definitely cognised by means of the two Means of Cognition*' (as stated in *Text* 3). Nor again, is it right to posit any such entity as the *Intervolved Wheel of Causation*; because even if it is entirely unmixed in its essence,—inasmuch as there would be no particular diversity among the auxiliary causes, there would be no possibility of its *having any efficient activity* (which is the characteristic of every *entity*); exactly as there is none in things admittedly non-productive."

In answer to this objection, we have the second line of *Text* 3—'*Aṇīyasāpi, etc.*'—'*It is not mixed up with the nature of anything else even in the slightest degree*'. What is meant is as follows—It is the latter of the two alternatives that we accept; and yet there is no room for the objections that have been urged against it; this we shall explain later on. The compound '*mishrībhūtāparatmakaḥ*' (in the *Text*) is to be analysed as—'wherein the nature of anything else is not mixed up'; that is, wherein there is not the slightest trace of the character of *anything else*,—for instance, that of the Cause in the Effect and so forth.—'*In the slightest degree*',—even in the most subtle form,—and not only in the form of many such extensive entities as 'Being', 'Knowable' and so forth,—this is what is implied by the particle '*api*', 'even'. What is meant is that, if the form of a single entity were present in it, the entire world would enter into its essence. This the Author will explain later on. This is what has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord—'How can the Sprout be eternal?—Since the Sprout is one thing and the Seed an entirely different thing. Verily the Sprout is not exactly the same thing as the Seed. So also is the Sprout unlike the Seed. Hence one thing (Seed) does not pass on into the essence of another thing'.—This points to the Chapter dealing with the Examination of *Syādvāda* (Chap. 20).—(3)

Question—"The *Skandha* (Sensorial Phase) and the rest, are pure and unmixed in nature; even so, do they always remain unchanged in their

character ?—as has been declared by some persons who hold all things to be real entities, passing from one phase into another ? "

The answer that it is not so is provided by the word '*Asaṅkrāntim*', '*it admits of no translocation*' (*Text* 4). What is meant is that, if there were translocation (passing from one phase into another), then, inasmuch as everything (every cause) would always exist in its entirety, there would be no Effect or Product, and hence no possibility of any 'Intervolved Wheel of Causation'.—The word '*Asaṅkrānti*' (in the Text) signifies 'that wherein there is no translocation'—i.e. passing from phase to phase,—'of the *Skandha* and other factors'.—[*Page* 14].—This has been declared by the Blessed Lord in the following words—'When the Eye is produced, it does not come out from anything else ;—when it is destroyed, it does not return to anything else; what happens, O *Bhikṣus*, is that the Eye, not having been in existence, comes into existence,—and having been in existence, it ceases to exist'.—This points to the Chapter dealing with the Examination of the *Three Points of Time* (Chapter 21 of the *Text*).

Question—" Then does it exist only at the time that it is actually seen ? As declared by the *Chārvāka* (Materialist)—'Whence can there be any coming again for that which has been burnt and ceased to exist ?' "

The answer is supplied by the Text in the word '*anādyantam*', '*it is without beginning, without end*'; the compound being analysed as 'that whose beginning and end are not'. This also has been pointed out by the Blessed Lord—'O *Bhikṣus*, the cycle of Births has no end and no beginning, etc. etc.' ;—in this quotation the term '*avara*' stands for *end*, and '*agra*' for *beginning* ; hence the negation of these two is what is spoken of as '*anavarāgra*'. This has been so asserted with reference to people who have *not* taken to the Noble Path ; for those who *have* taken to the Noble Path, the Cycle of Birth has actually ceased. It is in view of this that it has been declared that—'For the childish person who knows not the true Dharma, the path of Birth and Rebirth is a long one'.—This points to the Section dealing with the Examination of the Philosophy of the *Lokāyatas* (Chapter 22 of the *Text*).

Question—"Is this *Intervolved Wheel of Causation* of the nature of an external object ? Or has it a purely *subjective* existence ? "

Answer—*It is like the reflected image and other things* (*Text*). This shows that it has a purely subjective existence. The sense therefore is that this has a purely subjective existence,—just like the Reflected Image, Whirling Fire-Circle, the Fanciful City in the Sky and such other fanciful things. This has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord—'The external thing, as fancied by childish people, does not exist, it is only the Mind which, tossed about by Impressions, bears the semblance of the object and thus becomes operative'.—This points to the Chapter on the *Examination of the External World* (Chap. 23, *Text*).

Having thus shown that the *Intervolved Wheel of Causation* is entirely free from the webs of the fanciful assumption of things that have no existence, the Author sums up the whole idea in the words '*Sarvaprapañcha, etc.*', '*It is absolutely free from the whole lot of fantasies*'; that is, it is free from the whole

lot of fantastic notions, like the idea of Primordial Matter being the cause of things and so forth.

Question—" Has this doctrine been realised by other teachers also, —like *Viṣṇu, Shiva, Hiraṇyagarbha* and the rest ? "

Answer—Not so ; *it has not been apprehended by others* ; as a matter of fact, all other philosophical systems lay stress upon wrong notions of the *Soul,* and it is the Blessed Lord alone on whom this enlightenment has dawned. This is what the Text means. This the Author will explain in the course of all the sections of his work.—(4)

Question—" Was this doctrine of the *Intervolved Wheel of Causation* apprehended by the Blessed Lord by Himself and then promulgated ? Or did he promulgate it on the basis of the Veda which is regarded by others as *revealed* (not the work of any Person) ?—As declared by the followers of Jaimini—'Thus as regards things that are beyond the reach of the Senses, there is no Person who has seen them directly; hence that man alone knows them rightly who knows them through the Eternal Word '."

The answer to this is—Not so; '*Svatantrashrutiniḥsaṅgaḥ*'—'*independently of any self-sufficient revelation*' (*Text* 5). The term '*Self-sufficient revelation*' stands for the Veda whose authority is said to be self-sufficient,—that is the *Eternal Word* ;—'*niḥsaṅga*' is one who is not dependent upon, not depending upon it, i.e. seeing things directly by himself ;—the Lord Himself promulgated the Doctrine of the *Intervolved Wheel of Causation.* As a matter of fact, there is no sentence or assertion that has not emanated from a Person ; as has been declared by the Blessed Lord—' These Great Sages, the *Ānanda-paurāṇas* (Denizens of the Blissful Regions ?) are the authors of the Vedas and the promulgators of the *Mantras*'. What the Author means is that he is going to explain this later on.—This points to the Section dealing with the Examination of the Self-sufficient Authority of the Revelations (contained under Chapter 19 of the *Text*).

Question—" For the Blessed Lord who had attained all his own ends, what was the need for promulgating this Doctrine of the *Intervolved Wheel of Causation* ? "

Answer—*With a view to bringing about the Welfare of the World* (*Text* 5). '*Welfare of the World*' is what is good for the world ; this 'Good' consists in the destruction of all Afflictions and Illusion, brought about by the due comprehension of the Right Doctrine of the *Intervolved Wheel of Causation* ;—the desire to bring this about is what is meant by the '*view to bring about*' ;—this is the cause that led to the promulgation of the said Doctrine.

Question—" How is it known that the Lord had the desire to bring about the welfare of the world ? "

Answer—'*Supreme mercy having entered into His very soul through long innumerable cycles*' (*Text* 5). The compound is to be analysed thus:—'He whose supreme mercy'—'*Mahādayā*'—entered into His very essence, —(*sātmībhūtā*)—through long (*analpaiḥ*) innumerable cycles (*kalpāsaṅkhyayaiḥ*). This 'supreme mercy' of the Blessed Lord is inferred from the

fact that He did not renounce the work of doing good to other people, even though He had attained all His own ends.—(5)

[*Page* 15.] *Question*—"What did this Person do—*who had this supreme mercy entered into His very soul ?*"

Answer—'*Who propounded, etc.*'.—The term 'who', though a common pronoun, stands here for the Blessed Lord *Buddha* ; as no one else possesses the qualities described.—*The Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation* ;—this term '*pratītyasamutpāda*' stands for the doctrine that the '*utpāda*', 'causation' or 'origination' of the *Skandhas* (Sensory Aggregates or Phases) and other things takes place—'*pratītya*', i.e. on the basis of, *Causal Ideations* ; that is to say, who declared the Sensory Aggregates and other things to have been produced on the strength of Causal Ideations. Though the term '*Samutpāda*' (Origination or Causation) seems to have a negative (or exclusive) connotation, yet what is really meant to be expressed by the term is the positive entity produced (by the Ideation), but viewed as excluding other aspects of it.—Or, the term '*Samutpāda*' may be construed as '*Samutpadyatē*', *that which is produced,* the Product,—the term being formed with the '*Ghañ*' affix in the active sense, according to Pāṇini's *Sūtra* '*Kṛtyalyuṭo bahulam* (3.3.113)';—and this term '*Samutpāda*' thus explained is compounded with the term '*pratītya*', according to Pāṇini's *Sūtra* '*Sup-supā* (2.1.4)', or according to the rule governing such compounds as '*Mayuravyaṁsaka* (2.1.72)'.—Or the term '*Samutpāda*' may be taken by itself, not compounded with any other term.—What is expressed by all this is the fact that the Blessed Lord has the fully equipped power of bringing about the welfare of others. So that what the phrase 'who propounded the said Doctrine of the Wheel of Causation' means is that the Lord has acted towards the bringing about of the welfare of others. And what constitutes his action towards bringing about the welfare of others is this same teaching to others regarding the right path towards Heaven and Final Emancipation.—This has been thus declared—'The act has to be done by yourselves, the Blessed Ones are only expounders'.

The equipment of this capacity to bring about the welfare of others consists of the capacity for the direct vision of *Dharma* and Supreme Mercy. Even a merciful Person, if he is devoid of the knowledge of Truth, would be unable to teach the Truth ; and, on the other hand, even though one may possess the true knowledge of things, if he happen to be devoid of mercy, he would either give no teaching at all, or, even when teaching, might give such teaching as is harmful. Hence in the Blessed Lord, are present both these—Knowledge and Mercy—as equipment of His capacity to bring about the welfare of others. That He is possessed of the capacity for direct vision of *Dharma* has been indicated by the term (in the Text) '*independently of any self-sufficient revelation*' ; and the presence of Supreme Mercy has been indicated by the term '*Supreme mercy having entered into His very Soul*'.

Question—"As a matter of fact, this Right Doctrine of the *Intervolved Wheel of Causation* has been taught also by other Persons—such as *Bodhisattvas* and Saints ; what peculiar excellence then does this constitute in the Blessed Lord Himself ?"

Answer—He is *the Greatest of Expounders*. Though it is true that the said Saints and others also have expounded the Doctrine of *Intervolved Wheel of Causation*, yet the Supreme Lord is the 'Greatest' among them. The other persons could have no capacity to expound the said doctrine, except by reason of the fact that the essence of *Dharma* had been taught by the Supreme Lord.—Or the Supreme Lord—and none others—can be the 'Greatest', because He represents the highest stage in the ascending scale of the presence of Excellences and the absence of Defects; the others not being so.—By thus pointing out the fact of the Blessed Lord being superior to the Saints and others, it is made clear that the Lord was equipped with a specially efficient intellect,—this efficiency consisting in the destruction of all Dispositions, Afflictions and Ignorance regarding all cognisable things. If it were not for this, in what way would He be superior to other Saints? It is with a view to this that the Author has added the epithet '*That Omniscient Person*' (*Text* 6). This points to the Chapter dealing with the proof for the existence of the Omniscient Being (under Chapter 2 on 'God' and Chap. 24).

Question—"What is it that is going to be done after bowing to the Omniscient Person?"

Answer—*The 'Compendium of True Doctrines' is going to be composed.* The 'True Doctrine' meant are all those that have been mentioned as the accompaniments of the Doctrine of the *Intervolved Wheel of Causation*; as these alone are *not wrong*;—the bringing together of these doctrines, which lie scattered, within a small compass is what is spoken of as '*Saṅgraha*', '*Compendium*'; and as this brief *résumé* is dealt with in a book, the book itself is spoken of as the *Compendium*; just as the poem dealing with the *Abduction of Sita* is called the *Sītā-haraṇa* (Sita's Abduction).—Or, the term '*Tattvasaṅgraha*' may be explained as the *book* itself, in the sense that 'it deals, rightly and completely, with the True Doctrines'.—*Is being composed*;—the Present Tense has been used in reference to the time taken by the act of *composing*, from beginning to its completion.—(6)

End of Introductory Section.

CHAPTER I.

Dealing with the Examination of the Doctrine of Primordial Matter.

(A)

The Statement of the Sāṅkhya Doctrine of 'Prakṛti' (Primordial Matter).

TEXT (7).

"IT IS OUT OF *Prakṛti* (PRIMORDIAL MATTER) ITSELF ALONE, AS EQUIPPED WITH ALL POTENCIES, THAT THE VARIOUS PRODUCTS EVOLVE, REALLY HAVING THEIR ESSENCE IN THAT SAME MATTER."—(7)

COMMENTARY.

In order to show that there is no functioning of Primordial Matter, the Author proceeds to set forth the *Sāṅkhya* theory regarding it, in *Text* (7).—That which is *equipped*—endowed with *all* such *potencies*—productive of the host of products such as the *Mahat* (Cosmic Intelligence) and the rest,—such is *Pradhāna, Primordial Matter,* which consists of the Attributes of 'Harmony', 'Energy' and 'Inertia', in the state of equilibrium; and it is from out of this that the Cosmic Intelligence and other Evolutes *evolve*;—such is the view of the Followers of *Kapila.*—The emphasising of 'Primordial Matter *alone*' is for the purpose of excluding such agencies as those of Time, A Personality and the like;—the addition of the term '*Kēvalāt*', 'itself', is meant to exclude the 'God' postulated by the *Theistic Sāṅkhya* (*Yoga*).—*Evolve,*—are produced, directly or indirectly. The process of this Evolution is as follows:—Out of *Pradhāna* (Primordial Matter) first of all evolves *Buddhi* (Cosmic Intelligence);—out of *Cosmic Intelligence,* evolves *Ahaṅkāra* (the I-principle);—out of the *I-principle* evolve the five *Tanmātras* (Rudimentary Substances), consisting of Sound, Touch, Taste, Colour, and Odour—and also the eleven *Sense-organs*;—the five *Organs of Sensation,* in the shape of the Organ of Hearing, of Touch, of Vision, of Taste and of Smell,—the five *Organs of Action,* in the shape of Organs of Speech, Hands, Feet, Excretory Organ and the Generative Organ;—and *Mind* is the eleventh.—Out of the five *Rudimentary Substances* evolve the five *Gross Substances,*—*Ākāsha* out of *Sound-rudiment, Air* out of *Touch-rudiment, Fire* out of *Colour-rudiment, Water* out of *Taste-rudiment* and *Earth* out of *Odour-rudiment.*

This is as declared by *Īshvarakṛṣṇa* (in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā,* 22)—'From Primordial Matter issues the Great Principle (Cosmic Intelligence); thence the I-principle; thence the Group of Sixteen; from among this Group of

Sixteen, out of five, issue the five Gross Substances'. Here the term '*Mahān*', 'Great Principle', stands for *Buddhi*, the Cosmic Intelligence; this Cosmic Intelligence functions in the form of such conception or determination of things as 'this is a jar', 'this a piece of cloth'.—The I-principle functions in the form of such notions as 'I am handsome', 'I am presentable'.—The Mind functions in the form of *Reflection*; for instance, a boy happens to hear that food is to be had in another village, and this gives rise to his reflection in the form 'I shall go there, I wonder if there would be curds and molasses or curds only'; that which functions thus as Reflection is the Mind.—Such is to be understood the distinction among *Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle* and *Mind.* The rest (of *Īshvarakṛṣṇa's Kārikā*) is easily intelligible.

These entities, Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, along with *Primordial Matter* and the *Spirit* make up the twenty-five Principles (or Realities, Real Entities) of these philosophers. To this end, it has been declared that—'One who knows the twenty-five Principles,—be he addicted to any life-stage, being either a Hermit (wearing knotted locks), or a Wandering Mendicant (with shaven head), or a Householder (wearing the top-knot),—becomes liberated; there is no doubt on this point'.

All these various Products evolving out of Primordial Matter are not entirely distinct from their Cause,—as are the Products postulated by the *Bauddhas*;—they are, in fact, of the same essence; i.e. they have their *essence in that same*,—Primordial Matter; such is the analysis of the compound '*tadrūpāḥ*' (in the Text). The products are of the same essence as Primordial Matter, in the sense that they are all made up of the *Three Attributes.* For instance, in the ordinary world, it is found that the Product is of the same essence as the Cause; e.g. the cloth woven out of black yarns is black, and that woven out of white yarns is white. And Primordial Matter is made up of the Three Attributes;—and all that is *manifested,* in the form of Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle, Rudimentary Substances, Sense-organs and Gross Substance, is also found to be made up of the Three Attributes, hence it is that all this latter is of the same essence as Primordial Matter.—Similarly, Primordial Matter is *not-distinguishable*; that is to say, it cannot be distinguished that 'these are the Three Attributes, Harmony and the rest (constituting the *Unmanifest* Primordial Matter), and these are the Cosmic Intelligence and the rest constituting the *Manifest*'; in fact, the notion always is that 'the Attributes are the Manifest, and the Manifest is the Attributes'.—Further, both these,—the Manifest and the Unmanifest—are *Objective,* because they have the character of objects of enjoyment (experience, for the Spirit).—Both again are *common,*—to all Spirits; just as the *Malla-dāsī* (the Slave-girl who is the common property of several men).—It is also *insentient,* as it cannot feel pleasure or pain or delusion.—It is *productive*; that is, Primordial Matter is productive of Cosmic Intelligence, Cosmic Intelligence produces the I-principle, the I-principle produces the Rudimentary Substances and the Eleven Sense-organs; and the Rudimentary Substances produce the Gross Substances.—Thus all these various Products evolve, all having the same essence as Primordial Matter,—inasmuch as they also are constituted by the Three Attributes (are non-distinguishable, objective, common, insentient and productive). This has

been thus declared (by Īshvarakṛṣṇa, in *Kārikā* 11)—'The Manifest is *with the Three Attributes, undistinguishable, objective, common, insentient* and *productive*; so also is Primordial Matter; the Spirit is the reverse and yet also similar'.

The following question has been raised—"If the Products are of the same essence as Primordial Matter, then how is it that in this Philosophy a distinction has been made between the *Manifest* (Product) and the *Unmanifest* (Cause)? For instance, it has been declared by *Īshvarakṛṣṇa* (in his *Kārikā* 10)—'The *Manifest* is *with cause, not eternal, not-pervasive, mobile, multiform, dependent, soluble, composite, subordinate*; the *Unmanifest* is the reverse of this'. The meaning of this is as follows:—It is the *Manifest* alone that *has a cause*; e.g. Cosmic Intelligence is 'with cause'—i.e. has its cause in Primordial Matter; the I-principle has its cause in Cosmic Intelligence; the Five Rudimentary Substances and the Eleven Sense-organs have their cause in the I-principle; and the Gross Substances have their cause in the Rudimentary Substances. The *Unmanifest*, however, is not so (having no cause), because it is never produced, having no beginning.—Primordial Matter and Spirit subsist everywhere, in heaven, in sky and on Earth, pervading all things;—not so the *Manifest*, which, in fact, is *non-pervasive* in character.—Then again, in the course of Birth and Rebirth, the *Manifest*, equipped, in the form of the Subtle Body, with the thirteen-fold body consisting of Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle, the Sense-organs, actively moves along (from birth to birth); not so the *Unmanifest*; because, being all-pervading, it cannot be *mobile*.—Further, the *Manifest* is actually found to be *multiform*, through such diversity as is involved in the notions of the Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle and the rest;—not so the *Unmanifest*, which in one and the same form, is the cause productive of all the three Regions.—Then the *Manifest* is 'dependent',—that which is produced out of another thing is *dependent* upon this latter;—not so the *Unmanifest*; as it is not a product.—The *Manifest* again is 'soluble', in the sense that it goes into dissolution; for instance, at the time of the Universal Dissolution, the Gross Substances become dissolved into Rudimentary Substances, the Rudimentary Substances and Sense-organs into the I-principle, the I-principle into Cosmic Intelligence, and the Cosmic Intelligence into Primordial Matter; the *Unmanifest* however never goes into Dissolution; as it has no cause into which it could become merged.—Further, the *Manifest* is 'composite', being made up of such components as Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste and Odour; not so the *Unmanifest*, as Sound and the rest are not found to be present in the constitution of Primordial Matter.—Lastly, just as, while the father is alive, the son is not his own master, so also the Manifest is always 'subordinate', resting always on its Cause; not so the *Unmanifest*, because it is eternal and hence not subservient to any Cause".

The answer to this is supplied in the *Text*, by the word '*Bhāvataḥ*';—'*bhāvataḥ*' means that 'in reality' there is sameness of essence, and yet there is nothing incongruous in the idea that there is distinction into 'Cause and Effect', based upon the diversity of modifications.—Or, the term '*bhāvataḥ*' may mean 'by their nature',—the sense being that by their very nature,

consisting of the Three Attributes, the things operate only in that form, which is the same as that of Primordial Matter. What is meant is that, the diversity found in the World in the shape of the 'Great Principle' (Cosmic Intelligence) and other products is due to the predominance or otherwise of one or the other of the Three Attributes of Harmony, Energy and Inertia. Thus it becomes finally established that the Product always exists in the form of the Cause.—(7)

Question—"How is it known that the Effect (Product) exists even before it is produced ?"

Answer—

TEXT (8).

"IF THE EFFECT WERE NON-EXISTENT, POTENTIALLY, IN THE FORM OF THE CAUSE,—THEN IT COULD NOT BE PRODUCED; BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE NO FORM AT ALL, BEING LIKE THE *Sky-Lotus*."—(8)

COMMENTARY.

For proving the existence of the Effect (even prior to its production), the other Philosophers (*Sāṅkhyas*) have put forward the following five reasons (as stated in *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 9)—"(1) Because what is non-existent cannot be produced,—(2) because there is always recourse to the Cause,—(3) because all things are not possible,—(4) because the efficient can produce only that for which it is efficient,—and (5) because the Effect is of the essence of the Cause,—therefore the Effect must be existent (even before it is produced)."

(1) In support of the *first* reason, the following explanation has been provided (by the Text) in the words—"*If the Effect were non-existent, etc.*—That is to say, if the Effect did not already exist in the form of the Cause, even prior to its production, then it could not be produced; as it would be like the *Sky-lotus* (a non-entity). This reasoning is formulated as follows :—What is non-existent cannot be produced,—as for instance, the *Sky-lotus*,—prior to its production, the Effect is non-existent, according to the other party,—hence the acceptance of the other party's view would lead to a contingency contrary to the universal proposition (set forth above as the Major Premiss);—as a matter of fact, no such contingency does arise;—hence it becomes established that whatever effect is produced in the shape of such Effects as *Oil* and the like, by such causes as *Sesamum* and the like, did exist even before the said production."

Potentially—i.e. in the form of the latent potency; as regards actual appearance (manifestation), even the followers of Kapila do not regard the Effect to have existed prior (to the actual production).

Because it would have no form at all,—which means that, if the Effect had no existence, then it could not have any form at all.—(8)

In support of the second reason set forth [as above, in *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 9, "Because there is always recourse to the Cause"], the following argument has been put forward (by the *Sāṅkhya*) :—

TEXT (9).

"How is it that people have recourse to only specific causes, in the shape of such diverse things as the Paddy-seed and the like, and not any other,—even though the non-existence (of the desired Effect or Product) is equal (everywhere) ? "

COMMENTARY.

"If the Effect were non-existent, then people would not have had recourse to only specific causes (productive of particular Products). For instance, when a man wants paddy-grains, he takes up *paddy*-seeds, not *Kodrava*-seeds; when a man, thinking of feeding Brāhmaṇas the next day, wishes to have curds ready for the purpose, he secures a supply of *milk*, not *water*. As regards the 'non-existence' of the Paddy-grain or the Curd, this 'non-existence' (according to the Opponent) is there as much in the Paddy-seed as in the *Kodrava*-seed (and as much in milk as in water); then how is it that though the 'non-existence' of the Paddy-grain and other products is *equal everywhere* (in the Paddy-seed as well as in other seeds), yet it is only the specific seeds that are secured; the persons wanting the paddy-grain could secure the *Kodrava* and other seeds also,—inasmuch as the Paddy-grain would be as 'non-existent' in these latter as in the Paddy-seeds.—If it be urged that those other seeds are not secured by people because the desired grain is not there in them,—then, in that case, the person wanting paddy-grain also should not secure the Paddy-seed, as the desired grain *is not* there also (according to the Opponent),—exactly as in the *Kodrava*-seed. But this is what never happens. Hence it follows that the particular Effect (Paddy-grain) is actually present in the particular Cause (Paddy-seed)."—(9)

In support of the third reason (set forth in *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 9, '*because all things are not possible*'), the following explanation is provided :—

TEXT (10).

"Everything likely to be produced would be produced from everything; because the negation of co-essentiality is equally present in everything."—(10)

COMMENTARY.

"If it is your view that the Effect that is produced has been non-existent (before production), then, under that view, every product, in the shape

of gold, silver and the rest, would be produced from all things, such as grass, dust, clods and the rest ;—why ?—*because the negation of co-essentiality is equally present in everything*; that is, the negation or absence of the character of being co-essential with,—of the same essence as—the Grass and the rest is equally present in everything that is likely to be produced.—In the preceding text, the incongruity was indicated through the Cause, and in the present text, it is indicated through the Effect ; such is the difference between the two.—And yet, as a matter of fact, everything is not produced from everything. Hence it follows that the natural law is that one effect is produced from one cause because it is only in that cause that that effect already exists (in a latent form)."—(10)

The following might be urged (against the *Sāṅkhya* view) :—'The potency of Causes is such as is restricted to specific Effects ; hence, even though the Effect has been non-existent, yet it is only some one effect, an actual Product, that is produced,—and not an absolute non-entity, like the *Sky-lotus* ; this is the reason why only a specific cause is secured (for the production of a particular effect), that one which is efficient for the purpose, not anything at random ; so that particular effects are produced from particular causes, and not every effect from every cause ".

Having this objection in view, the *Sāṅkhya*, under the pretext of answering it, puts forward the following arguments in support of the fourth reason set forth [in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 9 : '*Because the efficient can do that only for which it is efficient*'].

TEXT (11).

" BECAUSE THE POTENCIES OF THESE THINGS ARE RESTRICTED IN THEIR SCOPE, THEREFORE IT IS NOT AS HAS BEEN URGED ; HENCE IT DOES NOT ANSWER OUR ARGUMENT. BECAUSE POTENT CAUSES PRODUCE ONLY SUCH EFFECT AS IS AMENABLE TO THEIR POTENCY."—(11)

COMMENTARY.

Of these things,—i.e. of things that are held to be causes.—*It is not as has been urged* ;—i.e. the objection urged does not affect the *Sāṅkhya* position ; hence it is not a suitable answer to our argument made by the *Bauddha* and others.—Why ?—Because even potent Causes, when producing their effects, produce only such effects as are amenable to their action, and not what is not so amenable.—(11)

[Says the Opponent to the *Sāṅkhya*]—" Who has said that causes produce effects which they are not efficient to produce,—that you are denying it here ? All that is said is that they also produce such effects as have been non-

existent; and that such previously non-existent effect is quite amenable to the potency of the cause".

To this the *Sāṅkhya* makes the following reply:—

TEXT (12).

"THAT TO WHICH NO PECULIARITY CAN BE ATTRIBUTED, WHICH IS FORMLESS AND UNMODIFIABLE,—HOW COULD SUCH A THING BE PRODUCED BY CAUSES,—WHEN ANY MODIFICATION WOULD INVOLVE THE LOSS OF ITS VERY ESSENCE?"—(12)

COMMENTARY.

The *Sāṅkhya* reasons as follows:—"The acceptance of the view that the Effect produced has been non-existent implies that causes produce an effect which is incapable of being produced by them. For instance, that which is non-existent is *formless*—i.e. characterless;—that which is formless is, like the *Hare's Horn,* something *to which no peculiarity can be attributed,*—i.e. which cannot be regarded as having any characteristics;—and that *to which no peculiarity can be attributed* must be *unmodifiable,* immutable,—like *Ākāsha*;—how can such a thing, which has not acquired a specific form, be produced by any cause?—It might be argued that 'from the fact of its being perceived in its existing state (after being produced) it follows that it does become *modified*'.—The answer to that is that *any modification would involve the loss of its very essence.* If *modification* is admitted, then *its very essence,*—essential character, which is described as consisting of *formlessness,*—would become *lost.* As a matter of fact, unless the *non-existent* thing has relinquished its essential character (of formlessness), it cannot become *existent*; and if it does relinquish the essential character, then it would not be true that the *non-existent* (formless) thing has become *existent* (with form); the form of the *Existent* is entirely different from the form of the *non-existent,*—the two being mutual contradictories. Hence what is *non-existent* cannot be produced. If it be admitted that a Cause can produce such a thing—then it would be admitted that Causes actually produce only such things as are incapable of *being produced*! Certainly what is incapable of being produced can never be produced; as we find in the case of the *Sky-lotus.* From all this it follows that the *Sāṅkhya* argument (the *fourth* in the *Kārikā*) is unanswerable."—(12)

In support of the *fifth* reason [stated in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā,* 9—*Because the effect is of the essence of the Cause*]—we have the following—

TEXT (13).

"THUS THE EFFECT BEING IMPOSSIBLE, WHAT WOULD THAT BE BY PRODUCING WHICH ANYTHING WOULD BE A CAUSE? AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT CANNOT BE POSSIBLE TO ADMIT THE CAUSAL CHARACTER OF EVEN SUCH THINGS AS THE SEED AND THE LIKE."—(13)

COMMENTARY.

Thus,—i.e. in accordance with the reason explained in the preceding text; or on account of the four Reasons stated above (by the *Sāṅkhya*),—*the Effect being* absolutely *impossible*, under the theory that 'the Effect is non-existent (prior to its production)',—*what would that be by producing which*, the Seed and other things *would be a Cause*? Hence it would be possible to assert that the Seed and other such things cannot be 'Causes', because their effect is non-existent, like the *Sky-lotus*. And yet such an assertion is impossible. Hence it becomes established that the contrary view is the right one, that the Effect exists even prior to its actual production.—(13)

The following argument might be urged (against the *Sāṅkhya*)—"It may be taken as established that the Effect is *existent*; but how is it proved that all the diverse Products emanate from Primordial Matter itself?"

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (14).

"ALL THAT IS *Manifest* IS CLEARLY KNOWN TO BE HOMOGENEOUS WITH PLEASURE AND THE REST, FROM THE FACT OF THE EFFECT BEING FOUND TO BE THE PRODUCT OF SATISFACTION, IRRITATION AND DEJECTION, ETC."—(14)

COMMENTARY.

As proofs of the existence of Primordial Matter, the following five affirmative arguments have been set forth by the other philosophers (*Sāṅkhyas*), detailed as below (in *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 15-16)—'(1) Because the various Products are finite,—(2) because they are homogeneous,—(3) because activity is due to efficiency (potency),—(4) because there is distinction between Cause and Effect,—and (5) because there is merging of the entire world (of effects),—therefore the *Unmanifest* (Primordial Matter) exists'.—The meaning of this is as follows:—

(1) Primordial Matter exists,—*because the various Products are finite*. In this world it has been seen that a thing that has a producer is always finite; for instance, the Potter takes up earth-clods which are finite and produces the Jar, which again is finite containing a *seer* or two seers and a half (of water); the 'Manifest' consisting of Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, is found to be finite,—Cosmic Intelligence being only *one*, the I-principle being

only *one*, the Rudimentary Substances being only *five*, the Sense-organs being only *eleven*, the Gross Substances being only *five*. Hence, through Inference, we prove it that Primordial Matter does exist, and it produces the *Manifest*, which is finite. If Primordial Matter were not there, then all this *Manifest* would not be finite (would be without any definite size).

(2) For the following reason also, Primordial Matter must be there—*Because the various Products are found to be homogeneous.* As a matter of fact, whenever something is found to belong to a certain genus, it is bound to have emanated from a Cause consisting of that Genus; for instance, when things like the Jar and the Saucer are found to belong to the Genus 'Clay', they are the products of the Cause consisting of *Clay.* The *Manifest* in question is found to be homogeneous with—permeated by—such Genuses (Generic entities) as 'Pleasure', 'Pain' and 'Delusion';—how ?—because of its being found to be *the product of Composure, Distress and Dejection.* Thus Composure, Buoyancy, Attachment, Delight and Affection are the products of the *Sattva-Attribute* (Harmony); as a matter of fact, Composure (Happiness) is actually spoken of as *Sattva* (Harmony); similarly Irritation, Emaciation, Piercing Pain, Numbness, Anxiety, Calamity, and Impetuosity are products of the *Rajas-Attribute* (Energy); and Pain is spoken of as 'Energy'; —Depression, Concealment, Despondency, Disgust and Lethargy are the products of the *Tamas-Attribute* (Inertia); and Inertia is spoken as 'Delusion'. All this—*Composure, Irritation* and *Dejection*—is found to be the Product of Cosmic Intelligence and the rest (constituting the 'Manifest'); and from this it is inferred that these are only particular phases of 'Pleasure', 'Pain' and 'Delusion' (as representing the three Attributes of *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas*, respectively). And from the fact of their being products of 'Pleasure', etc. it follows that they are 'homogeneous' with 'Pleasure', etc.; and from this 'homogeneity', it also follows that they have emanated from a Source (Cause) which is constituted of these (Pleasure, etc.); this having been established, it also follows by implication that this Source or Cause must be *Primordial Matter.* Thus it is established that Primordial Matter exists—by the fact that *the diverse products are found to be homogeneous.*

(3) For the following reason also, Primordial Matter must exist:—*Because activity is due to efficiency*;—in the ordinary world, when a man takes up an activity, it is only when he has the efficiency (or capacity) for it; for instance, the Weaver taking up the work of cloth-weaving. By this we infer that Primordial Matter has the efficiency (or Capacity) by virtue of which it produces the 'Manifest';—this efficiency (or Capacity) cannot be there without a substratum; hence we conclude that there is Primordial Matter wherein the said efficiency subsists.

(4) For the following reason also Primordial Matter must exist:—*Because there is distinction between Cause and Effect.* In this world, it is found that there is distinction between *Cause* and *Effect*; e.g. the Clay is the *Cause*, the Jar is the *Effect*; and this Effect has a character entirely different from that of the Cause; e.g. the *Jar* has the capacity to contain Honey, Water and Milk, while *Clay* has no such capacity. Similarly seeing the *Effect*, in the shape of the 'Manifest' in question, we infer that there is

Primordial Matter out of which is produced the Product in the shape of Cosmic Intelligence and the rest.

(5) For the following reason also, Primordial Matter must exist:—*Because there is merging of the entire world*; the term '*Vaishvarupya*', 'Entire World', stands for the three Regions (Heaven, Earth and Nether World); all these, at the time of Dissolution, *merge* into something; for instance, the five Gross Substances merge into the Rudimentary Substances,—the five Rudimentary Substances and the Sense-organs merge into the I-principle,—the I-principle merges into Cosmic Intelligence; thus the whole of the Three Worlds become merged; 'merging' means *non-differentiation*, as for instance, in the state of Milk, the differentiation is not possible, that Milk is different from Curd; similarly at the time of Universal Dissolution, no such discrimination is possible as that 'this is *Manifest* (Product) and that is Unmanifest (Cause)'. From this we conclude that there is such an entity as Primordial Matter wherein Cosmic Intelligence and the rest (making up the *Manifest*) become merged, incapable of being distinguished.

Our Teacher (*Shāntarakṣita*), however, has mentioned (in the Text) only one reason—that of *Homogeneity*, which is meant to imply the others also.

In the Text, in the phrase '*Pleasure and the rest*', the term 'the rest' includes *Pain* and *Delusion*;—the term '*Manifest*' stands for all the entities, from Cosmic Intelligence down to the Gross Substances.—The phrase '*is clearly known*' means *is distinctly perceived*;—how ?—'*from the fact of the Effect, etc. etc.*'; the term '*et cetera*' is connected with each member of the compound (Composure, etc., Irritation, etc. and Dejection, etc.). This is as we have already explained above.—(14)

Having established the validity of the reason '*On account of homogeneity*', the Text sets forth (on behalf of the *Sāṅkhya*) the full argument in support of their doctrine.—

TEXT (15).

"THUS, THE WHOLE (MANIFEST) MUST BE TAKEN AS HAVING EMANATED FROM SOMETHING MADE UP OF THE SAID (PLEASURE, ETC.),—BECAUSE THE SAID GENERIC CHARACTER IS FOUND PRESENT IN IT,—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS; AND THIS SOMETHING IS *Primordial Matter*",—SO SAY THE FOLLOWERS OF *Kapila*.—(15)

COMMENTARY.

'*The whole must, etc.*';—i.e. emanated from a Cause which is made up of Pleasure and the rest;—this sentence states the Conclusion to be proved.—The Probans (Reason) in support of the conclusion is stated in the words—'*Because the said generic character is found present in it*;—that is, it is all

permeated by the generic character of *being made up of the Three Attributes;* —*just as in the case of the Jar and other things*;—i.e. such diverse products as the Jar and the rest.—And this Cause *made up of the Three Attributes* is Primordial Matter;—*so say the followers of Kapila*,—i.e. the *Sāṅkhyas* offer the said explanation.—(15)

(B)

Refutation of the Sāṅkhya Doctrine.

COMMENTARY.

With the words '*Tadatra*', the Author begins the Refutation (of the *Sāṅkhya* Philosophy).—

TEXT (16).

IN ANSWER TO THIS, THE WISE ONES DECLARE THAT THE ARGUMENT THAT HAS BEEN URGED (BY THE *Sāṅkhya* AGAINST THE DOCTRINE THAT THE EFFECT IS NON-EXISTENT PRIOR TO ITS PRODUCTION) IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE *Existence* OF THE EFFECT. AND THE ANSWER THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO THAT ARGUMENT WOULD EQUALLY APTLY BE THE ANSWER OF THE WISE ONES ALSO.—(16)

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted (by the *Sāṅkhya*) that "The various products emanating from Primordial Matter and other Causes, are of the same essence as those Causes".—In regard to this, we proceed to consider the following points :—If these diverse Effects are of the same essence as Primordial Matter, then how is it that they emanate from it as its effects ? When one thing is non-different from (of the same essence as) another, it cannot be its cause or effect ; because the Cause and its Effect must be totally different in character from one another. If it were not so, how could there be any clear conception as to one thing being the 'Cause' and another the 'Effect'? In that case, how could there be any such deduction as that made by you—(*a*) that Primordial Matter must always be the *Cause*, (*b*) that the group of sixteen, consisting of the five Gross Substances and eleven Sense-organs must always be the *Effect*, and (*c*) that among Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle and Rudimentary Substances, one is the *Effect* of what precedes, and the *Cause* of what follows it ? This deduction has been thus formulated (in the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, 3)—"Primordial Matter is never a Product—the group of seven consisting of the Cosmic Intelligence and the rest are both Product and Productive—the group of sixteen is always Product ;—the Spirit is neither Product nor Productive".—In fact (under the *Sāṅkhya* Doctrine) everything would be equally liable to be the Cause or Effect of everything else. Or, the character of Cause and Effect being always relative,—and (under the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of all things being of the same essence) there being no entirely different thing to be conceived of as in relation to another,—all things would, like the Spirit, be 'neither Product nor Productive'; otherwise the Spirit also might be spoken of as 'Product' and

'Productive'. It has been said that—'When Rudrila asserted that what is *Curd* is *Milk* and what is *Milk* is *Curd*, he gave evidence of his being *Vindhyavāsin*, an inhabitant of the wilds of the Vindhya Hills'.*

[Under *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 10] it has been declared that the *Manifest* has the character of being 'caused' and the rest, and the *Unmanifest* is the reverse of all this;—this also is mere childish prattle. As a matter of fact, when one thing is not different in nature from another thing, it cannot be contrary to this latter; because 'contrariness' consists in difference of nature; otherwise, there would be an end to all notions of 'difference'; and as a consequence, there would be no grounds for accepting any difference among the Attributes of Harmony, Energy and Inertia (which are insentient) on the one hand and the sentient Spirits on the other; and the whole universe would be uniform; this would involve the contingency of the whole being produced and also destroyed at one and the same time. That all these contingencies would follow would be due to the fact that the notion of all kinds of 'Non-difference' must share the same fate (of being accepted or rejected). From this it follows that the 'Unmanifest' also, like the 'Manifest', should possess the qualities of being 'with cause' and the rest (which have been attributed to the 'Manifest' only), for the simple reason that the form (essence) of the Unmanifest is not different from that of the 'Manifest';—or (conversely) the 'Manifest' should, like the 'Unmanifest', possess the qualities of being 'without cause' and the rest, on the ground of its form being not different from the Unmanifest; both these universal affirmative propositions would have to be accepted; otherwise undesirable contingencies would arise.—Then again, in ordinary worldly experience, the relation of Cause and Effect is always apprehended on the basis of well-ascertained positive and negative concomitance; while as regards the subject under discussion, Cosmic Intelligence and other things are not ordinarily known to be produced from such causes as Primordial Matter and the rest. Nor again is any eternal thing found to have the nature of a Cause, on the basis of which the fact of the diverse Products being produced out of Primordial Matter (which is eternal) could be admitted. And the reason for this lies in the fact that, if an eternal thing is capable of any effective action, any idea of its operations being gradual or non-gradual (simultaneous), would involve self-contradictions.

The following argument might be urged—"The relation of Cause and Effect that we postulate is not based upon the idea that the Cause produces something that did not exist before at all; and it is only such causal relation that would be incompatible with the *non-difference in essence* (*form*);—what we do assert is that Primordial Matter undergoes *modification* into the form of Cosmic Intelligence and other Products,—just as the *Coiled Serpent* uncoils itself and becomes modified into the *Elongated Serpent*,—and it is in this sense that it is called the 'Cause' of Cosmic Intelligence and other

* There appears to be a pun here upon the name '*Vindhyavāsin*'; Vindhya is the name given to the Vindhya Hills, so the direct meaning of the term '*Vindhyavasitā*' would be *the character of being a denizen of the wilds of the Vindhya Range*; the indirect inuendo is to the *Sāṅkhya* author who gave expression to the opinion referred to here; his name was *Vindhyavāsin*. See *Foreword*, page LXI.

Products; and these, Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, being of the nature of *modifications,* are called its 'Effect' (or Product);—and there is nothing self-contradictory (or incongruous) in such *modification, even though there* be *non-difference* (between the original and its modification)."

This cannot be right; as under such circumstances, there can be no 'modification'. Because if there were Modification, it could come about either on the abandoning of the original form, or on the non-abandonment of it. If it were to come without the abandoning of the original form, then there would be a commixture of the two forms (original and modified); and it would be possible to perceive *youth* at the time of *old age.* If, on the other hand, Modification were to come after the abandoning of the original form, then this would involve the loss of form (of the original); so that it would mean that the previous form has been destroyed and a new and different form has come about; so that it could not be proved that any one thing is the 'modification' of another.—Then again, you explain 'modification' to consist in a change in the original itself into something else;—now would this *change* be *in part* or *in whole*? It could not be *in part,* because there are no *parts* (in Primordial Matter); nor could it be *in whole,* because that would mean the production of an entirely new thing and the consequent destruction of the *original.* Hence it cannot be right that there is *change* of the same thing; as it involves the notion of the coming into existence of an entirely different character (and thing).

It might be argued that—"What is meant is that while the thing itself remains constant, one property of it disappears and another property appears, and this (variation of the Property) is what is called *Modification*; and it does not mean that the very essence of the thing itself becomes different".

This also cannot be right. Because when the Property appears and disappears, would that Property be something different, or non-different, from the thing itself (in which it appears and disappears)?—If it were something different, then the thing itself remaining exactly the same, how can it be said to be *modified*? When two such things as *Cloth* and *Horse,* which are entirely different from the Jar and other things, are produced or destroyed, it is not regarded as a *modification* of the Jar and other things. If it were so regarded, it would lead to an absurdity. It might be argued that—"if this line of argument were adopted, then the Spirit also would be 'modifiable'; inasmuch as the properties related to the Spirit actually appear and disappear, which would mean 'modification' of the Spirit itself, not of anything else".—Not so, we reply. As no relationship can subsist either in an entity or a non-entity, there can be nothing that could have any relationship at all. For instance, if a Relationship existed, it could subsist either in an entity or in a non-entity;—as a matter of fact however, it cannot subsist in an entity; because the full majesty of its entire nature being already known as independent, it would not be possible for it to be dependent upon anything else (in the shape of a Relationship). Nor could the Relationship subsist in a non-entity, because by its very nature, it is devoid of all characterisation and as such cannot be dependent upon anything; e.g. the 'Hare's Horn' and such non-entities cannot be rightly held to be dependent upon anything.—Further, you do not advocate that there is *modification* on

the appearance and disappearance of entirely different properties ;—what then ?—what you advocate is that, in the case of an entity, its own essential character remaining constant, there is variation in its conditions (states), and this is what is meant by 'Modification'. When, however, the Properties are distinct from the Entity having the properties, there is no possibility of any essential character remaining constant; as the entity itself is the one 'essence' of the Properties; and that, *ex hypothesi*, is entirely different from them; so that there is no possibility of any essential character remaining constant. Nor again does any person ever become cognisant of any such Property coming within his range of cognisance as is different from the appearing and disappearing Properties; hence all wise men regard such a property as non-existent.—If, however, it be held that it is not a different entity at all, as both the properties, the *appearing* as well as the *disappearing*, would be non-different from the Entity to which they belong,—they should, like the Entity itself, be *one* only; and under the circumstances, on what basis would either the *Entity* or the *Property* be 'modified'? The two varying Properties being non-different from the Entity which remains constant,—there can be no *appearance* (production) or *disappearance* (destruction) of these,—just as there is none of the constant Entity. As regards the Entity also, inasmuch as it is non-different from the Properties, all that might be possible would be the production (appearance) of something new that did not exist before and the destruction (disappearance) of that which has been in existence; so that in no case would there be 'Modification' of any single thing. From all this it follows that, even on the basis of 'Modification', your theory of 'Cause and Effect' is not tenable.

All this defect in the *Sāṅkhya* theory is too manifest to need assertion; —with this idea, the Author has omitted to set it forth, and with the idea that 'we shall answer later on the objection that the *Sāṅkhya* has urged against the theory of the Effect being *non-existent* (before the causal operation)',—he proceeds, at this stage, to criticise the theory of the Effect being *existent*, by showing that it is open to the same objections (that have been urged against the theory of the Effect being *non-existent*). This is what is done in the text—'*In answer to this*, etc.'

The term '*sudhiyaḥ*', '*wise ones*', stands for the *Bauddhas*; they *declare* that the fivefold argument that the *Sāṅkhya* has set forth in the words 'Because what is *non-existent* cannot be produced, etc.' (*Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 9),—is equally applicable against the theory of the Effect being *existent*. For instance, it can be asserted (with equal reason) that 'Because what is existent cannot be produced,—because there is recourse to the Cause,—because all things are not possible,—because the efficient thing can produce only that for which it is efficient, and—because the Effect is of the same essence as the Cause,—therefore *the Effect is not-existent*';—[the reading '*Asadakaraṇāt*' of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* being altered into '*Na sadakaraṇāt*'] the negative 'not' (in the beginning) being construed with the phrase '*the Effect is existent*' (at the end of the sentence). "Why should the Effect be regarded as *not-existent*?"—Because of all the very same reasons that have been set forth in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*—*Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. etc.*—And when an objection is equally applicable to

both parties (to a discussion), then it should not be urged by one against the other ; such is the sense of the Text.

Objection—" In what way is there this *equality* (between the two theories), —when the objection as urged by one party is that ' the *Non-existent* cannot be produced ', while as urged by the other, it is that ' the *Existent* cannot be produced ? "

There is no force in this objection ; as it arises from non-comprehension of the sense of what is asserted. All that is meant by the assertion of ' equality ' in the Text is *only* with reference to the five statements (in the *Kārikā*) regarding ' non-production ', ' presence of connection between Effects and Specific Causes ' and so forth [and not with reference to the conclusion deduced from these statements by the two parties, which are certainly contradictory] ; because the reasons of the ' non-producibility ' and the rest are equally applicable as against the theory of the Effect being *existent.* The answer that you, upholders of the doctrine of the Effect being existent, would make against these arguments (as against your doctrine) would also be the answer of the wise Bauddhas who uphold the Doctrine of the Effect being *non-existent.*—(16)

Question—" In what way are the two ' equal ' ? "
The answer is provided in the following—

TEXT (17).

IF THE CURD AND OTHER EFFECTS ARE ALREADY WHOLLY EXISTENT IN THE ESSENCE OF (THEIR CAUSES) MILK AND THE REST,—THEN, INASMUCH AS THEY WOULD BE EXACTLY LIKE THE CAUSE, ETC. IN THEIR ESSENCE, WHAT OF THEIRS WOULD BE THERE THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE PRODUCED ?—(17)

COMMENTARY.

The argument here set forth is for the purpose of supporting the view that ' what is already *existent* cannot be produced ' (an argument aimed against the *Sāṅkhya*). If the Effects (Products) in the shape of Curd and the rest exist *wholly*—in their entirety—i.e. in their mature and properly differentiated character, regarding their specific taste, potency and consequences,—*in the essence of their Causes, Milk and the rest,*—then, as they would be already existent, what of their form would be there that would *have to be produced,* —i.e. for the purpose whereof they would have to be produced by such causes as Milk and the rest ?—The compound '*hētvādisadṛshātmanām* ' is to be analysed as ' those whose essence is exactly like the Cause, etc.' ; the ' Cause ' here stands for the Primordial Matter ; the ' *etc.*' stands for the *Sentience* ; —and certainly the fully matured Effects being thus circumstanced, what is meant is the fully developed form of the Effects, which, thus, cannot be produced again.—This indicates the two Reasonings that go to demolish any such permanent relation as that between Cause and Effect.—(17)

The Author now formulates the argument in the clear and proper form—

TEXT (18).

(A) THE SAID EFFECT CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY THE CAUSE,—BECAUSE IT ALREADY EXISTS,—LIKE THE CAUSE AND THE SPIRIT.—(B) THUS ALSO WHAT IS POSTULATED CANNOT BE THE CAUSE,—BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING THAT CAN BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY IT,—JUST LIKE THE OTHER THING.—(18)

COMMENTARY.

'*Hētu*', 'Cause', stands for Primordial Matter, and also the common things, Milk and the like;—'*Tat kāryam*', 'the said effect', stands for the Cosmic Intelligence, etc. (products, according to the *Sāṅkhya*, of Primordial Matter), as also the common things, Curd and the like;—'*Sattātaḥ*', means '*because it already exists*';—'*hētu-vitti-vat*', 'like the Cause and the Spirit',—'Cause' stands for Primordial Matter and also for the common things, Milk and the like; '*vitti*', 'Spirit', stands for the Sentient Faculty; and what is like these two is '*like the Cause and the Spirit*'.—The argument may be thus formulated—That which is existent in its entirety cannot be produced by anything,—as, for instance, Primordial Matter and Spirit;—and the Effect in its mature state is already existent (*ex hypothesi*),—according to the opinion of our Opponent the Curd and the Products are already existent;—hence (if these were held as *to be produced*) it would involve the contingency of going against a universal law.—Nor can the reason (probans) here put forward be regarded as *not true*, inadmissible; because, if what cannot be produced in any form were regarded as *producible*, then all things would have to be regarded as *producible*, and this would lead to *a regressus ad infinitum*, which would nullify the Opponent's proposition; and it would also involve the further absurdity of the producibility of what has already been produced.

So far the Author has shown that what are regarded (by the *Sāṅkhya*) as 'Effects' cannot really be 'Effects' or 'Products'; now he proceeds to show that what are regarded as 'Causes' cannot really be 'Causes'—'*Thus also what is postulated, etc.*'—'*Postulated*',—i.e. the Entity posited. What is meant is as follows:—Primordial Matter, and also the Seed, Milk and other common things,—which have been postulated as the 'Cause' of such intended effects as Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, as also Curd and other common products,—cannot be the cause of these latter,—that is, it is not capable of being treated as the *producer*;—why?—*because there is nothing that can be brought about by such a cause*; as a matter of fact, there is nothing that can be brought about by the said entity; and as the said entity has this character, it cannot be regarded as the 'Cause'. That this is so follows from what has been said (in the first half of the Text), regarding the effects in question being not effects at all; it is for this reason that the Text has used the term '*ataḥ*', '*thus*'.

'*Parātmavat*', '*Just like the other things*', i.e. like the thing with a different character,—i.e. like the entity which has not been posited as a *Cause*; the

entity that has not been posited as the Cause is the *Spirit*,—as declared (in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 3)—'The Spirit is neither productive nor product'.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—That for which there is nothing to be brought about cannot be a *Cause*,—e.g. the Spirit;—the entity postulated (as Cause) is one for which there is nothing to be brought about;—hence the entity concerned is not found to fulfil the conditions which are invariably concomitant (with the nature of the Cause).

Both these arguments put forward in the Text are only meant to expose the anomalies (involved in the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine); hence there is no need for putting forward only such corroborative examples as are accepted by both parties.

There is a party among *Sāṅkhyas* who hold the view that—"The Spirit also is also a *doer* (a Cause) in regard to his own experiences,—on the analogy of the Reflection [which, though not of the Reflecting Substance, is yet attributed to it; similarly though Experience does not subsist in the Spirit, yet it is attributed to him]".

As against this party, the explanation of the Text would be as follows:—The term '*parātma*' stands for the '*Para-ātmā*', the *Liberated Spirit*; as such a Spirit would be liberated, he could not be the *doer* (Cause) in regard to Experience. Hence (even so) there is nothing wrong with the corroborative instance cited in the Text.—(18)

The Author, in the following text, indicates (on behalf of the *Sāṅkhya*) the fallacy of 'Inadmissibility' in the argument just put up by himself—

TEXT (19).

IT MIGHT BE URGED THAT "THERE IS SOME PECULIAR FEATURE, SOMETHING IN THE SHAPE OF *manifestation* AND THE LIKE,—BY PRODUCING WHICH, CAUSES MIGHT CEASE TO BE DEFAMED (AS FUTILE)".—(19)

COMMENTARY.

[The *Sāṅkhya* may argue as follows:—]—"If, in your first argument, you mean your premiss to be in the fully qualified form 'because it already exists in its entirety, *even along with such features as being manifest and the rest*',—then the premiss is 'Untrue', 'Inadmissible'; because we do not regard the Effect as *existing* along with all such features as *being manifested* and the like; we regard it as *existing* only in the form of a *potency* (in the Cause).—If, on the other hand, you mean your premiss to be in general form, without the said qualification,—then it is 'Inconclusive'; because such peculiar features as *manifestation* and the like *are* actually produced (even under our theory).—Nor does our theory involve the absurdity of all things being Effects (produced).—For the same reason, the second reason put forward by you is also 'not true', 'Inadmissible', as there *is* something to be brought about, produced.

This is what is meant by the phrase '*Something in the shape of Manifestation and the like*'; the expression 'and the like' is meant to include such

peculiar conditions as *Growth*, etc.—'*Which*' (in the Text) stands for the 'peculiar feature'.—'*To be defamed*',—blamed. What is meant is that our theory is not open to the fallacies that have been urged against our Reason as being 'Inadmissible', 'Untrue' and the like.—(19)

The Author answers the above arguments in the following—

TEXT (20).

IF THIS (PECULIAR FEATURE) EXISTED PREVIOUSLY, THEN THE OBJECTION IS NOT ANSWERED ; IF, HOWEVER, IT DID NOT EXIST PREVIOUSLY, THEN, BEING NON-EXISTENT, HOW COULD IT BE PRODUCED OUT OF THE CAUSES ?—(20)

COMMENTARY.

There can be only two alternatives: (1) This 'peculiar feature' that has been spoken of, existed already, in its pristine state of Primordial Matter, prior to the condition of 'manifestation' and the rest,—or (2) it did not so exist. If it did exist, then you have not succeeded in showing the invalidity (inadmissibility) of the two Reasons put forward by us, and thus answering them. If, on the other hand, it did not exist previously,—then, even so, how could that 'peculiar feature' secure its production from the said 'Causes'? As your argument is that what is *non-existent* cannot be produced,—such production cannot be right;—such is the sense of the Text.—(20)

The argument 'because what is already *existent* cannot be produced' as stated by the Author himself (against the *Sāṅkhya* theory on p. 24, l. 20, parodying *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 9) has been duly supported; now he proceeds to argue in support of the other four arguments,—'*because there is recourse to the Cause*' and the rest,—in the following—

TEXT (21).

FOR THE SAME REASON, IF THERE IS NOTHING TO BE PRODUCED, THERE WOULD BE NO 'RECOURSE TO THE CAUSE',—NOR WOULD THERE BE ANY PRODUCTION OUT OF EVEN A SPECIFIC CAUSE,—NOR WOULD THERE BE ANY 'EFFICIENCY', NOR ANY 'OPERATION' (OF THE CAUSE).—(21)

COMMENTARY.

As in accordance with the said reasoning, the Effect to be brought about would (according to the *Sāṅkhya*) be already in existence [read '*Sādhyasya bhāvāt*'], 'recourse to Cause' would not be possible; as intelligent persons have recourse to a cause only for the purpose of something that could be brought about by that Cause. Nor would it be necessary that particular

Effects, like Curd and the rest, must proceed only from particular causes; simply because there would be nothing *to be produced* out of any cause. This supports the (parodied) argument '*Because all things are not possible*'. What is meant is that when the *Sāṅkhya* asserts that 'an Effect cannot be produced from all causes', what he means is that 'a particular Effect can be produced only from a particular Cause'. This is not possible under the *Sāṅkhya* theory of the Effect being already existent; as, under this theory, there would be nothing *to be produced.*—Similarly as regards the argument that 'an efficient Cause can produce only that for which it is effiicent', neither 'efficiency' nor 'the production of that for which it is efficient' is possible under the *Sāṅkhya* theory; for the very same reason that there is nothing *to be produced* (under the theory). If anything were produced by another thing, then alone could one admit the 'efficiency' of the latter thing, which could then be accepted as the 'Cause' of that which would be produced;—not otherwise.—This is what is meant by the words—*Nor would there be 'efficiency', nor any 'operation of the Cause'*.—(21)

The following Text proceeds to show that it is not right that things should be regarded as 'Cause', for the simple reason that what is regarded as to be *produced* already exists (according to the *Sāṅkhya*)—

TEXT (22).

INASMUCH AS EVERY EFFECT IS ALREADY THERE IN ITS ENTIRETY, THERE CAN BE NOTHING 'TO BE PRODUCED' (AN *Effect*); CONSEQUENTLY, THE VERY NAME 'CAUSE' CANNOT BE LOGICAL.—(22)

COMMENTARY.

This is said in support of the argument (the last one in the parodied *Sāṅkhyakārikā*)—'*Because the Effect is of the same essence as the Cause*'.—But it is not (i.e. the name 'Cause' is not illogical). *Hence the Effect cannot be regarded as existent*;—this conclusion has to be construed with all the (five) arguments set forth above.—(22)

With the following *text* the Author proceeds to criticise the theory of the Effect being existent, from another point of view—

TEXT (23).

ALL MEANS (OF COGNITION), WHEN OPERATIVE, SERVE TO SET ASIDE WRONG COGNITION AND TO PRODUCE DEFINITELY CERTAIN COGNITION; THIS WOULD NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH REASON (UNDER THE *Sāṅkhya* THEORY).—(23)

COMMENTARY.

'*Operative*'—active.—'*Wrong Cognition*' includes also *Doubtful Cognition,* as it partakes of both the contraries (affirmation and denial), and hence

is as much an 'imposition' (as Wrong Cognition).—As a matter of fact, every Means (of Cognition), when operating on its objective, does two things: it sets aside Misconception and Doubt relating to the object of Cognition, and produces a definitely Certain Cognition relating to it. This fact cannot be compatible with reason, under the *Sāṅkhya* theory of the 'Existent Effect'.—(23)

In the following *text*, the Author proceeds to explain why the said fact is not compatible with reason, under the *Sāṅkhya* theory:—

TEXT (24).

THE DOUBT AND THE MISCONCEPTION CANNOT BE SET ASIDE, AS THEY WOULD BE ALWAYS THERE. NOR IS THE PRODUCING OF DEFINITELY CERTAIN COGNITION POSSIBLE, FOR THE VERY SAME REASON. HENCE ALL THAT HAS BEEN SAID IS FUTILE.—(24)

COMMENTARY.

[It is not compatible] because, as regards Misconception and Doubt, both of these, under your theory, would be of the nature of either *Sentience* (Consciousness, *Spirit*) or *Cosmic Intelligence* and *Mind*; in either case any *setting aside* of these would be impossible, because Spirit, Cosmic Intelligence and Mind,—all these being eternal (constant),—Misconception and Doubt also would be constant. Nor would the production of Definitely Certain Cognition be possible through any Means; *for the same reason*,—i.e. because it is always there (*ex hypothesi*).—From all this it follows that all that you have said in support of your doctrine is entirely futile.—What this hints at is that the *Sāṅkhya*-doctrine involves self-contradiction; for instance, when the *Sāṅkhya* speaks of the means of producing a definitely Certain Cognition, it implies the producing of the Definite Cognition which has not been there; and this is contrary to the assertion that 'the Effect is existent'; so there is clear self-contradiction.—(24)

TEXT (25).

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, (IT BE HELD THAT) THE DEFINITE COGNITION THAT WOULD BE PRODUCED WOULD BE ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN THERE,—THEN, THIS ONE INSTANCE (OF THE EFFECT BEING NON-EXISTENT) WOULD INVALIDATE ALL THOSE REASONS (THAT HAVE BEEN SET FORTH BY THE *Sāṅkhya*).—(25)

COMMENTARY.

If, in order to avoid the futility of the reasons, it be admitted that the Definite Cognition that is produced from the Means is one that did not exist before,—then, in that case, the entire set of reasonings—'Because

what is non-existent *cannot be produced, etc. etc.*' (*Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 9),—becomes invalidated; because as there is nothing incongruous in the production of the Definite Cognition (which has not been existent), so there would be no incongruity in the production of any other *non-existent* thing;—similarly, just as there is production of the *non-existent* Definite Cognition,—and the securing of the particular Means for the said production,—and as there is no possibility of the said Definite Cognition being produced from all sorts of Means (Wrong, Doubtful and the like),—and as even though *non-existent*, the Definite Cognition is brought about by only such means as are efficient for that purpose,—and just as these Means have the nature of the 'Cause',—so exactly could it be also in every other case [and the Premiss of the *Sāṅkhya* would thus become annulled].—(25)

TEXT (26).

IF IT BE HELD THAT—"THE EFFECT, WHICH HAS BEEN *unmanifested* (LATENT, IN THE CAUSE), ACQUIRES *manifestation* THROUGH THE CAUSES",—THEN (THE QUESTION IS) WHAT IS THIS *manifestation* OF THE EFFECT?—IT CANNOT CONSIST IN THE APPEARANCE (PRODUCTION) OF A PECULIARITY IN ITS NATURE; BECAUSE OF NON-DIFFERENTIATION AND NON-CONNECTION.—(26)

COMMENTARY.

The *Sāṅkhya* may argue thus—"Though, even prior to the operation of its Means, the Definite Cognition is already in existence, yet the Means (Cause) is not futile; because prior to the operation of the Cause, the Cognition was *unmanifested* (lying latent in the Cause), and subsequently (to the operation), *it acquires manifestation through that cause*; hence what the Cause operates for is the *manifestation* (of the latent Effect); and so there is no futility."

This however cannot be right; because there can be no such 'manifestation'. This 'manifestation' consists either (*a*) in the appearance of some peculiarity in the nature of the Effect, or (*b*) in the apprehension of the peculiarity, or (*c*) in the disappearance of what has been obstructing the apprehension of the peculiarity.

It cannot consist in the appearance of some peculiarity in its nature; because would this 'peculiarity in its nature' be *non-distinct* from the Effect [Definite Cognition in the case in question], or *distinct* from it? If it were non-distinct, then, inasmuch as there would be *non-differentiation* from the Definite Cognition (Effect), it would be as constant as the form of the Definite Cognition itself; and hence there could be no 'production' of it. If, on the other hand, the 'peculiarity' is something distinct from the Effect (Definite Cognition) itself,—even so, there could be no such *connection* (or relationship) as 'this is a peculiarity of that'. Because any such connection (between the Effect and its Peculiarity) could only be either one of 'container and contained'

or of 'Cause and Effect' (Producer and Product).—The former is not possible in the case in question; because the two factors concerned not rendering any help to one another, the said relation of 'Container and Contained' is not possible; even if there were any help rendered, if that Help were something distinct from the two factors, then the Connection itself could not be there; so that there would be an infinite regress. If, on the other hand, the Help were not so distinct, then the operation of the Cause would be futile; as the Definite Cognition (Effect) itself would have brought about the 'Peculiarity', which, *ex hypothesi*, is not-distinct from the said Help.—Then again, the 'Peculiarity' being something incorporeal, it would not be possible for it to fall downwards, and as such, it would not need a 'container' (or receptacle, support), because a 'receptacle' can only serve the purpose of preventing this downward fall (due to gravity).—Nor is the relation of 'Cause and Effect' possible (between the *Effect* and its 'Peculiarity'); because the Cause in the shape of the Definite Cognition being *always* there, it would be possible for the peculiarity to be produced *always*,—which is absurd. Nor would it be right to hold that the production of the Peculiarity by the Definite Cognition would be dependent upon the actual operation of the Cause. Because there can be no dependence upon what renders no help; and if there is help rendered, then the theory becomes open to the objection and infinite regress urged above.—Further, this Peculiarity that is held to be produced as something distinct,—is it *existent* or *non-existent* (prior to the operation of the Cause)? These two horns of the dilemma present themselves here also.—If the Peculiarity is something *non-existent*, then, as urged above, all the reasons (put forward by the *Sāṅkhya*) become invalidated. If, on the other hand, it has been *existent*, then there is no use for the Cause. —If in regard to the Manifestation also, a further 'manifestation' were postulated,—there would be nothing to prevent the infinite regress as to what this further 'manifestation' is and so forth.—Thus, even on the alternative of the two being distinct, there would be '*non-connection*';—and as there would be no connection (relationship), any production of 'peculiarity' in the nature of the *Effect* would not be possible.—(26)

TEXT (27).

THE 'MANIFESTATION' OF THE EFFECT CANNOT CONSIST IN ITS *Apprehension*; NOR IN *the removal of what was obstructing its Apprehension*; BECAUSE THE APPREHENSION IS A CONSTANT FACTOR, AND ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF A SECOND (APPREHENSION).—(27)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be right to regard the 'manifestation' (of the Effect) as consisting in *the appearance of the cognition of the Effect*; because the Cognition of the Effect is *a constant factor*. For instance, this cognition of the Effect must, under the theory of the upholder of the theory of the Effect being

existent, be something eternal ; under the circumstance what of it would be there which would be produced ? Also *because no second apprehension is possible,* the *Manifestation* of the Effect cannot consist in *the appearance of the Cognition of that Effect.* The particle 'also' has the cumulative force ; and it has to be construed apart from its place in the text ; it should be taken as after the word '*asambhavāt*',—(i.e. at the end of the sentence). So that the sense comes to be as follows :—According to your view, *Cognition* (Consciousness) is one only,—your doctrine being that from Creation down to Dissolution, there is only one *Consciousness* ; and it is this same Consciousness that constitutes *Definite Cognition* ; apart from this then, what other 'apprehension' is there which would be styled 'manifestation', and which would be produced by Causes ?

The following might be urged here (by the *Sāṅkhya*)—"The *Apprehension* of an object is not of the nature of '*Buddhi*' (Consciousness), it is of the nature of '*Manas*', 'Mind'".

But that cannot be right ; because all these terms—'*Buddhi*' (Intelligence), '*Upalabdhi*' (Apprehension), '*Adhyavasāya*' (Determinate Cognition), '*Manas*' (Mind), '*Saṁvitti*' (Knowledge) and so forth,—are synonymous. This is going to be explained later on.

Nor can 'Manifestation' of the Effect consist in the '*removal of what has been obstructing its apprehension*' ; for the same two reasons. For instance, 'that which has been obstructing its apprehension' being something eternal (*ex hypothesi*), no 'removal' of it is possible. It is not possible for this 'removal' to be in the nature of 'disappearance' ; because until the thing has renounced its previous form, it cannot 'disappear'.

Further, '*because there is no possibility of a second apprehension*', there can be no obstacle to apprehension ; as there can be no obstruction (concealment) of what is non-existent, because what is 'obstructed' is always something that is existent. From all this it follows that there can be no 'removal' of the Obstruction (of Apprehension).

Or the term '*nityatvāt*', '*because of its being constant*' (in the Text), may be taken to mean that, *because the Cognition of the Effect is constant (eternal),* there can be no 'obstruction' of it ; and because such obstruction is impossible, there can be no 'obstruction' of it.—Nor again can the 'removal of the obstruction' be brought about by anything, because it is characterless (being a negative entity, it has no positive character).

Under the doctrine of the 'Existent Effect', the futility of the causal operation is not the only incongruity ; the impossibility of Bondage and Liberation is another incongruity ; in fact, the most undesirable contingency of the cessation of all worldly activity cannot be avoided. For instance, you hold the doctrine that 'Liberation' follows on the appearance of True Knowledge, in the shape of real discrimination between Matter and Spirit ; now as this True Knowledge is always constantly present, all embodied beings would be always 'liberated' ; hence there could be no 'Bondage'. Conversely, 'Bondage' also has been held to be due to *Wrong Notion* (Misconception, Illusion) ; and as this Illusion also would be a constant factor, all beings would be always 'under bondage' ; and under the circumstances, how could there be any 'Liberation' ?

Then again, whenever people have recourse to any activity, it is either for securing what is beneficial or for getting rid of what is harmful. Under the theory of the 'Existent Effect' however, there can be nothing that cannot be secured, nor anything that cannot be got rid of; hence the whole world would be without desire for anything; so that ultimately there would be total cessation of all worldly activities.—(27)

Having thus refuted the doctrine of the 'Effect being existent (even prior to the operation of its Cause),' the Author proceeds to refute the objections likely to be urged against the doctrine that 'the Effect is non-existent (prior to the operation of its Cause)':—

TEXT (28).

JUST AS (UNDER THE *Sāṅkhya* THEORY),—EVEN THOUGH, ON THE GROUND OF ALL THINGS BEING CONSTITUTED BY THE *Three Attributes*, THERE IS NO DIFFERENTIATION AMONG THEM, AND YET EVERYTHING (CAUSE) DOES NOT PRODUCE EVERYTHING (EFFECT),—IN THE SAME MANNER, EVEN THOUGH THE EFFECT IS NON-EXISTENT (BEFORE THE CAUSAL OPERATION), EVERYTHING CANNOT PRODUCE EVERYTHING.—(28)

COMMENTARY.

The very denial of the theory of the 'Existent Effect' has, by implication, proved that the Effect is 'non-existent'; as 'existent' 'and non-existent' are contradictory terms; and hence no third alternative is possible. Even so, the Author now proceeds to show the futility of the objections that the Opponent has urged (against the Buddhist theory of the 'non-existent Effect').

The objection has been urged (by the *Sāṅkhya*, under Text 8, above) that "if the Effect were non-existent, it could not be produced, *because it would have no form at all*".

Now this Reason is fallacious, beset with the fallacy of being 'Unknown' (not admitted); because the theory is that it is the nature or character itself (of the Effect) that is produced (by the Cause), and this nature or character of the thing is not 'known' (admitted) to be 'formless'.—It might be urged that "before its production, it is certainly characterless".—Not so, we reply; as it is not possible for it to be 'characterless'; it cannot be right to regard the *character* itself as *characterless*; because when something is said to be 'characterless' what is meant is that *it has no character*; and this certainly is not there, even before the production of the thing; in fact, (under the argument of the Opponent) that itself would come to be *characterless* by which the Effect is produced.—If the Reason 'because it would have no form' be held to have been put forward with reference to the 'formless entity' in the shape of the 'negation of the thing',—then the reasoning would be futile (proving what is already proved or admitted); as the 'negation of the thing' has not been regarded by any one as 'something produced'.—Further,

the Reason is invalid also as being 'Inconclusive': as no reason has been put forward for sublating the contrary; inasmuch as the potency of the Cause is always restricted, it is only some *non-existent* thing that is produced,—only that for the production of which the Cause is there; that thing, for producing which there is no Cause—such for instance as the 'Sky-lotus',—is never, produced. Hence the Reason put forward (by the *Sāṅkhya*) is 'too wide, Inconclusive'. Everything cannot be regarded as the Cause of everything; nor is any such universal proposition accepted as that 'whatever is non-existent must be produced'; what *is* accepted is the proposition that 'whatever is produced was non-existent before its production'.

The following might be urged (by the *Sāṅkhya*)—"All Causes being equally productive of what has been non-existent, why is it that all Causes are not productive of all non-existent effects ?"

This criticism can be urged with equal force against you also: All Causes being equally productive of what has been existent, how is it that all Causes are not productive of all effects ? According to your view, there is nothing that is *non-existent*, which, on account of its non-existence, could not be produced.

"It is because the potency of Causes is restricted that, though things like the *Hare's Horn* are existent, they are not produced."

The same is equally true for the other theory also.

Then again, just as for you, even though *all things* are *equally constituted by the Three Attributes*, yet *everything is not productive of everything*, because the potency (of things) is restricted;—the compound '*Sarvakāraka*' may be explained as 'productive of everything' or as 'that which has everything for its producer';—in the same manner (under our view also), even though all things (Effects) are equally *non-existent*, yet everything will not be productive of everything.

In fact, what has been asserted in the Text—'As in your case, so in mine also'—has been said after having admitted the Opponent's contention, for the sake of argument; in reality, there is no 'equality' between the two theories. Because (under our view) even though there is diversity among things, yet, some one effect is produced by some one Cause only; there being no incongruity in the idea that the efficiency of the Cause is always restricted by the diversity of character involved in the 'series of causes' (*Wheel of Causation*) bearing upon a certain Effect. If, on the other hand, there is 'non-differentiation' (between Cause and Effect),—how could it be possible to conceive of such an incongruity as that involved in one and the same thing being both 'cause' and 'non-cause' at the same time ? Specially as distinction (differentiation) among things is always based upon contrary properties being attributed to them. This has been thus declared—'For all differentiation there must be some ground or basis in the nature of the things concerned; if there were non-differentiation, then, all being one and the same, its activity as well as inactivity would both be rendered impossible'.—(28)

In the following Text, the Opponent raises an objection on the basis of the Restriction of Potencies (of Causes):—

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TEXT (29).

"Inasmuch as the presence of limits would be impossible for you, the potencies cannot be restricted. On the view of their being existent, on the other hand, their restriction would be right and proper as pertaining to the limits."—(29)

COMMENTARY.

For you—i.e. for the Buddhist who holds the Effect to be *non-existent*—it is not possible for the (causal) Potencies to be restricted.—Why ?—Because *the presence of limits*,—in the shape of *Effects—would be impossible* ; [as the Effects would be non-existent, there would be nothing *with reference to* which there could be restriction] ;—for the simple reason, that when the limit is non-existent, *that which is limited* cannot be there. This argument may be formulated as follows :—Things devoid of limits in the shape of existent Effects cannot have their potencies restricted,—e.g. such things as Hare's Horns,—and (according to you) things like the Paddy-seed are devoid of limits in the shape of existent Effects; hence they do not fall within range of the Major term [i.e. they cannot have their Potencies restricted]'.—With a view to show the soundness of his own view, the *Sāṅkhya* adds—*On the view of their being existent, etc.*—i.e. if Effects are held to be *existent* ;—'*their*'—i.e. of the Potencies.—(29)

In the following Text, the Author points out the invalidity of the reason (set forth by the *Sāṅkhya*, in the preceding Text) :—

TEXT (30).

It is not so ; it may be that, on account of the absence of 'Limits', there can be no such subsequent assertion as held by us. But there is no harm done to the nature of the Thing itself which is entirely free from all restrictive adjuncts.—(30)

COMMENTARY.

[It cannot be as urged by the Opponent]—because, *on account of the absence of 'Limits'*, it may be that there can be no such subsequent assertion as that 'the potency to produce Curd is present in the Milk'; that may be so ; but there is that Entity *which is entirely free from all restrictive adjuncts*—which is not a mere imposition (or assumption), subsequent to which there appears another Entity, which has not been previously perceived ; and there can be no denial of such an Entity (as of the former one).—(30)

The *Sāṅkhya* may urge the following—"Where, with regard to anything, there is absolute cessation of all verbal and conceptual content—there the very nature of the thing must cease".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (31).

THE NAME OF THINGS IS NOT THEIR 'ESSENCE' (NATURE, FORM); BECAUSE ALL KINDS OF 'CONCEPTION' AND 'VERBAL EXPRESSION' PROCEED THROUGH HABIT, WITH REFERENCE TO THE UNDIFFERENTIATED (IMMACULATE) ENTITY.—(31)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Nature' of a thing is what has the widest extension (range); it is only when that is excluded that it sets aside its less extensive concomitants,—be it Cause or Effect,—because there is invariable concomitance between the two (the more extensive 'Nature' and the less extensive Cause or Effect); nothing else sets aside this; for if it did, it would lead to absurdity. Such 'verbal expression' as that 'Milk has the potency to produce Curd',—does not constitute the 'Essence'—Nature—of things; if it were so, then alone could 'the verbal expression', on being excluded, exclude the relevant thing also.

'Verbal Expression' is mentioned only by way of illustration; 'Conception' (Fanciful Assumption) also as related to the Thing in question is meant to be included.

'*Essence*' also is mentioned only by way of illustration; it includes the 'Cause' also; so that the 'Name' of a thing is not its 'Cause'; because the thing can be produced without the Name.

The Author states the reason for the assertion just made—*Because all kinds of 'Conception'*, etc. etc. *Because,*—inasmuch as,—all '*Conceptions*', which are connected with *Names,*—as also all 'Verbal Expressions'—expressive words,—both of which are of *all kinds*—of various kinds,—*proceed,* become applicable,—*through habit,*—*with reference to the undifferentiated* (Immaculate) *Entity*—i.e. the Entity which has no component parts and which is of one constant uniform nature. That is to say, there is a single Entity, in the shape of 'Word-Sound' for instance, which, being constant, is 'conceived' and 'spoken of' by speakers existing at varying times. It is only when these 'Word-conceptions' become identified with, and have for their objective, the said constant Entity, that this latter becomes diversified; or (conversely), like the *Essence* of the Entity itself, the Conceptions themselves become unified in essence; in no case can it be right that any *single* thing should be *diverse* in its essence; any such idea would lead to absurdity.—Hence what happens is that the potency of the Cause being restricted, it is only *some non-existent* thing that is produced, not all.

Thus the Reason (put forward by the *Sāṅkhya,* under Text 8, above)—'*because it would have no form at all*' is Inconclusive.

For the same reasons, the other reasons also (propounded by the *Sāṅkhya* in support of the 'Existence of the Effect' under *Sāṅkhyakārikā,* 9)—such

as '*because the particular Cause is secured*', and the rest,—become invalid. Because, what is said regarding the 'Securing of the particular Cause' would be true if the said 'Securing of the particular Cause' were found anywhere to have been due to the presence (therein) of the Effect; specially as it is quite possible for the said *securing of the particular Cause to be* due to the restricted character of the Potency of the Cause itself.

That 'everything cannot be produced from everything' is also due to the restricted character of the Causal Potency itself; as it is impossible for everything to be, by its very nature, capable of producing all things.

As for the argument set forth (by the *Sāṅkhya*) above, under Text 12—"that to which no peculiarity can be attributed, which is formless and unmodifiable,—how could such a thing be produced by Causes?",—that also has been urged without understanding the real sense of our theory. We do not say that a Non-entity is produced; if we had said that then alone could it be urged against us that any modification of it would involve loss of its very essence. We have however already explained that what is produced is a *Thing* itself (not a mere non-entity); all that we say is that the thing was *non-existent* before its production,—a conclusion deduced from the fact that (prior to production) it is not found to fulfil the conditions of *Cognisability* and that which is already a full-fledged entity cannot be an *Effect*, something *to be produced*; and that it is spoken of as 'produced' by that Cause on whose mere proximity it springs into existence. Nothing is produced by the entering into it of any operations (of the Cause), because all things are, by their very nature, devoid of operative activity. Then again, there is nothing that can be called a 'non-entity', which could be *modified* (as urged *by the Sāṅkhya*); nor can 'non-existence' constitute the 'Essence' of anything; because 'non-existence' is a mere negation.—Then again, if it be asserted that "What is non-existent cannot be produced, because no peculiarities of the product could be attributed to it",—then how could the *Existent* also be produced, since its essential features are already accomplished, and no further peculiarities could be attributed to it?—For these reasons, the reasoning that "Because what is efficient can produce only that which can be produced by it" is invalid.

Further, inasmuch as under the theory of the 'Non-existent Effect', it is possible for things to be 'Causes', the final (*Sāṅkhya*) argument also—"Because the Effect is of the essence of the Cause"—is invalid, 'too wide and Inconclusive'.—Or, inasmuch as the fact of the *Existent* thing being an 'Effect' has been already shown to be impossible,—and as all the facts that have been urged, in the shape of the arguments (in *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 9)—"because the particular Cause is secured" and so forth,—are explicable only under the theory of the Effect being *non-existent*,—all these four arguments are 'contradictory' (as urged in support of the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of the '*Existent* Effect'), because they actually prove what is contrary to the conclusion desired (by the *Sāṅkhya*)—(31)

[Says the *Sāṅkhya*]—"If it is your view that what is produced has been *non-existent*, then how is it that in the *Sūtra* (of the Buddhists), the production of both, the *Existent* as well as the *Non-existent*, has been denied?

This is the declaration—' O high-minded one, all Things are un-produced, as neither the *Existent* nor the *Non-existent* is ever produced '."

The answer to this is provided by the following:—

TEXT (32).

IN REALITY, THE 'PRODUCTION' (OF A THING) CONSISTS IN ITS *becoming a thing*; THIS 'PRODUCTION' CANNOT BE RELATED TO WHAT IS *existent*, OR WITH WHAT IS *non-existent*; IT IS RELATED ONLY TO A CONCEPTUAL IDEA WHICH IS PURELY NON-EXISTENT—(32)

COMMENTARY.

The particle '*tu*' (*in reality*) serves to emphasise what is going to be said.—When we come to examine in what manner a particular thing may be distinguished from other things, we find that what is called the 'production' (appearance, coming into existence, of a Thing) is only its own *Essence, becoming itself,* which exists merely for a *moment,* free from all connection with all elements of the Past and the Future. It is not a 'Universal' with particular features, as assumed by the *Vaibhāṣika*; such a 'Universal' is going to be refuted (under *Chapter* 13). Nor does it consist in 'inherence in Being' or 'inherence in its own Cause', as postulated by the *Vaishēṣika*; as both these also are going to be refuted (under *Chapter* 13); and because, under the theory of the other party (the *Vaishēṣika*), both these (Inherences) are constant, and what is already constant cannot be *produced.* To this effect there is the following declaration :—'*Being* (Existence) consists in being in contact with the Cause; the Cause is a cause by virtue of producing the Effect; the Being and the Contact both being constant, what is there that could be produced ?'

This—the said Production—*cannot be related to what is non-existent,*—by the relation of 'co-essentiality' (being of the same essence); as 'existent' and 'non-existent' are mutually contradictory, what is *non-existent* cannot come about. Nor can the 'production' be related to what is *existent* already from before; because before Production, the *existent* cannot be there.

Question—" Then how is it that you (Buddhists) are upholders of the doctrine that 'the Effect is non-existent' ? "

Answer—Only to a conceptual idea, etc.;—it is only *to a conceptual idea,*—which is of the nature of either the Active Agent or the Instrument,—(*Cause*)—it is led into relationship. As a matter of fact, there is nothing called 'non-existent' which could enter into 'production'; the idea therefore that 'the non-existent is produced' is purely conceptual.—(32)

Question—" What is the basis of this 'conception' on which the said Idea is supposed to rest ? "

The answer is supplied by the following:—

TEXT (33).

THE BASIS (OF THE SAID CONCEPTION) LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE FORM OF A THING PERCEIVED IN IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE TO ANOTHER THING DID NOT EXIST BEFORE. IF THE SAID THING HAD EXISTED PREVIOUSLY, THEN THIS BASIS WOULD NOT BE THERE (FOR THE SAID ASSUMPTION).—(33)

COMMENTARY.

When the previously unperceived form of a particular thing is perceived in immediate sequence to another thing,—the said form is one that *did not exist before*—i.e. prior to its own 'middlemost state' *—for the simple reason that it is not apprehended as fulfilling the conditions of being perceived. Hence this forms the *basis* for the conception that the thing that is produced is one that did not exist before.—" How so ? "—*If the said thing, etc.*;—i.e. prior to its 'middlemost state', if the form of the thing, this middlemost state, had existed, there could be no room for the said 'basis' of the Conception that 'what was non-existent has become produced'. Because the term 'becomes produced' connotes that particular state of the thing which appears in its 'middlemost state'; and if this were present even previously (to that state), then this would set aside the notion that the 'form' of the thing consists in that particular form of it which appears during the 'middlemost state' *only*. As (*ex hypothesi*), it would be as all-pervading as *Ākāsha*, and as such it could not have any 'previous' or 'middlemost' or 'subsequent' states at all. Under the circumstances, it would be possible to assert that 'all things are produced at all times', as there would be no grounds for differentiation.—(33)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out further defects in the doctrine of the 'Existent Effect':—

TEXT (34).

IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT THE CURD AND OTHER *Effects* SUBSIST IN THE MILK AND OTHER *Causes*, IN THE FORM OF *Latent Potency*; NOW WHAT IS THIS 'POTENCY'? IF IT IS THE SAME AS THE *Curd* AND OTHER EFFECTS,—THEN THIS ALSO WOULD BE PERCEIVED LIKE THE MILK ITSELF.—(34)

COMMENTARY.

It is asserted (by the *Sāṅkhya*) that the Effect subsists in the Cause; what do you really mean by this ? Do you mean that the Effect exists

* Each object has three momentary 'States': (1) moment of *non-existence*, prior to coming into existence, (2) moment of *existence*, and (3) moment of *non-existence*, cessation, destruction.

there in the actually *manifested* form? If so, then that cannot be; for if it were so, then while the Milk is still in the form of Milk, the Curd would be perceived, just as it is after the production of the Curd.—Or, is it meant that it subsists there in the form of *Latent Potency*?—Is this 'Potency' something different from the *Curd* and other Effects as manifested in the perceptible form? Or is it the same as these?—If it is the same, then, as before, it should be perceptible (which it is not).—(34)

[The other alternative that it is something different is taken up in the following *Text*]:—

TEXT (35).

IF IT IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT (FROM THE EFFECT), THEN THE EXISTENCE OF ONE THING CANNOT BE SPOKEN OF AS THAT OF ANOTHER, EXCEPT FIGURATIVELY. (FOR EXAMPLE) THE EXISTENCE OF THE (ATTRIBUTE OF) 'HARMONY' IS NOT SPOKEN OF AS THE EXISTENCE OF 'PAIN' AND 'DELUSION'.—(35)

COMMENTARY.

If the other alternative is accepted—viz. that the 'Potency' is something different from the 'Effect',—then the view that 'the Effect subsists in the form of the Cause' becomes abandoned; because you admit the existence of an entity different from the *Effect*, in the shape of 'Potency'. For instance, when something becomes manifested in a form endowed with particular qualities resulting from the development of the particular taste and potency,—then it is called an 'Effect', like the *Curd* for instance; and this Curd-effect is spoken of as 'non-existent' in the state of *Milk*, because it is not capable of being perceived. As regards 'Potency', which (you say) is something different from this 'Effect',—it cannot thus be an 'Effect'; for the simple reason that the existence of one thing (*Potency*) cannot mean the existence of another (*Effect*); for if it did, then it would be all confusion.

"But we have such expressions as *Butter is longevity*, where *Butter* is found to be spoken of as *longevity*, which is a totally different thing, and *Damp Reed is foot-disease*, where *Damp Reed* is spoken of as *foot-disease*, a totally different thing."

In answer to this, the Text has added the phrase '*except figuratively*';—i.e. there can be no such expressions except in figurative language. *Longevity* is spoken of as *Butter* only figuratively, through attributing the character of the *Effect* (Longevity) to its *Cause* (Butter); and such expressions are not possible in their literal sense. If, when you say that 'the Effect is existent in the Cause', you are using only figurative language, then there is no difference between our views; there *is* difference however if you intend the assertion to be taken in its literal sense.—This is what the Text shows by means of an example—*The existence of Harmony, etc.*—Even you (*Sāṅkhya*) do not hold that the form of 'Pain' (*Rajas*-Attribute) and 'Delusion' (*Tamas*-Attribute) is the same as that of 'Harmony' (*Sattva*-Attribute);

as each one of these has been held to have a distinct character of its own.—(35)

The Text now proceeds to show the Inadmissibility of the Premiss put forward (by the *Sāṅkhya* under *Kārikā* 15) in the form "Because of *homogeneity*":—

TEXT (36).

THE 'MANIFEST' IS NOT ADMITTED BY US IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER AS HOMOGENEOUS WITH (MADE UP OF) PLEASURE AND THE REST; BECAUSE PLEASURE AND THE REST ARE 'INTERNAL', 'SUBJECTIVE'; AND THAT THESE ARE SO IS MANIFEST FROM THEIR OWN CLEAR COGNITION.—(36)

COMMENTARY.

That the 'Manifest', in the shape of Sound and other things, is 'homogeneous' with—of the same form as,—Pleasure (Pain and Delusion), is not admitted by us in any way;—why?—*because Pleasure and the rest are 'internal'*,—i.e. *subjective*, of the nature of consciousness (feeling); and Sound and other things being insentient,—how could they be homogeneous with Pleasure, etc.?—The argument may be formulated as follows:—Things that are not of the nature of Consciousness cannot consist of Pleasure and the rest;—e.g. the Spirit postulated by the other party;—and Sound and other things are devoid of the nature of Consciousness; hence the more extensive character is found absent in them (which excludes the presence of the less extensive character, that of *consisting of Pleasure, etc.*).

The following argument might be urged:—"It is only after the invariable concomitance of *the character of being of the nature of Consciousness* with *the character of consisting of Pleasure, etc.* has been established that the absence of the former might exclude the *character of causing Pleasure* from Sound and the rest; as a matter of fact however, the said invariable concomitance itself has not been established,—inasmuch as we do admit the *Spirit* to be of the nature of Consciousness (and yet *not* consisting of *Pleasure, etc.*)".

In answer to this, the Text adds—*That these are so is manifest from their own cognition.* That is, the fact of Pleasure, etc. being of the *nature of Consciousness* is well established,—how?—*from the cognition of Pleasure, etc.* themselves; i.e. the cognition of Pleasure, etc. is itself quite clear on this point.—As a matter of fact, it is too clear (to need emphasis) that the *Cognition itself of Pleasure, etc.*—in the form of the Feelings of Satisfaction and the rest, following upon the presence or absence of Sound and other things, is self-luminous by its very nature and does not depend upon anything else to illumine (manifest) it;—and whatever is independent of other things to manifest it, and is self-illumined in the form of Satisfaction, etc.,—is spoken of by such terms as 'Consciousness', 'Pleasure', 'Feeling', 'Cogni-

tion',—all which are synonymous. If the experiencing of Pleasure, etc. were due to some other feeling,—then the *feeling of Pleasure, etc.* would be of the nature of something *other than Satisfaction and the rest*; because it itself would not be of the nature of that; as is the case with the *Yogin*, or the Person making inferences, cognising the Pleasure, etc. as felt by other persons. If this were not so, then these persons—*Yogin, etc.*—also would be themselves actually feeling the Pleasure, etc. as present in others, and (hence) being distressed and so forth (on account of those feelings). Or (conversely), as in the case of the *Yogin*, so in all cases, the feelings of being kindly or unkindly treated would be absent, as the circumstances would be the same in both cases.—If then, the Feeling is admitted to be of the nature of *Satisfaction* and the rest, it becomes established that Pleasure, etc. are of the nature of *Consciousness*. Because our *Pleasure* is nothing more than the *feeling* of Satisfaction, and *Pain* is nothing more than the *feeling* of *Dissatisfaction*.—From all this it follows that the Reason put forward in the Text is not Inconclusive nor Inadmissible. Specially among people who (like the *Sāṅkhya*) believe in the Reality of the External World, it is an admitted fact that Sound and other things (which are external, objective) are devoid of the nature of *Consciousness*. If it were not so, then they would have accepted the doctrine of the Idealist; and this would be what we most desire.—Nor can our Reason be regarded as 'Contradictory', as it is found present in every case where the Probandum is known to be present.—(36)

The following argument might be urged (by the *Sāṅkhya*) :—"As a matter of fact, though Consciousness (or Cognition) by itself is devoid of the Blue or any other colour, yet it *appears* to be of that colour, by reason of the proximity of the Blue Object outside; and in the same manner, the Consciousness, which by itself is devoid of the form of Happiness and the rest, *appears* in these forms by reason of the imposition of the external Happiness, etc. upon it; so that, even though the Feeling is of the nature of Happiness, etc., these latter cannot be regarded as constituting *Consciousness*; and thus our principal Reason is not 'too wide' or Inconclusive."

The answer to this is provided by the following :—

TEXT (37).

ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIVERSITY OF HABIT AND NATURE, ALL POSSIBLE ATTACHMENT AND THE REST ARE CLEARLY FOUND TO BE RESTRICTED TO EACH SINGLE OBJECT, LIKE SOUND AND THE REST.—(37)

COMMENTARY.

'*Bhāvanājātibhēdataḥ*';—'*Bhāvanā*' stands for *Habit*;—'*jāti*', 'nature', for one's own *character*;—on account of the diversity—peculiarity—of these two;—*attachment and the rest*;—'attachment' stands for *Longing*; the phrase '*and the rest*' includes such feelings as *Love* and the like, due to

the *Harmony*-Attribute, *Hate, Agitation*, etc. due to the *Energy*-Attribute, and *Dejection*, Illusion, etc. due to the *Inertia*-Attribute; thus the effects of all the Three Attributes become included;—all these are found to be *restricted*,—i.e. of one form;—for instance, on account of their peculiar *habits*, the *Lover* and other persons have one or the other of the said feelings in regard to Wine, Woman and other things, according as they have been found to be conducive to good or evil;—similarly on account of the peculiar nature, one or the other of the said feelings appear in some of the animals, like the Deer (who are attracted by Sound), the Elephant (who are attracted by Odour) and the like.—All these feelings (of Love, Hate and the rest) are always *restricted* (to the Lover, or the Deer, etc.),—and do not appear in all persons or animals. This would not be right if Sound and other objects were of the nature of (consisted of) Pleasure and the rest.—(37)

Question—" Why ? "
The answer is given in the following:—

TEXT (38).

BEING IN KEEPING WITH ONE AND THE SAME OBJECT, THE CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD BE VARIEGATED IN CHARACTER.—IF IT BE URGED THAT " IT IS NOT SO BECAUSE OF DESTINY AND SUCH OTHER FORCES ",—THEN THE CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD NOT BE IN KEEPING WITH THE OBJECT AT ALL.—(38)

COMMENTARY.

All the said Feelings being in keeping with one and the same object, the Consciousness of each person *would be variegated in character*,—just like the cognition of such objects as the Blue and the like.

It might be urged that—"Even though every Object is tripartite in character (as made up of the Three Attributes), yet under the influence of such auxiliary unseen forces as those of Destiny and the like, in the form of Merit and Demerit, it is only some aspect of it that figures in the consciousness of any one person,—and not all its aspects to all persons.—The term '*ādi*', '*such other forces*', includes Habit, Nature, Desire to hold and the like."

If that were so, then *the Consciousness would not be in keeping with the object*; i.e. such Consciousness would not rest upon the object; as it would be devoid of the form of the Object itself.—(38)

The following text proceeds to show how the Consciousness would be 'devoid of the form of the Object':—

TEXT (39).

THE FORM OF THE *Object* ITSELF IS THREE-FORMED, AND THE *Cognitions* (*of men*) ARE ONE-FORMED ;—HOW CAN THESE LATTER BE REALLY POSSIBLE WITH REFERENCE TO THE OBJECT,—BEING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM IT IN CHARACTER ?—(39)

COMMENTARY.

The form of the Object consists of the Three Attributes of *Sattva* (Harmony), *Rajas* (Energy) and *Tamas* (Inertia).—*The Cognitions of men are one-formed* ;—the term '*tat*' stands for Men, Spirits ; what is meant is that the Cognitions that men have are all found to be of one form, having their form determined solely by each one of the numerous circumstances of 'Attachment' and the like. *How can these latter*,—i.e. the Cognitions—*in reference to the Object*—Sound and the rest,—*really*—truly,—*be possible* ?—"Why cannot these be possible ?"—*Because they are different from it in character* ; i.e. quite different in character from the object on which they are based.—The argument is to be formulated in the following form :—When a Cognition does not apprehend the form of a particular object, it cannot have this object for its objective basis ;—e.g. Visual Cognition cannot have Sound for its objective basis ;—the Cognitions in question are devoid of the form of the three-formed object ;—hence the conclusion of the Opponent would be opposed to the wider Premiss, and there is reason for denying it also, in the shape of likely incongruities.

The following might be urged (by the *Sāṅkhya*) :—" Even though what is actually apprehended by Perception is the Object, Sound and the rest, in its *entire* aspect,—yet, on account of predisposition and other circumstances, the definite cognition that actually appears (according to the Buddhist) is only in reference to certain aspects of it,—such as its momentary character—and not in reference to all its aspects ;—in the same manner (according to us) the Cognition would appear in a *single* form under the unseen influence of Destiny and such other circumstances."

This cannot be right. According to us, such conceptions as those of 'momentary character' and the like do not in reality have any Entity for their objective ; because (according to us) the 'Entity' is beyond all conception. It is only indirectly that conceptions (and Cognitions) are connected with the Entity, and thereby becoming the means of apprehending that Entity, they come to be recognised as the *Pramāṇa* (Proof, Evidence, Means of Cognition) for that Entity. As for Love and the rest on the other hand, they are actually admitted by the other party to have objects as their real objective ; if that were not so, then the said Love, etc. would have no basis (or substratum), and it would (thus) be not true to say that 'the Cognition of the feelings of Pleasure, etc. follows from the Cognition of Sound and other objects which are of the nature of Pleasure, etc.'—Further, inasmuch as the feelings of Love, etc. are definitely determinate in their character, there is no uncertainty or indefiniteness attaching to their character, and as a result of this, the Cognition of the feeling of these would be always

in their entire form. In fact it is this cognition of the object of all definite Cognitions that constitutes their *definiteness*.—(39)

It has been asserted above (by the *Sāṅkhya*, under Text 14) that—"From the apprehension of such effects as *Satisfaction, Irritation and Dejection*, it follows that Sound and other objects are made up of Pleasure (Pain and Delusion)".—The following text proceeds to show that the premiss herein set forth is *Inconclusive* :—

TEXT (40).

FOR THE FOLLOWERS OF YOGA, 'SATISFACTION', 'DISSATISFACTION' AND 'DELUSION' ARE PRODUCED IN THE SAME SPIRIT; AND YET THE OTHER PARTY DO NOT HOLD THE SPIRIT TO BE OF THE ESSENCE OF THOSE.—(40)

COMMENTARY.

Those *followers of Yoga* who accept the teachings of *Kapila*, when meditating upon the *Spirit* as distinguished from *Primordial Matter*, derive *Satisfaction* and *Happiness*, after having practised meditation of the Spirit in the right manner; but those who do not succeed in the practice of Meditation, and hence do not perceive the Spirit quickly enough, become beset with *Dissatisfaction*; while those who are, by their very nature, of dull intelligence, become beset with *Delusion*;—and yet the other Party do not regard the Spirit to be of the essence of these—i.e. to consist of the Three Attributes. From this it follows that the premiss stated in the form 'Because of the apprehension of such Effects as Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction and Dejection'—is Inconclusive, 'too wide'.

"As a matter of fact, however, Pleasure, etc. proceed from Volition (Determination, the function of Cosmic Intelligence), not from the Spirit."

The same might be said of Sound and the rest also; and in that case, as all these objects (Sound, etc.) would be products of mere Volition, there could be no such things as *External* Pleasure, etc.; because 'Volition' is of the nature of Consciousness, purely subjective. For the same reason the proposition that "Cognition or Experience is of the nature of Satisfaction (Dissatisfaction and Dejection), through the influence of such impositions as those of external Pleasure, etc."—also becomes rejected. Specially because, even without the imposition of such external things, Happiness, etc. are actually found to appear entirely on the substratum of the Spirit itself. How too could the imposition of something else bring about the well-known feeling of Pleasure, etc. which appears independently of the proximity of external things, from the mere contemplation of what is agreeable and disagreeable?

It might be said that "the Mind also (wherein this Contemplation takes place) would be made up of the *Three Attributes* through the imposition of the same".

But that cannot be; because by the assertion that "That which is independent of all other illumining agencies and is self-sufficient, etc." it has been established that it is of the nature of Consciousness.

From all this it follows that the reason put forward (by the *Sāṅkhya*) —"*Because of homogeneity*"—is 'Inadmissible', 'unproven'.—(40)

Now the Author admits (for the sake of argument) that the Reason (Homogeneity) is 'admissible', 'proved',—and proceeds to show its invalidity, 'Inconclusiveness'—in the following:—

TEXT (41).

EVEN THOUGH THE 'MANIFEST' BE ACCEPTED AS 'CONSISTING OF THREE ATTRIBUTES',—PRIMORDIAL MATTER DOES NOT BECOME ESTABLISHED AS THE ONE ETERNAL CAUSE OF THAT (MANIFEST); BECAUSE THAT 'MANIFEST' IS NOT IMBUED WITH ANY SINGLE GENERIC CHARACTER.—(41)

COMMENTARY.

Even if it be taken as proved that the 'Manifest' consists of the 'Three Attributes', yet that does not prove what the *Sāṅkhya* wishes—viz. that the Cause of that 'Manifest' is that which is called 'Primordial Matter'; that is to say, because the reason that has been put forward has not been found to be concomitant with a Cause of that kind. For instance, what the *Sāṅkhya* desires to prove is that the Cause of the 'Manifest' is one, consisting of the Three Attributes, eternal and all-pervading; as a matter of fact, with such a Cause, the invariable concomitance of the Reason has nowhere been perceived; nor is it necessary that the Cause must be of the same nature as the Effect is found to be; because there is a clear difference between the Cause and its Effect. You hold that the Effect in the shape of the 'Manifest' is that which has such characteristics as 'having a Cause', 'being non-eternal', 'non-pervasive' and so forth; and yet you do not hold the Cause (of this Manifest) to have these characteristics. Hence your Reason (Premiss) is 'too wide', 'inconclusive'.

The Text next proceeds to show that the Reason put forward (by the *Sāṅkhya*) is 'contradictory' also, inasmuch it entails the conception contrary to the nature of the particular Entity:—*As the one eternal Cause, etc.*;—that is to say, what is meant to be proved is the existence of an Entity, which is *one, eternal* and *made up of the Three Attributes,* as the Cause (of the 'Manifest'); and no such entity is established by the Reason put forward;—in fact, what is established is something quite contrary to it.—"How so?"—*Because that is not endowed, etc.*—The particle '*hi*' stands for 'because'; hence the meaning is that the *Effect* in the shape of the 'Manifest' is not recognised to be imbued with any such single *generic character* as consists of the Three Attributes and which forms the very essence of the 'Manifest'.—"What is it then that *is* recognised?"—The 'Manifest' is actually cognised as endowed with such qualities as *multiplicity, non-eternality* and so forth. If the 'Manifest' were really imbued with any such *generic character* as that postulated by the other party, then the Cause also of that 'Manifest' would have to be recognised as possessed of that character. Inasmuch as, however, the Effect (in the shape of the 'Manifest') is actually

found to be imbued with such qualities as 'non-eternality', 'multiplicity' and the like—its Cause also has to be inferred as possessed of these same qualities. Specially because in the case of a Cause that is eternal, the idea of its fruitful operations being both sequential and simultaneous would involve self-contradiction;—and because diversity in the Effect can be only due to diversity in the Cause; otherwise the diversity in the Effect would be without any Cause (baseless).—From all this it follows that any such *single eternal* Entity as *Primordial Matter* cannot be recognised.—If the name 'Primordial Matter' is given to a Cause that is *non-eternal* and *many*, then there we have no quarrel with you.—(41)

Question—"How is it known that the *Manifest* is not imbued with any single generic character?"

The *answer* is supplied in the following:—

TEXT (42).

ALL 'MANIFESTED THINGS' ARE FOUND TO BE LIKE IRON-BARS; AS HAVING THEIR FORMS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ORDER OF SEQUENCE AND THEIR ESSENCE MIXED UP WITH FANCIES.—(42)

COMMENTARY.

Just as bars made of Iron stand apart from each other,—so these 'Manifested Entities', as they appear in their own forms, are found to be diverse and separate, due to diversities of place, time, potencies, appearances and so forth; and they do not enter into each other's essence (or constitution). This proves the *multiplicity* (of Manifested Entities).

In order to prove their *non-eternality*, it is added—*Having their forms*, etc. etc.;—the compound is to be analysed as—'*have their forms associated with*—embraced, affected by—*an order of sequence*'.

Question—"If this is so, then how is it that Entities are conceived of *as units*,—in the form of 'Earth' and the like,—and also *as lasting*,—in such notions as 'this is that same thing'?"

Answer—*Their essence mixed up with fancies*; that is to say, the conception of 'unity' in regard to things is a '*fancy*', a wrong assumption. This is going to be established later on, under the sections dealing with the doctrine of the 'Perpetual Flux'.—(42)

It has thus been shown that the Reason '*Because of Homogeneity*' (as propounded by the *Sāṅkhya* in support of his doctrine of all things being the product of one 'Primordial Matter') is open to the three fallacies of being 'Unproven, Inadmissible', 'Contradictory' and 'Too Wide, Inconclusive'.—The Author now proceeds to show that the corroborative instance cited (by the *Sāṅkhya* in Text 15, above) in the words '*Just as in the case of the Jar and other things*' deos not fulfil the conditions of,—and is not possessed of the properties of—the Probans and the Probandum [and as such cannot serve as a 'corroborative instance']:—

TEXT (43).

SO ALSO THE VARIOUS PRODUCTS OF CLAY AND OTHER THINGS ARE NOT RECOGNISED AS IMBUED WITH ANY SINGLE GENERIC CHARACTER,—NOR AS THE EFFECTS OF ANY SINGLE CAUSE ; AS ALL SUCH THINGS AS THE 'LUMP OF CLAY' ARE DIVERSE.—(43)

COMMENTARY.

The phrase 'and other things' is meant to include the products of such things as Gold and the like.—The term 'so also' may be taken as *cumulative*,—adding one further defect in the Opponent's reasoning,—or as indicating *similarity* (to other defects already pointed out).—The phrase '*not imbued with any single Generic Character*' serves to show that the Instance cited (Jar, etc.) is devoid of the property of what has been cited (by the *Sāṅkhya*) as the Probans of his reasoning.—The phrase '*Nor as the effects of any single Cause*',—has to be construed with 'recognised'; and it serves to show that the property of the (*Sāṅkhya's*) Probandum also is not present in the instance cited.

Objection—"As a matter of fact, *single Causes*—of all such things,—are actually found in the form of the Lump of Clay or of Gold and other things ; and every one of these is also found to be imbued with the Generic Character of 'Clay', 'Gold' and the like. In what way then is our Instance devoid of both the properties of the Probans and the Probandum ?"

Answer—*As all such things as the 'Lump of Clay' are diverse* ;—there can be no such single composite entity as 'Lump of Clay' ;—if there were, then (since Generic Characters are all-pervading *ex hypothesi*), if it covered one point in space, the entire space would become covered. Nor is any 'Generic Character' found to appear in each individual thing,—every one of which is perceived as distinct by itself.—(43)

The Text again proceeds to show the 'inconclusiveness' of the *Sāṅkhya's* Reason—"Because of Homogeneity"—by itself :—

TEXT (44).

IN THE CASE OF 'SPIRITS', EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE ENDOWED WITH 'SENTIENCE' AND OTHER QUALITIES, THEY ARE NOT REGARDED (BY THE *Sāṅkhya*) AS PRECEDED (PRODUCED) BY A SINGLE ENTITY (AS THEIR CAUSE).—IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT "THE SAID QUALITIES ARE ATTRIBUTED (TO THE SPIRITS) ONLY SECONDARILY (INDIRECTLY, FIGURATIVELY)" ;—THEN WHY CANNOT THE SAME BE THE CASE IN REGARD TO THE MATTER UNDER DISCUSSION ALSO ?—(44)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, the *Spirits* are regarded (by the *Sāṅkhya*) to be endowed with endless such properties as being 'sentient', 'enjoyer' and the like ;

and yet they are not regarded by you as having a single Cause endowed with the same properties.—It might be urged that—"The property of being endowed with *Sentience* and the like that has been attributed to Spirits, is not in the direct literal sense, but in the indirect, secondary, figurative sense; and the reason for this lies in the fact that, all Spirits are found to be excluded from 'insentience' and other such qualities, and hence they are placed under the genus 'Sentient', which stands for the 'negation or exclusion of Insentience', which is assumed to meet their case; though in reality there is no such genus".—If then, it is only indirect and figurative, then, in regard to the 'Manifest' also,—as in the case of Spirits,—why is the presence of Pleasure, etc. not taken as 'assumed' in the same way,—without their being preceded and produced by any single Cause endowed with the same qualities?—Thus the Probans (Reason) is found to be Inconclusive.

The mention of 'Spirits' is only by way of illustration. In the same manner, Pleasure, etc., being so many modifications of Primordial Matter, are endowed with such qualities as being 'attributes', 'insentient', 'non-enjoyer' and so forth,—and Primordial Matter and the Spirits are endowed with such qualities as 'Eternality' and the like,—and yet none of these are preceded and produced by any single such Cause. So the Probans is clearly Inconclusive.—(44)

Thus the Reason (put forward by the *Sāṅkhya*)—"*Because of homogeneity*",—has been refuted. Now under the pretext of Re-affirming his conclusion, the Author proceeds briefly to point out defects in the other reasons (put forward by the *Sāṅkhya*):—

TEXT (45).

THUS, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A CAUSE IN THE SHAPE OF 'PRIMORDIAL MATTER', ALL DIVERSITY RELATING TO EFFECTS AND CAUSES AND OTHER THINGS BECOMES EXPLICABLE, ON THE BASIS OF THE DIVERSITY OF POTENCIES.—(45)

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted (in *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 15) that "Primordial Matter exists as the Cause, (*a*) because of the finite character of specific objects, (*b*) because Activity is due to Potency, and (*c*) because there is differentiation between 'Cause' and 'Effect'".—As a matter of fact, all these three Reasons are inconclusive, as no reason is provided to preclude a conclusion contrary to the one set forth.

For instance, *even in the absence of a Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter*, the three facts set forth—that of objects having a finite character, etc.—are not inexplicable. For instance, if what is sought to be proved is only the existence of *a Cause*,—then the argument is superfluous,—'proving what is already proved'; we also do not admit of any Effect being produced without *a Cause*; so that if the name 'Primordial Matter' were given in general to all Causes, then there would be nothing to quarrel about. On the

other hand, if what is sought to be proved is that 'there is an intelligent Cause, which produces an effect of certain finite dimensions, and acts according to its potencies',—then the Reason adduced becomes invalidated by 'inconclusiveness'; as even in the absence of an intelligent actor, there is nothing incongruous in the production of a particular effect with well-defined dimensions determined by the potencies of its own Cause. Further, it is not right to regard Primordial Matter as intelligent, as it is, *ex hypothesi*, 'insentient', and 'intelligence' is synonymous with 'sentience'.

Further, if by means of the Reason '*Because Activity is due to Potency*', it is meant to prove the existence of a mere Cause possessed of potencies not different (from those just needed for the particular effect),—then it is superfluous, proving what is already admitted by both parties. If, on the other hand, the Cause meant to be proved is some *one* Eternal Cause possessed of distinct and diverse potencies,—then the Reason becomes invalidated by 'inconclusiveness'.—Further, as concomitance with any such Reason is not cognised anywhere, the Reason becomes invalidated as being 'Unknown' and 'Inadmissible' also; because as a matter, nowhere has any activity of the Cause towards the producing of an Effect been found to have been due to extraneous and additional potencies; as all potencies subsist in the essence of the thing itself.

Another reason put forward by the *Sāṅkhya* (in *Kārikā* 15) is—"*Because of the merging of the whole world*".—This Reason is absolutely 'unknown, Inadmissible'. No such 'merging' of things is known of, all things being liable to such absolute destruction as leave behind no traces at all. If there were such 'merging', it would come about either on the disappearance of the previous condition of the thing concerned, or without such disappearance. If it comes on the disappearance of the previous condition, then it involves the *absolute* destruction (without leaving any traces) [which the *Sāṅkhya* does not admit]. If, on the other hand, it comes without the said disappearance, then there can be no 'merging' at all; because no 'merging' is possible for any entity so long as it retains its own untrammelled essence. Otherwise there would be endless incongruities. Hence the statement 'because of the merging of the whole world' involves a self-contradiction.

Thus, *even in the absence of a Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter*, the diversity relating to the Effect,—in the shape of its being 'finite' and the rest,—and the differentiation also into Cause and Effect—become explicable, *on the basis of the diversity of potencies.* And this means that the reasons set forth by the *Sāṅkhya* are all 'inconclusive'.

The phrase '*and other things*' is meant to include the argument (of the *Sāṅkhya*)—"Because all activity is due to Potency".

Or, the particle '*api*', 'even',—in the phrase '*even in the absence*, etc. etc.',—may be meant to be restrictive; hence the meaning comes to be this :—It is *only* when there is no Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter that there can be diversity in the Effect due to the diverse potencies of the Cause; and also because it is only thus that the relation of Cause and Effect would be possible;—hence the Reasons put forward (by the *Sāṅkhya*) are 'contradictory'. For instance, if Primordial Matter were the Cause of the 'Manifest', then the whole universe, as being (*ex hypothesi*) of the same

essence as that Matter, would be a single substance having the same character and form as that Matter; so that there could be no such distinction among Products as 'Cosmic Intelligence', 'I-principle', 'Five Rudimentary Substances' and so forth; and this would mean that the World is entirely devoid of 'modification'.—Similarly, it is only in the absence of any such Cause as Primordial Matter that the activity of the Potter and other Agents towards the making of the Jar and other things, in accordance with their potencies (powers), would be possible,—which would not be possible if there were such a single Cause as Primordial Matter. This is what has been already explained under Text 21, by the statement—'Nor would there be any efficiency, nor any operation'.

The distinction into 'Cause' and 'Effect' also is possible only 'in the absence of any such single Cause as Primordial Matter'. It has been already pointed out above that no diversity in the world would be possible if there were any entity as Primordial Matter (as the one Cause);—it has also been pointed out that if Primordial Matter were the Cause, then the whole world would be of the same essence as that Matter, which would lead to the absurdity that the entire world is a single substance (without any diversities); and under the circumstances, as there would be no 'diversity of forms' at the very outset, how could there be any 'merging' of it (as declared in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 15)?—(45)

Thus ends the Section on the Examination of the Doctrine of 'Primordial Matter'.

CHAPTER II.

Examination of the Doctrine of 'God'.

(A)

Statement of the Doctrine of 'God' (Theism).

COMMENTARY.

The next Chapter, beginning with the *Text* (46), proceeds to prove that there can be no operation of any such Being as the 'Supreme Lord', 'God'—

TEXT (46).

OTHER PHILOSOPHERS DECLARE THE 'LORD' TO BE THE CAUSE OF ALL THINGS PRODUCED; ON THE GROUND THAT NO INSENTIENT THING, BY ITSELF, CAN PRODUCE ITS EFFECTS.—(46)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as things that are *not produced*,—such as the Atom, *Ākāsha* and so forth,—are eternal, they have no Cause, hence the Text has added the qualification 'things *produced*'.—The term '*Lord*' stands for *God*.—'*Others*'—i.e. the *Naiyāyika* and other (Theists).—Some of these Theists hold that "the creator of the whole world is a distinct Soul or Spirit with special qualities, the omniscient God";—others hold that "the creator is a Substance (Being) distinct from the 'Soul' or 'Spirit', because He is eternal, one and equipped with the knowledge of all things, and as such having qualities different from those of the 'Spirit' or 'Soul'".

Question—"Where there are already such Causes of the world as Merit and Demerit, Atoms and so forth, why do these philosophers postulate another Cause in the shape of *God*?"

Answer—No insentient thing, etc.—Though Merit and the rest may be the Cause,—yet all these, being devoid of sentience or intelligence, cannot, by themselves, without an Operator or Supervisor, produce their effects; hence there must be a *Creator* (who is intelligent), as nothing that is devoid of intelligence is ever found to be the *Operator*. This argument is formulated as follows:—What is devoid of Intelligence cannot produce its Effect, without an Operator;—e.g. such things as Clay-lump, Stick, Water, String and the rest (all which are required for the making of the Jar) cannot produce the Jar, without the Potter;—Merit and the rest (which are regarded as the Cause of the World) are all devoid of Intelligence;—hence the idea that (these are enough to produce the World) would be contrary to the universal Proposition stated. Thus it becomes established that there is an *Operator*

and that is *God.*—Even so, Merit and the rest do not become useless (in the producing of the World); because God is only the 'Efficient Cause' (Guide, Supervisor) [and Atoms and Merit, etc. would still be needed as the 'Constituent' and 'Contributory' Causes].

The following objection might be urged :—" Those Merit and Demerit that are held to subsist in the Soul or Spirit (of Man) may be the required *Operator*; why should one assume a *God* ? "

Answer—That cannot be right; the particular Spirit at that time (of Creation) would be wholly unconscious ;—so long as his Body, Sense-organs and other aggregates of Causes and Effects are not produced, the Spirit remains unconscious, not perceiving even such Colour, etc. as are quite perceptible; under the circumstances, how could it perceive Merit and Demerit, which are entirely imperceptible ? To this end, there is the following declaration—'The ignorant Creature, not master of his own pleasure and pain, may go to Heaven or to the Nethermost Hole,—only as he is urged by God' [quoted in *Nyāyavārtika* 4. 1. 21, where the *Tātparya* speaks of it as '*Smṛti*'].—(46)

The Text proceeds to set forth two Reasons propounded by *Aviddhakarṇa* (an ancient *Naiyāyika*) in proof of the existence of God :—

TEXTS (47-48).

" (A) THAT WHICH IS CHARACTERISED BY A PECULIAR ARRANGEMENT OF ITS OWN COMPONENT PARTS IS SUBJECT TO A CAUSE THAT IS ENDOWED WITH INTELLIGENCE,—FOR INSTANCE, THE JAR AND OTHER OBJECTS.—THE THING IN DISPUTE,—WHICH IS PERCEPTIBLE BY MEANS OF TWO SENSE-ORGANS AND ALSO IMPERCEPTIBLE,—MUST BE PRECEDED (AND PRODUCED) BY A CAUSE ENDOWED WITH INTELLIGENCE,—ATOMS SUPPLYING THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE '*per* DISSIMILARITY'."—(48)

COMMENTARY.

The argument has been thus formally stated :—" The thing under dispute, which is perceptible by means of two sense-organs or not perceptible at all, must be regarded as produced by an Intelligent Cause,—because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its component parts,—*like* the Jar, and *unlike* the Atoms [the Jar being the Corroborative Instance *per Similarity*, and the Atoms being so *per Dissimilarity*]."—Now in this formulated argument —'*What is perceptible by means of two Sense-organs*' stands for the three kinds of Substance, *Earth, Water* and *Fire*—which are *perceptible by means of the* two organs of *Vision* and of *Touch*, because they fulfil such conditions of perceptibility as being *large*, being *composed of several substances*, being *coloured* and so forth ;—the '*imperceptible*' are *Air* and the rest, simply because the conditions of perceptibility are 'being large', 'being composed

of several substances', 'being coloured' and so forth,—and all these conditions are absent in *Air* and other things ; as has been declared in the following passage—"Perception follows from *Largeness, Presence of several Substances* and *Presence of Colour*; the Atom is imperceptible because it contains no other substances ; Air is imperceptible because it is devoid of the presence of Colour;—the term '*Saṁskāra*' stands for *subsistence, presence in composition*; —and the *Diad* (Two-Atom-Compound) and other things are imperceptible because of the absence of *largeness.*"

Now, in this argument, if the Probandum to be proved were stated in the general (unqualified) form that 'Things perceptible by two sense-organs and those imperceptible are produced by intelligent causes',—then it would be superfluous, proving what is already admitted by both parties, in regard to such things as the Jar and the like, over which there is no dispute at all. It would involve the fallacy of 'contradicting one's own doctrine', because the *Naiyāyika* does not admit such imperceptible things as the *Atom, Ākāsha,* and the like to be 'produced by an Intelligent Cause'; and also because these latter are eternal (hence not produced at all), the said assertion would involve that contradiction of a perceived (well-recognised) fact.—It is for the purpose of avoiding all these difficulties that the qualifying term 'under dispute' has been added ; the term '*Vipratipatti*' standing for *different opinions*, and that which forms the subject of diverse opinions is said to be the *matter under dispute*.—With this qualification, what become the 'subject' of the argument are only the Body, Sense-organs, the various Regions and so forth ; and what is asserted does not apply to the Atom and such other things.

Similarly, if the Probandum (to be proved) were stated in the form that 'the things under dispute are *produced by a Cause*',—then the argument would be futile—proving what is already accepted by both parties. In order to avoid this, the qualification has been added—in the form 'produced by an *intelligent* Cause'. This argument, thus stated, cannot be futile as addressed to the *Sāṅkhya*, as there is no Intelligence (*Buddhi*) for the *Sāṅkhya* apart from Primordial Matter ; and certainly a thing cannot be produced by itself.

'*Arrangement of component parts*' ;—the 'arrangement',—i.e. conjunction in the form of 'aggregation',—of the parts that go to make up the Things ; by this the Things in question are *characterised*—differentiated ; consequently they must be as asserted. Mere 'characterisation by components' would include the universals 'Cow' and the like (which also are held to be consisted of components in the shape of the individual animals) and thus render the Reason 'too wide'; hence the qualification '*its own* components'; what the universal 'Cow' and the rest are differentiated by is the arrangement of the parts that go to make up the Substance,—not by the arrangement of the parts that go to make up the Cow *itself*.

The 'Intelligent Cause' thus proved is '*God*'.

It is this proof that has been stated in these two *Texts*.—The compound '*Svārambhaka, etc.*' is to be analysed as meaning 'that which has for its *Vishēṣana*—differentia—the *peculiar*, characteristic,—arrangement, disposition—of its own component parts'. This indicates the invariable con-

comitance of the Reason (Middle Term) [with the Probandum]. The presence of the Reason in the *Subject* is indicated by the words '*which is perceptible by means of two organs, etc. etc.*'—The expression '*vivādapadam*' stands for 'what forms the matter under dispute'.—(47-48)

The second argument propounded (by *Aviddhakarṇa*) is next explained :—

TEXT (49).

"(B) THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF THE BODY AND OTHER THINGS IS CONTROLLED BY AN INTELLIGENT BEING,—BECAUSE THEY ARE ENDOWED WITH COLOUR AND OTHER QUALITIES,—LIKE THE YARN AND SUCH THINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN SEEN TO BRING ABOUT THEIR EFFECTS (ONLY WHEN CONTROLLED BY THE INTELLIGENT WEAVER)."—(49)

COMMENTARY.

Of the Body and other things,—the material Cause,—in the shape of Atoms and such things—can bring about their effects only when controlled by an Intelligent Cause ;—such is the construction of the Text.—The Reason (Probans) stated is '*because they are endowed with Colour, etc.*'.—The '*Yarn, etc.*' are cited as the Corroborative Instance. This has been thus declared —'The material causes of the Body, the World and other things produce their effects only when controlled by an Intelligent Being,—this is what we assert, on the ground that they are endowed with Colour, etc.,—like such things as the *yarn* and the like'.—(49)

Uddyotakara however has formulated the argument as follows :—"The Causes of the World,—in the shape of 'Primordial Matter', 'Atoms' and 'Destiny' (Unseen Force)—need a Controller with Superior Intelligence, in the producing of their Effects,—because their activity is intermittent, —like the Yarn, the Shuttle and such other causes (of the Cloth)".*—This is the argument set forth in the following Text.—

TEXT (50).

"IN THE PRODUCING OF THEIR EFFECTS, ALL SUCH CAUSES AS MERIT, DEMERIT AND ATOMS ARE CONTROLLED BY AN INTELLIGENT BEING,—BECAUSE THEY OPERATE INTERMITTENTLY, —LIKE THE SHUTTLE AND THE YARN."—(50)

COMMENTARY.

The meaning of this is quite clear.—(50)

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* These words are not found in *Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārtika*. This idea is there (under *Sūtra* 4. 1. 21, p. 463, lines 11 *et seq.*—Bib. Ind. Edn.); but the exact words are not there. Apparently the Commentator has reproduced the sense of *Uddyotakara's* argument.

Prashastamati argues as follows :—" All the usages of men, at the beginning of creation must have been preceded by (dependent upon) the teaching of other persons,—because later on, the usage of enlightened men is found to be restricted to particular things,—as for instance, in the case of little boys who have not yet learnt the use of words, it is found that their usage of words as restricted to particular things is always preceded (and brought about) by the teaching of their mother or other persons ;—the phrase ' the usages of enlightened men are restricted to particular things ' means that the usage of men *after enlightenment* is found to be so restricted ;—that Person to whose teaching usages at the beginning of Creation are due is *God*, whose superior knowledge does not disappear even at the time of Universal Dissolution ".

It is this view that is shown as fully established,—by the Author in the following *Text* :—

TEXT (51).

" AT THE BEGINNING OF CREATION, USAGE AMONG MEN MUST HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE TEACHING OF OTHER PERSONS ;—WHEN THEY BECOME SUBSEQUENTLY AWAKENED TO CONSCIOUSNESS, IT IS FOUND TO BE RESTRICTED TO PARTICULAR THINGS,—LIKE THE USAGE OF LITTLE BOYS."—(51)

COMMENTARY.

The term ' *Sarga* ', ' Creation ', stands for ' generation ' ; the ' beginning ' of this is its first moment.—The rest is easily intelligible.—(51)

There are other arguments also put forward by *Uddyotakara* ; these are the following :—" The Manifested World, consisting of the Primary Elemental Substances and the rest, are productive of Pleasure and Pain, only when controlled by an intelligent Cause,—(*a*) because it is, by itself, insentient, (*b*) because it is a Product, (*c*) because it is perishable, and (*d*) because it is endowed with Colour (or Form) and other qualities,—like the *Axe* and other things ".*

These are the arguments that are set forth in the following two *Texts* :—

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* This is clearly a brief paraphrase of the arguments stated by *Uddyotakara* in his *Nyāyavārtika*, on *Sūtra* 4. 1. 21, page 463, lines 11 *et seq.*, Biblio. Ind. Edn., where the words are very nearly the same.

TEXTS (52-53).

"THE MANIFESTED WORLD, CONSISTING OF THE PRIMARY ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCES AND THE REST, BECOMES THE SOURCE OF PLEASURE AND PAIN TO ALL PEOPLE, ONLY WHEN CONTROLLED BY AN INTELLIGENT CAUSE,—BECAUSE IT IS INSENTIENT, ITSELF A PRODUCT, EVANESCENT AND SO FORTH,—LIKE THE AXE AND OTHER THINGS; THUS EVERYTHING IS CLEARLY BELIEVED TO BE HIS."—(52-53)

COMMENTARY.

Controlled by an Intelligent Cause,—i.e. controlled by a Cause which is endowed with sentience.—*Thus*—i.e. for the said series of reasons;—'*His*', —i.e. of God, the Cause of the entire world.—(52-53)

Question—In what way is God's omniscience proved, by virtue of which He should become an object of devotion for people seeking for Prosperity and the Highest Good?

The answer to this is supplied by the following Text—

TEXT (54).

"THE FACT OF HIS BEING THE CREATOR OF ALL THINGS HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED, HIS OMNISCIENCE IS PROVED WITHOUT EFFORT; BECAUSE THE CREATOR MUST BE ONE WHO KNOWS THE FORM AND ALL OTHER DETAILS REGARDING WHAT HE HAS CREATED."—(54)

COMMENTARY.

This has been thus explained by *Prashastamati* and others:—"The omniscience of God is proved by the fact of His being the Cause (Creator) of the entire World; because the Creator must possess full knowledge of all such details regarding what he creates as its material and contributory causes, its use, its receiver and so forth. In the world, when a man makes anything, he knows its material cause, etc.; e.g. it is well known that the Potter who makes the Jar and such things, knows its *material cause,* in the shape of Clay-lump,—its *contributory causes,* in the shape of the Wheel, etc., —its *purpose,* in the shape of Fetching Water and the like,—and its *receiver,* in the shape of the Householder (who uses it); similarly God, who creates all the worlds, knows their *material causes,* in the shape of the *Atom,* etc.,—their *contributory causes,* in the shape of Merit, Demerit, Space, Time and so forth,—also the *auxiliaries* to their operation, in the shape of the Universal the Particular and Inherence,—their *purpose,* in the shape of the Experience (of Men),—and *receivers* in the shape of Men. This shows that He is omniscient.—*One who knows the form and other details regarding what he has created*;—'*Form and other details*',—'Form' stands for *character*; '*other*

details' stands for the Material Cause and the rest; the '*Vēdaka*' of these is *one who knows*. Such is the sense of the compound. The word '*vēdaka*' is to be grammatically explained either as included under the group of words beginning with '*yājaka*', or as formed with the affix '*aṇa*' in the passive sense—with the *reflexive* '*ka*' added to it.—The rest is easily intelligible.—(54)

There is yet another series of arguments set forth by these persons:—(A) "*That which is the substratum of the variegated and the mobile*, and *that which is not the substratum of these*—which is the thing under dispute,—is cognised through a means of cognition other than the five beginning with the *second*,—just as Colour, etc. are cognised as distinguished from the character of 'being an entity' and so forth,—the 'Hair of the Tortoise' (a non-entity) being the corroborative instance *per dissimilarity*".

In the argument as thus worded, the term, '*vichitrodaya*' stands for the category of *Quality*, in the sense that its '*udaya*', *appearance*, is '*vichitra*' *variegated*; the term '*prasyanda*' stands for the category of *Mobility*;—the '*āspada*', *substratum*, of these two is the category of *Substance*;—*that which is not the substratum* of these two (Quality and Mobility) stands for the five categories of *Quality*, *Action*, *Universal*, *Particular* and *Inherence*;—such a thing is cognised through *a Means of Cognition other than the five beginning with the second*,—i.e. other than Inference, Analogy, Word, Presumption and Non-apprehension; i.e. through *Sense-perception*. The rest is easily intelligible.

(B) The other argument propounded by them is in the following form:—"The Thing under dispute,—which is (1) what is embraced by the *Particulars* of such *Universals* as 'Being' and the like, and also (2) what is not so embraced,—is perceptible to some one,—because they exist,—like Colour and the rest".—In this statement, the term '*Being and the like*' stands for the six non-specific (general) entities,—'Being', 'Evanescent', 'Material Product', 'Cause', 'Universal', 'Particular';—the '*particulars*' of these go to *specify* Substance, Quality and Action;—hence what is 'embraced' by these particulars are these three categories of Substance, Quality and Action;—'*what is not so embraced*' consists of the *Universal* and the rest. The rest is easily intelligible.—[And the Person who has the perception of all these things is God.]

This series of arguments is set forth in the following Text:—

TEXT (55).

"THE THING UNDER DISPUTE MUST CLEARLY BE PERCEPTIBLE TO SOME ONE,—BECAUSE OF SUCH REASONS AS *being a thing*, BEING *existent* AND SO FORTH;—JUST LIKE THE DIVERSITIES OF PLEASURE, PAIN, ETC.—[AND THIS SOME ONE IS *God*]."—(55)

(B)

Refutation of the Doctrine of 'God' (Theism).

COMMENTARY.

The text now proceeds to supply the answer to the above arguments—

TEXT (56).

THE FIRST ARGUMENT (PROPOUNDED BY THE *Naiyāyika*) IS OPEN TO THE FALLACY OF BEING 'UNPROVEN, INADMISSIBLE'; BECAUSE THE EXISTENCE OF ANY SUCH 'ARRANGEMENT' AS 'CONJUNCTION' IS NOT PROVEN, NOR THAT OF THE 'COMPOSITE'.—(56)

COMMENTARY.

In the arguments set forth (under Text 47) in the form 'What is insentient cannot produce its effect without a controller',—the *Probans* ('because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of component parts') is one which, without any valid objection, could be cited as proving the contrary of the Probandum (for proving which it has been put forward); and thus its presence in the contrary of the Probandum being suspected, it becomes 'inconclusive';—this is what the Text means.

Then again, the Probans that has been put forward in the first argument—'Because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its component parts',—is 'unproven' and Inadmissible also. How this is so is explained in the next sentence—*Because, etc.*;—what is meant by the expression 'arrangement of component parts' is a particular kind of *Conjunction*; and the character of being characterised by this Conjunction is attributed to the substance called 'Composite'; now both these,—the said *Conjunction* and also the *Composite* that it characterises,—are yet 'unproven', 'unknown' (to at least one of party to the Discussion, the *Buddhist*, who denies both); hence the Probans cited is doubly 'unproven Inadmissible'.—(56)

Question—"In what way are the two *unproven* ?"

The *Answer* is supplied by the following Text :—

TEXT (57).

BECAUSE BOTH THE FACTS THAT HAVE BEEN ASSUMED (AND PUT FORWARD) ARE SUCH AS ARE NOT ACTUALLY APPREHENDED ; AND FOR THE SAME REASON THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE ALSO THAT HAS BEEN CITED HAS NO CONNECTION WITH THE PROBANS CITED.—(57)

COMMENTARY.

In brief, the Author for the present states his reason only in the form of 'Non-apprehension', which annuls the *Naiyāyika's* argument,—a detailed objection to these two arguments will be provided under the Chapters (10–15) dealing with the Six Categories.

Both the facts,—i.e. that have been put forward as the 'Arrangement' and the 'Composite'.—[Both of these are not apprehended] because the 'Arrangement' has been regarded as something *visible*, in such statements (by the *Naiyāyika*) as 'Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Higher Universal, the Lower Universal and Action are *visible*, as inhering in coloured substances'.—The 'Composite' also has been regarded as *visible*, in the statement—'There is perception of it because it is large, is made up of several component substances and is coloured'.—As a matter of fact however, apart from Colour, etc., no other 'Conjunction' or 'Composite' —such as is accepted by the *Naiyāyika*,—ever appears in Consciousness. Thus, while fulfilling the conditions of 'perceptibility', if it is not perceived, it must be regarded as non-existent, like the 'Hare's Horns'.—It will not be right to argue that—"inasmuch as Atoms are beyond the reach of the Senses, [if there were no such thing as the *Composite* composed of the Atoms], the perception of Colour and other qualities would be impossible";—because it is admitted that qualified Atoms are apprehensible by the Senses, and hence they are not 'beyond the reach of the Senses'.—Thus then, both 'Conjunction' and 'Composite' being non-existent, the *Jar* that has been cited as the Corroborative Instance *per similarity* is found to be devoid of that character which has been set up as the Probans; this is what is meant by the Text in the words '*has no connection with the Probans*, etc.'—(57)

It has thus been shown that the Probans is essentially 'unproven and Inadmissible', on the ground of the *qualification* and the *qualified* being 'unknown'; the following Text proceeds to show that it is 'unproven' also on the ground of the *unproven* (*unknown*) character of part of its *substratum* :—

TEXT (58).

VISUAL COGNITION AND TACTILE COGNITION ALWAYS APPEAR DIFFERENTLY ; THEY CANNOT THEREFORE HAVE ONE AND THE SAME SUBSTRATUM,—JUST LIKE THE COGNITION OF ODOUR AND OTHER THINGS.—(58)

COMMENTARY.

In the argument (put forward by the *Naiyāyika*, under verse 48, above) two kinds of things have been mentioned as the 'Subject'—'what is perceptible by two Sense-organs' and 'what is imperceptible'.—Now as a matter of fact, there is no object that is *known* (accepted by all parties) to be 'perceptible by two Sense-organs'; for instance, both *Visual Cognition* and *Tactile Cognition*, are known to appear in different forms, respectively as *manifesting the Blue and other Colours* and as *manifesting Hardness, Softness, etc. of the things touched*; thus both these cognitions cannot have the same objective,—because they appear as different,—like the Cognitions of Odour, Taste and other things. The argument may be formulated thus :—Any two cognitions appearing in different forms cannot have the same objective,—like the Cognitions of Odour and Taste,—the Visual and Tactile Cognitions do appear in different forms ;—hence the attributing of both to a single object would be a direct contravention of the said universal proposition.—If, even when appearing in different forms, Cognitions were to have the same objective, then the Cognitions of Colour, Sound and such diverse things also might be regarded as having the same objective ; this is the reason that annuls the argument of the *Naiyāyika*.—(58)

[Says the *Naiyāyika*]—"If the two Cognitions (Visual and Tactile) cannot have the same objective, then how is it that there is the recognition in the form that 'I am touching in the dark the *same* jar that I had seen in the light'?*—Hence the proposition set forth (by the Buddhist) is annulled by Inference. The Inference has been formulated by *Uddyotakara* in the following form—'The two Cognitions under dispute,—the Visual Cognition and the Tactile Cognition,—have the same object,—because it is recalled (recognised),—like the Cognition of the *Blue Lotus*'."†

The answer to this is provided in the following Text :—

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* This discussion is a clear reference to *Nyāya-Sūtra* 3. 1. 1—'*Darshanasparsanābhyāmēkārthagrahaṇāt*'.

† This is a reference to *Nyāya Vārtika*, 3. 1. 1, page 350, Bib. Ind.

TEXTS (59-60).

As a matter of fact, what brings about the joint cognition (involved in Recognition) is the fact that Recognition consists in an assumption arising out of the potencies of the two cognitions concerned.—Thus, such things as Water, Fire and the like are not 'perceptible by two Sense-organs'; and hence the Probans (of the *Naiyāyika*) is found to have its substratum 'unproven, Inadmissible', as is indicated by the 'unproven' character of the object itself.—(60)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tayoḥ*'—i.e. of the Visual and Tactile Cognitions as apprehending (respectively) Colour only and Touch only;—'Potency' is *capacity*;—out of that capacity *arises* the *assumption*, which constitutes—forms the essence of—the 'Recognition' (in question).—This shows that *Recognition* is not *perceptible*; firstly, because it is an essentially wrong cognition, apprehending as *one* what is really *not one*,—and secondly, because its very essence lies in an *assumption*.—Nor is there any other Means of Cognition (available for bringing about a valid notion of Recognition); *firstly*, because it apprehends what has been already covered by previous Cognitions, and as such it apprehends what has been already apprehended (and as such, is not of the nature of a *Direct Valid Cognition*); and secondly, because it is essentially wrong. From all this it follows that the Reason put forward (by the *Naiyāyika*)—"*Because there is Recognition*"—is 'inconclusive'. If the validity of Recognition had been established and admitted, then the Reason would not be open to the charge of being 'inconclusive'; because in cases where notions of such things as the Jar and the like have appeared,—taking in, in accordance with the capacity of things, a common idea of its Colour and other details,—if the *Colour* and the *Touch* have been duly apprehended, each by itself, by the organs of Vision and of Touch, then, at some future time, if the impressions of the things perceived present themselves accompanied by signs indicative of those things, there appears the notion of 'unity', 'sameness', which is essentially wrong, and is of the nature of 'Remembrance' (not Direct Cognition). It is for this reason that in this joint notion, the Colour—Blue,—also presents itself; though it is not

right that the notion of Colour should appear in the notion of Touch; as Colour is perceptible by the Organ of Vision (not of Touch).—For these reasons, the only reasonable view is what the Teachers have stated in the following words :—' After one has perceived by the Visual and Tactile Organs, each in its own way, there appears, subsequently, a notion, joining the two perceptions and apprehending the two objects conjointly as one unit; and this notion is of the nature of *Remembrance* '.

Objection—" In case the conjoint entity (Colour and Touch combined) has been previously actually perceived, then it would be right to regard this as *Remembrance* ; but, you (Buddhists) do not admit of any joint entity, —apart from the individual things, Colour and the rest,—which could have been thus previously perceived ; and if Colour and the rest were only individually perceived, then the Remembrance could only be one of ' Colour ' only, or of ' Touch ' only and so forth,—and not of the ' Jar ' ; and in regard to things that have not been previously cognised, there can be no Remembrance ;—then how could any Remembrance arise in regard to the joint entity (as asserted by your Teachers) ? "

This is not right, we reply. It is not asserted that the joint entity that is previously perceived is something distinct from Colour and the rest ;— your objection would hold only if the assertion of our Teachers meant this ; what is meant however is that those same Colour and the rest, when serving the fruitful purpose of holding water and the like, come to be collectively called the ' Jar ' ; and what happens is that after each of those Colour and the rest, has been perceived by means of each of their pertinent sense-organs,— there appears, at some future time, the Remembrance of these under the appellation of ' Jar ', which bears the impressions of the said perceptions.— Or the ' Joint Entity ' may be regarded as ' conceptual ', and being of the nature of a ' conceptual entity ', as apprehended by its own cognition ; under the circumstances, why cannot Remembrance of such a Joint Entity be possible ?

From all this it is clear that the Reason (put forward by the *Naiyāyika*), —" *Because of the peculiar arrangements of its component parts* ",—has its substratum ' unproven '.—" Why so ? "—The Answer is—*By the ' unproven ' character of the object itself*; that is, the object as stated by the *Naiyāyika* in the form ' perceptible by two sense-organs ' is *not proven, unknown* ; and thus the Reason having its substratum ' unproven ', becomes itself open to the fallacy of being ' unproven ', ' unknown, Inadmissible '.—(59-60)

Thus it has been shown that the Reason (put forward by the *Naiyāyika*) is ' unproven ' in three ways—' unproven ' regarding its qualified (subject), ' unproven ' regarding the qualification of that subject, and ' unproven ' regarding its substratum ; the following Text proceeds to show a fourth kind of ' unproven-ness ' as pointed out by the Teacher :—

TEXTS (61-62).

IN THE CASE OF TEMPLES AND SUCH THINGS, THE PRESENCE OF A PECULIAR ARRANGEMENT (OF COMPONENT PARTS) IS DISTINCTLY PERCEIVED,—FROM WHICH PERCEPTION FOLLOWS THE COGNITION (INFERENTIAL) OF AN INTELLIGENT BUILDER,—EVEN WHEN NO SUCH BUILDER IS ACTUALLY SEEN; IF, IN THE CASE OF SUCH OBJECTS AS THE BODY, THE MOUNTAIN AND THE LIKE, A SIMILAR PECULIAR ARRANGEMENT OF PARTS WERE DISTINCTLY PERCEIVED, THEN IT WOULD BE CORRECT TO DEDUCE FROM THIS PERCEPTION AS THE REASON, THE CONCLUSION THAT IS DESIRED (BY THE *Naiyāyika*).—(61-62)

COMMENTARY.

That 'peculiar arrangement of parts' which is known,—through affirmative and negative concomitance,—as produced by the operations of an intelligent builder, in the case of such things as the Temple and the like;—on the perception of such a peculiar arrangement of parts, the notion is deduced that the Temple has had an intelligent builder, even though no such Builder is actually seen at the time;—if a similar 'arrangement of parts' were put forward in connection with such 'subjects' as the Body, the Mountain and so forth,—then your desired conclusion might have been proved. Because when the affirmative and negative concomitance between a Cause and an Effect has been duly discussed, that Effect can never fail to be produced by that Cause; for if it did, it would cease to be the Cause.—As a matter of fact however, no such 'peculiar arrangement of parts' is so well known as regards the Tree, the Mountain and such things; all that is known is only the bare babbling that 'there is an arrangement'. A certain character which, by its very nature, stands as something distinct, does not cease to be so distinct by mere assertion; and if brought forward as a Reason or 'Probans', such a character cannot be sufficient to prove the desired conclusion; as the presence of such a character would not be incompatible even with the contrary of that conclusion. As for example, when the character of 'being a product of Clay' is brought forward as a Reason for proving that the Anthill has been 'built by the Potter'.—Such is the meaning of the Text taken as a whole.

The meaning of the words of the Text is now explained:—*From which perception follows the cognition of an intelligent builder*,—i.e. from the perception of which 'peculiar arrangement' there would follow the inference of an intelligent cause.—*In the case of such objects as the Body, etc. etc.*;—'*Tanu*'

is Body; '*Aga*' is mountain, or Tree; the phrase '*and the like*' includes such things as the Ocean and so forth.—*The conclusion that is desired,*— —i.e. the fact of being the work of an intelligent maker.—'*Sādhana*' is *proof.*—(61-62)

Question—"In what way would it be correct" (to draw the desired conclusion)?

The Answer is provided by the following Text:—

TEXTS (63–65).

WHEN A CERTAIN THING IS DEFINITELY RECOGNISED, THROUGH AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE, AS THE EFFECT OF A CERTAIN CAUSE, THEN, THE PERCEPTION OF THAT EFFECT MUST PROVE THAT CAUSE;—SUCH IS THE STANDING LAW.—THE 'PECULIAR ARRANGEMENT OF PARTS' IN SUCH DIVERSE THINGS AS THE BODY, THE MOUNTAIN AND THE LIKE HOWEVER IS NOT AN EFFECT OF THIS KIND; THERE IS A MERE ASSERTION TO THAT EFFECT.—SUCH A REASON, WHEN PUT FORWARD, RENDERS THE CONCLUSION OPEN TO DOUBT AND DENIAL, AS IT DOES WHEN PUT FORWARD FOR PROVING THAT 'THE ANTHILL IS THE WORK OF THE POTTER'.—(65)

COMMENTARY.

The Effect,—e.g. smoke;—*of a certain cause,*—e.g. Fire;—*definitely recognised,*—in regard to Fire, etc.;—*the perception of that effect*—when the effect in the shape of *Smoke* is seen.

"If that is so, then the same may be the case with the matter under dispute also."

The answer is—*The peculiar arrangement however,* etc.

"If the *peculiar arrangement* is proved by the general assertion, then, it can very well be put forward as the Reason."

Answer—Such a reason, etc.—*Such*—i.e. based on mere assertion.—*Work of the Potter,* etc.;—the reason being 'the fact of its being a product of Clay'.

Thus then, the conclusion arrived at is that the '*peculiar* arrangement' in question is 'unproven', and as for mere 'arrangement', that is 'inconclusive'.—(63–65)

In the following Text the Opponent urges that what the Buddhist has put forward is only a 'Futile Rejoinder':—

TEXT (66).

"WHAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD (BY YOU) IS ONLY A 'FUTILE REJOINDER', AS IT IS BASED UPON THE ASSUMPTION OF A PARTICULAR CHARACTER; WHILE WHAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD (BY US, THE *Naiyāyika*) IS ONLY THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF 'EFFECTS'."—(66)

COMMENTARY.

"What you have urged is only a 'Futile Rejoinder', that particular form of it which is put forward '*per* parity of the character of effect'. For instance, when it is argued that 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced', the man putting forward the Futile Rejoinder says—'The character of *being produced* that you put forward as the Reason,—do you mean this character as : (1) subsisting in such things as the Jar ? (2) Or as subsisting in Sound ? Or (3) as subsisting in both (Jar and Sound) ? The *first* alternative is not possible, as the subsistence of this Reason in the subject (of your syllogism, Sound) would be 'unproven'; in fact the character of one thing (the Jar) cannot subsist in another thing (Sound). The second alternative also cannot be accepted, as there would be no Corroborative Instance fulfilling the conditions of the Reason. The third alternative also would be open to both these objections. This has been explained to be an example of that *Futile Rejoinder* which is named 'Per Parity of the character of the effect'; as stated in the following words :—'When the Conclusion is shown to be not-proved on the basis of even the slightest deviation from the character of the Effect, it is *Futile Rejoinder*'.

"In the case under consideration the inference of *non-eternality* is sought to be proved on the basis of the generic character of the 'Effect', not on any particular aspect of it. Hence if a Rejoinder is put forward on the basis of the assumption of a *particular* character (or aspect),—when the Reason or Probans has been put forward by the other party on the basis of its *general* character,—this is a *Futile Rejoinder*, named 'per Parity of the character of Effect'. In short, this is based upon the assumption of a different character and hence is a *Futile Rejoinder*."—(66)

The above is answered by the following Text :—

TEXT (67).

[IN THE EXAMPLE OF FUTILE REJOINDER CITED] THE MERE THING (EFFECT IN GENERAL), AS EXCLUDED FROM ALL THAT IS *not that Thing* (NOT-EFFECT), DOES REALLY PROVE *non-eternality*, ON ACCOUNT OF ITS BEING OF THE SAME ESSENCE AS THAT. BUT AS REGARDS THE PROBANS UNDER DISCUSSION, THERE IS NO REASON FOR IT AT ALL.—(67)

COMMENTARY.

The argument put forward above (against which the example of Futile Rejoinder has been cited) is quite right and proper; because the mere fact

of being an *effect* (Product) in General does prove *non-eternality* (Evanescence); because between these two there is that invariable concomitance which consists in *being of the same essence.*—In the case of the reasoning put forward (by the *Naiyāyika*) however, there is no such reason behind the Probans as put forward by the *Naiyāyika*—viz. "Because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its component parts"; specially as 'arrangement of parts' *in general* is a factor the contrary of which is not precluded by any incongruity; hence the requisite 'invariable concomitance' is not available. In fact any such concomitance in the form of 'being produced from it'—on the cognition of which the consequent conclusion could become accepted even when one does not actually perceive the actual operation of the Cause,—is absolutely *unknown*, inadmissible. This is what is meant by the Text.—(67)

The following text proceeds to show that the *Naiyāyika's* reasoning would be open to the fallacy of 'Indecision' (Inconclusiveness), even if he gave up the idea of 'concomitance' being of a particular kind (i.e. *invariable*) and intended it to be in the general form (of mere concomitance *in general*).

TEXT (68).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE SMOKE THAT HAS BEEN SEEN TO BE INVARIABLY CONCOMITANT WITH FIRE IS *white*; AND YET THE MENTION OF MERE 'WHITENESS' COULD NOT PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF FIRE; IF IT DID, THEN THAT EXISTENCE COULD BE INFERRED EVEN FROM THE 'SNOW'.—(68)

COMMENTARY.

"How is it then that the Futile Rejoinder is cited?"
The answer is given in the following Text:—

TEXT (69).

WHEN THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE (PREMISS) IS STATED IN THE *general* FORM, AND THE OBJECTION URGED AGAINST IT IS ON THE BASIS OF A *particular* ASPECT OF IT,—THEN THIS IS SAID TO BE A *Futile Rejoinder*.—(69)

COMMENTARY.

In a case where the invariable concomitance of the Probandum with the Probans is definitely known to be in a *general way*,—specially by means of the right cognition of its absence in the contrary of the 'Subject',—and yet the objection that is urged against it is on the basis of a *particular* aspect or character (of the Probans),—then such an objection constitutes a 'Futile

Rejoinder '.—In the case of the reasoning (put forward by the *Naiyāyika*) however, the invariable concomitance cited is not known to be in the *general* form; the Probans that has been objected to as being 'unproven' is one that has been put forward as being concomitant with a particular 'arrangement of component parts'; hence this objection is not of the nature of a 'Futile Rejoinder'.—(69)

If a general character could bring about the cognition of a thing even without being invariably concomitant with it, then absurdity could result;—this is what is shown in the following Text:—

TEXT (70).

THE MERE CHARACTER OF 'BEING DENOTED BY THE TERM *Go*' (AS A GENERAL CHARACTER) MIGHT PROVE THE 'PRESENCE OF HORNS' IN THE QUARTERS AND OTHER THINGS (WHICH ARE ALL *denoted by the term 'Go'*),—IF THE REASONING WERE NOT ADOPTED IN A DIFFERENT FORM.—(70)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, *Heaven, Quarters, Speech, Eyes, Rays, Thunderbolt, Earth* and *Water*,—all these things are 'denoted by the term *Go*'; if, on the basis of this general character of 'being denoted by the term *Go*', it were sought to be proved that a particular Cow of variegated colour has horns,—then on the basis of the same character, it would be possible to infer *the presence of Horns* in *Heaven*, etc. also.—(70)

The following might be urged (by the *Naiyāyika*):—"As a matter of fact, there *is* invariable concomitance between the character of 'having a peculiar arrangement of component parts' and that of 'being produced by an intelligent Cause',—just as there is between this latter and the character of 'being a Product (Effect)'."

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (71).

IF IT WERE PROVED BY SOME VALID MEANS OF COGNITION THAT THERE *is* AN INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE BETWEEN THE PROBANS AND THE PROBANDUM (CITED BY THE *Naiyāyika*), THEN, THE CONCLUSION WOULD BE FULLY ESTABLISHED BY REASONING, AND NO ONE COULD HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY AGAINST IT.—(71)

COMMENTARY.

But, as a matter of fact, no such Invariable Concomitance is proved; this is what the Author proceeds to show by the following Text:—

TEXT (72).

But the existence of a Being who is eternal, one, and the substratum of eternal all-embracing Consciousness,—can never be proved; as the Invariable Concomitance (Premiss) that may be cited would be devoid of the Probandum.—(72)

COMMENTARY.

What you (*Naiyāyika*) desire to prove is, not only that the World has been created by an Intelligent Maker, but that it is preceded (produced) by the intelligent Entity known as God, who is the Cause of the whole World, being himself *one, eternal and the substratum of an eternal all-embracing Consciousness.* In fact, it is this entity that forms the subject of dispute. The existence of such a Being cannot be proved;—why?—because the Invariable Concomitance (that might be put forward to prove Its existence) will be *devoid of the Probandum* (the character to be proved); for the simple reason that any positive Corroborative Instance that might be cited in the form of the Jar and such things would be lacking in the element of similarity that is essential [the maker of the Jar not having all the character that is predicated of God], and this would make it impossible to prove the necessary Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum; as in no particular Instance (of any Product) is there any invariable concomitance between the Probans and the character of the Probandum as postulated (by the *Naiyāyika*).—(72)

With a view to showing the same, the following Text proceeds to add the following:—

TEXT (73).

For instance, all such products as Houses, Steps, Gateways, Towers and the like are definitely known to have been made by makers who have been many, and with fleeting Ideas.—(73)

COMMENTARY.

Further, the Probans is not only 'Unproven' and 'Inconclusive'; it is also 'Contradictory';—this is what is shown by the Author in the following Text:—

TEXT (74).

For the same reason, the Probans is also detrimental to what is desired; inasmuch as what it establishes is [a Cause] that is many, and the substratum of fleeting Ideas.—(74)

COMMENTARY.

For the same reason,—i.e. because the Invariable Concomitance (Premiss) is contrary to the Probandum (which is desired to be proved).—What the

term 'also' indicates is that the Probans is not only 'unproven' and 'inconclusive', as shown above [but it is also 'Contradictory'].—(74)

[Says the *Naiyāyika*]—"The Probans would be 'Contradictory' only if it were invariably concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum; in the case in question however, there is (as you say) no invariable concomitance even with the mere character of 'having an intelligent Cause'; how then could there be any such concomitance with any particular form of that character (which alone could be contrary to the desired conclusion)?"

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (75).

THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE THAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED BY YOU IS ONLY WITH REFERENCE TO THE PROBANDUM IN THE FORM OF 'THE CHARACTER OF HAVING AN INTELLIGENT CAUSE'; AND WE ARE GOING TO ASSERT IT CLEARLY WITH REFERENCE TO A SECOND (DIFFERENT, CONTRARY) PROBANDUM.—(75)

COMMENTARY.

You, Theist, in asserting the existence of God, have set forth an Invariable Concomitance in reference to the Probandum in the shape of 'the character of having an Intelligent Cause'; if that were not so, and if this general proposition (premiss) also were not admitted, then how could it have been possible to prove that all things have God for their Creator?—Thus then, we admit (for the sake of Argument) the premiss from your view-point—that 'Things have an Intelligent Cause',—and then proceed to show clearly that your Probans is invariably concomitant with a particular Probandum which is 'Second'—contrary—to that particular Probandum which you desire to prove;—this 'Second' Probandum being 'the character of being preceded (produced) by a person of evanescent and many Cognitions (Ideas)'.—(75)

Question—"How are you going to show this clearly?"

The answer is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (76).

FOR US, ETERNAL THINGS CANNOT PRODUCE ANY EFFECTS, BECAUSE 'CONSECUTIVE' AND 'CONCURRENT' ACTION ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY; AND IF OBJECTS ARE CONSECUTIVE, THERE MUST BE THE SAME CONSECUTIVENESS IN THEIR COGNITIONS ALSO.—(76)

COMMENTARY.

Any such *eternal things* as God and the like *cannot produce any effects*; because in any productive activity of an Eternal Thing, there is incompatibility

between 'Consecutiveness' and 'Concurrence'; hence only non-eternal things can be productive causes; as it is these alone which go on unceasingly changing their sequential character—of being *present* now and *past* at the next moment. Thus it is proved that an Intelligent Maker must be evanescent and many.

As regards the assertion (of the *Naiyāyika*) that "God is endowed with eternal and one Consciousness",—this is contrary to all reason; this is what is indicated by the words '*If objects are consecutive, etc.*' [Objects being fleeting, evanescent, according to the *Naiyāyika* also, their cognitions also must be evanescent; hence there can be no eternal cognition or consciousness].—(76)

What has been just asserted (in the second line of the preceding Text) is further supported by the following Text:—

TEXT (77).

God's Cognition must be consecutive, because it is related to consecutive cognisable things;—just like the cognition of Dēvadatta and other persons, relating to Flame and other things.—(77)

COMMENTARY.

That Cognition of which the object is consecutive must itself be consecutive; just as we find in the case of the cognition of Dēvadatta and other men pertaining to such things as Flame and the like;—and God's Cognition has for its object only such things as are consecutive. This is a Reason based upon the nature of things. And as this reasoning is put forward only by way of exposing the incongruity involved (in the Theist's position), [and not as a formal Inferential Argument],—it will not be right to urge against it the fact of the Probans being 'unproven' (not admitted by both parties). Inasmuch as the Cognition of Dēvadatta and others relating to such things as 'Universal' and the rest (which are held to be eternal) would be devoid of the main characteristic of the Probans (*evanescence of the Object*),—the instance cited is that of things like the *Flame* (which all parties admit to be evanescent).

Question—"What is the actual proof (argument) which annuls (the Theist's reasonings)?"

Answer—If God's Cognition manifesting itself is produced by an object which is consecutive, then it becomes proved that it must be consecutive;—if it is not so produced, then, as there would be no proximate contact (with the Object and the Cognition), God could not cognise the Object at all. And the result of this would be either that Cognitions would have to be held as valid even in the absence of their object, or you would have to renounce your doctrine (regarding the omniscience of God). There would be a further absurdity that, in regard to such objects as have been destroyed, or have not yet been produced, the Cognition (of God) would be objectless.—This is the argument that annuls the Theist's reasonings.—(77)

It has been asserted (by the *Naiyāyika,* under Text 48 above) that—"Atoms supply the corroborative Instance *per Dissimilarity* [in support of the reasoning that 'the World must have an Intelligent Cause, because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of component parts ']".

The Author proceeds to show in the following Text that the said *Instance per Dissimilarity* is one from which the character of the Probandum is not excluded :—

TEXTS (78-79).

THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS ARE REGARDED BY US AS MERE AGGREGATES OF ATOMS; AND THE POTTER AND OTHER MEN WHO MAKE THOSE THINGS ARE ONLY MAKERS OF THE ATOMS; HENCE THE CHARACTER THAT YOU MEAN TO PROVE (I.E. YOUR PROBANDUM) IS NOT EXCLUDED (ABSENT) FROM THE ATOM WHICH HAS BEEN CITED (BY YOU) AS A CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE *per Dissimilarity*.—(78-79)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Composite' is going to be denied by us in detail (under Chapter 10); and it has already in a way been denied; hence (there being no such composite whole as the *Jar*) the Potter must be regarded as the 'maker' of Atoms only; and thus the 'character to be proved',—that of *being made by an Intelligent Maker,*—is one that is not excluded from the Atoms, which have been cited as an *Instance per dissimilarity*; and thus the *Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity* that has been cited (by the Theist, in support of his reasoning) is found to be open to the defect that the character of the Probandum is not absent from it [and hence it cannot serve as an *instance per dissimilarity*].—(78-79)

The following might be urged :—"If what we had desired to prove were the *particular* phase of any character, then the Corroborative Instance per *Similarity* cited by us (in the form of the Jar) might have been open to the defect of being devoid of the *character sought to be proved* (Probandum); as it is however, what we are seeking to prove is only the *general* character of 'being produced by an Intelligent Cause'; and when that General thesis has been proved, then, by implication, God becomes proved as the Cause (Maker) of the Tree and other things. Potter, etc. cannot be the maker of these things, as they are of the Jar and such other things; because the General character is further specified by a particular characteristic. For instance, in the case of such things as the Tree and the like, it is not possible that there should be any other Maker; and the implication of this recognised fact is that, even without the specific mention of a particular character (of the Maker), it is God alone that comes to be recognised as the Maker of these things."

The answer to this is supplied in the following Text :—

TEXT (80).

IF THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING PRODUCED BY AN INTELLIGENT CAUSE' IS MEANT TO BE PROVED ONLY IN A GENERAL FORM, THEN WE HAVE NO DISPUTE WITH YOU; AS ALL DIVERSITY IS DUE TO ACTIONS.—(80)

COMMENTARY.

If it is as you now explain, then your argument is open to the objection of being futile—seeking to prove what is already admitted by all parties.—"How so?"—Because all *diversity*,—i.e. the diverse character of the world that exists,—is *due to Actions*,—i.e. brought about by common and uncommon, good and bad, deeds. Hence men performing the good and bad actions, who are all intelligent beings, become the *cause* of all this. And (in this form we also accept the general proposition that 'Things are produced by Intelligent Causes'); so your argument becomes 'futile'.—(80)

If (in order to avoid this) it be held that "the proposition sought to be proved is in a *particular* (not the General) form",—then the answer is as given in the following Text:—

TEXT (81).

IF WHAT YOU SEEK TO PROVE IS THE FACT THAT THE WORLD IS CREATED BY A CAUSE WHO IS ONE AND WHOSE CONSCIOUSNESS IS ETERNAL,—THEN THERE IS ABSENCE OF THE PROBANDUM (IN THE INSTANCE); AND IT IS 'INCONCLUSIVE' ALSO, SINCE SUCH THINGS AS THE HOUSE AND THE LIKE ARE FOUND TO BE MADE BY SEVERAL MAKERS.—(81)

COMMENTARY.

Though this has been already explained under Text 73 above, yet it is asserted again with a view to clinching the argument.—The compound '*Nityaikabuddhipūrvatvam*' may be taken to mean either 'produced by one who is eternal and has a single Consciousness', or 'produced by one whose Consciousness is eternal and one'.—*Absence of the Probandum*;—i.e. in what has been cited as the Corroborative Instance *per similarity*;—also '*inconclusiveness*',—i.e. *of the Probans*—(this has to be supplied).—"How?"—The answer is—*Since such things as the House, etc. etc.*—(81)

It has been asserted (by the Theist, above, under Text 49) that "The material Cause of the Tree and other things is controlled by an Intelligent Being, etc. etc."

The answer to these arguments is given in the following Text:—

TEXT (82).

AGAINST THE OTHER REASONINGS (OF THE THEIST) ALSO, THIS SAME CRITICISM MAY BE URGED *mutatis mutandis*; SOME OTHER CRITICISM ALSO IS NOW BEING BRIEFLY SET FORTH.—(82)

COMMENTARY.

As against the reason '*Because they have colour, etc.*', this same criticism may be urged: *This same,*—as follows:—(*a*) It is *Unproven*; (*b*) as there is no Invariable Concomitance, it is *Inconclusive*; (*c*) if there is Invariable Concomitance, it is *Contradictory*; (*d*) the Instance is devoid of the Probandum; (*e*) if the Conclusion is meant to be general, it is *futile,* and so forth.—For instance, *that presence of Colour,* etc. which is controlled by an Intelligent Controller is not admitted as being present in the Tree, etc.;—mere 'presence of Colour' by itself is not invariably concomitant (with the Probandum); hence the Probans is *Inconclusive*; if there is invariable concomitance, then, it becomes *contradictory,* as proving a conclusion contrary to the one desired;—the *Corroborative Instance per similarity* is devoid of the Probandum, as no concomitance is admitted with the character of 'being controlled by an eternal and one Intelligent Being';—if the conclusion is meant to be in the *general* form, then the argument is *futile*; if it is meant to be *specific,* then it is *inconclusive* (Doubtful), the contrary being found to be the case with such things as the Jar and the like.—In this same manner, the criticism may be applied to the other reasonings also.—(82)

Another reason has been put forward (by the Theist, under Text 50)—"'because they operate intermittently [all such Causes as Merit, Demerit and Atoms must be controlled by an Intelligent Being]".

Against this an additional objection is put forward in the following Text:—

TEXT (83).

'INTERMITTENT ACTION' OF ATOMS AND OTHER CAUSES IS *not proven* (ADMITTED); AS THERE IS 'PERPETUAL FLUX', ALL THINGS ARE UNDERGOING DESTRUCTION EVERY MOMENT; IT IS ALSO 'INCONCLUSIVE' IN REFERENCE TO THAT SAME (GOD), AS HIS ACTIVITY ALSO IS CONSECUTIVE (HENCE INTERMITTENT).—(83)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, all things (according to us) disappear immediately on appearance, and they do not remain in existence even for a single moment; how then can the action of these be 'intermittent'? This Reason therefore is one that is 'unproven, inadmissible', for your Opponent. *It is also 'incon-*

clusive', in reference to the same—God; as God also operates only intermittently over things which appear consecutively; and yet He is not controlled by an Intelligent Being; for if He were, then there would be no need to posit such Intelligent Controllers.—If the Reason be meant to be qualified by the qualifying phrase 'being insentient',—as has been actually done by *Prashastamati*,—even so the 'inconclusiveness' remains unavoidable; as the exclusion of the contrary of the Probandum remains doubtful. That Reason alone can be regarded as logical which serves to exclude the Probans from the contrary of the Probandum; that however which does not entirely set aside all doubt of the presence of the Probans in the contrary of the Probandum,—even if put forward,—is as good as not there (i.e. ineffective). Further, even with the said qualification, the Reason remains open to the aforesaid defects of being 'unproven' and the rest.—(83)

As regards the argument (put forward by the Theist under Text 51, above) that—"At the beginning of Creation usage among men must have been due to the teaching of other persons, etc. etc."—it is answered by the following Text:—

TEXT (84).

ACCORDING TO US, AT DISSOLUTION, PERSONS DO NOT CONTINUE TO REMAIN WITH ALL CONSCIOUSNESS AND MEMORY COMPLETELY LOST; BECAUSE THEY ARE BORN IN EFFULGENT REGIONS, AND FROM THESE LATTER THEY ARE BORN AGAIN IN THIS WORLD.—(84)

COMMENTARY.

In Text (51) the Theist has used the qualifying phrase, 'when they become awakened to consciousness'; but such a qualification is absurd. Because under our theory, it is not true that at Dissolution, there remain Persons with all consciousness and memory lost and with all organs enfeebled; what happens is that they are born in Luminous Regions, in celestial bodies, endowed with superior forms of clear consciousness; those however who have still got to expiate their Karmic residue through the fruition of particularly sinful and other deeds become born in other material regions; so that even at the time of the future evolution of the world (following after Dissolution), those same persons fall down from the Luminous and other regions and become born in this world, without losing all consciousness and memory. Hence any such qualification as 'when they become subsequently awakened to consciousness' is absurd.

Further, the Reason put forward is also 'inconclusive', because its absence from the contrary of the Probandum is doubtful. And if all that is meant to be proved is the fact of 'being preceded by the teaching of other persons',—then the argument is 'Futile', as all parties are agreed that in the matter of usage, which is beginningless, dependence on mutual teaching is inevitable.—If then what is meant to be proved is the fact of its being

'preceded by the teaching of the particular person called *God*', then the Reason put forward is 'Inconclusive',—because as a matter of fact, it is actually possible in other ways also (without such teaching). The Corroborative Instance also, in this case, would be devoid of the Probandum. This has already been urged before as a general defect (in the Theist's argument).—(84)

The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason put forward is also 'Contradictory' and the Conclusion is contrary to the Theist's own doctrines :—

TEXT (85).

THEN AGAIN, THE 'TEACHERSHIP' OF A MOUTHLESS PERSON CAN ONLY BE A MATTER OF BLIND FAITH ; GOD'S 'MOUTHLESSNESS' IS PROVED BY HIS HAVING NO BODY, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE IN HIM OF MERIT AND DEMERIT.—(85)

COMMENTARY.

If it were possible for usage to be preceded by (due to) God's teaching, then the Reason might not be 'Contradictory' ; as it is however, God having no mouth, it is not possible for Him to be a *teacher* ; and the fact of His having no mouth is *proved by His having no body*,—i.e. because He is devoid of a body.—*Question*—" But how do you know that He has no body ? "—*Answer—On account of the absence in Him of Merit and Demerit* ; that is, in God there is no Merit and Demerit, which are the causes of Souls having bodies. This has been thus declared by *Uddyotakara* :—'Proof is available for the presence of Intelligence in God, but there is no proof for the presence of such qualities as Merit and the rest'.*—Thus the 'teachership' of God being impossible, usage cannot be attributed to His teaching ; what is indicated is only the fact of its being due to the teaching of some persons other than God ; and thus by discarding what is desired to be proved, the Reason becomes 'Contradictory'.

Even if God's 'teachership' is admitted, the doctrine that He is 'mouthless' becomes abandoned ; and in this way the conclusion becomes contrary to the Theist's own doctrine.

As regards the argument—'The *manifest* consisting of the Primary Elements and the rest being controlled by an Intelligent Controller, etc. etc.' (put forward by *Uddyotakara*, in *Nyāyavārtika*, p. 463, and quoted in the *Text* 52),—it can be shown that the Reasons cited there also, as before, are (*a*) 'inconclusive', as there is no proof against a contrary conclusion,—(*b*) 'futile', if the reason is meant to be stated *generally*,—and (*c*) if it is

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* This is an exact quotation from the *Nyāyavārtika*, p. 468, ll. 12 *et. seq.*, Bib. Ind. Ed., with this slight difference that for '*Sattvē*' in the present context, *Nyāyavārtika* has '*Sambhavē*'.

meant to be *particular*, then the Corroborative Instance cited is devoid of the Probandum.—(85)

Having refuted in detail the arguments put forward for proving the existence of God, the following *Text* proceeds to urge the defects in the Invariable Concomitance (Premiss, on which the Theist bases his arguments), and thereby to establish his own view :—

TEXT (86).

IN ALL THE ARGUMENTS, THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE (PREMISS) IS CONTRARY TO INFERENCE ; AND THERE CAN BE NO INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE OF THE PROBANS ON THE BASIS OF A CONTRARY (FALSE) CHARACTER.—(86)

COMMENTARY.

In every one of the arguments put forward (by the Theist), the Invariable Concomitance that has been cited as between the Probans and the Probandum, is *contrary to Inference*,—as is going to be explained later on.

Question—" Why is not this *contrariness to Inference* urged against the conclusion (of the Theist) ? "

Answer—It would be so urged if the conclusion formed part of the Proof (Reasoning). As a matter of fact however, the Conclusion does not, either directly or indirectly, form part of the proving of the Probandum ; hence when what is going to be done is the urging of objections against the proof of the Probandum, if the party urged the defects in the Conclusion, he would become subject to the Clincher of 'Urging what is not a defect'. It is for this reason that in connection with the statement of proofs, the defects of the Conclusion should not be urged. If in some cases, a defect in the Conclusion is actually urged, there also it should be taken as having been urged only for the purpose of demolishing the Invariable Concomitance.—Or such instances may be regarded as possible only in cases where the Conclusion alone has been asserted (without any reasoning in support of it).

Question—" Even at the time that the Invariable Concomitance is put forward, how can there be *contrariness to Inference* ? "

Answer—*There can be no invariable concomitance, etc.*—'*Contrary character*' —is that which is opposed to all Means of Valid Cognition, *false* ; as such a character would be impossible (*non est*), an invariable concomitance with it would be impossible ; certainly there can be no invariable concomitance with what does not exist.—(86)

Question—" What is that *Inference* by which the Invariable Concomitance is annulled ? "

The answer is provided by the following Text :—

TEXT (87).

GOD CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF BORN THINGS,—BECAUSE HE IS HIMSELF DEVOID OF BIRTH,—LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS'. OTHERWISE, ALL THINGS WOULD COME INTO EXISTENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY.—(87)

COMMENTARY.

That which is itself devoid of birth cannot be the cause of anything;—as the 'Sky-lotus',—God is devoid of birth;—hence the proposition that He is the cause would be contrary to the Universal Premiss.—This argument is meant only to indicate an absurdity in the doctrine of the Opponent; hence it is not open to the objection that the substratum of its Reason (Probans) is 'unproven'.

Otherwise, all things would come into existence simultaneously;—what is meant is that, if the Cause were one whose efficiency is never obstructed, then all things would come into existence simultaneously,—exactly like things which are admitted to be produced at one and the same time.

This argument is the proof that annuls the Invariable Concomitance of the Theist. Or this may be taken merely as stating the sense of what has been said before.

The absurdity (involved in the Theist's position) is to be shown in this manner:—When the Cause is present, in its complete form, then the Effect must appear as a matter of course; just as it is found in the case of the *Sprout* which appears as soon as the final stage has been reached by the causal conditions conducive to it;—now under the doctrine of the Theist, as God, the cause of all things, would always be there and free from defects, all things, the whole world, should come into existence at once.

The following argument might be urged:—"God is not the only Cause (of all things); in fact what He does He does through the help of such auxiliary causes as *Merit* and the rest,—God Himself being only the Efficient (Controlling) Cause. So that so long as Merit and the rest are not there, the 'Cause' of things cannot be said to be present there in its efficient form."

This is not right; if there is help that has got to be rendered to God by the Auxiliary Causes,—then alone could He be regarded as dependent upon their aid; as a matter of fact however, God is eternal and as nothing can introduce into Him any efficiency that is not there already, there can be no help that He should receive from the Auxiliary Causes; why then, should He need such auxiliaries as are of no use to Him?—Further, even these Auxiliary Causes,—all of them should have their birth subject to God and as such, they should be always near Him. Thus, how can our Reason be regarded as 'unproven'?—Nor is our Reason 'inconclusive'; for if that were so (doubtful), then there would be no 'Perfect (defectless) Cause' at all (of things). If then, the Perfect Cause itself never came into existence, then there would be no birth (production) of anything, as the 'absence of Perfect Cause' would always be there.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows *:—"Though the Cause of Things named 'God' is eternal and perfect and always present, yet the producing of things is not simultaneous, because God always acts intelligently and purposely; if God had produced things by His mere presence, without intelligence (or purpose), then the objection urged would have applied to our doctrine. As a matter of fact however, God acts intelligently; hence the objection is not applicable; specially as God operates towards Products solely by His own wish. Thus our Reason is not *Inconclusive*."

This is not right. The activity and inactivity of things are not dependent upon the wish of the Cause; only if it were so that the appearance of all Effects would not be possible, even in the constant presence of the untrammelled Cause in the shape of God, simply on account of His wish being absent. The fact of the matter is that the appearance and non-appearance of things are dependent upon the presence and absence of due efficiency in the Cause. For instance, even though a man may have the wish, things do not appear, if he has not the efficiency or power to produce them; and when the Cause in the form of Seeds has the efficiency or faculty to produce the Sprout, the Sprout does appear,—even though the Seed has no wish at all. If then the Cause called 'God' is always there fully endowed with the due untrammelled efficiency,—as He is at the time of the producing of a particular thing,—then why should Things stand in need of His wish, which can serve no purpose at all? And the result of this should be that all things should appear simultaneously, at the same time as the appearance of any one thing.—Thus alone could the untrammelled causal efficiency of God be shown, if things were produced simultaneously. Nor can God, who cannot be helped by other things, stand in need of anything, for which He would need His wish.

Further, in the absence of Intelligence, there can be no desire for anything else,—and the Intelligence of God you hold to be eternally uniform; so that, even if God acted intelligently, why should not there be a simultaneous production of things? Because like God Himself, His Intelligence also is always there.—If then, His Intelligence be regarded as evanescent, even so, it must co-exist with God, and its presence must be as constant as God Himself; so that the objection on that score remains in force.

Thus the addition of the qualification, in the form 'because of God's Intelligence',—turns out to be futile; and our Reason is not 'Inconclusive'. Nor is the Reason 'Contradictory', because the Probans is present in all cases of the Probandum.

And yet the production of things is not found to be simultaneous; hence the conclusion must be contrary to that desired by the Theist.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—'When a certain thing is not found to be produced at a certain time, it must be taken to be one whose Cause at that time is not untrammelled in its efficiency,—as is found in the case of the Sprout not appearing while the Seed is still in the granary;—

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* These are not the exact words of the *Nyāyavārtika*; it is a paraphrase of what has been there said under *Sūtra* 4. 1. 21, p. 466, l. 8, and p. 467, ll. 10 *et. seq.*, Bib. Ind. Ed.

it is found that at the time of the appearance of one thing, the whole World is not produced,—hence what has been stated (by the Opponent) as a universal proposition is not found to be true.

This argument cannot be regarded as 'futile', because it has been shown that if God were the Cause of things, then it would be impossible to regard the Cause of things to be *trammelled* in any way.—(87)

The following Text sets forth another argument (against Theism) :—

TEXTS (88-89).

THINGS THAT ARE BORN CONSECUTIVELY CANNOT HAVE GOD FOR THEIR CAUSE,—JUST LIKE THE NOTIONS OF FOOLISH PERSONS ARISING FROM THE SAID REASONINGS (OF THE THEIST).—IF THOSE (NOTIONS) ALSO ARE PRODUCED BY GOD, THEN THE ADDUCING OF PROOFS (IN SUPPORT OF THEM) SHOULD BE USELESS ; BECAUSE OF (HIS) ETERNALITY; AND AS HE WOULD BE BEYOND REMEDY, THE SAID STATEMENT COULD RENDER NO HELP.—(89)

COMMENTARY.

The '*notions*'—i.e. the definite conclusions—derived from such reasonings as 'because characterised by a peculiar arrangement of component parts' and the rest,—relating to the object sought to be proved,—appearing in the minds of those *foolish persons* who are keen on proving God as the Cause of the World.

Objection—"As a matter of fact, the said reasons have all been shown to be invalid and beset with fallacies that have been pointed out ; and hence no conclusive notions could be derived from them, regarding what is desired to be proved; and under the circumstances, there could be no Corroborative Instance in support of the reasoning here set forth (by you)."

That is true; that is why the Text has used the term '*foolish persons*'; foolish people are not capable of discriminating the validity of Proofs, and hence they derive their notions from invalid premisses also.

"Even so, the Corroborative Instance would remain devoid of the Probandum; because 'the notions of foolish persons' also are accepted by us as having God for their efficient Cause."

Answer—If these notions also, etc.—These notions,—i.e. the notions of foolish persons ; if these also are held to be produced by God,—*then the adducing of proofs should be useless* ; the putting forward of reasons would be entirely useless; i.e. because they would all be produced from God Himself.

"God would be the producer of the said notions, through the help of the statement of proofs,—and not by Himself alone ; so that the said statement would not be useless."

Answer—Because of His eternality;—if the statement of proofs served to remove God's inefficient character and render it efficient,—then it could be helpful to Him; but inasmuch as God is eternal and hence His character cannot be liable to removal or production, He could not be helped by anything; so that the statement of the proof cannot be of any use to Him.—(88-89)

Further, even in the absence of Causes with perceptible efficiency, you postulate the causal character of God, whose efficiency is never perceived;—and this lands you in absurdities; because even after having assumed such a God, you might as well assume even such (absurd) things as the *Ḍhēṭkaṣaka* and the like (?), as there would be no difference between such things and God.—This is what is shown in the following Text:—

TEXT (90).

WHEN YOU HAVE SEEN THAT A CERTAIN THING EXISTS ONLY WHEN CERTAIN OTHER THINGS EXIST, AND NEVER WHEN THESE DO NOT EXIST,—THEN, IF YOU ASSUME A CAUSE FOR THE FORMER, OTHER THAN THESE LATTER,—HOW CAN YOU AVOID FALLING INTO AN *infinite regress*?—(90)

COMMENTARY.

A '*yat*' has to be added after '*bhavaddṛṣṭam*', 'seen by you'. *If you assume a Cause other than these*;—i.e. a Cause other than those whose efficiency has been perceived (by the positive and negative concomitance spoken of).—(90)

It has been argued (in Text 54) that "the fact of His being the creator of all things having been established, His omniscience is proved without effort".—The answer to this is provided by the following Text:—

TEXT (91).

BY THE REFUTATION OF GOD'S CREATORSHIP, HIS OMNISCIENCE ALSO IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE SET ASIDE BY THE SAME; AS IT IS ON THE STRENGTH OF 'CREATORSHIP' THAT THE ARGUMENT FOR 'OMNISCIENCE' HAS BEEN BASED.—(91)

COMMENTARY.

You regard God to be omniscient only on the strength of His being the Creator of all things; hence by the refutation of His *Creatorship*, His omniscience also becomes set aside 'without effort'.—(91)

Admitting (for argument's sake) the validity of the Theist's arguments, the following Texts proceed to point out another objection:—

TEXTS (92-93).

YOUR REASONINGS MAY NOT BE BESET WITH THE DEFECTS URGED ABOVE; AND YET THE CREATOR CANNOT BE *one*, BECAUSE THE FALSITY OF SUCH A PROPOSITION HAS BEEN SHOWN ABOVE; AND WHEN THE ONENESS OF THE CREATOR IS NOT PROVED, WHEREIN COULD 'OMNISCIENCE' SUBSIST?—(92-93)

COMMENTARY.

The defects urged above—ending with 'being contrary to Inference' (Text 86).

The upshot of the whole is as follows:—Though it may be true that the reasonings put forward succeed in establishing an Intelligent Creator of such things as the Body, Mountains and so forth,—yet it is by no means certain that the Creator of one particular thing is the same as that of another thing; because it is quite possible that each effect may have its own separate Cause (Creator); in fact, in the case of such things as the House and the like, it is found that they are made by many persons; hence it is not possible to establish that there is only one Creator for all things. And under the circumstances, how can 'omniscience' be regarded as proved?

Prashastamati has put forward the following argument for proving a single Creator:—"All beings, from Brahmā down to the *Pishācha* must have over them a single All-Superior Being,—because among themselves there are found to be of varying grades of superiority;—in the ordinary world it is found that where there are several persons of varying grades of superiority, they are always under the sway of *one* Superior Being; e.g. the controllers of the House, the village, the city and the province are all under one Sovereign Emperor of the entire world; and all such beings as serpents, *Rākṣasas*, *Yakṣas* and such other beings are possessed of varying grades of superiority among themselves;—from these facts we are led to think that all these also are under one Controller in the shape of God".

If what is meant to be proved is that all these Beings are 'controlled' by God,—then the Reason put forward is 'Inconclusive'; as there is no valid reason for precluding the contrary conclusion; specially as no Invariable Concomitance is admitted. The Corroborative Instance also is found to be devoid of the Probandum.—If from the mere fact of there being a Controller, it is meant to prove that the *Control* is actually there,—then the argument is futile; as we also accept the fact that the 'Enlightened One' (*Buddha*), who was the crest-jewel of the entire universe, did actually control the entire world, through His mercy; by virtue of which all good men of the present day also attain prosperity and Ultimate Good.

The same writer (*Prashastamati*) has adduced the following further argument :—" All the Seven Worlds must have been created by the intelligence of a *single* Being,—because they are all included under one 'Entity', —just like the several rooms of a House; we find that all the rooms of a House are built by the intelligence of a single architect; in the same way all the seven worlds are included under the one universe; hence it is concluded that these must be the creation of the Intelligence of a single Creator; and the one Being by whose intelligence all these have been created is the Blessed Lord, the one Architect of the whole universe ".

The Probans of this reasoning is 'unproven' (not admitted); there is no such thing as a 'single universe' or a 'single house'; such names have been given to certain things only for the purpose of simplifying business-transactions.—For this same reason the Corroborative Instance that has been cited is devoid of the Probans. Further, as a matter of fact, the several rooms in a house are actually found to be built by several architects (and masons);—hence the Probans is 'inconclusive' (Doubtful) also.

Objections to other Theistic arguments also may be set forth in the aforesaid manner.—(92)

It has been argued (under Text 55) that "The theory under dispute must be perceptible to someone, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is provided by the following Text:—

TEXT (93).

IN FACT, THE REASON ADDUCED FOR PROVING THE 'OMNISCIENT PERSON' IS EFFECTIVE ONLY AGAINST THE FOLLOWERS OF JAIMINI.—(93)

COMMENTARY.

If what you seek to prove is only an 'Omniscient Being' in general, then your proofs have no force against us; as it proves what is already admitted by us. In fact, it is effective only against the followers of Jaimini who deny the 'Omniscient Being' entirely.

If however what you seek to prove is the 'omniscient' *God,* then as there can be no Invariable Concomitance, the Reason is 'inconclusive', and the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum. For all these reasons, your arguments are not effective against us. Such is the meaning of the Text.

The Theist, in his arguments, has made use of such qualifications for the *Subject* of his argument as 'appearing in various forms'. But there is no use for such an epithet; it is only a loud enunciation of your views for the purpose of deluding other people. For instance, if, in the absence of such epithets for the Subject, the Probans is free from the defects of being 'unproven' and the like, then that alone suffices for proving the desired conclusion;—on the other hand, if the Reason is defective by reason of being

'unproven' and the like, then, even on the introducing of the said epithet, the desired conclusion is not established. Hence in every way the qualification added is absolutely useless.—Further, the Probans is one whose very substratum is 'unknown', 'unproven'; as the other party knows of no such subject or entity as is possessed of the qualification in question. Hence the Subject should not be one that is known to your Philosophy only.—(93)

Here ends the Examination of the Doctrine of God.

CHAPTER III.

Dealing with the Doctrine of Both—God and Primordial Matter—being the Cause of the world.

Statement of the Doctrine.

COMMENTARY.

The following Text proceeds to show that there can be no functioning of *Both* (God and Primordial Matter) :—

TEXT (94).

THE DOCTRINES OF 'GOD' OR 'PRIMORDIAL MATTER' SEVERALLY BEING THE CAUSE (OF THE WORLD) HAVING BEEN REFUTED,—IT FOLLOWS THAT THESE TWO TOGETHER CANNOT BE THE 'MAKER' OF THINGS PRODUCED.—(94)

COMMENTARY.

In this connection, some *Sāṅkhyas* (the Theistic *Sāṅkhyas*, followers of the '*Yoga*' system) have asserted as follows :—

"It is not from Primordial Matter alone that the various products are produced (as held by the *Sāṅkhyas* in general); that is not possible, as that Matter is insentient; no insentient entity has been found to proceed to any activity, in the absence of a Controller ;—the 'Spirit' (as postulated by the *Sāṅkhya*) cannot be that Controller, because at the time (of the beginning of the world) he is entirely unconscious (the 'consciousness' of the Spirit being dependent upon contact with the products of Primordial Matter, *after* these latter have come into existence). For instance, what the Spirit cognises, and is conscious of, is only a thing that has been already 'determined' by Intelligence; so that prior to contact with Intelligence, he is absolutely unconscious,—and cognises nothing at all; and until he cognises things, he cannot make or produce anything; hence he cannot be the 'maker' (of the World).—From this it follows that God is the maker, not by Himself alone, but through the help of Primordial Matter. For example, Devadatta alone by himself is not able to give birth to a son, nor is the Potter alone by himself able to make the Jar."

The doctrines of God or Primordial Matter severally being the Cause (*of the World*) *having been refuted*, it follows that the doctrine of these two jointly being the *Cause*—maker—*of things born*,—i.e. of products—also becomes refuted.—(94)

Objection—"If the *separate makership* of these two has been refuted above,—their *joint* makership remains unrefuted ; certainly, even though it is a fact that each of the Eye and other Sense-organs by itself alone has not the capacity to bring about the Visual and other perceptions,—yet it does not necessarily follow that they cannot do so jointly."

The answer to this objection is provided in the following Text :—

TEXTS (95-96).

AS FOR THEIR 'ASSOCIATION' ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF THEIR ACTING JOINTLY,—THIS COULD BE DUE EITHER (*a*) TO THE CREATION OF SOME PECULIARITY, OR (*b*) TO THEIR SERVING A COMMON PURPOSE. (*a*) THE FORMER OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS CANNOT BE RIGHT, AS BOTH ARE 'UNMODIFIABLE'; (*b*) NOR IS THE LATTER ACCEPTABLE ; AS THAT WOULD LEAD TO THE ABSURDITY OF ALL PRODUCTS COMING INTO EXISTENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY.—(95-96)

COMMENTARY.

'Association' implies *joint action* ; this can be of two kinds—either (*a*) by the creation of some peculiarity in one another, or (*b*) by serving a common purpose. The assumption of the 'association' of the former kind,—that consisting in the creating of some peculiarities—cannot be right ;—why ?—because both God and Primordial Matter are eternal and hence *unmodifiable* (unchangeable).—Nor is the assumption of the second kind of association right ;—such is the construction of the words of the Text ;—why ?—because that would lead to the absurdity of all products coming into existence simultaneously. The potency of the Joint Cause—in the shape of God-Primordial-Matter—being absolute and untrammelled, and they being constantly associated,—its causal activity (towards the making of all things) would always be there.

In this connection, the arguments already urged before (in Commentary on Text 87)—in the words 'That Cause is present in its complete form, etc.'—may also be brought forward.—(95-96)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out, from the standpoint of the Opponent, the inadmissibility (*unproven* character) of the Reason put forward above (under 87), to the effect that 'when the Cause is present in its complete form, the Effect must appear as a matter of course, just as it is found in the case of the Sprout, etc. etc.' :—

TEXTS (97–100).

THE THEISTIC *Sāṅkhya* MAY ARGUE AS FOLLOWS :—" IT IS A WELL-ESTABLISHED FACT THAT PRIMORDIAL MATTER IS TRIPLE IN ITS ESSENCE ; —WHEN THE SUPREME LORD COMES INTO CONTACT WITH THE MANIFESTED *Rajas-aspect* (ENERGY), HE BECOMES THE CAUSE OF CREATION ;—WHEN AGAIN, HE HAS RECOURSE TO THE MANIFESTED *Sattva-aspect* (HARMONY), THEN HE BECOMES THE CAUSE OF THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE WORLD ;—WHEN HE COMES INTO CONTACT WITH THE MANIFESTLY OPERATIVE *Tamas-aspect* (INERTIA), THEN HE BRINGS ABOUT THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ENTIRE WORLD. THUS THE ATTRIBUTES OF HARMONY, ENERGY AND THE REST ARE HIS AUXILIARIES, AND THESE BECOME OPERATIVE ONLY CONSECUTIVELY ; THAT IS WHY THERE IS NO *absence of consecutiveness* (I.E. SIMULTANEITY) OF PRODUCTS."—(97–100)

COMMENTARY.

" Even though these two Causes (Primordial Matter and God) are constantly present together, yet the various products will come into existence only consecutively, one after the other ; because the three Attributes of Primordial Matter,—*Sattva* and the rest,—are the auxiliaries of God ; and as these Attributes function only consecutively, there is bound to be consecutiveness in the Products also. For instance, when God becomes affected by the operative *Rajas-attribute,* He becomes the Creator of creatures, as the *Rajas-attribute* is conducive to *production* ;—when however, He has recourse to the operative *Sattva-attribute,* then He becomes the Cause of the continued existence of the worlds, because the *Sattva-attribute* is conducive to *subsistence* ;—when He comes into contact with the operative *Tamas-attribute,* then He brings about the *dissolution*—destruction—of *the entire World* ; as the *Tamas-attribute* is conducive to *mergence* (dissolution).—This process has been thus described (by Bāṇa-Bhaṭṭa in the opening verse of his *Kādambarī*) :—' He who has recourse to *Rajas* at the birth of creatures, to *Sattva* during their existence, and to *Tamas* at their dissolution,—who is unborn, and controls the birth, existence and destruction, who consists of the *Three Vedas,* the very essence of the Three Attributes,—to Him obeisance ! '

" The particle ' *Kila* ' (in Text 99) is meant to indicate *improbability* (of any complete Dissolution)."—(97–100)

The answer to the above is provided in the following Text :—

TEXTS (101-102).

THE ANSWER TO THIS IS AS FOLLOWS :—AT THE TIME THAT THE TWO ARE PERFORMING ONE ACT (OF CREATING OR MAINTAINING OR DISSOLVING),—IS THEIR CAPACITY TO PERFORM THE OTHER ACTS PRESENT ? OR IS IT NOT PRESENT ?—IF IT IS PRESENT, THEN AT THE TIME OF *creation*, THE OTHER TWO ACTS ALSO SHOULD COME ABOUT ;—THUS WHENEVER ANY ONE OF THE ACTS WOULD BE THERE, THE OTHER TWO WOULD HAVE TO BE THERE !—(101-102)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*tayoḥ*', 'the two', stands for Primordial Matter and God ;—*at the time of performing one act*;—i.e. from among the three acts of *creating*, *maintaining* and *dissolving*,—at the time that any one is being done, is their capacity to do the other two acts present in them or not ?—These are the two alternatives. If the capacity *is* there, then, inasmuch as at the time of *creating*, their Cause would be present in its untrammelled form, the other two acts—of *maintaining* and *dissolving*—should also come about, just like the act of *creating* ; so that at the time that a thing would be *maintained in existence*—*its creation* and *dissolution* also should be there ! And at the time of *dissolution*, there should be its *maintained existence* and *creation* ! This certainly cannot be right. Because when the three conditions are mutually nugatory (and incompatible) it is not possible that they should co-exist in the same object.—(101-102)

The following might be urged—"At the time that Primordial Matter and God are bringing about one effect in the shape of the *Creation* (Birth) of one thing, there is not present in them that particular form of theirs which would be productive of the other two effects (*Maintenance* and *Dissolution*) ; that is why there is no possibility of the absurdity that has been urged."

The answer to this is provided in the following Text :—

TEXT (103).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE TWO (PRIMORDIAL MATTER AND GOD) ARE THE CAUSE OF THE OTHER TWO ACTS ALSO, NOT IN ANY OTHER FORM THAN THE ONE THAT BRINGS ABOUT THE ONE ACT ; THE FORM OF THE CAUSE REMAINS THE SAME ; WHY THEN SHOULD THERE BE ANY CESSATION OF THE FUNCTIONING OF ANY ACT AT ALL ?—(103)

COMMENTARY.

The Pronoun '*Tat*' stands for the Cause, that is, Primordial Matter and God,—*of the other*,—i.e. of the two subsequent acts.—*Not in any other form*,—

—what then ?—it is always in its own form that the Two operate as *Cause.* —(103)

The following might be urged:—" Though it does not serve as the Cause in any other form, yet at the time that it is producing one effect, the capacity necessary for the producing of other effects is not present in it for the time being; that is why the other two effects do not appear at that time."

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (104).

IF THERE WERE DISAPPEARANCE OF ANY PARTICULAR POTENCY, THEN THE CAUSE COULD NEVER BE PRODUCTIVE OF ITS PARTICULAR EFFECT;—BECAUSE IT IS DEVOID OF THAT POTENCY AT SOME OTHER TIME; JUST LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS' AND SUCH OTHER THINGS.—(104)

COMMENTARY.

At some other time,—i.e. at the time of the producing of the particular effect meant by the *Sāṅkhya.*—(104)

The following might be urged:—" Even though all the Potencies are present in Primordial Matter, yet a particular effect is produced only by that particular Potency which becomes manifestly operative and thereby becomes the Cause of that effect; thus it is that there is no simultaneity in the appearance of effects."

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (105).

IF THE *manifested form of the Potency* HAD THAT SAME (PRIMORDIAL MATTER AND GOD) FOR ITS CAUSE, THEN, THAT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THERE AT ALL TIMES, BECAUSE OF THE PROXIMITY OF THE CAUSE, WHICH IS ETERNAL.—(105)

COMMENTARY.

The 'manifested form' of *Sattva* and other Attributes that you speak of,—cannot be said to be eternal; because these are found to appear at only certain times; then, in regard to the coming into existence of this 'manifested form', there are only three alternatives: they could be either (*a*) produced by the same Cause,—Primordial Matter and God—, or (*b*) produced by some other Cause,—or (*c*) they would be self-sufficient.—(*a*) Under the first of these alternatives, the said 'manifested form' would always be there, because its

Cause, in the shape of Primordial Matter and God, is eternal and hence always present close at hand.—(105)

As regards to second alternative, the objection is stated in the following Text:—

TEXT (106).

(*b*) AS REGARDS THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE, THAT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER PARTY; AND FOR THAT VERY REASON, IT COULD NOT BE THE EFFECT OF SOME OTHER CAUSE.—(*c*) NOR CAN IT BE SELF-SUFFICIENT; AS IT APPEARS ONLY AT CERTAIN TIMES.—(106)

COMMENTARY.

Apart from Primordial Matter and God, no other Cause is admitted by the *Sāṅkhyas,* from which the said 'manifested form' could be produced.—

Nor is the third alternative right; this is what is asserted by the words '*nor can it be self-sufficient*'.—(106)

Says the Opponent—"If the said manifested Potency be self-sufficient (self-produced)—why should that be incompatible with the fact of its appearing at only certain times?"

The answer is supplied by the following Text:—

TEXT (107).

IF IT WERE SELF-PRODUCED, THEN IT WOULD BE CAUSELESS; AS ANY OPERATION OF A THING UPON ITSELF IS A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS.—IF THERE WERE DEPENDENCE (UPON SOMETHING ELSE) THEN THE EFFECTS WOULD BE SUCH AS WOULD APPEAR AT ONLY CERTAIN TIMES.—(107)

COMMENTARY.

If the 'production' (of the Manifested Potency) were due to itself—its own nature,—then it would most certainly be *causeless.*

Question—"Why should an effect produced from itself be *causeless,*—when its own nature (or essence) would be its *Cause*?"

Answer—*Any operation of a thing upon itself is a contradiction in terms*; any causal action of a thing upon itself—its own essence,—is incompatible.

The following might be urged:—"Let it be *causeless*; even so the Effect would not appear at only certain times."

Answer—*If there were dependence, etc. etc.*—Things that are dependent for their existence upon other things can appear only at certain times; as their existence and non-existence would be dependent upon the presence and

absence of those other things. Those that are not dependent for their existence upon other things,—as they do not need the aid of anything else,—why should they appear at certain times only ?—(107)

Question—" How do you prove that there is 'self-contradiction' (incongruity) in a thing operating upon itself ? "

The answer is given in the following Text :—

TEXT (108).

FOR INSTANCE, MERE NEGATION (ABSENCE) IS NOT REGARDED AS HAVING ANY ACTION UPON ITSELF ;—AS FOR THE WELL-ESTABLISHED POSITIVE ENTITY, IT IS WELL KNOWN AND RECOGNISED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.—(108)

COMMENTARY.

When the 'nature' or 'essence' of the Effect produces itself,—is it itself an established entity or not ? It cannot be an established entity; because *under the circumstances,* the said 'essence' is nothing apart from the established form ; so that the recognition is as established as the 'essence' itself. Hence, as there would be nothing *to be produced,* whereupon could the Entity operate ?—(108)

The following Text proceeds to show that the 'Essence' cannot be something not-established :—

TEXT (109).

IF ITS OWN 'ESSENCE' IS STILL UNESTABLISHED, IT CANNOT BE OPERATED UPON BY ANYTHING ;—BECAUSE IT IS BEREFT OF ALL POTENCY, —LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS' AND SUCH THINGS.—(109)

COMMENTARY.

'*Upon anything*' ;—this is a general statement ; the meaning is that it cannot operate either upon itself or upon any other thing. If it did operate, then it would itself be an *established entity* ; as such operation is the only characteristic of an *established entity.*—(109)

End of Chapter (3)—*dealing with the Doctrine of Primordial Matter and God, both being the Joint Cause of the World.*

CHAPTER IV.

The Doctrine of the 'Thing by Itself'.

COMMENTARY.

The opening verses of the Text have spoken of 'other entities', which includes the doctrine of those philosophers who hold that the origination of the world is due to its 'own nature' (or constitution); this is the doctrine that is taken up now for refutation, even out of its proper sequence, because there is little to be said regarding it,—by the following Text:—

TEXT (110).

THE PROPOUNDERS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE 'THING BY ITSELF' DESCRIBE THE ORIGINATION OF THINGS AS BEING INDEPENDENT OF ALL CAUSES. THEY DO NOT DECLARE EVEN THE THING ITSELF TO BE ITS OWN 'CAUSE'.—(110)

COMMENTARY.

Though the Doctrine of the 'Thing by Itself' has nowhere been directly promulgated in so many words, yet it is implied by the doctrine that the Things are produced by themselves (as detailed in Texts 106 *et seq.*).—Those who assert that things are born out of themselves have been silenced by the words (in Text 107)—'The operation of a thing upon itself is a contradiction in terms';—now the upholders of the doctrine of 'the Thing by Itself' are going to be silenced.

These philosophers assert as follows:—"The origination of things does not proceed either from themselves or from any other thing; in fact, *it is independent of all Causes*;—i.e. it does not depend on the action of any 'Cause' at all."

Question—"What is the difference between these people and those who ascribe the origination of things to themselves?"

Answer—*They do not, etc.*—'*They*'—i.e. the upholders of the 'Thing by Itself';—*the thing itself*,—i.e. its own form (prior to origination);—'*even*'—this implies that they do not accept the form of any other thing to be the 'Cause'; the difference thus is that while the previous people hold the nature of the thing itself to be its 'Cause', these other people do not accept even that as the 'Cause'.—(110)

These people put forward the following reason in support of their view:—"When a thing which fulfils the conditions of perceptibility has its existence not perceived, it should be regarded by intelligent persons as *non-existent*,—as the 'Hare's Horns';—any 'Cause' of things is something whose existence

is not perceived ;—hence it follows that there can be no cognition of the 'nature of the thing' (the Cause)".

In the following Text,—it is shown that the Reason put forward is not 'unproven' (hence inadmissible) :—

TEXT (111).

"WHO MAKES THE DIVERSITY IN THE LOTUS AND ITS FILAMENTS, ETC. ? BY WHOM TOO HAVE THE VARIEGATED WINGS OF THE PEACOCK AND SUCH THINGS BEEN CREATED ?"—(111)

COMMENTARY.

'*Rājīva*' is *Lotus* ;—the 'filaments, etc.' of the Lotus.—Such is the analysis of the compound ;—'*Et cetera*' is meant to include the Stalk, the Petals, the Pericarp and other parts, also the sharpness of thorns and the like.—'*Diversity*' ;—such diversities as those of shape, colour, hardness and the like—'*Who makes ?*'—The sense is that no one makes it, since we do not find any such 'cause' as God and the like.—(111)

The following might be urged—"Even if it be regarded as proved that *external* things are without 'cause', because no such cause is perceived,—how can it be taken as proved in regard to *internal* things ?"

The answer to this is provided by the following Text :—

TEXT (112).

"JUST AS THE SHARPNESS AND OTHER PROPERTIES OF THE THORN AND OTHER THINGS MUST BE REGARDED AS *without cause*, ON THE GROUND OF THEIR APPEARING AT CERTAIN TIMES ONLY,—SO ALSO MUST PAIN AND OTHER (INTERNAL) THINGS BE REGARDED AS *without Cause*."—(112)

COMMENTARY.

"Even though the fact of Pain and other internal things being *without cause* is not proved by Perception, yet it is clearly proved by Inference. For instance,—what appears only at certain times is definitely known to be *without cause*,—e.g. the Sharpness of the Thorn and such things ;—Pain and such internal things appear only at certain times ;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. Nor is it right to hold that when a certain thing is present or absent when another thing is present or absent, then the latter should be regarded as the 'Cause' of the former ;—as this is not found to be always true ; for instance, Visual perception is present when there is Touch (in the object perceived), and is absent when there is no Touch ; and yet Touch is not the 'Cause' of Visual perception. Hence the said definition

of the causal relation cannot be true. From all this it follows that 'the origination of all things is independent of all causes'."—(112)

The Author answers the above arguments of the upholder of the 'Thing by Itself'—with the following Texts:—

TEXTS (113-114).

AS REGARDS THE LOTUS AND ITS FILAMENTS, ETC., IT IS DEFINITELY ASCERTAINED THROUGH PERCEPTION AND NON-APPREHENSION THAT THEY HAVE THEIR 'CAUSE' IN THE SEED, CLAY, WATER AND THE REST UNDER CERTAIN PECULIAR CONDITIONS,—WITH WHICH LATTER THEY ARE POSITIVELY AND NEGATIVELY CONCOMITANT;—SUCH BEING THE CASE, WHAT OTHER 'CAUSE' CAN THERE BE OF THOSE, WHICH YOU ARE ASKING ABOUT?—(113-114)

COMMENTARY.

By this Text, the Author shows that the Reason adduced by the other party is 'unproven' and 'inadmissible', and the conclusion put forward is contrary to perceived facts.

It has been asserted (under Text 111) that "of such things as the Lotus, its Filaments and the like, no *Cause* is perceived".—This is 'not admitted'; as through Perception and Non-apprehension, such 'Cause' is definitely cognised to consist in the Seed, Clay, Water and such things, with which the said things are positively and negatively concomitant. To explain; when it is found that a certain thing is produced only when another thing is present, and it becomes modified by the modifications of this latter,—then this latter thing is said to be the 'Cause' of the former thing. Such a 'Cause of the Lotus and its Filaments, etc.' is found in the shape of the Seed, etc.,—which *under certain peculiar conditions,*—such as becoming swollen under moisture and so forth,—serves as their 'Cause', with which they are *positively and negatively concomitant*;—i.e. the *Lotus*, etc. come into existence only when the *Seed*, etc. are present, and they do not come into existence when these latter are absent;—that these are the 'Cause' of the Lotus, etc. is definitely ascertained *through Perception and Non-apprehension.*—Thus the Reason (Premiss) put forward by the other party is 'inadmissible', *not true.*

Then again, it has been urged that "the definition of 'Causal Relation' is *not true* (fallible)".—This Reason also is 'unproven', *not admissible;* as, in the instance cited, as Touch also is a cause of Colour, it is admitted to be the cause of Visual Cognition also. To explain,—the term 'touch' (in this connection) stands for the *material substance*; and it is only by associating with these substances that Colour subsists; hence in regard to Visual

Cognition, Touch does serve as a 'Cause'; the only difference is that while one (Colour) is a *direct* cause, the other (Touch) is only an *indirect* one.

Further, mere negation (Absence) is not regarded by us as determining the causal relation;—"what then?"—It is a particular kind of absence that is so regarded; for instance, when it is found that, even though other efficient agents are present, yet in the *absence* of some one agent, the thing in question is not produced,—then this latter agent is regarded as the 'Cause' of that thing; and not when there is simple negation in the form that 'it is not produced while the other is absent'. Otherwise (if such mere negation were to determine the causal relation) the Date growing in the country where one's mother may have been married would not be produced if the mother's marriage had not been there [as *ex hypothesi*, by mere negation the 'Mother's Marriage' would be the 'Cause' of the growth of the Date].

The negative Premiss in the qualified form that we have shown is not 'fallible' (untrue) in regard to *Touch*. For, if it could be shown that, even in the presence of Colour and other conditions (of visibility), there is no Visual Cognition on account of the absence of *Touch* alone,—then there might be 'fallibility' in our premiss. Nothing like this however can be shown. Hence there can be no 'fallibility' in the definition of the 'Causal Relation' (as stated by us).—(113-114)

It is not only such things as the Seed of the rest that are definitely known as the 'Cause' of things; even particular points of Place and Time are definitely known as such 'Causes';—this is what the Author shows in the following Text:—

TEXTS (115-116).

PARTICULAR POINTS OF PLACE AND TIME ALSO ARE RELATED (AS CAUSE) TO THINGS.—"HOW SO?"—IF THE SAID POINTS WERE NOT THE CAUSE OF THINGS, THESE WOULD BE PRODUCED EVERYWHERE AND AT ALL TIMES.—(115)

AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER THINGS ARE FOUND TO BE PRODUCED SPECIFICALLY AT A CERTAIN PLACE, AT A CERTAIN TIME AND IN CERTAIN RECEPTACLES,—BEING DEPENDENT UPON THESE AND INDEPENDENT OF ALL OTHERS.—(116)

COMMENTARY.

If the Lotus, etc. did not have them—i.e. the particular points of place and time,—for their 'Cause',—then such phenomena as their production *only* in a particular Place, like *Water* and things like it, and not in other places like *Stone*,—and only at the particular point of time like the *Summer*, and not at other points of time like the Winter,—would not be possible; in fact, the Lotus and other things would come into existence at all places and at all times, as they would be independent of the peculiarities of place

and time. It is clearly recognised therefore that they are dependent upon these latter, from the fact that they avoid certain places and times and appear only at special places and at special times.—(115-116)

Question—"The things in question (by their insentience) cannot have any wish; how then can they have any *need* for (dependence upon) the causal conditions?"

The Answer is given in the following Text:—

TEXT (117).

WHAT IS MEANT BY THEIR BEING 'DEPENDENT' IS THAT THEY COME INTO EXISTENCE IN THAT MANNER; SO THAT IT IS THE CHARACTER OF 'EFFECT' THAT IS SPOKEN OF AS 'DEPENDENCE'. THAT THINGS COME INTO EXISTENCE IN THAT MANNER IS A PERCEPTIBLE FACT; HENCE THE SAID CAUSES BECOME DULY ESTABLISHED.—(117)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by the Things being so 'dependent' is that they come into existence at particular places and times and not at others; it does not mean that they have any 'wish' or 'desire'.

Objection:—"If such is their *dependence* on the particular points of time and place,—even so, how does it follow that they are *effects* of these?"

Answer:—*It is the character of 'Effect' that is spoken of as 'dependence'.*—The *character of the Effect* is not anything else except the *dependence* involved in the fact that they come into existence in that particular manner.

Question:—"How is it known that they come into existence in that particular manner?"

Answer:—*It is a perceptible fact.*—(117)

TEXT (118).

THUS THE DOCTRINE OF THE 'THING BY ITSELF' IS DISCARDED BY PERCEPTION; SPECIALLY AS THE EXACT NATURE OF THE 'CAUSE' OF THINGS IS DULY ASCERTAINED THROUGH PERCEPTION AND NON-APPREHENSION.—(118)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tat*'—Therefore, thus;—or the whole expression '*Tatsvābhāvikavādaḥ*' may be taken as a compound, meaning 'The doctrine of the *Thing by Itself* in regard to the Lotus and other things';—*is discarded by Perception*; Perception alone is mentioned here, as the 'non-apprehension' also of a

certain thing consists only in the 'apprehension' of something else, and as such, is of the nature of 'Perception'.

It has been sought (under Text 112, above) to prove that "Pleasure and such internal things can have no Cause because they appear only occasionally".—This reasoning however is 'contradictory', inasmuch as it proves only the contrary of what is desired to prove; because what has no cause and what is not dependent upon anything else cannot be 'occasional', appearing only at certain times and places. What is meant is that the Corroborative Instance cited is devoid of the character desired to be proved.—(118)

Thus it has been shown that the conclusion (of the other party) is contrary to facts of Perception and that their Reason is 'unproven, Inadmissible'; now the Author takes for granted (for the sake of argument) the 'admissibility' of the Reason, and then proceeds to show its 'Inconclusiveness'—in the following Text:—

TEXT (119).

IT MAY BE THAT THERE ARE NO PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE 'CAUSE' OF THINGS; BUT THE MERE *absence of proof* (MEANS OF COGNISING) CANNOT PROVE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ANY THING.—(119)

COMMENTARY.

If mere 'Non-apprehension' is put forward as the reason for the non-existence of the Cause, then it is 'Inconclusive'; because *mere absence of proof*—i.e. mere absence of a valid means of knowing,—cannot serve as a reason for establishing the non-existence of the thing concerned.—(119)

Question:—"Why cannot it be a proof?"

The answer is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (120).

INASMUCH AS 'PROOF' (MEANS OF COGNITION) IS NOT PERVASIVE OF THE 'EXISTENCE OF THE THING'; NOR IS IT ITS 'CAUSE',—(*a*) BECAUSE THERE IS DIFFERENCE, (*b*) BECAUSE THERE IS NON-CONCOMITANCE, AND (*c*) BECAUSE IT PROCEEDS FROM THAT,—[MERE ABSENCE OF PROOF CANNOT PROVE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A THING].—(120)

COMMENTARY.

When one character is pervasive of (more extensive than) another, then alone does the absence of the former imply the absence of the latter; similarly the absence of the *Cause* implies the absence of the effect; and the

reason for this lies in the fact that the less extensive is invariably concomitant with the more extensive one, because of the two being of the same essence,—and the effect is invariably concomitant with the Cause, being produced by this latter. In the case of 'Proof' and 'non-existence of a Thing' there can be no co-essentiality, as the two actually appear to be distinct;—nor can Proof be the 'cause' of the Thing, as there is no concomitance between them; the Thing existing even when the Proof is not there. For instance, there is nothing incongruous in admitting the existence of Things which are far removed in space and time and character and hence are not within reach of any Proof (Means of Cognition);—and when a thing can be there even during the absence of another thing, the latter cannot be regarded as the Cause of the former; for if it were, then it would lead to an absurdity. In fact, if the other party were to regard this as a 'Cause', he would renounce his own position.

Also because it proceeds from that,—Proof cannot be the 'Cause' of the Existence of Things. That is, the Proof arises out of the Thing itself—which forms its objective; and the cognisable Thing does not arise out of the Proof.—(120)

It might be argued that—"Even though not invariably concomitant, the Proof (being absent) may yet preclude the existence of the Thing".—The answer to this is provided by the following Text:—

TEXT (121).

WHEN A THING IS NEITHER THE ONE NOR THE OTHER, ITS ABSENCE DOES NOT CONCLUSIVELY PRECLUDE THE OTHER THING; BECAUSE THERE IS NO CONNECTION.—(121)

COMMENTARY.

Neither the one nor the other,—i.e. neither the *Cause*, nor *pervasive*;—the absence of what is not invariably concomitant cannot rightly be taken as necessarily precluding the other thing; for if it did, it would lead to an absurdity: the absence of the *Horse* might, in that case, imply the absence of the *Cow* also.—(121)

TEXT (122).

'NON-PERCEPTION' BY ALL PERSONS IS DOUBTFUL; 'NON-PERCEPTION' BY ANY ONE PERSON HIMSELF IS INCONCLUSIVE; AS IT IS FOUND THAT THE GRASS AND OTHER THINGS GROWING IN THE CAVES OF THE *Vindhya* MOUNTAIN DO EXIST, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE NOT PERCEIVED.—(122)

COMMENTARY.

Further, when 'non-apprehension' is put forward as the Reason (for *non-existence*), is it put forward in the form of the absence of perception by

all men? Or of the absence of perception of any one person himself? —It cannot be the former; because ordinary men with limited powers of perception can never be sure of any thing being *not perceived by all men*; hence it must be always *doubtful*. People of limited vision have no means of knowing that no man has the perception of an unseen cause for such things as the marks on the wings of the Peacock. As for any single man's own *non-perception*, that can never be conclusive:—why?—because even though such things as the grass, the coral, the pebbles and the like growing in mountain-caves are not perceived, yet *they do exist*; that is, there is nothing incongruous in regarding them as *existent*.—Thus the reasons adduced being doubtful, the *non-existence* cannot be regarded as proved beyond *doubt*.—(122)

TEXTS (123-124).

IF NO REASON IS ADDUCED TO PROVE THE FACT OF THINGS HAVING NO CAUSE, THEN, INASMUCH NOTHING CAN BE PROVED WITHOUT REASON, YOUR THEORY IS NOT PROVED.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU DO ADDUCE A REASON PROVING IT,—THEN ALSO YOUR THEORY IS NOT PROVED,—AS THE *proving* ITSELF WOULD BE PRODUCED BY THE PROOF ADDUCED [WHICH WOULD THEREFORE BE THE *Cause* OF THE *proving*].—(124)

COMMENTARY.

Further, you have to be asked the following question:—In support of your conclusion that "Things have no Cause",—do you adopt any Reason, or not?—If you do not adopt it, then your view does not become proved; as there can be no proving of anything without adequate *proof* (means of cognition).—If, on the other hand, you do adopt a Reason,—even then, your view cannot be proved; [such is the construction of the words of the Text].—"Why so?"—*Because the 'proving' itself would be produced by the Proof adduced*.—This is what has been thus declared by the revered *Āchārya Sūri*—'One who declares that there is no Cause would demolish his own conclusion if he adduced any reasons in support of his assertion; on the other hand, if he were slow to adduce reasons, what could be gained by mere assertion?'—(123-124)

The following might be urged:—"The Reason that I adduce is *indicative*, not *productive*; why then should my conclusion not be proved?"

The answer to this is provided by the following text:—

TEXT (125).

AS REGARDS THE *indicative*,—BE IT IN THE FORM OF THE PROBANS, OR IN THE FORM OF WORDS EXPRESSIVE OF THAT (PROBANS),—IT IS SAID TO BE 'INDICATIVE' OF THE PROBANDUM (DESIRED CONCLUSION), ONLY WHEN IT BECOMES THE 'CAUSE' OF THE *proving* (MAKING KNOWN) [OF THE SAID CONCLUSION].—(125)

COMMENTARY.

The indicative Probans—i.e. the Probans fulfilling the three conditions, as conceived by the Reasoner for his own benefit;—*or in the form of words*,—when the same Probans is asserted for the benefit of some one else,—*expressive of that*—i.e. of the Probans.—*Cause of the proving*,—i.e. of the bringing about of the definite cognition of the object to be cognised.—If it were otherwise, and the Probans or Reason did not serve as the 'Cause' of the said *proving*,—then, how could it be regarded as an 'indicative'? In fact, in this way, everything would be 'indicative' of every thing else.—(125)

Question—"If this is so, then how do the Teachers make the distinction between the *Indicative* and the *Productive*?"

The answer given in the following text is that the 'Indicative' is so called because it *makes the thing known*, and what is called 'productive' is that which actually brings into existence the thing concerned:—

TEXT (126).

THUS IT IS REALLY THE 'PRODUCTIVE' CAUSE WHICH IS SPOKEN OF AS 'INDICATIVE'; IT IS BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ACTUALLY PRODUCE (BRING INTO EXISTENCE) WHAT IS DESIRED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED THAT IT IS NOT CALLED 'PRODUCTIVE'.—(126)

COMMENTARY.

It is called 'Indicative',—and not 'Productive'—because it does not actually produce what is desired to be accomplished; while that which actually produces what is desired to be accomplished,—such as the *Sprout* and the like,—is called 'Productive'. Hence there is nothing wrong in the distinction that has been made.

This answers all the objections that may be urged against the declaration of *Āchārya Sūri*. For instance, the following is an objection that may be raised—"Even when asserting with Reason that *there is no Cause*, why should one demolish his own conclusion? As what he asserts is an *Indicative* Reason, while what he denies is the *Productive* Cause".—The answer to this is as follows:—The *Indicative* Reason also is a *Productive* Cause, because it *produces* the cognition of the thing.—This urges against the other party the

fact of his assertions being self-contradictory. In fact, there can be no Reason that could prove the absence of all Cause,—because such a proposition would be clearly one that is contrary to, and set aside by, sense-perception and the rest.—(126)

With the following Text, the Author sums up his position and thereby also shows that the conclusion of the other party is contrary to, and set aside by, Inference also :—

TEXT (127).

FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT OTHER THINGS ALSO HAVE THEIR 'CAUSES',—AS THEIR PRODUCTION IS RESTRICTED,—JUST LIKE YOUR COGNITION OF THE *Probandum* APPEARING WHEN THE PROBANS IS THERE.—(127)

COMMENTARY.

Things like the Lotus and its filaments,—which are 'other' than the things spoken of by the other party in his reasoning.—*As their production is restricted* ;—i.e. they are produced only when certain particular things are there.—The argument may be formulated as follows :—Those things whose production is restricted to occasions when certain other things are there must be regarded as *with Cause*,—as for instance, your own cognition of the *Probandum* (desired to be proved) which appears only when the *Probans* (Reason) is there ;—the same is the case with the Lotus and other things ;—[hence these must be regarded as 'with Cause']—this being a Reason based on the nature of things.—(127)

End of Chapter (4)—*dealing with the Doctrine of the 'Thing by Itself'*.

CHAPTER V.

The Doctrine of SOUND (' Word-Sound') being the Origin of the World.

COMMENTARY.

The upholders of ' Word-Sound ' as ' *Brahman* ' assert their view in the following words :—

" Free from such distinctions as ' prior ' and ' posterior ',—unborn,—imperishable,—such is the *Brahman* consisting of ' Word-Sound ' ; and from this Brahman there evolve the whole *lot of Things,*—such as Colour and the like ;—this fact is clearly recognised. This has been thus declared—' Without beginning and end, Brahman, of the essence of SOUND,—in the form of *Letter-Sounds,* evolves in the form of Things; whence proceeds the entire world-process '.—The term ' *ādi* ', ' beginning ', here stands for *production* ;—' *nidhana* ', ' end ', stands for *destruction* ; that which is free from these two is ' without beginning and end ' ;—' *in the form of the Letter-Sounds* ' ;—as it is the Letters ' a ' and the rest which are the means (of the expressing of Word-Sound) ;—this indicates the evolution in the form of the ' word ', the ' name ' ;—the evolution in the form of the ' thing denoted ' is indicated by the phrase ' in the form of things ' ;—the term ' *process* ' stands for the diverse things ;—the term ' *Brahman* ' mentions the name."

What has been asserted in the verse just quoted is reiterated in the following Text :—

TEXT (128).

"THE WHOLE LOT OF THINGS IS RECOGNISED AS EVOLVED OUT OF THAT *Brahman* WHICH IS OF THE ESSENCE OF Word-SOUND, THE HIGHEST,—UNAFFECTED BY DESTRUCTION AND ORIGINATION."—(128)

COMMENTARY.

' Destruction ' and ' Origination ' have been mentioned only by way of illustration ; what should be understood to be meant is that it is entirely free from all such distinctions as priority and posteriority *of Place* ; this includes freedom from distinctions of ' priority ' and ' posteriority ' of *Time* also.

' *Of the essence of Word-Sound* ' ;—of the nature of Word-Sound ; it is this fact of Word-Sound forming its essence that makes it spoken of as ' of the essence of Word-Sound ' ; what is meant is that Word-Sound is its inseparable form.

' *Highest* ',—in the form of the syllable ' *om* ' ; this syllable ' *om* ' is the essence of all words and names and also of all things ; and it constitutes

the *Veda*. This *Word-Sound* existing in the form of Letters and Words constitutes the *Veda*; which is the means of comprehending the syllable, of which it stands as the replica.—This *Highest Brahman* is perceived only by such persons as have their minds thoroughly imbued with Merit conducive to the fulfilment of Prosperity and the Highest Good.

In support of this view, they set forth the following reason :—" When a set of things is always associated with the form of a certain thing, the former are modifications (evolutes) of that thing; e.g. the Jar, the Saucer and the Cup are evolutes of Clay, being always associated with the form of Clay; and are hence known to be of the essence of Clay ;—all Things are found to be associated with some form of Sound in the shape of Names ; this reason being based upon the very nature of things ; as it is a clearly perceptible fact that all things are associated with some form of sound (in the shape of Name); for instance, when a cognition of the Name-Sound is produced in regard to things, the cognition of these things appears always associated with that Name-Sound. This is what has been thus declared (in *Vākyapadīya*)—' There is no cognition in the World which is not associated with word-sounds ; in fact, all cognition is always interfused with words'. —The knowledge of the nature of things also is always dependent upon the form of their cognition (which is associated with words). From this it follows that all things are always associated with Name-Sounds; and this being established, it follows as a matter of course that they have their essence in these Sounds ; as *having their essence in Sound* means nothing more than being always associated with Name-Sound.—(128)

The Author proceeds to refute the above doctrine (of Sound being the origin of the World) in the following Texts ;—

TEXTS (129–131).

THOSE PEOPLE WHO ASSERT THE ABOVE VIEW SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AS FOLLOWS :—[WHEN THE BLUE AND OTHER THINGS EVOLVE OUT OF THE SAID SOUND] DOES—OR DOES NOT—THE SOUND ABANDON ITS SOUND-FORM AND TAKE UP THE BLUE AND OTHER FORMS ?—IF IT IS THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE (THAT IT DOES ABANDON ITS OWN FORM) THAT IS ACCEPTED, THEN THE SOUND BECOMES DEPRIVED OF ITS IMPERISHABILITY,—INASMUCH AS ITS PREVIOUS FORM HAS BECOME DESTROYED.—IF THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE IS ACCEPTED, THEN, ON THE COGNITION OF THE BLUE AND OTHER THINGS, EVEN THE DEAF SHOULD HAVE THE CLEAR PERCEPTION OF THE SOUND-FORM.—(129–131)

COMMENTARY.

Is the World regarded as ' of the Essence of Sound',—' *Shabdamaya* '— in the sense that sometimes it takes the form of the modification of Sound ?

Or in the sense that sometimes it is produced from Sound,—as in the case of the expression '*annamayāḥ prāṇāḥ*' ('Life is of the essence of food'), the affix '*mayaṭ*' denotes *cause* (the meaning being that Food is the cause of Life)?

The first alternative cannot be right; as the said 'modification' itself is not possible. Because when *Brahman* who is 'of the essence of Sound' takes the form of the Blue and other things, does It—or does it not—abandon its own pristine Sound-form? If the former alternative be accepted—that It does abandon its pristine Sound-form,—then there would be an end to the view that it is 'without beginning and end', that is, imperishable, indestructible; as there would be a destruction of the pristine form.—If the second alternative be accepted,—that It does *not* abandon its pristine form,—then, at the time that *Blue* is cognised by the deaf person, he should have the perception of Sound also; as the cognition of *Sound* would be non-different from the cognition of *Blue*. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is non-different from another,—if one is cognised, the other becomes also cognised,—as when the *Blue* is cognised, the essence of that same Blue becomes also cognised;—Sound is non-different from Blue; hence this is a reason based on the nature of things.—If it were not so, inasmuch as the conditions for better or worse would differ in the two (Sound and Blue), they could not be recognised as of the essence of the other. This would be an argument against the conclusion (of the other party).—(129–131)

This same argument is set forth in greater detail, in the following Text:—

TEXT (132).

[IT WOULD BE AS ASSERTED ABOVE] BECAUSE ALL THINGS (ACCORDING TO YOU) EXIST PRIMARILY IN THE FORM OF SOUND; AND IF THE SOUND-FORM IS NOT ABANDONED, THERE CAN BE NO MODIFICATION (EVOLUTION).—(132)

COMMENTARY.

'*Yēna*' here stands for '*yasmāt*', *because,*—you hold that primarily the World is of the nature of *Sound*.

The second line explains why it would be as asserted.—(132)

Question—"What if the World remains primarily of the essence of Sound?"

The Answer is provided by the following Text:—

TEXT (133).

THE IDENTITY (OF SOUND) WITH BLUE AND OTHER THINGS BEING *not figurative* (BUT REAL),—WHY SHOULD NOT THERE BE COGNITION OF *Sound* AT THE TIME THAT THE *Blue* AND OTHER THINGS ARE COGNISED ?—(133)

COMMENTARY.

Identity of Blue, etc.—i.e. with *Sound.*

At the time that the Blue and other things are cognised;—that is, under the circumstances when Blue, etc. are cognised;—*why should not there be cognition of Sound* ?—that is to say, Sound also fulfilling all the conditions of perceptibility, it is only right that there should be perception of it, just as there is of Blue and other things.—(133)

TEXT (134).

IF THERE WERE NO COGNITION OF IT (SOUND), THEN THERE SHOULD BE NONE OF THE BLUE AND OTHER THINGS ALSO; BECAUSE BOTH ARE OF THE SAME ESSENCE. IN CASE THEY HAD DIFFERENT PROPERTIES, THERE WOULD BE ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM.—(134)

COMMENTARY.

If you do not admit of the Cognition of Sound (at the time of the cognition of the Blue, etc.) then there would be the absurdity of there being no cognition of the Blue, etc. also, just as there is none of Sound;—*because both are of the same essence*;—that is, Blue and the rest are of the same nature as Sound. Otherwise, if the Blue, etc. be held to have properties different from those of Sound, it would have to be admitted that the two are absolutely and entirely different.—(134)

The following *Text* explains why it would be so :—

TEXT (135).

WHAT INDICATES DIFFERENCE AMONG A NUMBER OF THINGS IS THE PRESENCE OF INCOMPATIBLE PROPERTIES; OTHERWISE, NO DIFFERENCE COULD EVEN BE ASSUMED AMONG DIVERSE INDIVIDUALS.—(135)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be right for any one object to be perceived and not perceived at the same time and by the same person; if it were, then, the object would cease to be *one*. Otherwise, if, even in the presence of incompatible properties,

there were one-ness, then even that difference which is assumed and accepted as subsisting among the Jar and other things would not be possible.—The term '*even*' is meant to imply that it is not in the form of *Brahman only* that there would be no diversity; because the established view is that while *Brahman* rests within Itself, there is no diversity in It; as *diversity* is appertenant to *modification*.—For instance, when *Brahman* is held to be 'without beginning and end', It is not in the form of such things as the Jar and the like,—but in the form of the Supreme Self. The Jar and other things are actually seen to be undergoing origination and destruction and to be occupying limited place and time.

The absurdity has been urged above (in Text 131) against the other party—that the deaf would clearly perceive Sound (when he perceives the Blue and other things). This should be understood to be applicable to the other party only if the form of *Brahman* is regarded as fulfilling the conditions of perceptibility.—The absurdity is not applicable if *Brahman* is held to be extremely subtile and beyond the reach of the Senses.—But in that case the objection to be urged should be that (if Sound be not perceived, then) the Blue, etc. also would not be perceived, as these are of the same nature as Sound; and in that case there could be no such generalisation as that 'ordinary men perceive only that much of things as is liable to origination and destruction'.

The following argument might be urged here:—"Just as according to you (*Bauddha*) the *momentariness*, though not different from Blue, etc., is not cognised when these latter are cognised,—so, in the same manner, there would be no cognition of *Sound*".

This is not right; it is not true that *momentariness* is not cognised when Blue, etc. are cognised; what does happen is that even though *momentariness* is actually apprehended by the non-conceptual Cognition, yet it is said to be *not definitely cognised*, because of the imposition upon it of other qualities, through Illusion. So that, so far as the man's general indefinite apprehension is concerned, it *is* duly apprehended; but it is *not apprehended* in so far as its well-defined cognition is concerned; and as referring to distinct forms of the cognition (definite and indefinite), both characters—of being *apprehended* and *not-apprehended*—are quite compatible.—In the case of your theory, however, such *apprehension* and *non-apprehension* of Sound (at the time of perceiving Blue, etc.) cannot be right; because you regard all cognitions as equally determinate and well-defined; so that Sound would be definitely apprehended in its complete form by a single cognition; and there would be no aspect of it which would remain *not-apprehended*. This has been thus asserted—"How can that aspect of it which is not definitely apprehended by well-defined cognitions—form the object of these latter?"—If some cognition is admitted by you to be undefined and non-conceptual, then you should not make such an assertion as the following—"There is no cognition in the world which is not associated with words".—In this case too, the reason adduced (by you) that "Things are associated with the form of Word-Sound"—would not be true, and as a result of this, there being no proof, any attempt to prove the fact of all things being of the essence of Sound would be entirely baseless.

Further, as regards the *momentariness* of things, it is actually established by means of proofs; and even though thus duly apprehended, it is spoken of as *not definitely cognised.* As regards the fact of Things being of the essence of Sound however,—by what proof is it established that it could be admitted in the same manner as *momentariness* is admitted ?—(135)

The following Text proceeds to set forth another method of criticising the 'Sound' theory :—

TEXT (136).

IF THE ONE 'SOUND-ESSENCE' BE HELD TO BE DIFFERENT WITH EACH INDIVIDUAL THING, THEN ALL THINGS WOULD OCCUPY THE SAME POINT IN SPACE AND WOULD BE COGNISED IN ONE AND THE SAME FORM.—(136)

COMMENTARY.

When (according to you) the 'Sound-essence' undergoes modification, does it become different with each object, or not ?—If the view is that it does *not* become different, then all things, Blue and the rest, should occupy the same point in space. That they should occupy the same point in space is said only by way of illustration. Time, modifications, functions and conditions also are meant to be included. The Cognition,—appearance (in Consciousness)—also would be in one and the same form ; as all things, Blue and the rest, would be non-different from the one essence of *Sound.*—(136)

TEXT (137).

IF (ON THE OTHER HAND) IT DIFFERS WITH EACH INDIVIDUAL (THING), THEN BRAHMAN BECOMES *many*,—AS HAVING A FORM WHICH IS DIVERSE AND OF THE NATURE OF SEVERAL THINGS,—JUST LIKE THE DIVERSITY OF INDIVIDUALS.—(137)

COMMENTARY.

If the 'Sound-essence' is admitted to differ with each individual, then *Brahman* becomes *many* ;—*as having a form which is diverse and of the nature of several things*; i.e. one whose nature—character—is diverse and of the nature of several things ;—and yet *Brahman* is held to be *one.* Thus your theory goes directly against your own tenet.—(137)

The Author states another objection (to the *Sound-theory*)—in the following Text :—

TEXT (138).

IF THINGS CONSISTED OF ETERNAL 'SOUND', THEY ALSO WOULD BE ETERNAL; AND HENCE AS THINGS WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE SOUND, NO 'MODIFICATION' WOULD BE COMPATIBLE.—(138)

COMMENTARY.

If Things consisted of eternal Sound,—i.e. if they were of the same nature as eternal Sound,—i.e. if Sound constitutes the very essence of the World,—then Things also should be held to be eternal; and hence as at all times *the Things would be accomplished simultaneously with Sound,*—on account of their being so accomplished,—it is not possible for them to be of the nature of 'modifications'.—'*Tat*' stands for '*tasmāt*', *Hence.*

Or the 'simultaneity' meant may be that of all such things as the *Blue* and the like.—(138)

Question—"Even if things are accomplished simultaneously, why should not they be *modifications*?"

The Answer is supplied by the following Text:—

TEXT (139).

THERE COULD BE 'MODIFICATION' ONLY IF THERE WERE DISAPPEARANCE OF ONE FORM FOLLOWED BY THE APPEARANCE OF ANOTHER FORM,—AS IS FOUND TO BE THE CASE WITH CLAY AND OTHER THINGS;—IT COULD NOT BE POSSIBLE HOWEVER IF ALL APPEARED WITHOUT SEQUENCE (SIMULTANEOUSLY).—(139)

COMMENTARY.

In a thing in regard to which there was no 'Sequence', however, 'modification' would not be possible; the term '*tu*', 'however', is to be construed with '*akramē*'.—From this it follows that it cannot be right to regard Things as 'consisting of Sound', through 'modification'.—(139)

The following Text proceeds to show that the other alternative cannot be maintained:—

TEXT (140).

IF THE WORLD BE REGARDED AS 'CONSISTING OF SOUND' IN THE FORM OF 'PRODUCT' (NOT ETERNAL),—EVEN SO, AS SOUND WOULD BE UNMODIFIABLE, THERE COULD BE NO SEQUENTIAL APPEARANCE.—(140)

COMMENTARY.

Even so, as Sound is eternal (*ex hypothesi*), and hence *unmodifiable,*—it is not possible for the Products to appear sequentially; in fact, all things

should appear simultaneously, as being the effects of equally perfect cause of unobstructed potency. In fact, the appearance of effects is delayed only when there is some imperfection in the Cause ; if the Cause is perfect, therefore, for what would the effect wait, and hence not appear simultaneously ?—(140)

TEXT (141).

IF, FROM SOUND WHICH IS OF ONE FORM ALWAYS, DIVERSE FORMS ARE PRODUCED, THEN HOW IS IT THAT THE WORLD IS SPOKEN OF AS 'EVOLVED' IN THE FORM OF THE *Object* ?—(141)

COMMENTARY.

Further, if it is admitted that out of Sound, which is of one form only, various diverse forms are produced,—then it will not be true to say that '*Brahman* evolves into the form of the Object' ; because it is not right that when a different thing is produced, one thing should evolve out of another in that form, without actually entering into that form itself.—Thus the Proposition set up by the other Party cannot be maintained in any way at all.—(141)

Another reason put forward (in support of the view that the World is produced out of Sound) is—"because all things are permeated with Sound-forms" ; the following Text proceeds to show that this Reason is 'unproven', 'Inadmissible' :—

TEXTS (142-143).

IN THE CASE OF SUCH DIVERSE THINGS AS THE JAR, THE PAIL AND THE LIKE, IT IS FOUND THAT ALL OF THEM ARE OF THE NATURE OF *Clay*, WHICH DIFFERENTIATES THEM FROM ALL THAT IS NOT-CLAY ; AND ON THE BASIS OF THIS IT IS ASSUMED THAT IN ALL THESE THERE SUBSISTS THE ONE 'CLAY-NATURE' ;—NO SUCH NATURE HOWEVER IS PERCEIVED IN THE CASE OF SUCH THINGS AS THE *Blue*, THE *Yellow* AND SO FORTH ; HENCE THE ASSUMPTION OF ANY SUCH *one nature* AS IS PRECLUSIVE OF ALL THAT IS *not-Sound* WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY BASELESS.—(142-143)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, there can be no one comprehensive notion of all things ; everything has its own specific character, and thereby differentiated from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous things ; whenever they are

regarded as permeated by a common character, it is only an assumption based upon the fact of that character serving to differentiate them from such other things as are heterogeneous; for instance, in the case of such things as the Jar, the Cup and the Pail, etc.—even though these are really distinct from each other,—the common character of 'Clay' is assumed, on the basis of the exclusion of all that is *not-Clay*. Even this assumed 'uniformness', consisting of *being permeated by the nature of Sound*, is not possible in the case of the things in question,—such as, the *Blue*, the *Yellow* and the like; because we do not perceive the *Sound-character* in the *Blue*, the *Yellow* and such things; and when you do not perceive such a uniform character in them, how can it be assumed that, *being permeated by Sound-character* is due to the preclusion of what is *not of the nature of Sound*? Thus the assumption is entirely baseless and hence the reason is 'unproven', 'Inadmissible'.—(142-143)

It has been urged (under *Text* 136) that "all things would occupy the same point in space and would be cognised in one and the same form";—the following Text raises an objection from the point of view of the other party:—

TEXT (144).

If it be held that—"Brahman in its essence remains ever undifferentiated; it is only under disturbance due to Ignorance that people regard It as diverse".—(144)

COMMENTARY.

The following view might be urged by the Opponent:—"The one Principle of *Brahman remains always undifferentiated*,—essentially unmodified; in reality, there is no *modification* of It; what happens is that people having their minds and eyes clouded by the darkness of Ignorance, regard It as *diverse*, in such forms as the *Blue* and the like. This has been thus declared:—'Even though *Ākāsha* (Space) is pure, yet obsessed by darkness, people come to regard it as limited and made up of diversified parts; in the same manner, though *Brahman* is immortal and unmodifiable, yet It appears to be sullied by Nescience and hence diversely modified'.—Under the circumstances, there would be no such absurdity as all things occupying the same point in Space; because in reality all things are non-entities, therefore there would be diversity in their cognitions also,—the diversity being due to the oscillations of Nescience".—(144)

The above argument is answered by the following Texts:—

TEXTS (145-146).

EVEN SO, WHAT IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED IN THE FORM OF *Blue* AND THE REST BY PERSONS TRAMELLED BY NESCIENCE WHICH FORM SERVES AS THE BASIS OF REJECTING AND ACQUIRING CERTAIN THINGS, —APART FROM THAT FORM, WHAT IS THERE IN THE FORM OF 'BRAHMAN', UNPERCEIVED, WHICH COULD BE COGNISED AS 'EXISTING', BY PERSONS WHOSE MIND HAS RISEN ABOVE (THE SHACKLES OF NESCIENCE) ?—(145-146)

COMMENTARY.

The existence of the cognisable thing can be established only by means of Proofs (Means of Cognition); there is however no proof for (means of cognising) the existence of *Brahman* as postulated. For instance, It cannot be proved by Perception, as *Brahman* does not appear in any form other than the *Blue* and the rest as the basis of such activity as *rejecting* and *acquiring*;—and when It does not appear at all (in any pure form of Its own), how could It be cognised as *existing*, by persons whose minds have risen (above the shackles of Nescience) and are centred on the path of Reason ?—(145-146)

TEXTS (147-148).

THE UNDIFFERENTIATED BRAHMAN CANNOT BE PROVED BY PERCEPTION, BECAUSE IT NEVER APPEARS IN THAT FORM;—AND AS NOTHING CAN BE PRODUCED FROM WHAT IS ETERNAL, THERE CAN BE NO PROBANS IN THE FORM OF AN EFFECT (WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE INFERENCE OF *Brahman*); AND AS THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE THING ITSELF (BRAHMAN) IS STILL UNPROVED, NO CHARACTER OF ITS OWN COULD SERVE AS THE PROBANS LEADING TO THE INFERENCE (OF THE SAID *Brahman*); AND APART FROM THESE TWO, THERE CAN BE NO PROBANS WHICH COULD PROVE THE EXISTENCE (OF *Brahman*).—(147-148)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged (by the other party):—"The said *Brahman* is proved by Its own cognition, since it is of the nature of

Consciousness itself. For instance, Brahman Itself is Light, because It is of the essence of Sound, and because it is of the nature of Intelligence."

This however is contrary to our own experience; for instance, even when one has his mind wandering elsewhere, when looking with his eyes upon Colour, one has such non-determinate perception of the *Blue* and such things as is free from verbal expression; this is going to be explained in detail later on.

This also sets aside what has been asserted as to "there being no cognition in the world which is not associated with words".

From all this it follows that *the undifferentiated Brahman* of the essence of Sound cannot be proved by Perception.

Nor can It be proved by Inference. If there were an Inference (of Brahman) it could be based on a Probans in the form of an *Effect* (of that Brahman), or in that of the *nature* of Brahman Itself.—As for mere Non-apprehension, it can have only *negation* for its object, and can have no influence upon an *affirmation* (such as that of the *Existence of Brahman*).—Now, there can be no Probans in the form of an *Effect,* because no effect can proceed from what is eternal; because any fruitful action—either consecutive or concurrent—would be repugnant to the very nature of the eternal Thing.—Nor can there be a Probans in the shape of the nature of *Brahman* Itself; because the Thing itself, in the form of *Brahman,* is still not established; and so long as the Thing itself has not been established, no nature or character of it can be established independently by Itself.

It might be urged that there may be some other Probans (apart from the two just mentioned).—In answer to this, it is added—*Apart from these,* etc.; —i.e. apart from *Nature* and *Effect,* there is nothing that can prove your Probandum; as no other Probans would be invariably concomitant with it; and what is not invariably concomitant cannot serve as a Probans; for, if it did, it would lead to absurdities.

It has been asserted that Things are associated with Sound-forms;—such association has not been proved, and is absolutely false; and as such cannot prove the fact of Brahman being really of the essence of Sound.

Nor can such a Brahman be proved by Scripture; as the character of 'Scripture' itself is uncertain.

'Non-apprehension' also is a sort of Indication (Probans); but that is included under what has been mentioned already as 'Nature'.—Nor can this 'Non-apprehension' serve to prove *Existence*; and it is Existence that is desired to be proved; this is what is meant by the phrase—*which could prove the existence of Brahman.*—(147-148)

Further, you must understand that *Brahman* is not capable of bringing about even mere Cognition; and being so incapable, Its form turns out to be that of mere non-entity. A further elucidation of this is supplied in the following Text:—

TEXT (149-150).

ALL CONSCIOUSNESS MUST BE CONSECUTIVE, AS IT MUST FOLLOW THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE OF THE OBJECTS COGNISED; IF IT WERE NOT SO, ITS EFFECT IN THE FORM OF COGNITION WOULD COME ABOUT SIMULTANEOUSLY.—HENCE EVEN IN THE EFFECT IN THE FORM OF 'COGNITION', THERE IS NOTHING, APART FROM THE REJECTING AND ACQUIRING, WHICH COULD BE WITHIN THE POWERS OF *Brahman*; SO THAT IT BECOMES REDUCED TO THE POSITION OF THE 'SON OF THE BARREN WOMAN'.—(149-150)

COMMENTARY.

All this has been proved under the section dealing with 'God' (in Text 89).

'*Tataḥ param*', '*apart from that*';—i.e. other than the Blue and other things which form the basis of the acts of *rejecting* and *acquiring*.—Or the term '*tataḥ*' may be taken as the re-assertion of the Conclusion; the meaning being that 'it is something apart from the Blue and other things which form the basis of the acts of *Rejecting* and *Acquiring*'.—Or the term '*tataḥ*' may be taken as the re-assertion of the Conclusion, in the form 'therefore it is true, real'.

The position of the 'Son of the Barren Woman';—for regarding the 'Son of the Barren Woman' as a non-entity, there is no reason apart from the fact of his being incapable of effective action.—(149-150)

The following might be urged:—"The said essence of Supreme *Brahman* is perceived only by such *Yogins* (*Mystics*) as have their mind aided by Merit leading to Prosperity and Highest Good".

This also is not possible;—this is what is shown by the following Text:—

TEXT (151).

FOR THE SAME REASON EVEN MYSTICS WITH THEIR 'CHAIN OF PURE CONSCIOUSNESS' DO NOT KNOW THAT FORM OF *Brahman*; AS THE NECESSARY CONNECTION COULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY AFTER AN ACTION OF THE COGNITION ITSELF.—(151)

COMMENTARY.

If the Mystic had operated upon the cognition born of mystic communion, then it might be admitted that Mystics perceive that form of *Brahman*. As it is, however, in the manner shown above, no such operation is possible; hence this view cannot be right.

The following might be urged:—"When Mystics perceive that form of *Brahman*, it is not through the appearance of cognition relating to it; as apart from that, neither the Mystic nor the mystic cognition has any existence; what happens is that during the mystic state, Mystics perceive It as their own self, in the form of Light effulgent".

The answer to this is as follows :—If it is so, then it has to be explained what the Brahman's form is prior to the mystic state. If It is always of the form of Light effulgent, then there can be no state which is *not-mystic* ; as *ex hypothesi*, Brahman is ever of the nature of the effulgent light of Self ; so that the Liberation of all beings would be accomplished without effort.

It is possible that the following might be urged :—" Just as for you, Buddhists, during the state of Dream and the like, the Cognition, though one, appears in a variegated form,—so the Brahman also, even though one, appears diverse to persons whose chain of cognitions is not pure, through Ignorance."

That cannot be right ; because as a matter of fact, apart from *Brahman*, there are none whose ' Chain ' is not pure, to whom the said form could appear as stated.

" *Brahman* appears, by Itself, in that form."

In that case, no Liberation would be possible ; because *Brahman* is always of the nature of one single Cognition. As for us (Buddhists), Liberation is quite possible, as at that stage, there appears a distinct pure Cognition.

Further, for you, apart from *Brahman*, there can be no Ignorance or Illusion under whose influence the *Brahman* would appear in the said form. And on account of Illusion being non-separate from It, it would be well-said that ' under the influence of that Illusion, Brahman appears as Itself in that form ' !

It might be said that—" When it is said that ' It becomes cognised under the influence of Ignorance ', what is meant is that It is of the nature of Ignorance (or Illusion)."

If so, then the implication is all the clearer that there can be no Liberation : when the Eternal One Brahman has the nature of Ignorance, there can be no cessation of that Ignorance, which forms the essence of *Brahman*,—by virtue of which cessation there could be Liberation.

If then, Ignorance is admitted to be something apart from *Brahman*, —even so, it could not produce any effect upon *Brahman*, which is eternal and hence not susceptible to any addition to Its qualities. So that it cannot be right to assert that Its appearance (in Cognition) is due to the influence of Ignorance ; and thus there being no connection between Ignorance and *Brahman*, there can be no *Birth and Rebirth*.—Nor can it be right to assert that " It could be described as being neither real nor unreal " ; because all things must fall within one or the other of these two ; otherwise it would not be a *Thing* (Entity) at all. Nor will it be right to say that " it is because of its being a *Non-entity* that it is cognised in that form " ;—as such an explanation would lead to absurdities.—If, even in that state, it is called a ' State ' or ' Condition ', in the sense that its nature is capable of fruitful action,—we have nothing to say against that.

As for us (Buddhists), Ignorance (or Illusion) is only the Disposition of wrongful Attachment (or Yearning) ; and this Disposition is called a ' Faculty ' ; and this Faculty is only of the Essence of Cognition in the form of a ' *Cause* '. Hence what happens is that each preceding Cognition,—which is of the nature of Ignorance and serves as a *Cause*,—

is followed by a succeeding Cognition, which is of the nature of its *Effect* and has within itself the traces of *wrongful attachment*; and under such circumstances, it is only right that there should appear a Cognition in the form under discussion, due to the influence of Ignorance.—This Ignorance is duly removed by Mystic Practices,—through the process of succeeding moments endowed with gradually increasing degrees of inefficiency (in the Ignorance),—and there appears a series of *pure* Cognitions and consequent *Liberation*; so that the process of 'Bondage and Liberation' becomes duly established on a reasonable basis.

This is not possible under your theory; as Brahman, being Eternal and One, cannot have two 'states' (of Ignorance and Liberation),—and because the said *Brahman* is one, the Liberation of one man would mean the Liberation of all men; and the non-liberation (Bondage) of one would mean the Bondage of all.

Nor is there any proof for the fact of *Brahman* being of the nature of 'the Light of Self', during the *non-mystic* state. The Cognition that proves anything is of the nature of 'Light' and hence recognised as 'self-cognised'. The 'Sound-self' however is never found to be cognised in all cognitions,—as has been already mentioned before.—Thus then, if it is admitted that during the 'non-mystic' state, Brahman is *not* of the nature of the 'Light of Self',—even so, it will have to be explained how the 'Light of Self' which, thus, would not be previously existent, comes about subsequently during the 'mystic state', in the *Brahman*, without this latter having abandoned Its previous form and character.

From all this it follows that your doctrine of 'Sound-Brahman' is absolutely wrong. We desist from further expatiation on this point.—(151)

With the following Text, the Author applies the previously-detailed objections to this doctrine also :—

TEXT (152).

THIS DOCTRINE OF '*Brahman*' ALSO IS SIMILAR TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE 'EVOLUTION FROM PRIMORDIAL MATTER'; AND THE OBJECTIONS URGED AGAINST THIS LATTER SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE APPLICABLE TO THE FORMER ALSO.—(152)

COMMENTARY.

The objection may be stated thus :—'The World cannot be the effect of Sound,—because it exists,—like the cognition of the Cause; hence what is meant to be the Cause cannot be the Cause,—because it cannot be so proved,—like the other Self',—and so on.—(152)

End of the Chapter on the Doctrine of 'Sound-Brahman'.

CHAPTER VI.

Doctrine of the 'Puruṣa'—Spirit—Personality—as 'Cause' of the World.

With the following Text, the Author introduces the doctrine of the '*Vedavādin*' (Follower of the Veda) :—

TEXTS (153-154).

OTHERS, HOWEVER, POSTULATE THE 'PURUṢA' (SPIRIT),—SIMILAR IN CHARACTER TO 'GOD'—AS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD,—THEIR MIND BEING SWAYED BY AN ILL-CONCEIVED DOCTRINE. THUS 'SPIRIT' HAS HIS POWERS SUCH AS DO NOT CEASE EVEN IN REGARD TO THE DISSOLUTION OF ALL THINGS ; HE IS THE CAUSE OF ALL BORN THINGS, JUST AS THE SPIDER IS OF THE COBWEBS.—(154)

COMMENTARY.

These people state their doctrine as follows:—"The *Puruṣa, Spirit,* alone is the Cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the whole world ; *his powers do not cease even in regard to Dissolution.* This has been thus declared —'As the Spider is the cause of the cobwebs, the Lunar Gem of water, and the Banyan Tree of its offshoots,—so is the Spirit the Cause of all born things' ; —and again 'The Spirit alone is all this, the past, and also the future'."

Similar in character to God ;—i.e. He has qualities equal to those of God ; inasmuch as both are the 'efficient cause' of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe ; the only difference between these two (*Spirit* and *God*) is that those who regard *God* as the Cause of the World postulate other things also like the Soul and such things, as the 'constituent' and other kinds of Cause (God being only the 'efficient' cause),—while those who regard 'Spirit' as the Cause of the world, posit the *Spirit* alone as the sole cause (*efficient* as well as *constituent*) ; but the character of being the *efficient* cause of creation, sustenance and dissolution is common to both doctrines.—*They have their mind swayed by an ill-conceived doctrine* ; i.e. their mind is under the influence of a doctrine which is wrongly conceived.

The term '*Ūrṇanābha*' stands for the *Spider*.—(153-154)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to set forth the objections against this doctrine :—

TEXT (155).

THE REFUTATION OF THIS ALSO IS TO BE SET FORTH, IN THE SAME MANNER AS THAT OF 'GOD': FOR WHAT PURPOSE DOES THIS 'SPIRIT' PERFORM SUCH AN ACT (AS THE *creating*, ETC. OF THE WORLD)?—(155)

COMMENTARY.

'*Īshvaravat*'—is to be construed as '*īshvarasya iva*', 'as in the case of God'.

This refutation is to be stated thus:—'The *Spirit* cannot be the Cause of born things,—because He is Himself devoid of birth,—like the sky-lotus; otherwise all things would come into existence simultaneously'.—[This is exactly the same argument that has been put forward against 'God', under *Text* 87, above].

If the upholders of the *Spirit* put forward the same arguments that have been put forward by others in proof of 'God',—then the same fallacies—of being 'unproven' and the rest—that have been shown in the latter should be applied to the former also.

The Text mentions another line of objection also—*For what purpose, etc.*—The activity of all intelligent beings is found to be prompted by some purpose; hence it has to be explained for what purpose the Spirit performs such an act as that of creating the world.—(155)

TEXTS (156-157).

IF HE DOES IT BECAUSE HE IS PROMPTED BY ANOTHER BEING, THEN HE CAN NOT BE SELF-SUFFICIENT (INDEPENDENT).—IF HE DOES IT THROUGH COMPASSION, THEN HE SHOULD MAKE THE WORLD ABSOLUTELY HAPPY. WHEN HE IS FOUND TO HAVE CREATED PEOPLE BESET WITH MISERY, POVERTY, SORROW AND OTHER TROUBLES,—WHERE CAN HIS COMPASSION BE PERCEIVED?—(156-157)

COMMENTARY.

If the Spirit does all this, even though himself unwilling to do so, because he is prompted by another Being in the shape of God and the like,—then the 'self-sufficiency' that has been postulated for him disappears.—If it were through compassion that he did it, for the purpose of helping others, then he would not make it full of such dire miseries as those of Hell, etc.,—he would make it entirely happy.—(156-157)

TEXT (158).

FURTHER, INASMUCH AS, PRIOR TO CREATION, THE OBJECTS OF COMPASSION WOULD NOT BE THERE,—THERE COULD NOT BE EVEN THAT COMPASSION THROUGH THE PRESENCE OF WHICH THE ORDAINER IS ASSUMED.—(158)

COMMENTARY.

Further, prior to creation,—there is no entity towards whom he would be compassionate;—and through the presence of this 'compassion', the *Ordainer*—Creator—is assumed.—(158)

TEXT (159).

NOR SHOULD HE EVER BRING ABOUT THE DISSOLUTION OF THOSE BEINGS WHO WOULD BE ALWAYS PROSPEROUS. IF IN SO DOING, HE BE REGARDED AS DEPENDENT UPON THE 'UNSEEN FORCE' (OF DESTINY), THEN HIS 'SELF-SUFFICIENCY' CEASES.—(159)

COMMENTARY.

If he created people through compassion, and they were always happy, —then why should he bring about their dissolution? The sense is that if he has to bring about Dissolution, he should bring about the Dissolution of only such Beings as are miserable and imbecile.—It might be urged that— "He makes people happy or unhappy in accordance with their *Destiny*, in the shape of Merit and Demerit".—That cannot be right; as in that case his 'self-sufficiency'—which has been postulated,—*would cease*. One who is himself endowed with power does not depend upon anything else; if one is wanting in power, then the creation of the world itself might be attributed to That on which he is dependent; and in that case He would cease to be the 'Cause'.—(159)

TEXT (160).

THEN AGAIN, WHY SHOULD HE MAKE HIMSELF DEPENDENT UPON THAT DESTINY, WHICH IS CONDUCIVE TO SUFFERING AND PAIN? IN FACT, FULL OF MERCY AS HE IS, THE RIGHT COURSE FOR HIM WOULD BE TO IGNORE THAT DESTINY.—(160)

COMMENTARY.

It may be granted that he is dependent upon the 'Unseen Force' (of Destiny). Even so, it is not right for the merciful Being to make himself dependent upon such Destiny—in the form of Merit and Demerit,—as leads

to pain and suffering; on the contrary, he should totally disregard such Destiny, if he is influenced (in his activity) by Mercy and Compassion; merciful persons do not seek for such causes as bring about suffering; because the sole motive behind their actions consists in the desire to remove the sufferings of others.—(160)

TEXT (161).

IF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SPIRIT BE SAID TO BE FOR PURPOSES OF 'AMUSEMENT', THEN HE WOULD NOT BE HIS OWN MASTER REGARDING THAT AMUSEMENT, AS HE WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THE VARIOUS IMPLEMENTS OF THAT AMUSEMENT,—JUST LIKE A CHILD.—(161)

COMMENTARY.

If it be held that "He creates the world, not through Compassion,—but for purposes of 'Amusement'",—that also cannot be right. As, in that case, in the matter of bringing about this 'Amusement', he would not be 'self-sufficient',—being dependent upon such diverse implements of Amusement as creation, sustenance and dissolution (of the world).—(161)

TEXTS (162-163).

IF HE HAD THE POWER TO CREATE THEM, HE WOULD HAVE CREATED, AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME, ALL THE IMPLEMENTS CONDUCIVE TO THE PLEASURE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE 'AMUSEMENT'.—IF HE DID NOT HAVE THAT POWER IN THE BEGINNING, THEN HE COULD NOT HAVE IT FOR CREATING THEM CONSECUTIVELY EITHER. BECAUSE FOR AN INDIVISIBLE THING, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO HAVE POWER AND ALSO TO BE WITHOUT POWER.—(162-163)

COMMENTARY.

Further, those various implements of Amusement that are there,—if he has the power to create them, then he should create them all at the same time; if he does not have that power in the beginning, then he could not create them subsequently, one by one either; as the 'powerless condition' would be there still; it is not possible for one and the same thing to have the power and not to have the power—to do a certain act—at one and the same time,—the two, *power* and *absence of power*, being mutually exclusive.

The arguments that have been urged before against the doctrine of God,—e.g. why does He undertake such an operation as creation and so forth,—are applicable to this doctrine also.

This also disposes of the following arguments set forth by *Prashastamati*:—" God undertakes activity for the purpose of helping others. Just

as a certain sage, who has had all his own purposes accomplished and hence for whom there is nothing to be done for either acquiring what is desirable or avoiding what is not desirable, undertakes the work of teaching for the benefit of others,—similarly God also, having made known the majesty of His own power, proceeds to act for the purpose of helping living beings. —Or, just as, on account of the natural potency of Time, the Spring and other seasons come about by turns, upon which animate and inanimate products come about by their own inherent nature,—similarly in the case of God also, the faculties of creating, maintaining and dissolving become manifested by turns, and through these, He becomes the Cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of all living beings."

This argument becomes set aside by what has been said above. For instance, the assertion that "Spirit acts for the purpose of helping others" is to be met by this reasoning:—If it were kindness towards others, then He should have created the world absolutely happy, etc. etc.

As regards the statement that "it is due to the nature of his powers";—the objection against this is as follows:—If he had his powers fully manifested, he would bring about creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world simultaneously; if he has not his powers manifested, then the creation and the rest could not be brought about even consecutively; if then, the Being with manifested power were someone else, then how could there be a single Being in the shape of *Spirit*?

The assertion regarding Time being the cause operating towards the consecutive appearance of Spring and other seasons is also open to the same objection. *Time*, in fact, is nothing more than Things of the world themselves as beset with such diversities as those of heat and cold; as we are going to explain later on.—(162-163)

The Author now proceeds to examine *Uddyotakara's* view that the functioning of God is due to His own nature:—

TEXTS (164-165).

IF IT BE HELD THAT "THE FUNCTIONING AT THE BEGINNING OF CREATION IS DUE TO HIS NATURE,—JUST LIKE THE FUNCTIONING OF FIRE AND SUCH THINGS TOWARDS *burning* AND SUCH EFFECTS, WHICH IS DUE TO THEIR VERY NATURE";—THEN, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ALL THINGS SHOULD COME INTO EXISTENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY; BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE CAUSE FULLY COMPETENT TO PRODUCE THEM.—(164-165)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara argues as follows:—"The action of God cannot be for purposes of amusement; on the other hand, just as in the case of Earth and other Rudimentary Elements, their very nature is such that they operate towards the bringing about of their products, so also in the case of God".—[This is a

clear reference to what is said in the *Nyāyavārtika*, pages 466-467 ; though the words are slightly different].

This is not right ; as the appearance of all things being entirely dependent upon the action of that Being,—when the Cause in its fully efficient and perfect form would be present, all things would be produced simultaneously. It will not be right to introduce the qualification of "intelligence" (in the Cause),—as we have already explained (under the section on *God*).—(164-165)

Question—"If this is so, then how is it that the effects of Fire and other things do not come about simultaneously ?"

The answer is provided in the following Text :—

TEXTS (166-167).

IN THE CASE OF SUCH THINGS AS FIRE AND THE LIKE, THEIR POWERS ARE DEPENDENT UPON THE EFFICIENCY OF THEIR OWN CAUSES, AND HENCE RESTRICTED IN THEIR OPERATIONS, AND CONSEQUENTLY NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL TIMES. IF IT WERE NOT SO, ALL EFFECTS WOULD COME INTO EXISTENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY,—IF IN THEIR CASE ALSO THERE WERE NO SUCH RESTRICTION.—(166-167)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tēṣām*'—of Fire and such things.—The particle '*api*', 'also', implies that what is urged is applicable not to the case of 'God' *only*.—'*If there were no such restriction*',—that is, the restriction due *to the efficiency of their own causes*.—(166-167)

The following might be urged :—"The Spider acts through its own nature, —why then does it not produce its effects, in the shape of cobwebs and the like, simultaneously ?"

The answer to this is given in the following Text :—

TEXT (168).

IN THE CASE OF THE SPIDER ALSO, THE CAUSAL CAPACITY TO PRODUCE THE COBWEBS IS NOT ADMITTED (BY US) TO BE DUE TO ITS VERY NATURE ; WHAT PRODUCES THEM IS THE SALIVA EMITTED BY THE SPIDER'S EAGER DESIRE TO DEVOUR INSECTS.—(168)

COMMENTARY.

The Spider also does not act by its very nature ; what happens is that it acts *from its eager desire to devour insects*,—which appears only occasionally,

through special causes.—The Spider thus is not always of one and the same character; its efficiency also is only occasional and due to the force of its own causes.—(168)

The following might be urged:—"The Spirit may not act through *Compassion,* or through *Amusement*; but somehow it acts unintentionally (automatically)".

The answer to this is given in the following Text:—

TEXT (169).

IF THE FUNCTIONING (OF THE SPIRIT) BE 'SOMEHOW' (UNINTENTIONAL),—THEN WHAT SORT OF 'INTELLIGENCE' IS HIS?—SINCE EVEN THE FISHERMAN DOES NOT ACT WITHOUT THINKING OVER THE EFFECT OF HIS ACTION.—(169)

COMMENTARY.

How could such a Person be listened to by intelligent men,—being more ignorant and stupid than even such common people as the fisherman and the like.—'*Buddhimattā*' stands for *intelligence.*—'*Shanaka*' is the *fisherman.*—(169)

This objection against the 'Spirit' should be taken as rejecting all those 'creators'—*Shauri* and the rest,—who have been postulated by other people.—This is what is shown in the following Text:—

TEXT (170).

'*Shauri*' (*Viṣnu*), 'THE SELF-BORN' (*Brahmā*), AND OTHERS WHO HAVE BEEN ASSUMED TO BE THE CREATORS (OF THE WORLD)—ALL BECOME ACTUALLY REJECTED BY THE ABOVE REASONINGS.—(170)

COMMENTARY.

'*Shauri*' is *Viṣnu*; '*Self-born*' is *Brahmā*;—'and others' is meant to include 'Intelligent Time', which also is postulated by some people.

[There is a lacuna in the Text here.]

End of the Chapter on 'Spirit' as the Creator.

CHAPTER VII.

Doctrine of the 'Self' (*Soul*).

SECTION (A).

According to the Nyāya-Vaishēṣika School.

TEXTS (171–176).

OTHERS AGAIN POSTULATE THE 'SELF' (SOUL) AS THE SUBSTRATUM OF DESIRE AND THE REST,—WHICH, BY ITSELF, IS NOT OF THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS, BUT IS ETERNAL AND ALL-PERVASIVE;—IT IS THE DOER OF GOOD AND BAD ACTS AND THE ENJOYER OF THE FRUIT OF THESE; IT IS 'CONSCIOUS', NOT BY ITSELF, BUT THROUGH THE PRESENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS;—THE PRESENCE OF COGNITION, EFFORT, ETC. AS ALSO THE CHARACTER OF BEING THE 'DOER' IS ATTRIBUTED TO IT. ITS BEING THE 'ENJOYER' (EXPERIENCER) CONSISTS IN THE SUBSISTENCE IN IT OF THE FEELINGS OF PLEASURE, PAIN AND THE LIKE;—CONTACT WITH PHYSICAL BODY AND WITH SPECIAL UNPRECEDENTED COGNITIONS AND FEELINGS IS CALLED ITS 'BIRTH'; AND DISSOCIATION FROM THESE SAME AS TAKEN UP BEFORE IS CALLED ITS 'DEATH'; ITS 'REBIRTH' CONSISTS IN BECOMING EQUIPPED WITH A BODY AND MIND, UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MERIT AND DEMERIT. IT IS ASSUMED TO BE 'HURT' BY THE HURTING OF ITS BODY, EYES AND THE REST; SO THAT THOUGH IT IS ETERNAL, THE SAID PROCESS (OF BIRTH AND REBIRTH) HAS BEEN HELD TO BE UNOBJECTIONABLE.—(171–176).

[*There is a large lacuna here in Shāntarakṣita's Text tiself; as is clear from the following portions of Kamalashīla's Commentary, of which latter also, the earlier portions are wanting.*]

COMMENTARY.

[The existence of the *Soul* as the cogniser has been asserted in the following words:—"All particular cognitions of such cognisables as Substance, Quality and Action, which are comprised under 'Being', etc.,—and also of Generality, Specific Individuality and Inherence, which are not comprised under 'Being, etc.'—all which cognitions are perceptional or inferential or analogical or verbal or occult (astrological, etc.) or intuitional (e.g. 'my brother will come to-morrow') or doubtful or wrong or dreamy or dream-cognition,—are apprehended by a cogniser distinct from my body, etc.,—(*a*) because their origination is dependent upon their own causes,—(*b*) because they are 'general' and 'particular',—(*e*) because they are of

the nature of Consciousness,—(*d*) because they are very quickly destructible,—(*e*) because they leave impressions,—(*f*) because they are cognitions,—just like the cognition of other persons;—the Jar and other things serving as the Corroborative Instance *per dissimilarity*."

The import of this comprehensive argument the Author sets forth (from the Nyāya-standpoint) in the following Text:—

TEXT (177).

"MY COGNITIONS ARE APPREHENDED BY A COGNISER DISTINCT FROM MY BODY, ETC.—BECAUSE THEY ARE COGNITIONS,—LIKE COGNITIONS OTHER THAN MINE.—(177)

COMMENTARY.

In the phrase '*body, etc.*', the 'etc.' includes the Intellect, Sense-organs and Feelings.—'*Because they are cognitions*',—this also is only illustrative; the other reasons also are meant,—such as 'having their origin dependent upon their own causes' and the rest (mentioned in the aforesaid comprehensive statement).—(177)

Shaṅkarasvāmin (an old Nyāya-writer) proves the existence of the Soul in another manner:—"Desire and the rest must subsist in something,—because, while being entities, they are effects,—like Colour, etc.".—This argument is set forth in the following Text:—

TEXTS (178-179).

"ALL SUCH THINGS AS DESIRE AND THE REST MUST SUBSIST IN SOMETHING; BECAUSE WHILE BEING ENTITIES, THEY ARE EFFECTS,—LIKE COLOUR.—THIS SOMETHING IS THE SPIRIT (SOUL). THE PRESENCE OF THE QUALIFYING PHRASE 'WHILE BEING ENTITIES' SAVES THE ARGUMENT FROM BEING 'UNTRUE' (FALLIBLE), IN REGARD TO DESTRUCTION; BECAUSE THOUGH DESTRUCTION IS AN EFFECT (HAS A CAUSE), YET IT IS NOT AN 'ENTITY'."—(178-179)

COMMENTARY.

The words 'the presence of the qualifying phrase, etc.' serves to show the use of the phrase 'while being an entity'.—(178-179)

Uddyotakara, on the other hand, seeks to prove the existence of the Soul in the following manner:—[The words here are almost an exact

reproduction of the words of the *Nyāyavārtika* on 1. 1. 10, page 70, also on 3. 1. 1, page 340, Bib. Ind. Edn.]—"Dēvadatta's cognitions of Colour, Taste, Smell and Touch must be due to one and to several causes,—because they are recalled as 'mine',—just like the simultaneous cognitions of several men who have come to an understanding among themselves, relating to the glances of the dancing girl."—The meaning of this is as follows:—"When several men have come to an understanding to the effect that 'when the dancing girl casts her glances, we should throw clothes to her', there are several cognitions, by several cognisers, of the single object in the shape of the 'glances',—and yet as the object cognised (the glances) is one only, each man recalls the cognition as 'I have seen', 'I have seen';—in the same manner, in the case in question also, the cognitions of several things would be recalled, on account of their cause (cogniser) being one only; and that one Cause is the *Soul*.—The 'recalling' of the cognitions also consists in their being grouped together in such expressions as 'It has been seen by me,—heard by me' and so forth, as due to their belonging to a single *Cogniser*. In the case of 'the glances of the dancing girl' however, what is meant to be stressed is only the fact of the *cognised object* (not the *Cogniser*) being one. In all cases however the fact of the 'recalling' remains, whereby several cognitions become associated with a single entity."

This argument of *Uddyotakara's* is set forth in the following Text:—

TEXTS (180-181).

"ALL COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, ETC. SHOULD BE REGARDED AS HAVING ONE AND ALSO SEVERAL CAUSES,—BECAUSE THEY ARE RECALLED BY THE NOTION OF 'BEING COGNISED *by me*';—JUST LIKE THE COGNITIONS OF SEVERAL MEN REGARDING THE GLANCES OF THE DANCING GIRL. IF IT WERE OTHERWISE, THERE COULD BE NO 'RECALLING', AS THERE WOULD BE NO BASIS FOR IT."—(180-181)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(180-181)

The following is another argument put forward by the same writer (*Uddyotakara*):—[This argument is found set forth, in different words, in the *Nyāyavārtika*, under 3. 1. 19, page 368, Bib. Ind. Edition; see also page 340]—"The term 'Soul' must be expressive of something different from the aggregate of Body, Sense-organs, Mind, Intellect and Feelings,—because it is a single term, while being distinct from the well-known synonyms of these latter,—like such terms as 'Jar' and the like."

This argument is set forth in the following Text:—

TEXTS (182-183).

"THE TERM '*ātman*' (SOUL) MUST BE EXPRESSIVE OF SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM THE AGGREGATE OF INTELLECT, SENSE-ORGANS AND THE REST, —BECAUSE IT IS HELD TO BE A SINGLE TERM, WHILE BEING DIFFERENT FROM THE WELL-KNOWN SYNONYMS OF THOSE TERMS ;—WHATEVER IS DEFINITELY KNOWN AS FULFILLING THESE CONDITIONS IS ALWAYS QUALIFIED BY THE SAID PROPERTY ; AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE TERM 'CLOTH'."—(182-183)

COMMENTARY.

Being different from the well-known synonyms ;—i.e. such terms as '*dhī*' (which is a sonynym of '*buddhi*') and the rest, which are well-known synonyms of the term '*Buddhi*' ; the term 'Soul' is distinct from all these syonyms.—*Whatever is definitely known, etc.*—i.e. which is different from well-known synonyms and is yet a single word,—*is always qualified by the said property*,—i.e. is always characterised by the quality of being expressive of something distinct from Intellect and the rest.—(182-183)

The same writer has also adduced a negative Reasoning in proof of the *Soul*—"This living body is not Soul-less, because if it were so, it would have to be regarded as devoid of the functions of Breathing, etc.,—like the Jar and such things".

TEXT (184).

"THIS LIVING BODY WOULD BE DEVOID OF BREATHING AND OTHER FUNCTIONS,—BECAUSE IT WOULD BE SOUL-LESS,—LIKE THE JAR. HENCE IT CANNOT BE SOUL-LESS."—(184)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be Soul-less,—i.e. the Living Body cannot be without a Soul. Or the meaning of the Text may be that 'the Soul cannot be non-existent',—devoid of existence ; that is, its existence is established.—(184)

As regards the question as to how the *eternality* and *omnipresence* of the Soul are to be proved,—*Aviddhakarṇa* has propounded the following argument :—"The cognitions that I have had since my birth must have had the same *cogniser* who had the first cognition immediately after my coming out of my mother's womb,—because they are *my* cognitions,—like my *first* cognition.—The same reasoning may be stated in regard to Pain and other experiences also.—This is the inferential reasoning that proves the *eternality* of the Soul."

This argument is set forth in the following Text :—

TEXT (185).

"ALL SUBSEQUENT COGNITIONS ARE APPREHENDED BY THAT SAME COGNISER WHO APPREHENDED THE FIRST COGNITION IMMEDIATELY ON BIRTH,—BECAUSE THEY ARE MY COGNITIONS,—LIKE THAT FIRST FORERUNNER OF THOSE COGNITIONS."—(185)

COMMENTARY.

Like the first forerunner, etc.—i.e. the first forerunner of all subsequent cognitions.—(185)

In proof of the *omnipresence* of the Soul, the same writer sets forth the following argument :—" The Earth, Water, Air and Mind which are things under dispute, are at a distance from my Soul, and yet they are in contact with that Soul,—(*a*) because they have material form,—(*b*) because they have velocity,—(*c*) because they have priority and posteriority,—(*d*) because they are associated with, and dissociated from, each other,—just like my own body ".

This argument is set forth in the following Text :—

TEXT (186).

"EARTH AND THE REST, EVEN THOUGH EXISTING AT A PLACE REMOTE FROM ME, ARE YET CONNECTED WITH MY SOUL,—BECAUSE THEY HAVE A MATERIAL FORM, ETC.,—JUST LIKE MY OWN BODY."—(186)

COMMENTARY.

The next Text sums up the arguments of the protagonists of the Soul :—

TEXT (187).

"THUS THE EXISTENCE, ETERNALITY AND OMNIPRESENCE OF THE SOUL BEING DEFINITELY PROVED,—IT BECOMES ESTABLISHED THAT NOTHING IS SOUL-LESS."—(187)

COMMENTARY.

The following Text proceeds to answer the above arguments (of the upholders of the Soul) :—

TEXT (188).

As regards the first argument that has been put forward, it is open to the charge of 'proving what is already admitted' (Futile); as the apprehensibility of your cognition by the Omniscient Person and others is already admitted (by us).—(188)

COMMENTARY.

The first argument,—i.e. the one set forth in Text 177—"My cognitions are apprehended by a Cogniser, etc.".—This is futile; inasmuch as we already admit the fact that your cognitions are apprehended by a Cogniser other than your body, etc.,—in the person of the Omniscient Being, as also by the *Shrāvakas* and *Pratyēkabuddhas* and other thought-readers.—(188)

As regards the *instance per similarity* cited in the same argument—"like the cognitions of other persons",—it is one that is 'devoid of the Probandum' (i.e. the character meant to be proved is not present in it).—This is shown in the following Text:—

TEXT (189).

Whenever Consciousness appears, it appears in its own form, independently of any other 'illuminator'; so also the 'cognition of other persons';—hence your instance is devoid of the Probandum.—(189)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as the 'cognition of other persons' also appears in its own form, independently of any other 'illuminator',—this instance that you have cited is *devoid of the Probandum*,—i.e. devoid of the character that is sought to be proved,—viz. that of 'being apprehended by a Cogniser distinct from the Body and the rest'.—(189)

It might be argued that—"it is not mere *Cognition of another person* that is meant to be the Corroborative Instance, but that particular cognition which appears in the form of the thing concerned".

The answer to this is supplied in the following Text:—

TEXT (190).

Even if the instance meant be that cognition which is cognised as tinged by the form of the thing concerned,—it would be doubtful in regard to another cognition.—(190)

COMMENTARY.

Even so, with reference to that cognition which does appear in its own form, without any 'cognition of another person',—there would be doubts regarding the Probans cited, which, therefore, would remain 'inconclusive'.

It might be urged that "the said Cognition also must be apprehended by a Cogniser different from itself,—(*a*) because it is prone to appearance and disappearance,—(*b*) because it is cognisable,—(*c*) because it is capable of being remembered as a means of cognition,—like the objects (of cognition)".

But here also: (1) as there would be nothing to preclude the contrary of the Probandum, the negative concomitance would remain doubtful; (2) as it would involve cognition after cognition, there would be an infinite regress;—(3) there would be no 'object' whose appearance had not become manifested; hence, for the establishing of one 'object', it would be necessary to carry on a series of Cognitions, which would take up the entire life of a man.

If for fear of the 'infinite regress', some one cognition were accepted as appearing *by itself*,—then that one case would render doubtful and inconclusive the whole set of Reasons cited,—in the form 'being liable to appearance and disappearance' and the rest. Further, in that case, why should there be any aversion to the acceptance of the 'self-cognisability' of other cognitions also,—on the basis of that said one cognition?—If (in order to avoid this difficulty) it be held that the said one cognition is one whose form is not cognised at all;—even so, that cognition not being 'un-proven', the entire set of cognitions preceding it would be 'not proven',—having their appearance not manifested; and as a consequence of this, the object (of cognition) also would be 'not proven'.—Further, as regards the opinion of the Idealists,—under which all Cognitions are self-manifested, on account of their being no 'Cogniser' of Cognisable things, and are not manifested by any other Cognition,—the defect in the Opponent's reasoning, of 'being devoid of the Probandum' would remain absolutely unshaken.

In the same manner it may be pointed out that the other reasons—'having its birth dependent upon Causes' and the rest,—are open to the objection of being 'Futile' and so forth.

[In the opening lines of the Commentary on 171–176, above, it has been asserted by the *Naiyāyika* that "all particular cognitions of such cognisables as are *the objects of Being*, etc. etc."];—herein the qualification that has been added to the subject of the Reasoning, is, as before, absolutely useless; as in the matter of proving the Probandum in question, they do not render any help at all. Because what is there that does not become included under the subject thus qualified?—since all my perceptional and other cognitions are declared to be apprehended by a cogniser other than the Body, sense-organs and the rest. Even if a distinction were made on the basis of some cognitions being 'perceptional' and some 'inferential' and so on,—any distinction in regard to the Subject itself would be useless; as all cognitions would have become included under the term 'my cognitions'.—Nor even for the opposite party is any such qualified Subject known; hence the Reasons put forward are devoid of a substratum.—If it is the case that by setting up a useless qualification, another reason is put forward for the proving of the said substratum,—then the reasoner becomes subject to the 'Clincher' of '*Arthāntara*', 'Irrelevancy'—by reason of setting up something entirely unconnected with the thing under consideration.—(190)

TEXTS (191-192).

IF (BY THE ARGUMENT SET FORTH UNDER *Text* 178), IT IS SOUGHT TO BE PROVED THAT DESIRE AND THE REST MUST SUBSIST *somewhere*, —AND THAT THE 'CAUSE' ONLY CAN BE SUCH A SUBSTRATUM, —YOU SEEK TO PROVE WHAT IS ALREADY ACCEPTED BY US. IF HOWEVER IT IS THE RECEPTACLE (OR CONTAINER) THAT IS MEANT BY YOU TO BE THE 'SUBSTRATUM' (OF DESIRE, ETC.),—THEN ALSO THE ASSUMING OF A 'RECEPTACLE' FOR WHAT IS IMMOBILE IS ABSOLUTELY USELESS.—(191-192)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued (under *Text* 178, above) that "Desire, etc. must subsist somewhere"; if, by this, all that is meant to be proved is that only the Cause is the substratum of Desire, etc., then the effort is futile; because we also do not regard Desire, etc. to be *without cause*; as is clear from our declaration that 'the mind and the mental phenomena are brought about by four etc.'.

'*Parikalpyatē*'—asserted, meant.

If the 'substratum' you seek to prove is in the form of a 'container' (Receptacle),—then what is asserted being annulled by Inference, there can be no invariable concomitance between that and the Probans put forward.—This is what is shown by the words—'*If however it is the Receptacle, etc.*,'—i.e. the receptacle of the Desire, etc. It might be possible to postulate such a 'Receptacle' for things with material forms, which are capable of moving about,—for whom the 'Receptacle' would save them from falling down; those things however which, like Pleasure and the rest, are immobile (and immaterial) can never *fall down*, and under the circumstances, what would any such thing as the 'Soul' do for them, whereby it would be their 'receptacle'? (191-192)

Objection—"When the Jujube-fruit and other things are placed in such receptacles as the jar and the like,—even though these latter do not do anything for the fruits, yet they serve as their 'receptacle' (container); in the same manner the Soul would be the 'receptacle' of Pleasure, etc."

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (193).

THE PIT AND OTHER THINGS CAN BE THE 'RECEPTACLE' OF THE JUJUBE FRUIT AND OTHER THINGS, BECAUSE THEY SERVE TO OBSTRUCT THEIR MOVEMENT, OR BECAUSE THEY BRING ABOUT SPECIFIC CHANGES.—(193)

COMMENTARY.

'*Because they serve to obstruct their movement*';—this is in accordance with the view that things are *not* momentary;—'*because they bring about*

specific changes,—this is in accordance with the view that things are momentary; as the 'changes' meant here are those that are brought about on the same spot where the constituent cause existed.—Both these kinds of 'receptacle' are impossible in the case of Desire and the rest; hence there can be no 'receptacle' for these.—(193)

Under the argument urged above (in *Text* 178) the phrase 'while being entities' has been introduced as a qualification;—this qualification is absolutely useless; as there is nothing that it can serve to exclude. This is what is pointed out in the following Text:—

TEXT (194).

IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO REGARD 'DESTRUCTION', WHICH IS *formless*, AS A 'PRODUCT'; HENCE THE QUALIFICATION MENTIONED IN THE REASONING OF THE OTHER PARTY IS ENTIRELY USELESS.—(194)

COMMENTARY.

If Destruction could be of the nature of a 'Product', then the qualification 'being an entity' would serve the purpose of excluding that; as a matter of fact however, as it is a non-entity, causes cannot do anything to it; how then could it have a Cause? This reasoning may be formulated as follows:—That which is a non-entity cannot be the product of anything,—e.g. the 'Hare's Horns',—Destruction is a non-entity;—hence to speak of it as having a cause would be contrary to the said universal proposition.—If it were a 'product', it would be an 'entity', like Pleasure, etc.—This would be an argument against the reasoning of the other party.

Further, what has been asserted also runs counter to your own doctrine. For instance, the name and the idea of 'Product' is due—(*a*) to its acquiring its character, or (*b*) to its subsistence (manifestation) in its Material Cause, or (*c*) to the subsistence therein of 'Being' (*existence*);—Destruction is not possessed of the character of Substance, etc., hence it cannot subsist in its Material Cause; nor, for the same reason, can 'Being' (Existence) subsist in it (Destruction), for the simple reason that it has no form (wherein the *Existence* could subsist). If it were otherwise, then, like Substance, etc., it would also be 'contained' in a receptacle, and be an 'Entity' also; and as such, it could not be excluded by the qualification in question; hence this qualification—'being entities'—is absolutely useless.—(194)

As against the argument put forward by the Opponent under Text 180 above, to the effect that 'the cognitions of Colour, etc. have one and several causes, etc. etc.',—the Author urges as follows:—

TEXTS (195-196).

THE 'RECALLING' OF SUCH NOTIONS AS 'BY ME (SEEN, HEARD)', ETC. MUST BE DUE TO PERTURBATIONS OF IGNORANCE; AS SUCH NOTIONS OF THE ONE-NESS OF THE AGENT (PERCEIVER) ARE FOUND TO APPEAR ALSO IN CONNECTION WITH ALL MOMENTARY THINGS. FROM THIS FALSE ASSUMPTION, IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO DEDUCE ANY CONCLUSION REGARDING THE TRUE STATE OF THINGS; SPECIALLY AS EVEN THINGS THAT ARE DIVERSE BY REASON OF THE DIVERSITY OF THEIR POWERS BECOME THE BASIS OF AN EFFECT CONCEIVED OF AS *one*.—(195-196)

COMMENTARY.

'*Seen by me and heard by me, etc. etc.*',—the 'recalling', in the 'associating' of several such cognitions, has been put forward as the reason for their having a single Cause (in the shape of the 'Soul').—But this reason is 'inconclusive';—as even in regard to momentary things, such 'recalling' is possible through the false assumption of their being due to a single Cogniser. Hence it cannot be right to deduce any conclusion regarding the true nature of things from the fact of such 'recalling'.

Question—"In what way do your *Moments* (Momentary entities) come to be the cause of the said *Recalling* (of Cognitions)?"

Answer—*By reason of the diversity of their powers, etc.*;—i.e. by reason of the peculiarity of its powers,—the thing which is *many* (diverse) becomes the '*basis*'—cause—of such *single* effects being *recalled* in one form; as is found in the case of such medicines of fever as *Gudūchi* and the rest; all which is going to be explained in detail later on.—(195-196)

Question—"How is it ascertained that the notion in question is *wrong*?" The answer is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (197).

IF MANY THINGS—SUCH AS THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND AND THE REST,—WERE THE EFFECTS OF A SINGLE CONTINUOUS (PERMANENT) CAUSE,—THEN ANY ORDER OF SEQUENCE AMONG SUCH EFFECTS WOULD BE INCONGRUOUS; AS THEIR EFFICIENT CAUSE WOULD BE ALWAYS THERE.—(197)

COMMENTARY.

If the cognitions of the *Blue* and the rest were the effect of a single such Cause as the 'Soul', which is *eternal*, continues for all time, past and future,

—then any order of sequence among such cognitions would be incongruous; as the efficient Cause being present, all the effects should appear simultaneously; specially as the eternal Cause cannot need the help of anything else; for the simple reason that it cannot be helped by anything else.—(197)

Further, if what is meant to prove is merely the fact of the cognitions being 'preceded by a Cause', then the effort is futile;—this is what is shown in the following *Text*:—

TEXT (198).

INASMUCH AS THE APPEARANCE OF SIX COGNITIONS OUT OF A SINGLE PRECEDING COGNITION IS CLEARLY RECOGNISED SIMULTANEOUSLY, —WHAT YOUR ARGUMENT PROVES IS ADMITTED (BY US).—(198)

COMMENTARY.

From a single preceding Cognition,—out of a single Cognition immediately preceding them,—there is an appearance of Six Cognitions, through the Eye and other organs,—which 'appearance' is clearly recognised. For instance, at the time that a man *sees* the complexion of the dancing girl, he also *hears* the Sound of the drum and other musical accompaniments, *smells* the odour of the Lotus and other fragrant things, *tastes* the Camphor and other things, *feels* also the wind emanating from the fans, and *thinks* of taking up his clothes.—It cannot be right to say that his vision appears to be such because it moves quickly, like the whirling fire-brand. For if it were so, then the appearances would be vague and dim. To explain;—it is on the basis of the 'recalling' of all these perceptions (through the several Sense-organs) that you explain the feeling that the whole lot of the perceptions appears in a single Cognition; the Recalling too is done through Remembrance;—and Remembrance, appertaining, as it does, to the past, is always indistinct;—while the single Cognition of Colour and the rest is found to be quite distinct.—Further, in the case of such expressions as '*saro-rasa*', there is an appearance of the cognitions quickly apprehending the '*sa*' and other letter-sounds; so that in this case also there might be the notion of a single Cognition; and there would, therefore, be no idea of any order of sequence among them.—All this is going to be explained later on; in the present context the Text has merely indicated the lines of the refutation (of the Opponent's doctrine).—(198)

If what you seek to prove is the fact of the Cognitions having a single Cause, by the fact of their having for their Cause a Single Eternal and Uniform Entity,—then your premiss is one that is annulled by Inference.—This is what is shown in the following Text:—

TEXT (199).

THAT THINGS APPEARING CONSECUTIVELY, ONE AFTER THE OTHER, CANNOT HAVE ONE AND THE SAME CAUSE, HAS JUST BEEN POINTED OUT. FOR THIS REASON, HEREIN THE (OPPONENT'S) PREMISS ASSERTING THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE IS FOUND TO BE CLEARLY ANNULLED BY INFERENCE.—(199)

COMMENTARY.

'*Just been pointed out,*'—in Text 197.

The 'annulment' is in the following manner :—Things whose causes—efficient and untrammelled,—are present, must be produced simultaneously ; —e.g. Sprouts and such other effects, whose causal paraphernalia is complete, appear at one and the same time ;—Devadatta's cognitions of Colour and such objects have their Causes—efficient and untrammelled,—present ; this is a reason based upon the nature of things.—As a matter of fact however they never appear simultaneously ; hence the conclusion is wrong.—(199)

The following Text proceeds to show that the Corroborative Instance also is 'devoid of the Probandum' :—

TEXT (200).

AS FOR THE 'GLANCE OF THE DANCING GIRL', IT IS NOT REALLY A SINGLE ENTITY ; IN FACT IT IS MADE UP OF SEVERAL MINUTE PARTICLES ; AND ITS 'ONE-NESS' IS ONLY ASSUMED.—(200)

COMMENTARY.

Such things as the 'glance of the Dancing Girl' are not single entities ; they are, in reality, an aggregate of several minute particles.

Question—"If that is so, then how do they come to be spoken of as *one* ?"

Answer—Its one-ness is only assumed.—(200)

Question—"What is the basis of this assumption ?"

The answer comes in the following Text :—

TEXT (201).

IT IS BECAUSE IT IS USED FOR A SINGLE PURPOSE THAT IT IS SPOKEN OF AS 'ONE'. IF SOMETHING LIKE THIS IS WHAT YOU DESIRE TO PROVE, THEN YOUR EFFORT IS FUTILE (PROVING WHAT IS ALREADY ADMITTED).—(201)

COMMENTARY.

Because the 'glance of the Dancing Girl' is used for the purpose of bringing about the single effect in the form of *Visual Cognition*,—therefore, even though diverse, it is spoken of as 'one'.

It might be urged by the Opponent—" It is just such a Probandum, of which the one-ness is assumed, that we mean; so that the Corroborative Instance cannot be said to be 'devoid of the Probandum'."

The answer to this is that—*if something like this is what you desire to prove,* then it involves the fallacy of 'futility', 'proving what is already proved'; as (according to us) several Impressions appearing consecutively do form the objects of the apprehension of several things, which go to make up a single Cognition.—(201)

Under *Text* 182, it has been argued that " the term 'soul' is expressive of something distinct from the aggregate of Intellect, Sense-organs and the rest ".—This is answered in the following Text :—

TEXTS (202–204).

IN THE CASE OF SYNONYMS,—SUCH AS '*buddhi*', '*chitta*' AND THE REST,—WE FIND THAT THOUGH EACH OF THEM IS A SINGLE TERM, YET IT DOES NOT EXPRESS A THING DIFFERENT (FROM THAT EXPRESSED BY OTHERS) ;—HENCE YOUR REASON IS 'INCONCLUSIVE'.—" BUT A QUALIFICATION (IN THE FORM 'AS APART FROM RECOGNISED SYNONYMS') HAS BEEN ADDED."—OUR ANSWER TO THAT IS THAT THE QUALIFICATION IS NOT 'ADMITTED', AS THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE 'SOUL' IS SYNONYMOUS WITH 'CONSCIOUSNESS'; AS IT IS CONSCIOUSNESS ITSELF, AS THE SUBSTRATUM OF 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS', THAT IS SPOKEN OF AS THE 'SOUL'. ALL THIS HAS BEEN SAID BY US ON THE BASIS OF 'ILLUSORY CONCEPTION'; IN REALITY, THERE IS NOTHING THAT IS DENOTED BY THE TERM IN QUESTION ('SOUL').—(202–204)

COMMENTARY.

The reason—'because it is a single term'—is 'inconclusive'.—Because in the case of such synonyms as (*a*) '*buddhi*', '*chitta*', '*jñāna*',—as (*b*) '*indriya*', '*akṣa*',—as (*c*) '*vēdanā*' and '*chitta*',—as (*d*) '*kāya*' and '*sharīra*',—which are denotative of (*a*) *Intellect,* (*b*) *Sense-organs,* (*c*) *Cognition,* and (*d*) *Body,*—according to our view, the *character of denoting distinct things* is not present, though each term is 'one'; hence no preclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being possible, the Reason must be 'inconclusive'.

Says the Opponent :—" It is because we suspected this that in our argument we added the qualification, 'apart from well-recognised synonyms', to our Reason; how then can it be Inconclusive ? "

The answer to this is as follows :—This qualification of the Reason is one that is 'not admitted'.—" How ? "—Because the fact remains that the

'Soul' is the synonym of 'Consciousness'. As it has been declared (by the other party) that—"It is Consciousness itself which, as the substratum of *I-consciousness*, is spoken of as 'Soul'"; in this quotation '*upacharyatē*' stands for the phrase *is spoken of in common parlance*. It is for this reason that what *Uddyotakara* has said, regarding the 'figurative use' not being right where the 'direct use' is possible,—should be taken as being due to his ignorance of what is meant. This is what is made clear by the term '*gīyatē*' (*is spoken of*). Hence the Reason has a qualification that is 'unproven', inadmissible.

Whatever we have said regarding the 'inconclusiveness' of the Reason so far is on the basis of 'Illusory Conception'—admitting, for the sake of argument, the fact of there being something denoted (by the term 'Soul');—if what is sought to be proved is the fact of the term 'Soul' being *really* denotative of something distinct from Intelligence and the rest,—then the Reason put forward is a highly improper one, the premiss (invariable concomitance) on which it is based being annulled by Inference.—This is what is shown by the Text in the words—'*all this has been said, etc.*';—that is, as a matter of fact, all verbal usage is based upon a conceptual imposition of its connection with things;—this is going to be explained later on. Thus then, in reality, there is nothing that is denoted by the term 'Soul'; and under the circumstances, how could there be any *invariable concomitance* between the said Reason and the Probandum (the character sought to be proved)?—(202–204)

The following Text proceeds to show that even with the said qualification, the Reason remains 'inconclusive':—

TEXT (205).

THE REASON IS FOUND TO BE *False* ALSO; WHEN, FOR INSTANCE, NAMES, SUCH AS '*Kāraka*' (ACTIVE AGENT), AND THE LIKE, ARE APPLIED TO THINGS LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS'.—(205)

COMMENTARY.

When a name, such as '*Kāraka*', is applied to such *non-entities* as the 'Sky-lotus' (in such expressions as 'the Skylotus is a non-entity', where the 'Sky-lotus' may be spoken of as the 'Nominative'),—then, according to both parties, the term is *one* only and also distinct from terms denoting the Body, etc.;—and yet the denotation of the term does not consist of *a thing* distinct from the Body, etc. Hence the Reason, as urged, is 'Inconclusive'.—(205)

Question—"How can the declensional names we applied to *non-entities*, which are absolutely *characterless*?"

The answer is supplied in the following Text:—

TEXT (206).

[THE USE OF] TERMS BEING BASED ENTIRELY ON CONVENTION,—WHAT IS THERE TO WHICH THEY CANNOT BE APPLIED ?—IN THE CASE OF TERMS LIKE 'SOUL' ALSO, THERE IS NOTHING IN THEIR VERY NATURE WHICH IS EXPRESSIVE OF ANYTHING.—(206)

COMMENTARY.

'Convention' proceeds from the independent desire of men (to give a certain name to a certain thing); and Terms also are expressive of that alone; *wherefore* then could there be any restriction of their use ?

If the meaning of the Opponent's Reason be that "because it is an *unconventional* single term",—and by that means its Inclusiveness be sought to be avoided,—then the answer is—*In the case of terms like 'Soul'*, etc.—that is, apart from Convention, terms, by their nature, are not expressive of anything; for, if it were so, then even unlearned persons (not conversant with Convention) could understand the meaning of words; there would also be no independent instruction as to the meaning of words; also because all Convention would, in that case, be useless. From all this it follows that such terms as 'Soul' and the like, by their nature, are not expressive of anything; so that the Reason put forward is 'unproven', 'Inadmissible'.

If (in order to avoid these difficulties) it be sought to add a further qualification—to the effect that 'it has for its objective a cognisable thing which is included under a category which cannot be specified',—as has been asserted by *Bhāvivēka*,—even so, inasmuch as such a qualification would be 'unproven', the Reason itself would be 'Inadmissible',—as also 'Inconclusive', on account of the absence of the necessary invariable concomitance.—(206)

It has been argued above (under *Text* 184) that "The living body would be devoid of Breathing, etc., if there were no Soul".—The answer to that is provided in the following Text:—

TEXTS (207-208).

THE CONTINGENCY THAT HAS BEEN URGED WOULD BE RIGHT IF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE FUNCTIONS OF BREATHING, ETC. AND THE SOUL WERE WELL-ESTABLISHED; OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE ABSURD. FOR INSTANCE, THE ABSENCE OF THE 'SON OF THE BARREN WOMAN' CANNOT MAKE THE LIVING BODY DEVOID OF BREATHING, ETC. AND YOUR URGING OF THE CONTINGENCY IN QUESTION IS OF THE SAME KIND.—(207-208)

COMMENTARY.

If between Breathing, etc. and the Soul, there were some connection,—as that of *being produced from it*, or *being of the same nature*,—known as

established, then there would be some reason for urging the contingency that the absence of the Soul would involve the absence of Breathing, etc. Otherwise, the urging of the absence of one thing on the absence of another thing not connected with it at all, would be absurd. Certainly the absence of 'the Son of the Barren Woman' does not entail the absence of Breathing etc. Hence, if someone were to put forward the contingency of absence of Breathing, etc. as due to the absence of the 'Son of the Barren Woman', —like that of the Jar,—this would be entirely 'inconclusive'; in the same way your argument putting forward the contingency of Breathing, etc. being absent on account of the absence of the Soul is purely 'inconclusive', for the simple reason that no connection is known (to subsist between Breathing, etc. and the Soul).—(207-208)

Question—"How do you know that the connection is not known?"
Answer :—

TEXTS (209-210).

THE BREATHING, ETC. CANNOT BE OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE SOUL, AS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM HAS BEEN ADMITTED; NOR IS THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE TWO, AS IN THAT CASE, THERE WOULD BE SIMULTANEITY; THUS THEN, ON THE ABSENCE OF THE SOUL,—WITH WHICH THEY HAVE NO CONNECTION,—WHY SHOULD THE BREATHS—UPWARD, DOWNWARD AND THE REST,—DEPART FROM THE BODY?—(209-210)

COMMENTARY.

'*Between the two*,'—i.e. between the *Soul* and *Breathing, etc.*, there cannot subsist the relation of *being of the same nature*; because the *Naiyāyika* himself admits the nature of the two to be different.—Nor can the relation between the two be one of *being produced from it*; because (if the Soul were the Cause), then, inasmuch this Cause would always be present in its perfect form, the Breathing, etc. would all be simultaneous.—Apart from these two, there is no connection possible. Thus then, being devoid of any connection with the Soul, why should they disappear from the Body which is still endowed with Life?—They can never so disappear. The sense is that for this reason, the Reason put forward by the other party is 'Inconclusive'.

By this same argument all those indications of the Soul which have been put forward by the other party,—in the shape of *Desire, Hatred, Effort, Pleasure, Pain, Cognition* and so forth,—should be understood to be rejected; on the sole ground of there being no connection between these and the Soul. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When certain things are not related (by concomitance) with any particular thing, they cannot be regarded as indicators of this latter thing,—e.g. the *line of cranes* cannot be regarded as indicators of *Sesamum* and other things;—and *Breathing, etc.* are not related with the Soul; hence the conditions of the general proposition are

not fulfilled by these.—The Probans here put forward cannot be said to be 'unproven'; as it has been already proved that neither of the two forms of relation is present in the case.—Nor can the Probans be said to be 'Inconclusive'; for, if the Probans were so, then all things would be indicators of all things.—Nor can the Probans be said to be 'Contradictory'; as it is actually found to be present wherever the Probandum is present.

The other party has also asserted that "from the knowledge of the Instrument follows the knowledge of the Operator (of the Instrument)".—This however is 'not-proved'. Because it has not been proved that the Eye and other organs are 'specific instruments' (of specific cognitions), in reality; as in the producing of cognitions the 'causal efficiency' of all the organs is equal; and because any such distinction as that between the 'Instrument' and the 'Operator' is purely arbitrary.—If what is sought to be proved is only the fact of the Soul being the *operator*, then the argument is superfluous; because we have never denied the presence of the *conceptual* (assumed) 'Operator'. If the Reason be intended to prove the *real* Operator, then it is 'Inconclusive'; as the Eye and other organs have never been found to be invariably concomitant with any such real Operator.—(209-210)

It has been argued (in *Text* 185) that "all subsequent cognitions are apprehended by that same Cogniser who apprehended the first Cognition immediately on birth, etc. etc.".—This is answered in the following :—

TEXT (211).

THUS THE EXISTENCE OF THE 'SOUL' NOT BEING PROVED BY ANY OF THE PROOFS (PUT FORWARD), THE INSTANCES THAT HAVE BEEN CITED OF 'ETERNALITY' AND 'OMNIPRESENCE' BECOME 'DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM'.—(211)

COMMENTARY.

The Opponent has cited the instances of 'the first cognition' and 'my body'; all these instances are 'devoid of the Probandum',—as the existence of the 'Soul' has not been proved.—Consequently the Probans is clearly 'inconclusive'.—(211)

With the following Text, the Author again introduces the view of *Uddyotakara, Bhāvivikta* and others :—

TEXT (212).

OTHERS HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE 'SOUL' IS PROVED BY PERCEPTION; BECAUSE 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS' IS SELF-COGNISABLE, AND THE SOUL FORMS THE OBJECT OF THAT CONSCIOUSNESS.—(212)

COMMENTARY.

These people argue as follows :—"Soul is proved by Perception itself; for instance, the notion of 'I', which is independent of any remembrance

of the connection between an Inferential Indicative and that which has that Indicative, is of the nature of 'Perception',—like the cognition of Colour and other things. Of this notion of 'I', Colour, etc. do not form the object; as what appears in that notion is different from the cognition of Colour, etc.: hence the object of that notion must be totally different [and that is the *Soul*]".—[*Uddyotakara* has stated this view under 3. 1. 1; see *Nyāyavārtika*, p. 345.]

This view is answered in the following texts:—

TEXTS (213-214).

THIS IS NOT RIGHT; BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE FORM OF THE 'SOUL' DOES NOT BECOME MANIFEST IN 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS'; THEREIN IS NOT PERCEIVED ANY MANIFESTATION OF ETERNALITY, OMNIPRESENCE AND SUCH PROPERTIES (POSTULATED OF THE SOUL); WHAT IS CLEARLY PRESENT THEREIN, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS THE 'FAIR COMPLEXION', ETC.; AND THE 'SOUL' IS NOT HELD TO BE OF THE NATURE OF THESE LATTER;—HENCE THE 'SOUL' CANNOT BE AN OBJECT OF 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS'.—(213-214)

COMMENTARY.

The fact of 'I-consciousness' having the 'Soul' for its object cannot be regarded as proved; as the form of the 'Soul' is not present in it. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is devoid of the form of another, it cannot have this latter for its object; e.g. Sound is not an object of visual perception;—the notion of 'I' is devoid of the form of the *Soul*; hence if it were regarded as its object, it would be contrary to the universal proposition stated above.—That the Probans of this argument is not 'unproven' is shown by the Text in the words—'*There is not perceived any manifestation of Eternality and Omnipresence, etc. etc.*';—that is to say, the Soul is held to be eternal, omnipresent, intelligent and so forth; not the slightest manifestation of these characters is perceived in 'I-consciousness'; the manifestation that *is* perceived in 'I-consciousness' is all in connection with 'fair-complexion' and other conditions of the *body*,—as is apparent in such expressions as 'I am fair,—with weak powers of vision,—lean,—beset with acute pain' and so forth. From this it is deduced that I-consciousness, which is thus found to appear as connected with the conditions of the Body, envisages the *Body*.—'*Clearly* present';—it is said to be *clear*, because it is never found to fail.

This argument serves to reject the following statement made by *Uddyotakara* and others:—"The character of 'Soul' is figuratively (indirectly) attributed to the Body which is only the locus of experience,—just as when speaking of a satisfactory servant, the King says—'He is what I am'".—This assertion becomes rejected; because if such an attribution (notion) were figurative and indirect, then it would be liable to be false; because in the case of the *Lion* and the *Boy*, when the Boy is figuratively

spoken of as the ' Lion ',—the notion of ' Lion ' can never be *true* in reference to both the Boy and the Lion.—It might be urged that " the Body and the Soul are actually spoken of as distinct, in such expressions as ' My body, etc. ' ; and to that extent, the said figurative attribution does become false ".—But it is not so ; as it might be possible to regard the notion of ' Soul ' with regard to the Soul also as false ; as in this connection also, we find such expressions as ' My Soul ', where there is a distinction made between the two. —If it be urged that " in this case the distinction is *assumed* ",—then the same may be said in regard to the other case also.

" Even if the expression ' I am fair ' is used in its direct sense, why should not the *Soul* be the object of this notion ? "

The answer is—*The Soul is not held to be of the nature*, etc.—i.e. of the nature of ' fair-complexioned ', etc. ; for the simple reason that it is not possible for the Soul to have any such qualities as Colour and the like.—(213-214)

It has been explained that it is not right to regard the ' Soul ' as forming the object of ' I-consciousness ', because this latter is devoid of the form of the ' Soul '. The following Text proceeds to show that the same cannot be right also because in that case there would be no dispute (between us and the *Naiyāyika*) :—

TEXT (215).

IF THE SOUL WERE REALLY AMENABLE TO PERCEPTION, THEN WHEREFORE SHOULD THIS DISPUTE ARISE REGARDING ITS EXISTENCE AND OTHER THINGS ?—(215)

COMMENTARY.

' *Existence and other things* '—i.e. regarding its *Existence, Eternality, Omnipresence* and so forth.—(215)

The following might be urged—" Just as, for you, even though the *Blue* and other things are actually perceived, yet disputes arise in regard to their *momentariness* and other characters, which are held to be non-different from the nature of those things ;—in the same manner, there might be dispute regarding the Existence, etc. of the Soul also ".

The answer to this is provided in the following Text :—

TEXT (216).

THE ' I-CONSCIOUSNESS ' ALWAYS FUNCTIONS IN THE FORM OF A DEFINITE COGNITION ; AND BETWEEN A *Definite Cognition* AND A MERE *Indefinite Conception*, THERE IS ALWAYS THE RELATION OF ' THE ANNULLER AND THE ANNULLED '.—(216)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of *Blue* and the rest, it is only right that even though they are apprehended by Perception, there should be a dispute regarding their

momentariness and other properties ; because the Perception of these things is always *indeterminate* (vague, undefined) in character, and as such not conducive to any definitely certain cognition ; and hence there can be no definitely certain cognition of their *momentariness* and such other properties.—In your case however, it would not be right ; because the notion of 'I' is *well-defined* and definite (according to you) and hence of the nature of a definitely certain cognition,—so that the notion of the Soul also would be definitely certain ;—and where a thing has been the object of a definitely certain cognition, there can be no room for any *assumed conception* to the contrary ; by virtue of which any dispute could arise ; specially as when there are two contrary notions, one must annul the other. In fact, it is in the very nature of definitely certain cognitions regarding their objects, that they bring about well-ascertained notions of their objects ; so that, if they do not bring about these well-ascertained notions, it follows that they do not apprehend the objects at all.—(216)

Having thus demolished the Opponent's doctrine, the Author proceeds to set forth his own view :—

TEXTS (217-218).

THUS IT FOLLOWS THAT DESIRE AND ALL THE REST CANNOT SUBSIST IN THE 'SOUL' ;—BECAUSE THEY APPEAR SUCCESSIVELY,—LIKE THE 'SEED—SPROUT—CREEPER'.—OR, ALL PSYCHICAL (SUBJECTIVE) CONCEPTS MUST BE REGARDED AS HAVING THEIR FORMS OBSESSED BY 'ABSENCE OF SOUL',—BECAUSE OF SUCH REASONS AS 'BEING THINGS', 'BEING EXISTENT' AND SO FORTH,—JUST LIKE THE JAR AND OTHER EXTERNAL OBJECTS.—(217-218)

COMMENTARY.

The argument is to be formulated as follows :—Things that are produced successively can not subsist in the Soul,—e.g. Seed—Sprout—Creeper ;—Pleasure and the rest are produced successively ; hence they are found to be beset by a concomitance to what is denied (by the Opponent) ; because 'successive origination' is invariably concomitant with 'subsistence in what is not-Soul', which is contrary to 'subsistence in the Soul' (which is what is desired by the other party). A reason annulling the desired conclusion is also available in the fact that the appearance of effects must be simultaneous when the cause is present in its perfect form.

Or,—there is also a more direct reason :—Things that are endowed with the character of *being things, being products, having origin,* and so forth,—all these are devoid of the 'Soul',—as is found in the case of such things as the Jar and the like ;—and all such subjective (psychical) concepts as the Mind, Intellect, Pleasure, Pain and the rest appearing in the Living Body, are endowed with the said character of *being things* and the rest ;

[hence they cannot have any connection with any such thing as the Soul].—(217-218)

Question—" In what way is this invariable concomitance (Premiss) established ? "

The answer is provided in the following Text :—

TEXT (219).

IF THE THINGS IN QUESTION WERE CONNECTED WITH THE SOUL, THEN THE THINGS CAUSED BY THAT (SOUL) WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS ETERNAL ; AND BEING ETERNAL, THEY WOULD YET BE POWERLESS FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION. CONSEQUENTLY IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO HAVE THE PROPERTIES OF 'EXISTENCE' AND THE REST.—(219)

COMMENTARY.

If the things in question are connected with the Soul—if the Body and the rest were controlled by the Soul,—then this Soul would be their 'Cause' ; as what is not a Cause cannot be a *controller* ; as otherwise there would be an absurdity.—And the Body and other things caused (produced) by that Soul, having their Cause always present in its perfect form, would have to be regarded as *eternal*,—i.e. not successive.

The following might be urged :—" If they are held to be eternal,—even so they retain their character of *being things* and so forth ".

The answer is given in the words—'*And being eternal, etc. etc.*' ;—i.e. *being eternal*, the Body and the rest would have to be regarded as *powerless* in bringing about any effective action. The word '*prasajyatē*' (singular) of the first line being transformed, in this construction, to the plural form ['*Prasajyatē*' as applied to the second line being construed as '*Prasajyantē*']. —The sense is that in the case of an eternal thing, any effective action,—either successive or simultaneous—is incompatible. And on the cessation of the power for effective action, they cease to be 'things' (entities) ; because 'capacity for effective action' is the characteristic of all *Entities* (Things). And when the character of *being Entities* has ceased, there is cessation of the other characteristics of Entities also,—such as *having existence* and the like ; and thus the invariable concomitance becomes duly established.—(219)

Uddyotakara argues as follows :—" What is it that is meant by [the Living Body] being *not connected with the Soul* ?—(*a*) If it means that the Body does not serve any useful purpose for the Soul,—then, there can be no Corroborative Instance (such as would be accepted by both parties) ; as (according to us) there is nothing that does not serve a useful purpose for a Soul.—(*b*) If again, what is meant is simply the denial of the Soul, the meaning of the proposition being that 'the Soul is not the Body', then our answer is—

who is there that regards the Body as the Soul ? Then again, the negative preposition '*nis*', 'not' (in the term '*nirātmakam*' 'no-Soul') signifies the negation of what is expressed by the following term '*ātman*' (i.e. of something *with Soul*). So that it behoves you to explain what is that which is 'with Soul'; for in no case do we find the negative Preposition '*nis*' prefixed to a term denoting a *non-entity*; for instance, in the expression '*nirmakṣikam*', 'without flies', the preposition is added to '*makṣikā*' (denoting the *Fly*, a positive entity).—(*c*) Again, if the statement 'the Body is not with Soul' is meant to deny the Soul *in the body*, then the reasoning proves only what is already admitted by all; for who is there who holds that the Soul subsists in the Body ?—(*d*) If then the statement means that 'the Body has no connection with the Soul', then there can be no Corroborative Instance.—Lastly, all the aforesaid four cases would mean the denial of a distinctive character in regard to the Soul; and this would imply the tacit admission of the Existence of the Soul itself, in a general way; so that what was sought to be denied becomes admitted.—If what is meant is that 'the term *Soul*, being a verbal entity, is transient, it must denote something that is transient', —then, in the first place, in view of the term 'eternal', the premiss of the above reasoning is found to be 'inconclusive', doubtful; and secondly, [the term 'soul' in your argument can stand either for the Body or for something other than the Body]; if it stands for the Body and such things, then the argument becomes superfluous; and if the term stands for something other than the Body, etc. and your proposition declares it as denoting something transient, then the existence of something other than the Body, etc. becomes admitted; and this goes against your doctrine."—[This is an exact quotation from *Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārtika* on 3. 1. 1, Bib. Ind. Edn., p. 346, line 18 to p. 347, line 10.]

The above is answered by the Author in the following Text :—

TEXT (220).

THAT 'NEGATION OF THE SOUL' WHICH OTHER PEOPLE SEEK TO PROVE IN REGARD TO THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS,—THAT SAME WE ARE GOING TO PROVE IN REGARD TO THE LIVING BODY.—(220)

COMMENTARY.

The objection that has been urged above is equally applicable to your case also. For instance, it is admitted by you that the Jar and other external things are 'without Soul', either on the ground of their being not occupied by a Soul, or on the ground of their being the receptacle of the Soul's experiences. If it were not so, then you could not have mentioned these as the Corroborative Instance in your argument which is stated in the form—'This Living Body is not *without Soul*, because, if it were, then it would be devoid of Breathing and such other functions,—like the *Jar and other things*'.—Now in reference to these Jar and other things, the

question may be put—'In what sense are these *without Soul*? Does it mean that 'they serve no useful purpose for the Soul' and so on (as has been urged by *Uddyotakara*, in the passage quoted above). If so, then (*a*) you *affirm* the fact of all external things, like the Jar, being equally *without Soul*,—on the ground of their being not occupied by the Soul, or on account of their being the receptacle of the Soul's experiences;—and you *deny* the *absence of Soul* in regard to the Living Body, in the assertion 'The Living Body is not *without Soul*'; and from this denial you deduce the conclusion that it is the Living Body alone that is *with Soul*, and not the dead body, or the Jar and other things. In the same manner, we also prove the fact that 'the Living Body is *without Soul*, because it is a *thing* and so forth' (as explained above).—Thus the various alternatives put forward—'Is it meant that the Body serves no useful purpose for the Soul' and so forth,—are entirely out of place; as 'absence of Soul' has been admitted by you also (in regard to certain things).

Further, it has been alleged that "there is no Corroborative Instance in support of the assertion that the Body serves no useful purpose for the Soul".—This is not right. Because it is possible to set up the following argument—When one thing does not add any peculiar property to another thing, it cannot be regarded as serving any useful purpose for this latter,—e.g. the *Vindhya* of the *Himālaya*;—the Body and the rest do not add any peculiarity to the character of the Soul, which remains eternally of one uniform character;—hence the wider factor not being present (the less extensive factor cannot be admitted).—The Probans put forward in this argument cannot be said to be 'unproven', 'inadmissible'; because the 'additional property' not being anything distinct from the Soul itself, any 'adding' to it would mean the 'adding' to the Soul itself; and this would imply the 'transience' of the Soul. If, on the other hand, the 'additional property' be held to be distinct from the Soul itself,—as there would be no basis for any connection between that property and the Soul, there would be no such idea as that 'this property belongs to the Soul'.—From all this it follows that for an Eternal Entity, there is nothing that can serve a useful purpose; as, in regard to such an Entity, it could not do anything at all.

It has been further alleged—'Who is there who regards the Soul as the Body?'—This again is not right; there are actually some people who describe the Body, etc. as being transubstantiation of the 'Soul' (Spirit);—e.g. the Followers of the *Upaniṣads* (Vedantins). So that the denial in question may well be regarded as urged against these people.

Then again, it has been argued that—"the preposition '*niṣ*' (in the term '*nirātmakam*') must pertain to the term that follows after it; hence it behoves the other party to say what is it that is *with Soul* (which is denied by the negative Preposition)?"—This also is entirely irrelevant. What is denied by the negative Preposition cannot be a real positive entity,—in fact it *is only a conceptual* entity that may be denied; a real positive entity can never be denied. Thus then, what is denoted by the negative compound ('*nirātmaka*', *without Soul*) is that particular entity which the other party has *conceived* through illusion; as it is only with reference to such an entity that the said denial is made, in order to proclaim that the other party entertains

a wrong notion.—If it were otherwise, then, when you proceed to put forward denials of the Buddhist's assumption of 'momentariness' expressed in such words as 'The Lamp and the rest are momentary',—you would be open to the same objection; because we never find any case where the negative is used without a term following it.

Then again, it has been asserted—"Who is there who holds that the Soul subsists in the Body?"—This also is not right; as there are some people who regard the Soul to be of the size of the 'half of the Thumb' or of 'a *Shyāmāka* grain'; and under their view, the Soul, being a corporeal material substance, must be subsisting in the Body; and it is only right that the denial in question should be made against these people.

It has been alleged that "there is no Corroborative Instance in support of the denial of the Body being related to the Soul".—This is not true; as it is easy to prove, as shown above, that 'there can be no relationship between the Body and the Soul,—because one does not render any help to the other,—as between the *Vindhya* and the *Himālaya* mountains.

It has also been alleged that—"The denial of the *particular* implies the acceptance of the *general*".—This generalisation is not true; e.g. even though you deny the *momentariness* of the Lamp and other particular things, you do not accept the *momentariness* of anything *in general*.—It might be argued that—"We do admit the applicability of the term 'momentary' to the Lamp and such things, on the basis of their not continuing to exist for a long time; so that in this way, *momentariness in general* may be regarded as admitted".—If it is so, the applicability of the term 'Soul' also to the *Mind associated with 'I-consciousness'* is admitted by us; and this may be regarded as the Soul *in general* being admitted.

The assertion of the two alternative views regarding the term 'Soul' denoting something transient, etc. etc.—is not relevant; for the simple reason that no such view has been held; nothing, in fact, has been held (by us) as to be really denoted by the term 'Soul'. Nor has any such object been admitted by us as is 'distinct from Colour, etc.'. Nor again is the denotation of the term 'Soul' admitted in regard to any *eternal* thing, which would falsify the said premiss.—Nor lastly can the use of the term 'Soul' in reference to the Body, etc. be regarded as 'figurative' (indirect);—because such use is never found to fail, as explained above. Hence there is no 'Superfluity' in our reasoning.—(220)

TEXT (221).

THUS THE 'SOUL' BEING SOMETHING 'NOT-PROVED', THE ENTIRE FABRIC (OF CONCEPTIONS) THAT HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN REGARD TO IT, BECOMES BASELESS LIKE 'THE SON OF THE BARREN WOMAN'.—(221)

COMMENTARY.

Thus, any such thing as the 'Soul' being found to be precluded by all means of Right Cognition, and hence 'not proved', 'not admissible'—

the '*entire* fabric (of Conceptions)',—such as its being the *doer*, the *experiencer* and the like,—that has been set up by you, turns out to be like 'the Son of the Barren Woman',—entirely baseless. Hence no criticism is made of all this fabric; as it becomes demolished by the demolition of its very basis (in the shape of the *Soul*).—In what manner our view is not open to the criticism that it involves 'the destruction of what has been done and the appearance of what has not been done' [i.e. the contingency of the Person not experiencing the effects of his own deeds, *Karma*, and experiencing those of the deeds not done by him]—is going to be explained under the Chapter dealing with the 'connection between Action and its Effects' (i.e. Chapter 9).

End of the Examination of the 'Nyāya' Doctrine of the 'Self'.

CHAPTER VII.

SECTION (B)

Examination of the Mīmāmsaka's Conception of the 'Self'.

COMMENTARY.

The Author next proceeds to refute the *Mīmāmsaka's* Conception of the 'Soul':—

TEXT (222).

OTHERS AGAIN HAVE DECLARED THE 'SOUL' TO BE OF THE NATURE OF *Chaitanya*, SENTIENCE, EXCLUSIVE AND INCLUSIVE IN CHARACTER;—THIS *Chaitanya* (SENTIENCE) BEING THE SAME AS *Buddhi* (INTELLIGENCE).—(222)

COMMENTARY.

'*Exclusive*' *in character*;—the states of Pleasure, Pain, etc. (wherein the Soul is perceived) are mutually exclusive;—'inclusive' in character,—such character as 'Intelligence', 'Substance', and 'Being' are 'inclusive' or 'comprehensive' (inasmuch as they serve the purpose of 'comprehending' or *including*, not *excluding*);—these two, 'exclusion' and 'inclusion' form the 'character',—characteristic feature—of the Soul.—What is meant is that the followers of Jaimini declare the 'Soul' to be of the nature of 'Sentience' (Consciousness), and to be 'exclusive' in the form of the states of Pleasure, Pain, etc., and 'inclusive' or 'comprehensive' in the form of 'Being' and the rest.—This *Chaitanya*, 'Sentience', is not anything different from *Buddhi*, 'Intelligence',—as held by the *Sāṅkhyas* (according to whom Buddhi is Cosmic Intellect, a product of Primordial Matter, while *Chaitanya* belongs to the Spirit];—it is in fact *Buddhi*, 'Intelligence', itself. This is what is shown in the text—'*Sentience*' *being the same as* '*Intelligence*'; that is, it is only a form of Intelligence; the sense is that apart from Intelligence, no other form of 'Sentience' is recognised.—(222)

Question—"How is it possible for one and the same Soul to have the two mutually contradictory characters of being 'exclusive' and 'inclusive'?"

The answer to this from the Sankhya point of view is as follows:—

TEXTS (223–225).

"JUST AS, IN THE CASE OF THE SERPENT, THE 'COILED' FORM DISAPPEARS, AND AFTER THAT, APPEARS THE 'STRAIGHTENED' FORM; BUT THE CHARACTER OF BEING 'SERPENT' CONTINUES THROUGH BOTH STATES;—IN THE SAME MANNER, IN THE CASE OF THE SOUL, THERE IS NO COMPLETE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE CHARACTER OF 'ETERNAL SENTIENCE'; NOR IS THERE CONTINUANCE OF ITS WHOLE CHARACTER; THERE IS DISAPPEARANCE OF SUCH OF ITS STATES AS 'PLEASURE', 'PAIN' AND THE LIKE,—AND THESE APPEAR AGAIN; BUT THROUGH ALL THESE 'SENTIENCE' CONTINUES."—(223–225)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the Serpent,—snake,—though it remains one and the same, the *coiled form* disappears and the *straightened form* appears,—and yet the character of the 'Serpent' continues in both forms;—in the same manner, in the case of the Soul,—though it is of the nature of *eternal Intelligence*, and one only,—yet, there never is disappearance of its whole character,—nor is there a continuance of its whole character,—as postulated by the *Naiyāyīka* in regard to their 'Soul'; what happens is that its states of Pleasure, etc. go on disappearing and appearing again, but the form of 'Intelligence' continues to permeate through all these states; hence there is no incompatibility between the 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' character.—Such is the sense of the Text as a whole.

The meaning of the words is as follows:—The compound word '*nitya-chaitanyasvabhāvasya*' is to be explained as 'that which has eternal Intelligence for its form';—'*whole character*',—i.e. of the entire form;—'*continuity*'—'there is *not*'; such is the construction;—'*and these appear again*',—i.e. the states of 'Pleasure' and the like.—(223–225)

Question—Why is the theory of *Absolute Exclusion* not accepted,—as it is by the *Bauddhas*, who postulate 'absolute (traceless) Destruction' of things,—or even the theory of *Absolute Inclusion* (all-comprehensiveness), as it is by the *Naīyāyīka* and others?

The answer is as follows:—

TEXT (226).

"IF THERE WERE ABSOLUTE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOUL, THERE WOULD BE 'DESTRUCTION OF WHAT IS DONE AND THE BEFALLING OF WHAT IS NOT DONE'; AND IF THE SOUL ALWAYS REMAINED OF THE SAME FORM, THEN THERE COULD BE NO EXPERIENCING OF PLEASURE, PAIN AND THE REST."—(226)

COMMENTARY.

If there were *absolute destruction* (of the Soul), then there would be destruction (ineffectiveness) of the act done; as the *doer* would not be there to come into contact with the effect of the act; and there would be 'befalling of what is not done'; as the Soul experiencing the effect of the act done would be experienced by a Soul who did not do the act.—Further, if the Soul remained of one and the same form, there could be no experiencing of Pleasure, Pain, etc. for it,—just as there is none for *Ākāsha*; specially as there would be no difference between the 'state of experiencing' and the 'state of not-experiencing'. This has been thus asserted by *Kumārila*:—'Thus both the absolute conditions being impossible, the Spirit (Soul) should be held to be of the nature of both Exclusion and Inclusion,—just like the Serpent in the coiled and other forms'. (*Shlokavārtika, Ātmavāda,* 28)."—(226)

Objection—If the Spirit (Soul) is of the nature of both states, the state that *does* the act would not be the same that experiences its effects; so that this doctrine also would involve the anomaly of the 'destruction of what is done and the befalling of what is not done'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (227).

"THE SOUL'S CHARACTERS OF 'DOER' AND 'EXPERIENCER' ARE NOT DEPENDENT UPON THE STATE; HENCE, AS IT IS THE SOUL ITSELF THAT REMAINS THE SAME THROUGH THE VARIOUS STATES, IT IS THE *Doer* OF THE ACT THAT ALWAYS OBTAINS (EXPERIENCES) THE FRUIT OF THAT ACT."—(227)

COMMENTARY.

The character of being the *Doer*—and that of being the *Experiencer*—are not dependent upon the state of the Soul; they are dependent upon the Soul itself; as it is the Soul itself,—not its condition or state—which *does* the Act and *experiences* its effects. Hence, for this reason, inasmuch as the Soul to whom the states belong remains the same and does not abandon its previous form, it is the *Doer* himself who secures the fruit of that Act.—So that this doctrine is not open to the said objection.—(227)

Question—What is the Proof (Means of Cognition) that establishes the existence of the Soul?

The answer is supplied by the following Text:—

TEXT (228).

"The Spirit (or Soul) as described is proved by the presence of Recognition; and the doctrine of 'No-Soul' is disproved by this same (Recognition)."—(228)

COMMENTARY.

By the presence of Recognition,—involved in such notions as '*I* cognised it', '*I* am cognising it' and so forth, where there is 'recognition' of the same 'doer' (cogniser)—is proved—the existence of the Soul.—*By this same*—Recognition—also *is disproved* the doctrine of 'No Soul', as propounded by the *Buddhist* and others; as has been thus declared—'Thus from this fact Recognition which is admitted by all men, follows the refutation of the doctrine of *No-Soul*'—(*Shlokavārtika, Ātmavāda,* 136).—(228)

Question—How do these two conclusions follow from the fact of Recognition?

The answer is as follows:—

TEXTS (229–237).

"The notion of 'I' involved in the conception 'I know' envisages the *Cogniser*; this *Cogniser* may be either the 'Soul' or the absolutely evanescent 'Cognition' (Idea). If it is the 'Soul' that is the objective of that notion, then all is square; on the other hand, if the momentary 'Cognition' (Idea) is held to be so, then all becomes inexplicably confounded. For instance, the notion that appears in the form 'it was I who cognised this thing on a previous occasion, and it is I who am cognising it now', —of this notion, what 'Cognitive Moment' is assumed to be the objective? Would such a 'moment' be (*a*) *past*, or (*b*) *present*, or (*c*) in the form of a continued series? If it be the first (*a*), the moment could well be the objective of the notion 'I cognised it (in the past)'; but it could not be the objective of the notion 'I am cognising it (now)', because the cogniser is not cognising the thing at the moment of speaking; it is only when the object is present at the time (of cognition) that it can be spoken of as 'I am cognising it'. But (in regard to such a present object) it would not be true to say 'I cognised it', because the object did not exist in the past. —From this it follows that both of these (past and present)

CANNOT FORM THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SAID NOTION. NOR DID BOTH 'COGNITIVE MOMENTS' COGNISE THE THING IN THE PAST; NOR DO THEY BOTH COGNISE IT IN THE PRESENT.—(c) NOR CAN THE 'SERIES' BE REGARDED AS THE 'COGNISED OBJECT', AS BOTH ARE IMPOSSIBLE; THE 'SERIES' COULD NOT COGNISE IT IN THE PAST; AND AS IT IS NOT AN ENTITY, IT CANNOT COGNISE IN THE PRESENT.—FOR ALL THESE REASONS, IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THAT WHEREIN 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS' SUBSISTS,—WHICH MUST BE SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM THE SAID COGNITION,—IS THE 'SOUL' OF THE ETERNAL FORM."—(229–237)

COMMENTARY.

That the conception 'I know' envisages the Cogniser,—is beyond all dispute; as the verb 'I know' connotes the notion of the person who does the *cognising*. Now in regard to this *Cogniser*, there are two theories possible: (1) that it is the 'Soul', or (2) the absolutely evanescent Cognition (Idea) as postulated by you (Buddhists).—If the theory that 'it is the Soul' be accepted *then all becomes square*, as it accomplishes what is desired. If, on the other hand, the other view is accepted—that it is the *Idea*, then all becomes extremely inexplicable. Because, the conception appears in the form 'I cognised this in the past and I am cognising it in the present', and herein there is a clear conception, the notion of 'I' being the Cogniser in both cases;—of this conception of 'I', if the 'Cognitive Moment' be assumed to be the object, would this 'moment' be (*a*) past, or (*b*) present, or (*c*) both present and past, or (*d*) in the form of a continued series? There are these four possible alternatives.—Now as regards (*a*), the *past* 'moment' being assumed as the object of the notion of 'I', the idea that 'I cognised' might be all right, as the thing had been cognised in the past; but the idea that 'I am cognising it now' could not be true, because the *past* 'Cognitive Moment' does not cognise the thing at the present time,—as *ex-hypothesi* it has already disappeared.—(*b*) If the second alternative is accepted that the *present* 'Cognitive Moment' is the object of the notion of 'I', then the idea that 'I am cognising' would be all right, as it is really the Cogniser at the present moment; but the idea that 'I knew it in the past' would not be true,—why?—because it did not exist at the previous time. The word '*idam*' (in the Text) stands for the *present* Cognition. Thus then, inasmuch as the conception operates both ways, it becomes established that the present and the past, both, Cognitive Moments cannot form the object of the notion of 'I'; as both these 'Cognitive Moments' did not cognise the thing in the past, nor do they cognise it in the present; as a matter of fact, one 'Moment' cognised it in the past, and another 'Moment' is cognising it in the present.

For the same reason the 'Series' also cannot form the object of the notion of 'I'; as both—the past and the present acts of cognition—are impossible. Because this 'Series' did not cognise the thing in the past, nor does it cognise it in the pressnt; because being only 'conceptual', it is not a *thing*, an entity; and what is not an *entity* cannot be the *Cogniser*, as *being a Cogniser* is a property that can belong only to an entity.

From all this it follows that, that thing wherein the notion of 'I' (I-consciousness) subsists,—and as shown above, it must be something distinct from the said Cognition,—is the *Soul.*—(229–237)

Question—How is it proved that the Soul is eternal ?"
The answer is as follows :—

TEXTS (238-239).

" THE 'COGNISER' WHO FORMED THE OBJECT OF 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS' IN THE PAST MUST BE REGARDED AS CONTINUING TO EXIST TO-DAY,—BECAUSE HE IS THE OBJECT OF 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS',—LIKE THE COGNISER IN THE PRESENT.—OR, HE (THE PRESENT COGNISER) MUST BE REGARDED AS HAVING BEEN THE COGNISER OF YESTERDAY,—BECAUSE HE IS THE COGNISER ;—OR BECAUSE OF THE SAME REASON (OF BEING THE OBJECT OF 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS'),—LIKE THE COGNISER OF YESTERDAY ; AND ALL THESE FULFILL THE CONDITIONS OF THE PROBANDUM."
—(238-239)

COMMENTARY.

He who formed the object of 'I-consciousness' in the past continues to exist to-day ; just like the Cogniser in the present ;—and the Cogniser in the present is the object of 'I-consciousness' ;—this is the Reason based up the real state of things.

'*Or, he*'—i.e. the present Cogniser.—'*Because of the same reason*'—i.e. because of being the object of 'I-consciousness'.

This argument has been formulated in reference to the *Cogniser* as the Subject. The Author next proceeds to set forth another argument on the basis of the present *I-notions* as appertaining to the Probandum—*All these, etc.*—'*all these*'—*I-notions,* of the past and of the present—*fulfil the conditions of the Probandum,*—i.e. come to appertain to the Probandum.—(238-239)

The following *Text* proceeds to show how this is so :—

TEXT (240).

" ALL (I-NOTIONS) OF YESTERDAY AND OF TO-DAY MUST HAVE THE SAME OBJECT,—BECAUSE THEY ARE I-NOTIONS BELONGING TO THE COGNISER CONNECTED WITH ONE AND THE SAME 'CHAIN',—LIKE ANY SINGLE COGNITION."—(240)

COMMENTARY.

'*All I-notions of yesterday and of to-day*',—this states the Subject in regard to which the Probandum is to be predicated ;—'*must have the same object*',—

this states the Probandum;—the meaning is that they should have one and the same object.—The Probans is stated thus:—*Being such I-notions as belong to a Cogniser who is connected with one and the same Chain,*—such as that of a single person like *Dēvadatta.* The mere character of being *I-notion* is present in the *I-notions* of other persons also; hence if the Probans had been stated in that form, it would be 'Inconclusive'; hence in order to avoid that contingency, the Probans has been stated as qualified by the qualification of 'pertaining to a Cogniser connected with one and the same *Chain*'. '*Like any single Cognition*',—this is the Corroborative Instance; it means 'like any single intended Cognition among these same *I-notions*'.—(240)

With the next *Text,* the Author proceeds with the Answer to the above-stated doctrine of the *Mīmānsaka*:—

TEXT (241).

IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE TO BE CONSIDERED:—IF *Intelligence* IS HELD TO BE *eternal* AND *one,* THEN, COGNITION ALSO SHOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS OF THE SAME CHARACTER.—(241)

COMMENTARY.

If *Intelligence* is held to be eternal and one, then Cognition also—which has no form other than that of Intelligence,—*should have to be regarded* as eternal and one. This however cannot be desirable for you; as it would be contrary to your doctrine. For instance, the author of your *Bhāṣya* (Shabara) has declared [under *Sūtra* 1. 1. 5, page 9, line 17, *Bib. Indica* Edition] that 'Cognition, being momentary, cannot be present at the time of another Cognition'. *Jaimini* also has asserted (under Sū. 1. 1. 5) that 'Perception is that Cognition of man which is produced on the contact of an existing thing'; and if Cognition were *eternal,* there could be no 'production' of it.

It would also involve self-contradiction on the part of *Kumārila* himself: He has declared for instance that—'It does not remain for a single moment, nor does it even appear in the form of wrong cognition whereby it could operate later on towards the apprehending of its object, like the Sense-organs and the like'—(*Shlokavārtika, Pratyakṣa-Sūtra,* 55).

Further, if Cognition were held to be only one, this would be contrary to the doctrine of 'Six Means and Forms of Cognition'.—It would also be contrary to Perception also; as Cognitions are clearly perceived to be liable to appearance and disappearance in the course of the thinking of things with constant imposition of variations.—(241)

Not perceiving all these incongruities and self-contradiction, Kumārila declares as follows:—

TEXT (242).

"COGNITIONS, AND THE SOUL ALSO, ARE HELD TO BE *eternal* AND *one*, ON THE GROUND OF THEIR BEING OF THE NATURE OF 'INTELLIGENCE'; IF THERE IS DIVERSITY, IT IS DUE TO THE OBJECT."—(242)

[This is a quotation from *Shlokavārtika*, Chapter on Eternality of Sound, 404].

COMMENTARY.

Cognitions and the Soul also are regarded as *eternal* and *one*;—why?—*because they are of the nature of Intelligence*; that is, because, under our view Spirit is of the nature of Intelligence in the form of Cognitions.

Question—How then is it that such diversity (in Cognitions) is recognised as 'Colour-Cognition', 'Taste-Cognition' and so forth?

Answer—"*If there is diversity, it is due to the object*; the term 'if', has been used as admitting (for the sake of argument) the opinion of the other party; the sense being—'If—in case—diversity be assumed".—(242)

Objection (to Kumārila's position)—If Cognition is *eternal* and *one*, then, how is it that it apprehends Colour and other things consecutively? It should apprehend all at once, there being no distinction (to which the successiveness would be due).

The answer to this (from Kumārila's point of view) is given in the following Text:—

TEXT (243).

"THOUGH, BY ITS VERY NATURE, FIRE IS ALWAYS OF THE NATURE OF A *burner*, IT BURNS ONLY WHAT IS PRESENTED TO IT,—AND THAT ALSO ONLY A THING THAT IS CAPABLE OF BEING BURNT, —NOT ANY OTHER THING, NOR AT ANY OTHER TIME."—(243)

COMMENTARY.

Fire is eternally of the nature of a *Burner*, and yet it does not burn all things at all times. It burns only *what is brought to it*;—and then also, it burns only *a thing that is capable of being burnt*,—and not the Sky or any such thing.—(243)

In the following Text, he cites another example:—

TEXTS (244-245).

"OR, THE CLEAN MIRROR, OR THE ROCK-CRYSTAL, REFLECTS THE IMAGE OF ONLY WHAT IS PLACED BEFORE IT ;—IN THE SAME MANNER, SOULS, THOUGH POSSESSED OF ETERNAL SENTIENCE, APPREHEND COLOUR AND OTHER THINGS ONLY WHEN THEY ARE THEMSELVES IN THE BODY AND THE THINGS ARE PRESENTED TO THEM BY THE ORGANS. AND IT IS THIS SENTIENCE THAT WE CALL 'INTELLIGENCE'."—(244-245)

COMMENTARY.

The epithet '*clean*' has been added because the dirty mirror is not capable of reflecting images.—'*Placed before it*',—carried to it.—*In the same manner* ;—this introduces what has to be illustrated. Though, in reality, the Souls are all-pervading, yet, it is only when, under the influence of the Unseen Force (of destiny), they subsist in the Body, that they apprehend things that are presented to them by the Eye and other organs,—not while they are away from the Body.—This eternal Sentience is what we call 'Buddhi' (Intelligence), and it is not different from it,—like the 'Buddhi' (Cosmic Intellect) of the *Sāṅkhyas*.—(244-245)

Question—If that is so, how is it that this Cognition is known as *evanescent* ?

In answer to this, the next Text proceeds to show the reason, already indicated before, why Cognition is regarded as evanescent, and thereby explains that evanescence :—

TEXT (246).

"IT IS ON ACCOUNT OF THE EVANESCENT CHARACTER OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE PRESENTING ORGANS THAT THE COGNITION IS EVANESCENT; JUST AS, EVEN THOUGH FIRE IS ALWAYS A BURNER, IT BURNS ONLY WHEN THE COMBUSTIBLE THING IS CLOSE TO IT."—(246)

COMMENTARY.

'*Presenting organs*',—the Eye and other organs which present to the Soul the Colour and other things ;—the '*functioning*'—operation—of these organs is '*evanescent*'—fleeting ;—and on this account, the resultant Cognition is recognised as evanescent; by itself, it is not evanescent, fleeting.—"If, by itself the Cognition is not evanescent, then the objection remains that

it should apprehend all things ".—The answer to this is that *even though Fire is always a burner,* etc. Similarly, the Cognition does not always apprehend all things ; for the simple reason that all things are not always in close proximity (to the organs, etc.)—(246)

Question—How do you know that Cognition is eternal ?
Answer :—

TEXT (247).

" COGNITION IS ALWAYS RECOGNISED AS BEING OF THE NATURE OF 'INTELLIGENCE' ; AS REGARDS THE COGNITIONS OF THE JAR, THE ELEPHANT AND SO FORTH, THEIR DIVERSITY IS HELD BY PEOPLE TO BE DUE TO THE DIVERSITY AMONG THOSE THINGS."—(247)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*tatra*' is a meaningless term used as introducing the sentence—'*Being of the nature of Intelligence*' ;—because it is always recognised as 'Cognition', it is eternal, like the Word-Sound.

" If that be so, then how is it that in common parlance, we find such distinction among Cognitions accepted by observers as 'this is the Cognition of the Jar', 'that is the Cognition of the Cloth' and so forth ? "

Answer—As regards the Cognitions of the Jar, etc. etc. ;—'*due to the diversity among those things*',—i.e. the diversity among the Jar, the Elephant and the rest.—(247)

The same idea is further clarified by the following *Text* :—

TEXT (248).

" PEOPLE WHO FOLLOW UP THE DIVERSITY AMONG THE OBJECTS COGNISED DO NOT SPEAK OF THE COGNITION AS 'THAT SAME COGNITION' ; NOR IS THERE NON-RECOGNITION OF IT AS 'COGNITION', SO LONG AS NOTICE IS NOT TAKEN OF THE DIVERSITY AMONG THE OBJECTS."—(248)

COMMENTARY.

People who follow up, etc. ;—i.e. the *Cognisers*.—What this Text shows, by means of affirmative and negative premisses, is that the diversity in Cognitions is due only to diversity among the objects cognised.—*Nor is there non-recognition, etc.* ; that is, there *is* recognition.—(248)

The following Text proceeds to answer the above arguments :—

TEXT (249).

IF SUCH IS THE CASE, THEN, ON THE OCCASION WHEN THERE APPEAR COGNITIONS IMPOSING THE CONCEPTS OF 'ELEPHANT' AND THE REST IN REFERENCE TO SPOTS WHERE THESE ANIMALS DO NOT EXIST,—TO WHAT IS THE DIVERSITY IN SUCH COGNITIONS DUE?

COMMENTARY.

If the diversity of the Cognition is due to the diversity in the objects cognised,—then, what is the basis for the diversity that appears in the case of those Cognitions which successively impose the concepts of the 'elephant', 'horse' and the rest upon a place where the elephants do not really exist? The meaning is that in such cases there is no basis at all for the notion of such diversity. Because, there is no difference in the Cognitions *per se*; as all Cognition is held to be *one* (by the *Mīmānsaka*). Nor can the diversity be due to the multiplicity of the objects imposed; as there is no object that does the *imposing*.—(249)

The following might be urged:—"The idea that a Cognition may be devoid of a real object is not true; as has been declared by Kumārila—'It is not admitted that even in the case of Dreams and other such Cognitions, a real external object is entirely absent; in every case there is an external background, only conceived of in connection with a wrong place and time'. [*Shlokavārtika, Nirālambanavāda,* 107-108]."

This is the view presented in the following Text:—

TEXT (250).

IF THE INDIVIDUAL OBJECTS EXISTING AT OTHER TIMES AND PLACES BE HELD TO SUPPLY THE BASIS FOR SUCH IMPOSED COGNITIONS,—ON THE GROUND THAT IN ALL COGNITIONS THE BASIS OF REALITY IS SUPPLIED BY OBJECTS EXISTING AT TIMES AND PLACES OTHER THAN THOSE OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE COGNITIONS THEMSELVES,—[then the answer would be as stated in the following Text].—(250)

COMMENTARY.

'*Basis*',—i.e. the cause of the notion of diversity among Cognitions.—The compound '*dēshakālānyathātmakam*' is to be analysed as—'that of which the time and place are otherwise',—or as 'that of which the differentiation is done by time and place'.—(250)

The answer to this is given in the following Text:—

TEXT (251).

BUT AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE COGNITIONS IN QUESTION HAVE NO SUCH CONNECTION WITH THAT PARTICULAR PLACE ; WHY THEN SHOULD THEY APPEAR IN THAT FORM AT THAT PLACE ?—(251)

COMMENTARY.

When at a certain place, a number of individual objects actually appear as 'imposed' upon Cognitions in a certain order of sequence,—there is no connection between the Cognition and those individual objects existing at other times and places,—in the same order of sequence. Under the circumstances, how is it that they appear in the form that is imposed upon them arbitrarily ? Certainly it cannot be right for one thing to appear in the form of another thing ; if it were, then this would lead to incongruities ; and in this way all Cognitions would come to have all things for their objects ; and there would be an end to all ordered usage regarding things.—(251)

TEXT (252).

THEN AGAIN, UNDER YOUR VIEW, THE EXTERNAL FORM IS NOT DECLARED TO BELONG TO THE COGNITION ; NOR ARE THE ELEPHANT, POLE AND OTHER THINGS ACTUALLY EXISTENT AT THE PLACE DESIRED.—(252)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, *under your—Mīmānsaka's—view,* the form that appears (in Cognition) does not belong to the Cognition ; as you assert that the Cognition is *formless*.—" What if it is so ? "—*At the place desired* etc. ;—i.e. at the place where the 'imposition' is made—, the Cognitions should appear as connected with that same time and place wherewith the said objects—Elephant and the rest—are connected ;—how is it then that they appear at a time and place which are not connected with themselves and which are yet different from those with which the objects are connected ?—From this it follows that these Cognitions have no real basis, and they are, in reality, unmixed in character and mobile ; that they are so is due to the fact of their appearing only occasionally ;—and it also becomes established that the Soul, which is of the nature of the said Cognition, must also be *evanescent* and *many*.

The following might be urged :—" Cognition is a property of the Soul ; hence the diversity of the Cognition need not imply diversity of the Soul, the latter being only an object having that property."

This cannot be right ; '*Pratyaya*' (Cognition), '*Chaitanya*' (Sentience), '*Buddhi*' (Intelligence), '*Jñāna*' (Knowledge) are all synonymous terms ; nor does a mere difference in names make any difference in the nature of things. Further, even with a difference in their names, all these are actually

accepted (by you) as being of the nature of *Sentience* (*Chaitanya*); and as this *Sentience* is one and the same, there can be no distinction among the *Cognitions* that are of the same nature. If it were not so, then, on account of the attribution of contrary properties to them, the two (Sentience and Cognition) would become entirely different from one another.

This same argument in proof of Cognitions having no real basis serves also to prove the *imperceptibility* of Cognitions. For instance, it has been proved that the form appearing in the Cognition cannot be the *external* Elephant, etc.; so that it becomes established that the Cognitions apprehending that form as their own are of themselves, because they are self-luminous in their character.—(252)

It has been argued (under *Text* 243 above) that—" Though by its very nature, the Fire is always of the nature of a burner, etc. etc."—This argument is refuted in the following Text:—

TEXT (253).

If Cognition remains for ever in the form of the apprehension of all things,—then how is it that the Cognition of all things is not present at all times?—(253)

COMMENTARY.

If Cognition, which is of the nature of Apprehension, exists for ever, then all things should be cognised at all times.—(253)

The following *Text* proceeds to show how this is so:—

TEXT (254).

That Cognition on which *Sound* has been imposed must be the same that apprehends Taste, Colour and other things. If this is not admitted by you, then you have, by your own words, admitted that there is difference among Cognitions.—(254)

COMMENTARY.

That Cognition on which Sound has been imposed,—i.e. the Cognition of Sound,—is the same that apprehends Taste, Colour and other things,—and it cannot be different; so that at the time of the apprehension of one thing, there should be apprehension of all things,—as the Cognition apprehending all these would be there always. This has been thus declared:—' Many things being apprehended by a single Cognition, all these would be apprehended once for all, without any distinction; nor could it appear in any order of sequence, as no distinction is possible'.

If this is not admitted; if you do not admit that the Cognition of Sound is the same that apprehends Taste and other things, then you would be admitting that there is diversity among Cognitions.—(254)

The following Text is going to show that the instance of Fire that has been cited (in *Text* 243) is itself 'unproven' (not admitted by all parties):—

TEXT (255).

EVEN FIRE IS NOT ALWAYS A 'BURNER' OF ALL COMBUSTIBLE THINGS; OTHERWISE THE WHOLE (WORLD) WOULD BE INSTANTLY REDUCED TO ASHES.—(255)

COMMENTARY.

The Fire, in the form of the burner of all combustible things, is not always existent; if it were, then all combustible things would be reduced to ashes,—because they would always have their burner in contact with them,—like that combustible thing which is in actual contact with the fire-flame.

'*Even*', '*api*', is meant to indicate that it is not only Cognition that cannot be of the nature of the apprehension of all things.—(255)

Objection—"If that is so, then Fire is *not always* of the nature of the *Burner* (possessed of the power to burn); how then could it burn even the thing that is presented to it?"

The answer is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (256).

IN FACT, IT IS ONLY WHEN IT IS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE COMBUSTIBLE THING THAT FIRE CAN BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS THE *burner*; THUS IT IS WHY THERE DOES NOT HAPPEN THE CONTINGENCY OF ALL THINGS BEING BURNT ALL AT ONCE.—(256)

COMMENTARY.

Thus it is;—it is because of our acceptance of the view just expressed—that there is no simultaneous burning of all things;—i.e. there is no likelihood of any such absurd contingency.—(256)

It has been argued (under Text 244, above) that—"Just as the clean Mirror or Rock-crystal, etc. etc."—It is shown in the following Text that what has been alleged there would not be possible if the Mirror, etc. were eternal and always of the same form:—

TEXTS (257-258).

ALL SUCH THINGS AS THE MIRROR, THE ROCK-CRYSTAL AND THE LIKE ARE THEMSELVES IN PERPETUAL FLUX; AND WHEN THEY BECOME CONNECTED WITH THE BLUE LOTUS AND SUCH OBJECTS,—THEY BECOME CAUSES OF BRINGING ABOUT THE ILLUSION REGARDING THEIR REFLECTIONS.—IF THAT WERE NOT SO, EVERYONE OF THOSE THINGS WOULD BE ALWAYS ONE AND THE SAME,—WHEN IN CONTACT WITH THE SAID OBJECTS, AS WELL AS WHEN *not* IN CONTACT WITH THEM; AND AS SUCH IT SHOULD BE SEEN EITHER AS ALWAYS WITH ITS REFLECTION OR ALWAYS WITHOUT ITS REFLECTION.—(257-258)

COMMENTARY.

The Rock-crystal, the Mirror and the like are things that are in a state of perpetual flux,—undergoing destruction every moment; and when they come into contact with the Blue Lotus and such things, they become masters in the producing of illusions (regarding the reflections of these things, which have no real existence, and whose Cognition, therefore, must be illusory, wrong).

If that were not so,—i.e. if it could reflect the image without being momentary,—then it would have to be admitted that the Mirror in contact with the object is the same as that *not* in contact with it; so that, even in the absence of the Blue and other reflected things, the reflection of these would be perceptible, as the reflector will not have abandoned its previous character (when in contact with the object);—or, conversely, even when in contact with the object, it would be seen without the said reflections; as its form would not be different from its previous state (when *not* in contact with the object).

This argument serves to set aside the possibility of all reflections in general in any such reflecting substances as the Mirror and the like,—under the view that things are *not-momentary*.—(257-258)

The Author now proceeds to refute the possibility of the perception of all Reflections,—under both theories—that things are momentary and that things are not-momentary:—

TEXT (259).

As a matter of fact, the Mirror-surface can never contain the reflection (of anything),—because it is lasting, because it is indivisible, and because several things with material shape cannot subsist together.—(259)

COMMENTARY.

Because it is lasting,—i.e. not momentary,—therefore the Mirror-surface cannot contain the reflection.

Even if it is momentary, it cannot contain the reflection *because it is indivisible*; when the reflection is perceived it is perceived as if it were inside the mirror, just as the Water is perceived inside the well; and yet the Mirror-surface has no *parts*—i.e. vacant space;—because its component particles are closely packed. Hence the perception of the Reflection must be an illusion.

Or the term '*nirvibhāgatva*', 'indivisibility', may stand for *absence of difference between the previous and succeeding states*; and the reason for this absence is '*because it is lasting*'; so that the meaning comes to be—'because on account of its lasting character it is devoid of difference between its previous and succeeding states'; that is, *because it has no previous or succeeding states.*

Further, *because several things with material shape cannot subsist together,*—'the Mirror-surface cannot contain the reflection',—this has to be construed here. Because what are perceived in the Mirror-surface are only *reflections* occupying the same space; material things with forms can never occupy the same points in space; as if they did, they would become one and the same.

This objection is applicable under both views—of things being momentary or non-momentary.—(259)

The Rock-crystal also does not become transformed into the reflected image of the object placed by it; this is what is shown in the following Text:—

TEXT (260).

Persons standing on the two sides of it perceive only the purely white Rock-crystal; hence it follows that this also does not become transformed into the Reflection.—(260)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, the man standing in front of the Rock-crystal placed in contact with the Hibiscus Flower, perceives it as *red*; while persons who may be standing on two sides of it would perceive it as *purely white*,—not even as partly red and partly white.—Now if the Rock-crystal had become transformed into the reflection (of the Flower), then, just like the man standing

in front, the persons standing on the two sides of it also would perceive it as *red.*

This objection is applicable under both views—of things being *momentary* and *not-momentary.*—(260)

With the following *Text,* the Author proceeds to point out the objection that would be applicable only under the view that things are *not-momentary* :—

TEXT (261).

THE OPPONENT'S THEORY WOULD ALSO ENTAIL THE INCONGRUITY OF THE ROCK-CRYSTAL BECOMING DIFFERENT WITH EACH OBJECT PLACED BEFORE IT,—IF THERE WERE A REAL TRANSFORMATION OF IT INTO THE REFLECTION.—(261)

COMMENTARY.

If the Rock-crystal and such things were really transformed into the reflection of the object placed before them, then,—just as the reflections of the various things placed before the reflector appearing one after the other, are different in character, and hence there is no identity among them,—in the same manner, in the *Soul,* and in the Rock-crystal and such things also, there would be differences due to the character of each thing presented to it (and reflected therein).—If the perception of the Reflection, however, be admitted to be an illusion, then there can be no objection to it,—this is what is meant by the epithet '*real*'.—(261)

TEXT (262)—(*First line*).

FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE SAID PERCEPTION OF THE REFLECTION IS AN ILLUSION,—APPEARING IN CONNECTION WITH THINGS POSSESSED OF DIVERSE UNTHINKABLE POTENCIES.—(262)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as, under both theories, it is not possible for the Reflector to become transformed into the Reflection,—it becomes established that it is an Illusion.

Question—"If that is so, then such Illusion appears only in connection with things like the *Rock-crystal,* and not with things like the *Wall.*"

The answer is supplied by the words—'*In connection with things possessed of diverse unthinkable potencies.*'—*Diverse,*—of various kinds;—and '*unthinkable*',—are the potencies of things; no objection can be raised against the particular potentialities of things,—as these potentialities are the effects of the series of causes that have brought about each thing. In fact, you also can have no dispute against this much; as you have yourself said—'Who can take objection to the fact that it is *Fire,* not *Ākāsha,* that burns?'.—(262)

"If that is so, then in the case of Cognition also, the idea of its being transformed into the reflection of its object may be mere Illusion; so that there is no transformation into the reflected form."

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—

TEXT (262)—(*Second line*).

IN THE CASE OF COGNITION, THERE CANNOT BE EVEN ILLUSION; AS THERE IS ABSENCE OF DIFFERENCE.—(262)

COMMENTARY.

It is not right that there should be Illusion in the case of Cognition. What is implied by the term '*even*' is that it is not only 'transformation into Reflection' that is not right;—why?—*as there is absence of difference*; i.e. because there is no difference. In the case of the Rock-Crystal and other things, it is right that there should be Illusion, as it is possible for the illusory cognition to be different from those things; in the case of Cognition, however, there cannot be another Cognition in the form of an Illusion; as all Cognition is held (by the *Mīmānsaka*) to be *one*. Nor can it be said that the Cognition itself appears in the form of an Illusion; as Cognition has been held to be eternal (which Illusion can never be).—(262)

It has been argued above (under *Text* 247), for the purpose of proving the *one-ness* and *eternality* of Cognition that—'*Cognition is always recognised as being of the nature of Intelligence, etc. etc.*'

This is answered in the following Text:—

TEXT (263).

THE CHARACTER OF *being different from non-cognition* IS ONE THAT IS COMMON TO ALL COGNITIONS; AND THE SAID RECOGNITION COULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE IMPOSITION OF THAT COMMON CHARACTER,—EVEN UNDER THE VIEW OF COGNITIONS BEING MANY AND DIVERSE.—(263)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Recognition' that has been put forward is Inconclusive; because the said fact of 'Recognition' can be explained, in regard to all Cognitions, as being due to the imposition of the character of being different from *what is not-cognition*;—i.e. such things as the Jar and the like;—and this would not be incompatible even with the view of Cognitions being many and diverse.—The following has to be definitely understood: It is only when Cognitions are *many*,—and not when they are *not many*,—that the said Recognition can be explained as being brought about by the 'exclusion of all that is not homogeneous to it'. For instance, in the case of such superimposed (assumed) Cognitions as have no real background, even when a diversity among the

objects is not admitted, there is no Recognition ; e.g. there is no such recognition as that 'this Cognition of the Horse and the Chariot is the same as what was the Cognition of the Elephant' ;—and it has been already proved that all these Cognitions are without any real background ; hence we are not asserting that here again. Thus the assertion—that "there is no non-recognition of it as Cognition so long as notice is not taken of the diversity among the objects" (*Text* 248, above)—should be regarded as 'unproven' (untrue).—(263)

Then again, if the Soul is held by you to be enternally of one and the same form, then such diverse states as 'Happiness' and the like are not possible. If you do admit these diverse states, then the Soul cannot be eternally of one and the same form. As one and the same thing cannot have such contradictory characters as *diversity* and *non-diversity*.

This Objection has been sought to be answered by Kumārila ; and what has been said by him is now introduced in the following Text,—for the purpose of refuting it (below, under *Text* 268 *et. seq.*) :—

TEXTS (264-265).

"THE PERMANENT SOUL HAVING BEEN ABSOLUTELY ESTABLISHED AS DEVOID OF DIVERSITY DUE TO THE DIVERSITY OF STATES,—WHAT PEOPLE ASSUME TO BE THE STATES OF HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS AND THE REST,—EVEN WHEN UNDERGOING ALL THESE STATES, MY PERSON (SOUL) DOES NOT RENOUNCE HIS CHARACTER OF *being sentient, being a substance, being an entity* and so forth." [*Shlokavārtika*, page 695]—(265)

COMMENTARY.

'*Undergoing*'—passing through ;—'*Person*'—Soul. The term '*and so forth*' includes such generic characters as *being knowable, being rightly cognisable, being the active agent,* and the like.—(265)

The following Text proceeds to show that there is no disappearance of the specific properties :—

TEXT (266).

"EVEN ON THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW STATE, THE PRECEDING STATE IS NOT ENTIRELY DESTROYED ; IT BECOMES MERGED INTO THE COMMON CHARACTER, IN ORDER TO HELP THE APPEARANCE OF THE NEXT STATE." [*Shlokavārtika*, page 596]—(266)

COMMENTARY.

'*Preceding state*',—of *happiness.*

"If that is so, then why is not *Unhappiness* also not felt during the state of *Happiness* ?"

The answer is—*It becomes merged, etc. etc.*—While the state of 'Happiness' remains in its own form, the other state, of 'Unhappiness', does not appear; it remains merged in the *common character*, which permeates through all states,—such as *being sentient, being substance* and so on; and thereby renders possible the appearance of the succeeding state of 'Unhappiness'; it is for this purpose that it becomes merged in the common character.—(266)

Objection—If that be so, then the mergence of the states into the common character also should be as unreasonable as in the other states; as that also involves an incongruity.

In regard to this objection, the explanation is as follows:—

TEXT (267).

"THE STATES, IN THEIR OWN FORMS, ARE MUTUALLY INCOMPATIBLE; AS FOR THE COMMON CHARACTER, HOWEVER, IT IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH ANY STATE, AND IT IS ACTUALLY RECOGNISED, IN ITS COMMON FORM, IN ALL STATES." *Shlokavārtika*, page 696—(267)

COMMENTARY.

The States of 'Happiness' and the rest are incompatible among themselves; hence it is not reasonable that they should become merged into each other;—on the other hand, if any one State became merged into the common character, where would there be any incongruity, which would go against the acceptance of its mergence therein? As a matter of fact, the said common character is actually seen to be compatibly permeating through all the States; as is clear from the fact that 'Sentience' and the other common characters are found to be present in all the States.—(267)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to answer the above arguments of the *Mīmāmsaka*:—

TEXT (268).

IF THE STATES ARE NOT ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE SOUL, THEN THERE SHOULD BE DESTRUCTION AND ORIGINATION OF THE SOUL ALSO, FOLLOWING UPON THE DESTRUCTION AND ORIGINATION OF THE STATES.—(268)

COMMENTARY.

If the States are not held to be entirely different from the Soul, then, on the destruction and origination of the States, there should be destruction and origination of the Soul also. The term 'entirely' is meant to show that, if there were even the slightest degree of *non-difference*, the said 'des-

truction and origination' would be irrepressible. The argument is to be formulated as follows :—When one thing is non-different from another, its destruction and origination must follow on the destruction and origination of the latter, just like the specific forms of those same States of Happiness and the rest,—and the Soul has been held to be non-different in nature from the States of Happiness and the rest; hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.—(268)

The following Text shows that the Reason just put forward is not 'Inconclusive' :—

TEXT (269).

IF THERE BE PRESENCE OF CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES, THEN THERE SHOULD BE ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE ; JUST AS IN THE CASE OF YOUR SOULS WHICH ARE ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT FROM EACH OTHER, THROUGH THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER BELONGING TO EACH OF THEM.—(269)

COMMENTARY.

If it be held that destruction and origination pertain to the States only, not to the Soul,—so that the two (the States and the Soul) have two contradictory properties—of 'origination' and 'non-origination',—then there must be difference between them ; just as in the case of Souls, which are many,—each has its own character restricted to himself,—and hence they are regarded as distinct from each other ; that is, this much alone serves as the basis of difference.

The qualification '*distinctive character belonging to each*' has been added for the purpose of avoiding the fallacy of the 'absence of the Probandum' in the Probans, due to the fact that in the case of the Souls also, there is no difference in their own pristine forms. As a matter of fact, the *form belonging to each* of the individual Souls is entirely different from each other ; if that were not so, as there would be no restriction regarding the apprehensions and remembrances of different persons, there would be confusion in all matters.

The argument may be formulated as follows :—When one thing is not subject to the same vicissitudes as another, there cannot be non-difference between them ;—e.g. among Souls, each having its own distinctive form restricted to itself, they are not subject to the same vicissitudes,—the States of Happiness and the rest also are not all subject to the same vicissitudes ; —hence, inasmuch as the wider condition is not found in them (they cannot be non-different).—(269)

It has been asserted that "on the appearance of another State, the preceding State is not entirely destroyed" ;—the following Text supplies the answer to this :—

TEXT (270).

IF YOUR 'STATES' BECOME MERGED INTO THE SOUL IN THEIR OWN FORM, THEN, ON THE APPEARANCE OF HAPPINESS, UNHAPPINESS ALSO SHOULD BE FELT.—(270)

COMMENTARY.

When the States become merged in the Common Soul, they could be so merged either in their own form or in some other form ; if it is the former that is meant, then on the appearance of Happiness,—i.e. when there is feeling of the State of Happiness,—Unhappiness also should be felt ; as this latter also is possessed of the common character of 'feeling'.—(270)

If they become merged in some other form, then there would be the following difficulty :—

TEXT (271)

AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHEN THERE IS TRANSFERENCE OF ONE FORM TO SOMETHING, THERE CAN BE NO TRANSFERENCE OF ANOTHER FORM. SO THAT IF THE STATES BECAME TRANSFERRED (MERGED INTO THE SOUL) IN THEIR OWN FORM, THEN THE SOUL ALSO WOULD BE SOMETHING LIABLE TO ORIGINATION.—(271)

COMMENTARY.

Further, the transference (mergence) of Happiness and other States into the Soul could be possible only in their own forms ; and in that case, like Unhappiness and the other States, the Soul also, being non-different from them, would be something *liable to origination*,—capable of being produced.—(271)

It has been asserted (under *Text* 227) that "the Soul's characters of *Doer* and *Experiencer* are not dependent upon the State." The answer to this is provided in the following :—

TEXT (272).

IF THE CHARACTERS OF *Doer* AND *Experiencer* ARE NOT DEPENDENT UPON THE STATE,—THEN THE SAID CHARACTERS CANNOT BELONG TO THE SOUL,—AS THEY CAN BELONG TO ONLY ONE WHO HAS THAT STATE.—(272)

COMMENTARY.

If the character of 'Doer', etc. rested in the Souls themselves,—then these could never belong to the Soul, which never abandons its previous char-

acter. This argument may be formulated thus:—One who has not abandoned his previous States of *non-doer* and *non-experiencer* can never *do* or *experience*,—e.g. the *Ākāsha*,—and the Soul never abandons its State of *non-doer* and *non-experiencer*; hence we find (in the assertion concerned) conditions contrary to the more extensive character.—(272)

The revered *Diṅnāga* having declared that—' if the fact of the Soul being modified on the appearance of Cognition meant the non-eternity of that Soul, then, there can be no *Cogniser* in the shape of the *Soul* not modified ';—in answer to this declaration, *Kumārila* has argued as follows:—" We are not denying the fact of the Soul being expressed (spoken of) by the term ' non-eternal '; but if the term meant mere modification, then that alone would not imply the *destruction* of the Soul."—(*Shlokavārtika*, *Ātmavāda*, 22).

Against this the Author states the following objection, which also serves to sum up his own conclusion:—

TEXT (273).

FOR THESE REASONS, WE ARE NOT DENYING THE FACT OF THE SOUL BEING SPOKEN OF BY THE TERM ' ETERNAL '; BUT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS FORM BEING SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION, THERE MUST BE DESTRUCTION OF IT.—(273)

COMMENTARY.

For these reasons, we are not denying the fact of the Soul being spoken of as ' eternal ',—on the ground that *Sentience*, which is in a State of perpetual flux, continues undestroyed, along with its Cause, as long as the world lasts. But its *form*—nature—being *subject to modification*, as there is always the abandoning of the preceding and the appearance of the succeeding form,—its liability to destruction is clearly indicated.—(273)

As regards the instance of the Serpent, etc. that has been cited above (under *Text* 223),—the following Text proceeds to show that all these things are not found to be eternal and of one and the same form:—

TEXT (274).

THE SERPENT ALSO IS LIABLE TO BECOME CROOKED AND SO FORTH, BECAUSE IT IS SUBJECT TO PERPETUAL FLUX; IF IT HAD A PERMANENT FORM, THEN, LIKE THE SOUL, IT COULD NEVER COME BY ANOTHER STATE.—(274)

COMMENTARY.

Just as in the case of the Soul,—because of its being always of one lasting character,—there is no possibility of another State,—so in the case of the

Serpent also. If it were subject to destruction (modification) every moment, then alone could it have another State; as the 'appearance of another State' is always in the form of the 'appearance of another character'.—(274)

It has been argued (under *Text* 229) that "The conception of *I* in the notion *I know* apprehends the *Cogniser*";—the following Text proceeds to show that this is 'unproven' (not admitted by all parties):—

TEXT (275).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE 'NOTION OF I' COMES ABOUT WITHOUT A REAL BASIS, THROUGH THE FORCE OF THE BEGINNINGLESS SEED OF THE VISION OF BEING; AND THAT ALSO ONLY IN SOME PLACES.—(275)

COMMENTARY.

The said 'I-notion' has no real background, by virtue of which the 'Cogniser' could form its object.

"If that is so, then what is the cause of its origin?"

The answer is that—*It proceeds from the beginningless, etc. etc.* '*Vision of Being*' is the vision of the existing body;—the 'seed' of this vision is the Potency of Dispositions; and this 'seed' is beginningless;—and it is *through the force* of this that 'I-consciousness' is brought about;—*and that also only in some places*,—i.e. only in the internal economy of the Sextuple Body.—(275)

Question.—"Why does not the 'I-notion' come about everywhere?"

The Answer is supplied in the following:—

TEXT (276).

IT IS ONLY SOME (NOT ALL) IMPRESSIONS THAT SECURE THE REQUISITE POTENCY FOR BRINGING ABOUT THE SAID NOTION APPREHENDING THAT PARTICULAR FORM; HENCE IT DOES NOT APPEAR EVERYWHERE.—(276)

COMMENTARY.

'*The said notion, etc.*',—i.e. the 'I-notion, apprehending the form of the *Cogniser*, as existing through the preceding and succeeding points of time'.—'*Not everywhere*',—i.e. in other 'chains', like those of the *Jar* and other things.—(276)

TEXT (277).

IF THIS WERE NOT SO,—THE OBJECTION IN QUESTION COULD BE URGED WITH EQUAL FORCE AGAINST YOUR 'SOUL' ALSO; BUT ALL DIFFICULTIES ARE REMOVED BY THE FACT THAT THERE IS DIVERSITY IN ITS POTENCIES.—(277)

COMMENTARY.

Further, even when the 'I-notion' is held to have the Soul for its basis,—the objection in question would apply with equal force:—Why does the said notion not appear in connection with another Soul also?—It might be answered that "it is not so because of the restrictions imposed by the potency of things",—then, for us also the same answer would be available,—that the notion appears only in regard to some internal objects, and not in regard to all. So that all difficulties would be removed.—(277)

It might be urged that—"There may be such restriction; but how is the fact of its having no real basis proved?"

The answer is supplied by the following:—

TEXTS (278-279).

IF THE SAID NOTION (OF 'I') HAD AN ETERNAL THING FOR ITS BASIS, THEN ALL 'I-NOTIONS' WOULD COME ABOUT ALL AT ONCE, AS THEIR EFFICIENT CAUSE WOULD BE ALWAYS PRESENT. —IF IT HAD A NON-ETERNAL BASIS, THEN ALL THESE NOTIONS WOULD BE EQUALLY CLEARLY MANIFEST. HENCE (IT FOLLOWS THAT) THE OTHER PARTIES NEEDLESSLY RAISE QUESTIONS REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF THE BASIS OF THE SAID I-NOTION.—(278-279)

COMMENTARY.

The basis (background) of this 'I-notion' could be either eternal or non-eternal;—if it is eternal, then all 'I-notions'—'I-consciousness'—would come about (appear) simultaneously, as their cause would be present in its perfect condition; nor can the said basis be without cause; as such an idea would lead to absurdities;—nor can an efficient cause stand in need of auxiliary causes;—all this has been discussed more than once.—Nor can it be urged that "there is only one *I-consciousness*", because its multiplicity is clearly proved by its appearing only occasionally. For instance, during the states of deep sleep, or of intoxication, or of swoon, there is no 'I-consciousness' felt, and yet at other times, it is actually felt; and this non-apprehension of it at certain times shows that it appears only occasionally; and because it

appears only occasionally, therefore it must be regarded as *many* also. Thus it is clear that all these 'I-notions' would come about simultaneously, as their coming about is dependent upon the presence of the said cause only.

If then the other view be accepted that the basis of the 'I-notion' is *non-eternal,* then all *I-notions* should be all as clearly manifest as the Visual and other Cognitions; as they would be directly apprehending the specific individuality of the thing concerned.

For these reasons, we conclude that '*other people*'—other philosophers, like *Kumārila* and others—needlessly raise questions regarding the basis of the *I-notion* in question,—in such words as (those under *Text* 232)—"Of that notion, what cognitive-moment is assumed to be the object?" and so forth. —(278-279)

In this connection, it has been asserted by the Buddhist that the 'I-notion' is entirely baseless, and it appears only as an Illusion due to the beginningless Dispositions of the "Vision of the Body of Being".—As against this, *Kumārila* has raised an objection, which is set forth below:—

TEXTS (280-281).

"WHAT THE DISPOSITION CAN DO IS TO BRING ABOUT THE RECOGNITION OF THE COGNISER; IT CANNOT BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF A THING AS WHAT IT IS NOT; BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF ILLUSION (WRONG COGNITION).—THUS THE 'I-NOTION' CANNOT BE REGARDED AS AN ILLUSION; AS THERE IS NOTHING TO ANNUL IT (AND HENCE PROVE IT TO BE *wrong*)";—[*Shlokavārtika,* page 720]—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the following *Text*].—(280-281)

COMMENTARY.

What the Disposition can do is to bring about the Recognition of the Cogniser, and not the Cognition of a thing—*Cogniser*—as what it is not, —i.e. as *not-Cogniser*; the construction is that Disposition cannot bring about this latter Cognition.—"why?"—*because it cannot be the cause of Illusion*; in fact it always brings about the Cognition of a thing exactly as it had been cognised on the previous occasion, and not a wrong Cognition.—Thus then, because this I-notion is produced from Dispositions, and because there is no valid reason for annulling it, it cannot be regarded as an Illusion.

The term '*chēt*', 'if this be urged', should be construed away from its place,—after the end of the sentence.—(280-281)

The following Text answers this argument:—

TEXT (281).

WHAT HAS BEEN URGED IS NOT RIGHT ; AS THE REASONING ADDUCED ABOVE IS CLEARLY FOUND TO BE SUBVERSIVE OF THE SAID IDEA.—(281)

COMMENTARY.

'*Adduced above*'—under *Text* 278.—(281)

It has been argued that "Disposition cannot be the cause of Illusion" ; this reason is 'Inconclusive' ;—this is shown in the following Text :—

TEXT (282).

HOW IS IT THAT, ENTIRELY FROM DISPOSITIONS,—SUCH DIVERSE ILLUSIONS COME ABOUT AS THOSE THAT DEVOTEES HAVE IN REGARD TO GOD AND OTHER BEINGS AS BEING THE CAUSE OF THINGS AND SO FORTH ?

COMMENTARY.

If Disposition were not the cause of Illusion, then how could such Illusions appear, purely out of Dispositions, as 'God is the cause of all products, omniscient, the receptacle of eternal cognition' and so forth ? In fact, *Kumārila* himself has denied a creator of the world, like God and other Beings.

In the phrase '*proceeding entirely from Disposition*', the term 'entirely' is for the purpose of excluding a *real* background.—(282)

TEXTS (283-284).

THUS THEN, THE BASELESSNESS OF 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS' HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED, THERE CAN BE NO *Cogniser* WHO COULD BE APPREHENDED BY THE SAID 'NOTION OF I'. HENCE AMONG ALL VALID FORMS OF COGNITION, THERE IS NOT ONE WHICH IS FOUND ABLE TO SUPPLY A FIT EXAMPLE ; AND THE REASONS ALSO THAT HAVE BEEN ADDUCED IN DUE COURSE ARE FOUND TO BE 'UNPROVEN' REGARDING THEIR SUBSTRATUM.—(283-284)

COMMENTARY.

Thus 'I-consciousness' being baseless, there can be no Cogniser who could be admitted to be the object of that consciousness. Hence the existence of the 'soul' is not proved.

The other party has adduced (under *Text* 238, *et seq.*) such reasons as 'because he has been apprehended by past I-notions' and so forth,—for proving the eternity of the Soul; against this it is urged that *there can be no Cogniser, etc.*—i.e. neither an eternal nor a non-eternal Cogniser is there who could serve as the corroborative instance; hence the corroborative instance (of the opponent's inference) is 'unproven' (non-existent). For instance, the first and second reasonings (set forth by the opponent) are open to the objection that the corroborative Instance is beset with the defect of having its subject unknown; as there is no such Cogniser known as is the object of the 'I-notion' of *to-day* and also of *yesterday*.—As regards the third reasoning, the Instance cited—'like the single Cognition'—is devoid of the Probandum and the Probans; because the 'one Cognition' intended to be the 'I-notion' of the cogniser connected with the same chain,—and also to appertain to a single object,—is 'not proven' (not admitted by all parties). Thus, on account of the two characters being 'unproven', the Instance itself has been declared to be 'unproven'.

Adduced in due course,—i.e. those Reasons that have been adduced above;—'*in due course*'—according to the nature of the defect found in each.—'*Unproven regarding their substratum*',—for instance, in the first and second arguments, the Reasons adduced are 'unproven regarding their substratum', as it is *not admitted* that there is any such object as 'the Cogniser apprehended by *I-notion*';—in the third argument, though the substratum is not 'unproven', inasmuch as the 'Cognitions' which form the subject are well-recognised entities,—yet, what is 'not proven' in regard to them is the fact of their being qualified by a '*Cogniser connected with a single chain*',—because it is well known that Cognitions are baseless (devoid of any basis in reality). This is the reason why the Text has used the qualifying term, '*in due course*'.—(283-284)

End of section 7 (*b*) *dealing with the Mīmāmsaka's Doctrine of the 'Soul'*.

CHAPTER VII.

SECTION (C).

The Sāṅkhya doctrine of the 'Soul' (Spirit).

COMMENTARY.

The Text proceeds now to refute the 'Soul' as postulated by the *Sāṅkhya* :—

TEXTS (285-286).

OTHERS HOLD *Chaitanya* 'SENTIENCE' TO BE DISTINCT FROM THE FORM OF *Buddhi*, INTELLECT (COGNITION). THEY POSTULATE 'SENTIENCE' AS THE 'SPIRIT'S' OWN FORM ; HE ONLY ENJOYS THE FRUITS PRESENTED TO HIM BY PRIMORDIAL MATTER ; HE IS NOT THE 'DOER' ; THE CHARACTER OF 'DOER' IS HELD TO BELONG TO PRIMORDIAL MATTER ALONE.—(285-286)

COMMENTARY.

'*Others*'—the Sāṅkhyas. They postulate the Spirit's own form as consisting of *Chaitanya*, 'sentience',—which is something different from *Buddhi* (of the *Sāṅkhyas*, which is Cosmic Intellect) ; as their doctrine is that *Buddhi* is of the nature of Primordial Matter, while *Chaitanya* is the form of the Spirit alone.—This 'Spirit' is the *enjoyer* of the fruit of good and bad deeds, presented by Primordial Matter,—but he is not the *doer* of the deeds ; as the character of the *doer* is held to belong to Primordial Matter alone, which contains within itself the evolution of the whole world. In support of this doctrine they adduce the following proof :—Whatever is of the nature of an aggregate is found to be for another's purpose,—e.g. Beds and such things ;—the eye and the rest are of the nature of aggregates ; hence this is a reason based on the nature of things ;—and this 'another' is, by implication, the Spirit (or Soul). This is what the other party means.—(285-286)

With the following Text proceeds the refutation of the said doctrine (of the *Sāṅkhyas*) :—

TEXT (287).

AS REGARDS THIS DOCTRINE, IF 'SENTIENCE' IS HELD TO BE ONE ONLY, THEN HOW IS IT THAT, IN THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND AND OTHER OBJECTS, WHAT IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED IS A FORM BESET WITH DIVERSITY ?—(287).

COMMENTARY.

To explain—When the *Sāṅkhya* says that "Sentience is the Soul's own form", what becomes postulated is that sentience is eternal and of one form,—inasmuch as it is non-different from the Soul who is eternal and of one form.—This however is contrary to facts of perception; inasmuch as in the Cognitions of Colour, Sound and other things, what is clearly—distinctly—perceived, through their own Cognition itself—is a *form beset with diversity*,—i.e. a diverse character is perceived;—and this could not be possible if *Sentience* were only one.—(287)

The following Text shows that the said doctrine is open to the charge of being contrary to doctrines of the *Sāṅkhya* himself :—

TEXT (288).

IF 'SENTIENCE' IS OF ONE FORM AND CONTINUES TO EXIST FOR ALL TIME, THEN, HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SENTIENT SOUL TO BE THE ENJOYER OF THINGS OF MANY KINDS ?—(288)

COMMENTARY.

The Soul is of one form, and yet the enjoyer of many kinds of things,—this involves self-contradiction; specially as it cannot be distinguished from the state in which one is not the enjoyer.—(288)

It might be argued that "there is no self-contradiction, because of the presence of the *desire to see* and other characters".

The following *Text* supplies the answer to this :—

TEXT (289).

THE 'DESIRE TO SEE' AND THE LIKE, WHICH ARE DIVERSE, DO NOT COME INTO EXISTENCE AS FORMING THE BASIS OF THE SPIRIT'S EXPERIENCE; FOR, IF THEY DID SO, THEN THE SOUL ITSELF WOULD BE SOMETHING *produced*.—(289)

COMMENTARY.

If, in regard to colour, etc. the 'desire to see', 'desire to hear' and so forth,—which are different from one another,—be assumed to be the basis of

the Spirit's experience,—then no such can come into existence. If they did come into existence, then,—i.e. if they came into existence as distinct from each other,—the Spirit also would be something *produced*, just like the 'desire to see', etc. as it is non-different from these.—(289)

This same point is made clearer in the following :—

TEXT (290).

THE 'DESIRE TO SEE' AND THE REST ARE NOT ANYTHING DISTINCT FROM 'SENTIENCE'; AND IF THIS LATTER WERE LIABLE TO 'APPEARANCE AND DISAPPEARANCE', THEN THE SAME COULD NOT BE DENIED OF THE SOUL.—(290)

COMMENTARY.

If they were something entirely distinct, then there could be no such connection between them as that 'these are his'; as there is no benefit conferred which could be the basis of such connection.

'*The same*',—i.e. the attributing of 'appearance and disappearance'.

This argument may be formulated as follows :—When there is no basis for any restriction regarding the existence of a thing, that thing should not be so restricted by any intelligent person,—e.g. ***Ākāsha*** as having a material shape ;—in the case of the Spirit there is no basis, in the shape of 'Desire to see' and the rest for restricting the character of 'being the experiencer' to it; so that no reason is perceived for such restriction.—This Reason cannot be said to be 'unproven'; as has been explained already.—(290)

For the following reason also the character of 'experiencer' cannot belong to the Soul, on the ground that it cannot be the 'doer' :—

TEXT (291).

IF GOOD AND BAD DEEDS ARE NOT DONE BY THE SOUL, THEN WHEREFROM DOES THIS DIVERSITY IN HIS EXPERIENCES PROCEED ?—(291)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, no one enjoys the fruit of the act that he has not done ; for if he did, then this would involve the incongruity of the 'accruing of what has not been done', etc. etc.—(291)

The following *Text* states a likely answer from the other party :—

TEXT (292).

IF IT BE HELD THAT—" IT IS PRIMORDIAL MATTER THAT BESTOWS THE FRUITS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIRES OF THE SOUL; AND THIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO STANDS LIKE THAT BETWEEN THE LAME AND THE BLIND PERSONS ",—[then the answer is as given in the following *Text*].—(292)

COMMENTARY.

Though the Soul is not the *doer* of deeds, yet it is Primordial Matter that presents to him things, in accordance with his desires, and then he enjoys these things.—So that there is none of the incongruity that has been urged.

Question :—" Primordial Matter being insentient, how can it be the *Doer* of good and bad deeds, by virtue of which it brings about the fruits of deeds for the Soul according to his desires ?"

Answer :—This relationship, etc.; just as the Blind man acts towards things, through his connection with the man with eyes,—so do the *Cosmic Intellect* and other 'divergent' things perform the functions of 'determining' and the rest towards such effects as Merit, etc., through their contact with the Soul, which is *sentient*.—This has been thus asserted—" The Soul serves the purpose of bringing about *Perception* (of Matter), and Primordial Matter serves to bring about *Liberation* (of the Soul); the connection between these two thus is like that between the Lame and the Blind; and creation (evolution) proceeds from this connection " (*Sāṅkhyakārikā*, 21).—(292)

The above argument is answered in the following—

TEXT (293).

IF THAT IS SO, THEN HOW IS IT THAT EVEN WHEN THE DESIRE FOR THE DESIRED THING IS THERE, IT IS NOT FULFILLED ? PRIMORDIAL MATTER CANNOT STAND IN NEED OF ANYTHING ELSE.—(293)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant is that Primordial Matter brings to the Soul the desired fruit of even such acts as he has not done, then how is it that, at all times, on the desire appearing for anything, the desires of all men do not become fulfilled ?

It might be argued that—" It does not become fulfilled because its cause, n the form of Merit, is not present ".

The answer to that is that *Primordial Matter cannot stand in need of anything else.*—Merit is a product of Primordial Matter, and as such non-different from it; consequently it must be always present; and the desired fruit must therefore always appear. For instance, all things (for the *Sāṅkhya*) are included under the two categories of 'Primordial Matter' and 'Soul', and these are always close to one another; so that the fruit should be always there.

Then again, if it is the desired fruit that Primordial Matter brings to the Soul, why then does it present to him what is undesirable? For certainly no one desires what is undesirable.—(293)

Further, if Primordial Matter presents the thing to the Soul,—even so, it cannot be right to regard him as the 'enjoyer', as he is unmodifiable.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (294-295).

IF, AT THE TIME OF HIS ENJOYING A THING, THERE IS NO MODIFICATION IN THE SOUL,—THEN HE CANNOT BE THE *enjoyer*; NOR CAN PRIMORDIAL MATTER BE OF ANY SERVICE TO HIM.—IF (ON THE OTHER HAND) THERE IS MODIFICATION IN HIM, THEN HIS ETERNALITY DISAPPEARS; AS 'MODIFICATION' CONSISTS IN *becoming changed into something else*; AND HOW COULD ANY SUCH CHANGE BE POSSIBLE IF THE SOUL REMAINED IN THE SAME CONDITION ALWAYS?—(294-295)

COMMENTARY

If the Soul is not made to undergo 'modification' into Joy and Sorrow due to Pleasure and Pain and so forth,—then he would be just like *Ākāsha*, and hence he cannot be the *Enjoyer*; and *Primordial Matter also cannot be of any service to him*,—[such is the construction of the Sentence];—because no service can be rendered to that which is unmodifiable.—If then, it be admitted that the Soul *is* modifiable,—then there is the undesirable contingency of his losing his eternality; because what we mean by the 'Non-eternality' of a thing is that it does not remain in the same form always; and as this would be there, if the Soul were modifiable, how could he be eternal? As what is meant by 'eternality' is that the thing should retain the same form always.—(294–295)

The following text provides another explanation of the Soul being the 'enjoyer'—from the standpoint of the other party:—

TEXTS (296-297).

THE FOLLOWING MIGHT BE URGED—"FIRST OF ALL THE COSMIC INTELLECT BECOMES EVOLVED IN THE FORM OF THE OBJECT; AND WHEN THIS OBJECT HAS BEEN 'DETERMINED UPON' (DEFINED) BY COSMIC INTELLECT, THE SPIRIT ATTAINS IT. THUS HIS CHARACTER OF BEING THE 'ENJOYER' IS THROUGH THE APPEARANCE OF THE REFLECTION; AND THE SPIRIT NEVER RENOUNCES HIS OWN NATURE."—(296-297)

COMMENTARY

'The Spirit is not held to the 'enjoyer' in the sense that he becomes *modified;* what is meant is that he becomes so by way of the appearance therein of the object 'determined' by Cosmic Intellect. That is to say, the object, first of all, enters as a reflected image in the mirror of Cosmic Intellect,—this reflected image of the object then becomes transferred into Spirit, which is the second reflecting mirror; and this is what constitutes the Spirit being the 'enjoyer' (of the object); and not his undergoing *modification.* By the mere transference of the reflected image, the Spirit does not renounce his own nature, because, like the Mirror he remains just as he was.—Thus, in the argument that was urged above (by the Buddhist against the *Sāṅkhya*) to the effect that ''what is non-differentiated from the non-enjoyer cannot be the enjoyer etc. etc.' (under Text, 288)—the Reason is found to be 'inconclusive'.—(296–297)

The answer to this is supplied in the following—

TEXT (298).

OUR ANSWER TO THIS IS AS FOLLOWS:—IF THE REFLECTION APPEARS IN THE SAME FORM (AS THE REFLECTING SUBSTANCE), THEN THE SAME LIABILITY TO 'APPEARANCE AND DISAPPEARANCE' REMAINS.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS DIFFERENT, THEN THE SPIRIT CANNOT BE THE *enjoyer.*—(298)

COMMENTARY

You hold that the reflection of the object in Cosmic Intellect becomes transferred to the Spirit, who is like a second mirror;—now if this reflection in Spirit is non-different from the Spirit itself, then the Spirit remains liable to 'appearance and disappearance' as urged above; for the simple reason that he is non-different from (identified with) the Reflection, which is liable to appearance and disappearance.—If, on the other hand, the view held is that the Reflection is something different from the Spirit, then he cannot be the 'enjoyer'; as his condition would not be different in any way from what it was when he was *not* the 'enjoyer'.—Nor can it be right to regard the Spirit's

character of being the 'Enjoyer' as being due to his contact with the reflection of the object; as there can be no 'contact' between two such entities as do not benefit each other in any way.—(298)

TEXT (299).

IF PRIMORDIAL MATTER OPERATES TOWARDS BRINGING ABOUT THE DIVERSIFIED CREATION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE (SPIRIT'S) 'DESIRE TO SEE' AND THE REST,—THEN HOW CAN IT BE *insentient* ?—(299)

COMMENTARY

Then again, if Primordial Matter *knew* of the Spirit's 'desire to see' etc.—then it might be resonable to regard its activity to be for the sake of the Spirit, and to be in accordance with his 'desire to see' etc. ;—as a matter of fact, however, the said Matter is itself *insentient*,—even when in contact with the Sentient Spirit;—it cannot then be right to regard its activity as brought about as by the contact of the Lame and the Blind. Because even though the Blind man does not see the road, yet he knows of the Lame man's desire, because he is himself *sentient*. Primordial Matter however cannot *know* the Spirit's 'desire to see' etc., because being insentient by its very nature, it is *unconscious*.—Nor is it possible for these two—Spirit and Primordial Matter—to be related like the Lame and the Blind,—as there can be nò mutual benefit in their case.—(299)

TEXT (300).

PRIMORDIAL MATTER KNOWS HOW TO PRODUCE THE SOUP AND OTHER THINGS, AND YET DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO EAT (ENJOY) THEM, —WHAT CAN BÈ MORE INCONGRUOUS THAN THIS ?—(300)

COMMENTARY

If it be held that Primordial Matter actually *knows* of the Spirit's 'desire to see' and the rest of it.—then it must have to be regarded as being the 'Enjoyer' also. How can one who knows how to produce a thing not know how to enjoy it ? Hence what can be more incongruous than that Primordial Matter knows how to produce things, but does not know how to enjoy them ? The meaning is that nothing can be more incongruous. The Cook who prepares the soup and other things cannot be regarded as not knowing how to eat (enjoy) them. The particle '*iti*' should be taken as understood after '*vijā āti*'.—(300)

In the following text the Author sets forth the answer likely to be given by the other party :—

TEXTS (301-302).

IF IT BE ARGUED THAT—" INASMUCH AS PRIMORDIAL MATTER IS EQUIPPED WITH COSMIC INTELLECT, ALL THIS CANNOT BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH ITS NATURE ",—THEN, ON THE GROUND OF ITS BEING EQUIPPED WITH INTELLECT, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE POSSESSED OF SENTIENCE ALSO,—LIKE THE SENTIENCE IN SPIRITS. BECAUSE 'INTELLECT', 'VOLITION', 'CONSCIOUSNESS', 'FEELING', 'KNOWING',— ALL THIS IS EXPRESSIVE OF *Sentience*.— (301-302)

COMMENTARY

'*All this*'—i.e. acting in accordance with the Spirit's 'desire to see' and the rest ;—'*its nature*'—its character of Primordial Matter.—What is meant is this—" Even though Primordial Matter is not of the nature of Sentience, yet it is equipped with Cosmic Intellect which is of the nature of 'determination',—and thus it can know of the Spirit's 'desire to know' etc., and act accordingly ; so that there is no incongruity at all ".

The answer to this is that *on the ground of its being equipped with Intellect*, etc. etc. That is to say, if it is admitted that Primordial Matter is equipped with Intellect, then it should have to be regarded as endowed with *Sentience* also, like the Spirit ; as '*Buddhi*' (Intellect) etc. are only so many synonyms of '*Sentience*'. For instance, that which is of the nature of *light* and has its form known by itself and shines independently of all else, is 'Sentience'; and this character is present in *Buddhi* (Intellect) also ; why then should this latter not be the same as *Sentience* ? specially as apart from Intellect, we do not perceive any other form of *Sentience*, by virtue of which this distinct nature could be attributed to Spirit.—(301–302)

In the following Text, the other party proceeds to show that *Buddhi* (Intellect) is something different from '*Sentience*':—

TEXT (303).

" COSMIC INTELLECT MUST BE INSENTIENT BY ITS NATURE,—LIKE SOUND ODOUR, TASTE AND OTHER THINGS,—ON ACCOUNT OF THE TWO REASONS OF *being produced* AND *being perishable* ",— IF THIS BE YOUR VIEW—[then the answer is as stated in the following Text].—(303)

COMMENTARY

The opponent's argument is formulated thus :—" Whatever is characterised by the character of *being produced, being perishable*, and the like,—must

be *insentient*,—e.g. Taste etc. ;—Cosmic Intellect is so characterised; hence this must be a reason based upon the nature of things (for regarding it as *insentient*). "—(303)

The following Text answers this argument :—

TEXT (304).

IF THE REASONS ADDUCED ARE MEANT TO BE SELF-SUFFICIENT, THEN THEY ARE *not admitted* BY BOTH (PARTIES) ; IF THE REASONS ARE MEANT TO BE INDIRECT, THEN THERE IS NOTHING TO ANNUL THE CONTRARY CONCLUSION.—(304)

COMMENTARY

The reason that has been put forward,—is it meant to prove the conclusion *directly* or *indirectly* (*per Reductio ad absurdum*) ?—If *directly*, then the Reason adduced is 'not admitted' by either one or the other of the two parties; for instance, the 'producibility' of things that the Buddhist admits is in the form of the production of something that did not exist before,—similarly, the 'perishability' of things that the Buddhist admits is of the nature of complete destruction,—while such is not the 'producibility' or 'perishability' that is admitted by you, the *Sāṅkhya ;* as you regard them as being of the nature of 'appearance' and 'disappearance' respectively; and the form in which you admit these is not the one that is admitted by the Buddhist; hence the reason comes to be 'not admitted' by either one or the other party. The mere admission of the verbal expression does not prove the admission of the Reason ; the admission of a fact is proved by a fact, as it is only a fact that can be the *cause.* This has been thus declared—'In the case of such fallacies as Falsity and the like, even though the verbal expression may be quite correct, the Reason may be regarded as fallacious, as it is only a fact that can prove a fact.'

If it be held that the Reason adduced is meant to prove the conclusion *indirectly ;* even so, inasmuch as no reason has been adduced which would annul (and make impossible) a conclusion contrary to the one intended, the two reasons adduced must be regarded as 'inconclusive'. What is there, for instance, to obstruct the notion that 'producibility' and 'perishability' belong to *Sentience?*

As for the assumption of the *Sāṅkhya* in the following *Kārika*—" As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the Calf, so does Primordial Matter act towards the liberation of the Spirit " (*Sāṅkhya-Kārikā*, 57),—this is not a sound assumption at all ; because it is not independently by itself that the Milk flows for the Calf's growth ; what happens is that the milk is produced by particular causes functioning occasionally ; and when produced, the milk becomes the means of the calf's growth ; and it is in this sense that it is said that 'even the insentient thing acts'. No such activity however is possible for Primordial Matter ; because, inasmuch as Primordial

Matter is eternal, and there can be no other cause except itself,—it cannot be right to regard its Potency as only occasionally active, on account of being dependent upon certain causes operating only occasionally. Nor can it be right to regard the said Potency of Primordial Matter to be inherent in it; for, if that were so, then as the Cause in its perfect form would be always present, the entire purpose of all men, in the form 'prosperity' and 'highest good', would be brought about all at once.—(304)

It might be argued that—"There may be non-difference between *Cosmic Intellect* and *Sentience*; even so the fact of its being Spirit remains undenied"—The answer to this is given in the following—

TEXTS (305-306).

THERE IS NO HARM DONE TO US BY THE MERE APPLICATION OF THE TERM 'SPIRIT' TO *Sentience*; WHAT WE ASSERT IS THAT ITS *eternality* IS DIFFICULT TO PROVE; BECAUSE THE EYE AND OTHER THINGS SERVE A FRUITFUL PURPOSE. IF *Sentience* WERE EVERLASTING, THEN ALL SUCH THINGS AS THE EYE AND THE REST WOULD BE USELESS; E.G. THERE WOULD BE NO USE FOR THE FUEL IF FIRE WERE EVERLASTING.—(305-306)

COMMENTARY

What we deny is not merely the applying of the same 'Spirit' to *Sentience*; what we do deny is the property of 'eternality' that is imposed upon it.—'Why?'—Because such things as the Eye, the Light, the Mind and the like serve a fruitful purpose. Otherwise, if *Sentience* were everlasting—eternal—then the Eye and the rest would be entirely useless; as the only purpose served by these is the bringing about of *Sentience* (Cognition); and there can be no bringing about of what is eternal.—An example is cited.——*There would be etc.;*—i.e. if fire were everlasting, then people would not fetch fuel for the lighting of fire.

From all this it follows that *Sentience* cannot be Eternal. (305-306)

Another argument put forward by the *Sāṅkhya* (in *Kārikā* 17) is that "all composite things are found to be for another's use".—The author proceeds to examine who this 'another' is:—

TEXTS (307–310).

THE FACT OF THE EYE ETC. BEING FOR 'ANOTHER'S USE' IS ASSERTED (BY THE *Sāṅkhya*), ON THE GROUND OF THEIR BEING 'COMPOSITE THINGS', LIKE THE BED, SEAT AND SUCH THINGS.—IF IT IS MEANT BY THIS TO PROVE THAT THEY SERVE THE PURPOSE OF SOMETHING ELSE WHICH IS CAPABLE OF HAVING ADDITIONAL PROPERTIES PRODUCED IN IT,—THEN WHAT IS SOUGHT TO BE PROVED IS ALREADY ADMITTED; INASMUCH AS THE SAID EYE ETC. ARE ADMITTED BY US TO BE HELPFUL TO COGNITION. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT IS MEANT TO PROVE THAT THEY ARE HELPFUL TO SOMETHING THAT IS *unmodifiable*,—THEN THE REASONING IS OPEN TO THE FALLACY OF THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE BEING DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM; AS THE THINGS CITED AS THE INSTANCE ARE ALSO HELPFUL ONLY TO WHAT IS MOBILE (PERISHABLE).—LASTLY, IF WHAT IS MEANT TO BE PROVED IS MERELY THE VAGUE GENERAL FACT OF THEIR BEING HELPFUL TO 'ANOTHER',—EVEN SO, THE REASON WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS; AS THEY ARE ALREADY ADMITTED TO BE HELPFUL TO THE MIND.—(307–310)

COMMENTARY

The 'another' that is meant,—(*a*) is it one capable of having additional properties produced in it?—or (*b*) one incapable of having such additional properties produced, and hence *unmodifiable*?—or (*c*) what is meant to be proved is the mere vague fact of 'being for another's purpose', which is pleasing enough so long as it is not examined?—These are the three alternatives possible.

Under the first alternative (*a*), the reasoning proves what is already admitted; as we also admit that the Eye etc. are helpful to Cognition; as is clear from the statement that 'That Cognition which originates from the Eye and the Colours is *Visual Perception*, and that Cognition which originates from the whole body and the touchable things is *Bodily (Tactile) perception*.'

Under the second alternative (*b*), the Reason is 'contradictory'; this is what is shown in the text 309. If the Eye, etc. are meant to be proved as helpful to something that is unmodifiable (eternal), then as the Reason is found, in the instance cited, to be concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum, it becomes 'Contradictory'; because the Bed and other things (cited as instances) are actually found to be helpful to what is *mobile*, i.e., non-eternal; in as much as it is impossible to add to the properties of what is *unmodifiable*.

(*c*) Lastly if these alternatives are excluded, and what is meant to be proved is merely the vague general fact of 'being for another's purpose', even so it would be proving what is already admitted; as the Eye and the rest are actually admitted (by us) to be helpful to the Mind. If the Mind

also is included in the Probandum (along with the Eye etc.), as held by the *Naiyāyikas*, even so, what you desire is not proved; as you do not hold the Spirit to be other than the Mind. Nor does the argument prove what is wanted by the *Naiyāyikas* ; because it is already admitted that the Eye and the rest are 'for another's purpose', in the sense that they are helpful to one another ; specially as the notion of 'another' is purely relative, like the notion of 'near and far'.

Then again, the 'composite character' that is assumed in the Mind is actually there, inasmuch as it takes in the help rendered by several causes ; and to this extent your reason would be 'unproven' also (if the Mind also is included among 'the Eye and the rest').—(307–310)

End of the Examination of the Sāṅkhya Doctrine of 'Soul'.

CHAPTER VII.

SECTION (D).

The Doctrine of 'Soul' according to the Digambara Jainas.

COMMENTARY

The Author now proceeds to refute the 'soul' postulated by the *Digambara* (Jaina) :—

TEXT (311).

THE *Jainas*, LIKE THE *Mīmāṃsakas*, ASSERT THAT THE PERSON (SOUL) IS CHARACTERISED BY 'SENTIENCE'; THAT, IN THE FORM OF 'SUBSTANCE', IT IS *inclusive*, AND IN THE FORM OF 'SUCCESSIVE FACTORS', IT IS *exclusive*.—(311)

COMMENTARY

'*Jainas*', i.e., the *Digambaras*.—They assert as follows :—" The Soul is characterised by *Sentience* only; and in the form of *Substance*, it remains the same under all states, and as such is 'inclusive' (comprehensive) in its nature; while in the form of *successive* factors, being distinct with each state, it is 'exclusive' in its nature. This two-fold character of the Soul is cognised by direct Perception, and hence does not stand in need of being proved by other proofs. Thus that 'Sentience' which is found to continue to exist through all the states, even though these states are diverse, in the forms of Pleasure and the rest, —is 'substance'; while the 'successive factors' consist of the diverse states which appear one after the other; and all these are distinctly perceived ".

Such is the view of the other party (the *Digambara Jainas*).—(311)

The refutation of this view proceeds with the following—

TEXT (312).

UNDER THIS VIEW ALSO, IF THE *unmodified* SUBSTANCE IS CONNECTED WITH THE *Successive Factors*, THEN THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE (CHANGE) IN IT, AND, IN THAT CASE, IT COULD NOT BE LIABLE TO MODIFICATION.—(312)

COMMENTARY

There are two opinions possible :—(*a*) The Substance that exists in the form of *Sentience* may be connected with the 'successive factors in its *un-*

modified form, i.e., without renouncing its previous character of 'Sentience', or (*b*) it is connected with the 'successive factors', in its *modified* form, i.e., in a form in which the previous character has been abandoned. If this latter view be accepted, then there is disappearance of the 'eternality' (of the Soul); as under this view, there would be no single entity existing throughout the series of successive factors. If the former view be accepted —that it is connected in its *unmodified* form,—then there is no *difference*, i.e., change, as between the preceding and succeeding states; so that the sentience *would not be liable to modification;* i.e., it has to be regarded as unmodifiable; as 'modification is of the nature of 'change', becoming something else. And yet it is held to be modifiable. The argument may be formulated as follows :—When a thing cannot be differentiated between its preceding and succeeding states, it cannot be regarded as modifiable; e.g. the *Ākāsha ;* Sentience is not differentiated at all in any state; so that the wider character being absent (the narrower one must be denied).—(312)

In the following texts, it is urged from the standpoint of the *Jaina* that the reason just put forward is 'unproven', 'not admitted' :—

TEXTS (313–315).

"WHEN *Sentience* IS SPOKEN OF AS 'ONE', IT IS WITH REFERENCE TO SPACE, TIME AND NATURE; WHEN IT IS SPOKEN OF AS 'DIFFERENT', IT IS WITH REFERENCE TO NUMBER, CHARACTERISTIC, NAME AND FUNCTION.—WHEN WE SPEAK OF THE 'JAR' (SINGULAR) AND ITS 'COLOUR AND THE REST' (PLURAL), THERE IS DIFFERENCE OF 'NUMBER' AND 'NAME'; THERE IS ALSO DIFFERENCE OF 'NATURE', INASMUCH AS 'INCLUSIVENESS' (COMPREHENSIVENESS) IS THE NATURE OF THE *substance Jar*, WHILE 'EXCLUSIVENESS' (DISTRIBUTIVENESS) IS THE NATURE OF THE *Successive Factors* IN THE FORM OF *Colour and the rest*; AND THERE IS DIFFERENCE ALSO OF 'FUNCTION'; INASMUCH AS THE PURPOSES SERVED BY THE TWO ARE DIFFERENT.—SIMILARLY BETWEEN THE 'SUBSTANCE' AND THE 'SUCCESSIVE FACTORS'.—THUS *Substance* IS NOT ABSOLUTELY *undifferentiated*, AS IT DOES BECOME DIFFERENTIATED IN THE FORM OF THE *Successive Factors*."—(313–315)

COMMENTARY

If the *Substance* were absolutely different from the *successive factors*, then no differentiation in it would be possible; because, on the ground of their non-difference regarding place, time and nature, the two are held to be one and the same; as a matter of fact, however, the two are different as regards number and other factors; for instance, the difference regarding

number is that while the *substance* is *one*, the *successive factors* are *many* ; that is, the *Substance* is characterized by the *number* 'one', while the *Successive Factors*—Pleasure and the rest—are characterized by the number 'many'; the *nature* of the two also is different: inasmuch as the *Substance* is 'comprehensive' in nature, while the *Successive Factors* are 'distributive' (exclusive). The term '*sanjñā*' stands for *Name ;* and '*artha*' for *action, function.* This has been thus stated :—'Between the qualified and the qualification, there is *non-difference,* due to non-difference in their place, time and nature, but there is *difference* due to difference in their number, name, nature and function, as is found between the Jar and its Colour and other properties'; that is, between the Jar and its Colour, etc., there is non-difference regarding place, etc., while the Jar is different from Colour etc., regarding number, etc. ; e.g. the Jar is *one* while its properties, Colour and the rest, are *mnay.* There is difference in their name also : while the one is named 'Jar', the other is named 'Colour and the rest'. There is difference regarding their nature also: while the Substance, in the shape of the Jar, etc., is *comprehensive* in its nature, the Successive Factors, Colour etc., are *distributive.* There is difference in their *function* also : the Jar serves the purpose of *containing water,* while *Colour* and the rest serve the purpose of lending *colour to the cloth* and so forth.

What has been said above (regarding the Jar and Colour etc.) should be understood to hold respecting the *substance* 'Soul' which is of the nature of 'Sentience' and the *Successive Factors,* 'Pleasure, Pain and the rest'. In this case, the difference of 'function' should be understood as follows: The function performed by Sentience is the 'apprehension of things', while that performed by Pleasure, Pain, etc. is happiness, unhappiness, and the like. This is what is shown by the Text, in the words '*Rūpādayaḥ, . . . saṅkhyāsañjñāvibhēditā*'; the latter term is to be construed with the term '*dravyaparyāyayoḥ*' appearing later on (under text 315); the various terms in the second line of Text 314 are to be construed along with their respective correlates : the construction being '*Kāryabhēda*' 'difference of purpose' constitutes the 'difference of functions', and '*anuvṛtti, . . vyāvṛtti*', 'Comprehensiveness and Distributiveness' constitute the 'difference of nature'. One sentence ends with the word '*dravyaparyāyayoḥ*' '*similarly between the substance and the successive factors*' (in line 1 of *text* 315); and another sentence begins with the terms '*Ēvam naikāntēna.*'

'*Thus the Substance, etc.*', this sums up the fallacy of being 'unproven' in the Reason (put forward by the Buddhist as against the *Jaina*). What is meant is that, as shown above, the *Substance* is not absolutely undifferentiated; as a matter of fact, it becomes differentiated through the diversity in the forms of the *Successive Factors ;* and thus *Substance* not being absolutely different from the *Successive Factors,* the reason put forward (by the Buddhist, in Text 312) '*because there is no difference*' is 'unproven', '*not true*'.—(313–315)

The answer to the above argument of the *Jaina* is provided in the following—

TEXT (316).

'ONE-NESS' (SAMENESS, IDENTITY) CONSISTS IN *non-difference of nature* WERE THERE IF THIS 'ONE-NESS' (BETWEEN TWO THINGS), THEN 'DIFFERENCE' (BETWEEN THEM) WOULD BE HARD TO PROVE IN ANY WAY; AS IN THE CASE OF THE FORMS OF THE SUCCESSIVE FACTORS THEMSELVES.—(316)

COMMENTARY.

Even admitting that there is *non-difference* between the '*Substance*' and the '*Successive Factors*',—such being the case, the 'non-difference' should be *absolute*; how then could there be 'difference' between them, which is the contradictory of 'non-difference'? It cannot be right to *affirm* and *deny* a thing,—affirmation and denial being mutually contradictory. For instance, when two things are spoken of as 'one', what is meant is that there is 'non-difference in their nature (character)',—this 'non-difference' being inseparable from 'negation of difference'; and when there is such 'non-difference of character' (between the 'substance' and the 'successive factors'), how could there be, at the same time, 'difference', which is the negation of 'non-difference'? This argument may be formulated as follows:—In a case where there is *non-difference* between two things, there can be no room for *difference*, which is the contradictory of 'non-difference'; e.g. as is found in the case of the same 'successive factors' and the 'substance', in regard to the specific individuality of each, where there is *non-difference of character*; and between 'substance' and 'successive factors', non-difference is clearly present (hence there is perception of what is contrary to the Probandum, i.e. difference).—(316)

Thus in reality, there being *non-difference* between 'Substance' and the 'Successive Factors', there cannot be any difference between them as regards their 'characteristics' also; this is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (317-318).

THE 'ONE-NESS' THUS BETWEEN 'SUBSTANCE' AND THE 'SUCCESSIVE FACTORS' BEING NOT-FIGURATIVE (I.E. REAL), THE 'SUBSTANCE' ALSO SHOULD BE *distributive* (EXCLUSIVE), LIKE THE FORMS OF THE 'SUCCESSIVE FACTORS'; OR THOSE 'SUCCESSIVE FACTORS' THEMSELVES SHOULD BE *comprehensive* IN THEIR CHARACTER, LIKE THE 'SUBSTANCE'; BECAUSE THE ONE-NESS OF THESE WITH 'SUBSTANCE' IS DULY ESTABLISHED. —(317-318)

COMMENTARY.

When a thing is *non-different* from another thing which is 'exclusive' in its nature, the former also must be *exclusive*; as for example, the forms

of the Successive Factors themselves ;—and Substance is non-different from the Successive Factors, which are *exclusive ;* so that there is a natural reason (for the Substance also being *exclusive*).—Or (the argument may be stated in another form)—When a thing is non-different from another which is *inclusive* in character, the former also must be *inclusive* ; e.g. the form of the 'Substance'; and the 'Successive Factors' in the form of Pleasure, etc. are non-different from the 'Substance' which is *inclusive ;* hence this is a natural reason (for regarding these as *inclusive*). If this were not so, then as the fate befalling them would be different, the two would have to be regarded as *different.*

There is also an argument which annuls the contrary of the conclusion, in the form that—"if things possessed of contradictory properties would be regarded as *one,* there would be an end to all business."—(317–318)

TEXT (319).

FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE IS NO SUCH LASTING 'SUBSTANCE' AS THE 'SOUL' AND THE LIKE ; BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE 'SUCCESSIVE FACTORS',—LIKE THE FORM OF THE 'SUCCESSIVE FACTORS' THEMSELVES.—(319)

COMMENTARY.

The phrase '*and the like*' is meant to include the Jar, Grains and other things.—(319)

The following text sets forth the upshot of the second, 'indirect', proof :—

TEXT (320).

NONE OF THE 'SUCCESSIVE FACTORS' ALSO CAN BE BESET WITH 'APPEARANCE AND DISAPPEARANCE',—BECAUSE THEY ARE NON-DIFFERENT FROM 'SUBSTANCE',—LIKE THE PERMANENT FORM OF THE 'SUBSTANCE.'—(320)

COMMENTARY.

The text has added the clause 'like the permanent form of the Substance' in view of the argument that "Inasmuch as *Substance* also is held to be *beset with appearance and disappearance,* there can be no absence of the Probandum in the Reason". The compound '*niyatātma*' is to be taken as a *Karmadhāraya,* the meaning being 'the eternal form—nature—in the shape of *Substance* and so forth'.—(320)

The following Text clinches the argument :—

TEXT (321).

FOR THIS REASON IT SHOULD BE ADMITTED, EITHER THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTE DESTRUCTION OF ALL, OR THAT ALL IS PERMANENT (ETERNAL) ; *exclusiveness* AND *inclusiveness* COULD NOT EXIST IN ANY SINGLE THING.—(321)

COMMENTARY.

Any such comprehensive entity as 'substance', cannot be accepted, not only because it is non-different in nature from the 'successive factors', but also for the following reason (shown in the next text), it is not perceived apart from the 'successive factors' even when the conditions of its perception are present, and hence it should be treated as 'non-existent'. This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (322).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO PERCEPTION OF 'SUBSTANCE', WHICH SHOULD BE PERCEPTIBLE, AS SOMETHING PERMEATING THROUGH (AND COMPREHENSIVE OF) THE 'SUCCESSIVE FACTORS', —HENCE IT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS EXISTING, —LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS'.—(322)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that the statement that "The Soul, in the form of Substance, is permeating through the 'Successive Factors', is apprehended by perception itself" is not true; because as a matter of fact, no such substance as 'Soul' is perceived to appear, in that comprehensive (all-embracing) form, in any such Cognition as is admitted (by all parties) to be 'Sense-perception'.—(322)

Question.—"If it is so,—i.e., if there is no such substance as 'Soul', apart from the 'Successive Factors', —how do the distinctions of Number etc. come about ?"

The Answer is provided in the following—

TEXT (323).

IN FACT, THINGS ARE CAPABLE OF DIVERSE FRUITFUL ACTIONS ;—THEY ARE CAUSES OF THE NOTIONS OF 'SIMILARITY' AND THE REST ; —AND THEY ARE AMENABLE TO CONVENTIONAL VERBAL EXPRESSIONS CONNOTING SUCH THINGS.—(323)

COMMENTARY.

The '*fruitful actions*',—of the 'successive factors', Colour etc.,—are '*diverse*'—of various kinds—distinguished as *similar* and *dissimilar* ;—the

'similar' actions are the *Holding of water* and the like, and the 'dissimilar' actions are the colouring of cloth, the bringing about of visual perception and the like;—of these actions, the 'Successive Factors' are capable. Thus is the compound to be analysed. As regards the 'similar action', all the 'Successive Factors' are used simultaneously; hence in order to indicate their common causal efficiency,—even though there is no common identical Substance permeating through them, and even though they are different from each other, yet—they are spoken of by means of the single term 'Jar', as being *one* in number; and when it is intended to indicate the dissimilar specific actions of each of the 'Successive Factors', they are spoken of by means of words expressive of the plural number;—it is in this way that the diversity in *number*, as also diversity in *action* (purpose) is explained.

"How then is there diversity of characteristics?"

They are causes of the notions, etc. etc.—The things, Jar e.g., become 'causes of notions of similarity', when under all conditions, of baked, unbaked, etc., they are conceived of as 'Jar' and 'Jar' only,—being apprehended as objects of *indeterminate* cognitions;—as even though they are destroyed every moment, they are produced at each succeeding moment as particular things, but of similar shape. But when they become produced in the different colours of *dark, red,* and the like, they become 'causes of notions of dissimilarity'. Thus even in the absence of any simple comprehensive entity permeating through them, the things become the causes (basis) of notions of similarity and dissimilarity, and thereby come to be regarded as 'comprehensive' and 'exclusive' in character; and thus the *diversity of character* becomes established.

The term '*ādi*' in the compound '*tulyādi*' is meant to include the '*atulya*', 'notions of dissimilarity'.

"To what then is the *diversity in Name* due?"

'*They are amenable etc.*'—'*Such things*',—i.e. things like Colour, which are *capable of diverse fruitful actions* and *are causes of notions of similarity and dissimilarity;* such things form the 'object'—connotation—of such *conventional verbal expressions* as 'Jar' and 'Colour' etc.; and the said things are *amenable to such* verbal expressions (*names*).—(323)

Thus what is proved by Perception is the fact that things are without 'Soul',—this is what, by way of recapitulation, is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (324).

IN FACT, IT IS ONLY THE 'SUCCESSIVE FACTORS' THAT ARE COGNISED AS CHARACTERISED BY 'APPEARANCE AND DISAPPEARANCE'; HENCE PURE 'SOULLESSNESS' BECOMES CLEARLY ESTABLISHED.

COMMENTARY.

'*Successive Factors*'—i.e. Colour etc., as also Pain etc. as felt in their own nature;—'*only*'—i.e. without any *one* 'substance' non-different from

them :—because for an eternal entity, any fruitful action, either simultaneous or consecutive, is incompatible. In fact, fruitful action in the case of things is possible only when they are liable to 'appearance and disappearance'. Thus, through Inference also, it becomes established that those things which are capable of fruitful action are 'without Soul', this being indicated by their mere *existence*.—(324)

Against what the Buddhist has said under *Text* 322 above, the author anticipates the following objection from the opponent's (*Jaina's*) standpoint :—

TEXT (325).

IT MIGHT BE URGED THAT—" WHAT *exists* IS THE MIXED FORM OF THE 'SUBSTANCE' AND THE 'SUCCESSIVE FACTORS',—BECAUSE IT IS HELD TO BE DUAL IN FORM, BUT IMPARTITE,—LIKE *Narasimha*."—(325)

COMMENTARY.

'*Mixed*' —joined together; that is why the form of the 'Substance', though existent, is not perceived :—The next sentence explains the reason for its being thus 'mixed' in character: *Because it is held to be etc.*,—i.e. because the Soul and other things, though dual in form, are held to be *impartite,—like Narasimha*; and because the Soul is impartite, therefore it exists in the joint dual form, and hence is not perceived separately.—(325)

That this assertion (of the *Jaina*) involves self-contradiction is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (326).

THE ASSERTION THAT 'A CERTAIN THING IS OF DUAL FORM' CAN BE BASED ON THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL THINGS,—BECAUSE THE TERM 'FORM' CONNOTES *nature*.—(326)

COMMENTARY.

If the thing is 'impartite', then, to speak of it as 'of dual form' is a contradiction in terms; because such an assertion can be based only upon the existence of several things; because when a thing is spoken of as '*dvirupa*', 'of dual form', what is meant is that 'it has two forms—two natures'; and one and the same thing cannot have 'two natures'; as that would deprive it of its *one-ness*. What you have proved is only that there are two *forms* or *characters*, and not that there is a *single* entity *with two forms*; and that for the simple reason that the characters of *being one* and *being many* are mutually contradictory and preclusive.—(326)

As regards *Narasimha*, he is one only and is not regarded as of 'dual form',—this is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (327).

Narasimha ALSO CANNOT BE *one* AND ALSO OF 'DUAL NATURE'; AS HE IS PERCEIVED AS SUCH BECAUSE HE IS AN AGGREGATE OF MANY ATOMS.—(327)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by '*also*' is that it is not only the thing under dispute that cannot be 'of dual form'. '*He*'—i.e. *Narasinha*—'*as such*', through the diverse character of the parts of his body, and also through His occupying larger space; otherwise He would not appear as He does. If even a small part—of the size of the fly's leg—of His body were concealed, He would be hidden to that extent.

This same argument also sets aside the fact of His being of the Colour of the Emerald.

All this we are going to explain in detail under the chapter on 'The *Refutation* of the Composite Whole'.

End of Chapter on the *Jaina* 'Doctrine of the Soul'.

CHAPTER VII.

SECTION (E).

The 'Advaita' Doctrine of the Soul.

COMMENTARY.

Others, upholding the *Advaita* (Monistic) system of Philosophy, who are followers of the *Upaniṣads*, postulate the 'Soul' to be *Eternal, One* and of the nature of Consciousness, which appears in the form of the illusory modifications of Earth etc.—This is the view set forth in the following Texts.—

TEXT (328).

OTHERS ASSERT THAT—"THE EARTH, FIRE, WATER ETC. ARE THE ILLUSORY MODIFICATIONS OF ETERNAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THIS IS WHAT CONSTITUTES THE 'SOUL'."—(328)

COMMENTARY.

This is what constitutes the Soul—That is, the Soul is of the nature of one Eternal Consciousness of which Earth etc. are illusory modifications. —'*Others*'—i.e. the followers of the *Upaniṣads.*—(328)

Question :—'What is the proof of this ?'—The answer is given in the following—

TEXT (329).

"THERE IS NOTHING IN THIS WORLD WHICH IS ENDOWED WITH THE CHARACTER OF *apprehensibility* ; AND ALL THIS IS HELD TO BE THE ILLUSORY MODIFICATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS."—(329)

COMMENTARY.

Apart from Consciousness (Cognition), Earth etc. are not found to fulfil the conditions of 'apprehensibility';—whereby they could appear (be perceived) as composites;—and Atoms do not exist (for the *Vedāntin*) ; hence, by implication, it is concluded that Earth etc. are merely so many reflections in Consciousness.

'*This*'—i.e. Earth and the rest.—(329)

The above view of the *Vedāntin* is controverted in the following—

TEXTS (330-331)

THE ERROR IN THE VIEW OF THESE PHILOSOPHERS IS A SLIGHT ONE,—DUE ONLY TO THE ASSERTION OF ETERNALITY (OF COGNITION); AS DIVERSITY IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED IN THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND AND OTHER THINGS.—IF ALL THESE COGNITIONS WERE ONE, THEN, COLOUR, SOUND, TASTE AND OTHER THINGS WOULD BE COGNISABLE ALL AT ONCE; AS IN AN ETERNAL ENTITY THERE CAN BE NO DIFFERENT STATES.—(330-331)

COMMENTARY.

'*The error is a slight one*';—as they postulate only Cognition (Consciousness, as the only entity), which is quite reasonable.

"If that is so, then what is even the 'slight error' in their view?"

It is *due to the assertion of 'eternality'*.

"But why should not the acceptance of 'eternality' be reasonable?"

Answer—Diversity is clearly perceived etc. etc.;—'Eternality' connotes *remaining in the same state always*, and 'non-eternality' connotes *not remaining in the same state always*; and as a matter of fact, the Cognition that manifests (apprehends) Colour, Sound and other things is not found to be *in one and the same state always*;—actually it appears at one time as manifesting *Colour* and at another time, as manifesting Sound and other things, in a certain order of sequence. Under the circumstances, if all these things, Sound and the rest, were manifested by a single Eternal Cognition, then all of them would appear (be Cognised) simultaneously, like the bedspread of variegated colours; as the Cognition manifesting them would (*ex hypothesi*) be always there.

It may be held that "the Cognition of Sound and other things are different 'states' of it appearing one after the other,—so that the apprehension of Sound etc. could not be simultaneous".

The answer to this is—'*In an Eternal Entity there can be no different states*';—because the 'states' are not different from the Entity to which they belong; so that the Entity to which the states belong would be liable to 'production and destruction',—appearance and disappearance,—in the same way as the *States* are liable; or, conversely, the states also would be *eternal*, like the Entity to which they belong.—If, on the other hand, the states are different from the entity to which they belong, then there can be no idea of the states belonging to this entity; as there is no benefit conferred by the one on the other; and this alternative (of the states being different from the Cognitions) would also be contrary to the doctrine that the eternal Cognition is the only one Entity.—(330–331)

Further, if the Eternal Cognition existed, it could be known either through Perception or through Inference; that it cannot be known through Perception is shown in the following—

TEXT (332).

COGNITION OR CONSCIOUSNESS IS NEVER APPREHENDED AS ANYTHING DISTINCT FROM THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR AND OTHER THINGS; AND INASMUCH AS THESE LATTER UNDERGO VARIATIONS EVERY MOMENT, WHAT REMAINS THERE THAT COULD BE LASTING (PERMANENT, ETERNAL) ?—(332)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, apart from the Cognitions of Colour etc., which appear one after the other, we do not apprehend any lasting Consciousness, eternal and one,—whereby it could be held to be known through Perception.—Then, inasmuch as it is well known that the Cognitions of Colour and other things are apprehended one after the other, and are destroyed every moment —it has to be explained what remains there that is non-different from those Cognitions ? Thus, inasmuch as there is no apprehension of any such Cognition, which would be apprehended if it were there,—it cannot but be regarded as 'non-existent'. This is what the Text means.

Nor can it be held that the said Eternal Cognition is known through *Inference*. Because such an Inference would be based either upon the nature of the Cognition itself, or upon that of its effects. It cannot be the former, as there is nothing which can prove that such is the *nature* of the said Eternal Cognition; on the contrary, there is Perception itself which precludes any such notion.

Thus the doctrine that 'the world is the illusory modification of the Eternal Consciousness' is not right.—(332)

Then again, under this doctrine, the notions of 'Bondage' and 'Liberation' are not possible.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (333).

THERE CAN BE NO DISTINCTION IN COGNITION AS 'WRONG' AND 'RIGHT' —IF THE 'SOUL' CONSISTS OF A SINGLE (ETERNAL) COGNITION; HOW THEN CAN THERE BE ANY 'BONDAGE' AND 'LIBERATION' ?—(333)

COMMENTARY.

For one who holds the view that—Cognition is in perpetual flux, different with different persons, undergoing variations in a series,—the notion of 'Bondage and Liberation' is quite reasonable, as being due to the coming about of a series of cognitions, wrong and right; and through the practice of *yoga*, gradually purer and purer Cognitions coming about, the series of *impure* cognitions cease and the final Aim (of Liberation) is attained; and thus the attempt at Liberation becomes fruitful.—For you, on the other hand,

the 'Soul' is of the nature of *one Eternal Cognition ;* how then can there be any 'Bondage' and 'Liberation' for such a Soul ? Because if the *one Cognition* is eternally *wrong,* then, as there could be no other state for it, there could be no possibility of 'Liberation'; on the other hand, if the one Cognition were eternally *right,* then as it would be always pure, there could be no 'Bondage'.—As regards our doctrine, the Cognition is held to be defective (wrong) or pure (right), in accordance with the varying character of the Series (in which it appears), and hence the notion of 'Bondage and Liberation' is entirely reasonable. This has been thus declared—'Cognition is defective and free from defects, beset with impurities and free from impurities ; if it were never *impure,* then all embodied beings would be always *liberated ;* if it were never *pure,* then the attempt to secure Liberation would be fruitless'. —(333)

If it be held that 'Bondage and Liberation are only *assumed, not real*';—then it becomes necessary to explain the basis of this *assumption.* What this basis is under the doctrine of 'Cognitions being non-eternal' has been shown above. Thus the Effort —in the form of the contemplation of Truth, —that you put forth for the attaining of the 'Ultimate Aim' and for passing beyond the cycle of Birth and Death, can only lead to futile fatigue.—This is shown in the following—

TEXTS (334-335).

WHAT COULD THE MYSTIC SET ASIDE OR ACCOMPLISH BY THE PRACTICE OF *Yoga* ? WHAT TOO IS THERE THAT COULD BE REJECTED ? AS *Wrong Cognition* ALSO IS OF THE NATURE OF THE SAME (ETERNAL COGNITION).—THE *Knowledge of Truth* ALSO CANNOT BE SOMETHING TO BE BROUGHT ABOUT ; AS, BEING OF THE NATURE OF COGNITION, IT IS ALWAYS THERE.—SO THAT THE ENTIRE *Practice of Yoga* ALSO IS ENTIRELY FRUITLESS.—(334-335)

COMMENTARY

If, by the contemplation of Truth, the Mystic could set aside, or bring about, anything, then his Effort would be fruitful. As it is however, he can never set aside Wrong Cognition, because *it is of the nature of the same,*—i.e. of the nature of *Eternal Cognition.*—*For the same reason it cannot be rejected ;* because what is eternal cannot be destructible and hence its rejection is impossible.—How can the *Yogin* accomplish—bring about—the *Knowledge of Truth* ? Being of the nature of *Eternal Cognition,* the *Knowledge of Truth* would be always there.—Thus the doctrine in question cannot be right.—(334–335)

CHAPTER VII.

SECTION (F).

The Doctrine of 'Soul' according to Vātsīputrīyas.

COMMENTARY.

The Author proceeds to refute the doctrine of '*Pudgala*' (Soul) set up by the *Vātsīputrīyas.*

TEXT (336).

SOME PEOPLE WHO REGARD THEMSELVES AS '*Bauddhas*' DESCRIBE THE *Soul* BY THE NAME OF '*Pudgala*', AND DECLARE IT TO BE NEITHER THE SAME AS, NOR DIFFERENT FROM—(THE *Skandhas*, THOUGHT-PHASES).—(336)

COMMENTARY.

'Some people',—the *Vātsiputrīyas.*—Though these people regard themselves as '*Saugatas*',—sons of *Sugata,* Buddha,—yet, under the pretended name of '*Pudgala*', they postulate the 'Soul', which cannot be said to be either the 'same as', or 'different from', the 'thought-phases'. The question arising as to how persons, who admit their being 'Sons' of the Blessed Buddha who has taught the doctirne of 'No-Soul', have wedded themselves to a false view of 'Soul',—the Author answers it in a joking spirit, by the term '*who regard themselves as Bauddhas*',

The character of the 'Soul' is held to be as follows :—(*a*) He who is the doer of the diverse good and bad deeds, (*b*) the enjoyer of the agreeable and disagreeable fruits of his deeds, and (*c*) who moves from the point of the abandonment of the preceding Thought-phase to the point of the assuming of another Thought-phase, and is also the Experiencer,—is the *Soul.*—All this is held to be true (by the *Vātsīputrīyas*) of their '*Pudgala*' also; the only difference is in regard to the name.—(336)

Question :—What is the reason for regarding the *Pudgala* as 'incapable of being spoken of' (either as the same as, or as different from, the *Thought-phases*) ?

The answer is given in the following—

TEXT (337).

THE '*Pudgala*' CANNOT BE SPOKEN OF AS 'DIFFERENT' FROM THE *Thought-phases,*—AS IN THAT CASE THIS DOCTRINE WOULD BE THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE '*Tairthika Philosophers*';—NOR CAN IT BE SPOKEN OF AS THE 'SAME' (NON-DIFFERENT); AS, IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS 'MORE THAN ONE' (MANY) AND SO FORTH;—HENCE IT IS BEST TO REGARD IT AS 'INCAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF' (AS EITHER THE ONE OR THE OTHER).—(337)

COMMENTARY

If the *Pudgala* were held to be different from the *Thought-phases,*—then it would come to be the view of the 'Soul' propounded by the *Tairthika Philosophers,*—which would mean the acceptance of the doctrine of the *Eternal* 'Soul'; and it is not possible (as shown above) for the Eternal Soul to be the *doer* and the *enjoyer*, because it is always undifferentiated, like *Ākāsha;* and the Blessed Lord also has denied the *Eternal* Soul; whose words—'all entities are devoid of the Soul'—would thus become contradicted.

"In that case, the *Pudgala* may be regarded as *non-different* from the Thought-phases".

Nor can it be spoken of as 'non-different' from the Thought-phases.—If the *Thought-phases,* Colour and the rest, were the *Pudgala,* then, as it would be non-different from many *Thought-phases,* the *Pudgala* itself would have to be regarded as *many,*—like the various forms of the *Thought-phases;* and the *Pudgala* is held to be *one;* as has been asserted in the sentence—'The *Pudgala* is one, and is born in the world as one; and so also the *Tathāgata*'.—The phrase '*and so forth*' is meant to include 'non-enternality' and such other characters.—Under the circumstances, the *Pudgala* would be something liable to destruction, like the *Thought-phases;* which would mean that there is 'destruction of what has been done' [i.e. there would be no accruing of the fruit of one's deeds to the man, who would be disappearing every moment]; and the Blessed Lord has rejected the doctrine of the absolute destruction of things.—From all this it follows that the *Pudgala* is 'incapable of being spoken of' (either as the same as, or as different from, the Thought-phases).—(337)

The following Text proceeds to show that like other things, the *Pudgala* also cannot be regarded as *existing,* because it is *incapable of being spoken of;*—this conclusion being deducible from your own words:—

TEXT (338).

THESE PEOPLE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT (ACCORDING TO WHAT THEY HAVE SAID), THE *Pudgala* CANNOT BE REGARDED AS *existing* IN REALITY ;—BECAUSE IT IS INCAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF EITHER AS THE SAME OR AS DIFFERENT (FROM THOUGHT-PHASES) ;—JUST LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS' AND SUCH NON-ENTITIES.—(338)

COMMENTARY

The argument may be formulated as follows :—That which is incapable of being spoken of either as the same as, or as different from, a thing cannot be an entity,—as the sky-lotus ;—and the *Pudgala* is (*ex hypothesi*) incapable of being so spoken of ;—hence the wider character being absent (the narrower character must be absent) ; the corroborative instance *per dissimilarity* is supplied by Feelings etc.—(338)

Question—'How is the invariable concomitance (Premiss) urged here arrived at ?'

The answer is provided by the following—

TEXT (339).

A THING CANNOT ESCAPE BEING EITHER 'SAME AS' OR 'DIFFERENT FROM', ANOTHER THING ; IN FACT, IT IS ONLY WHAT IS ENTIRELY FORMLESS THAT CAN BE REGARDED AS 'INCAPABLE OF BEING SO SPOKEN OF'.—(339)

COMMENTARY

A thing cannot escape from being either the same as, or different from another thing,—as there is no other third alternative possible. If that were not so, then Colour and the rest also would be 'incapable of being spoken of' (either as the same as or different from one another).—It is for this reason that it is only what, by its very nature, is *formless* that is regarded as 'incapable of being spoken of',—not so any Entity.—(339)

"How is that" ?

The answer is given in the following—

TEXTS (340-342).

IT IS ONLY AN ENTITY THAT CAN BE LIABLE TO THE ALTERNATIVES OF BEING 'DIFFERENT' OR 'NON-DIFFERENT'; HENCE IT IS ONLY IN REGARD TO *things that are formless* (I.E. NON-ENTITIES) THAT IT CAN BE CORRECT NOT TO SPEAK OF THEM EITHER AS 'DIFFERENT' OR 'NON-DIFFERENT' (FROM ONE ANOTHER);—NOT SO IN REGARD TO AN *entity*;—BECAUSE IN THE CASE OF THE DENIAL '*this* IS NOT WHAT *that* IS,—LIKE A DIFFERENT THING',—IT IS *difference* THAT IS CLEARLY SPOKEN OF;—SIMILARLY WHEN THERE IS DENIAL '*this* IS NOT WHAT *that* IS NOT', WHAT IS CLEARLY SPOKEN OF IS *non-difference* (BETWEEN THE TWO); THUS IT IS THAT AN ENTITY CAN NEVER ESCAPE FROM BEING EITHER *different* OR *non-different* FROM ANOTHER ENTITY.—(340–342)

COMMENTARY

As a matter of fact, an *Entity* alone can be the substratum of *difference* and *non-difference*; —never a *non-entity*; hence the non-mention of both *difference* and *non-difference* is possible only in regard to things that are *formless*,—i.e. have no character of their own; such non-mention is not right in regard to an *Entity*;—such is the construction of the sentence; and the reason for this lies in the fact that no third alternative is possible.

"Why is no third alternative possible?"

Answer:—Because in the case of the denial etc. etc.;—that is, when there is the denial, 'The *Pudgala* is not of the nature of Colour and other things', what is mentioned is the *difference* of the *Pudgala* from Colour and other things; because the denial of the fact of one thing being the same as another is invariably concomitant with the affirmation of a different character for the former. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is devoid of the character of another thing, it is *different* from it,—e.g. *Colour* is different from *Feeling*;—the entity named '*Pudgala*' is devoid of the character of Colour and the rest; hence this is a reason (for its being regarded as *different* from them) based upon the nature of things.—*Similarly where there is denial 'this is not what that is'*,—i.e. the denial of its not being of the same character as the other thing,—what is meant is its *non-difference* from that thing; because the denial of a real Entity being different from another thing is invariably concomitant with the affirmation of its being the same as that thing; if it were not so,—and no character is affirmed regarding that thing,—then all character being denied of it, it would become a *non-entity*; because a *non-entity* is characterised by the denial of all character in regard to it. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is denied the character of being something other than another thing, it must be the same as this latter,—just as Colour is denied the character of being something different from itself;—the *Pudgala* (according to the opposite party) is denied the character of being something other than *Colour* and the rest; hence this is a reason (for its being regarded as non-different from the latter) based upon the nature of things.—Thus we conclude that an Entity cannot escape from the alternatives of being different or non-different from another thing;

so that the Premiss of our main reason (against the doctrine of the *Vātsīputrīyas*) is fully established.—(340–342)

It has thus been proved that, under the theory of its being 'incapable of being spoken of', the *Pudgala* can have an existence only in imagination. The author now proceeds to clinch the argument by showing that if the *Pudgala* is regarded as an entity, it cannot be right to regard it as 'incapable of being spoken of'; otherwise the conclusion would be contrary to your own assertion—

TEXT (343).

YOUR WORDS THAT "THE *Pudgala* IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE THOUGHT-PHASES' ARE A CLEAR ASSERTION OF ITS *non-difference*; WHILE THE WORDS 'THE *Thought-phase* IS NOT THE *Pudgala*' CLEARLY ASSERTS ITS *difference*.—(343)

COMMENTARY

Further, when you assert that 'the *Pudgala* is incapable of being spoken of', you loudly proclaim quite clearly that the *Pudgala* is different from the *Thought-phases*. This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (344).

THE PRESENCE OF CONTRARY PROPERTIES IS SPOKEN OF AS CONSTITUTING 'DIFFERENCE' AMONG ENTITIES; IS THERE NO SUCH 'DIFFERENCE' BETWEEN THE *Pudgala* AND THE *Thought-phases*?—(344)

COMMENTARY

This argument may be formulated as follows:—Where two things are possessed of properties that are mutually exclusive, they must be *different* from one another,—e.g. between Colour and Feeling, the former being endowed with material shape and the latter being devoid of material shape;—*Pudgala* and *Thought-phase* are (according to you) possessed by such mutually exclusive properties as 'capable of being spoken of' and 'incapable of being spoken of'; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding the two as *different*).—(344)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that the reason here put forward is not 'unproven':—

TEXT (345).

FOR INSTANCE, THE *Pudgala* IS SAID TO BE '*incapable* OF BEING SPOKEN OF' AS DIFFERENT OR NON-DIFFERENT FROM FEELING AND THE REST, WHILE COLOUR, NAME AND OTHER THINGS ARE SAID TO BE '*capable* OF BEING SPOKEN OF' AS DIFFERENT FROM THEM.—(345)

COMMENTARY

That is to say, the *Pudgala* is said to be '*incapable* of being spoken of' as different or non-different from Feeling, Name and the rest; while Colour,

Name, and the rest are spoken of as quite '*capable* of being spoken of' as *different* from each other ; so that our Reason is not 'unproven'.—(345)

The following Text shows another reason why the presence of contradictory properties in the two (*Pudgala* and *Colour, etc.*) must be admitted :—

TEXT (346).

THE 'COLOUR-PHASE' AND THE REST ARE HELD TO BE 'CAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF' AS 'NON-ETERNAL'; WHILE THE *Pudgala* IS NOT SO ; SO THAT THERE IS A CLEAR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO.—(346)

COMMENTARY

The assertion that 'all impressions are non-eternal' shows that *Colour and the rest* are quite 'capable of being spoken of' as 'non-eternal'; while the *Pudgala* is not held to be so 'capable of being spoken of' as 'non-eternal'; on the ground that it is entirely 'incapable of being spoken of' (as anything at all).

Nor is our Reason 'inconclusive'; because all idea of 'difference' is based upon the said fact (of the presence of contradictory properties) ; if it were not so, then the whole Universe would be a single Entity ; which would mean the possibility of all things being produced and destroyed simultaneously.—(346)

The *Pudgala* is a non-entity, not only on account of its being 'incapable of being spoken of as different or non-different from Colour etc.', as explained above,—but it is a non-entity for the following reason also, on account of its being 'incapable of being spoken of as *non-eternal*';—this is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (347).

Capacity for effective action IS THE DIFFERENTIA OF THE *Existence* (OF A THING) ; AND SUCH *Capacity* IS RESTRICTED TO MOMENTARY ENTITIES ONLY ; HENCE IF ANYTHING IS 'INCAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF (AS *momentary*)', IT CANNOT BE AN *existent* ENTITY.—(347)

COMMENTARY

What characterises 'Existence', the nature of an 'Entity,' is *Capacity for effective action* ;—as a matter of fact, a *non-entity* is characterised by the *absence of all Capacity ;* which implies that *Capacity for effective action*

is the only characteristic of an *Entity*. *This Capacity is restricted to momentary Entities only* ;—that is, it is invariably concomitant with *momentariness* ; specially as any effective action would be impossible for an *Eternal* Entity, whose activities could not be either successive or simultaneous. So that, if the *Pudgala* is 'incapable of being spoken of as *momentary*',—then it cannot have the nature of an 'Entity'; as the more extensive character of 'momentariness' is absent in it ;—just as the absence of the character of 'Tree' means the absence of the character of the '*Shimshapā*' (a particular tree). This is what has been thus declared :—'That which is incapable of being spoken of as *non-eternal* cannot be the cause of anything.'

The following might be urged :—"If the *Pudgala* were *eternal*, then Effective Activity would be incompatible as, being neither successive nor simultaneous ;—but as a matter of fact, it is as 'incapable of being spoken of' *as non-eternal* as it is of being spoken of as *eternal* ; so that effective action cannot be incompatible with it."

This is not right ; there can be no entity with a specific individuality which is devoid of both these characters (of *eternality* and *non-eternality*) ; as 'eternal' and 'non-eternal' are mutually exclusive (and contradictory) terms ; so that in any entity, the absence or presence of one of these must mean the presence or absence (respectively) of the other.

We are not objecting to the application of the term 'incapable of being spoken of', to the *Pudgala* ; because the applying of names to things depends entirely upon the wish of the speaker, and as such, cannot be objected to by anyone. What we are doing however is to examine the nature of the 'Entity',—is this nature always present in the thing called '*Pudgala*', or not ? If it *is* present, then the thing must be *eternal*, because 'eternality' consists in nothing else except that character which is always present and is never destroyed ;—and it is only a thing having this character that is called 'Eternal'; as has been declared in the words—'The learned call that thing *Eternal* which, in its own form, is never destroyed'.—If, on the other hand, the other view be held, that the said nature is not always present in the *Pudgala*,—then the *Pudgala* must be *non-eternal* ; as the only characteristic of the *non-eternal* thing is that it should not be *lasting* (permanent).—Thus then there being no other alternative apart from being 'momentary' (*non-eternal*) or 'non-momentary' (*eternal*),—and effective activity—either successive or simultaneous—being incompatible for the *non-momentary* (Eternal) Entity, the *Existence* of a thing must be invariably concomitant with 'momentariness'; so that if 'momentariness' is absent in the *Pudgala*, 'Existence' also must be absent,—and it becomes established that it is *non-existent*.—(347)

Says the *Jaina* :—"If it is so, and if the *Pudgala* does not exist at all,—then how is it that the Blessed Lord (*Buddha*) when asked—as to whether the Living Entity is *this* and the Body is *that*,—the *Living Entity* being different from the *Body*,—said 'this has not been explained' ?—Why did he not say straight away that *there is no such thing* as the *Living Entity* (Soul) ?"

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (348)

GREAT MEN HAVE SUCCESSFULLY EXPLAINED ALL THOSE CASES WHERE THERE IS CONFLICT BETWEEN 'SCRIPTURE' AND THE REAL STATE OF THINGS. IN FACT THE DIVERSE TEACHINGS OF THE MERCIFUL ONE ARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF REBUTTING 'UNBELIEF' (*Nāstikya*).—(348)

COMMENTARY

If there were such an *object* as the '*Pudgala*', then alone could it have deserved an explanation as to whether it is different or non-different (like other things); as a matter of fact, however, the *object* itself has not been proved; how then could its character be explained? An absolute non-entity, as the 'Hare's horn' can have no *sharpness* or other properties, which could be explained. Hence while propounding the notion that the *Pudgala* has only an *ideal* (imaginary) *existence*, the Blessed Lord said 'it has not been explained'.

He did not declare straight away that 'it does not exist', because the question had not been asked about the nature of the *object* itself [the question having been only about its difference or non-difference from the Body].

Or it may be that, even though the thing had a merely 'ideal' existence, He wished to avoid the extreme view that 'it does not exist';—in consideration of the welfare of such disciples as were not yet fit for receving the extreme Doctrine of the 'Void' (Nihilism), He did not say that 'the *Soul* or *Pudgala* does not exist.'—It has been thus declared :—'Noting the difference between the *Tusker* and the *Tusk*, and the destruction of Actions, the *Jinas* propound the *Dharma*,—on the analogy of the Tigress' Cub (?).'—In this way have *Vasubandhu* and other teachers succeeded in disclosing the real import of the teachings in such works as the *Koshaparamārthasaptati* and the rest; hence it should be learnt from those works. In the present context the details are not written down for fear of becoming too prolix.

"If that is so"—says the opponent—"how do you construe the assertion that 'there is *existence* which proves it'?"

The answer is—'*For the purpose of rebutting unbelief etc. etc.*'—There are divine teachings of the Merciful One which speak of '*sattva*' and '*astitva*' (Existence),—*which are not incompatible* (with the Buddhist doctrine);—this has to be taken as understood. The 'mental series' in which the 'idea of existence' appears,—it is with reference to the non-cessation (continuity) of *that* series, that the Blessed Lord has said 'there is existence'. If he had not done so, then there would be an idea that even those 'Impressions' do not exist in the cause-effect-chain of whose 'moments' there has been no break,—which would mean that things of the 'other world' do not exist,—and this would demolish the whole idea of the 'other world', and the disciples would become inclined to 'unbelief'. [The form '*Nāstikya*' here is used in the old sense of the idea that there is no such thing as the 'Soul' or the 'other world.']—(348)

The following argument has been urged by the *opponent*:—" It has been declared by the Blessed Lord as follows—' O *Bhikkhus,* I am describing to you the *Burden,* the *Taking up of the Burden,* the *Throwing up of the Burden* and the *Bearer of the Burden*; the term ' burden ' stands for the five constituent thought-phases, the 'taking up of the Burden ' for satisfaction (pleasure), the ' throwing up of the Burden ' for Liberation, and the ' Bearer of the Burden ' for the *Pudgalas* '.—Now, how do you explain this ? Certainly the ' Bearer of the Burden ' cannot be the same as the ' Burden ' itself."

The answer to this is supplied by the following—

TEXT (349)

THE MENTION OF THE ' BEARER OF THE BURDEN ' AND SO FORTH IS MADE WITH THE *Aggregates,* ETC. IN MIND ; AS REGARDS THE PARTICULAR DENIAL,—THAT IS OF USE AGAINST THOSE WHO HOLD THOSE VIEWS.—(349)

COMMENTARY.

The *Thought-phases* that appear at the same time, when meant to be spoken of collectively, come to be called ' aggregates ' ; when these appear at the same time, in the form of Cause and Effect, they come to be called a ' series ' or ' Chain ' ; and when they are used as the basis of conception as a single concept, they come to be called by such names as ' members of the Series ' and ' Components of the aggregate ' ;—and it was with these ' aggregates ' in mind that the Teacher spoke of the ' Bearer of the Burden ' ; and there is thus no incongruity in this.

The term ' *etc.*' in the expression ' *aggregates, etc.*' includes the *Series* and the term ' *and so forth* ' in the phrase ' *Bearer of the Burden and so forth* ' stands for the *Burden* and the rest.

Thus then, those same *Thought-phases* which are spoken of as ' aggregate,' ' series ' and the like, are spoken of as ' the *Pudgala,* the Bearer of the Burden ', as in common parlance it is this to which the name ' *Pudgala* ' is applied. It is for this reason that the Blessed Lord has described the *Pudgala* in the following words :—' What is *Pudgala,* the Bearer of the Burden ' ?—having asked thus, He goes on—' It is that which, O Long-lived one, bears such and such a name, belongs to such and such a caste, to such and such a clan, takes such and such food, feels such and such pleasures and pains, and lives so long '. Thus being of the nature of the ' aggregate of thought-phases ', the *Pudgala* should be understood to be only *ideally existent,* and not as an Eternal Substance, as postulated by others ;—it was with a view to show this that the Lord used the above words. It has to be accepted as true ; otherwise, as the ' Burden ', etc. also have been spoken of as something different from the *Thought-phases,* (in the passage under reference), these also, like the *Pudgala,* would have to be regarded as not included among the *Thought-phases.* Thus it is clear that those preceding *Thought-phases* themselves which operate

towards the bringing about of another succeeding *Thought-phase* have been spoken of as 'Burden',—those that are going to appear as the result have been spoken of as the 'Bearer of the Burden'. So that the passage quoted does not warrant the conclusion desired by the Opponent.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows :—[This is a clear reference to *Nyāya-vārtika* 3-1. 1, page 341, but the passage found extends only up to the words '*naiva tvamasi*', in line 26, of the present text]— "One who does not admit the 'Soul' cannot make sense out of the words of the *Buddha* who has declared —'O *Bhadanta*, I am not *Colour*, I am not Feeling, Name, Impression or Cognition, O *Bhadanta* ; similarly O *Bhikṣu*, you are not Colour, or Feeling, Name, Impression, or Cognition, you are not, O *Bhadanta*' —here Colour and the other *Thought-phases* have been denied to be the object of 'I-consciousness', this denial is particular, not *Universal* ; while one who denies the 'Soul' should assert the denial in the Universal form 'I am not—you are not'. A particular *denial* always implies a corresponding particular *affirmation* ; e.g. when it is said 'I do not see with my left eye', it is clearly implied that 'I do see with my right Eye' ; if the man did not see with the right Eye also, then the mention of the qualification 'left' in the former assertion would be useless ; the assertion should have been in the general form 'I do not see'. Similarly in the case in question when it is said '*Colour* is not the Soul, *Cognition* is not the Soul', it becomes implied that the Soul *is* and it is something different from these (Colour, Cognition, and the rest). It may be 'incapable of being spoken of' or anything else, but in any case the *Soul* is there."

It is in answer to this that the Text adds—'*As regards the particular denial, etc.*'.—That is to say, the mountain of the doctrine of the extant Soul propounded by evil-minded persons has risen up with twenty peaks,—such as 'Colour is Soul, Cognition is Soul, the Soul has Colour, the Soul has Cognition, Colour subsists in the Soul, Cognition subsists in the Soul' and so forth. —It is as against the first five of these views that the denial *has its use as against persons who hold those views.* The term '*Taddṛṣṭīn*' means those who hold the view that 'Colour is Soul' and so forth. What is denied in the assertion (made by our Teacher) is exactly those points where the foolish-minded persons might have their doubts ; and it is not intended to *affirm* anything. Otherwise, by saying what could not benefit His hearers, the Expounder would prove himself to be lacking in intelligence.—(349)

End of the section on the Vātsīputrīyas' doctrine of 'Soul'.

CHAPTER VIII

Examination of the Doctrine of the Permanence of Things.

COMMENTARY.

The Author has spoken of his doctrine (in the opening lines of his Introduction) as 'mobile', 'impermanent'. The following Texts proceed with the proof in support of this :—

TEXT (350-351)

OR, ALL THIS EFFORT (TO REFUTE THE VARIOUS DOCTRINES REGARDING THE ORIGIN OF THE WORLD) IS MADE NEEDLESSLY ; AS ALL SUCH DOCTRINES ARE REALLY SET ASIDE BY THE WELL-ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE OF THE 'PERPETUAL FLUX' OF THINGS.— HENCE IT IS THIS 'PERPETUAL FLUX' THAT IS GOING TO BE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FOR THE REFUTATION OF ALL THAT HAS BEEN REFERRED TO ABOVE AND ALL SUCH THINGS AS THE 'UNIVERSAL' AND THE LIKE WHICH ARE GOING TO BE MENTIONED LATER ON,— A REFUTATION THAT IS APPLIED EQUALLY TO ALL THOSE DOCTRINES.— (350-351)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, by establishing the *Perpetual Flux* of things, all the various entities postulated by others,—such as those of 'Primordial Matter' 'God' and the like—become discarded at a single stroke ; under the circumstances, all the effort that we have put forth in the above extensive portions of our work, towards the setting forth in detail of the several doctrines and refuting them, is practically useless ; that is to say, all these are refuted by the much simpler method (of establishing the *Perpetual Flux*). That is to say, 'Primordial Matter' and the rest are not held by others to be undergoing destruction immediately on appearance, or to be liable to absolute destruction ; hence by the establishing of the doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux' which includes all things, all those postulated entities become set aside ; holding this opinion as we do, we proceed to establish this 'Perpetual Flux' with special care,— for the purpose of discarding (*a*) all those doctrines that have been discussed so far,—beginning with 'Primordial Matter' and ending with '*Pudgala*',— and (*b*) all those that are going to be discussed later on,—such as the 'Universal', 'Quality', 'Substance', etc., Words and their denotation, the Means

and the Objects of Right Cognition, the Thing of Variegated Character coloured with the various tints of the Emerald, etc., an Entity continuing during all these points of time, the four Elemental Substances postulated by the *Chārvāka* and the Materialists, and the Mass of Words (Veda) posited by the followers of Jaimini.

'*Clearly*',—because for the proof set forth, there is a Reason that satisfies all the three conditions of the *valid Probans.*

What is meant by this is that in reality, the whole purpose of our philosophy reaches its culminating point in this examination of the '*Permanent Character*' *of things.*—(350–351)

The Author proceeds to show how this *Perpetual Flux* is established :—

TEXT (352)

SOME PEOPLE HOLD THAT THERE ARE TWO CLASSES OF THINGS—*Created* AND *Uncreated* ; OTHERS HAVE HELD THAT THE TWO CLASSES OF THINGS ARE *Momentary* AND *Non-momentary.*—(352)

COMMENTARY.

In this connection, the followers of *Nyāya* and others do not regard anything as 'momentary', and they hold that there are *two classes of things* in the shape of 'Created' and 'Uncreated'; among things some are 'created',—as the jar and the rest, while some are 'uncreated'—as the Atom, *Ākāsha*, etc.

Others however,—like *Vātsīputrīyas*—hold that there is a further classification of things under the two heads of 'momentary' and 'non-momentary'; that is, according to these people, such things as Cognition, Sound, Light-rays, are 'momentary', while such things as Earth and *Ākāsha* are 'non-momentary'.—(352)

Such being the diversity among the various views, the Author first of all proceeds to set forth reasonings in support of the 'Perpetual Flux' of those things that are held to be 'Created',—which thus form the 'Subject' of the Reasoning set forth :—

TEXT (353)

AMONG THESE, ALL THOSE THINGS THAT ARE 'CREATED' ARE IN 'PERPETUAL FLUX',—BECAUSE, AS REGARDS THEIR DESTRUCTION, ALL OF THEM ARE ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT.—(353)

COMMENTARY.

As regards their destruction, things are independent of other Causes.—This briefly indicates the Reason which fulfills all the three conditions of the Valid Probans.—(353)

This reason is more clearly stated in the following—

TEXTS (354-355)

WHEN A CERTAIN THING DOES NOT NEED ANY OTHER CAUSE FOR THE BRINGING ABOUT OF A CERTAIN CONDITION, THAT CONDITION SHOULD BE REGARDED AS ATTACHING TO IT PERMANENTLY,— BECAUSE, OUT OF ITS OWN CAUSES, THAT THING APPEARS IN THAT CONDITION ;—JUST AS THE CAUSAL CONDITIONS ARE INDEPENDENTLY, BY THEMSELVES, CAPABLE OF PRODUCING THEIR EFFECT ;—AND ALL THE THINGS THAT ARE PRODUCED ARE INDEPENDENT OF ALL ELSE IN THE MATTER OF THEIR DESTRUCTION.—(354-355)

COMMENTARY.

The argument is to be formulated as follows :—When certain things are independent in regard to a certain condition, they should be regarded as permanently attached to that condition :—as for example, the causal conditions that produce their effect immediately, are permanently restricted to those effects ;—*all things that are produced,*—i.e. all created things—are independent in regard to their destruction ; hence this is a natural reason (for concluding that they are permanently attached to this destruction).—'*Any other Cause*', —i.e. any cause other than that which has produced the thing itself.—The reason for this statement is added—*because out of its own causes, it appears in that form ;*—i.e. because it is produced in a form so permanently attached to the said condition.—When certain things are not permanently attached to a certain condition, they are not independent in regard to that condition ; as for instance, the *unbaked* jar in reference to the *Baking.* This forms the corroborative instance *per dissimilarity.*—(354-355)

Says the Opponent :—"The Reason put forward is *Inconclusive* : Even though things are independent regarding their destruction, yet it is quite possible that the destruction of a thing may come about at some other time and at some other place ; so that it cannot prove the *immediate destruction* of the thing, which is what is desired by the upholder of the 'Perpetual Flux', the doctrine of all things being 'momentary'."

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (356)

EVEN THOUGH INDEPENDENT, IF THE DESTRUCTION WERE TO COME AT ANOTHER PLACE AND TIME,—THEN, ON ACCOUNT OF ITS BEING DEPENDENT UPON THOSE, THE THING COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS 'INDEPENDENT'.—(356)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ēṣa*'—i.e. the Destruction.

'*On account of its being dependent upon those*'—i.e. dependent upon the other time and place.

If a certain thing being independent in regard to a certain condition, were to be in this condition only at a certain time and place,—then, as dependent upon that time and place, it would not be 'independent' at all. How then is there any 'inconclusiveness' in our Reason ? For instance, if a certain condition were to be present only at a certain time and place,—and never apart from these,—then, how could it be regarded as 'independent' ? As such existence itself would constitute its 'dependence'; which term cannot stand for 'desire', for the simple reason that the thing is devoid of all 'intention'.—(356)

"If then what is meant to be the reason is the fact of its being *entirely independent*,—then such a Reason is 'not proven', 'not admitted'; for instance, some things are dependent, for their destruction, upon such causes as the stroke of a Bludgeon—as in the case of things like the Jar. Even those things which,—like Cognition, Words, and the like,—are known to be 'independent',—though they do not depend, for their destruction, on any such cause as the stroke of a Bludgeon, yet they do depend upon the peculiarities of time and place. Thus the Reason, as put forward by the Buddhist, is entirely 'unproven'."

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (357)

ALL *produced things* ARE ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE INDEPENDENT IN REGARD TO THEIR DESTRUCTION ; AS IN THIS MATTER, ALL CAUSES OF DESTRUCTION ARE ENTIRELY INEFFICACIOUS.—(357)

COMMENTARY.

'*Always and everywhere*',—i.e. at all times and places,—the produced things are independent of the cause of their destruction ; because those that are not accepted as the cause of the destruction are *inefficacious*,—i.e. of no use ; and there can be no 'dependence' upon what is of no use,—it renders no help ;—as if there were, then it would lead to an absurdity.—(357)

The following Text shows why they are inefficacious :—

TEXT (358)

FOR INSTANCE, THE 'DESTRUCTIVE CAUSE' CANNOT BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS THE BRINGER ABOUT OF A 'DESTRUCTION' WHICH IS NOT-DIFFERENT FROM THE THING ITSELF ; AS THE POSITIVE THING IS PRODUCED FROM ITS OWN CAUSE.—(358)

COMMENTARY.

When the destruction is brought about—is it an *entity* or a *non-entity* ?—if it is an *entity*, then it must be brought about by the 'Cause of Destruction':—

now, would the destruction, as an entity, be brought about as something *not-different* from the thing that was the 'cause of the destruction' ? or as something *different* from that thing ? In regard to any existing entity, there can be only these two alternatives ; and only one of these two can be right ; both cannot be right ; nor can both be wrong ; as the denial of one character of a thing must always imply the affirmation of the contrary of that character, and the affirmation of the former must imply the denial of the latter ; and one and the same character cannot be both denied and affirmed, as has been explained above.

Of the two alternatives shown above, it cannot be right to hold that 'the Destruction, as an entity, is brought about as something *not-different* from the cause of that destruction' ; because that which is of the nature of a positive thing is always produced—born—from its own cause ; as that also, like the thing itself, is produced out of what is not-different from it ; and what has been already brought about cannot have another Cause ; as if it did have one, then there would be no end to the series of such causes.—(358)

The following might be urged :—"When the thing is born out of its cause, it is not in its complete form ; hence what it obtains from another cause is another character in the shape of 'Destruction'."

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (359)

WHEN A CERTAIN THING THAT COMES OUT OF ITS CAUSE IS WITHOUT PARTS,—THE 'DESTRUCTION' THAT WOULD BE IMPOSED UPON IT BY OTHER CAUSES MUST BE OF THE SAME NATURE.—(359)

COMMENTARY.

A single thing cannot have two *natures*, by virtue of which it could be produced in parts ; on the contrary, the thing is *without parts ;* and when a thing is produced from its Cause, it must be produced in its entire form ; how then can another nature be imposed upon it, later on, by other Causes ? In fact, what is not produced at the time that a thing is produced, cannot form the *nature* of that thing ; because 'non-difference', 'sameness', implies complete identity of condition. Hence that which comes about at a later time, in the form of 'Destruction', must be a different 'nature' (character) ; and how can this, which is thus *different*, belong to the thing itself ? Hence there is nothing in this theory.—(359)

If the other alternative be accepted that 'the Destruction produced is something *different* from the thing', even so, the cause of the destruction of the thing would be useless. This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (360-361)

IF THE DESTRUCTION THAT IS BROUGHT ABOUT IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE THING, THEN THERE IS NOTHING PRODUCED IN THE THING ITSELF BY THOSE OTHER CAUSES (OF THE SAID DESTRUCTION) ; SO THAT THE EFFECTS, LIKE THE APPREHENSION OF THE THING AND OTHER PHENOMENA, SHOULD CONTINUE AS BEFORE. AND AS THE THING CONTINUES TO REMAIN IN THE SAME CONDITION, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANY 'CONCEALMENT' ETC. OF IT. —(360-361)

COMMENTARY.

The bringing about of one thing cannot confer any benefit on another thing ; if it did, then this would lead to an absurdity. Nor can it be right to assert that 'the bringing about of the Destruction related to a thing helps the thing itself' ; because no relation is known to subsist between them. For instance, inasmuch as the two are, *ex hypothesi,* different, the relation between the two cannot be one of 'identity' ; nor can the relation be that of 'being produced from it', as the destruction is produced only from the 'Cause of destruction' ; and there can be no other real relation between the two. Even if there were some relation between the two, as the Thing is (*ex hypothesi*) an established positive entity, the apprehension and other effects produced by it must also be positive entities (and Destruction is not positive) :—In the compound '*Upalambhakāryādi*', the '*Upalambha*', 'Apprehension', itself is meant to be the '*Kārya*', 'effect' ; and the term '*ādi*', '*and the other phenomena*', is meant to include the *containing of water* (of the Jar), the *breaking of the thighs,* and so forth.

It might be argued that—"when the thing becomes concealed—or obstructed—by the destruction, which is something different from it, it ceases to produce such effects as its own apprehension and the like."

In answer to this it is added—'*As the thing continues to remain in the same condition, etc. etc.*'—Nothing is possible as a 'concealer' or 'obstructor' of a thing unless it removes its properties or does not produce them ; if it were, it would lead to absurdities. Hence it follows that, on account of its previous nature being unabandoned, unconcealed, and unobstructed, there can be no 'concealment' or 'obstruction' of the thing.—(360-361)

The following argument might be urged :—"It is not possible for the thing (whose destruction has been brought about) to bring about its apprehension and other phenomena ; because the destruction of the thing—being different from it,—has destroyed it."

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (362)

It is not true to assert that "The Thing is destroyed by another thing named 'Destruction'",—because the arguments based upon the alternatives of its being 'different' or 'non-different' and so forth are applicable, by implication, to such an assertion also.—(362)

COMMENTARY.

When the Destruction destroys the thing,—is the thing destroyed different or not-different (from the Destruction)? Or again, if it be asserted that 'it brings about that destruction of the thing which consists of its annihilation, like the Bludgeon and other things', the same alternatives may be put forward. And the objections urged above would all become applicable; as is going to be explained later on. This is what is meant by the sentence '*the arguments based, etc. etc.*'; i.e. even against the assertion that what is called 'destruction' brings about another destruction. '*Are applicable by implication*', i.e. the alternatives of being different or non-different and so forth are applicable to this also.

Thus it is established that the Destruction of a thing cannot be an *entity*, [the first alternative put forward above, under Text 358].—(362)

The following Text proceeds to show that the 'Destruction' of a thing cannot be of the nature of a *non-entity* :—

TEXTS (363-364)

If it be held that—"the 'Destruction' ('*Nāsha*') brought about is of the nature of the 'negation of entity', otherwise called 'Disruption', (*Pradhvamsa*'),—there can be no reasonable Cause for that also.—If Negation were an Effect, then it would be an *Entity*, like the sprout and other Effects; because while there is possibility of its being regarded as something '*not-produced*', it is found to come about through the potency of a Cause.—(363-364)

COMMENTARY.

What is brought about, produced, is always an *entity*, not a non-entity, because of the latter, which is of the nature of the absence of positive character that could be predicated of it, there is no form that could be *produced*.

Hence *what is of the nature of the negation of entity*, i.e. what consists of the denial of existence,—cannot be brought about by anything,—simply because it is a non-entity,—like the 'Hare's Horns'. Otherwise (if it were something *produced*) then it would be an 'effect', and as such an *entity*,—like the sprout and other effects. This argument may be formulated as follows:—What is an *effect* must be an *entity*, as the sprout and other things,—and Destruction is an effect (*ex hypothesi*), hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as an *effect*).

The author states the 'invariable concomitance' (Premiss) of this reasoning—*Because it is found to come about through the potency of a Cause.* As a matter of fact, that alone is said to be an 'effect' which acquires an accretion to its nature through the potency of a Cause; and it is only an *entity* that can acquire such accretion to its nature.

This point is not disputed even by the *Naiyāyika* and others: As these people also declare the character of the 'effect' to be either 'inherence in Being' or 'inherence in a Cause'; and *Destruction* cannot inhere either in Being or in its Cause; for, if it did, then, like Substance and other things, it would have to be regarded as a *substratum of 'existence'* (i.e. an *entity*).—(363-364)

Says the opponent—"If that is so, let the *Destruction* be an entity, what is the harm in that?"

Answer:—

TEXT (365)

THE VIEW THAT 'NEGATION' IS BROUGHT BY AN 'AFFIRMATION' HAS BEEN SOUGHT TO BE SUPPORTED BY HAVING RECOURSE TO 'PRECLUSION' (AS THE FORM OF THE NEGATION SO BROUGHT ABOUT);—BUT THE ARGUMENT BASED UPON THE ALTERNATIVES POSSIBLE REGARDING DIFFERENCE OR NON-DIFFERENCE, ALL BECOME APPLICABLE TO THIS VIEW.—(365)

COMMENTARY.

'How is Negation brought about by Affirmation?' In answer to this question the other party has recourse to 'Preclusion', i.e. the assertion that it is Negation in the form of 'Preclusion' that is so brought about; that is to say, through the speaker's choice sometimes even an *entity* is spoken of as a different *form* (negation) of some other entity. With this explanation also the view is open to all those arguments that have been urged above as based upon the alternatives of 'difference' or 'non-difference' etc.—(365)

If, for fear of this criticism, it be held that—"what is brought about by the Causes of 'Destruction' is Negation,—not in the form of 'Preclusion',—but in the form of the *absolute negation*."—But here also, the inefficacy of the cause of 'Destruction' would be still clearer.

This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (366)

IF IT BE HELD THAT "WHAT IS MEANT BY 'DESTRUCTION' IS THE NEGATION OF EFFECTIVE ACTION, AND THIS DOES NOT BRING ABOUT A POSITIVE ENTITY",—EVEN SO, IT BECOMES ESTABLISHED THAT WHAT BRINGS ABOUT THE DESTRUCTION CANNOT BE ITS 'CAUSE',—BECAUSE IT IS DEVOID OF THE CHARACTER OF 'CAUSE'.—(366)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, if 'Destruction' means the 'negation absolute'—as in the expression 'brings about Destruction, i.e. Negation'—the negative term would be related to the term denoting *action*, and the meaning would be that it does not bring about an entity (in the form of *Action*); and as this would be the denial or negation of Action, what it would imply is the fact of the 'Cause of Destruction' not being a 'Cause'; for how can a thing devoid of action be a 'cause'? So that nothing can be the Cause of Destruction.—(366)

In this connection, the Author proceeds to set forth those arguments in proof of Destruction having a Cause which have been propounded by *Aviddhakarṇa* :—

TEXTS (367-368)

"THIS *Destruction* OF THE THING IS NOT PRESENT AT THE TIME THAT THE THING IS IN EXISTENCE; NOR IS IT PRESENT BEFORE (THE THING HAS COME INTO EXISTENCE); NOR VERY LONG AFTER (THE THING HAS COME INTO EXISTENCE). IN FACT, IT COMES IMMEDIATELY AFTER (THE THING HAS COME INTO EXISTENCE); THUS, INASMUCH AS IT COMES INTO EXISTENCE ONLY AT A PARTICULAR TIME, IT MUST HAVE A CAUSE. IF IT WERE INDEPENDENT (OF ALL CAUSES), THEN THIS OCCASIONAL CHARACTER WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE, AS SHOWN BEFORE".—(367-368)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the Destruction of a thing cannot be present at the time that the thing is in existence, as if it did, then the momentarily existent

thing could never exist. Nor can it be present before the thing has been produced, as what has not been born cannot be destroyed; e.g. the 'son of the Barren Woman' and such non-entities are not destroyed while unborn.—Even when coming *after* the thing has come into existence, it cannot come *very long* after it; because all things (*ex hypothesi*) being destroyed at the third moment (of existence), there cannot be another destruction very long afterwards, as is found in the case of Fire that has become reduced to ashes. The destruction of the thing, therefore, must come immediately after it has come into existence, i.e. at the second moment. Thus it is established that, as it has the time of its coming definitely fixed, the Destruction must have a Cause, just as the sprout has—'*as it has the time, etc. etc.*; i.e. because it appears only occasionally. The invariable concomitance of this reason is next shown—'*If it were independent etc. etc.*';—if it were independent of all Cause, then its *occasional character* could not be possible; as in that case its existence would be there at all times. Hence, from its *occasional character*, it is deduced that it must have a Cause.—(367-368)

Another reason for the same conclusion is set forth in the following—

TEXT (369)

"As it comes immediately after the Thing, the Destruction must have a Cause; also because, not having been in existence, it comes into existence,—just like the following Moment."—(369)

COMMENTARY.

Thus three reasons have been stated: Destruction must have a Cause, (*a*) because it is occasional, (*b*) because it comes immediately after the thing, as admitted by the *Bauddhas*, and (*c*) because not having been in existence, it comes into existence, like the following Moment. The 'Hare's Horn' and such other non-entities serve as Corroborative Instances *per dissimilarity*.—(369)

The author next states the reasons adduced by *Uddyotakara* [in *Nyayavārtika* on 3.2.14, *page* 415, Bib. Indica, from where large portions of the Commentary on this Text are bodily quoted]—

TEXTS (370–372)

"THEN AGAIN, IF DESTRUCTION HAD NO CAUSE, IT WOULD BE EITHER A NON-ENTITY, LIKE 'THE SON OF THE BARREN WOMEN' AND OTHER NON-ENTITIES, OR AN ETERNAL ENTITY, LIKE *Ākāsha*; AS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE IS POSSIBLE.—IF DESTRUCTION WERE A NON-ENTITY, THEN ALL THINGS WOULD BE ETERNAL, AS THERE WOULD BE NO DESTRUCTION (OF ANYTHING); AND THE IDEA OF THE *Destructibility* (FLEETING CHARACTER) OF ALL PROPERTIES WOULD BE BASELESS.—IF DESTRUCTION WERE ETERNAL (EXISTING AT ALL TIMES), THEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE THING TO EXIST ALONG WITH ITS OWN DESTRUCTION; AS THERE COULD BE NO INCOMPATIBILITY IN THIS CASE; AND THE ASSERTION OF THE 'DESTRUCTION' OF WHAT HAS NOT BEEN PRODUCED WOULD NOT BE IN KEEPING WITH REASON."—(370–372)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows :—

"One who declares that 'there is no Cause for Destruction' should be questioned as follows : Does this mean that there being no Cause for Destruction, Destruction does not exist (come into existence) at all, like the 'sky-lotus' ? or that having no Cause, it is *eternal* (ever-lasting), like *Ākāsha* and other things ? According to your view what is *causeless* is found to be of two kinds—*eternal* and *non-existent*, there is no other alternative to these two—*existence* and *non-existence* :—Now, if being without a Cause, Destruction is *non-existent*, then all things must be eternal; as there is no Destruction at all. And the idea that 'all properties become destroyed' becomes, in this case, baseless ; because when there is no movement, the idea of anything 'moving' is impossible. If, on the other hand, having no Cause, Destruction is eternal,—then it becomes possible for it to co-exist with the Thing (destroyed), as the Destruction would be always there. And this would be highly improper, as the *Presence* and *Absence* of a Thing are mutually negatory. If then the said *co-existence* is not admitted, then there can be no producing of any effect, as its contrary, the Destruction of the effect would be there always :—and when a thing is not produced at all, there can be no Destruction of it ; for instance, such unproduced things as the 'Hare's Horns' are not known among people to be destroyed ; hence any such assertion as that 'there is destruction of what has not been produced' cannot be in keeping with Reason."—(370–372)

The Author answers all these criticisms in the following *Texts* :—

TEXTS (373-374)

WHAT SORT OF 'DESTRUCTION' IS IT (THE CAUSELESSNESS OF) WHICH THE OTHER PEOPLE OBJECT TO ? (a) IS IT THE 'MOMENTARY EXISTENCE' OF THINGS, AS EXPLAINED BY US ? OR THE 'CESSATION OF THE FORM OF THE ENTITY', CALLED 'DISRUPTION' (*Dhvamsa*, ANNIHILATION) ? —IF IT IS THE FORMER, THEN THERE IS NO QUARREL.— (373-374)

COMMENTARY.

Destruction is of two sorts—*positive* and *negative*. For instance when, on account of the thing being mobile and having only a momentary existence, it becomes 'destroyed', this is called 'Destruction' (of the Positive kind); and there is the other kind of Destruction which consists in the thing losing its positive character and becoming what is called 'disruption', 'annihilation'. If it is in reference to the former kind of 'Destruction' to whose 'causelessness' objection has been taken (by other people) on the ground of the reasons adduced above,—then it is entirely futile (as what is objected to is denied by us also).—(373-374)

The futility of the arguments is further explained :—

TEXT (375)

THAT THING WHICH, HAVING A MOMENTARY EXISTENCE, IS CALLED 'DESTRUCTION',—*This* DESTRUCTION WE ALSO ADMIT AS *having a cause* ; IT IS ONLY THE OTHER KIND OF DESTRUCTION WHICH WE REGARD AS *without cause*, ON THE GROUND OF THERE BEING NOTHING ELSE (WHICH COULD BE ITS CAUSE).—(375)

COMMENTARY.

Question.—"If that is so (and you admit what we have argued), then why have you held Destruction to be 'without cause'?"

The Answer is—'*It is only the other kind etc. etc.*'; i.e. *there being nothing else*,—apart from the Cause that brought the thing into existence,—coming later on, in the shape of the Bludgeon and such things,—that we regard the Destruction to be *without cause*.—(375)

The Subject (of the inference) in the form of 'Destruction' being as explained, the two Reasons,—'because it is occasional' and 'because not having been in existence, it comes into existence',—are duly admitted (by us also). As regards the character of 'coming immediately after the thing', if that is intended to be true only in a general way, then that too is

duly admitted (by us), because its existence immediately after that thing which is the Cause is admitted by us.—If, however, what the other party means by 'the Destruction coming immediately after the thing' is that it comes immediately after that thing which forms its own self (essence),—then such a Reason is *not admitted.*—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (376)

THE CHARACTER OF 'COMING IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE THING' DOES NOT SUBSIST IN THE DESTRUCTION AS DESCRIBED; BECAUSE THE DESTRUCTION IN THE FORM OF THE MOBILE (MOMENTARY) THING APPEARS ALONG WITH THE THING ITSELF.—(376)

COMMENTARY.

'*In the Destruction as described*', i.e. in the form not different from the *nature of the mobile thing itself.* There can be no 'parts' of a thing which is devoid of parts, by virtue of which such Destruction could come immediately after such a thing: because, like the nature of the Thing itself, its Destruction also comes about on the coming about of the thing itself; otherwise its *forming the very nature of the thing* would not be true; as already explained.—(376)

It has been argued above that 'There is no basis for the notion that all Properties are destructible' (under *Text* 371);—this also becomes rejected by what has been just said.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (377)

THUS THEN, THE DESTRUCTION BEING THERE, THINGS CANNOT BE ETERNAL; AND THE NOTION THAT 'THINGS ARE DESTRUCTIBLE' CANNOT BE BASELESS.—(377)

COMMENTARY.

Simply because all things have the character of *existing for a moment,* and those very things that are regarded as so destructible form the basis of the notion of 'destructibility of things',—this notion therefore, cannot be baseless.—(377)

If then the 'Destruction' intended to be the Subject of the arguments adduced by the other party is that in the form of 'Disruption' (Annihilation),—then all the three Reasons adduced are 'unproven', 'not admitted' (by us).—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (378)

AS REGARDS 'ANNIHILATION', AS IT CAN HAVE NO ESSENCE (CHARACTER), IT CANNOT 'COME INTO EXISTENCE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE THING';—AND AS REGARDS THE PRESENCE OF THE CHARACTER OF 'COMING INTO EXISTENCE AFTER HAVING NOT EXISTED BEFORE', THIS IS PRECISELY LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS' AND OTHER THINGS.—(378)

COMMENTARY.

Such characters as 'coming into existence immediately after the thing,' and the like can exist in *things* only, never in a *non-entity,* like the 'Hare's Horns'; and 'Annihilation' has no 'essence', no character;—how then can it have any such character as 'coming immediately after the thing' and the like?

As regards the presence of the character of 'coming into existence, having been not in existence before'; the particle '*cha*' includes the character of *being occasional.*—(378)

"If that is so, if *Annihilation* has not the character of *coming into existence immediately after the thing,* then what can be the meaning of the assertion that 'there is Annihilation of the thing'? When something does not belong to a thing, it can never be attributed to it."

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (379)

WHEN IT IS SAID THAT 'THERE IS *Annihilation* OF THE THING', WHAT IS MEANT IS THAT 'THE THING IS NOT THERE'. AND IT IS NOT MEANT TO CONVEY THE AFFIRMATION (PREDICATION) OF ANY THING.—(379)

COMMENTARY.

Even though the assertion 'there is Annihilation of the thing' appears to be affirmative of Annihilation, yet what is really meant is only the *negation* of the Thing itself, and not the *affirmation* of any positive entity.—(379)

"In such expressions as 'It is Chaitra's Son', it is the *existence* of the son that is affirmed; so in the expression 'There is Annihilation of the thing', it must be the *presence* of the Annihilation that is affirmed."

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (380).

THE MERE NAMING OF A PERSON AS 'DONKEY' DOES NOT LEAD TO THE ATTRIBUTION OF THE WHOLE CHARACTER OF THE ASS TO THAT PERSON.—(380)

COMMENTARY.

The *existence* and *non-existence* of things are not dependent upon the use of mere words, as the using of words depends upon the whim of the speaker; if it were not so, then if, through a whim, the name 'Donkey' were given to a man, the entire character of the Ass would have to be attributed to that man.

The term '*bālēya*' (in the Text) is a synonym for '*rāsabha*' (Ass).—(380)

The following Text asserts that it must be understood that when 'annihilation' is spoken of in regard to a thing, it is only the *negation* of the nature of the thing itself, and there is no *affirmation* of anything—

TEXT (381).

IF THE CATEGORY NAMED 'ANNIHILATION' WERE AFFIRMED IN REFERENCE TO A THING, THERE BEING NOTHING ACTUALLY PRODUCED IN THE THING,—HOW IS IT THAT THE THING CEASES (TO EXIST)?—(381)

COMMENTARY.

If it were not as declared by us, and if the category of 'annihilation' were regarded as *affirmed* in reference to the thing,—then, as there is nothing actually produced in the thing concerned,—why should that thing cease to exist?—(381)

As regards the argument put forward above (under *Text* 371)—'If Destruction were non-existent, all things would be eternal',—it is answered in the following—

TEXT (382).

THUS IT IS THAT THE EXISTENCE OF ANY 'DESTRUCTION OF THINGS' OF THE NATURE OF 'ANNIHILATION' IS NOT ADMITTED; BECAUSE THE 'DESTRUCTION OF A THING' CONSISTS IN THE *Dissociation of a particular form*, AND NOT IN THE *negation of its existence*.—(382)

COMMENTARY.

Thus:—because it is really of the nature of the dissociation of a particular form of the Thing,—and it is not of the nature of the negation of the Thing due to the cessation of the existence of the nature of the Thing itself,

Why then should our doctrine involve the absurdity of all things being eternal? If the 'Destruction of things', in the form of the negation of their character, were *non-existent,* then alone the things would be eternal; as a matter of fact, however, the Destruction in the shape of the negation of character, though itself negative in character, is actually there;—how then could the things be *eternal* ?

As for the notion of all properties being destructible,—the basis for this has been already explained.—(382)

It has been argued by the Opponent (under *Text* 372, above) that 'If the Destruction of the thing be eternal, then it would be co-existent with the Thing itself'. This is answered in the following —

TEXTS (383-384).

WHEN IT IS ASSERTED THAT 'DESTRUCTION IS OF THE NATURE OF CESSATION', IT DOES NOT MEAN THE AFFIRMATION OF ITS POSITIVE CHARACTER; IT ONLY DENIES THE CONTINUITY OF THE PARTICULAR FORM OF THE THING BEYOND ONE MOMENT. THUS NO LASTING FORM IS AFFIRMED IN REGARD TO THE 'ANNIHILATION', AND THERE IS NO ROOM FOR THE ALTERNATIVE THAT IT IS *eternal.*—(383-384)

COMMENTARY.

When it is said that 'there is *cessation*', it does not mean the affirmation of the positive form of 'cessation' in regard to 'Annihilation',—for the simple reason that it has no positive form; it means only the denial of the continuity of the particular form of the Thing beyond one moment. Thus there is no room for the alternative that it is something absolutely eternal; because, on account of its having no character at all, it is impossible for it to have a permanent form. Specially because the properties of eternality or non-eternality are invariably concomitant with the nature of things.

It has been argued by *Uddyotakara* (under *Text* 371, above) to the effect that—"Under your view, what is *without Cause* may be either *eternal* or *non-existent,* etc."—But this assertion is based upon his ignorance of the doctrine of his opponent. As a matter of fact, for Bauddhas who are fully conversant with Logic, what is *without cause* must be *non-existent*; this has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord—'The Wise One seeking for the common property among similar things does not perceive any such property in the slightest form'.—As for the *Vaibhāsikas* (a particular sect among *Buddhists*), who posit such *existent* things as *Ākāsha* and the rest, they are converts to your view, and they cannot be regarded as *Followers of the Buddha*; hence the putting forward of their view cannot be relevant.

Thus all causes of Destruction being inefficacious, our Reason (put forward under Texts 353–366) cannot be said to be 'Unproven'.

For the following reason also the Causes of Destruction should be declared to be inefficacious :—When a Thing is produced from its Cause, is it produced sometimes as *evanescent* by its very nature,—and sometimes as *not-evanescent* (eternal) ? If it is produced as *evanescent,* then it cannot be the cause of Destruction, because it is destroyed through its own nature. When a certain nature (or character) belongs to a Thing, this thing, when produced, is produced with that same nature ; and it does not depend upon any other cause (for producing that nature). For instance, the things that are bright or fluid or solid and the like—when produced—are produced along with these properties,—and they do not depend upon another cause for the bringing about of these properties. It might be argued that—" In the case of the seed and such things, it is found that though the seed has the nature of producing the sprout, yet by itself it cannot produce it, it needs the help of other causes in the shape of water and such things,—and in the same way, though the Thing may have the evanescent nature, yet for its destruction it would require other Causes." This cannot be right ; because what is regarded as the 'cause' of a thing is what brings it about in its final complete form ; nothing else is regarded as its 'Cause'. So when a thing has a certain nature, it must produce it by itself, and it does not need another Cause. If the seed in the granary does not produce the sprout, it is because such productivity does not constitute its 'nature' ; it may be called 'the cause of the Cause' (of the Sprout), not the *direct* Cause ; so that this does not vitiate our position.

If the alternative view be accepted,—that when the Thing is produced it is produced in the *non-evanescent* (permanent) form, then, for that also, any Cause of its destruction would be entirely inefficacious ; because any change in the nature of such a thing would be impossible. Because if the nature of a thing were not destroyed immediately after its production, then, later on also, as the same character of *permanent standing* would be there, what is there that would be done by the 'cause of destruction', by virtue of which the thing could be destroyed ?—The following might be urged—" In the case of Copper and other things it is found that, though they are solid, yet, on the contact of fire, their condition becomes changed ; similarly even though the thing may be naturally *indestructible,* the Cause of its destruction may change its condition ; and by reason of this, it may become *destroyed* on its coming into contact with that Cause of Destruction ".—This cannot be right ; as a matter of fact, it is not the same thing that becomes *changed* ; because 'Change' consists in the production of another nature or character ; now this 'change' that you speak of—is it something different from the Thing itself ? or is it the Thing itself ? It cannot be the Thing itself ; as that has been already produced by its own Cause [and hence could not be produced again by the Cause of the *change*]. If it is something different from the Thing, then the Thing itself remains as before, retaining its permanence ; so that it has not *changed.* As regards the example of *Copper* and other things, that is not admissible. Because what happens in their case (according to us) is that the preceding 'solid-moment' of the Copper being inherently perishable (destructible) becomes destroyed by itself,—then under the influence of such auxiliary causes as Fire and the like, there is produced, out of its own constituents and under other circumstances, a different character in the

shape of *fluidity* ; again this character of *fluidity*, being inherently perishable, becomes destroyed, and there is produced, out of the auxiliary causes and out of the same constituents, another character in the shape of *solidity*. So that there is no *change* of one and the same thing.

Thus the 'Cause of Destruction' is in every way infructuous ; and our Reason is not 'unproven'.

Nor is our Reason 'Contradictory' ; as what is put forward does actually happen according to our view.

Nor is the reason 'inconclusive' ; as it has been already established before.

The following might be urged—"The *Ākāsha* does not need a cause for becoming *corporeal* (with a shape), and yet it is not permanently liable to *corporeality* ; in the same manner, though the Things may be products, yet there may be some thing which is not permanently liable to destruction."

This is not right. There is no Product which is not regarded as *non-eternal* (evanescent) ; as all *caused* things are held to be evanescent ; and these same Products are made the 'subject' of the inferential argument ; how then can the Reason be 'inconclusive' ? Those things which, though Products, are yet expected to be *eternal*, on account of their indestructibility,—these are really included under the category of 'uncreated things', and as such should be regarded as discarded by the discarding of that category itself. So that there is no defect in our Reason. Nor is it admitted that *Ākāsha* and such other things are independent in the matter of their *corporeality* ; because as a matter of fact, when a Property does not belong to a thing, that thing is certainly 'dependent upon something else' in regard to that property ; things are never regarded as 'dependent on something else' for the purpose of those properties that are already present in them ; in fact, they are so dependent, only in regard to Properties that are not there already. So the Corroborative Instance cited by the other party is one that cannot be admitted.—(384)

The Author proceeds to say something regarding the category of 'uncreated things' :—

TEXTS (385-386).

THE *Ākāsha* AND OTHER THINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN HELD TO BE 'UNCREATED' ARE REALLY NON-EXISTENT, IN THE FORM OF 'ENTITIES' ; AS THEY ARE DEVOID OF ALL POTENTIALITY ; HENCE THERE CAN BE NO ROOM FOR ATTRIBUTING TO THEM ANY SUCH ALTERNATIVE CHARACTERS AS THAT OF 'MOMENTARINESS' OR 'NON-MOMENTARINESS' ; WHEREBY THEY COULD BE REGARDED EVEN AS AN 'ENTITY'—BE IT EITHER MOMENTARY OR OTHERWISE.—(385-386)

COMMENTARY.

If things like *Ākāsha* were such as have their existence established, then alone could there arise any discussion as to their being *momentary*, etc. ;

because Properties have no existence by themselves;—if they did, then they would cease to be *Properties.* Nor are *Ākāsha,* etc. uncreated things,—because, being devoid of all potentiality, they are to be spoken of as 'non-existent',—like the 'son of the Barren Woman'. This argument may be formulated as follows:—A thing that is devoid of all potentiality must be non-existent,—like the 'son of the Barren Woman';—*Ākāsha,* etc. are devoid of all potentiality; so that this is a natural reason (for regarding them as non-existent); or in reality, there is absence of the more extensive character (which implies the absence of the less extensive character).—Nor can the Reason adduced be said to be 'inconclusive', as this alone is enough to justify the notion of 'non-existence'. Nor can the Reason be said to be 'unproven'; as we shall explain later on. Nor, lastly, can it be said to be 'contradictory'; as it is found to be present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.—(385-386)

Question:—"Why cannot the question of *momentariness* or *non-momentariness* arise in regard to a *non-entity*?"

The answer is provided in the following—

TEXT (387).

THAT THING IS SAID TO BE 'MOMENTARY' WHOSE FORM PERSISTS FOR A MOMENT; WHILE THAT THING IS SAID TO BE 'NON-MOMENTARY' WHICH IS ENDOWED WITH A LASTING (PERMANENT) FORM.—(387)

COMMENTARY.

The meaning of this is clear.—(387)

Uddyotakara has put forward the following argument:—"The term '*Kṣaṇika*' ('momentary') contains the Possessive Affix ('*ṭhañ*', by Pāṇini 5-2-115); how does this affix come in? If, in accordance with the *Nirukta,* '*kṣaṇa*' stands for *kṣaya, Destruction,* and the term '*kṣaṇika*' means *that which has destruction,*—this cannot be right; because of the difference in time; that is, at the time that there is *Destruction,* the thing to which it belongs is not there (having ceased to exist); and the Possessive affix is never found to be used in connection with things that exist at different times. If (with a view to escaping from that difficulty) it be held that the positive entity itself, as qualified by its *impending* destruction, is what is spoken of as '*kṣaṇika*', ('momentary'),—even so, it is not possible for the thing qualified by the destruction to be spoken of as *possessing* that Destruction; and thus also the use of the Possessive affix would be injustifiable. If what is meant by things being '*kṣaṇika*' 'momentary', is that the time of their existence is only one moment; and that having posited the '*kṣaṇa*', 'Moment', as the lowest conceivable measure of time, we call those things 'momentary' which continue to exist only during that point of time;—then

this also cannot be right; because the *Bauddha* admits of Time only as a mere name (a hypothetical entity, without reality); and it is not right for what is a mere name to be regarded as the qualification of an entity." (*Nyāyavārtika* on 3-2-14, page 418, lines 8–16, *Bib. Indica* Edition.)

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (388).

THAT FORM OF THE THING WHICH DOES NOT PERSIST AFTER ITS PRODUCTION IS WHAT IS CALLED '*Kṣaṇa*', 'MOMENT'; AND THAT WHICH HAS THIS FORM IS HELD TO BE '*Kṣaṇika*', 'MOMENTARY'.—(388)

COMMENTARY.

What is called 'moment' is the character of the thing which is destroyed immediately after it has been produced; and that which has this character is called 'momentary'. This has been thus declared—'*Moment* is that which is destroyed immediately after the thing has come into existence, and that which has this is called *momentary*.'—(388)

"Even so, as the 'nature' of a thing is not-different from the Thing itself, there can be no such idea as that 'this belongs to that',—which idea is based upon the difference of the two factors concerned."

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (389).

EVEN WHEN THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO THINGS, THERE IS NOTHING TO PREVENT THE NOTION OF 'THIS BELONGING TO THAT'; AS EVERY EXPRESSIVE WORD IS APPLIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ARBITRARY WHIM.—(389)

COMMENTARY.

In such expressions as 'one's own nature', 'the body of the stone-image', and so forth,—even though there is no actual difference between the two things spoken of, the Possessive ending implying difference is used on the basis of an assumed difference; so would it be in the case in question also. Verbal expressions are used, not always in accordance with the real state of things, but in accordance with the whim of the speaker.—(389)

Further, when a man utters a verbal sound, that sound denotes, in that form alone, only that much of a thing as to which it is applied,—such

denotation being due to convention ; and in reality there is no 'basic term' or an 'affix' ; the term (verbal sound) '*kṣaṇika*' is applied by the learned to only such a thing as does not continue to exist after its coming into existence ; and such a thing being meant to be denoted by the term 'momentary'—it may be used along with an affix or without an affix,—we have no regard for any such use, which is used on the basis of conventions that are purely arbitrary.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (390).

WHAT IS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF (BY THE TERM '*Kṣaṇika*', 'MOMENTARY') IS THE THING THAT DOES NOT CONTINUE TO EXIST AFTER ITS COMING INTO EXISTENCE ; AND THAT TERM MAY BE USED EITHER WITH THE AFFIX OR WITHOUT THE AFFIX (TO WHICH *Uddyotakara* HAS TAKEN OBJECTION).

COMMENTARY.

'*Evam*'—i.e. by the term '*kṣaṇika*', 'momentary.'
'*With the affix*'—i.e., with the Possessive affix (*Thañ*).—(390)

Thus it has been shown that if *Ākāsha* and the rest are regarded as *uncreated,* they must be regarded as being *non-existent* ; and it is now going to be shown that if they are regarded as *existent,* they must be *momentary* :—

TEXT (391).

IF *Akāsha*, TIME AND SUCH THINGS ARE *existent,* THEN, BEING SO, THEY CANNOT ESCAPE FROM BEING *momentary,*—JUST LIKE THE CREATED THINGS.—(391)

COMMENTARY.

'*Kṛtāh*'—stands for '*kṛtakāh*', 'created things'.
This indicates 'being', 'existence', as the Reason (for regarding things as *momentary*).—(391)

This Reason is stated more explicitly :—

TEXTS (392–394).

FOR INSTANCE, WHATEVER THINGS ARE EXISTENT ARE ALL IN A STATE OF PERPETUAL FLUX,—JUST AS ALL CREATED THINGS HAVE JUST BEEN SHOWN TO BE;—THESE THINGS, *Ākāsha*, TIME, GOD, AND THE REST ARE HELD BY YOU TO BE *existent*;—THESE COULD NEVER HAVE AN EXISTENCE IF THEY WERE DEVOID OF *momentariness*; —BECAUSE PERMANENT THINGS CANNOT HAVE ANY FRUITFUL ACTIVITY, EITHER SUCCESSIVELY OR SIMULTANEOUSLY,—THEREFORE THEY ARE HELD TO BE *non-existent*. —(392–394)

COMMENTARY.

The reasoning may be thus formulated :—What is *existent* must be *momentary*,—like the things just shown to be momentary ;—*Ākāsha* and other (uncreated) things are held by you to be *existent*; this is therefore a natural reason (for regarding them as *momentary*).

'*As have been shown to be*' ;—i.e. as *momentary*.

This shows that the Corroborative Instance is not devoid of the Probandum, as its presence has been already established.

'*Held by you*' ;—this is meant to indicate that the reasoning here put forward is an indirect one, in the form of a *Reductio ad absurdum*. Otherwise the Reason cited would be one that is not admitted by one or the other of the two parties.

Question—" In what way is the invariable concomitance of the Reason (with the Probandum) established ? "

Answer :—'*If they were devoid of momentariness, etc.*' ; the 'existence' that is meant to be the Reason here is that which consists in 'capacity for fruitful action' ; and this 'existence' must be absent, if 'momentariness' is absent; because when things perform a fruitful act, they do it either successively and simultaneously,—there is no other way of acting except successively and simultaneously; as these two are mutually exclusive, as is clearly perceived ; for instance, the Jar is not perceived, at one and the same time, to perform the *successive* functions of containing wine, water and other liquids as apart from one another,—and also the simultaneous functions of bringing about its own cognition and also containing water, at one and the same time ;—now those various acts that the Jar is seen to perform successively,—or the Potter is seen to make the Jar, the plates and other objects,—all those it or he is not able to do or make simultaneously. When too the Jar is found to produce its own cognition and other things at one and the same time, it is not, at that same time, found to produce those same

successively also. All this is clearly established by direct Perception. Thus *succession* being excluded by *simultaneity,* and *vice versa,* the cognition that precludes both these functions (the successive as well as the simultaneous) naturally precludes the object also to which those functions belong,—and it also indicates that there can be no third kind of functioning ; thus then there is mutual exclusion—' contradiction '—between these two—*succession* and *simultaneity*—of that particular kind in which the presence of one implies the absence of the other. Thus no third kind of activity being possible, all fruitful activity of things must be either *successive* or *simultaneous*; and when such activity is precluded in Permanent things by the absence of the more extensive character, it precludes its characteristic in the shape of ' existence ' also. In this way the necessary invariable concomitance becomes secured.

It cannot be argued, in answer to this that—" The *succession* and *simultaneity* of the things themselves have not yet been proved, inasmuch as *Time* is not postulated by us as a distinct entity."—It will not be right to argue thus, because we do not say that the ' succession ' and ' simultaneity ' of things are due to a distinct category in the shape of *Time* ; what we mean is that it is due to their coming into existence in those ways. For instance, when it so happens that when one comes into existence, the others also come into existence similarly, then they form the basis of the notion of ' non-succession ' or ' simultaneity ' ; as is found in the case of several sprouts coming out from similar causal conditions ;—when, on the other hand, things appear in a different manner, they are spoken of as ' successive ' ; e.g., such things as the sprout, the stem, the leaves, and so forth.—All these are clearly recognised by direct perception, and are spoken of as such by people. The functioning of Causes also towards the bringing about of such things is similarly spoken of as ' successive ' or ' simultaneous '. Thus the objection that has been urged cannot be rightly urged against us.

Says the opponent :—" In case the Thing were proved to be *permanent*, the preclusion of *succession* and *simultaneity* might not imply the preclusion of *fruitful activity* ; e.g. when the existence of the ' Tree ' becomes precluded in regard to a certain place, it precludes the particular tree ' *shimshapā* ' ; otherwise, if the place itself were unknown where could *the absence of the shimshapā* be cognised ? As a matter of fact, the *permanent thing* itself does not exist (for you, the Buddhist), as this is what you wish to deny. If, however, you do admit that such a *permanent thing* does exist, then it cannot be right to deny it ; since you admit its existence as the substratum (of the two kinds of activity). Thus your reason—' because it has existence ',—becomes ' inconclusive ', as it is found to be present also in the contrary of your Probandum (' Momentary ')."

It is not so, we reply. When we urge the non-perception of the more extensive character as proving our negative conclusion, we do not urge it as an independent valid cognition ; we put it forward only in the form of a *Reductio ad absurdum* against the opponent ; the sense being—*if you accept the permanence of the thing,* then, you cannot admit its fruitful activity,—as ' succession ' and ' simultaneity ',—which are of larger extension, and with which the said ' succession ' and ' simultaneity ' are invariably concomitant,

—cannot be present in it; because when the wider thing is not there, the narrower thing cannot be there; otherwise the two could not be related as being of 'larger' and 'narrower' extension. Hence on the preclusion of *the capacity for fruitful activity*, the presence of *existence* also cannot be accepted; as the said capacity constitutes the characteristic of 'existence.'

By this method, the non-existence of things becomes established.

Nor is it necessary that the Corroborative Instance *per Dissimilarity* must always be a real entity; as all that is meant to be shown by such instance is that the absence of the Probandum means the absence of the Probans. And this is proved by the mere assertion,—without admitting the real existence of any object,—that when the wider thing is absent the narrower thing also must be absent,—after it has been recognised in a general way that between the two things there lies the relation that one has a wider extension than the other and as such there is invariable concomitance between them; e.g., the assertion 'when the *Tree* is absent, the *Shimshapā* cannot be there'.—This has been thus declared:—'In the case of the Corroborative Instance *per dissimilarity*, it is not necessary that the existence of the objective substratum should be admitted; as what is intended follows from the mere assertion that *on the absence of one, the other also cannot be there*'.—(393-394)

The following *Text* shows that the Permanent Thing cannot have any *successive* fruitful activity:—

TEXT (395).

Effects are delayed on account of the non-proximity of the Cause. If the efficient Cause were there, to what would that delay be due?—(395)

COMMENTARY.

It is not by their own wish that the effects come into existence or not come into existence; in fact, their *being* and *not being* depend upon the presence or absence of the Cause. Under the circumstances, if the Thing in its permanent form were always there, as the cause of all things,—then how is it that all effects are not produced at once,—being dependent as they are upon the mere presence of the said Cause? and why should they appear successively—one after the other?—'*Kṣēpa*' is Delay.—So that even the subsequent effect should come into existence beforehand,—because its Cause would be there in its untrammelled form,—just like the effect that the Opponent has in view.—(395)

In the following *Text*, the Opponent offers an explanation:—

TEXT (396).

"EVEN OF THE ETERNAL THING, THERE ARE CERTAIN AUXILIARIES,—ON ACCOUNT OF WHOSE HELP, THE FORMER BRINGS ABOUT THE LARGE NUMBER OF ITS EFFECTS, IN SUCCESSION".—(396)

COMMENTARY.

"Even though the Permanent Entity is always there, yet its auxiliaries come up to it only in succession; hence on account of these latter, the Permanent Entity will naturally produce its effects only in succession".—(396)

The following *Text* answers this argument :—

TEXTS (397–399).

THIS IS ALL VERY WELL; BUT WHEN THOSE OTHER THINGS BECOME ITS 'AUXILIARIES', IS IT BECAUSE THEY ARE THE CAUSE OF THE CAUSAL EFFICIENCY (OF THE PERMANENT THING)? OR BECAUSE THEY ALSO SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE?—IF THEY ARE THE CAUSE OF THE CAUSAL EFFICIENCY (OF THE PERMANENT THING),—THEN THIS THING ITSELF WOULD BE PRODUCED BY THEM; AND YET THIS IS INCAPABLE OF BEING PRODUCED, AS IT IS ALWAYS THERE (BEING PERMANENT). OR, IF THE VERY FORM OF THE PERMANENT THING WERE HELD TO BE PRODUCED (BY THE AUXILIARIES), THEN ITS ETERNALITY (PERMANENCE) DISAPPEARS. IF THE 'PECULIARITY' (PRODUCED IN THE PERMANENT THING) BE REGARDED AS SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM THE THING ITSELF, THEN,—HOW CAN THIS (THING) BE REGARDED AS THE 'CAUSE'?—(397–399)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, it is not possible for the Permanent Thing to have any auxiliary. Because (*a*) would that be an 'auxiliary' by virtue of creating peculiar conditions in the thing—as the Earth, Water and other things become auxiliaries of the seed through producing in it such conditions as *swelling* and the like? Or (*b*) would it by virtue of their serving the same purpose as the thing—as Colour etc. become auxiliaries to the Eye in producing the visual perception of Colour, by mere appearance?—The former view cannot be maintained; because the 'peculiar condition' that is produced in the Thing, by the auxiliary—would that condition be non-different or different from the form of the thing itself?—or would it be neither different nor non-different? Or would it be both different and non-different?—as

held by the *Ājīvakas*. These are the four alternatives. The first of these alternatives is not tenable ; as in this case, the *condition*, being non-different from the thing, would be, like it, always there, and what is always there cannot be produced,—or if it be produced, the thing itself also might be produced in the same way ; and that would deprive it of its *permanence*.—If the second alternative be accepted, in that case, the effect being produced by the condition in question, the Thing itself would cease to be the *Cause*.

The term '*asau*' (in the fourth line of the *Text*) stands for the *Permanent Thing*.—(397–399)

The same argument is further clarified in the following—

TEXT (400).

THE EFFECTS WOULD IN THAT CASE BE PRODUCED ONLY WHEN THE SAID 'CONDITION' IS THERE,—AND THEY WOULD NOT BE PRODUCED WHEN THE 'CONDITION' IS NOT THERE ;—AND THUS IT WOULD BE THIS 'CONDITION' THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS THEIR *Cause*.—(400)

COMMENTARY.

When 'it'—i.e., the said *condition*—is there.—'*Thus*', i.e., from the positive and negative concomitance just pointed out.—(400)

The following *Text* states an answer from the standpoint of the Opponent [and then refutes it]—

TEXTS (401-402).

IT MIGHT BE ARGUED THAT—" ON ACCOUNT OF ITS (THE CONDITION'S) RELATION TO THE THING, THE CAUSAL CHARACTER DOES BELONG TO THAT (THING) ALSO ".—WHAT 'RELATION' CAN BE HELD TO SUBSIST BETWEEN THESE TWO ?—IT CANNOT BE *identity* ; AS THE TWO ARE RECOGNISED AS DISTINCT. NOR CAN THE RELATION BE HELD TO CONSIST IN THE FACT THAT IT IS PRODUCED FROM IT ; AS IN THAT CASE, THERE SHOULD BE SIMULTANEITY ; AND THEN THE APPEARANCE OF THE EFFECTS ALSO WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS.—(401-402)

COMMENTARY.

'*Its*'—i.e., of the condition.—'*That*'—the permanent thing.

With the words '*what relation, etc.*' the Author replies to the answer of the Opponent. The meaning is that no relation is possible between the two. There are only two kinds of relation possible : *Identity* and *Being Produced out of it* :—the relation between the *thing* and the *condition* cannot

be that of *Identity*; as the two have been admitted to be different. Nor can the relation be that of *being produced out of it*; because, in fact, the effects are produced out of the auxiliaries themselves. If then, it be accepted that the conditions are produced out of the thing, then, as the appearance of the conditions would be contingent upon the thing itself, all the conditions would be produced simultaneously, and this would imply the simultaneous appearance of all the effects also; as the Cause (in the shape of the Permanent Thing) along with the conditions would be always present.—(401-402)

TEXT (403).

IF IT BE HELD THAT THERE IS NEED FOR A FURTHER AUXILIARY,—THEN THERE WOULD BE AN INFINITE REGRESS. FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF RELATION, THE EFFECT CANNOT BE PRODUCED EVEN ONCE.—(403)

COMMENTARY.

If it be held that "for the producing of the said 'conditions' also there is need for other auxiliaries; so that the conditions appear successively and hence there can be no simultaneous appearance of the effects",—this cannot be right; as in this way, there would be an Infinite Regress. For instance, for these auxiliaries also, there would have to be postulated further auxiliaries for the bringing about of other *conditions*; of that condition again, which would be different, there would be no relationship,—and if it were to be produced out of the same, then all effects would be produced simultaneously; and if a further auxiliary were needed for that,—the same difficulties would again present themselves.—Thus there being this *infinite regress*, no relationship between the Thing and the Condition could be established; and when this cannot be established, then the effect would be produced not from the Permanent Thing, but from the Condition itself.—(403)

TEXTS (404-405).

IF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWO (THE PERMANENT THING AND THE CONDITIONS) WERE HELD TO BE THAT OF 'INHERENCE' (SUBSISTENCE), THEN ALSO THE FOLLOWING HAS GOT TO BE CONSIDERED:—IS THE 'INHERENT' THING SO REGARDED BECAUSE IT IS HELPFUL? OR NOT SO? IF THE FORMER ALTERNATIVE IS ACCEPTED, THEN IT COMES TO BE THE SAME AS THE RELATION OF 'BEING PRODUCED FROM IT', AND THIS HAS JUST BEEN REJECTED.—(404-405)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—"the relation between the *condition* and the Permanent Entity is not that of *being produced from it*, but that of *inhering*

in it, the condition being inherent (subsisting) in the Permanent Thing".—This cannot be right; this is shown in the Text with the words —'*Then also, etc.*'—'*Or not so*';—the construction being—'it is held to be inherent without being helpful'.—Under the first alternative, the *help* rendered being non-different from the Thing *helped,* it would come to be the same relation which has been spoken of above as that of *being produced from* it; and this has been just rejected.—(404-405)

If the second alternative is accepted, then there being no distinction, everything would be 'inherent' in everything. This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (406).

IN CASE THE 'INHERENT' BE NOT SOMETHING HELPFUL TO THAT WHEREIN IT INHERES, THEN ALL THINGS WOULD BE EQUALLY INHERENT, AS THERE COULD BE NOTHING TO DIFFERENTIATE ONE FROM THE OTHER.—(406)

COMMENTARY.

'*Equally*',—because, in the matter of being *not helpful,* it could not be differentiated from the thing that is meant by the opponent (to be *inherent*).—(406)

The Author next takes up the views that both (the Permanent Thing and the Conditions) are both *different* and *non-different* :—

TEXT (407).

EACH OF THE TWO ALTERNATIVES—THAT THE TWO ARE *Different and non-different*—HAVING THUS BEEN SEVERALLY REJECTED, THE IDEA THAT THE CONDITION IS BOTH (DIFFERENT AND NON-DIFFERENT) ALSO BECOMES DISCARDED.—(407)

COMMENTARY.

The rejection of each of the two alternatives naturally implies the rejection of both alternatives; as the *two alternatives together* do not differ from the two alternatives treated severally.—Further (between two contradictories), the acceptance or rejection of one must imply the rejection or acceptance, respectively, of the other; hence it cannot be right to regard the existing thing as being both *different* and *non-different* (from the Conditions); as the same thing cannot be both affirmed and denied at the same time; otherwise it would cease to be *one.*—(407)

The following Text shows that this has already been explained before, in course of the examination of the doctrine of the '*Pudgala*' (section F, chapter VII) and the rest.

TEXT (408).

IN COURSE OF THE EXAMINATION OF THE 'PUDGALA', ETC. IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT BOTH ALTERNATIVES CANNOT BE ACCEPTED. HENCE THE 'CONDITION' CANNOT BE BOTH 'DIFFERENT' AND 'NON-DIFFERENT'; NOR CAN IT BE NEITHER 'DIFFERENT' NOR 'NON-DIFFERENT'.—(408)

COMMENTARY.

The other party now puts forward the view that the 'Auxiliaries' of the Permanent Thing become so by reason of their serving the same purpose as the latter [the second alternative suggested under *Text* 397]. To this effect, some people argue as follows: "The Permanent Thing does not require the Auxiliaries,—and yet apart from the Auxiliaries, it cannot bring about its effect; the fact of the matter is that its very nature is such that it produces its effect only when all its auxiliaries are close to it,—and never by itself, like the Final Cause. Hence even though the thing be always present, there is no possibility of all its effects being produced simultaneously."

This is the view set forth in the following—

TEXTS (409-410).

"EVEN THOUGH THE PERMANENT THING MAY NOT ACTUALLY NEED THE AUXILIARY AGENCIES, YET, APART FROM THESE LATTER, IT CANNOT PRODUCE ITS EFFECT, LIKE THE FINAL CAUSE; ITS OWN NATURE IS SUCH THAT IT BECOMES AN EFFICIENT CAUSE ONLY WHEN IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE AUXILIARIES; HENCE IT IS THAT EVEN THOUGH THE PERMANENT THING IS ALWAYS PRESENT, ITS EFFECT DOES NOT COME ABOUT ALWAYS."—(409-410)

COMMENTARY.

The 'na' (at the end of the second line) goes with '*kārakaḥ*'.

'*Like the Final Cause*';—this is meant to be the Corroborative Instance *per dissimilarity*; or it may be taken as the Corroborative Instance *per similarity* in support of the proposition stated in the last line '*it becomes an efficient cause, etc.*'

The term '*hētuvat*' is to be analysed as '*hētoḥ*' (with the genitive ending) '*iva*'.

'*Even though the Permanent thing, etc.*'—i.e., even though the Permanent Thing is always there.—(409-410)

The above view is answered in the following—

TEXT (411).

THIS MAY BE SO ; BUT IF THE CHARACTER OF THE PERMANENT THING IN ITS COMPLETE FORM (ALONG WITH ITS AUXILIARIES) BE HELD TO BE THE SAME AS THAT OF IT IN ITS INCOMPLETE FORM (WITHOUT THE AUXILIARIES), THEN THE AUXILIARIES ALSO SHOULD BE PERMANENT (ETERNAL).—(411)

COMMENTARY.

The above theory may be all right ; but what has to be examined here is this—The character that belongs to the Permanent Thing in its complete form as fully equipped with its auxiliaries,—is this character the same as that of the same thing in its incomplete form (without the Auxiliaries) ? Or is it different from this latter ?—If it is the same, then the auxiliaries should be regarded as permanent.—(411)

The following *Text* shows how that is so—

TEXTS (412-413).

BECAUSE THEY MUST EXIST WHILE THAT THING EXISTS WHOSE CHARACTER IS CONNECTED WITH THEM.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE INCOMPLETE FORM BE HELD TO BE DIFFERENT (FROM THE COMPLETE FORM), THEN THE UNITY OF THE THING BECOMES LOST.—THUS THE SUCCESSIVE APPEARANCE OF EFFECTS IS NOT POSSIBLE, EVEN WHEN THE CAUSE IS DEPENDENT (UPON AUXILIARIES).—(412-413)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*tatsambaddha, etc.*' is to be expounded as 'that whose character is connected with them,'—i.e. the Auxiliaries.

'*They must exist*'—i.e. the Auxiliaries must exist.—Just as when a man tied to a chain is dragged, the chain also becomes dragged,—the auxiliaries must follow the Permanent thing with which they are connected. Thus alone does the Thing become saved from renouncing its previous character. If it does not renounce its character which is connected with the auxiliaries, then on account of the non-relinquishment of the character connected with the auxiliaries, the implication is that it does not relinquish the auxiliaries also ; because the 'connection' is always dependent upon the connected factor. Otherwise the character of the thing would not be the same as the previous one.

If it be held that the incomplete form of the thing (i.e. without the auxiliaries) is different from that of the complete form (along with the auxiliaries), then the answer is as follows: If the form of the thing as without the auxiliaries be held to be different from its form as with the auxiliaries, then it loses its permanence; as the *form* is nothing different from the *thing* itself.

Thus, even if the action of the cause be dependent upon auxiliaries, it is not possible for the Permanent Thing to have any successive fruitful activity.—(412-413)

The following *Text* shows that even simultaneous action is not possible:—

TEXT (413).

AS FOR *simultaneity*, THAT IS NOT FAVOURED (BY THE OTHER PARTY AT ALL); AS THE EFFECTS ARE ACTUALLY FOUND TO APPEAR IN SUCCESSION.—(413)

COMMENTARY.

Even the other party do not favour the idea of the effects of the Permanent Thing being simultaneous. For instance, the following are described as the effects of Permanent Things: (*a*) Pleasure, Pain and the Rest,—of the Soul; (*b*) Sound—of *Ākāsha*; (*c*) the successive cognitions—of the Mind; (*d*) the gross substances, from the Diad onwards,—of the Atoms; (*e*) all products—of Time, Space, God and so forth. And in the case of all these effects it is clearly perceived that they appear *in succession*.—(413)

What is meant is that the theory of *simultaneity* is contrary to perceived facts, and also contrary to the opponent's own doctrines.

The author now proceeds to show that it is contrary to Inference also:—

TEXT (414).

IF THE THING POSSESSED OF THE CAUSAL POTENCY DISAPPEARS, AFTER HAVING BROUGHT ABOUT ALL ITS EFFECTS SIMULTANEOUSLY,—THEN ITS *momentariness* BECOMES ESTABLISHED.—(414)

COMMENTARY.

That is, does the *nature* of the thing consisting in its capacity for effective action disappear, after having brought about all the effects simultaneously?

Or does it continue to exist ?—These are the only two alternatives possible.—If it is held that it disappears, then that establishes its momentary character; as at each moment fresh natures would be appearing, one after the other, each preceding nature becoming destroyed by itself.—(414)

TEXTS (415-416).

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FORM OF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE CONTINUES (AFTER HAVING BROUGHT ABOUT THE EFFECTS), THEN IT SHOULD PRODUCE THE EFFECT OVER AGAIN; BECAUSE, HOW COULD ANY EFFICIENCY BE ATTRIBUTED TO WHAT IS NOT EFFECTIVE IN BRINGING ABOUT DUE EFFECTS ? THUS ALL THINGS WOULD BE NON-EXISTENT AND MOMENTARY,—LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS',—ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR BEING DEVOID OF ALL *efficiency*; BECAUSE—IT IS *efficiency* (FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION) THAT CONSTITUTES THE CHARACTERISTIC OF (EXISTING) 'THINGS'.—(415-416)

COMMENTARY.

If the second alternative is accepted, then, as the form of the thing, in the shape of its causal efficiency, would continue,—it should produce its effect over again; because it will not have abandoned its previous form, just like its previous condition; and thus there would come about the same *succession* of effects. This shows that the doctrine of *simultaneity* is contrary to Inferential Reasoning.

It might be argued that—"It may be that the effective action of the Permanent Thing is neither *successive* or *simultaneous*; and yet its efficiency may be there all the same."

In answer to this, it is said—'*How could any efficiency, etc. etc.*'—When the efficiency of things is determined, it is only on the basis of their bringing about their effects; so that when a thing does not bring about any effect, how could it be efficient ? Otherwise, why could not efficiency be attributed to the 'sky-lotus' and other such things also ?

Says the Opponent—"Even though the efficiency of the Thing has disappeared, the *existence* of the Thing is still there (it still *exists*); and as it would be in existence, your Reason becomes *Inconclusive*."

Answer :—'*Thus all things could be non-existent, etc. etc.*'—The only characteristic of an *existing thing* is that it should have the capacity for effective action; if this *capacity* has disappeared, how could *existence*, the characteristic feature of the *entity*, remain there ?

Thus it is established that *Ākāsha* and other things which are held to be *non-momentary* (permanent) can only be regarded as 'non-existent', —like 'the son of the Barren Woman',—because they are devoid of the capacity for effective action, functioning either successively or simultaneously. —(415-416)

TEXT (417).

IF, THEN, CAPACITY (FOR FRUITFUL ACTION) BE NOT ADMITTED TO BE THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF THE 'ENTITY',—THEN, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT BEHOVES THE OTHER PARTY TO POINT OUT SOME OTHER CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF 'ENTITIES'.—(417)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—"If *capacity for effective action* were the characteristic feature of *entities,* then alone all this would be very well".—In that case it should be explained what their characteristic feature is. As a matter of fact, when it is said that the 'Hare's Horn' and such thing are 'non-entities', this idea is based entirely upon the absence in them of the capacity for effective action. Then, inasmuch as 'entity' and 'non-entity' are mutually exclusive, it follows, by implication, that the characteristic feature of 'entity', as distinguished from 'non-entity', consists in its *capacity for effective action.*—(417)

The following *Text* anticipates the opponent's answer to the above :—

TEXT (418).

IF THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF 'ENTITIES' BE HELD TO CONSIST IN *being related to existence* (*Being*),—THAT CANNOT BE RIGHT; BECAUSE NO SUCH RELATION AS THAT OF 'INHERENCE' AND THE LIKE IS KNOWN TO SUBSIST BETWEEN THEM. HOW TOO COULD THEY BE THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF ONE ANOTHER ?—(418)

COMMENTARY.

[Says the Opponent]—"*Capacity for effective action* is not the characteristic feature of *entities*; it is '*being related to existence*', i.e., the 'Inherence of existence (Being)', that is their characteristic feature."

The answer to this is—*That cannot be right;* i.e. that cannot be the right characteristic feature of entities ;—*because no such relation as that of 'Inher-*

ence' and the like is known to subsist between them; the phase '*and the like*' is meant to include 'existence'. If any such relation as Inherence and the like were known to subsist between them, then 'Inherence' might be the characteristic feature of 'entities'; as a matter of fact however, it is exactly those relations whose existence the opponent has set out to prove; and also because there are valid proofs to the contrary. Or even the proofs already adduced before may be regarded as setting aside 'existence' (Being) as well as 'Inherence'. The reason for this lies in the fact that 'Existence' or 'Being' can have no relation with anything, as it cannot be helped by anything; and there can be no relation between things that are not helpful to one another; if there were such relation, it would lead to an absurdity.—Further, it behoves you to explain what is the characteristic feature of 'Being' (Existence), 'Inherence' and of the 'ultimate specific Individualities',—which feature marks them out as 'entities'. As a matter of fact 'Existence' (or 'Being') does not inhere (subsist) in either 'Inherence' or in 'the ultimate specific Individualities'; nor does it subsist in 'Being' or 'Existence' itself. In fact, the theory (of the opponent) is that what the presence of *existence* (or *Being*) marks out as 'entities' are only the three categories of *Substance, Quality and Action.*—Thus the characteristic feature proposed is found to be too narrow (not applicable to all the things in question).

Even granting that such entities as 'Existence' and the rest do exist;—the 'inherence of existence' cannot be the characteristic feature of *entities*; because it is an entirely different thing; when one thing is entirely different from another, it cannot constitute the form of the latter; and thereby serve as its characteristic feature. Thus, when a person is found whose mind is bewildered by his ignorance of the real character of 'entities', if a definition of their characteristic feature is provided, what should be pointed out as the required feature is some character in the thing in question itself which serves to differentiate it from something else; so that through that character, the nature of the thing could be determined; e.g. the Earth is distinguished as characterised by *roughness of surface.* One thing cannot constitute the form of another thing; for if it did, then it would not be *another* thing at all; how then could it form its characteristic feature? Specially because the term 'characteristic feature' in the present context stands for the *nature* or *character* of things.—(418)

Some people argue as follows:—"That entity which in its ultimate form does not bring about any cognition even for the Omniscient Person,—what would be the proof that would establish the non-existence of such an entity,—by virtue of which such a universal proposition could be asserted that 'whatever exists is momentary'? Nor would the non-cognition of such an entity vitiate the omniscient character of that Person, as His omniscience applies to only such things as are cognisable; it is only when a man does not know what is knowable, that he is regarded as *not omniscient*; while the said entity is not *knowable*; because, even though its cognition could be produced, it would remain *incapable of being* cognised."

Against these people, the author directs the following remarks:—

TEXTS (419–421).

All operations bearing upon the consideration of things are to be carried on by one who has an undisturbed intellect and seeks to accomplish a useful purpose,—not by one who is demented. Hence it would be right to determine the existence of only such a thing as would be of use to some people, at some place, at some time and in some way. It is in reference to such a thing that we are proving the *momentariness* ; and it is only with reference to such things that the Universal Premiss has been asserted.—(419–421)

COMMENTARY.

Whenever there is any consideration as to anything being existent or non-existent, it is done by one who seeks to accomplish some useful purpose, —and not because he is addicted to the habit of considering things ; as otherwise he would be regarded as a demented person. Hence an intelligent person can seek to determine the existence of only such things as could be of use to persons seeking to accomplish a useful purpose, in some way, directly or indirectly, at some place, and at some time ; and not anything else ; as there would be no basis for such consideration, and no useful purpose would be served by it.

The term '*ādi*' is meant to include the consideration of such particular things as Fire, Water and the like.

Thus what we are trying to prove is the *momentary character* of only those things which are capable of accomplishing some useful purpose of intelligent men, and which alone are known as 'entity', 'thing', and which have the said character of being capable of accomplishing a useful purpose. And as what we have cited as the Reason is the 'capacity for fruitful action', there is no *fallibility* in such a Reason, and it is only such a Reason which is found to be actually invariably concomitant, in the universal form, with the Probandum (Momentariness). That Premiss is said to be 'universal' which asserts the universal concomitance of the Reason, without any distinction between what is actually known to contain the Probandum and what is not so known.—(419–421)

The following texts answer the question why the character of 'entity', 'thing,' cannot be attributed to what is devoid of the *capacity for effective action* :—

TEXTS (422–424).

THAT WHICH IS DEVOID OF ALL CAPACITY, AND IS LIKE 'THE SON OF THE BARREN WOMAN', NEVER BECOMES A CAUSE (BASIS) EVEN FOR THE MIND OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON. AND AS IN SUCH A THING, INTELLIGENT MEN DO NOT PERCEIVE AN EFFECT OR CHARACTER AND SO FORTH, THEY DO NOT SEEK TO ESTABLISH ITS *existence* ; AS ANY SUCH ATTEMPT WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY BASELESS. THERE CAN BE NO USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED BY PROVING THE *momentariness* OF SUCH A THING. SO THAT ANY OBJECTION TAKEN TO THIS IS ALSO ABSOLUTELY FUTILE.—(422–424)

COMMENTARY.

'*Even for the mind, etc.*' ;—the term 'even' is meant to indicate that it is so, not only in regard to the 'moments' of the same 'series' as the said kind, but also in regard to such other purposes as the *holding of water* and the rest (in the case of the Jar).

'*Do not perceive the effect or character and so forth*' ;—the term '*kārya*', 'effect', stands for the *fruit, result* ;—the term '*rūpa*' for *nature, character,* —and '*so forth*' includes the particular time, place and condition ;—what is meant is that such a thing does not differ in any way from absolute non-entities like the 'Hare's Horns'.

Nor is there any useful purpose to be served for the person seeking to accomplish a purpose, by proving the 'momentariness' of such a thing ; because the perception or non-perception of such a character in it would not help in accomplishing any good, nor in avoiding an evil. This has been thus declared—'For one seeking to accomplish a useful purpose, what would be the use in discussing a thing which is incapable of accomplishing a useful purpose ? What need has the young woman of discussing whether the man wanting in virility is handsome or ugly ?'

For these reasons, when the disputant raises such questions as—"How is it known that it is momentary ?"—it is entirely futile ; because his opponent does not wish to prove the *momentariness* of such things.—(422–424)

The opponent now proceeds to show that 'capacity for fruitful activity' also cannot be the right differentia of 'entity',—as it would be *too wide* :—

TEXT (425).

"SUCH THINGS AS THE *Sky-lotus* ARE FOUND TO BE *capable of fruitful activity*, IN SO FAR AS THEY SERVE AS THE CAUSE OF THEIR OWN COGNITION ; AND YET THESE ARE *not existent*."—(425)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, things like the 'sky-lotus' are found to be capable of such fruitful action as the bringing about of such cognitions as 'the sky-

lotus', 'the sky-lotus';—and yet they do not really *exist*; hence the definition that 'Efficiency is the characteristic feature of the entity' (as put forward by the Buddhist under *Text* 416) is found to be 'too wide'.—(425)

The following *Text* supplies the answer to this :—

TEXT (426).

THE CHARACTER IN QUESTION AS ATTRIBUTED TO THE 'SKY-LOTUS' IS ENTIRELY BASELESS; ITS IDEA IS THERE ONLY AS THE RESULT OF ONE'S EAGERNESS FOR WRANGLING.—(426)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, *the capacity for fruitful activity* is not admitted in the 'sky-lotus' and such things. The idea of it is merely an outcome of the opponent's imagination and is utterly baseless.—(426)

Question :—"What is the Proof that annuls the idea of the said notion actually arising out of the 'sky-lotus' and such things?"
Answer :—

TEXT (427).

IF THE SAID IDEA HAD A NON-ENTITY FOR ITS CAUSE, THEN IT WOULD BE PRODUCED CONSTANTLY; AS THE NON-ENTITY CANNOT NEED ANYTHING ELSE, BEING ALWAYS DEVOID OF DISTINCTIONS.—(427)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*abhāvakāraṇatvē*' is to be expounded as 'the character of having a non-entity,—like the *sky-lotus*,—for its cause'. If the idea had such a non-entity for its cause then the idea of the *sky-lotus* and such things would be produced constantly; because its cause would be always present in its perfect form. Nor can it be said to be dependent upon the help of other things, as by its very nature it is incapable of being helped by anything else; hence its activity towards producing its effect could not

be held to be occasional on account of the occasional absence of such aids.—(427)

In the following *Texts*, the author sets forth the view of *Bhadanta-Yogasēna* (a Buddhist writer):—

TEXTS (428–434).

"EVEN IF THINGS ARE MOMENTARY,—HOW CAN THERE BE ANY *effective action*? THE INITIAL AUXILIARIES COULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE OF PECULIARITIES IN ONE ANOTHER; BECAUSE IF THEY HAVE COME INTO EXISTENCE, THEY MUST BE THERE ALREADY IN THEIR COMPLETE FORM; IF THEY HAVE NOT COME INTO EXISTENCE, AS THE ENTITIES WOULD NOT BE THERE, AS THIS ABSENCE WOULD BE WITHOUT DIFFERENTIATION, WHEREFORE COULD NOT THE EFFECT ITSELF BE PRODUCED THEREFROM (FOR THE BRINGING ABOUT OF WHICH THE AUXILIARIES ARE POSITED)? SPECIALLY AS THEY COULD NOT BE DIFFERENTIATED FROM ANYTHING ELSE, BEING EQUALLY OPEN TO QUESTION. THUS TOO THERE WOULD BE AN INFINITE REGRESS OF AUXILIARIES FOR YOU.—THEN AGAIN, AS THEY COULD NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE ACTION EITHER SUCCESSIVELY OR SIMULTANEOUSLY, IT IS USELESS TO REGARD THEM AS 'MOMENTARY'; SPECIALLY WHEN NO PECULIARITY CAN BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY ANY AUXILIARIES, THE ENTIRE SERIES IS RIGHTLY HELD TO BE WHOLLY UNDIFFERENTIATED (UNIFORM). IF THEN THE DESTRUCTION WERE WITHOUT CAUSE, IT SHOULD COME ABOUT AT THE VERY BEGINNING; AND IF THERE BE NO POSSIBILITY OF IT AT THE BEGINNING, HOW COULD IT COME AT THE END ALSO?—IF AGAIN, NO CAUSE IS ADMITTED EXCEPT THE CAUSE OF THE ENTITIES THEMSELVES,—THEN WHY SHOULD THERE BE ANY INCONGRUITY IN THEIR DESTRUCTION COMING ABOUT IN CERTAIN CASES ONLY (NOT ALWAYS)?"—(428–434)

COMMENTARY.

Yogasēna has argued as follows:—"Even if things were momentary, any activity of theirs, either successive or simultaneous, would be incompatible.—Because, by themselves, they could be either *capable*, or *incapable*, of such action. If they are *capable*, then they cannot need auxiliaries; as what is itself capable does not need anything else.—If the things are themselves *incapable*, then any need for auxiliaries is all the more baseless. For instance, the things that fall within the scope of the first series cannot acquire any peculiarities from one another; because things that are *produced* and *not produced* being *existent* and *non-existent*, cannot stand in the relation of *Helper* and the *Helped*. Hence at the initial stage, they being all undifferentiated, they could not produce any particular 'moment'; for, if

such a 'moment' could be produced from the undifferentiated things, wherefore could the effect in question also not be produced? Nor can it be right to say that they are produced out of what is different from the initial 'series'; as it is entirely on this ground that there is no differentiation among the components of the 'series' themselves. If these also were ultimately to bring about particular entities, then there would be an infinite regress.—Thus, there being no differentiation, how could any effect be produced from an undifferentiated 'series' of Causes? If there were to be production out of the undifferentiated Cause, then all things would be produced from all things.

"Thus then, even when there is an incongruity in *effective action*, coming either successively or simultaneously,—things do have effective activity,—and in the same manner, even though they are permanent, they could have the necessary effective activity. Hence it is needless to have recourse to the theory that things are *momentary*.

"Thus the Reason put forward (by the *Buddhist*)—'*because things exist* (therefore they must be momentary)'—is found to be Inconclusive.

"Nor can it be said that—'the production of the effect is due to the "series" *in a particular condition*, and not always';—because in accordance with the reasoning explained above, there being no peculiar condition brought about by Auxiliaries, the series would remain always undifferentiated.—Nor can it be right to assent that—'the *series* itself is only a peculiar feature connected with its own constituent cause';—as this would be contrary to a perceived fact. For instance, the effect is actually found to appear and disappear at the appearance and disappearance (respectively) of the Auxiliaries. If then, the peculiar condition were connected only with its own constituent cause, then the productivity would belong to the thing independently of auxiliaries.

"Further, in accordance with the reasonings adduced above, the series remaining always undifferentiated, such particular products as the *Potsherd* and the rest could not be produced out of the *Jar*.

"Then again, if the *Destruction* of a thing, consisting of the cessation of the series of its homogeneous *moments*, were without Cause,—then, as independent of all else, it should come about at the very outset; and if it does not come about at the initial stage, it could not come at a later stage either; because it would, even then be as undifferentiated as before.—If then, for the destruction of things, no such Cause is admitted as another 'series' distinct from the Cause of the things themselves,—then why should *Fire* be the destroyer of *Cold*? because what is ineffective cannot be a destroyer,—simply because it is incapable of doing anything; and even so if it were regarded as an effective destroyer, it would be an absurdity; and everything would be the destroyer of everything. Thus it would be impossible to explain such phenomena as the use of the term 'non-apprehension' and the 'destroying of life'—as being due to *opposition* (or destruction)."—(428–434)

The above arguments are answered in the following—

TEXTS (435-436).

OUR ANSWER TO THE ABOVE IS AS FOLLOWS :—THERE CAN BE NO MUTUAL HELP IN THE CASE OF THINGS APPEARING AT THE 'INITIAL STAGE'; THEY BECOME AUXILIARIES ONLY BY VIRTUE OF HAVING THE SAME EFFECTIVE ACTION. EVEN WHEN THERE IS NO HELP RENDERED TO ONE ANOTHER, THESE ARE NOT ENTIRELY *undifferentiated* ; BECAUSE WHEN THEY ARE THEMSELVES PRODUCED OUT OF THEIR OWN CONSTITUENT CAUSE, THEY BECOME PRODUCTIVE OF THEIR OWN SEVERAL DISTINCT 'SERIES'.—(435-436)

COMMENTARY.

The effect is produced only from a cause that is efficient; and yet auxiliaries are not entirely useless. Because the Auxiliary is of two kinds—(1) that which serves the same purpose, and (2) that which renders mutual help ;—in the case of the effect appearing immediately, the auxiliary can be of the former kind only, not of the latter kind; because at one and the same moment one could not produce any peculiarity in the other, as it remains impartite (undifferentiated) ;—in the case of the remoter effect, however, the auxiliary is of that kind where there is mutual help; as the qualified succeeding moment is produced mutually out of both, and the remote effect is produced by mutual help in reference to its own 'series'. Thus then, as regards those that appeared at the initial stage, there can be no differentiation from one another; and yet there can be nothing incongruous in their rendering mutual help; inasmuch as they serve the same purpose. But they are not *undifferentiated* in regard to the producing of the immediately following particular 'moment'; as the entire series of the succeeding effects is produced out of its own preceding 'causal ideas', and each member of this series is equally efficient in producing the said effects. These 'Causal Ideas' are produced from their own 'Causal Ideas',—these again from other 'Causal Ideas' of their own; and thus there is an endless series of causes.—Even if there is an Infinite Regress, that is nothing undesirable. Even though each member of the series is efficient, yet the others are not useless; as they also have been produced as so efficient, through the potency of their own causes. Nor is it possible for them to have a separate existence, as there is no cause for it. Nor can it come later on, as all things are momentary.

'*They become productive of their own several distinct series*' ;—that is, they are capable of producing the set appearing at the second moment.—The term 'their own constituent cause' should be understood to have been added for the purpose of precluding the usefulness of an auxiliary that appears at the initial stage. And it is not possible for any effect to be produced entirely from its own constituent cause, as everything becomes possible with the help of attending circumstances. This has been thus declared—

'Nothing can come out of any single thing, all is possible out of the attendant circumstances'.—(435-436)

TEXT (437).

THENCEFORWARD THE PARTICULAR ENTITIES THAT COME INTO EXISTENCE ARE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THAT; ON ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT THOSE THAT HELP TOWARDS THEM ARE OF THAT NATURE.—(437)

COMMENTARY.

'*Thenceforward*';—i.e. since the moment following the second 'moment'.

'*Are brought about by that*';—that is, produced by the particular causes brought about by the auxiliaries.

"How so?"

'*On account of, etc. etc.*';—i.e. because their nature is of that character,—i.e. produced by particular causes brought about by particular auxiliaries. '*Those that help towards them*';—this should be construed with the preceding phrase '*because their nature is of that form*'; and the particle '*cha*' has to be understood as before the phrase '*Those that help towards them*'. The meaning thus is as follows:—Towards the effect that comes into existence at the third moment, the particulars that have appeared during the second moment are helpful, as its cause; and those that are so helpful have the character of having a nature which is capable of producing the effects producible by the particulars brought about by the auxiliaries; so that the particulars appearing at the third moment are all brought about by these.—(437)

Question—"How does this restriction become applicable to these?"

Answer.—

TEXT (438).

EVERY MOMENT, ENTITIES GO ON COMING INTO EXISTENCE, WITH DEFINITE UNDEFINABLE POTENTIALITIES, AND NO OBJECTION CAN BE TAKEN TO THEM,—JUST AS TO THE FIRE'S CAPACITY TO BURN.—(438)

COMMENTARY.

The nature of things cannot be criticised (or objected to); because all diversity of the nature of things comes out of a series of 'ideas' bringing the things into existence; like the 'burning capacity' of fire; as a matter of fact, they come into existence every moment, as endowed with diverse potentialities, through the functioning of the series of ideas coming one after the other. Hence, even though, for some reason, they are cognised as being similar in form, through the presence of some similarity,—yet, in

reality, their nature is entirely different. That is the reason why only one entity becomes the cause of only one other entity, and not everything of everything. Hence there is no force in the objection urged.

'*Bhavanti*', '*go on coming into existence*',—i.e. are produced.—(438)

It has been argued by the opponent (under *Text* 433, above) that "if the Destruction were without cause, it should come about at the very beginning";—this is answered in the following :—

TEXTS (439-440).

IT IS 'DESTRUCTION' IN THE SHAPE OF THE 'BREAKING UP OF THE SERIES' WHICH IS WITHOUT CAUSE ; AND THIS DOES NOT COME ABOUT EVEN AT THE END ;—WHAT IS DENIED IS ITS COMING INTO EXISTENCE IN THAT FORM. AS FOR THE COMING INTO EXISTENCE OF SUCH DISSIMILAR THINGS (SERIES) AS THE *Potsherd* AND THE LIKE,—THIS CERTAINLY HAS A CAUSE ; BUT THIS ALSO IS NOT PRODUCED AT THE BEGINNING, BECAUSE AT THAT TIME ITS CAUSE IS NOT THERE.—(439-440)

COMMENTARY.

'Destruction' is of two kinds—(1) in the form of the 'Breaking up of the series', and (2) in the form of the coming into existence of a 'dissimilar series'.—If then what has been urged refers to 'Destruction' in the form of the 'Breaking up of the series',—then that cannot be right ; as such 'Destruction' does not come about even at the end ; for the simple reason that it has no form ; then what do you mean when you ask 'How does it come about at the end ?' Thus then, inasmuch as we do not admit of its coming into existence at any time, the argument based upon its presence or absence at the beginning or at the end is entirely irrelevant. All that is done by us is that *its coming into existence in that form is denied* ;—'in that form',—i.e. by the appearance of another similar series. When it is said that 'there is destruction of the Jar', what is meant is that 'another similar series does not come into existence' ; and there is no *affirmation* of anything.

If the 'Destruction' meant by the opponent is that in the form of 'the coming into existence of a dissimilar series',—then the fact of its being without cause is one that is not admitted (by anyone) ; because it is not admitted by any one that the stroke of the Bludgeon produces anything of the nature of a positive entity. That is the reason why it cannot come into existence even at the beginning ; as at that time its cause, in the shape of the Bludgeon, is not there.—(439-440)

The following *Text* proceeds to explain the idea of 'antagonism' (relation of *Destroyer and Destroyed*) among things :—

TEXTS (441–443).

THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF 'MOMENTARY THINGS'—SOME ARE CAUSES OF DECADENCE,—E.G. FIRE IS THE CAUSE OF THE DECADENCE (DIMINUTION) OF COLD ; AND OTHERS ARE NOT SO.—PEOPLE, NOT PERCEIVING THE TRUTH, THINK THAT THERE IS ANTAGONISM OF VARIOUS KINDS AMONG THINGS, EVEN WHEN THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT IS THERE. AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER THERE IS NO REAL 'ANTAGONISM' AMONG THINGS, IN THE SHAPE OF THE RELATION OF THE DESTROYER AND DESTROYED. IT IS IN THIS SENSE THAT THE EXPRESSION 'NOTION OF ANTAGONISM' HAS BEEN USED. —(441–443)

COMMENTARY.

There are certain things which become causes of the 'decadence' of certain other things,—the 'decadence' consisting in the production of 'moments' of gradually decreasing degrees of intensity ; for instance *fire* is the cause of such a 'decadence' of *Cold* ;—while there are other things *which are not so*,—i.e. not causes of the decadence of things ; e.g. *Fire* is not the cause of the 'decadence' of *smoke*.—Among the former—i.e. among the causes of decadence,—even though there is the relation of cause and effect,—yet people, having their powers of vision bedimmed by ignorance, think that there is 'antagonism' (between the said *cause* and the thing whose decadence has been brought about),—*of various kinds*,—e.g. *Fire* is antagonistic to *Cold*, *Air* is antagonistic to the *Lamp*, *Light* is antagonistic to *Darkness* and so forth.—In reality, however, there is no such antagonism among things as that between the *destroyer* and the *destroyed* ; because when an entity comes into existence, it does so in its complete form,—and it is impossible to bring about any change in the nature of a thing ; there can be no cause for any such change,—whether it be different or non-different from the thing. As regards the *non-entity*, nothing can be done to it, simply because it is non-existent.—So that in both ways, the 'antagonist' can do nothing. It is for this reason that the Teacher has declared that 'When your cause is there in its perfect form, and yet there is non-existence (of its effect) while something else is existent, it is spoken of as *antagonism*' ;—it is only a *notion* of antagonism ; i.e. there is no real antagonism.

The particle '*api*' stands for '*cha*', and should be construed after '*ēva*'.—(441–443)

In the following *Texts*, the author sets forth arguments against the doctrine of the 'Perpetual Flux', from the standpoint of the followers of *Jaimini* and others :—

TEXTS (444-445).

"As a matter of fact, there is always the *Recognition* of a thing in the form 'this is that same', when the sense-organ concerned is rightly functioning; and this Recognition is quite firm and undeniable.—This therefore is an irrepressible fact of perception, which annuls all the reasons that have been adduced for proving the 'Perpetual Flux' of things."—(444-445)

COMMENTARY.

"For instance, in regard to Mountains, the Body, the Diamond and such things,—after the proper functioning of the sense-organ concerned, there appears the valid sense-perception called 'Recognition',—in the form of 'this is that same',—which rejects the idea of things being 'momentary'. Even though it is true that such Recognition is found to appear also in regard to newly grown nails, hairs, grasses, and such things,—yet the Recognition regarding the Diamond and such things cannot be invalid,—as it is never annulled. This is what is meant by the epithets '*firm and undeniable*'. What is meant is that the mere fact that the Recognition in the case of Hair—brought about by the Eyes affected by darkness,—is invalid cannot lead men with unclouded minds to regard as invalid the direct visual perception of the real Hair, brought about by undimmed Eyes.—The epithet '*firm*' implies the fact of its not being of doubtful character,—there being no such doubt as to whether this is really the same or something else. The epithet '*undeniable*' implies the fact of its not being *wrong*."—(444-445)

The Author answers these arguments in the following—

TEXTS (446-447).

In fact, Recognition can never be of the nature of Direct Sense-perception; because the form of the thing itself is inexpressible, and the *Recognition* is expressed in words.—*Recognition* must be wrong, and Sense-perception is entirely different from it. That Recognition is wrong is clear from the fact that it appears in the form of the notion of '*non-difference*' where, in reality, there is *difference*.—(446-447)

COMMENTARY.

The very fact of the said Recognition being of the nature of Perception is not admitted. Because the real character of a 'Thing' is inexpressible in

words, because of the absence of contiguity; hence its real cognition can only be in the form of a mental apprehension; specially because when the Thing has not been apprehended as related to any words, it cannot be possible to apprehend it along with a verbal expression. Hence a Real Perception, pertaining as it does to the specific individuality of things, must be *beyond all imposition, indeterminate.* And as such Perception would be entirely valid, it cannot be wrong. This is the reason why wise men have declared the definition of Perception to be that 'it is free from all determination, and not mistaken', which is perfectly logical.—*Recognition*, on the other hand, is *not* 'free from determination', as it is always conceived in the verbal form 'this is that same'; nor is it *unmistaken*, because it apprehends, as *non-different*, things that are really *different.*—(446-447)

Question :—" How is it so ? "
Answer—

TEXT (448).

IF THE RECOGNITION DID APPREHEND THE FORM OF THE THING AS PREVIOUSLY COGNISED, THEN IT WOULD HAVE APPEARED AT THAT SAME TIME, AS ITS OBJECT WOULD BE THE SAME,—LIKE THE PREVIOUS COGNITION.—(448)

COMMENTARY.

If the Recognition had the same object that has been cognised before, then it would have appeared at that same time,—because as having the same object, its cause would be there in its perfect form; like the previous cognition;—'*as its object would be the same*';—i.e. the object of the Recognition would be that same object which has been cognised before.—(448)

The following *Text* puts forward reasonings in the indirect form of a *reductio ad absurdum* :—

TEXTS (449-450).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, HOWEVER IT IS NOT SO; THEN THE RECOGNITION HAS NOT BEEN REGARDED AS APPREHENDING THE SAME OBJECT;—BECAUSE IT IS PRODUCED AT ITS OWN TIME,—LIKE THE COGNITION OF ANOTHER THING; AND INASMUCH AS IT APPREHENDS AS *non-different* WHAT IS REALLY *different,* IT MUST BE MISTAKEN,—LIKE THE NOTION OF THE ILLUSORY BALL.—(449-450)

COMMENTARY.

The arguments may be thus formulated :—(*a*) When a cognition does not appear even when the thing is there in its perfect form, that Cognition cannot have that thing for its object;—e.g. even when Colour is there in

its perfectly perceptible form, the auditory perception is not there;—even when the Diamond and other things were there in the perfectly perceptible form at the time of their previous perception, their Recognition does not appear at that time; hence the wider condition not being present (the less wide condition cannot be there).—(*b*) Thus if the Diamond and other things were permanent, the Recognition of those things should appear on the previous occasion, when its causes would be present in its perfect form;—and yet as a matter of fact, it does not appear at that time;—hence it becomes established that those things cannot be permanent. Thus then, it remains undisputed that since it apprehends as *non-different* what is *different*, the Recognition must be mistaken, like the cognition of the illusory Ball. Thus it has been shown that Recognition is not one that has its object not denied;—[hence it is invalid]; because its object is actually annulled by the aforesaid reasoning which has proved it to be wrong.—(449-450)

For the following reason also,—that it apprehends what is already apprehended,—Recognition cannot be valid,—being just like Remembrance.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (451).

IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO REGARD RECOGNITION AS VALID,—BECAUSE IT OPERATES TOWARDS AN OBJECT WHOSE PURPOSE HAS BEEN ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED,—LIKE REMEMBRANCE AND SUCH OTHER COGNITIONS;—AND HENCE IT IS DEVOID OF THE CHARACTER OF THE VALID MEANS (OF COGNITION).—(451)

COMMENTARY.

That active agent alone is called the 'Means of Right Cognition' which is the best implement and the most effective instrument in the bringing about of the action of valid Cognition. If then, Recognition has for its object something that has been already apprehended by a previous Cognition, then, inasmuch as it would be operating towards a Cognition that has been already brought about, it could not be 'the most effective instrument',—and under the circumstances, how could it have the character of the 'Means of Right Cognition'? If it did, then Remembrance also would be a means of Right Cognition (which no one admits). And when it has not acquired the character of a 'valid means of Right Cognition', it cannot be effective in annulling any notion. If it did so, it would lead to an absurdity.

"Recognition may not be a separate Means of Right Cognition; and yet the mere fact of its having for its object something that existed at the previous time does annul the notion of the 'Perpetual Flux' of things."

This is not right; because in reality, its object is not the same as the previous thing; in fact it is a figment of the imagination, and even though purely imaginary, it apprehends, through illusion, the previously perceived thing; and by reason of this illusory apprehension, it is said to have the previously perceived thing for its object. Under the circumstances, how can

the doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux' be discarded on the strength of the said 'Recognition' which is illusory in its very source ?—(451)

The following *Texts* urge—from Kumārila's standpoint [*vide Shlokavārtika* —Perception, Shlo. 234]—the argument that "Recognition does not apprehend what has been already apprehended" :—

TEXTS (452-453).

"As a matter of fact, *the existence of the thing at the present time* (of Recognition) has not been included under the previous Cognition; this is a peculiar feature in Recognition, which is not present in Remembrance. Remembrance is in the form of 'that' and appertains only to that which has been already cognised before; Recognition however is in the form 'This is that same', which is something totally different (from the previous Cognition)."—(452-453)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila has argued as follows :—"The previous Cognition has not apprehended *the existence of the Thing at the present time* (of Recognition); as it could not appear in the form 'this is the same as that'; hence there is a difference between Recognition and Remembrance.—"How ?"—Remembrance always appears in the form of 'That' which takes in only that much of the Thing as has been cognised before; while Recognition takes in the idea of 'This' also (being in the form '*This* is the same as *that*'), which is an additional feature of the thing concerned. To this extent, Recognition is something different from *Remembrance.* Thus Recognition acquires the character of a real 'Means of Right Cognition', after having shaken off the Doubt and Mistake in regard to it."—(452-453)

He proceeds to show in what way it shakes off the Doubt and Mistake :—

TEXT (454).

"Inasmuch as there is no Doubt or Mistake in regard to what is cognised (by Recognition),—Recognition acquires the character of the 'Means of Right Cognition' after having set aside both."—(454)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as Doubt and Mistake do not exist at all in regard to the thing *recognised,*—having been dispelled, like cold in a place surrounded by a large mass of flaming fire.—(454)

The following argument has been urged against Kumārila's position :— In the case of an object cognised through Inference,—such as the inference of the dark complexion of the child (from the fact of its being born of a dark woman),—it is sometimes found that it is subsequently set aside by direct Perception (when the child is actually seen to be fair-complexioned) ; —in the same manner, in the case in question, even though the permanence of Things might be cognised through Recognition, yet it may be that at some later time, the *successive* (fluctuating) character of things may be proved through Inference based upon the fact of the effects of the thing being successive ; and the said permanence vouched for by Recognition may thus be set aside by this subsequent Inference. Under the circumstances, how can the doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux' be held to be discarded (by Recognition) ?

This is answered (from Kumārila's point of view) in the following—

TEXT (455).

"A THING, THOUGH COGNISED BY OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION, COULD BE ACCEPTED AS OTHERWISE, IF SO APPREHENDED BY SENSE-PERCEPTION ; WHEN HOWEVER A THING IS ALREADY TAKEN UP BY SENSE-PERCEPTION, THERE CAN BE NO APPEARANCE OF ANY OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION (TO THE CONTRARY)."—(455)

COMMENTARY.

'*Other means of Cognition*'—i.e. Inference and the rest ; such as 'The child must be dark-complexioned because he is the son of so and so' and so forth.

'*Could be accepted as otherwise*',—through the instrumentality of Sense-perception ;—'*otherwise*',—i.e. of a form other than that apprehended through Inference, etc.

'*Already taken up*',—i.e. apprehended.

'*There can be no appearance, etc.*' ;—Means of Cognition other than Sense-perception,—i.e. Inference and the rest—cannot set aside Sense-perception.—(455)

Why so ?

Answer :—

TEXT (456).

"WHEN A THING HAS BEEN DULY APPREHENDED THROUGH THE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED HIGHEST MEANS OF COGNITION,—HOW COULD ONE EVER HAVE A COGNITION TO THE CONTRARY, ON THE STRENGTH OF THE OTHER WEAKER MEANS OF COGNITION ?"—(456)

COMMENTARY.

It is only right that what has been ascertained through Inference should be concluded to be otherwise, on the strength of Sense-perception ; because

this latter is the highest among the Means of Cognition ; but Inference and the rest can never alter the nature of a thing as cognised through Sense-perception ; as they are weaker.

'*Firmly established*',—i.e. free from Doubt and Mistake.

'*To the contrary*',—i.e. otherwise than that cognised through Sense-perception.—(456)

With the following *Text*, the Author answers the above arguments of *Kumārila* :—

TEXT (457).

IF *existence at the present time* IS HELD BY YOU TO BE DISTINCT FROM THE PREVIOUS EXISTENCE, THEN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM BECOMES PROVED BY YOURSELF.—(457)

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted that the object of Recognition is *existence at the present time* ;—is this *present existence* different from the *existence* apprehended by the previous Perception ? Or, is it the same ? If it is different, then *difference* being proved by your own assertion, there is contradiction of your own doctrine ; while for us, it is what is desired by us.—(457)

TEXT (458).

IF THE *present existence* IS *not-different* (FROM THE *previous existence*),—THEN HOW IS IT THAT IT IS 'NOT INCLUDED IN THE PREVIOUS COGNITION' ? IN FACT, IF IT WERE NOT INCLUDED THEREIN, THEN IT WOULD COME TO THIS THAT THE THING ITSELF WAS NOT APPREHENDED AT ALL.—(458)

COMMENTARY.

If the 'present existence' is something *different* from the 'previous existence', then, how could it have been not-included in the previous Cognition,—on account of which you have asserted (under *Text* 452) that 'it is not included in the previous Cognition' ?

The following might be urged—"The momentary character of Sound and other things, though not anything different from these things, is said to be *not-apprehended* when the things are apprehended ; the same may be true in the case in question also."

This is not right. It is not true that while the object, Sound, is apprehended, its momentary character, though not-different from it, is held to

be not apprehended ; what is held is that, though the momentary character is apprehended, yet its apprehension is not definitely certain, on account of the ground for certainty not being there ; because mere apprehension does not bring about *certain* Cognition ; the certainty is dependent upon the needs of the apprehender and the soundness of the repetition of the apprehension.—This explanation is not available for you ; because for you, even the previous perception is *determinate* (certain) in character; and when the form of the thing has been definitely cognised with certainty, through that previous Perception, then its *present existence* also, which is non-different from the previous form, must also have been definitely ascertained with certainty by that same Perception ; if this latter were not *definitely certain*, the form of the thing also,—as non-different from this *present existence*,—would have to be regarded as *not definitely* ascertained.

Some people have held that—" The validity of the Recognition is based upon the definite ascertainment of the Thing that has been in doubt."—This also becomes rejected by our above reasoning. Nor, in the present case, is there any ascertainment of a Thing in doubt ;—because in the case of Hairs, even though different hairs come out one after the other, there is Recognition ; so that the doubt would remain (even after Recognition, which has been found to be fallible in the case of Hairs).—(458)

It has been argued (under *Text* 455) that—" what has been cognised by other Means of Cognition could be accepted as otherwise, if so apprehended by Sense-perception ".—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (459).

IF WHAT HAS BEEN COGNISED THROUGH INFERENCE AND THE OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION WERE ANNULLED BY SENSE-PERCEPTION, THEN INFERENCE AND THE REST COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION,—BECAUSE THEY ARE ANNULLED,—LIKE COGNITIONS THROUGH DEFECTIVE VISION.—(459)

COMMENTARY.

If the subject-matter of an Inference,—such as ' because it is your child [it must be dark-complexioned] ',—could be annulled by Sense-perception,—then that Inference cannot be a Means of Right Cognition at all; because on account of its subject-matter being annulled, there can be no agreement with the real state of things, and hence it would be like the perception obtained through defective vision.—Hence the assertion that—" What has been cognised through other Means of Cognition could be accepted as otherwise, on the strength of Sense-perception "—is irrelevant, being entirely impossible.—(459)

It has been argued (under *Text* 456) that—" Sense-perception is the highest among the Means of Right Cognition " ;—that also is not true.—This is shown in the following—

TEXT (460).

THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REAL STATE OF THINGS' BEING EQUALLY PRESENT IN ALL FORMS OF VALID COGNITION, —WHY SHOULD THERE BE A PREJUDICE AT ALL ?—IN CASE THE SAID CHARACTER BE NOT PRESENT IN *Inference* AND THE REST, THEN THESE LATTER WOULD NOT BE VALID MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION AT ALL.—(460)

COMMENTARY.

The 'validity' of the Means of Right Cognition consists only in their having the capacity to bring about the *right* notion of things ; and if this is admitted as belonging to all the Means of Right Cognition,—then, why should Perception be regarded as the 'highest' among them ?—It might be said that "it is Perception alone that is in strict accordance with the real state of things ",—then, *this character of being in strict accordance with the real state of things* being absent in Inference and the rest, these latter would not be 'Means of Right Cognition' at all ; because the very idea of being a 'Means of Right Cognition' is based upon *accordance with the real state of things* ; and this (*ex hypothesi*) would be absent in Inference and the rest.—(460)

The following *Text* introduces the arguments advanced by *Bhāvivikta* (against the doctrine of *Perpetual Flux*) :—

TEXT (461).

" THE ALL-COMPREHENSIVE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE (PREMISS) THAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED IN ALL THE REASONINGS (PROPOUNDED BY THE BUDDHIST) BECOMES ANNULLED BY THE FOLLOWING INFERENCE ; OR ELSE, THE PROPOSITION (ASSERTING THE DOCTRINE IN QUESTION) ITSELF BECOMES REJECTED."—(461)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—" What is that Inference ? "
Answer :—

TEXTS (462-463).

"THE SUBSEQUENT COGNITION OF THE SUN AND OTHER THINGS MUST APPERTAIN TO THE SAME SUN AND OTHER THINGS THAT EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE COGNITION THAT APPEARS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUN AND MOON, ETC.,—BECAUSE WHILE IT IS NOT A COGNITION OF ANYTHING RELATED TO THE EARTH AND OTHER THINGS, IT IS SPOKEN OF AS THE COGNITION OF THOSE THINGS (SUN, ETC.),—JUST LIKE THE PREVIOUS COGNITION OF THE SUN AT THAT TIME."—(462-463)

COMMENTARY.

"The Cognitions—in dispute—of *the Sun, the Moon, the Planets, the Stars and such objects* must appertain to *the Sun, the Moon, the Planets, the Stars and the rest* as associated with the time at which appeared the cognition of these Sun and the rest in Dēvadatta and other persons,—because while not apprehended as related to the Earth, they are spoken of by means of the term '*the Cognition of the Sun, the Moon, the Planets, the Stars and the rest*',—like Dēvadatta's Cognition of these things on the first occasion."

'*Must appertain to, etc.*'—i.e. to luminous substances.

'*While not apprehended as related to the Earth*';—this qualification has been added in order to avoid the invalidity that might apply to it on the basis of the Cognition of the Sun, etc. as painted in pictures.

'*Subsequent*',—i.e. a Cognition other than Dēvadatta's; i.e. appearing at a different time.—(462-463)

The following is an argument put forward by *Bhāvivikta* :—"The substrata of Universals like 'Colour', the substrata of those substrata, and the particular Cognitions of all these,—in the form of Perception, Inference, Analogical Cognition, Verbal Cognition, Remembrance, Recognition, Mystic Vision, Doubt, Wrong Cognition, Representative Cognition, Dream, and Dream-end,—all these cannot be liable to destruction immediately on coming into existence,—because they are spoken of by such verbal expressions as—'knowable', 'rightly cognisable', 'expressible', 'either *existing* or *non-existing*', 'not characterised by cognitions whose object is something different from Being and Non-being', 'not apprehensible by cognitions whose objects are non-apprehensible', 'not expressible by words which are inexpressive', 'expressible by such words as are the products of sounds produced by the conjunction and disjunction of homogeneous and heterogeneous substances',—like 'Previous Negation' and such things."

'*Substrata of Universals like Colour*', *etc.* are the Colour, etc. themselves.—'*The substrata of these substrata*'.—What are these ?—Such things as the Jar, (which are the substrata of Colour, etc.).—'*Mystic vision*',—perception by mystics.—The others have been explained before.—'*Either existence or non-existence*'—i.e. Being or Non-being.—Inasmuch as there

is nothing that is 'neither Being nor Non-being', there can be no cognition of which that could be the object; and its 'non-characterisation' follows from its very non-existence.—Similarly, *the apprehension of an inapprehensible* object being impossible, inapprehensibility by such apprehension follows as a matter of course.—Similarly *inexpressibility by words which are inexpressible* also follows from the fact that such words are meaningless.—'Homogeneous things' are substances, like the lips, teeth and so forth, all these having the common character of being *products*; 'heterogeneous things' are *Ākāsha* and the rest; the *mutual conjunction and disjunction of these homogeneous and heterogeneous substances* produce the first Sound, and this first Sound brings about, in due succession, its product in the shape of the Sound that reaches the Ear; and it is by this Sound that things are expressed.—The process of sound-production, according to these people, is as follows:—The initial sound arises from Conjunction and Disjunction; thence proceed other sound waves, in the manner of the filaments of the *Kadamba* flower; that Sound which reaches the *Ākāsha* in the Ear, that alone is heard, not any other."

This entire set of reasonings is set forth in the following:—

TEXTS (464-465).

"ALL THOSE THINGS THAT ARE THE SUBSTRATA OF COLOUR, ETC.,—AND THE SUBSTRATA OF THESE THINGS,—AS ALSO THE COGNITIONS THAT APPEAR IN REGARD TO THESE,—ALL THESE ARE NOT, LIKE THE SKY-LOTUS, LIABLE TO DESTRUCTION IMMEDIATELY ON COMING INTO EXISTENCE,—BECAUSE THEY ARE COGNISABLE AND EXPRESSIBLE."—(464-465)

COMMENTARY.

The two reasons 'cognisability' and 'expressibility' have been mentioned by way of illustration; the other reasons also are meant to be applicable.—

'*Khārabinda*'—is the '*arabinda*', Lotus, in '*kha*', the Sky,—i.e. the 'Sky-lotus'.—(464-465)

Uddyotakara [in *Nyāyavārtika* on 3. 2. 14, page 421, Bib. Ind. Edn.] has stated the argument (against Perpetual Flux) as follows:—"The Cognitions under dispute, appearing at diverse times, must appertain to the same thing,—because while being rightly co-extensive with the cognition of that thing, it is expressible by the same terms,—like the present cognition of a thing as appearing in various persons".—Here the term '*avyutthāyi*' stands for what is not '*vyutthāyī*', wrong,—i.e. what is *right*;—the 'co-extensiveness' is that of the cognitions of the Jar and such things;—and the epithet 'right' is meant to qualify this 'co-extensiveness'; what is meant is that the said co-extensiveness is never sublated or annulled. This qualification has been added in order to avoid the falsity that might attach to it on

the basis of the example of the Lamp-light and such things.—' *Expressible by the same terms* '—such as ' Chaitra's Cognition ', ' Chaitra's Cognition ' and so forth.

This argument of *Uddyotakara's* is set forth in the following—

TEXTS (466-467).

" OUR PROCLAMATION IS THAT THE COGNITIONS UNDER DISPUTE WHICH APPEAR IN SUCCESSION,—ALL APPERTAIN TO ONE AND THE SAME THING,—BECAUSE THE FACT OF THEIR BEING BASED UPON ONE THING IS NEVER ANNULLED, AND THEY ARE ALL SPOKEN OF BY THE SAME TERMS ;—JUST LIKE THE COGNITIONS OF SEVERAL MEN APPEARING AT THE PRESENT SINGLE MOMENT."—(466-467)

COMMENTARY.

' *Proclamation* '—our conclusion, declaration.

' *Co-extensiveness* ',—*the character of subsisting in the sâme thing* ;—this is *not annulled*.—Such is the analysis of the compound.—(466-467)

The above argument is answered in the following—

TEXT (468).

IN THE FIRST REASONING, THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE IS DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM, AS IT IS ALL INCLUDED UNDER THE PROBANS ; AND ALL OBJECTS OF COGNITION ARE NOT ALWAYS SYNCHRONOUS WITH THEIR COGNITION.—(468)

COMMENTARY.

' *In the first reasoning* ',—where the Reason (Probans) is stated in the form ' because it is spoken of as the Cognition of that ' (under Texts 462-463).—As a matter of fact, the first Cognition of the Moon, etc. also does not appertain to the Moon, etc. as existing at the time of the Cognition ;—because what forms the object of the cognition is what is included under the Probans itself. Further, it is not possible for any causal relation to subsist between synchronous things. It has been thus asserted :—' What does not exist could have no previous potentiality, and it could have no use later on ; all causes must exist before (these effects) ; hence the object cannot exist along with its own cognition '.—(468)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that the Reason is ' inconclusive ', even with the qualification ' though not apprehended as related to the Earth ' (under *Text* 463) :—

TEXT (469).

When terms like 'Sun' and the rest, whose use depends upon the speaker's whim, are applied to the *Lamp* and such things,—the cognition of the Sun that appears proves the falsity of the Reason in question.—(469)

COMMENTARY.

In the second set of arguments also (set forth in the Introduction to *Texts* 464-465),—for the simple reason that things like the 'Universal' do not exist at all,—no one holds them to be 'momentary';—if the Opponent proceeds to prove the absence of such momentariness in those things (like the 'Universal', etc.),—then his effort is entirely futile.—This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (470).

Things like the 'Universal' have no character at all (being non-existent),—hence the 'momentariness' of such things cannot be postulated by anyone; so that any reasons adduced for the proving of the absence of 'momentariness' in the said things is entirely futile.—(470)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*like*', in the Expression '*Things like* the Universal' is meant to include the substrata of the Universal, in the shape of Colour, Jar and the like, and also the Cognitions of these.—These also, even as qualified by the said qualification, do not exist at all; hence the reason that has been adduced for the purpose of proving the 'momentariness' of such things is entirely futile; that is to say, there can be no dispute on that point at all.

The Author has not gone into the minute details of the reasoning in question. If we go into the minute details, we come across a large number of defects. For instance, the reason that has been adduced in the form that 'it is either existent or non-existent', is found to be absent in the Probandum and also in the Corroborative Instance; as the term 'either—or' signifies *option*, and *option* is possible only when there are more things than one, and not when there is only one thing; and it is not possible for both *existence* and *non-existence* to be present in the object that forms the Probandum; because it being of the nature of 'entity', it is only *existence* that can belong to it. Nor are both possible in the Corroborative Instance; because, as it is a 'non-entity', it is *non-existence* alone that can belong to it. —The Reason also as stated has been loaded with a useless qualification: For instance, the expression 'because it is expressible *by words*', even by itself, is highly improper, as the term 'expressible' itself implies the

qualification 'by words'.—Similarly, the qualification put forward by the words 'homogeneous, etc.' is too childish. Similarly the other qualifications of the Reason should be regarded useless.

Further, all the Reasons put forward are 'inconclusive',—because no evidence has been adduced in denial of a conclusion contrary to the desired conclusion.—This is going to be explained later on.—(470)

As regards the argument set forth under *Texts* 466-467,—the answer is provided in the following—

TEXT (471).

As regards the character of 'being expressed by the same term'—this is present in the Cognitions of things like the Lamp also. Hence this Reason becomes 'inconclusive'.—(471)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the Cognitions of the Lamp, we find that the same expression 'Cognition of Lamp' is applied to the cognitions which have different things (in the shape of the flickering flames) for their object; hence the character of 'being expressed by the same term', which has been adduced as the Reason for *sameness*, is found to be 'fallible' in the case of the 'Cognitions of the Lamp'.

Or the Text may be read with a taunting intonation, the sense being——'the said character subsisting in the Cognitions of the Lamp is, on that very account, a very Sound reason, and for you, indeed, it is infallible; but in reality, it is not so'.—(471)

In the following *Text* the Author anticipates the view of the other party:—

TEXT (472).

If it be held that "in the case of the Cognitions of the Lamp, the 'co-extensiveness' is subsequently annulled",—then how is it that you do not perceive the clear annulment of the same in your proposed conclusion also?—(472)

COMMENTARY.

"In fact, the qualification—'while being *rightly* co-extensive with the Cognition of that thing'—has been added (by *Uddyotakara*), solely for the purpose of excluding such cases as that of the 'Cognitions of the Lamp', as the one-ness of the object of these latter Cognitions is annulled; because the Lamp is at one moment with a high flame, and the next moment with a

low flame, it is at one moment very bright and at the next moment, less bright. How then can our Reason be false ? "

Such is the sense of what the Opponent says.

In answer to this, the Author adds—'*How is it, etc.*'—That is, the qualification also is one that is not admitted. As a matter of fact, even in regard to the character of the Opponent's intended Probandum, there is annulment ;—why is *that* also not perceived ? For instance, in regard to *Chaitra* and other persons, the Cognition of them that is produced is in such diverse forms as 'infant', 'boy', 'youth' and so forth,—in regard to the mountain and such things, the notions are diverse in the shape of 'cold', 'hot', etc. So that, as in the case of the Lamp, so in the case of these things also, the diversity of the cognised thing is clearly perceived. If it were not so, then, if the same mountain that was *cold* subsequently became *hot*,—then under both conditions both *cold* and *heat* would be perceptible there ; because the said qualified conditions being related to the thing, the qualities would have to be regarded as present there ; for instance, when a man tied to a chain is pulled, the chain also becomes pulled. This has been nearly all explained before.—Thus even with the said qualification, the Reason is 'unproven', 'not admitted'.—(472)

The annulment of the Opponent's argument by Inference also is next shown :—

TEXTS (473-474).

THE COGNITIONS UNDER DISPUTE CANNOT PERTAIN TO ONE AND THE SAME THING, BECAUSE THEY APPEAR IN SUCCESSION,—LIKE THE COGNITIONS PERTAINING TO LIGHTNING, LAMP AND SUCH THINGS.—IN ALL COGNITIONS PERTAINING TO ONE AND THE SAME THING, THE PRESENCE OF SUCCESSION IS INCOMPATIBLE. AND WHEN THE EFFECT IS THE SAME, EVEN THE DEPENDENCE OF OTHER THINGS WOULD BE INCONGRUOUS. —(473-474)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated thus :—What appears in succession can never have its complete cause always in close proximity to it,—as the cognitions of Lightning, Lamp and such things ;—the Cognitions under dispute all appear in succession ;—hence there is found something which is contrary to that with which the desired character is invariably concomitant.—This Reason cannot be said to be 'inconclusive' ; because *succession* is not possible in the Cognition of any single object, the complete cause of which Cognition is present.—Nor can the cause be said to be dependent on other causes (which could account for the succession) ; because what is permanent cannot be helped by such aids ; and no dependence can rightly be held to lie on what is not helpful ; as this would lead to absurdities. If there were

help actually rendered, then the thing would lose its *permanence*. This has been explained hundreds of times.—(473-474)

The following *Text* shows that all our arguments are free from the defect of 'Inconclusiveness', as there is no proof in support of a conclusion contrary to ours :—

TEXT (475).

ALL THESE REASONS ARE FREE FROM DOUBT AND DENIAL ;—AS NO PROOFS HAVE BEEN ADDUCED IN ANNULMENT OF THESE.—(475)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily intelligible.—(475)

End of the Chapter on the Permanence of Things.

CHAPTER IX.

Examination of the Relation between Actions and their Results: Action and Reaction.

COMMENTARY.

The Author now proceeds to examine the doctrine of *Relation between Actions and their Results,* the Law of Action and Reaction, mentioned in the Introductory verses; and starts off with an objection from the standpoint of that doctrine, against the Doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux':—

TEXT (476).

"IF ALL THINGS ARE OBSESSED BY *non-permanence,* IN THE FORM OF 'MOMENTARINESS', THEN HOW CAN THERE BE ANY RELATION BETWEEN ACTION AND ITS RESULT (REACTION), OR BETWEEN THE CAUSE AND ITS EFFECT AND SO FORTH?"—(476)

COMMENTARY.

The Text speaks of '*non-permanence in the form of momentariness*', with a view to exclude that 'non-permanence' which does not consist in *momentariness*; the meaning being—'if things are held by you to be obsessed by that non-permanence which belongs to momentary things'—then, how could there be any such relations as the one subsisting between Actions and their Results and so forth, which are recognised among men and in the scriptures?—The expression '*and so forth*' is meant to include the means of cognising the cause and its effect, the Recognition following after Apprehension, the longing for one thing aroused by the seeing of another thing, the notion of Bondage and Liberation, Remembrance, Decision following after Doubt, seeking for something kept by oneself, the cessation of curiosity for things already seen and such other hosts of grounds for objection raised by the evil-minded.—What is meant is that if a doctrine is contrary to notions current among people and recognised by the scriptures, it can never secure acceptance; hence the Doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux' is open to the objection that it is annulled by universally accepted notions.—For instance,

it is well known among people that the result of the good or bad action is experienced by that same man who did the act; when a good or bad act has been done by *Dēvadatta*, the result of that act—agreeable or disagreeable,—is not experienced by *Yajñadatta*. Nor is such an idea countenanced in the scriptures, where we read—'When the action has been done by this person, who else will experience its results?'—Such a notion is contrary to the doctrine of the 'Perpetual Flux' of things; as under that doctrine there cannot be any one entity who would do the act and experience its result; so that the said doctrine is clearly open to the criticism that it involves the anomaly of 'the disappearance of the action done by the Person himself and the befalling upon him of the effect of what was not done by him'.—(476)

The following *Text* explains how the doctrine is open to this criticism :—

TEXTS (477–479).

"IN THE CASE OF ACTIVE PEOPLE, THAT 'MOMENT' (MOMENTARY THING) WHICH IS BELIEVED TO BE THE *doer* OF THE ACT, DOES NOT CONTINUE TO EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE RESULT OF THAT ACT ;—AND THE ACT WAS NOT DONE BY THAT 'MOMENT' WHICH IS SPOKEN OF AS THE *experiencer* OF THE RESULT AT THE TIME OF ITS APPEARANCE ; AS IT DID NOT EXIST AT THAT TIME.—THUS, INASMUCH AS NO SINGLE ENTITY IS ADMITTED AS BEING THE *doer* OF THE ACT AND THE *experiencer* OF ITS RESULTS,—THE POSITION THUS CLEARLY IS THAT THE ACT IS LOST FOR THE MAN WHO DID IT AND ITS RESULTS BEFALL ONE WHO DID NOT DO IT,—WHICH IS EXTREMELY ANOMALOUS."—(477–479)

COMMENTARY.

'*Does not continue to exist*' ;—as it is destroyed immediately on its coming into existence.

'*Inasmuch as no single entity, etc.*' ;—i.e. since the Act and its Result have not been taken up by one and the same entity. There is 'loss of the Act' for the doer of the act, as he does not come by the result ; and there is 'befalling of what he did not do' on the man who did not do the act.

'*Extremely anomalous*' ;—i.e. no such situation is found either among people or mentioned in the scriptures.—(477–479)

The anomaly of 'the loss of what is done and the befalling of what is not done' has been pointed out, on the acceptance of the view that 'activity' is possible ; the Opponent next proceeds to show—from Kumārila's standpoint,—that *activity* itself is not possible (under the Doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux') :—

TEXTS (480-481).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 'NO-SOUL', THE *doer* OF AN ACT WOULD KNOW, BEFOREHAND, THAT, 'AS I AM GOING TO PERISH IMMEDIATELY, THERE WOULD BE NO RESULT FROM THIS ACT, OR IT WOULD COME TO SOME ONE OTHER THAN MYSELF'; AND KNOWING THIS, THE INTELLIGENT MAN WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY ACT, GOOD OR BAD, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING ITS RESULT; AS FOR THE RESULT, IT WOULD BE STILL FURTHER REMOVED."—(480-481)

COMMENTARY.

Under the Doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux', it would be held that all things are devoid of 'Soul'; as all things being dependent upon their cause (in the 'Causal Chain'), nothing can be independent (self-sufficient). Under the circumstances, the intelligent agent must know,—be conscious of the fact,—"what?"—that 'after my destruction, the result could not accrue to me, as I would not be there at the time that the Result comes about; even if the Result comes about, it would come to a Moment other than myself'. Knowing this, the intelligent person would not undertake the act at all; how then could there be any result which can follow only from an act preceded by the activity (of an active agent)? Such Result would be 'still further removed', as absolutely impossible.—(480-481)

It has thus been proved that there can be no *relation between Action and its Result*; the Author next proceeds to show,—again from *Kumārila's* standpoint,—that the *Relation of Cause and Effect* is not possible under the doctrine of 'Perpetual Flux':—

TEXT (482).

"NEITHER THE FUTURE NOR THE PAST ENTITY CAN BE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING THE EFFECT; AS FOR THE PRESENT ONE, THAT ALSO DOES NOT CONTINUE TO EXIST TILL THAT TIME."—(482)

COMMENTARY.

'*Till that time*';—i.e. during the time that it would come into existence and produce the effect, it does not continue to exist,—being *momentary*—(482)

The following *Text* adduces arguments in support of each of the assertions made in the preceding *Text* regarding the *Future*, etc.:—

TEXTS (483-484).

"AN ENTITY THAT HAS ITSELF NOT SECURED ITS EXISTENCE CAN NEVER BE THE CAUSE OF SOMETHING ELSE ; NOR CAN THE DESTROYED ENTITY (BE A CAUSE) ; NOR CAN THE PRESENCE (OF THE PRESENT ENTITY) BE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING THE EFFECT.—FURTHER, IF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PREVIOUS 'MOMENT' BE HELD TO BE *absolute*, THEN THERE COULD BE NO PRODUCTION OF ANY SUBSEQUENT 'MOMENT', AS ITS CAUSE WOULD NOT BE THERE."—(483-484)

COMMENTARY.

That thing is called 'future' which has not yet secured its existence ;—what has not secured its existence must be 'non-existent' ; what is non-existent must be devoid of all potentiality ;—what is devoid of all potentiality cannot serve as the cause of anything else,—i.e. cannot serve as the cause of bringing about any other thing ; because it is agreed on all sides that it is only a potential thing that can serve as a cause.

Similarly what has perished cannot serve as the cause of anything else, as it is devoid of all potentiality.

As for the Present thing, that has no continued existence, by virtue of which it could be capable of producing any effect.

Then again, if it is held that the preceding 'Moment' perishes *absolutely*, then there could be no producing of the subsequent 'Moment', as there would be no cause for such production.—(483-484)

The following argument might be urged (by the Buddhist) :—Just as the *rising* and *falling* of the weighing scales come about simultaneously, so also would be the *destruction* of the Present Moment and the *appearance* of its effect ; so that what is meant is that the subsequent Moment is brought about by the preceding Moment before the latter has been destroyed ; and that the appearance of the later moment would not fail to have its cause.

The following *Text* supplies the answer to this argument :—

TEXT (485).

"EVEN IF THE DESTRUCTION AND PRODUCTION WERE SIMULTANEOUS, THERE WOULD NOT BE MUTUAL DEPENDENCE ; SO THAT THERE COULD NOT BE THE RELATION OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT', AS THERE WOULD BE NO HELP RENDERED BY IT."—(485)

COMMENTARY.

Even if the Destruction (of the first Moment) and the Production (of the second Moment) be assumed to be simultaneous, there would not be the

relation of 'Cause and Effect' between the said *Destruction and Production*, or between the Moments undergoing the said Destruction and Production;—because the two would be independent of one another.—"How would they be independent of one another?"—Because *there would be no help rendered by it*; that is, the Destruction, being featureless, would have no action; and as for the entity that is regarded as the Cause, it is not present at the time that the Effect comes into existence; so that it could not have any action bearing upon the latter.—(485)

The following might be urged (by the Buddhist)—Even without any operation, the relation of 'Cause and effect' would be there on the basis of mere *proximity*.

The answer to this is supplied by the following—

TEXT (486).

"THE *Odour* AND OTHER QUALITIES THAT APPEAR AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE *Colour* OF THE JAR ARE NOT HELD TO BE THE EFFECT OF THIS LATTER; IN THE SAME WAY THE SUBSEQUENT *Colours* ALSO (COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS THE EFFECT OF THE PREVIOUS COLOUR)."—(486)

COMMENTARY.

If the idea is that when one thing comes into existence after another, it must be the effect of this latter, then just as, after the 'Colour-Moment' subsisting in the Jar has ceased, the homogeneous Colour-moments that appear in it are regarded as the effects of the preceding Colour-moment,—so also the *Odour* and other properties that are produced in the same Jar would have to be regarded as the Effects of that same preceding *Colour-moment*. And, yet, even though this immediate sequence is there, the *Odour-moment* is not held to be the effect of the preceding *Colour-moment*; because between material properties, there cannot be the same causal relation that there is between material substances themselves, because they appear in different 'chains' (or series). This is the opinion that our opponent himself holds.

'*In the same way the subsequent Colours also*';—that is to say, the homogeneous Colour-moments cannot be regarded as the effects of the previous Colour-moment, entirely on the ground of immediate sequence; as otherwise there would be an absurdity.—(486)

Having thus shown that mere immediate sequence cannot be the basis of the causal relation, the Opponent sums up his own view by way of recapitulation:—

TEXT (487).

"THUS THAT ALONE CAN BE REGARDED AS THE CAUSE OF AN EFFECT WHOSE ACTION IS FOUND TO BE THERE BEFORE THE PRODUCTION OF THAT EFFECT; AND NOT MERE IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE."—(487)

COMMENTARY.

'*Not mere immediate sequence*',—'can be the basis of the notion of Cause-effect'—this has to be regarded as understood.—(487)

What has been already explained above is now briefly summed up :—

TEXTS (488-489).

"THE UPSHOT BRIEFLY IS THIS :—IF THE EFFECT WERE PRODUCED FROM A CAUSE THAT HAS *perished*, THEN SUCH AN EFFECT WOULD BE WITHOUT CAUSE,—AS WHAT HAS PERISHED CAN HAVE NO CHARACTER (OR POTENTIALITY).—IF THE EFFECT BE HELD TO BE PRODUCED FROM A CAUSE THAT HAS *not perished*,—THEN, AS THE CAUSE IN THAT CASE WOULD CONTINUE TO EXIST DURING SEVERAL MOMENTS,—WHEREFORE COULD THE 'MOMENTARY CHARACTER' OF THINGS NOT BECOME DISCARDED (ON THAT ACCOUNT)?"—(488-489)

COMMENTARY.

Only two views are possible in this connection :—(1) The Effect is produced out of the Cause which is itself destroyed, and (2) that it is produced out of the Cause which is not destroyed; things cannot be other than either *destroyed* or *not destroyed*. The first view cannot be right; because what has been destroyed is *non-existent*, and if production from that were admitted, the effect would have to be regarded as *without Cause*; which would mean that it is eternally *existent*.—Nor can the second view be right; as, in that case, things would continue to exist during several moments, which would deprive them of the character of *momentariness*.—'*Wherefore could it not be discarded?*'—i.e. it would certainly become discarded. For instance, it would mean that—(*a*) the Thing comes into existence, then (*b*) it acts, then (*c*) it produces the Effect, then (*d*) it perishes; so that it is there during all these several moments; which rejects the idea of its being 'momentary'.—(488-489)

Having thus shown the impossibility of the relation of 'Cause and Effect', the Opponent proceeds to show the impossibility of any Means of Cognising such relation :—

TEXTS (490-491).

"IF THE JAR AND SUCH THINGS EXISTED ONLY FOR ONE MOMENT, THEN THEY COULD NOT BE PERCEIVED BY THE EYE; AS THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN DESTROYED ARE NEVER COGNISED,—AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THINGS LONG PAST.—THE RELATION OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT' CANNOT BE APPREHENDED BY MEANS OF 'PERCEPTION AND NON-APPREHENSION', BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THINGS IS NOT APPREHENDED AT ALL".—(490-491)

COMMENTARY.

The Relation of Cause and Effect is sought to be proved through Perception (of Effect only when the Cause is present) and Non-apprehension (of the Effect when the Cause is absent). Under the circumstances, if Things were momentary, as they could not be in existence at the moment of their cognition, they could not be perceptible; as the relation of Cause and Effect is not possible between things existing at the same moment. Thus there is no possibility of Perception or Non-apprehension (in support of the *momentariness* of things); specially because 'Non-apprehension' also is only a form of 'Perception', being, as it is, of the nature of the apprehension of a Thing as not related to anything else; and hence there being no use for it when there is no apprehension of any thing. Such being the case, how could the relation of Cause and Effect be proved through Perception and Non-apprehension?—(490-491)

Even though there be an apprehension of the Thing,—as there can be no one entity who would comprehend the preceding and succeeding Moments,—there can be no relation between these two.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (492).

"WHAT PERMANENT DOER (AGENT) IS THERE WHO WOULD CORRELATE THE COGNITIONS APPEARING IN SUCCESSION? IF ANY SUCH WERE SEEN, THEN ALONE WHAT IS DESIRED COULD BE ADMITTED; AND IF ANY SUCH IS NOT SEEN, THEN THIS LATTER CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD."—(492)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*gati*' stands for *apprehension*.—'*Kramavadgatim*',—the '*gati*', apprehension, which is '*kramavati*', successive.—'Who would *correlate*'—have a comprehensive notion of.—That is, no one.—If there were any one who would conceive of such a comprehensive notion as—'The smoke has become cognised through the cognition of the Fire, and without the cognition of the latter the former is not cognised'—which appears in succession,—as apprehended by a single Perceiver, then it might be possible to establish the relation of 'Cause and Effect'.—There can however be no such correlator,

under your view,—hence the relation of Cause and Effect cannot be established.—(492)

The following *Text* proceeds to show the impossibility of 'Recognition'—

TEXT (493).

"IF THINGS ARE IN 'PERPETUAL FLUX', THEN *Recognition* ALSO IS IMPOSSIBLE ; BECAUSE WHAT HAS BEEN SEEN BY ONE PERSON CANNOT BE 'RECOGNISED' BY OTHERS."—(493)

COMMENTARY.

'Recognition' consists of the notion that—'that same object which was seen by me previously is seen by me now'—which includes within itself the two perceptions as pertaining to the same object and the same perceiver ;—and such 'Recognition' cannot be possible if all things were in a 'perpetual flux' ; as under that view, neither one 'perceiver' nor one 'object' would be there (to be related to both perceptions) ; for instance, *Viṣṇumitra* does not 'recognise' what has been seen by *Dēvadatta*.

The mention of '*one person*' is only by way of illustration ; it is also to be understood that the *object* also which has been seen by one person cannot be 'recognised' by another person.—(493)

The Buddhist may argue that—As in the case of the hair and nails that have been cut and have grown again, though there is difference (between what has been cut and what has grown again), yet there is 'recognition' on account of similarity,—so would it be in all cases of *Recognition*.—This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (494-495).

"IN THE CASE OF THE HAIRS AND OTHER THINGS, WHERE THERE IS DIFFERENCE, RECOGNITION MAY BE DUE TO SIMILARITY, BECAUSE THE PERCEIVER IS ONE AND THE SAME. WHEN HOWEVER THERE IS DIFFERENCE OF BOTH, THERE WOULD BE NO BASIS FOR RECOGNITION. IF THERE IS NO SINGLE ENTITY WHO COULD HAVE THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION, THEN HOW IS IT THAT, ON SEEING *Colour*, THERE APPEARS A LONGING FOR THE *taste* AND OTHER QUALITIES (OF THE THING SEEN) ?"—(494-495)

COMMENTARY.

If there were a single cogniser, then there could be Recognition based upon similarity, even when there is difference between the two things con-

cerned,—such Recognition being due to the common *Cogniser*. *When however there is difference of both,*—i.e. when the *cognisers* as well as the *cognised things* in the two cases are different, there would be no basis for the Recognition.—Then again, if there were no single cogniser correlating the two cognitions,—then how could there be such phenomenon as that when one sees the colour of the citron-fruit, he remembers the taste concomitant with that colour and evinces a desire for experiencing that taste and undertakes activity towards securing it ? Certainly no one could have a longing, etc. for what has been seen by another person.—(494-495)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that 'Bondage' and 'Liberation' also would not be possible (under the doctrine of Perpetual Flux) :—

TEXT (496).

"WHAT IS *bound* UP WITH CHAINS OF ATTACHMENT, ETC. IN THE PRISON-HOUSE OF THE WORLD IS ONE 'MOMENT', WHILE THE 'MOMENT' THAT IS *liberated* IS ANOTHER, WHO HAS NOT BEEN IN BONDAGE ;—THIS IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE."—(496)

COMMENTARY.

One 'Moment' is *bound up* with Attachment while another is *liberated,*—*this is incomprehensible* ; i.e. impossible.

'*Bhava*' is world, Cycle of Birth and Rebirth,—which is the '*prison-house*', the place where persons are kept in bondage.—(496)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that any attempt at Liberation would be useless,—as no Liberation can be possible :—

TEXT (497).

"FOR THE BOUND (IMPRISONED) PERSON, LIBERATION CAN NEVER BE POSSIBLE ; BECAUSE (*ex hypothesi*), HE IS ABSOLUTELY DESTROYED. HENCE ALL THE EFFORT PUT FORTH BY PERSONS SEEKING FOR LIBERATION IS FUTILE."—(497)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—there would be Liberation for one who has not been in bondage ;—where is the incongruity in that ?

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (498).

"THE PERSON SECURING LIBERATION HAS ALWAYS BEEN FOUND TO BE ONE WHO HAS BEEN BOUND UP IN CHAINS, ETC.; ANY SUCH ASSERTION THEREFORE AS THAT 'THE UNBOUND PERSON BECOMES LIBERATED' IS CONTRARY TO A WELL-PERCEIVED FACT."—(498)

COMMENTARY.

That the person who is *liberated* is the same that had been in *bondage* is a fact well recognised and seen in the world. The assertion therefore of the Liberation of the Person who has *not* been in Bondage is one that is annulled by popular notion and also by a perceptible fact.—(498)

The following *Text* points out that the said idea is annulled by Inference also—

TEXT (499).

"'BONDAGE' AND 'LIBERATION' MUST BELONG TO THE SAME PERSON,—BECAUSE THEY ARE OF THAT NATURE,—LIKE BONDAGE AND LIBERATION IN THE ORDINARY WORLD.—THUS EVERYTHING BECOMES THOROUGHLY WELL-ESTABLISHED."—(499)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be thus formulated :—*Bondage* and *Liberation* must subsist in one and the same person,—like the Bondage and Liberation in the world,—the 'Bondage' and 'Liberation' under dispute are Bondage and Liberation in the form of Attachment and Dissociation therefrom;—this is a reason based upon the nature of things.

'*Because they are of that nature*';—i.e. because they are in the form of Bondage and Liberation, i.e. because they have the character of Bondage and Liberation.

'*Tau*', 'these two'—i.e. Bondage and Liberation.

Thus the single substratum in the shape of the 'Soul' being established, all the doctrines relating to the Relation between Actions and their Results and so forth *become thoroughly established*;—i.e. are beautifully proved; there being no room for the criticisms directed against them.—(499)

TEXT (500).

"IN THIS SAME MANNER IT MAY BE SHOWN THAT, IF ALL THINGS ARE IN 'PERPETUAL FLUX', REMEMBRANCE AND SUCH OTHER PHENOMENA WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE,—AS THERE WOULD BE NO SINGLE SUBSTRATUM (UNDER THAT THEORY)."—(500)

COMMENTARY.

As any single Agent would be impossible, it should be understood that there would be no possibility of any such phenomena as the following:—Remembrance, well-ascertained cognition, seeking for a thing hidden by one-self and so forth. Because in all these, the substratum being different, there would be incongruities; e.g. when *Chaitra* is the original *apprehender, doubter, hider and seeker*,—*Maitra* could not be the *rememberer*, the *ascertainer, seeker*, and so forth.—(500)

With the following *Text*, the Author proceeds to answer the above criticisms (levelled against the Doctrine of *Perpetual Flux*):—

TEXT (501).

WE PROCEED TO ANSWER THE ABOVE CRITICISMS AS FOLLOWS:—THINGS BEING WITHOUT 'SOUL', IN REFERENCE TO THESE ALSO, THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT BEING THERE, ALL THE SAID NOTIONS BECOME ESTABLISHED WITHOUT ANY DIFFICULTY.—(501)

COMMENTARY.

Even when things are regarded as being 'without Soul', all such notions as those relating to 'the Relation between Acts and their Results' and so forth, are based upon the relation of 'Cause and Effect'; so that when the relation of Cause and Effect is there, all those notions become established and there is no incongruity at any point.—(501)

Says the Opponent—"This definite Law of Cause and Effect itself is not possible without a 'Soul'."

The answer is provided in the following—

TEXT (502).

JUST AS THE POTENCY OF THE SEED IS RESTRICTED TO THE SPROUT EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A PERMANENT 'SOUL',—SO WOULD IT ALSO BE IN THE CASE OF PSYCHICAL CONCEPTS.—(502)

COMMENTARY.

Just as the potency of the Seed and such things is restricted to the Sprout and such things,—even without a controller in the form of the 'Soul', —so would it also be in the case of every psychical concept. Such things as the *Seed* and the rest are not controlled by the 'Soul', in the way that the Body, as the receptacle of experience, is held to be controlled. Otherwise, there would be no sense in the (*Naiyāyika's*) argument that "the living body cannot be without soul, as, if it were, then there could be no *breathing* and other functions"; in the case of the Jar and such things, if the absence of 'Breathing, etc.' were found to follow from the absence of the 'Soul', then alone could the negative concomitance involved in the argument be admissible;—if the Jar, etc. also were with *Soul*, then how could the Reason adduced have the requisite negative concomitance?

'*Even in the absence of a permanent Soul*',—i.e. even when there is no character which is common to them all.—(502)

Question—"How does the Causal relation become established?"

Answer :—

TEXT (503).

EITHER INDIRECTLY OR DIRECTLY, IT IS ONLY A CERTAIN THING,—AND IN ONLY CERTAIN CASES—THAT HAS THE POTENTIALITY IN REGARD TO ANOTHER THING; THUS ALONE ARE SUCH RELATIONS AS THAT BETWEEN ACTIONS AND THEIR RESULTS POSSIBLE.—(503)

COMMENTARY.

Just as, in regard to external things, the law of Action and Reaction is restricted, so is it in regard to the group of Psychical Concepts also; as the causal potency is everywhere restricted; it is only from certain good and bad acts that particular results, agreeable or disagreeable, follow, through a chain of 'moments'; e.g. from the apprehension of Colour follows its Remembrance,—from cognition follows definite conclusion,—from the act of *depositing* follows the subsequent seeking for it,—from the longing for a thing follows the actual sight of it,—thence the cessation of the eagerness for it. In no case do the Buddhists admit of all these Reactions of Remembrance and the rest as connected with any one single entity; for them, it is mere *Conception*, a mere *Idea*. This has been thus declared—'The Action is there, the Result is there, but the Maker (Agent) is not

perceived,—one who abandons these thought-phases and takes up others; nothing apart from the Law of Things; this Law of Things being that *where such and such a thing appears when such and such another thing is present—the former is said to be produced from the production of the latter.*'

'*Such relations as between Actions and their Reactions*';—this is meant to include Remembrance and the rest;—the 'relation' meant is that of 'Cause and Effect' ('Producer and Product').—(503)

Objection—"If that is so, then how is it that among people and in the scriptures it is said in reference to the *Soul*—'When the action has been done by him, who else will experience its Reaction?'"

Answer:—

TEXT (504).

THE NOTION OF THE 'DOER' AND THE REST IS IN REFERENCE TO THE UNITY OF THE 'CHAIN'; AND THAT TOO IS HELD TO BE ONLY A FIGMENT OF THE IMAGINATION; IT IS NOT A PART OF THE REAL STATE OF THINGS.—(504)

COMMENTARY.

People have the light of their wisdom bedimmed by a mass of deep ignorance; hence they ignore all considerations regarding their being this or that, being existent or non-existent, and so forth,—and come to regard the chain of impressions in the shape of particular causes and effects as 'one', and thus come to make use of such expressions as 'The same I am doing this act', and proceed to make attempts to bring about their Liberation.—It is in view of this (popular) egotism that the Blessed Enlightened Ones, desirous of saving their disciples from the pitfalls of Nihilism, propound the theory of the 'Unity of the Chain' and thereby explain the notions of the 'Doer' and the like.

Says the Opponent—"The said Explanation is enough to establish the reality of the matter under dispute".

Answer:—"*It is not a part of the real state of things*';—as a matter of fact, the real state of things cannot be determined on the basis of the notions entertained by childish persons enmeshed in illusion and averse to the investigation of truth; specially as the said notion is negatived by the evidences of 'Soullessness' and 'Perpetual Flux' of Things.—(504)

The Author anticipates the Opponent's objection to the effect that "the absence of the continuous Soul in the case of Seed and such things not being admitted (by all parties), the Corroborative Instance (cited by the Buddhist, under *Text* 502) is one that is not admitted (and hence inadmissible as Corroborative Instance)":—

TEXTS (505-506).

IN THE ABSENCE OF CONTINUITY, THE RELATION OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT' WOULD BE OF THE PARTICULAR KIND JUST POINTED OUT,—THIS ALONE IS POSSIBLE AMONG THINGS APPEARING UNDER DIFFERENT 'CHAINS'.—IN THE CASE OF THE SEED, SPROUT AND SUCH THINGS, THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT IS FOUND TO BE DEFINITELY CERTAIN, AND YET THERE IS NOT THE SLIGHTEST TRACE OF CONTINUITY.—(505-506)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*anvaya*' stands for *anugama*', *continuity*,—i.e. of any particular character.—(505-506)

The following might be urged by the Opponent :—" Continuity is certainly present in the case of the Seed and such things ; as has been declared by *Uddyotakara* :—What happens in the case of the Seed and Sprout is that the components of the Seed relinquish their previous formation and become arranged in a different formation,—when they have taken this formation, the Earth-element in it becoming mingled with the water-element, and heated by the Fire-element, produces a substance in the shape of the Sap ; and this Sap, along with the previous components assumes the form of the Sprout. Such being the case, how can it be true that *there is not the slightest trace of continuity* ? "

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXTS (507-508).

IF THE ELEMENTS OF EARTH AND THE REST IN THE SEED—SPROUT—CREEPER AND SO FORTH ARE NOT DIFFERENT,—THEN THERE CAN BE NO DIFFERENCE AMONG THEM ; AS, IN THAT CASE, ALL OF THEM WOULD BE OF THE SAME NATURE. HENCE IT MUST BE ADMITTED THAT THERE IS NO CONTINUITY IN THIS CASE.

For these reasons, for the purpose of establishing the existence of 'Action and Re-action', the superior philosophers should put forth an effort to prove the relation of 'Cause and Effect';—and for the purpose of establishing the non-existence of 'Action and Reaction', the other philosophers should put forth an effort to disprove the relation of 'Cause and Effect'.—(507-508)

COMMENTARY.

The sense of this is as follows:—If the Earth and other elements present in the later formation continue without surrendering their previous forms,—then there can be no surrendering of the previous formation and the assuming of the later formation; because both the formations would be exactly of the same nature as before; so that there would be no difference among the Seed, the Sprout, and the Creeper,—all being of the same nature.—In case you admit of difference among the Seed, etc., then, as there would always be the abandoning of the preceding form, it must be admitted that the Earth and other elements also abandon their own respective formations and assume other formations. Otherwise, there would be no difference at all; as already explained. Thus there being an appearance of several forms, one after the other, where would there be any 'continuity'?

Inasmuch as on the proving of the true character of the causal relation, all such notions as the relation between Action and its Result become explicable,—and on the disproving of it, the said notions become dispelled,—for the purpose of determining the existence of Actions and their Results, etc.,—efforts should be put forth for the proving of the Causal Relation,—*by the superior philosophers*,—i.e. by the Buddhists, who are 'Superior philosophers' on account of their being followers of the best doctrines. And for the purpose of disproving the same notions, effort should be put forth by other philosophers,—i.e. the followers of other philosophical doctrines.

The term '*Kāryakāraṇatāsiddhau*" has been construed twice over,—the last term in one case being '*asiddhau*'.

[The latter assertion would appear to be in the nature of a taunt].—(507-508)

As for the two alternatives—'destroyed or not destroyed'—set forth by the Opponent (under *Texts* 488-489),—the author proceeds to dispel them,—thereby establishing the Causal Relation as the very root of all laws:—

TEXTS (509-510).

OUR EXPLANATION IS AS FOLLOWS :—THE EFFECT COMES INTO EXISTENCE AT THE SECOND MOMENT ;—THE CAUSE HAD COME INTO EXISTENCE AT THE FIRST MOMENT ; AND DURING THAT MOMENT IT IS NOT DESTROYED. BUT BEING *momentary*, IT DOES NOT EXIST AT THE MOMENT AT WHICH THE EFFECT IS THERE ; EVEN IF IT WERE THERE, IT WOULD BE USELESS, AS THE EFFECT WILL HAVE ALREADY COME INTO EXISTENCE.—(509-510)

COMMENTARY.

Our view is that the effect comes out of the Cause while this latter is still undestroyed ; and there is no possibility of the two being simultaneous ; because what happens is that the Effect comes into existence at the *second* moment, through its dependence upon the Cause which has come into existence at the *first* moment and has not yet become destroyed ; so that when the Effect comes into existence it does so from the Cause while it is still undestroyed ; as it has not been destroyed at the *first* moment. And yet the Cause does not continue to exist at the moment that the Effect is in existence, as, being momentary, it cannot so continue to exist. Even if it were to continue, it would not have the nature of the *Cause* ; because when the Effect has already come about, it would be absolutely useless.—(509-510)

The following *Text* shows this same uselessness :—

TEXT (511).

WHAT HAS ALREADY COME INTO EXISTENCE CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY IT OVER AGAIN ; BECAUSE WHAT IS MEANT BY A THING ' COMING INTO EXISTENCE ' IS THAT THERE SHOULD COME ABOUT SOMETHING THAT DID NOT EXIST BEFORE. IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN THERE WOULD BE NO RESTING AT ALL.—(511)

COMMENTARY.

'*If it were not so, then there would be no resting*' ;—i.e. if it were not as stated, *then there would be no resting*,—i.e. there would be no limit ; i.e. there would be an infinite regress. If what has come into existence were to be produced again, then there would be an equal possibility of its being produced over again ; and in this way there would be an infinite regress of *productions*,—there would be no cessation in the activity of the Cause,—and the Causes themselves would be liable to be produced ; as there would be nothing to

distinguish them :—and the result would be that there could be no such distinction as 'this is the *Cause* and that the *Effect*'.—(511)

In the following *Text* the author sums up his position and shows that there is no flaw in the view that the Effect is produced from the Cause while the latter is still in existence :—

TEXTS (512–514).

THUS WE CONCLUDE THAT IT IS AT THE SECOND MOMENT THAT THE EFFECT COMES INTO EXISTENCE OUT OF AN EFFICIENT CAUSE WHICH CAME INTO EXISTENCE AT THE FIRST MOMENT AND HAS NOT YET BEEN DESTROYED.—IF IT HAD BEEN HELD THAT THE EFFECT COMES INTO EXISTENCE AT THE THIRD MOMENT, THEN IT WOULD COME OUT OF THE *destroyed* CAUSE ; AS THE CAUSE OF THE DEVELOPMENT WILL HAVE BEEN DESTROYED, LIKE THE EFFECT ITSELF,—AS IS GOING TO BE EXPLAINED LATER ON.—THERE WOULD BE SIMULTANEITY ONLY IF THE EFFECT HAD COME AT THE FIRST MOMENT. BUT THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT,—BEING JUST LIKE THE DOCTRINE OF THE EFFECTS COMING INTO EXISTENCE ALONG WITH THE CAUSE.—(512–514)

COMMENTARY.

As regards the alternative of the Effect coming out of the *destroyed* Cause, that is improper, as it is not held by us. As that alternative would mean that the Effect comes at the third and subsequent moments,—as has been held by the *Vaibhāṣikas*, in such assertions as—' the one presents (the effect) when it is past' ; if this view were held, then it would mean the admission of the view that the Effect comes from the *destroyed* Cause ;—but such is not the view held by us ; because it is devoid of reason.—

There might have been some chance of the anomaly of the Cause and Effect being simultaneous if the view were that the Effect comes at the *first* moment ; as these same *Vaibhāṣikas* regard the Cause as 'born along with the Effect'. This is entirely unreasonable.—(512–514)

Why this is unreasonable is shown in the following—

TEXT (515).

WHAT DID NOT EXIST COULD HAVE NO POTENCY ; —IF THE POTENCY WERE THERE, THE EFFECT WOULD SURELY BE PRODUCED ; HENCE SIMULTANEITY BETWEEN CAUSE AND EFFECT IS CLEARLY INCONGRUOUS.—(515)

COMMENTARY.

When the *co-born* Cause (i.e. the Cause that comes into existence along with its Effect) produces its Effect, it can do so either while it is itself *unborn*,

or when it is itself *born* ;—the former alternative cannot be right ; as the Cause does not exist prior to the production of the Effect,—and as such, is devoid of all potentiality.—If it be said that—" It produces the effect when it is *born,* and then, being endowed with potentialities, it produces the Effect ", —the answer is—' *if the Potency were there, etc.*' ; i.e. if the Cause has its potency while it is in the state of having been born, then, like the character of the Cause, the Effect also would be already born ; and under the circumstances, on what would the potency of the Cause operate ?—Thus the doctrine that Cause and Effect are simultaneous is clearly contrary to the authority of Inference.—(515)

Says the Opponent :—" The relation of Cause and Effect is the same as the relation of ' Agent and Object ' ; and as such it would be highly incongruous if the two factors appeared at different times. For instance, between the Potter and the Jar, the relation of ' Agent and Object ' is perceived only when the two are there at the same time ".

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXTS (516-517).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHEN THE CAUSE PRODUCES ITS EFFECT, IT DOES NOT DO SO BY HOLDING THE EFFECT IN THE MANNER OF THE PAIR OF TONGS,—BY REASON OF WHICH THERE WOULD BE SIMULTANEITY BETWEEN THE TWO. NOR DOES THE EFFECT COME INTO EXISTENCE, BY FIRMLY EMBRACING ITS CAUSE, IN THE MANNER OF THE LOVER EMBRACING THE BELOVED,—BY REASON OF WHICH THE TWO COULD BE REGARDED AS COMING INTO EXISTENCE AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME.—(516-517)

COMMENTARY.

If, in the producing of the Effect, the Cause operated in the manner of the Pair of Tongs,—or if the Effect, in the process of coming into existence were to do so by embracing its Cause in the manner in which a woman is embraced,—then there might be simultaneity and co-existence of the two always. As a matter of fact, however, the whole of this universe is entirely devoid of activity, there is, in reality, no ' active agent ' or ' objective ' at all,—apart from ' Convention '.—Such is the sense of the whole answer.

' *Prakṛti* '—is *cause.*—(516-517)

Opponent—" If that is so, and everything, the Cause as well as the Effect, is inactive, how is it that people are found to make use of such verbal

expressions as 'the Fire produces Smoke', 'the smoke comes into existence on the basis of Fire,' and so forth ?"

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXTS (518-519).

THOUGH THE THING IS REALLY INACTIVE, YET ON ACCOUNT OF THE RESTRICTION IMPOSED BY THE NATURE OF ITS CAUSE WHICH CAME INTO EXISTENCE AT THE FIRST MOMENT, THERE APPEARS, IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS, SOMETHING COMING INTO CONTACT WITH THE SECOND MOMENT; IT IS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE FORMER IS SAID TO PRODUCE THE LATTER;—SUCH ASSERTION BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH A CONVENTION WHICH IS PURELY ARBITRARY, BASED UPON THE WHIM OF THE SPEAKER. —(518-519)

COMMENTARY.

On account of the restriction imposed upon the potency of the Cause, arising from the Idea that gave rise to that Cause,—a particular Effect is produced from the Cause which has appeared at the first moment,—this Effect *being in contact with*,—i.e. appearing at—the second moment; it is then that the said 'Cause' is said to produce the said 'Effect'. The mention of 'producing' is only by way of illustration; it should be understood to mean also that the Effect comes into existence on the basis of the Cause.

"Who are the people who speak of it as such ?"

'*Such assertion, etc. etc.*'—that is, thus say those persons who act in accordance with conventions based entirely upon the speaker's wish, irrespectively of external realities.—(518-519)

Question—"If a thing, on coming into existence, did not become operative, how could it become the Cause in the bringing about of a particular effect ?"

Answer :—

TEXT (520).

WHAT WOULD BE THE GOOD OF ANY ACTIVITY AT ANY TIME OTHER THAN THAT OF ITS OWN BIRTH ? MERE *existence* IS THE ONLY OPERATION, AS IT IS WHEN THIS IS THERE THAT THE EFFECT APPEARS.—(520)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as the Effect is produced immediately after the Cause has come into existence, any operation of that Cause on this Effect, after the latter

has come about, would be absolutely useless. Because, what is it that is called the 'operation' of the Cause? It is that immediately after which the Effect secures its appearance; and as a matter of fact, the Effect appears immediately after the *existence* of the Cause; hence it is this *existence* itself which may be called the 'operation'. What is the need of assuming any 'operation' other than this 'birth' (coming into existence) of the Cause? —(520)

"If this is so, then, how is it that people speak of 'the Effect has need of the Cause', 'the Cause operates on the Effect'?"

Answer :—

TEXT (521).

IT IS THE NECESSARY CONDITION OF 'IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE' THAT IS CALLED 'NEED'; AND IN THE APPEARANCE OF THE EFFECT, THE ONLY OPERATION OF THE CAUSE IN ALL CASES IS ITS 'EXISTENCE'.—(521)

COMMENTARY.

The 'need' that the *Effect* has of the *Cause* consists only in the fact of its coming into existence immediately after the latter; and of the *Cause* also, the only 'operation' towards the bringing about of the *Effect* is that it is always *in existence* at the time of the appearance of the *Effect*.—(521)

Further, you have to admit that the 'causal character' of an 'operation' —or of a Thing with that operation,—towards a particular Effect consists entirely in the fact of the latter coming into existence only when the former is in existence; in fact, for the determining of the causal relation between a Cause and its Effect there is no ground except positive and negative concomitance. Such being the case, why is not the causal character attributed to the Thing itself (and not to its action or operation)?—specially as it cannot be said that the positive and negative concomitance of the Effect with the *Thing itself* is not well known. Hence it is far better to regard the Thing itself as the Cause, with which the positive and negative concomitance of the Effect is well recognised.—This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (522).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE *Operation* ALSO IS ASSUMED TO BE THE CAUSE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE FACT THAT THE EFFECT APPEARS WHEN THE OPERATION IS THERE; IT IS FAR BETTER, THEN, THAT THE THING ITSELF TO WHICH THAT OPERATION BELONGS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE CAUSE.—(522)

COMMENTARY.

'*Assumed*',—i.e. the 'operation', which has been assumed by you to be of the nature of neither the Cause nor the Effect, nor both.

'*That to which the operation belongs*',—'becomes the Cause, by reason of the fact of the Effect appearing only when it is there'—such is the construction of the sentence.

'*The Thing itself*',—i.e. the Thing by itself, without any peculiar form of activity or operation, may be regarded as the 'Cause'.—(522)

Question—"What is the peculiarity in this latter view that it is said to be 'far better'?"

Answer :—

TEXT (523).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT IS ON THE *existence* OF THE SEED ITSELF THAT THE SPROUT IS SEEN TO APPEAR; ON THE OTHER HAND, NOTHING IS SEEN AS COMING INTO EXISTENCE ON THE EXISTENCE OF AN 'OPERATION'.—(523)

COMMENTARY.

'*On the existence*',—i.e. on mere existence; i.e. on the existence of the Thing—the seed—itself, devoid of any other operation (or activity).—This establishes the fact of the *Effect* being positively and negatively concomitant with the *Thing itself*,—and not with the *Operation*.—(523)

Says the Opponent :—"Even though the concomitance of the Effect with an *Operation* is not admitted,—yet the Operation can have the *causal character*".

Answer :—

TEXT (524).

IF YOU ASSUME THE 'CAUSAL CHARACTER' OF THE OPERATION WHEN ITS POTENCY (TOWARDS THE EFFECT) HAS NOT BEEN PERCEIVED,—THEN WHY DO YOU NOT ASSUME THE SAME OF SOMETHING ELSE ALSO? OR, WHAT DISTINGUISHING FEATURE DO YOU FIND IN THE 'OPERATION' WHICH IS NOT FOUND IN THAT OTHER THING?—(524)

COMMENTARY.

Having assumed the *Operation* to be the Cause, you will have to assume some other thing also as the Cause; because this latter would not be different from the 'Operation', as both would be equally such as having their potency not perceived;—and so on there would be an infinite regress (of assumed Causes).—If no other Cause (than the Operation) is assumed, on the ground of there being no basis for it, then, the assumption of the 'Operation' also may not be there; as the 'baselessness' would be equal in both cases.

Then again, this 'Operation' that is said to produce the Effect,—does it produce it through the medium of another Operation? Or by its mere *existence*? It could not be the former, as, in that case, the causal character should belong to that other Operation, not to the previous Operation; and for this later Operation also, there would be the need for another Operation, etc.—all which would be open to the same objection. And if that other Operation also would need a further Operation, then there would be an infinite regress.—(524)

If then, it be held that the *Operation* produces the Effect by its mere *existence*,—then, like this *Operation*, the Thing itself might produce the Effect by its mere *existence*; and the assuming of the 'Operation' would be entirely futile.—This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (525).

JUST AS THE 'OPERATION', WITHOUT ANY OTHER (OPERATION), IS HELD TO BE THE *Cause* OF THE EFFECT,—IN THE SAME WAY, WHY CANNOT OTHERS, LIKE IT, BE *Causes*?—(525)

COMMENTARY.

Just as the Operation, without further Operation, is regarded as the Cause of the Effect, in the shape of the Sprout,—in the same manner, why cannot other things also, without any particular Operations, be regarded as 'Causes'?—(525)

It might be argued that—"the Operation does not directly help the Effect,—it helps only the Thing to which it belongs".

The answer to this is provided in

TEXT (526),

[which is missing in the printed Text; the commentary upon it however is available, as follows]:—

The phrase '*held to be the Cause*' (of *Text* 525) is to be construed here also.—What is meant is that for you also, when the causal character would belong to the Thing as *equipped with the Operation*, it would be so without the intervention of a further Operation; so that there would be no Corroborative Instance available for you.—(526)

Then again, apart from its *existence*, there can be no other 'Operation' of the Thing, for the simple reason that if it were there, it would be perceived, and yet it is not perceived.—This is explained in the following—

TEXT (527).

THOUGH IT HAS BEEN REGARDED AS PERCEPTIBLE, YET WE DO NOT PERCEIVE IT ; HOW THEN CAN WE ACCEPT THE CONNECTION OF THAT AS THE BASIS (OF THE CAUSAL CHARACTER) ?—(527)

COMMENTARY.

'Operation' has been held by you to be something perceptible; as asserted by *Kumārila* (*Shlokavārtika : Shabdanityatā*—433)—' When the *Operation* of a Thing is perceived before the Effect, that thing is regarded as the *Cause* of that Effect, etc. etc.'—And further, that particular entity which is of the nature of the ' Operation '—is it something different from the Thing to which it belongs ? Or is it non-different from it ?—In the case of all entities, no third alternative is possible ; and no such alternatives are possible as ' it is both different and non-different ', or that ' it is neither different nor non-different '.

If then, it is something different, then the *Thing itself* cannot be the ' Cause ', as the ' causal character ' belongs to the *Operation* which is something different from the Thing.—It might be argued that " by virtue of its connection with the Operation, the Thing also would have the causal character ".—That however is not possible ; because there can be no connection between things which do not help one another.—It might be answered that " the Operation *is* helped by the Thing ".—That also is not right ; as a matter of fact, the Thing has no other Operation by which it could help the previous Operation ; if it were otherwise, then there would be an infinite regress (of Operations), whereby the successive Operations themselves would accomplish each other, and there would be no connection between the Operation and the Thing.—If it be assumed that the Thing helps the Operation, without any further Operation,—then, why should not the Thing by its mere existence, without any Operation, help the Effect (to come into existence),—for which purpose a different thing in the shape of the *Operation* is assumed ? In fact, there is nothing to prevent its usefulness towards the Effect, by its mere *existence*. From all this it follows that it is not right to assume a distinct thing in the shape of the ' Operation '.

If then the other alternative be accepted—that the ' Operation ' is *non-different* from the ' Thing ' (to which it belongs),—then it becomes admitted that ' existence ' is the only *Operation* ; because the term ' *existence* ' connotes only the nature of the thing concerned.

Thus the view that the ' Operation ' (of the Cause) is something different from its own coming into existence—cannot be accepted.—(527)

Further, in the case of Cognition, it is found that as soon as it appears in the form of the apprehension of its object,—it operates by its mere *existence* ; and hence in the case of all Things, the *causal character* must belong to themselves, without any subsequent operation.—This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (528).

IN THE CASE OF COGNITION, ITS COMING INTO EXISTENCE ITSELF HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS CONSTITUTING ITS CHARACTER OF ' MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION ' ; WHY THEN SHOULD NOT THE CAUSAL CHARACTER IN THE CASE OF ALL THINGS BE HELD TO BE THE SAME ?—(528)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of Cognition there is no other operation apart from its *being born, coming into existence* ; for instance under *Mīmāmsā-sūtra* 1. 1. 4, defining ' Sense-perception ',—while explaining the purpose served by the term ' *janma* ', ' birth ', in the *Sūtra, Kumārila* has declared as follows :—" What the term ' *birth* of Cognition ' connotes is the fact of the Cognition being a Means of Right Cognition *as soon as it is born* ; in the case of other agencies, a certain Operation is found, which is something distinct from their *birth* ; in order to preclude the same in the case of the *Means of Right Cognition*, it is necessary to use the term ' birth '."—(*Shlokavārtika* · *Sūtra* 1. 1. 4, 53-54).

' *The causal character, etc.*' ;—i.e. why cannot all things be regarded as produced by the ' birth ', ' coming into existence ', of the Cause ?—(528)

" In the case of Cognition, it is quite right that mere *existence* is the Operation, as the Cognition does not continue to exist at any later time, being momentary ; [but the same cannot be true in the case of other things, which are *not* momentary]."

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (529).

JUST AS COGNITION IS MOMENTARY, SO ARE ALL THINGS THAT ARE BORN, AS THEY HAVE BEEN PROVED TO BE. HENCE THE WHOLE UNIVERSE MUST BE DEVOID OF ' OPERATION '.—(529)

COMMENTARY.

Under the chapter on the ' Permanence of Things ' it has been proved that all things are in ' perpetual flux '.

' *So are, etc.*'—i.e. like Cognition.

' *Hence* ',—i.e. because of their momentary character.

The argument may be formulated as follows :—Things that are momentary can have no action (or operation),—like the Cognition,—Seed and other things have already been proved to be momentary ;—this therefore is a reason based on the nature of things (for regarding them as *devoid of action*). As a matter of fact, things have no subsequent existence, and there could be no action without a substratum ;—this supplies the argument annulling the possibility of action or operation in things.

From all this it follows that the only basis for the relation of Cause and Effect consists in *immediate sequence,* and not in any *action* (or operation, on the part of the Cause).—(529)

It has been argued above by the Opponent (under *Text* 486) that—" the Odour and other qualities that appear when the colour of the Jar has been destroyed, etc. etc.' ;—but this is not incompatible with the Buddhist's argument ;—this is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (530).

As regards Odour and other qualities (appearing in the Jar), the fact of their being causes of each other, as forming factors of the same 'chain', is actually admitted (by us) ; and this idea is not annulled by the alleged anomaly of their being such causes.—(530)

COMMENTARY.

As regards Colour, Taste and other qualities, it is already admitted by us that as forming part of the same 'chain' they are auxiliary causes of each other ; as has been thus declared—'Without the action of Potency, there is no Cause of Taste ; this is the only explanation of all past qualities that have existed at the same time, which is derived from the indications of their Effects'.—(530)

Says the Opponent :—" Just as Smoke appears in immediate sequence to Fire, so sometimes it may appear in immediate sequence to such things also as the Cow, the Horse and the like ; then why cannot mere *immediate sequence* be regarded as 'inconclusive' (in the proving of the Causal Relation) ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (531).

Even when one thing appears in immediate sequence to another,—it is only in some cases (not always) that the latter is the Cause of the former, where the sequence is invariable ; this is what is accepted, in view of such being the real state of things ;—the same is the case under the view that Things are permanent.—(531)

COMMENTARY.

We do not say that mere *immediate sequence* is the basis of 'Causal Relation') ; what we do assert is that one thing is to be regarded as the Cause

of another when the latter is *always* found to appear in immediate sequence to the former; that is, one thing is regarded as the Cause of another when the latter is found to appear *only* in immediate sequence to the former. Smoke is not found *always* to appear in sequence to the Cow, the Horse and so forth; because it actually appears even in the absence of these animals.—Then again, to you also, who hold Things to be permanent, the said criticism would be applicable—why the smoke, appearing after the Cow, etc. is not regarded as the Effect of these ?—(531)

The Opponent urges an objection (in the first half, which is answered in the second half)—

TEXT (532).

"IF A THING THAT IS ACTIVE TOWARDS THE PRODUCING OF AN EFFECT IS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS THE CAUSE OF THIS LATTER, [WHAT THEN ?] "—THEN LET THAT BE ACCEPTED AS THE 'CAUSE' OF A THING WHOSE PRESENCE IS ALWAYS ESSENTIAL FOR THE APPEARANCE OF THIS LATTER.—(532)

COMMENTARY.

'*Then let, etc.*'—This sentence supplies the Buddhist's answer to the other's objection.—(532)

Thus it has been shown that even under the doctrine of things being momentary, the Relation of Cause and Effect is quite possible. The Author next proceeds to show the possibility of the 'Means of the Cognition' of the said Relation :—

TEXTS (533–535).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE *existence* AND *non-existence* (OF THINGS) ARE ALWAYS KNOWN THROUGH PERCEPTION AND NON-APPREHENSION (RESPECTIVELY),—IF THE VIEW HELD IS THAT THE THINGS ARE APPREHENDED BY COGNITIONS WITH FORMS.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU HOLD THAT THE THING IS APPREHENDED BY A COGNITION WHICH IS FORMLESS,—THEN THE SAME IS FOUND TO BE THE CASE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF THINGS BEING MOMENTARY. BECAUSE WHENEVER COGNITION IS PRODUCED BY ITS ANTECEDENT CAUSES, IT IS ALWAYS IN THE FORM OF AN APPREHENSION HAVING THE SAME COLOUR, ETC. THAT HAPPEN TO APPEAR AT THE TIME.—(533–535)

COMMENTARY.

Just as the apprehension of the Permanent Thing would come about for you, so also would that of the Momentary also come about.

For instance, when the apprehension of a Thing appears, it comes about either through a Cognition with a form, or through a formless Cognition. If it comes through the Cognition with a form, then the apprehension of the form of the Cognition would be the same as the apprehension of the Thing concerned ;—and this would be equally possible under both views—of things being *permanent* or *momentary*. If on the other hand, it is through *formless* Cognition, that also makes no difference in the two views. Because, as a matter of fact, the Cognition is produced in such a form by antecedent Causes that what it apprehends is the same Colour, etc. that happen to be present at the same time,—and no other Colour, etc. ; because it is produced in the form of the apprehension of these same.—Thus then, it being admitted that Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of the Colour, etc. appearing at the same time,—there is no difference in the character of the Thing itself as concerned under the two views of *Permanence* and *Momentariness*. You will have to admit the presence of the character of 'Cognition' in the apprehension of each particular Colour, etc. appearing at the same time; by virtue of which, even though the character of appearing at the same time is equally present in all, yet what distinguishes the Cognition is the Colour, etc., and not the Sense-organ concerned. And this explanation holds good under the doctrine of the Momentariness of things also. So it is of no significance at all.—(533–535)

The Opponent raises an objection against both (Cognition having a form, as also being formless) :—

TEXT (536).

"IF COGNITION HAS A FORM, THEN CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD BE OF VARIEGATED FORM. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS NOT MARKED BY ANY FORM, THERE CAN BE NO BASIS IN THE FORM OF PROXIMITY (FOR SPECIFYING THE COGNITION)."—(536)

COMMENTARY.

If the Cognition has a form, then in the Cognition of such things as the sheet of variegated Colour, this variegated Colour would be present in the Consciousness (Cognition) also ; while it is not possible for a single Cognition to have various Colours.

If on the other hand, the Cognition is formless, there could be no such differentiation as that 'this is the Cognition of the *Blue* Colour, not of the *Yellow* Colour' ; as in all cases, the mere Cognition itself would be of the nature of Consciousness, and hence there being no distinction, there would be no basis for the said differentiation (in the Cognition).—(536)

The following *Text* supplies the answer to this cirticism :—

TEXT (537).

YOU ALSO HAVE TO SUPPLY SOME EXPLANATION IN ANSWER TO THE ABOVE ; AND WHATEVER ANSWER YOU PUT FORWARD WOULD ALSO BE OUR ANSWER TO IT.—(537)

COMMENTARY.

The criticism that has been urged applies equally to both parties ; as you also will have to accept one or the other of the two views—of Cognition having form or being formless otherwise there would be no possibility of the Cognition apprehending an object.—Nor is there any other alternative besides these two ways in which the Cognition could apprehend the object. When a criticism is applicable to both parties, it should not be urged by one against the other. Thus then the answer that you may be able to make to the criticism shall be our answer also. For instance, under the view that Cognition has some form, the answer that you might make would be either that the forms are unreal, or that they are nothing different from the Cognition itself with which it is found to be invariably concomitant, even though the two appear to be different ;—and this same answer shall be ours also.—Under the view that Cognition is formless, the explanation that could be given would be that that character of the Cognition whereby it apprehends only a particular thing is due to previous Causes ;—and this same answer shall be available for us *Bauddhas* also, who hold Cognitions to be formless. Hence our answer to the Opponent's criticism is that it cannot be urged against us.—(537)

Having thus established the existence of the 'Means of Right Cognition' apprehending the Relation of Cause and Effect, the Author now proceeds to meet the objection that his theory involves the anomaly of 'the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done':—

TEXTS (538-539).

THERE WOULD BE 'WASTE OF WHAT IS DONE', ONLY IF THE CAUSE DID NOT PRODUCE AN EFFECT ;—NO SUCH VIEW HOWEVER IS HELD BY US, WHEREBY THERE COULD BE NO 'CAUSAL CHARACTER'.—THE 'BEFALLING OF WHAT IS NOT DONE' ALSO WOULD BE THERE IF AN EFFECT WERE PRODUCED WITHOUT A CAUSE ; THIS ALSO IS NOT HELD BY US ; AS THE PRODUCTION OF THE EFFECT IS ALWAYS DEPENDENT UPON THE POTENCY OF A PARTICULAR CAUSE.—(538-539)

COMMENTARY.

If it had been held by us that there is really a *Doer* and *Experiencer*, then the doctrine of the 'Perpetual Flux' might have involved the anomaly of 'the

waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done' ;—as a matter of fact however, the view held by us is that the Universe is a mere Idea, and there is nothing that is *done* or *experienced* by anyone. How then could the said anomaly of 'the waste of what is done, etc.' be urged against us ?

It is possible that the anomaly of '(*a*) the Waste of what is done and (*b*) the befalling of what is not done' is urged against us on the ground that our view involves the production of Results from a Cause (*a*) which has lost that capacity to bring about desirable and undesirable results which is concurrent with a pre-existing Intelligence,—and (*b*) which has acquired that capacity which is not concurrent with the preceding act.—But this cannot be right; because there is no incompatibility between the doctrine of 'No-Soul' and the presence of the capacity due to previous acts. For instance, just like the Seeds soaked in red dye, the particular potentialities due to previous acts do actually continue in the 'chain', and it is through these as subsequently developed that the desirable or undesirable result appears. Nor do we hold that the Result proceeds from a 'chain' *not* set up by previous acts; thus how could our view involve the anomaly of 'the befalliug of what has not been done' ?

Uddyotakara has argued that "the Mind being a fleeting entity, there is no possibility of its being affected (impressed) by Actions".—This is not right; as a matter of fact, there can be no *affecting* of the *permanent* thing which has not renounced its previous form; as for the '*impermanent* (fleeting) thing, its being 'affected' consists in the very fact of the coming about of a new character. When the Scriptures speak of 'the Permanent Entity as *affected*', it is with reference to the permanence of the 'Chain'; that 'Chain' which is liable to be snapped cannot serve as the 'Cause', as it cannot be present at the time of the birth of the Result at a long interval; hence it would be clearly wrong to regard such a 'Chain' as the substratum of the 'impression' leading to such a result. This is what is meant.—Thus what has been urged by *Uddyotakara* is based upon his ignorance of the doctrines of the other party and deserves to be ignored.—(538-539)

Kumārila has argued as follows :—"When we speak of 'the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done', we do not mean that the said anomaly is due to the act done by a certain *Doer* being destroyed,—for the simple reason that under your view, there is no *Doer*; what we mean is that, inasmuch as you hold the destruction of the Act and the production of its Result to be absolute,—this is what involves the said anomaly of 'the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done'." [See *Shlokavārtika, Ātmavāda* 12 *et seq.*]

In answer to this the Author proceeds to show that the said anomaly in this last form is what is actually admitted by the Buddhist and hence it is not right to put that forward to him as an undesirable contingency :—

TEXT (540).

WHAT IS URGED AGAINST US, BY SETTING FORTH THE ALTERNATIVE OF THINGS BEING DIFFERENT EVERY MOMENT, IS THE FACT OF EVERYTHING UNDERGOING DESTRUCTION AT EVERY MOMENT AND SO FORTH. BUT BY URGING ALL THIS THE OTHER PARTY HAVE NOT PUT FORWARD ANYTHING THAT IS DISAGREEABLE TO US.—(540)

COMMENTARY.

"The preceding *Action-Moment* being absolutely destroyed, there is 'waste of what is done';—and then an absolutely new *Result-Moment* being produced, there is 'befalling of what is not done'",—if such is the anomaly that is urged against us, through the setting forth of alternatives relating to the momentary change in things,—then what is urged against us is what is quite agreeable to us. In fact, we are going to show that there is no continuity of the slightest trace of any part of anything at all.—(540)

As regards the argument (put forward by the Opponent, under Texts 496–499) that "the intelligent man would not undertake any activity",—this is answered in the following—

TEXTS (541-542).

THE ASSUMPTIONS BASED UPON THE DIFFERENCE AMONG MOMENTS DO NOT ARISE IN PERSONS THE POWERS OF WHOSE VISION HAVE BEEN DAMAGED,—BECAUSE OF THEIR IDEA OF THE UNITY OF THE 'CHAIN'. IN FACT, PERSONS WHO HAVE FULLY REALISED THE TRUTH UNDERSTAND THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CAUSES APPEARING IN A 'PERPETUAL FLUX', AND UNDERTAKE THE PERFORMANCE OF GOOD DEEDS ACCORDINGLY.—(541-542)

COMMENTARY.

Those persons whose powers of seeing things other than the ordinary ones have not deteriorated,—for them the assumptions made relating to the difference among Moments do not arise at all. Because they are fully satisfied by their conviction that by realising the 'Chain' to be one they would be quite happy, and hence betake themselves to the performance of actions.—Those persons also who are devoted to the welfare of other people, having realised, through reasoning and scriptures, the 'momentariness' and 'soul-less-ness' of all things, and thus fully realised the Truth,—they also accept the 'Intervolved Chain of Causation'; they come to understand that when acts of charity and the like are done, being prompted by sympathy and good will, there come about Impressions tending to the welfare of oneself and also of others,—these impressions appearing in a mutually

intervolved 'Chain' or 'Series';—and that no such impressions arise from the performance of such evil acts as Harming others and the like. Having thus realised the exact limitations of Causes and their Effects, they undertake the performance of good deeds. This has been thus declared—'Until the loss of love for one's own self comes about, the man continues to suffer pain and does not feel comfortable; there should therefore be efforts put forth for the removing of these false impositions,—even though there be no such entity as the *Experiencer* (of the fruits of actions)'.

How the *Relation of Cause and Effect* and the *Means of Right Cognition* thereof are established has already been explained above.—(541-542)

It has been argued above (under *Text* 493) that "if things are *momentary*, Recognition cannot be explained".—The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (543).

THE PECULIAR CHARACTER OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT' IS RESTRICTED TO SOME MINDS ONLY; THAT IS HOW REMEMBRANCE, ETC. COME ABOUT WITHOUT OBSTRUCTION.—(543)

COMMENTARY.

In the term '*kāryakāryitā*', '*kāryī*' is *that which has an effect,* i.e. a *Cause*; and thus the compound stands for *the character of Cause and Effect.*—In reality, there is no *one* who is the *Rememberer* or the *Apprehender* of things; for, if there were, then it would mean that the thing is remembered by the same entity that had apprehended it. What happens is that Remembrance and the rest come about only in that 'Chain' (or Series) in which their seed has been laid by the successive production of more and more specialised 'moments' by a specially vivid apprehension;—and not anywhere else; as the scope of the relation of Cause and Effect is restricted. Such in brief is the sense of the Text.—This has been thus declared:—'Our theory cannot be vitiated by the possibility of Remembrance and Experience of Results coming to other persons; because there can be no such remembrance at all: Who is the man whose mind has ever remembered what had been apprehended by another?'

As for Recognition and the rest, they are always brought about by previous Remembrance; hence there is no incongruity at all.—Nor has it anywhere been proved that Recognition and the rest are all based upon a single *Cogniser,* by virtue of which it has been asserted (under *Text* 494) that "if there were difference between the two, the Recognition would be baseless". Because merely on the basis of the relation of Cause and Effect, difference has to be admitted in all cases.—(543)

It has been argued (under *Text* 496) that "what is bound up with the chains of Attachment, etc. is *one* Moment, etc. etc.; and hence there can be no idea of Bondage and Liberation under the theory of 'Perpetual Flux'".—The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (544).

IGNORANCE AND THE REST, IN THE FORM OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT', ARE HELD TO CONSTITUTE 'BONDAGE', AND THE CESSATION OF THESE, AS CONSISTING IN THE PURITY OF THE MIND, IS HELD TO CONSTITUTE 'LIBERATION'.—(544)

COMMENTARY.

For us no 'Bondage' and 'Liberation' have been admitted as belonging to any one entity; as no one is held to be either 'bound' or 'liberated'; all that is admitted by us is that 'Impressions' in the form of *Ignorance* and the rest ending with decay and death are spoken of as 'Bondage' on the ground of their being the cause of pain. This has been thus declared:—'All this is merely an aggregate of the Thought-phase that causes pain'.—When the said Ignorance and the rest cease, by virtue of True Knowledge, there comes about *purity of the Mind*; and it is this purity that is spoken of as 'Liberation'; as thus declared—'When the Mind is beset with the troubles of Attachment and the rest, it constitutes the *Cycle of Birth and Death*, and when the same is freed from them, it is called the *End of Birth*'.—(544)

It has been argued (under *Text* 499) that "Bondage and Liberation appear in the same substratum".—The next *Text* proceeds to show that in this argument the Corroborative Instance cited is 'devoid of the Probandum':—

TEXT (545).

EVEN IN THE ORDINARY WORLD, THESE TWO—'BONDAGE' AND 'LIBERATION'—ARE NOT ADMITTED AS APPEARING IN THE SAME SUBSTRATUM; AS EVERYTHING IS HELD TO BE *momentary*.—(545)

COMMENTARY.

When it has been proved that everything perishes immediately after it is born, then nowhere can Bondage and Liberation be accepted as appearing in the same substratum; hence what has been cited by the Opponent as the Corroborative Instance is what is not admitted.—(545)

Having thus established his own doctrine, the Author proceeds to discard the doctrine of the Opponent:—

TEXT (546).

As the coming in of any peculiarity is entirely impossible, all notions of the 'Doer and the Experiencer', 'being in bondage' and so forth,—in regard to the Soul—must be incompatible; or else the Soul is something evanescent.—(546)

COMMENTARY.

If the Troubles in the shape of Attachment and the rest had really brought about the Bondage of the Soul,—or if Contemplation and the rest had really produced certain peculiarities in the Soul,—then the idea of the Soul's 'Bondage and Liberation' might have been admitted; as a matter of fact, however, as the Soul is eternal (*ex hypothesi*), no peculiarities can be produced in it; for the same reason no ideas of 'Bondage and Liberation',—which presuppose limitations of the relation of Cause and Effect,—are possible in regard to the Soul;—just as in regard to *Ākāsha*.

'*Or else*',—i.e. if peculiarities were actually produced in the Soul,—then as the 'Peculiarity' would be of the nature of the Soul, the Soul itself also, being non-different from the Peculiarity, would, like the Peculiarity, be something *evanescent*.—If the 'Peculiarity' were something different from the Soul, then, the idea of its being produced in the Soul would be wrong,—as no connection would be possible (between the Soul and the Peculiarity). This matter has been discussed times without number.—(546)

End of Chapter IX.

CHAPTER X.

The Examination of the First Category—'Substance'.

COMMENTARY.

The Introductory verses have spoken of the Doctrine of 'Intervolved Chain of Causation' as 'free from such limiting conditions as those of *Quality, Substance, Action, Universal, Inherence* and so forth'. In support of this the Author proceeds to examine the 'six categories' (of the *Vaishēṣikas*); this examination is what is introduced in the following—

TEXTS (547-548).

THE FOLLOWERS OF *Akṣapāda* (GAUTAMA, *Naiyāyikas*) AND OF *Kaṇāda* (*Vaishēṣikas*) HAVE ASSERTED, SOLELY ON THE STRENGTH OF VERBAL AUTHORITY, THAT—"THE THEORY OF THE *Universal* AND SUCH THINGS BEING FORMLESS, SET FORTH PREVIOUSLY—CANNOT BE RIGHT; BECAUSE THE SIX CATEGORIES OF 'SUBSTANCE' AND THE REST DO REALLY EXIST".—HENCE THE REFUTATION OF THESE, SUBSTANCE AND THE REST, IS BRIEFLY SET FORTH HERE.—(547-548)

COMMENTARY.

"In one of the earlier chapters, that on the 'Permanence of Things' (Chapter VIII), it has been asserted (by the Buddhist) that 'the Universal and such concepts being *formless*, the momentary character is not attributed to them' (*Text* 740).—This cannot be right; because the six categories of *Substance, Quality, Action, Universal, Ultimate Individuality* and *Inherence* do really exist";—so say *the followers of Akṣapāda* and others. *Naiyāyikas* have been called '*Ākṣapāda*' because they are the disciples, followers, of *Akṣapāda*; and similarly the *followers of Kaṇāda*, the *Vaishēṣikas*, have been called '*Kāṇāda*'.

'*Solely on the strength of verbal authority*';—i.e. they are dependent upon Verbal Authority only, totally devoid of reason.—(547-548)

With a view to refuting the category of 'Substance', the Author sets forth the subdivisions of 'Substance' (as postulated by its exponents):—

TEXT (549).

SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN HELD TO BE OF NINE KINDS—DIVIDED UNDER THE DIFFERENT HEADS OF 'EARTH' AND THE REST; OF THESE, THE FOUR BEGINNING WITH THE 'EARTH' ARE OF TWO KINDS—*eternal* AND *non-eternal*.—(549)

COMMENTARY.

The idea underlying this setting forth of the subdivisions is that when the subject has been thus stated, it is easier to find fault with it.

'*Nine kinds*',—as stated in the *Sūtra* (*Vaishēṣika*)—'Earth, Water, Fire, Air, *Ākāsha*, Time, Space, Soul and Mind'. From among these, Substance in the form of the first four—i.e. Earth, Water, Fire and Air—is of two kinds, being *eternal* and *non-eternal*.—(549)

These two kinds are shown in the following—

TEXT (550).

THE 'ATOMS' THAT HAVE BEEN HELD TO BE OF THE NATURE OF 'EARTH' AND THE REST ARE *eternal*; WHILE THOSE MADE UP OF THE ATOM AND THE REST ARE EVANESCENT.—(550)

COMMENTARY.

Earth, etc. in the form of the *Atom* are eternal,—the Atoms being eternal. Those that are made up of *the Atom and the rest* are *non-eternal*, according to the Law that what has a Cause must be non-eternal.

'*Atom and the rest*',—i.e. those among which Atoms are the first.

Ākāsha and the rest are eternal;—such is the sense of the *Text*.—(550)

The Author proceeds to discard 'Substance' of the said four kinds:—

TEXT (551).

AMONG THESE, THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE ETERNAL (PERMANENT) ATOMS HAS ALREADY BEEN PROVED, BY ESTABLISHING THE FACT OF ALL THINGS BEING IN A STATE OF 'PERPETUAL FLUX'.—(551)

COMMENTARY.

Among these, what have been described as Earth and the rest in the form of *Permanent Atoms*,—the non-existence of these in the form of anything permanent has been proved by the establishing of the 'Perpetual Flux' of things which pervades over all things; the Universal proposition having

been established in the form—'Whatever exists must be momentary,—because what is not-momentary cannot have any fruitful action either successive or simultaneous; hence what is not-momentary cannot exist'.—(551)

The following *Text* states a counter-argument in annulment of the permanence of Atoms :—

TEXT (552).

If Atoms were permanent, then all gross substances would be produced at once; as they are equally independent of Conjunction and other conditions.—(552)

COMMENTARY.

If Atoms, which are the cause of all gross things, like the Mountain and so forth, are held to be permanent,—then their Products, in the shape of all gross things, should be produced simultaneously, as their cause would be always there in its perfect condition. This argument may be formulated thus :—All those things whose causes are present in their perfect and unobstructed form must be produced at once,—like many Seeds, when their causes are present in their perfect and unobstructed forms ;—all gross things are held to have permanent Atoms for their cause ;—so this must be a natural reason (for regarding them as liable to be produced all at once). If things were not to be produced even in the presence of their causes in the complete form,—then they might never be produced at all, there being nothing to distinguish one case from the other; this would be a counter-argument in annulment of the *Nyāya* doctrine.

The following argument might be put forward by the other party :—"The Cause is held to be of three kinds—(1) the *Inherent* (Constituent) Cause, (2) the *Non-inherent* Cause, and (3) the *Efficient* Cause ;—when one thing *inheres* (subsists) in another, it is its *Inherent* Cause; that which acts as the Cause without inhering in a thing is its *Non-inherent* Cause; e.g. the *conjunction* of the component parts is such a Cause of the composite object; —all the other kinds of Cause are included under the third kind, the *Efficient* Cause. Such are the various kinds of Cause that go to produce a thing. All these necessary causal conditions in the form of Conjunction and the rest cannot always be present; and the presence of the *complete* Cause cannot be admitted at all times. So that the Reason put forward in the above argument of the Buddhist cannot be admitted."

In answer to this, the Author has added—'*They are equally independent of Conjunction and other conditions*' ;—if Conjunction and the other conditions produced a certain peculiarity in the Atoms, then these latter would be dependent upon those conditions; as it is however, the Atoms, being permanent, cannot have any peculiarity produced in them by anything else; under the circumstances, how could they be dependent upon Conjunction and other conditions ?

As a matter of fact however all such gross things as the Body, the House and the like do not appear at one and the same time;—in fact, they are found to be produced one after the other. Hence the conclusion must be contrary to the one propounded by the *Naiyāyika.* This argument may be formulated as follows:—The causes that produce things successively must be *impermanent,*—e.g. the Seeds which produce the Sprouts successively;—the Atoms also are productive of Effects in succession; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding Atoms as *impermanent*).—(552)

Aviddhakarṇa has put forward the following proof of the Permanence of Atoms.—"What is held to be the producer of Atoms cannot be endowed with the property of *existence,*—because it is not cognised by any Means of Right Cognition indicating *existence*;—like the 'Hare's Horns'. The 'property of existence' means *the property that should be present in the existing thing*; and the denial of this in the said Cause is what is meant. It means simply that '*there is* no Cause productive of the Atom'."

This is the argument which is anticipated in the following—

TEXT (553).

IF THE PRODUCER OF ATOMS IS NOT HELD TO BE ENDOWED WITH THE PROPERTY OF *existence,* ON THE GROUND THAT IT DOES NOT FORM THE OBJECTIVE OF ANY MEANS OF COGNISING EXISTENT THINGS,—[then the answer is as explained in the following *Text*].—(553)

COMMENTARY.

The construction of the sentence is—'*If the Producer of Atoms is not held to be endowed with the property of existence*'.

The term '*vidyamānopālambha, etc.*' means that 'it is not the objective of any such Means of Right Cognition as serves to apprehend the *existent* thing'. The rest is easily intelligible.

What is indicated by this is the argument that the assertion of the impermanence of Atoms is contrary to, and annulled by, Inference; because of the declaration that 'the existing thing which has no Cause must be permanent', which proves the *permanence* of Atoms on the ground of there being no cause productive of them.—(553)

The following *Text* explains that the Reason put forward here is not admissible:—

TEXT (554).

THE REASON ADDUCED CANNOT BE RIGHT ; BECAUSE IT IS INADMISSIBLE ; AS THE CAUSE OF ATOMS IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED IN THE SHAPE OF THE WEAVER AND THE LIKE ; INASMUCH AS THE CLOTH AND OTHER THINGS ARE ALL CONSTITUTED OF ATOMS.—(554)

COMMENTARY.

The question being—"The Weaver, etc. are known to be the cause of such things as the Cloth and the like, then how can it be said that they are found to be the cause of Atoms ?"—the answer is—'*They are constituted of Atoms*' ; what is meant is that this is going to be shown later on.—(554)

Then again, in the case of things that are far removed in space, time and character,—even though no Means of Right Cognition is found to be operative, yet their *being existent* is not regarded as incompatible ; so that the Reason cited ['Because it is not the objective of any Means of Right Cognition'] is 'not-conclusive' (in proving the *non-existence*, of the Cause of Atoms).—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (555).

IT MAY BE THAT THE *existence* OF A THING CANNOT BE KNOWN IN THE ABSENCE OF A MEANS OF THE RIGHT COGNITION OF THE EXISTING THING. BUT THE MERE ABSENCE OF THE MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION CANNOT BRING ABOUT CERTAINTY REGARDING ITS BEING ACTUALLY *non-existent*.—(555)

COMMENTARY.

'*Cannot bring about certainty, etc.*',—as is found in the case of such things as the *Ghost* (which is not *seen*, and yet one cannot be *sure* that it does not exist).—(555)

Having thus denied the Substance in the form of *Cause* (Atoms), the Author next proceeds to deny it in the form of *Products* (Things composed of Atoms) :—

TEXT (556).

THE COMPOSITE SUBSTANCE MADE UP OF ATOMS,—AS DISTINCT FROM QUALITIES AND COMPONENTS,—IS NEVER APPREHENDED ; HENCE, THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE FOR IT, IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED.—(556)

COMMENTARY.

'*Qualities*'—Colour, etc. ;—'*Components*'—Yarns, etc. ;—that which is something different from these ;—such a *Composite*, distinct from Qualities

and Components, is never apprehended. As a matter of fact, any such composite substance as the ' Cloth ', complete in itself, and entirely different from qualities like *Whiteness*, and from components, in the shape of the Yarns (composing it)—never appears in any visual or other kinds of Cognition.—From this non-perception of the Substance as distinct from Qualities, it also follows that there is no basis for the idea that Substance and Quality are distinct categories ;—and from the non-perception of the *Composite* as distinct from the *Components*, it follows that the idea of Component and Composite (Part and Whole) is groundless.—This argument may be formulated as follows: —When a perceptible thing is not perceived, it does not exist,—just as the Jar, not being perceived at a certain place, is regarded as non-existent ;—and no ' Qualified Substance ', apart from the Qualities and Components,—which is held to be perceptible,—is ever perceived as occupying the same place ;—nor is any ' Composite ' ever perceived apart from the Components ;—hence this is a natural reason (for regarding such Composite Substance as *non-existent*).—The Reason adduced here cannot be said to be ' not admitted ' ; because there is the distinct declaration of *Kaṇāda* to the effect that ' In a gross substance, there is perception due to its containing several substances and to qualities ' (*Vaishēṣīka-sūtra*), which clearly shows that the Quality and the Components are regarded as perceptible.—(556)

In the following Texts, the Author sets forth the arguments put forward by *Uddyotakara*, *Bhāvivikta* and others,—to show that the Reason that ' the Composite Substance is never perceived as distinct from its Qualities and Components ', adduced in the above argument, is ' not admitted ', ' unproven ' :—

TEXTS (557-558).

" As a matter of fact, the Rock-crystal is actually perceived when in contact with another thing, even though its Quality is not perceived ;—similarly the Line of Cranes and such things are also seen ;—when the man is covered by a long cloak, even though his complexion, etc. are not perceived, there is perception of him as a ' man ' ;—in the case of the red cloth, there is perception of it as ' cloth '."—(557-558)

COMMENTARY.

The said writers argue as follows :—" The Substance is really apprehended as apart from its Qualities ; in fact, even when its Colour and other Qualities are not perceived, the Substance itself is perceived. For instance, (*a*) when the Rock-crystal is placed near another thing, even though the colour of the white Rock-crystal itself is not perceived, the Crystal itself is perceived.—(*b*) Similarly things like the Line of Cranes flying in the sky at night when the light is dim, are actually perceived, even though their white

colour is not perceived.—(*c*) Similarly when a man is covered by a long cloak reaching to his feet, even though his dark complexion and other details are not seen, the perception that it is a ' man ' is there all right.—(*d*) In the case of pieces of cloth coloured with saffron, etc., even though the natural colour of the cloth itself is suppressed, yet the Cognition of the ' Cloth ' itself is there."—(557-558)

It has been explained above that the distinction between the Substance and its Quality is vouched for by Perception itself; in the following *Texts*, they proceed to show that it is proved by Inference also :—

TEXTS (559-560).

"(A) COLOUR AND OTHER QUALITIES ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE LOTUS AND OTHER THINGS,—BECAUSE THEY ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THESE (LATTER)—JUST AS THE HORSE IS DISTINGUISHED BY *Chaitra* (THE RIDER).—(B) OR, THE EARTH AND OTHER SUBSTANCES ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM COLOUR, ODOUR AND OTHER QUALITIES BECAUSE THEY ARE DIFFERENTLY SPOKEN OF BY MEANS OF WORDS IN THE SINGULAR AND PLURAL NUMBERS (RESPECTIVELY),—JUST AS THE ' MOON ' (SINGULAR) AND THE ' STARS ' (PLURAL) ARE DIFFERENT."—(559-560)

COMMENTARY.

The Quality is different from the Lotus, because they are spoken of as ' the Qualities of the Lotus ', where the Qualities are *distinguished* by the *Lotus* ; just as in the expression ' Chaitra's horse ', the Horse is distinguished —i.e. differentiated—from other riders, by *Chaitra,* and is therefore different from him.

Each of the Substances,—Earth, Water, Fire and Air,—are different from (the Qualities) Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch,—because they are spoken of by means of words in the Singular and Plural numbers (respectively),—just as the *Moon* and the *Stars* ; just as ' Moon ' being in the Singular number and the ' Stars ' in the Plural number form the basis of difference between them, so also ' Earth ' is in the Singular number, and the compound ' Colour-Taste-Odour-Touch ' is in the Plural number ; similarly ' Water ', ' Air ' and ' Fire ' also.

The several ' Stars ' meant are *Puṣya* and the rest.—(559-560)

Having thus proved the difference between the Quality and the Substance possessing the Quality, the Opponents proceed to prove the difference between the *Composite* and its *Components* :—

TEXT (561).

"SIMILARLY, THE *Yarns* AND THE *Cloth* MUST BE REGARDED AS DIFFERENT,—BECAUSE THEY HAVE DIFFERENT MAKERS AND DIFFERENT POTENCIES,—JUST AS THE PILLAR AND THE JAR ARE REGARDED AS DIFFERENT BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES."—(561)

COMMENTARY.

This argument is formulated as follows :—Things having different makers, different effects, different times, different sizes must be regarded as different,—just like the Pillar, the Jar and such things ;—the things under discussion do have different makers, different effects, different times and different sizes.—This Reason cannot be said to be 'unproven' ('not admitted'), or 'inconclusive'. In fact, the difference among things is always based upon the presence of contradictory properties,—as is found in the case of the Pillar, the Jar and so forth ;—such contradictory properties are found in the *Composite* and the *Component* ; for instance, of the *Yarn*, the maker is the (spinning) woman, while of the *Cloth*, the maker is the Weaver ; the Cloth—and not the Yarn,—has the capacity to remove cold ; the Yarns are found there before the Cloth ; hence it is prior in time, while the Cloth appears later, after the operation of the Weaver ; the length and breadth of the Cloth are different from those of each of the Yarns ; thus the sizes of the two are different. Thus the Reasons adduced are not 'inconclusive'. Such is the sense of the argument.—(561)

Having thus established the difference between the Composite and the Components, the Opponent proceeds to prove the same on the strength of Perception also :—

TEXTS (562-563).

"IF THERE WERE NO GROSS SUBSTANCES, THEN THE PERCEPTION OF THE TREE AND SUCH THINGS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE ; BECAUSE THE ATOMS ARE BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES ; NOR WOULD THE TERM 'ATOM' (SMALL) BE POSSIBLE ; BECAUSE IT IS THE EXTREMELY SUBTLE THING THAT IS SO SPOKEN OF IN RELATION TO A GROSS SUBSTANCE ; HENCE IN THE ABSENCE OF THE GROSS SUBSTANCE, IN RELATION TO WHAT WOULD ITS 'SUBTLETY' BE ?"—(562-563)

COMMENTARY.

If there were no Composite Substance, there would be the anomaly that there would be no Perception at all ; as the Atoms themselves are beyond the reach of the Senses.—In the absence of the 'gross' thing again, the

name 'Atom' (Small) itself would not be possible.—Why ?—'*Because it is the extremely, etc.*'—This is easy to understand.—(562-563)

With the following *Text*, the Author proceeds to answer the above arguments (of the Realists) :—

TEXT (564).

IN THE CASE OF THE *Rock-crystal* (CITED ABOVE), THE ROCK-CRYSTAL IS PERCEIVED AS *red* IN COLOUR ; AND YET, IN REALITY, IT CANNOT BE RED ;—AS THAT WOULD DEMOLISH YOUR OWN THEORY.—(564)

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted that "the Rock-crystal and such things are perceived even when their Qualities are not perceived" ; but this cannot be admitted ; because the said perception, being not in accordance with the reality, must be wrong, and hence baseless. For instance, when the red Hibiscus flower is placed adjacent to the Rock-crystal, the latter is perceived as *Red*, which it is not ;—similarly when the Line of Cranes are perceived as *Dark* (in the dark) when they are really *White*. Neither of these two things—Rock-crystal and the Cranes—are really of the Colour as perceived ;—i.e. of the *Red* or the *Dark* colour.—"Why ?"—*Because that would demolish your own theory* ;—i.e. if they were really of the Colour that is perceived, then your theory, just mentioned,—that things are perceived even when their Colour is not perceived,—would become demolished.—(564)

The Opponent might argue that—"the Rock-crystal itself is perceived, apart from the Colour".—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (565).

APART FROM THE COLOUR, NOTHING ELSE IS PERCEIVED OF THE NATURE OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT ; AND IT CANNOT BE RIGHT,—EVEN FOR YOU—THAT THINGS SHOULD BE APPREHENDED BY THE COGNITION OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT ; AS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN ABSURDITY.—(565)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, apart from the *Red Colour, nothing else of the nature of something different,*—i.e. in the shape of the 'Rock-crystal'—is perceived ; as all that is actually perceived is the Red Colour.—If it be urged that "what is perceived as *Red-coloured* is the Rock-crystal itself which is not really *red*",—then our answer is that '*it cannot be right, etc. etc.*' ;—i.e. when a Cognition is regarded as appertaining to a particular thing, it is on the basis

of the form cognised; if then, the object of the Cognition had a form other than that of the Cognition,—then *Sound* and other things might be the object of the Cognition of *Colour*,—there being no difference between the two cases.—(565)

Even granting that a Cognition may have for its object something which has a form different from that of the Cognition itself,—even so, what the other party desire cannot be accomplished.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (566).

IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TOO IN THAT CASE, THAT IT IS THE *White* COLOUR (OF THE ROCK-CRYSTAL) ITSELF THAT IS ACTUALLY COGNISED; BUT SUCH A COGNITION WOULD BE CLEARLY WRONG,—LIKE THE COGNITION OF THE CONCH BEING YELLOW.—(566)

COMMENTARY.

That is, (under the view of the other party) it might be possible that in the case cited, what actually exists apart from the White Substance (Rock-crystal) is the *White Colour,* which is cognised as 'red'.—But even so, that does not prove the existence of the *Substance with the Quality.*—The '*cha*' should be construed as after '*shuklādayaḥ*'.

'*The Cognition would be wrong*',—i.e. not in strict accordance with the real state of things.—(566)

Another instance cited by the Opponent was that of 'the man covered by a cloak'.—That also cannot be regarded as 'Perception'; because it is accompanied by a verbal expression ('this is a man'), and also because it is *indistinct.* It can at best be regarded only as an 'Inferential Cognition', as pertaining to the 'man' in the shape of *the aggregate of Colour and other Qualities.* So that this also does not serve to prove the existence of the *Composite Substance.*—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (567).

THE COGNITION THAT APPEARS IN THE CASE OF THE MAN COVERED BY THE CLOAK IS INFERENTIAL, AND DOES NOT APPERTAIN TO THE *Man* AT ALL; BECAUSE WHAT IS REALLY COGNISED IN THIS CASE IS THE *Cloak* HAVING THE SHAPE DUE TO THE MAN.—(567)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*taddhētusannivēshasya*' is to be expounded as 'the cloak which has the shape of which the Man,—who is only an aggregate of

Colour, etc.—is the Cause'.—This shows that the inferential Cognition is brought about by the particular indicative mark called the 'Effect'.—(567)

Another example cited (by the Opponent) is the notion of the 'cloth' in reference to the *Red Cloth.*—The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (568).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, SUCH THINGS AS THE RED DYE AND THE SAFFRON PRODUCE A NEW COLOUR IN THE CLOTH, ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PREVIOUS COLOUR ; BECAUSE THE CLOTH ITSELF IS MOMENTARY (AND ITS PREVIOUS COLOUR HAS PERISHED ALONG WITH IT).—(568)

COMMENTARY.

What happens in the case cited is that the Cloth itself being momentary, its previous White Colour is destroyed, and a new Colour comes into existence through other causal conditions ; and when this new Colour is perceived, there appears, on the wake of that Perception, the reflective notion pertaining to the aggregate—as 'the Cloth, the Cloth'—with appropriate distinction ; and this notion (of the 'Cloth') is purely illusory, without a real object. Thus the Cognition cited is not of the nature of *Perception* at all.

Nor is it *Inference* ; as its object is one that has been already apprehended by a previous Perception, and also because it is not a Cognition brought about by means of an Inferential Indicative.

Thus in the case cited there is no Colour that has been suppressed. —(568)

The following might be urged :—"If the original White Colour does not lie hidden in the Cloth, then how is it that when the Cloth is washed, the White Colour reappears ?"

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (569).

WHAT HAPPENS IS THAT OUT OF ONE COLOUR (RED) ANOTHER WHITE COLOUR IS PRODUCED THROUGH THE INTERVENTION OF WATER AND SUCH OTHER THINGS ;—JUST LIKE THE BLACK COLOUR OF METALS.—(569)

COMMENTARY.

Just as, in the case of Metals which have become bright white by the contact of Fire, the Dark Colour is again subsequently produced,—so in the case in question also, another White Colour is produced in the Cloth. Hence there is no incongruity at all.—(569)

The following might be urged :—" How do you know that a fresh White Colour is produced,—and not that the previous White Colour itself, which could not be perceived by reason of being suppressed, becomes perceptible later on, by the removal of the suppression ? "

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (570).

If the Colour had remained in the same condition, then there could be no suppression of it ; as the previous unsuppressed Colour would continue to exist.—(570)

COMMENTARY.

This argument may be formulated as follows :—That which has not abandoned its unsuppressed character cannot be suppressed by anything else,—just as the same in its previous condition ;—and under the suppressed condition also, the original Colour has not abandoned its unsuppressed character ; hence this would be a proposition which is contrary to a larger proposition.

On the other hand, if it be held that, the Colour *has* abandoned its unsuppressed character,—then it becomes established that the Colour subsequently produced is different from the original Colour.—(570)

It has been argued (under *Text* 559) that " The Colour differs entirely from the Lotus, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (571).

The diverse ways of verbal expression wherein the Genitive and different Numbers are used proceed entirely from the speaker's whim ; hence it is not right to determine the real state of things on the basis of such expressions.—(571)

COMMENTARY.

If it were admitted that the use of the Genitive and other forms of verbal expression proceed precisely on the basis of the real state of things, then the existence of such things could be admitted on the basis of those expressions ; as a matter of fact, however, verbal expressions proceed entirely from the whim of the speakers,—and they do not depend upon the real state of things ; how then can they prove the real existence of anything ?

The use of the ' Genitive ' referred to is in such expressions as ' *Paṭasya rūpaḥ* ', ' Colour *of the Cloth* ' [which, according to the other party proves the difference of the Cloth from the Colour] ;—and the use of diverse ' numbers '

referred to is in such expressions as '*Paṭaḥ*', 'Cloth' (in the Singular), and '*rūpādayaḥ*' 'Colour and other qualities' (in the Plural).—The phrase 'diverse ways' is meant to include the use of the Locative,—as in the expression '*Paṭē rūpādayaḥ*', 'Colour, etc. *in the Cloth*',—and such use of Nominal Affixes as in the expression '*Paṭasya bhāvaḥ paṭatvam*', [where the *Universal* character of 'Cloth' is spoken of as different from the *particular* Cloth].—(571)

In the following *Text*, the Author further reiterates the 'inconclusive' character of the Reason adduced by the other party :—

TEXT (572).

FURTHER, THE OTHER PARTY DO NOT REGARD THE 'EXISTENCE' OF THE SIX CATEGORIES AS ANYTHING DIFFERENT ; NOR IS ANY SINGLE 'GROUP' OF THEM ADMITTED.—(572)

COMMENTARY.

There are such expressions used as '*ṣaṇṇām padārthānām astitvam*', 'the existence *of the Six Categories*', '*ṣaṇṇām vargaḥ*', 'the group *of six*',—where the Genitive forms are used, even though there is no real difference between the two factors (the *Categories* and their *existence*, or the *Categories* and their *group*). You do not admit any such thing as 'existence', apart from the Six 'Categories' themselves.

This is only by way of illustration. In fact, in such words as '*dārāḥ*', '*sikatāḥ*' and the like, even though the Plural number is used, we do not perceive a multiplicity of the things (*wife* or *sand*).

As a matter of fact, the '*svatva*', 'self-hood', of a thing is not regarded as a distinct category.—(572)

In the following text, the Author anticipates the answer of the Opponent :—

TEXT (573).

IF IT BE SAID THAT—"THE *existence* OF THE SIX CATEGORIES IS HELD TO BE THE PROPERTY SUBSISTING IN WHAT IS AN OBJECT MADE KNOWN BY A *Means of Right Cognition*",—THEN, IN THAT CASE, THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DISTINCT FROM THE SIX THAT YOU POSTULATE.—(573)

COMMENTARY.

"What is meant is that the 'existence' of the Six Categories is a distinct property consisting in their being cognisable of such Means of Right Cognition as apprehend existing things ;—so that there is no discrepancy in our Premiss" ;—this is the sense of the Opponent's answer.

The answer to this is—'*In that case, etc., etc.*';—'*Distinct*'—i.e. a distinct *Category*; i.e. it becomes a *seventh* 'Category'; and this would militate against the doctrine of the 'Six Categories'.—(573)

Says the other party—"This is what we readily admit; hence it does not vitiate our argument."

How is it then that you have declared the Categories to be *six* only?

The answer to this question is anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXTS (574-575).

"THE SIX THAT HAVE BEEN POSTULATED ARE THINGS WITH PROPERTIES, AND THE PROPERTIES ARE CERTAINLY ADMITTED BY US TO BE DISTINCT FROM THEM."—IF THIS IS SAID (BY THE OTHER PARTY), THEN (WE ASK)—WHAT IS THE RELATION THAT IS HELD TO SUBSIST BETWEEN THE CATEGORIES AND THE PROPERTIES? THIS RELATION CANNOT BE THAT OF 'CONJUNCTION', AS THIS IS RESTRICTED TO SUBSTANCES ALONE (UNDER THE *Nyāya*-VIEW); NOR IS THE OTHER RELATION, THAT OF 'INHERENCE', POSSIBLE; AND NO OTHER RELATION IS ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER PARTY.—(574-575)

COMMENTARY.

"The 'Six Categories' that have been postulated are only *those that have Properties*; while the 'Six Categories' in the shape of the *Properties* are held to be quite distinct; as is found in the following words of the *Padārthapravēshaka*—'This mention has been made of only the *things with properties,* without any mention of the *Properties*'."

The answer to this explanation of the other party is provided by the words—'*Then what is the relation, etc., etc.*';—*Relation*—of the Property in the shape of *Existence,* etc.—with '*those*'—i.e. the Categories;—what is that relation by virtue of which *Existence* becomes the 'property' of the Categories? Without some sort of relation the character of '*Property* and *With Property*' would not be possible; otherwise it would lead to the absurdity of everything being the Property of everything. As a matter of fact, there is no relation between the Property of *Existence* and the Categories. Because there are only two kinds of Relation—Conjunction and Inherence. The relation of Conjunction is not possible in the case in question, because being of the nature of *Quality,* Conjunction is restricted to Substances only [and Substance is only one of the Six Categories; all these latter, therefore, cannot have *Conjunction* with the Property of *Existence*].—Nor can the relation be one of the nature of Inherence, because it is held to be one only, like 'Existence' itself; while if the relation of 'Inherence' subsisted between Inherence and

the Categories, then the former 'Inherence' should have to be regarded as different from the latter [and this would involve self-contradiction].—(574-575)

It might be argued that "the Property of *Existence* could belong to the Categories without any relation".—The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (576).

IF NO RELATION IS POSSIBLE, THEN HOW COULD THE PROPERTY BELONG TO THE CATEGORIES ?—IF IT WERE HELD TO BELONG TO THEM MERELY ON THE GROUND OF ITS BEING PRODUCED BY THEM, THEN THERE WOULD BE OTHERS ALSO LIKE IT.—(576)

COMMENTARY.

So that it would lead to an absurdity.

If it be held that the Property is said to be related to the Six Categories, on account of its being produced by them,—then, there are other things also,—such as Water and the like—which would be '*like it*'—i.e. related to things like the Tank and such things, merely on that ground 'of being produced by them'; and under the circumstances, the postulating of Relations in the shape of 'Conjunction' and 'Inherence' would be futile.—(576)

TEXT (577).

FURTHER, AS THERE WOULD BE 'EXISTENCE' *of the Existence* ALSO, THE INCOMPATIBLE (GENITIVE) ENDING WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH IT; AND IF THERE WERE EXISTENCE OF THAT EXISTENCE ALSO, AND SO FORTH, THERE WOULD BE NO END TO IT.—(577)

COMMENTARY.

Further, even granting that the Property of 'Existence' belongs to the Six Categories,—your Reason remains defective (false, inconclusive). For instance, that *Existence* itself would have *existence,* as it is an Entity; how then could there be the Genitive ending in the expression 'existence *of Existence*', which (as you say) is based on difference ?—If it be held that there is yet another existence of the Existence, then there is an Infinite Regress.—(577)

Says the Opponent :—"When it is found necessary and desirable, 'Infinite Regress' cannot be a defect that can justify the rejection of the Premiss".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (578).

THUS IN ALL THESE 'EXISTENCES', THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING WITH PROPERTY' WOULD BE DUE TO THE PRESENCE THEREIN OF ANOTHER PROPERTY; AND IN THE CASE OF *Substance* AND THE REST ALSO, THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING WITH PROPERTY' HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ON THE SAME BASIS.—(578)

COMMENTARY.

In each one of these Existences (*ad infinitum*), the character of 'being with property' would be due to the presence therein of the properties coming one after the other; and under the circumstances, the assertion that 'these Six Categories alone are *with property*' would not be correct; as there would be many other things also (in the shape of the *Existences*), apart from the Six Categories, which would be *with property*. Such is the sense of the argument.

It might be argued that—"what are said to be *six only* are those things that are always *with property* only [while others are *with property* and also are themselves *property*]".

But there is nothing in this explanation. As, under this explanation, Quality, Action, Universal, Individuality and Inherence could not be mentioned therein, as these are not always *with property* only, they are of the nature of property also,—as all these subsist in the Substance.

'*On the same basis*';—i.e. because of the presence of other properties.

The Opponent says:—"The *existence* of the Six Categories consists in their *Cognisability by the Means of Cognising existing things*; and this *Cognisability* is in the form of the Cognition which has the Six Categories for its object; as it is only when this Cognition is present that they are regarded as 'existent'. Thus 'cognisability' is produced by Cognition and 'predicability' is produced by Predication; so that the use of the Genitive Ending—based upon difference,—becomes quite possible. Nor is there an Infinite Regress; nor the contingency of Categories other than the six (postulated by us)."

This also is a mere figment of the Opponent's imagination. If the things in question are in their essence of the nature of a Category (Thing) capable of effective action, then, as being capable of effective action, they must be Categories (Things); this being conceded, if they are spoken of by words with case-endings connoting difference,—in such expressions as 'the existence *of these*',—only to meet the enquiry as to their being other forms of Categories,—then what is the dispute between us? Because though its character is really *not-different*, yet having withdrawn that character from it, if the speaker were to speak of it as if it were *different*,—then there would be no dispute; because the use of words depends entirely upon the speaker's whim,—as is found in the case of characters created in concocted stories, where extreme degrees of beauty and other qualities are assumed and described.—(578)

It has been argued by the other party (under *Text* 561, above) that "the Yarns and the Cloth are distinct things, because their makers and potencies are different, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (579-580).

IF IT IS THE DIFFERENCE OF THE CLOTH FROM THE VERY FIRST YARNS THAT IS SOUGHT TO BE PROVED,—THEN THERE IS THE IRRESISTIBLE DEFECT OF 'FUTILITY'. THOSE OTHER YARNS ALSO THAT APPEAR LATER ON, IN ANOTHER STATE (FORM), CAPABLE OF A PARTICULAR KIND OF USEFUL ACTION,—ARE NOT ENTIRELY DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER FROM THOSE FIRST YARNS.—(579-580)

COMMENTARY.

If what you are seeking to establish is the difference of the Cloth from those first yarns which have not yet acquired the name of 'Cloth',—then you are proving what is already admitted. In fact, all things being momentary, it is admitted by us that the later yarns which subsequently come to be called 'Cloth' are actually produced from those first yarns,—though (as a matter of fact) it is not possible for one thing to be produced out of another totally different from it.—(579-580)

If, on the other hand, what is sought to be proved is the difference of the *Cloth* from those yarns that have come into existence at the same time as the Cloth,—then, the Reasons adduced are such as are *not admitted*, 'Unproven'.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (581–583).

THE INTENTION BEING TO INDICATE THEIR USE IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A SINGLE PURPOSE,—IF EACH YARN WERE SPOKEN OF SEPARATELY, THEN THERE WOULD BE THE DEFECTS OF (*a*) PROLIXITY, (*b*) INCAPACITY, AND (*c*) FUTILITY;—WITH A VIEW TO AVOID THESE, THINKING THAT THERE WOULD BE SIMPLICITY OF USAGE IF ALL THE YARNS WERE MENTIONED BY A SINGLE NAME, PEOPLE MAKING USE OF WORDS HAVE BROUGHT FORTH THE SINGLE TERM AND APPLIED IT TO THE YARNS.—BUT THESE (YARNS) DO NOT SERVE TO PROVE THE *Cloth*, WHICH IS SYNCHRONOUS WITH THOSE YARNS, AS HAVING A DIFFERENT MAKER AND DIFFERENT POTENCIES AND DIFFERENT SIZE.—(581–583)

COMMENTARY.

If the Cloth existing at the same time as the yarns were at the time actually known as something different from the yarns, then, in comparison

with the yarns, it might be recognised as having the characters of having a different maker and the rest (which have been put forward by the other party); as it is, however, that Cloth itself is not known as something different from the yarns; as it is this very difference that the other party has proceeded to establish. The mere presence of the two different names—' Cloth ' and ' Yarns '—does not necessarily prove the two things to be different, as different names may be applied to the same thing for various other purposes. For instance, some particular yarns, having reached a certain condition, become capable of accomplishing the useful purpose of keeping off cold; and there may be other yarns—which, for instance, have just left the hands of the spinning women,—which are not so capable. And with a view to indicate that the former yarns are capable of accomplishing a single purpose, the single term ' Cloth ' is applied to them by people speaking of them, specially for the purpose of avoiding confusion; even though, in reality the *Cloth* is not anything different from the *yarns*.

Question:—" Why, then, is a single term applied at all ? "

Answer:—If each of the yarns were spoken of separately,—i.e. if each yarn were spoken of one by one,—then, there would be the following defects:—(*a*) *Prolixity*; i.e. as many words will have to be used as there are things capable of accomplishing the same purpose; and this would be too prolix; (*b*) *Incapacity*; it will not be possible to ascertain the specific forms of each individual; this is what is meant by *incapacity*;—(*c*) *Futility*: speaking of them as having some imaginary common form, it is better to speak of them by a single word; and hence there is no use in speaking of each of them separately.—On the other hand, if they are all spoken of as a whole, there is the distinct advantage that usage becomes simplified. Just as single comprehensive words are used in speaking of *all things* by such all-comprehensive names as ' World ', ' Three-Worlds ', ' Universe ' and so forth. Exactly of the same kind is the name ' Cloth ' (as comprehending all the yarns).

The compound ' *vibhinna, etc.* ' is to be expounded by making a copulative compound between ' *Kartṛ* ' and ' *Sāmarthya, etc.* ', and then taking this copulative compound as qualified by the term ' *vibhinna* '.—(581–583)

It has been argued (under *Text* 462, above) that—" if there were no gross Substance, the perception of the *Tree* and such things would not be possible; etc., etc."—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (584).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THOSE ATOMS THAT HAVE COME INTO EXISTENCE AS MUTUALLY HELPFUL,—ARE NOT BEYOND THE SENSES; AS THEY ARE WITHIN REACH OF THE SENSES.—(584)

COMMENTARY.

The fact of Atoms being beyond the reach of the senses is not admitted; because such Atoms as have attained a certain condition are actually percepti-

ble by the senses.—In fact, it is for people who regard Atoms as eternal, that the appearance of peculiar features in the Atoms being impossible, they would be always beyond the reach of the senses ;—not so for us.

'*Anyonyābhisarāḥ*'—'*as mutually helpful*',—i.e. as helping each other. —(584)

The following text also shows that Atoms are perceptible by the senses :—

TEXT (585).

THE 'BLUE' AND OTHER SHAPES HAVE BEEN POSTULATED IN REGARD TO THE ATOMS THEMSELVES ; AND THE VISUAL AND OTHER COGNITIONS ALSO SERVE TO MANIFEST ONLY THOSE BLUE AND OTHER SHAPES.—(585)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—"Atoms are held to exist in a sequential form—one after the other ;—and certainly they are not 'perceived' in that form ; then how can they be said to be *perceptible* ?"

Answer :—

TEXT (586).

THOUGH THEY ARE NOT PERCEIVED IN THE SEQUENTIAL FORM,—YET THEIR *perceptibility* CANNOT BE DENIED,—IT BEING SIMILAR TO THAT OF DRINKS AND OTHER THINGS.—(586)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*adhyakṣatābādhā*' may be taken as a genitive *Tatpuruṣa* compound, meaning—'non-denial of Perceptibility' ;—or it may not be treated as a compound but two separate words—'*adhyakṣatā*' and '*abādhā*', —the meaning being 'Perceptibility is undeniable' ; i.e. there being no annulment of it, it cannot be denied.

'*It being similar, etc.*' ;—i.e. its perceptibility remains as undenied as the perceptibility of Drinks and other things. For instance, in the case of a 'Drink', the '*Taptopala*' (? Heated or Burnt, Stone, a medicinal preparation), the '*Sūtahĕma*' [? *Quick-silver and gold*, another medicinal preparation, the *Makaradhvaja* ?], and such things,—where the constituent atoms are of mixed characters (tastes), they are actually perceived as such. In the case of these things, there is no 'composite substance' (apart from the constituent Atoms), the things consisting of heterogeneous elements. In fact, if the Composite were something different from the Atoms, no conjunction among them could be visible ; because the substratum of such conjunction —i.e. the Atoms—are unseen (*ex hypothesi*) ; and if even one of the factors of the Conjunction is not visible, the Conjunction cannot be perceived ; e.g.

the conjunction between the Jar and the Ghost; and the conjunction between the Solar Disc and parts of space and of *Akāsha*. Such being the case, where all the conjuncts—in the shape of Atoms,—are imperceptible, how can the Conjunction subsisting in them be perceptible ?—(586)

Question :—" Thus then, the whole matter being uncertain, how can the perceptibility of Atoms be accepted as reasonable ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (587).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, IN THE MATTER OF THE PERCEPTION OF ALL THINGS,—WHICH EXIST ONLY IN THE FORM OF *mutual exclusion* (*negation*),—THERE IS THE SAME UNCERTAINTY IN REGARD TO *all* THEIR CHARACTERS AND FORMS.—(587)

COMMENTARY.

Under the view of the other Philosophers also, whenever anything is apprehended by Perception, there is no certainty in regard to all the forms and characters of that thing; what happens is that it is regarded as perceived to that extent which serves to differentiate it from other things,—and not *all* its forms and characters. Because even if other factors were perceived, there would be no certainty regarding them, and these would be of no practical use, and as such, would be as good as *not-perceived*.

'*The same uncertainty*' ;—i.e. as in the case of the apprehended thing. —(587)

Says the Opponent :—" Inasmuch as things are impartite,—and everything is actually perceived in its complete form,—why should there be no certainty regarding the *whole* Thing ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (588).

EVEN THOUGH, THE THING BEING IMPARTITE, ITS CHARACTER IS APPREHENSIBLE ONLY BY *Indeterminate Perception*, YET THERE IS DEFINITE (CERTAIN) COGNITION OF ITS DIFFERENTIATION (FROM OTHER THINGS) ; AND IT IS THIS DEFINITE COGNITION THAT IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE CAUSE (OF CERTAINTY).—(588)

COMMENTARY

'*Ākṣa*' is *that which pertains to the senses*; i.e. perceptional cognition ;—and this is qualified by the term '*akalpana*', 'indeterminate' ;—though it is apprehensible by indeterminate Sense-perception, yet etc., etc.

'*There is definite (certain) cognition of its differentiation*';—i.e. certainty as regards its being different;—the cause of this consists in Repetition, Close Proximity, vividness of conviction of difference, and so forth. As a matter of fact, mere Apprehension by itself does not bring about *certainty,* which is brought about with the help of repetition, etc. also. Hence the meaning is that there is certainty where all these conditions are present.

All this we have said on the supposition (for the sake of argument) that Atoms exist and also the external object is actually cognised by Perception; as a matter of fact however, for the *Idealist,* there is no external object, in the shape of Blue and the like, cognised by Perception; because in dreams and other such conditions, there is perception of such things as the Blue, even though such things have no existence at the time; and this fact makes the ordinary perception of such things also at least doubtful; specially as the form of the 'Blue' being devoid of the nature of *one* or *many,* its cognition must be of the nature of an illusory appearance.—Nor are the *Atoms* admitted as existent; because they exist in sequential succession,—and as they vary in regard to the point of space occupied by them, they cannot be regarded as *one.* Under the circumstances, in view of such an Atom, how can it be asserted that Atoms are perceptible as having the Blue Colour, and that the sequence has no significance, being imposed upon it from outside—through illusion?—(588)

The Opponent might argue that—"if there were no Composite substance, how could a man with open eyes have the notion of 'one mountain' in reference to what are only so many Atoms?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (589).

JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE LAMP IT IS ONLY A SERIES OF SIMILAR FLAMES WHICH BRINGS ABOUT THE ILLUSION (OF ITS BEING *one*); SO [IN THE CASE OF THE MOUNTAIN ALSO], THERE IS AN ILLUSION OF UNITY, EVEN THOUGH WHAT ARE REALLY COGNISED ARE SEVERAL SUBTLE ENTITIES APPEARING IN CLOSE JUXTAPOSITION.—(589)

COMMENTARY.

In such things as the Lamp, it is the series of successively appearing similar flames that give rise to the illusion of there being '*one* lamp',—though in reality there are *several* flames,—in the same manner, in the case of the mountain, what are really cognised are many small and smaller entities appearing in close juxtaposition, and this gives rise to the illusion of 'oneness'. So that there is no incongruity at all.—(589)

Question:—"If then, the Atoms are not perceived as distinct from one another, how do they become perceptible?"

Answer:—

TEXT (590).

IF THE PERCEPTIBILITY OF ATOMS IS NOT ADMITTED BECAUSE OF THEIR BEING NOT-DIFFERENTIATED, THEN HOW IS IT SEEN IN THE CASE OF THE LAMP AND SUCH THINGS? OR, IS THE COMPOSITE HELD TO BE OF THAT KIND?—(590)

COMMENTARY.

If it is held that what cannot be cognised in differentiated form cannot be perceptible, then, how is it that perceptibility is found in the Lamp, wherein also the individual flames appearing in quick succession cannot be differentiated?—Or is it that the Composite only is a thing that is perceptible, even though its components are not differentiated? The reason thus put forward by the Opponent is inconclusive.—(590)

The following *Text* advises the other Party as to the way in which he should level his criticism:—

TEXTS (591-592).

ALL THAT CAN BE URGED IS—"ON THE DEFINITE COGNITION OF THESE (ATOMS), HOW IS IT THAT IT IS NOT REALISED THAT WHAT IS PERCEIVED AS *Blue* IS THE FORM OF THE *Atoms*?" —BUT THAT ALSO CANNOT BE THE CAUSE; BECAUSE THE COGNITION IN QUESTION CANNOT BE WITHOUT AN OBJECT; AND YET IT CANNOT HAVE FOR ITS OBJECT A *single gross object*, AS THERE IS INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN *grossness* AND *one-ness*.—(591-592)

COMMENTARY.

'*These*'—i.e. of the Atoms.

'*That also cannot be the Cause etc., etc.*';— i.e. the fact of the Atoms being perceived as differentiated from one another cannot be the cause—of the fact that the Blue colour is not perceived as belonging to the Atoms; because the certainty regarding this can be got at from other sources. For instance, the upholder of the 'External Thing' cannot hold a Cognition to be devoid of an object; if he did admit it, then his view would come to be the view of pure 'Idealism'.

Under the circumstances, the Colour, etc. which form the objects of the Cognition, and appear therein in the gross form,—is it *one* or *many*? If *one*, is it composed of the components, or not so composed? In either

of these two forms, it cannot be *one*, as that would be incompatible with Perception.—(591-592)

Question :—" What is that ' incompatibility (with Perception) ? "
Answer —

TEXTS (593-594).

IF THE GROSS OBJECT WERE OF THE NATURE OF *one* ONLY, THEN ON EVEN PART OF IT BEING COVERED BY THE LITTLE LEG OF A FLEA, ALL OF IT WOULD BECOME COVERED, WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION ;—AND ON ONE PART OF IT BEING REDDENED, ALL OF IT WOULD BECOME COLOURED RED.—OR, ON THE CONTRARY, THE PRESENCE OF INCOMPATIBLE PROPERTIES WOULD INDICATE *multiplicity*.—(593-594)

COMMENTARY.

If the gross object were *one*, then the covering of one part of it would mean the covering of all of it, and the colouring of one part would mean the colouring of all ; as, according to your view, there would be no difference between the *covered* and *uncovered* parts, or between the *coloured* and *uncoloured* parts. And yet it is not possible for any single object to be possessed of contradictory properties,—as that would lead to absurdities. Thus the whole universe would become a single substance ; and this would involve all the anomalies of *simultaneous production of things* and the rest. As a matter of fact too, the covering of one part is not seen to lead to the covering of all. Thus the said view is clearly incompatible with perceived facts.

It is incompatible with *Inference* also : For instance, that which is obsessed by contradictory properties cannot be *one*,—e.g. the Cow and the Buffalo ;—the gross object is found to be obsessed by the contradictory properties of being *perceived* and *not perceived*, as being ' covered ' and ' not covered ' ;—hence there is found in it the contrary of the wider condition, [which makes *one-ness* impossible].—The contingency of the whole universe becoming one would be an Inference that would annul the notion [of the said *one-ness* of the gross object].—(593-594)

Uddyotakara has argued as follows—" As there can be no diversity in any *one* thing, the term ' all ' cannot be rightly applied to it ; then how can there be the use of the term ' all ', on the basis whereof *all* (*sarva*) of it could be said to be *covered* ? "

This objection is expounded in the following—

TEXT (595).

"INASMUCH AS THE OBJECT IS OF ONE UNIFORM CHARACTER, TO WHAT WOULD THE USE OF THE TERM '*sarva*' ('ALL') BE DUE? BECAUSE THAT TERM DENOTES MORE THAN ONE INDIVIDUAL THING, WHILE THE *Composite* IS NOT OF THE NATURE OF MANY INDIVIDUALS."—(595)

COMMENTARY.

"As a matter of fact, the term 'all' denotes *many*—more than one—things; while the Composite is *not many*; how then can the term 'all' be used in reference to it—in such an assertion as 'all of it would become covered'?"—(595)

This argument is answered in the following—

TEXTS (596–598).

IT IS ONLY SUCH THINGS AS ARE WELL KNOWN IN THE WORLD,—SUCH AS *Cloth, Body, Mountain* AND SO FORTH,—THAT HAVE BEEN MENTIONED BY YOU AS 'COMPOSITES';—AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, ALL MEN MAKE USE OF SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS 'THE CLOTH IS RED—ALL OF IT—WHOLE OF IT—IN ITS TOTALITY—COMPLETELY',—ENTIRELY ON THE BASIS OF THEIR WHIM.—THUS THE USE OF VERBAL EXPRESSIONS BEING DEPENDENT UPON THE WHIM OF THE SPEAKER, WE ALSO MAKE USE OF THE EXPRESSION '*all* OF THE OBJECT WOULD BE REDDENED'; BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO CHECK UPON SPEAKERS.—(596–598)

COMMENTARY.

It is just the well-known things,—like the *Cloth*, the *Body* and so forth,—that have been put forward by you as 'composites'; and in regard to all these things the use of such terms as 'one' and 'all' is also well known; e.g. people are found saying 'all of this cloth has been coloured' and so forth.—Such being the whim of speakers,—when there is a desire to speak of the colouring of things like the cloth-piece which occupy a larger space, we also, on the basis of the ordinary notion, make use of the said expression, for the purpose of bringing out the incongruity involved in your view.

Further, this criticism is applicable to yourself, who regard the gross object as *one*,—not to us; because we do not regard the gross object to be *one*.—(596–598)

The following might be urged—"The said criticism cannot apply to us either, because (according to us) the application of the name 'Cloth' to its

component yarns is only indirect, figurative, based upon their being its cause ; so that the use of terms like ' all ' would be all right ".

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (599).

IF THE NAME BE SAID TO BE FIGURATIVE (INDIRECT), THEN THERE SHOULD BE DIFFERENCE IN NUMBER. THERE IS ALSO NO DIFFERENCE IN THE COGNITION, WHICH IS ADMITTED BY BOTH (THOUGH DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY).—(599)

COMMENTARY.

If it is as you say, then there should be ' difference in number ' ; i.e. in all cases, the Plural number should be used—' all *Cloths* are coloured ' ; you do not consider it right to use the Singular number in regard to things that are *many*.

It might be argued that—" when the term ' Cloth ' is used in regard to the component yarns, it is in accordance with the number of the composite object, which term ' Cloth ' therefore does not abandon the gender and number of what is denoted by it ".

But this also cannot be right ; this is what is shown in the second line—' *There is also no difference, etc. etc.*' ; if the applying of the name ' Cloth ' is figurative (indirect), then the distinction between the cognition of what is *direct* and what is *indirect* would be only a halting one ; because as a matter of fact, there is no difference. For instance, when the expression is used as ' all of the cloth is coloured ', the idea that it produces is *not* that ' what is coloured is not the *Cloth*, but the yarns that are its constituent cause '.

The particle ' *cha* ' in the *Text* implies, the following argument :—You do not admit that the *Cloth*, being only *one*, is denoted by the term ' all ' ; how then can the term ' all ', without the term ' Cloth ', be applied to the *components*, on the basis of the Number of the *Cloth* ?

Or, the second line may be explained as follows :—The ' *bhēda* ', *diversity*, of the Cognition, is not present in what are regarded as ' direct ' and ' indirect ' ; i.e. different colours are not found in the yarns and the Cloth, in the way in which they are found among *Colour*, *Taste*, and other things ; and when the forms of the two are not found to be different, they cannot be regarded as *direct* and *indirect*.—(599)

The following *Text* introduces the answer given by *Shaṅkarasvāmin* :—

TEXT (600).

" INASMUCH AS CONJUNCTION IS NOT ALL-EMBRACING IN ITS CHARACTER, THE COLOURING CANNOT BELONG TO ALL THE CLOTH ; NOR IS THE WHOLE FOUND TO BE COVERED."—(600)

COMMENTARY.

He argues as follows :—" The colour spoken of as belonging to the *Cloth* is of the nature *Conjunction* (contact) with such colouring substances

as the red dye, saffron and so forth; and Conjunction is a quality that is not *all-embracing*; hence when one (part) is coloured, the whole does not become coloured.—Similarly when one part of the body is covered by the Cloth, the whole body does not become covered.—(600)

The following *Text* shows that this explanation is not right :—

TEXTS (601-602).

WHEN THE SUBSTANCE HAS NO PARTS, WHAT FORM WOULD BE THERE THAT WOULD NOT BE EMBRACED (BY THE CONJUNCTION)? IF SUCH AN (UNEMBRACED) FORM OF THE SUBSTANCE REMAINED THERE, THEN DIVERSITY BECOMES ESTABLISHED.—EXISTENCE IN SEVERAL PLACES IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ANY SINGLE OBJECT. HENCE IT BECOMES ESTABLISHED THAT THINGS LIKE THE CLOTH ARE DIFFERENT IN FORM FROM THE ATOMS (COMPOSING THEM).—(601-602)

COMMENTARY.

If the Cloth is a single substance, then in such an impartite substance, what is it that would not be embraced by the Red Colour, by virtue of which the contact of the colour would be *not-pervasive* ? If it is admitted that there is something left unpervaded by the colour, then that alone suffices to establish difference between the two parts,—as it would be impossible for the mutually contradictory *pervaded* and *unpervaded* parts to belong to one and the same thing. Nor would it be possible to explain that one part—the one covered by the Colour,—is larger than the other; because the thing has no *parts*. Otherwise, as all such diverse things as Water, Animal, Elephant and the like would be equally *one* only, there would be no difference among them and hence there could be no such differentiation as that between 'large' and 'small'.

"The difference would be due to the one being made up of a larger number of component parts than the other."

In that case, those parts themselves, appearing in larger or smaller numbers, may be the basis of the notions of 'gross' and 'subtle',—what is the use of postulating a 'composite' made up of those components, specially when these latter have not been found to be effective at all ?

As a matter of fact, even when there are large and small number of component parts in things, that cannot constitute a difference among the composites themselves, as these latter are impartite; so that there can be no basis for differentiation into 'gross' and 'subtle'. If the difference were held to be based upon the larger and smaller number of components, that would only imply the admission of the *components*, as the notion of 'gross' and 'subtle' would be applicable to these alone; and that would mean that the Atom is the only entity; nothing apart from the Atom, either gross or subtle, being perceived at all.

Then again, what is the meaning of the assertion that "Conjunction is not all-pervasive" ?—If it means that it does not pervade over *all* (whole) of the substance,—then it cannot be right ; because it has been held that the term 'all' cannot apply to the substance.—If it means that "Conjunction subsists only in a part of its substratum",—that also cannot be right ; as there can be no 'part' of it.—It may be said that what is meant is that "it subsists in a component making up the substance" ;—if that be so, then, inasmuch as what has been coloured are only the components (where alone the contact of the Dye subsists), the colour of the composite would not be red at all ; so that what should be perceived should be *coloured* and *not-coloured*, at one and the same time.—Further, what is called 'the component making up the substance',—if that is of the same form as the composite itself,—then the Conjunction that would subsist there would also subsist only in a part of that component (as Conjunction is *non-pervasive, ex hypothesi*) ; so that the objection would be equally applicable to this also.—If, on the other hand, the component be held to be of the form of the *Atom*, then, inasmuch as Atoms are beyond the reach of the senses, the Conjunction subsisting therein would also be beyond the reach of the senses ; so that there could be no perception of the Red colour at all.

The Opponent might argue thus :—"*Pervasion* is the name given to that character whereby the shape of the finger is perceived only on the perception of the whole finger ; hence when Conjunction is said to be *not-pervasive*, what is meant is that in its case it is *not* that it is perceived only on the perception of its substratum".

This is not right. As a matter of fact, Conjunction is never perceived while its substratum is not perceived ; e.g. the Conjunction between the Jar and the Ghost (which is not perceived because the Ghost is not seen). Thus then, under this explanation, the colour also would not be perceived ; it should be regarded to be perceptible only when its substratum is perceived ; and hence that also would be *pervasive* in character.

Says the Opponent :—"Even when the substance inhering (subsisting) in the other *un-coloured* components is perceived, there is no perception of the colour, which consists in Conjunction ; hence even when its substratum (in the form of the substance) is perceived, the Conjunction is not perceived [and this is what makes it *non-pervasive* in character]".

This is not right. In this way, there being only one substance inhering in components some of which are *coloured* and some *un-coloured*,—even though a component might be coloured, the Colour would be not-perceived (in the Thing) through that perception of colour ; because even though the substratum would be perceptible, the colour would be imperceptible. Nor is there any other way of perceiving the Conjunction, except the perception of its substratum.

From all this it follows that there is no 'object' which is of *one* form. Even when of various forms,—on the strength of *being* itself,—the difference can lie only in the form of the *aggregation of Atoms* ; specially as the *number* of possible components can never be *one*.

Thus it is proved that the Jar and such things exist only in the form of

Atoms; and hence the *Blue* and the rest form the shape of the Atoms; there being no other 'single object' possible.—(601-602)

It has been argued above (under *Text* 562) that "there could be no such word as *Atom*".

The following *Text* supplies the answer to this:—

TEXT (603).

IT IS ONLY PEOPLE WHO HAVE NOT UNDERSTOOD THE REAL NATURE OF THINGS THAT CONCEIVE OF 'ONE *mass*'; AND IT IS ON THE BASIS OF THIS ASSUMPTION THAT THE TERM 'ATOM' IS USED.—(603)

COMMENTARY.

'*It is on the basis, etc., etc.*'—i.e. these people are dependent upon the slight thread of the said assumption.—(603)

Another answer is supplied in the following—

TEXT (604).

OR, THE NAME 'ATOM', AS APPLIED TO WHAT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED, MAY BE TAKEN AS BASELESS, DEPENDENT UPON MERE CONVENTION; JUST AS THE NAME 'LORD' IS APPLIED TO ONE WHO HAS NO PROPERTY AT ALL.—(604)

COMMENTARY.

'*As applied, etc. etc.*',—i.e. to what is impartite, and has no resistance. Just as even the poor man is praised as 'the Lord', where the name 'lord' is applied without any basis, on the strength of mere convention or custom,—so also is the use of the name 'Atom'. So that there is no incongruity at all.—(604)

It has thus been established in a general way that there can be no single *gross substance,* either made up, or not made up, of component parts. The Author now proceeds to point out the weak points in the notion of that of which the *composite* is held to be made up:—

TEXTS (605-606).

(A) SUCH THINGS AS THE YARNS AND THE HAND AND OTHER LIMBS CANNOT BE PERMEATED BY ANY SINGLE 'COMPOSITE',—BECAUSE THEY ARE MORE THAN ONE,—LIKE SUCH WELL-KNOWN THINGS AS STRAW, HUT AND JAR.—

OR (B)—THE SUBSTANCE IN QUESTION CANNOT SUBSIST IN SEVERAL COMPONENTS,—BECAUSE IT IS ONE,—LIKE THE ATOM.—AND (C) IMPOSSIBILITY OF SUBSISTENCE WOULD BE THE PROOF ANNULLING THE OTHER PARTY'S PROPOSITION. —(605-606)

COMMENTARY.

The arguments are to be formulated as follows :—

(A) That which is diverse cannot be permeated by a single substance,—e.g. the Jar, the Hut and many other things which are *many* are not permeated by any single substance ;—the components in question, such as the yarns, the Hand and other Limbs of the body and so forth, are diverse ;—hence there is found in these a character which is contrary to the larger term of the Opponent's proposition (i.e. to the components being permeated by the single composite).

Or, (B) What is one must subsist in a single substance,—like the single Atom ;—and the substance called 'composite' is one ;—hence there is found a character incompatible with the larger predicate of the Opponent's proposition.—This is an argument in the form of a *reductio ad absurdum.*

(C) In support of both the above arguments, the author adduces a proof annulling the contrary of the Buddhist's conclusion—'*Impossibility of subsistence, etc. etc.*';—i.e. the fact that the subsistence of the composite in the components cannot be explained on the basis of any means of Right Cognition serves to annul the conclusion (of the other party).—(605-606)

Question :—"Why should there be this *impossibility* ?"
Answer :—

TEXTS (607-608).

[IF THE *Composite* SUBSISTED IN THE *Components*] IT COULD SUBSIST IN ONE *Component*, EITHER EXACTLY IN THE FORM IN WHICH IT SUBSISTS IN ANOTHER *Component*, OR IN SOME OTHER FORM. NO THIRD WAY IS POSSIBLE.—IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR IT TO SUBSIST IN ONE EXACTLY IN THE FORM IN WHICH IT SUBSISTS IN ANOTHER ; BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EMBRACED WITHIN ITS FOLD BY THE LATTER. IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN IT WOULD NOT BE SUBSISTING IN THAT EITHER.—(607-608)

COMMENTARY.

When the one Composite which is embraced—subsists—in one of its components—in one form,—is it in the same form that it subsists in another of its components ? Or in some other form ?—There are only these two alternatives possible ; in fact in any case, there can be no other alternative than the thing being one or the other.—The former alternative cannot be

accepted; as it is entirely embraced within the folds of the first component,—how can it have any opportunity of subsisting in the other component at the same time? Otherwise, if it subsisted at the same time in the other component also, then it could not have subsisted in the first component in its entirety. It can have no other form in which it could subsist in the other component also; because in that case, it could not be regarded as 'one'.—(607-608)

The following *Text* formulates the argument:—

TEXT (609).

JUST AS THE BABY DOES NOT OCCUPY THE LAP OF A SECOND NURSE,—SO A SUBSTANCE EMBRACED IN ONE COULD NOT SUBSIST IN ANOTHER (COMPONENT).—(609)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When a thing is embraced by one thing, it cannot subsist in another thing at the same time;—e.g. when a baby is occupying the lap of one nurse, it cannot occupy the lap of another nurse;—the substance (composite) is embraced by one component;—and thus there is perceived a character which is contrary to your conclusion.

'*The substance could not subsist in another*';—this states the first conclusion of the argument.—(609)

The Author next states the argument in support of the contrary of the Opponent's conclusion, which is thus annulled by it:—

TEXTS (610-611).

IF THE COMPOSITE ESSENTIALLY RELATED TO ONE COMPONENT SUBSISTED IN SOME OTHER COMPONENT OCCUPYING A PLACE OTHER THAN THAT OF THE SAID COMPONENT,—THEN IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE TWO COMPONENTS OCCUPY THE SAME PLACE AND ARE ESSENTIALLY ONE AND THE SAME, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT DIFFERENTIATED.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE COMPOSITE SUBSISTED IN THE OTHER COMPONENT IN ANOTHER FORM,—THEN AS OCCUPYING TWO PLACES, THE COMPOSITE COULD NOT BE *one*; SPECIALLY AS DIFFERENCE IN FORM (AND CHARACTER) MUST CONSTITUTE DIFFERENCE IN THE THING ITSELF.—(610-611)

COMMENTARY.

If the composite substance, which has its form and character connected with one Component, subsisted in another Component which occupies another

point in space,—then the components in question would have to be regarded as occupying the same point in space; which would mean that they are essentially one and the same, being of the same nature.

"Why so ?"

Because they are not differentiated ;—because they exist without being differentiated from one another.—Otherwise,—if they existed in their differentiated forms,—they could not occupy the same point in space.

If the second alternative is accepted,—i.e. the Composite subsists in the second component in a different form,—then it means that *one* thing subsists in several components,—which would be inadmissible ; because, as a matter of fact, when one thing differs from another in its nature, it must be different from this latter ; as difference in things is always of the nature of difference in their character (and form).—(610-611)

Uddyotakara has argued as follows :—" All that the assertion 'The Composite subsists in the components' does is to mention two objects, one of which is the *substratum* (container) and another the *subsistent* (the contained), which means that the latter becomes the *subsistent*,—this 'subsistence' being of the nature of the contact called 'Inherence' ".—(*Nyāyavārtika*, 2. 1. 32, page 217, Line 4, etc.).

The answer to this is provided in the following :—

TEXT (612).

IF IT BE HELD THAT THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE COMPOSITE IN THE COMPONENTS IS OF THE NATURE OF 'INHERENCE',—THEN THE SAME CONSIDERATIONS AS ABOVE FOLLOW THAT IDEA ALSO WITH EQUAL FORCE.—(612)

COMMENTARY.

Even in regard to this form of *subsistence*, the considerations just urged are applicable,—such as 'does it subsist in another component in the same form and character as in one component, or in some other form ?' ; they follow this idea also as if in ferocity, in anger—not tolerating the criticisms emanating from the poor intelligence of the other party.—(612)

Hitherto the subsistence of the Composite has been discarded without recourse to the alternatives of its subsisting in whole or in part.—Now the author proceeds to show the way of discarding the same by recourse to the said alternatives,—in the manner indicated by actual experience :—

TEXT (613).

OR AGAIN, IF IT (THE COMPOSITE) SUBSISTS (IN THE COMPONENT) IN ITS ENTIRETY,—THEN IT BECOMES LIABLE TO BEING REGARDED AS *many*; AS FOR ITS SUBSISTENCE *in part*, THAT IS NOT WHAT IS HELD (BY THE OTHER PARTY); AND THE COMPOSITE WOULD (IN THAT CASE) NOT BE *one*; AND IT WOULD NOT SUBSIST ANYWHERE AT ALL.—(613)

COMMENTARY.

When the substance (Composite) subsists in its components,—does it subsist in each one of them *in its entirety* ? or *in part* ?

If *in its entirety*, then the entire form of the Composite should be as many as there are components. Unless it had the same form in each component, it could not be present in each component *in its entirety*; as there can be no *subsistence* except in a form that is fully recognised. Such being the case, if the Composite subsisted in each component simultaneously in its entire form, then it would have to be regarded as *many, several*; just like the Lotuses blooming in several ponds.

If the other view be held, that it is *in part* that the Composite subsists in each component, then there would be an infinity of such 'parts' of the Composite. For instance, those of its parts in which this Composite subsists in each of its components would themselves be its 'parts', in which also the Composite would subsist *in part*; and so on and on *ad infinitum*.

It might be argued that—"Those of its parts through which the Composite subsists in the Components are all its *own forms*, and not different things; as apart from the Composite itself, there can be no parts of its own. Hence there can be no such infinite regress."

The answer to this is as follows :—'*The Composite would not be one (in that case)*';—i.e. if such were the case, then, the Composite would not be *one* only; as it is only a conglomeration of the components—(and these latter are many); and under the circumstances, the thing (man) may be regarded as consisting only of such of his limbs, Hand and the rest, as are actually seen; what use then would there be of assuming any others ?

The Author points out another defect in the Opponent's theory :—'*And it would not subsist anywhere at all*'; the term '*vṛttaḥ syāt*', 'would subsist', has to be supplied. What is meant is as follows :—If each of the Composites present in each of the components had occupied the same point in space, then alone could the Composite be subsistent in the Component; as a matter of fact, however, each of the Composites does not occupy the same point in space; because if they did subsist in each of the Components, then they could not occupy the same point in space; specially as there is no other 'Composite' of the same form. How then could it be said to be subsistent in the Components ?—(613)

In the following *Texts*, the author sets forth the answer made by *Shaṅkarasvāmin* :—

TEXTS (614–618).

"WHENEVER A REASON IS ADDUCED,—EITHER DIRECTLY OR IN THE FORM OF A *Reductio ad Absurdum*,—IT BECOMES TRULY APPLICABLE ONLY WHEN IT IS ITSELF APPREHENDED ;—NOT OTHERWISE.—AS A MATTER OF FACT, SUBSISTENCE EITHER *in whole* OR *in part* HAS NEVER BEEN PERCEIVED (BY YOU, BUDDHISTS),—ON THE BASIS OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WHICH IN THE SUBSTANCE, THE SUBSTANCE COULD BE HELD TO BE NON-EXISTENT, OR SOMETHING ELSE.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, SUCH SUBSISTENCE HAS BEEN PERCEIVED BY YOU ANYWHERE, THEN IT CANNOT BE DENIED IN THE CASE OF THE SUBSTANCE AND SUCH THINGS.—IF THE SAID SUBSISTENCE HAS NOT BEEN PERCEIVED, THEN THE QUESTION DOES NOT ARISE REGARDING THE DISTINCTION ; ALL THAT COULD BE ASSERTED WOULD BE THAT 'THE SUBSISTENCE IS NOT THERE'. AND THIS WOULD NOT BE RIGHT ; AS IT IS SOMETHING DIRECTLY PERCEIVED ; AS IS CLEAR IN SUCH NOTIONS AS 'THIS *subsists* HERE'.—IF IT BE HELD THAT 'THE FACT OF THIS BEING DIRECT PERCEPTION IS NOT ADMITTED', THEN SOME ANNULLING REASONING SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD. OTHERWISE, EVEN SUCH COGNITIONS AS THOSE OF COLOUR AND SUCH THINGS MIGHT CEASE TO BE OF THE NATURE OF 'PERCEPTION'."—(614–618)

COMMENTARY.

Shaṅkarasvāmin argues as follows :—" Whenever a Reason is adduced,—either directly or in the form of a *Reductio ad absurdum*,—it becomes applicable only when it is itself perceived ; otherwise it would be open to the charge of being 'unproven'.—As a matter of fact, you have not anywhere perceived the *subsistence* of anything either in its entirety or in part ;—hence on the basis of the absence of such subsistence, it does not behove you to regard the (composite) substance as non-existent. Or—if it were possible—*then there would be something else*—Component and Composite.

If such subsistence has been perceived by you anywhere, then it could be the same in the case of the Substance, etc. also, which, therefore, cannot be denied.—If, however, the said subsistence has not been perceived, then there does not arise any question regarding the *distinction*—as to whether the subsistence is *in entirety* or *in part* ; because it is only when the object itself has been admitted that anything can be denied in regard to it. When however the object itself is not admitted, then it is better to deny the object itself,—so that the assertion should be in the form that 'there is no subsistence',—and not the denial of any particular character in regard to it. But such an assertion—as that 'there is no subsistence at all'—would not be proper ; because the subsistence of the Composite in the components is vouched for by direct Perception.

Question :—What is that Perception ?

" *Answer* :—It is in the form '*This subsists here*' ;—i.e. the Perception is in the form—'This—Cloth—subsists in the yarns'.

" It might be argued that this notion cannot be regarded as Perception.

"In that case, it behoves you to put forward some reasoning in annulment of the said notion; whereby its perceptional character could be rejected. If, even in the absence of such annulling Reason, the notion be not accepted as 'Perception', then, your cognition of even such things as colour and the like would not be *Perception*; as there can be no difference between the two cases."—(614-618)

The Author answers the above in the following—

TEXT (619).

THAT 'THE SUBSISTENCE IS NOT THERE' HAS ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED ABOVE, IN A GENERAL WAY. AS FOR THE NOTION THAT 'IT SUBSISTS HEREIN', THERE IS NO SUCH COGNITION AT ALL; AS THIS EXACT FORM DOES NOT APPEAR IN ANY COGNITION.—(619)

COMMENTARY.

Under *Text* 607—the subsistence of one thing in several things has already been rejected above in a general way.

As regards the assertion that "the notion that *this subsists herein* is vouched for by Perception",—this also is something out of the common; because, as a matter of fact, among people, no such notion as 'the Cow subsists in this Horn', or that 'the Cloth subsists in the yarns',—ever appears even in men's imagination; the notion that appears is that 'the Horn is in the Cow', 'the yarns are in the Cloth'.—Nor in any Perception does the Cloth ever appear as something different from the yarns; and unless the two were distinguished, there could be no such notion as that '*this* subsists in *that*'. For instance, until discriminating persons have actually perceived the water as something distinct from the Pond, they do not have any such notion as 'there is Water in the Pond'.—(619)

It has been argued (under *Text* 615 above) that "subsistence either in entirety or in part has not been perceived by you, etc. etc."—This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (620-621).

WHAT IS MEANT BY (THE QUESTION CONTAINING) THE TERMS 'IN ENTIRETY' AND 'IN PART' IS—DOES THE SUBSTANCE SUBSIST AS AN IMPARTITE WHOLE,—IN THE WAY IN WHICH THE BILVA-FRUIT LIES IN A DISH? OR DOES IT SUBSIST IN SOME OTHER WAY—AS A CERTAIN PERSON, *Chaitra*, DOES WHEN LYING DOWN ON SEVERAL SEATS? —(620-621)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by the term 'in entirety' is—whether the substance subsists in all its Components in its impartite form,—as is found in the case

of the *Bilva*-fruit lying in a dish ? *or in some other way* ?—in the way, for instance, in which a person like *Chaitra* lies down upon more than one couch. This is what is meant by subsistence 'in part'.

This is only by the way.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows [in *Nyāyavārtika* on 2. 1. 32, *page* 216, Bib. Ind.) :—" Inasmuch as the terms *entire* and *a part* cannot be applied to one and the same Composite, the question raised—as to whether it subsists *in its entirety* or *in part*—is an improper one ; as a matter of fact, the term 'entire' stands for *all, excepting nothing*, while the term 'a part' stands for *one among several* ; as such, these two terms cannot be rightly applied to any *one* Composite ".

This argument becomes rejected by what has been said in the Text. As a matter of fact, in common parlance, the terms *whole* and *in part* are found to be applied to such things as the *Foot* and the like, in such expressions as 'Does the whole foot lie in the pond, or only in part ?'—Nor can it be right to say that such use is figurative ; because it is never found to fail or falter ; as has been pointed out before.—(620-621)

So far the four kinds of *Substance*, ending with *Air* [i.e. Earth, Water, Fire and Air] have been discarded ;—the Substance called 'Soul' has already been discarded in the chapter on 'Soul' ;—the Author next proceeds to deny the remaining four kinds of *Substance*—viz. :—*Ākāsha, Time, Space* and *Mind* ; [and to that end, sets forth the arguments whereby the other party seeks to establish their existence] :—

TEXT (622).

" SOUNDS MUST SUBSIST IN SOMETHING,—BECAUSE OF THEIR *perishability* AND SUCH OTHER CHARACTERS ; LIKE THE JAR, THE LAMP-FLAME AND SUCH THINGS ;—AND THIS SOMETHING MUST BE *Ākāsha* ".—(622)

COMMENTARY.

The existence of the substance called '*Ākāsha*' is sought to be proved by the other party in the following manner :—

" There must be a Substance named *Ākāsha*, permanent, one and all-pervasive, having sound for its indicative ; sound is its indicative in the sense that it is its quality.—This argument may be formulated as follows :—Those things that are equipped with qualities like *perishability and producibility*, must subsist in something else ;—and the 'substratum' of sound can only be *Ākāsha*, as that alone has the requisite capacity. Because, the said sound cannot be the quality of the four substances,—Earth, Water, Fire and Air,—(*a*) because, while being perceptible, it is not preceded by any quality in its Cause,—(*b*) because it does not last as long as the Substance lasts,—and (*c*) because it is perceived in a place other than its substratum ;—and the qualities of all tangible things have been found to be otherwise

than all this.—The qualification 'while being perceptible' has been added with a view to those qualities in the Atom which are produced by Fire-contact.—Nor can Sound be a quality of the *Soul* ;—(*a*) because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ,—(*b*) because it is perceptible by other Souls,—(*c*) because it is perceived as distinct from the 'I-notion'; while all qualities of the Soul, such as pleasure and the rest are otherwise than all this.—Sound cannot be a quality of Space, Time and Mind,—because it is apprehended by the Auditory Organ.—Thus, by elimination, Sound can be the quality of *Ākāsha*, of which, therefore, it becomes the *indicative*.—This *Ākāsha*, having Sound as its only common Indicative, and having no other specific indicatives, must be *one* ;—and as having its qualities perceptible everywhere, it must be *all-pervading* ;—and having a quality, and itself not subsisting in anything else, it must be a *substance* ;—and as it is not created (by any one), it must be *permanent*."

Such is the process of reasoning put forward by the other party (in proof of *Ākāsha* as a Substance).

The following *Texts* sets forth his reasonings in support of *Time* being a *Substance* :—

TEXTS (623-624).

"THE NOTION OF *Priority*, *Posteriority* AND SO FORTH MUST HAVE FOR ITS BASIS SOMETHING OTHER THAN MOBILE SUBSTANCES LIKE THE SUN,—LIKE THE NOTION OF THE JAR AND SUCH THINGS, —BECAUSE IT IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER FROM THE NOTION OF *wrinkles*, *grey hairs*, *emaciation* AND SO FORTH ;—AND IT IS THIS BASIS, CAUSE, WHICH IS HELD TO BE '*Time*'."—(623-624)

COMMENTARY.

"The term 'mobile substances' should be taken as standing for '*wrinkles*', *etc.*

"Such notion as—'*Prior*', applied to the Father ;—'*Posterior*', to the Son ;—'simultaneous', 'for a long time', 'soon', '*is* being done', '*was done*', '*will be done*', and so forth—all this notion of *Priority* and *Posteriority*, etc. must be based upon (due to) some substance other than the Sun and other mobile substances ;—because they are different in character from the notion of 'wrinkles', 'grey hairs' and so forth,—like the notion of the Jar and such things :—and that which is the basis of the said notions must be *Time*, as that alone has the requisite capacity. For instance, the said notion of 'Priority' and 'Posteriority' cannot be due to Space,—because when the old man is standing in space at the back of the younger man, he is said to be 'posterior'; and similarly when the Son is standing in space in front of the Father, he is said to be 'prior'.—Nor can the said notion be due to wrinkles, grey hairs and such causes ; because it is entirely different from the notion of these.—Nor can it be due to any Action (Movement),—because it is different

in character from that also.—To this end is the *Sūtra* (of the *Vaishēṣikas*)—'Such notions as Prior, Posterior, Simultaneous, *for Long Time,* and *Soon* are the indicatives of Time '.

"The character of being *permanent, one* and so forth has to be understood in regard to Time in the same way as in regard to *Ākāsha.*"—(623–624)

The following *Texts* set forth the arguments (of the Opponent) in support of '*Space*' as a Substance :—

TEXT (625).

"SIMILARLY *Space* IS INFERRED FROM SUCH NOTIONS AS 'FORE' AND 'AFT'."—(625)

COMMENTARY.

Taking one corporeal substance as the starting point, there are, in regard to other corporeal substances, the ten notions as—'this is to the East—to the South—to the West—to the North—to the South-East—to the South-West—to the North-West—to the North-East,—above—below—of that'; and that upon which these are based is *Space.* Says the *Sūtra* :—'That to which the notion that *this is from that* is due is the indicative of Space';—because these are peculiar notions,—and peculiar notions cannot appear in a haphazard manner;—nor are they dependent upon the corporeal substances themselves; as such mutual interdependence would nullify both; hence, there being no other cause for them, these are regarded as indicatives of *Space.*—Of this Space, the qualities of *one-ness, all-pervasiveness* and other qualities are to be understood to be like those of *Time.*—Though *Space* is one only, it comes to be regarded as diverse by reason of the diversity of its effects.—The argument may be formulated as follows :—The notions of 'fore' and 'aft' and the like must be based upon a Substance other than the corporeal substances,—because they are different from the notions arising from these,—like the notions of pleasure, etc.—(625)

The indicative of *Mind* is next stated :—

TEXTS (625-626).

"THE MIND HAS BEEN HELD TO BE INFERRED FROM THE SUCCESSIVE APPEARANCE OF COGNITIONS ; WHICH REQUIRES A CAUSE DIFFERENT FROM THE EYE AND OTHER SENSE-ORGANS. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR AND SUCH THINGS APPEAR SUCCESSIVELY,—LIKE THE CHARIOT AND SUCH THINGS."—(625-626)

COMMENTARY.

Even when the contact between the object and several sense-organs is present at the same time, the cognitions are found to appear one after the

other; which shows that there is some other cause,—distinct from the object and the sense-organ,—the presence and absence of which leads to the appearance and non-appearance (respectively) of the cognition. Thus from this appearance of cognitions, in succession, the inference of Mind is got at. To this effect we have the *Sūtra*—'The fact that cognitions do not appear simultaneously indicates the Mind'. The argument may be formulated thus:—The Cognition of colour and such things is dependent upon a cause other than the Eye and the other organs,—because it appears in succession,—like the Chariot and such things.—(625-626)

With the following *Text* proceeds the refutation of the arguments (urged above, in favour of the existence of *Ākāsha,* Time, Space, and Mind as distinct Substances):—

TEXT (627).

INASMUCH AS SOUND IS ALREADY ACCEPTED AS HAVING ITS CAUSE IN THE 'GREAT ELEMENTS' THAT HAVE BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED (OR NOT-ACKNOWLEDGED),—IT IS ALREADY ADMITTED THAT SOUNDS SUBSIST IN THOSE ELEMENTS. SO THAT THE FIRST REASON PUT FORWARD (FOR THE EXISTENCE OF *Ākāsha*) CANNOT PROVE (WHAT IT IS MEANT TO PROVE).—(627)

COMMENTARY.

If it is only the fact of Sounds being subsistent in a general way in *something* that is sought to be proved,—then the Reason is superfluous (proving what is already admitted). Because, as a matter of fact, Sounds are already admitted as having their cause in the Great Elements that have been acknowledged (by all parties) and those that have not been so acknowledged;—and Sounds are certainly subsistent in these elements which are their cause (source); because effects are always subsistent in their cause, having their appearance (production) inseparably connected with the Cause. The 'acknowledged' elements are the *Chitta* (*Idea*) and the *Chaitya* (the *Ideal*), which are accepted (by Buddhists also).—The term '*ādi*' includes the causality of such elements as are *not acknowledged* (i.e. Earth etc., which though *not-acknowledged* by the Buddhist, are accepted by the other party).

'*Tēṣu*'—i.e. in those elements.

'*Iti*'—i.e. therefore.

'*The first Reason*',—i.e. the one put forward under *Text* 622;—it cannot prove what it is desired to prove; that is, because it is open to the objection of being 'superfluous'.—(627)

If, on the other hand, what is meant to be proved is that Sounds are subsistent *in a particular manner*,—that is, subsistent in a substance which is *one, incorporeal, external* and *all-pervading*,—then there can be no *corroborative Instance* possessing the character meant to be proved; and to that

extent, the Reason becomes 'inconclusive'.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (628).

THE SUBSISTENCE OF SOUNDS IN *Ākāsha*,—WHICH IS *one*, ALL-*pervading* AND *eternal*,—CANNOT BE PROVED (BY THE REASON ADDUCED),—BECAUSE IT IS DEVOID OF 'POSITIVE CONCOMITANCE';—AND ALSO BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE *absence of succession* AND SO FORTH; AS ALSO *universal contact*.—(628)

COMMENTARY.

'*Na-ēṣām*'—goes with the preceding line.

That the Opponent's conclusion is contrary to Inference is shown in the Text by the words '*and also because, etc.*'; i.e. what has been said in the foregoing sentence to the effect that 'the subsistence of sounds is not proved', is so *also because* of the following reason :—If the Sounds were subsistent in the eternal, one substance, *Ākāsha*,—then like the several Sounds produced at the same time, even Sounds produced at other times would be there at the same time in question,—as their cause would be present there always in its perfect condition, and also because they would all be subsisting in the same substratum ;—and it has already been explained that what is eternal cannot be dependent upon anything else ; nor would it be right to regard that as 'subsistent' which is of no use. So that the appearance of all Sounds would cease to be successive.

The phrase '*and so forth*' includes the anomaly of all Sounds being heard by all persons. Because the Auditory Organ consists of *Ākāsha*, and *Ākāsha is* one only,—all Sounds would reach the organ of all men and hence become heard ; and on account of the impartite nature of *Ākāsha*, any such restriction would be impossible as that 'this is *my own* Auditory Organ and that is of another person'.

The following argument might be urged :—"When the tympanum of one has been affected by his Destiny, then that portion of the *Ākāsha* alone which is circumscribed by that tympanum forms the Auditory Organ of that person ; that is why Sound is not perceived through other openings,—such as the mouth, the nostrils and the like. And when that same Tympanum is hurt, there is deafness".

This cannot be right ; because *Ākāsha* being impartite, any such partition of it would be impossible. Nor can imaginary component parts bring about, through mere imagination, any effective action which can be done only by real positive entities ; merely imagining *Water* to be *Fire* does not make the former to burn or flare up.

It might be said that—"what is meant by *Ākāsha* having a part is that contact with it is not pervasive".

This also has been already answered.

Then again, under the theory in question, the Jar, the Tympanum and all such things, as being in contact with one and the same *Ākāsha*, would come

to occupy the same point in space; because when one thing comes into contact with *Ākāsha* in one form, the other thing also comes into contact with it in the same form; so that other Jars and other things also would appear at the same place; because these would be in contact with *Ākāsha* which is in contact with the former thing;—just like the Jar already existing there. In this way, all Sounds also would appear at one and the same place; and this would be contrary to the generally accepted notion regarding Sounds appearing far off or close by.

These are the difficulties that appear against the Opponent's theory. —(628)

As regards the arguments put forward for proving the existence of *Time* and *Space*,—these also are generally open to the charge of being 'superfluous'; and particularly, the Reason is devoid of the necessary concomitance,—and the conclusion is annulled by Inference.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (629-630)

THE NOTIONS OF 'PRIORITY AND POSTERIORITY' (AND OF 'FORE AND AFT') ARE BASED UPON A CONCEPTION ARISING OUT OF PARTICULAR CONVENTIONS; THEY ARE NOT DUE TO 'TIME', NOR TO 'SPACE'. INASMUCH AS THESE ARE *impartite*, ONE, 'PRIORITY', 'POSTERIORITY' AND THE LIKE ARE NOT POSSIBLE IN THEM. IF THE NOTIONS BE SAID TO BE BASED UPON THE THINGS RELATED TO THEM, THEN THEY THEMSELVES BECOME USELESS.—(629-630)

COMMENTARY.

'*Particular Conventions*',—i.e. the understanding that the epithets 'prior' and 'posterior' are to be applied to things produced *before* and *after*, and so forth;—*the conception* that arises out of such conventions,—is the basis of the notions in question. Thus it is that there is no mutual interdependence; as the notion is based entirely upon a particular convention. Thus then, if the other party has set out to prove only that the said notions *have a cause*, —then it is superfluous (as it is admitted by all parties).

If however he intends to prove that a particular Substance is that cause, then (1) there is annulment by Inference, (2) absence of concomitance, as before; and (3) the Reason is 'contradictory', as it proves what is contrary to the desired conclusion;—this is what is meant by the words of the *Text*—'*Inasmuch as these are impartite*'.

'*Related to them*',—i.e. to Space and Time.

As a matter of fact, what is desired to be proved is that the notion of 'Priority and Posteriority' and so forth is based upon the impartite and single substances, Time and Space;—this is not proved (by the Reason

adduced). Because a thing becomes the 'object' (of cognition) when it produces a cognition exactly of the same form as itself; in the case of an impartite substance, there cannot be any differentiation between 'fore' and 'aft', to which the notion of 'fore' and 'aft' could be due; thus by proving the contrary of what is desired to be proved, the Reason becomes 'Contradictory'.

'*If the notions be said to be based, etc. etc.*';—This anticipates the answer of the Opponent. It might be argued (by the Opponent) that—"Such external and internal things as the Lamp and the Body and the like are related to Space and Time,—there is 'priority and posteriority' among these,—and it is this 'priority and posteriority' of their relatives that is attributed to Space and Time,—hence the Reason is not Contradictory".

The answer to this is as follows:—'*Then they themselves become useless*'.—Under the said assumption, Space and Time themselves would be useless; as what is meant to be brought about by them will have been brought about by the things related to them. For instance, *Time* is held to be the cause of such notions as those of the various divisions of *priority* and *posteriority* as are denoted by the terms '*Kṣaṇa*', '*Lava*', '*Kāṣṭha*', '*Kalā*', '*Muhūrta*', '*Ahorātra*', '*Ardhamāsa*' and so forth (the various divisions of Time);—and *Space* is held to be the cause of the notions of 'East', 'North' and so forth;—and as a matter of fact, all this diversity does not belong to *Space* and *Time*; it is present in the divisions themselves; so that the assuming of Time and Space is entirely useless.—(629-630)

As regards the argument adduced for proving the existence of *Mind*,—if the mere fact of certain notions having a cause in general is meant to be proved, then it is superfluous.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (631-632).

Mind AS DISTINCT FROM THE EYE, ETC. IS ADMITTED BY US ALSO; THAT IDEA BEING REGARDED AS 'MIND' WHICH APPEARS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SIX (COGNITIONS).—IF HOWEVER THE MIND IS REGARDED AS *permanent*, THEN THERE COMES THE ANOMALY OF COGNITIONS BEING SIMULTANEOUS; THUS THE REASON PUT FORWARD BY YOU BECOMES DESTRUCTIVE OF WHAT IS DESIRED.—(631-632)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant to be proved is the *eternal* and *one* Mind, then the conclusion is one that is annulled by Inference, and the Reason is 'Contradictory'. This is what is shown by the words '*If however, etc. etc.*'

'*Destructive of what is desired*';—because what it proves is only the dependence (of the notions cited) upon an *impermanent* (fleeting) cause which is distinct from the Eye and other organs. Otherwise, if they had

an *eternal* Cause, as the Cause would always be present in its perfect form, the successive appearance of Cognitions would be incongruous.—(631-632)

The following *Text* jokingly confirms the same 'contradictory' character of the opponent's Reason—

TEXT (633).

I THINK THAT THE *Sūtra* (*Nyāya-sūtra* 1. 1. 36) HAS BEEN COMPOSED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVING AND DISPROVING THE MIND AS POSTULATED BY THE *Buddha* AND THE OTHER PHILOSOPHER (RESPECTIVELY),—AND HENCE IT HAS BEEN REPEATED WITH AN ADDITIONAL 'A' ('*not*').—(633)

COMMENTARY.

I think as follows:—The *Sūtra* '*Yugapajjñānnāupapattirmanasolingam*' ('The fact that cognitions do not appear simultaneously *is*—and *is not*—indicative of the Mind',—Nyāya-*sūtra* 1. 1. 16) is meant to *prove* the 'Mind' as conceived by the *Buddha*,—and to *disprove* the same as conceived by the other philosopher; for the latter purpose an additional 'a' ('not') being read (before '*lingam*', 'indicative'). Such is the sense of the *Text* as a whole.

The meaning of the words is now described:—The compound '*Saugata—siddhayē*' is to be expounded as 'for the purpose of the proving and disproving, respectively, of the Mind, as postulated by the *Bauddha* and the other Philosopher'.

Question:—"How can one and the same Sūtra express two mutually contradictory meanings?"

Answer:—'*With an additional a* (*not*)';—that is to say, as applied to the view of the other philosopher, the words of the *Sūtra* are to be construed as 'for the *disproving*—*asiddhi*—of the Mind postulated by the other philosopher',—with an 'a' (before '*lingam*');—and it is different when applied to the view of the Buddhist, in which case it is without the said '*a*' ('not').

Question:—"How can one and the same expression be *with*, and also *without*, the syllable '*a*' ('not')?"

Answer:—It is '*repeated*';—i.e. in such a case, the repetition of the expression is justified.—(633)

End of the Chapter on 'Substance'.

CHAPTER XI.

On 'Quality' as a Category.

COMMENTARY.

The Author now proceeds to discard the categories of 'Quality' and the rest:—

TEXT (634).

BY THE REJECTION OF 'SUBSTANCE', ''QUALITY', 'ACTION' AND THE REST, WHICH ARE HELD TO BE SUBSISTENT IN SUBSTANCE, ALL BECOME DISCARDED.—(634)

COMMENTARY.

'Quality', 'Action', ending with 'Specific Individuality', become rejected by the rejection of 'Substance'; because they subsist in this latter; and when the substratum is not there, the 'subsistents', which are dependent upon it, cannot be there.

'*Held to be, etc.*'—i.e. held to be subsistent, either directly or indirectly, in *Substance.* For instance, *Quality* and *Action* are held to be directly subsistent in *Substance*; as declared in the *Sūtra* (*Vaishēṣika*)—"*Quality* is subsistent in *Substance,* devoid of qualities, not the cause of Conjunction or Disjunction, independent";—which is the definition provided of *Quality*; similarly the definition of *Action* provided is—"It subsists in one *Substance,* is devoid of Qualities, the independent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions". The term '*ēkadravyam*' in this last *Sūtra* means 'subsisting in one Substance'. —*Qualities,* on the other hand subsist, some of them, in several *Substances*; e.g. Conjunction, Disjunction and the rest. The Genus and the Specific Individuality subsist, some of them, in *Substances* only; e.g. such *genuses,* as 'Earth' and the like; while such genuses as 'Quality', 'Action' and so forth subsist in *Qualities* and *Actions* related to *Substances.*—The *Summum genus*—which is 'Being'—subsists in the three categories beginning with 'Substance' [i.e. in *Substance, Quality* and *Action*].

Thus, when *Substance* has been rejected, *Quality* and the rest become rejected without any effort. What is meant by this is that the final upshot of the examination of the other Categories has been achieved under the examination of *Substance* itself.—(634)

Opponent:—"If that is so, then the Denial of *Subsistence* should be proceeded with separately."

Answer:—

TEXT (635).

THE 'RELATIVE' (WHEREIN THE RELATION COULD SUBSIST) HAVING BEEN DISCARDED, WHOSE 'SUBSISTENCE' WOULD IT BE? AND WHERE? STILL A DETAILED DENIAL OF EACH (CATEGORY) IS GOING TO BE SET FORTH.—(635)

COMMENTARY.

'Subsistence' is described as 'inherence of the *five* categories'; so that when the *Substance* and other (four) categories—wherein alone the said Relation could subsist,—have been rejected, *whose 'subsistence' would it be? and where?* That is, *of nothing* and *nowhere*; for the simple reason that all that could be the *substratum* and the *subsistent* have been rejected.—(635)

The detailed denial of *Qualities* is now set forth.

In this connection, the *Sūtra* (*Vaishēṣika*) is as follows:—" The following are the *Qualities*:—Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Cognitions, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Hatred and Exertion"; the particle '*cha*', 'and', including Gravity, Fluidity, Viscidity, Momentum, Merit and Demerit and Sound.—*Colour* is what is apprehended by the Eye, and subsists in Earth, Water, and Fire;—*Taste* is apprehended by the Gestatory Organ, and subsists in Earth and Water;—*Odour* is apprehended by the Olfactory Organ and subsists in Earth;—*Touch* is apprehended by the Tactile Organ, and subsists in Earth, Water, Fire and Air".

From among these Qualities, the Text sets forth the denial of the first four—*Colour* and the rest:—

TEXT (636).

IF IN A LARGE SUBSTANCE, THE *Blue colour* IS HELD TO BE *one* ONLY,—THEN HOW IS IT THAT THERE IS NO MANIFESTATION AND PERCEPTION OF IT WHEN IT IS SEEN IN LIGHT COMING THROUGH AN APERTURE?—(636)

COMMENTARY.

Qualities are perceptible only when they subsist in a large substance; that is why the *Text* has added the epithet '*large*'.

If it is held that the *Blue Colour*,—in all its four forms,—that subsists in a Large Substance is one only and without parts,—then, at the time that there is manifestation of the Blue Colour as subsisting in a large substance like the Jar placed in a small room, through lamp-light coming through an aperture in the split bamboo or some such thing,—the whole of the Blue Colour subsisting in the whole Jar should be manifested and perceived; because it has no parts; as a single entity cannot have parts, by virtue of which there would be manifestation of one part only.

'*Light coming through an aperture*' has been mentioned only by way of illustration.

Similarly when odour in a part of the Earth is manifested by Water, the odour in other parts of it also should become manifested and perceived.

Similarly in the case of Flames and the Mango and other fruits,—the Touching and Tasting of one part should lead to the perception of the Touch and Taste subsisting in the whole of those substances.—(636)

It might be urged (by the Opponent) that "there do come about the manifestation and perception of the *entire* Blue Colour ?

The Answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (637).

THE BLUE COLOUR IS NOT HELD TO EXIST IN WELL-DEFINED PARTS ; HENCE WHAT IS MANIFESTED THEN BY THAT (LIGHT) MUST, ON THAT ACCOUNT, VARY WITH EACH ATOM.—(637)

COMMENTARY.

'*Then*'—at that time.

'*By that*'—by the light coming through the aperture.

'*What*'—i.e. the Blue Colour.

In case it is admitted that the Blue Colour in its entirety varies with each atom,—then that would imply the presence of the *Atomic Dimension* in the Blue Colour,—just as in a *Substance* ; which would mean that the Blue Colour has a *quality* (Dimension) ; so that it would have the character of 'Substance' (which alone can have a *quality*), and not that of 'Quality'. If things varying like this with each atom, were called 'Quality', then the dispute (between us) would be only in regard to names.—When the thing is possessed of the Atomic Dimension, it cannot be right to regard it as a 'Quality', simply on the ground of its subsisting (in a Substance) ; because there can be no 'subsistence' between two things, one of which exists and the other does not ; if there were, it would lead to absurdities. That is to say, in that way, on the ground that it subsists in the Component substance, the Composite Substance would also have to be regarded as a 'Quality'.—(637)

"As regards the Quality of '*Number*', it has been defined as 'the basis of the notions of *one* and so forth'. Number subsists in one substance and also in several substances ; the Number 'one' subsists in one substance ; and the numbers beginning with 'Two' subsist in several substances.—Of the Number subsisting in one substance, the *eternality* and the *appearances* should be understood to be like those of the Colour and other qualities subsisting in the atoms of Water, etc. ; while of Number subsisting in several substances, the *appearance* is due to the unities associated with the cognition of several things ; and its destruction (disappearance) follows from the disappearance of the unitary conception ; and in some cases, the disappearance is also due to the destruction of the substratum.—*Number* of both these

kinds is vouched for by Perception. Others have held it to be established by Inference also, on the ground that all specific cognitions are dependent upon diverse causes."

The denial of this *Number* is set forth in the following—

TEXT (638).

'NUMBER', WHICH IS HELD TO BE PERCEPTIBLE, DOES NOT APPEAR IN COGNITION AS ANYTHING DISTINCT FROM SUCH NAMES AS 'THE ELEPHANT', ETC. WHICH CONNOTE 'NEGATION OF THE CONTRARY'; HENCE IT MUST BE NON-EXISTENT.—(638)

COMMENTARY.

Such names as 'elephant' are applied to the animals as being the negation of what is not-elephant,—such things as the Aggregate and the like;—apart from such names, there is no such thing as 'Number' which is perceptible; hence it must be non-*existent*, like the 'Hare's Horns'. And yet it has been held (by the other party) to be perceptible; as declared in the following *Sūtra*—" Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority,—as subsisting in coloured things,—are perceptible by the Eye".—(638)

The following *Texts* show that the existence of 'Number' is not proved by the Cognition of specific individualities :—

TEXTS (639-640).

AS IN COGNITION, SO IN THINGS LIKE THE JAR ALSO, THE NOTION OF 'ONE' AND THE REST IS ONE THAT FOLLOWS ONLY FROM AN IMAGINARY CONVENTION SET UP BY A MERE WHIM.—THERE CAN BE NO DIFFERENTIATING NUMBER IN THESE (COGNITIONS), BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT 'SUBSTANCE'.—NOR CAN THE NOTION BE SAID TO BE 'FIGURATIVE', AS IT IS NOT FOUND TO BE FALLIBLE.—(639-640)

COMMENTARY.

There are such notions as 'one cognition', 'two cognitions' and so forth,—in which the notions of *one, two*, etc., appear even though there are no such Numbers actually present (in the Cognitions);—in the same manner, in the case of a Jar also when it is not accompanied by anything else, there is the notion of its being 'one'; and this must have its source in the imaginary convention that has been set up by people. Consequently the argument based upon such notions cannot be conclusive.

That in Cognitions, no Number exists follows from the fact that Cognitions are not *Substance*, while Number is a *Quality* and as such must subsist in a *Substance*.

It might be argued that "in the case of Cognition, the said notion may be regarded as *figurative*,—the sense being that 'Cognition is *as if it were* one',—and the *absence of companion* may be taken as the similarity on which the figurative expression is based".

The answer to this is as follows :—'*Nor can the notion, etc., etc.*' ;—that is, the notion in question cannot be rightly held to be figurative ; as it is not found to be fallible. Such figurative expressions as 'the Ploughman is an ox' mean that 'the man is as if it were an ox', and *not that he is 'an ox itself'*—as he does not have the dewlap and other distinguishing features of the ox ;—there is no such *failure* (negation) in the case in question,—the notion being that 'the cognition *is* one', not that 'it is *as if it were* one' ; as a matter of fact, the notion in regard to the Cognitions is just as infallible as that in regard to the Jar and such things.—(639-640)

The Opponent may urge the following—"The notion is described as 'figurative', not on the basis of *similarity*',—but what is meant is that the notion of 'one', etc. in regard to *Quality, Action, Subsistence* and so forth is based on the ground that these subsist in the same substratum as the 'oneness', etc. subsisting in the Substance that forms their own substratum".

This is the explanation anticipated and set forth in the following :—

TEXT (641).

"THE NOTION OF *one* IN REGARD TO COGNITIONS IS ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF THE *one-ness* SUBSISTING IN THAT SAME SUBSTANCE, ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR SUBSISTING IN THE SAME THING",—IF THIS IS ASSERTED [then the answer is as in the following *Text*].—(641)

COMMENTARY.

The answer to the above is provided in the following—

TEXTS (642-643).

THE NUMBER 'ONE' MAY SUBSIST IN THE ONE COGNITION ; BUT ON WHAT BASIS DOES THE NOTION OF 'TWO' PROCEED, IN REFERENCE TO COGNITIONS ? OR EVEN IN REGARD TO THE 'SIX CATEGORIES' AND THE REST ?—THE NOTION TOO OF ITS 'SUBSISTING IN THE SAME THING' CAN ONLY BE FIGURATIVE, AND HENCE FALLIBLE,—LIKE THE NOTION OF 'FIRE' IN REGARD TO THE BOY.—(642-643)

COMMENTARY.

If the notion of 'one-ness' is due to subsistence in the same substance,—then it may be so in regard to *one Cognition*, as also to *Pleasure* and the

rest,—in which case the notion of 'one' is due to their subsisting in the same substance 'Soul' (which is *one*) ;—but what would the basis of such notions as '*two* cognitions', '*three* Cognitions' and the like ? Certainly *duality, etc.* do not subsist in the *Soul* (in which the Cognition subsists).

The assertion too that is made,—such as '*Six* Categories', 'the *two*, Pleasure and Pain', 'the *two*, Desire and Hatred', '*Five* kinds of Action', '*Two* kinds of Genus, the Higher and the Lower', '*One* Being', 'One Subsistence' and so forth,—what would be the basis for such notions ? In these cases, there is no Number subsisting in the same thing.—So that this assumption also is not comprehensive enough ; hence it cannot be right.

Further, 'Subsistence in the same thing' and such other basis, are asserted ; and yet the notion of such subsistence, even if it appeared, could be only *figurative*,—because there are no other things ; and hence the notions would be fallible ; just like the notion of 'Fire' in regard to the Boy, where there is no real ground for applying the word to him. And, yet the notion is not fallible. So that the objection urged above still remains in force.—(642-643)

The following *Text* anticipates the arguments set forth by *Aviddhakarṇa* for the proving of the existence of *Number* :—

TEXT (644).

"THE NOTION OF *Number* IS ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF ITS BEING DIFFERENT FROM THE NOTION OF THE 'ELEPHANT' AND OTHER THINGS ; THE SAID NOTION (OF NUMBER) MUST ARISE FROM THINGS OTHER THAN THOSE,—JUST LIKE THE NOTION OF THE 'BLUE CLOTH' AND THE LIKE."—(644)

COMMENTARY.

He argues as follows :—"The notion of *Number* must have a basis other than such things like the Elephant, Horse, Chariot and the like,—because it is different from the notions of the Elephant, etc.,—like the notion of the 'Blue Cloth'.—'*Must arise from things, etc., etc.*',—i.e. it should arise from a thing other than the said elephant, etc."—(644)

The Author answers this argument in the following—

TEXT (645).

WHAT IS DESIRED TO BE PROVED COULD BE PROVED AS BEING DUE TO SUCH CAUSES AS AN IMAGINARY CONVENTION ARISING FROM MERE WHIM AND SO FORTH. THE EXISTENCE OF 'NUMBER' IN COGNITION AND OTHER THINGS ALSO MAY BE DUE TO THE SAME CAUSE.—(645)

COMMENTARY.

Causes apart from the 'Elephant, etc.' are already admitted (by us also) in the shape of *imaginary Convention* and the like ; so that the argument adduced is entirely futile (the conclusion being admitted by us).

The term 'and so forth' is meant to include the Remembrance of Convention and such other things.

If however what you intend to prove is the fact of the notions in question having causes other than the said Imaginary Convention and the like, then the reason adduced is *inconclusive*. This is shown by means of a *Reductio ad Absurdum*—'*The existence of Number in Cognition, etc., etc.*';—'*The same cause*',—i.e. the fact of being different from the notions (of Elephant, etc.).—What is meant is that the 'Number' involved in such notions as '*One* Cognition', '*Two* Cognitions', '*Five* Actions', would be due to the same Cause; as here too 'the difference from the said notions' is present:—As a matter of fact the said Number is not due to this circumstance; hence the Reason is *Inconclusive*.—(645)

Further, you have explained that the number 'Two' which subsists in more than one substance is brought about by several 'unities' associated with the several Cognitions. But as a matter of fact, there can be no basis for such an assertion.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (646).

IF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE NUMBER BE EXPLAINED AS DEPENDENT UPON COGNITIONS,—THEN, WHY CANNOT THE NOTION BE ACCEPTED AS DUE TO MERE CONVENTION ?—(646)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'mere' is meant to exclude such notions as 'one', 'two' and the rest, the genus constituted by these, and the relationship of these.

'*Why cannot the notion, etc., etc.*';—i.e. the notion of 'two', 'three', 'four' and so forth, that appear in connection with the *numbered* things,—why cannot this be accepted as brought about by mere Convention ?—The advantage in this would be that it would not involve the assuming of the causality of anything whose potency is not perceived; for if such causality were assumed, then there would be an infinite number of such 'Causes'. It is far more reasonable therefore to postulate the 'unitary conception' itself as the requisite cause,—on the strength of positive and negative concomitance. Otherwise, it might be assumed that 'deities, getting at the *Harītakī*, bring about the movement of the bowels' [not the *Harītakī* itself].—As a matter of fact too, 'duality' and the rest, which have been held to be perceptible apart from things excluded from the 'aggregate' and such entities, are never perceived; nor are they compatible; because the existence of 'one' in 'many' has been denied, and 'genus' and 'subsistence' are going to be denied.—(646)

The following *Text* proceeds to deny 'Dimension':—

TEXT (647).

'DIMENSION' HAS BEEN CLASSED AS 'LARGE', 'LONG' AND THE LIKE;—WHY CANNOT IT BE REGARDED AS DUE TO DIVERSITY OF FORMS IN THE THING ITSELF?—(647)

COMMENTARY.

The theory of the other Party is as follows:—

"*Dimension* is the basis of all notions of *size*; it is of four kinds—(1) Large, (2) Small, (3) Long, (4) Short.—The 'Large' Dimension again is of two kinds—*eternal* and *non-eternal*;—the *eternal*, as also the *Largest*, Dimension subsists in *Ākāsha*, Time, Space and Soul; the 'non-eternal' Dimension subsists in the *Triad* and other substances.—Similarly the 'Small' Dimension also is of two kinds—*eternal* and *non-eternal*;—the *eternal* and also the smallest, Dimension, subsists in the Atom and the Mind,—in the shape of the 'atomic globule'; and the *non-eternal* Dimension subsists in the *Diad* only; it is also used in connection with such things as the Pearl, the *Āmalaka*-Fruit, the *Bilva*-fruit and the like, which are really 'large',—but only *figuratively*, on account of the absence of much 'largeness' in their 'large dimension'; e.g. the 'Large Dimension' of the Pearl is not of the same degree as that of the *Āmalaka*; and so on in regard to all things.—*Question*:—'What is the difference between the *Largeness* and *Length* as subsisting in the *Triad* and the *Smallness* and *Shortness* subsisting in the *Diad*?'—*Answer*:—As regards *Largeness* and *Length*, there is mutual distinction; for instance, we come across such varied expressions as 'from among the *Large* things, bring the *Longer* one', 'from among the *Long* things, bring the *larger* one'. As regards the distinction between 'smallness' and 'shortness', it is perceptible only to Mystics who alone see them."

In this scheme the 'Large' and the rest are held to be something different from Colour and the rest,—on the ground that they are apprehended by Cognitions other than cognitions of these latter, like Pleasure, etc.—In this Reasoning, if the Reason adduced is meant to consist in the fact that "*Largeness, etc.* are the objects of Sense-perception different from the Sense-perception of Colour and such things",—then, such a Reason is one that is 'unproven', *not admitted*; because as a matter of fact any such thing as the 'Large and other Dimension' is never found to appear in any Sense-perception, apart from the Colour and other things as they exist.—If then, it be held that the notion of 'small', 'large' and the like is a cognition that is entirely different from the cognition of Colour, etc.,—then the Reason becomes 'fallible', 'Inconclusive'; as there is nothing to invalidate a contrary conclusion. As a matter of fact there is nothing that really forms the object of the notion in question; as what is held to be such is a mere verbal figment. All that happens is that when the same Colour is seen turning towards the same direction,—and it is desired to bring out the difference between that Colour and other Colours,—there appears the notion, based upon preconceived convention, that it is 'large'. And this does not

justify the conviction that it is something altogether different. Consequently there is nothing apart from *Colour, etc.* ', that could be regarded as the object of that notion ; and hence the Reason is one that is ' unproven '.

The Proposition (or Conclusion) also is contrary to Perception ; inasmuch as the ' large ' and other dimensions, which are meant to be perceptible, are never perceived apart from Colour and other things.

Thus then, why cannot the ' Dimension ' of things be regarded as of the same nature as Colour and the rest, but based on this difference, turning towards a direction different from that towards which other things turn ? In so doing, the assumption of unseen and unreasonable things is avoided.—This is what is implied by the particle ' *éva* ' in the *Text.*—Thus when several Colour, etc. are seen or touched, as turning towards the same direction, people come to speak of it as ' long ' ; and when the *Colour,* etc. seen or touched are fewer as compared to the former, they speak of it as ' short '. The same explanation may be applied to the notion of ' Large ', etc. also.

As in the case of the denial of Colour and other qualities, so here also, the denial of the ' Large ' and other dimensions may be set forth, on the basis of the alternatives—is it one or many ?—(647)

Further, inasmuch as the Reason adduced is found even where the Probandum (character to be proved) is absent, its ' inconclusiveness ' becomes all the more pronounced. This is shown in the following—

TEXTS (648-649).

A *Line of Mansions* IS CONCEIVED OF AS ' LARGE ' ; AND YET NO ' DIMENSION ' COMMENSURATE WITH THE FORM OF THE LINE IS ASSUMED. IF IT BE SAID THAT IT IS SPOKEN OF AS SUCH ON THE BASIS OF THE QUALITY SUBSISTING IN THE SAME OBJECT (MANSION), —THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT NEITHER ' LARGENESS ' NOR ' LENGTH ' IS EVER MEANT TO BELONG TO MANSIONS.—(648-649)

COMMENTARY.

Even where the ' Largeness ' as conceived by you is not present,—in such things, for instance, as the *Line of Mansions*—the notion of 'largeness ' is found to appear.

It will not be right to assert that—"The *largeness* subsists in the same *Houses* wherein the quality of ' line ' (*being in a line*) is present, and on the strength of this inherence in the same thing, the Line comes to be spoken of as *Large* " ;—because this would be contrary to the Opponent's own doctrine. This is what is meant by the words of the *Text*—' *Neither Length, etc., etc.* '.

' *Dhāmasu* '—in the Mansions, Palaces ;—the Dimension—extending to a mile and so forth,—is not meant (by the Opponent) to be present in the Palaces.—(648-649)

Question :—" Why cannot such Dimension subsist in the Houses ? "
Answer :—

TEXT (650).

THE 'PALACE' IS HELD BY YOU TO BE A 'CONGLOMERATION', WHICH IS A QUALITY; WHICH, AS SUCH, CANNOT HAVE DIMENSION (WHICH IS ANOTHER QUALITY); NOR CAN THERE BE ANOTHER 'LINE' OF IT. NOR CAN RECOURSE BE HAD TO FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION.—(650)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, you regard the 'Palace' to be of the nature of *Conjunction, Conglomeration,* and hence a Quality; and not a composite substance, as it is not productive of heterogeneous substances. The said Quality cannot have *Dimension*; because your doctrine is that Qualities cannot reside in Qualities. For the same reason the Palace, which is one quality, cannot have a 'line' (or series), which is another quality; the expression 'line of Palaces' itself would be an absurdity; whence then could it be 'large' or 'small'? To explain further—'Line' (series) is held to be of the nature of 'Number'; and Number, as a Quality, can subsist only in a Substance, never in a Quality.—Even if 'line' or 'series' be regarded as of the nature of a 'Composite',—even so, the substratum of a Substance must be a Substance, not a Quality; so that the *Line* (a Substance) cannot subsist in the *Palace* (a Quality).—If 'Line' be held to be of the nature of *Genus,*—even so, as the Genus subsists in its complete form in every one of its component Individuals, even a single Palace could be called a 'Line',—like the Tree. This has been thus asserted—'Though the House is a Conglomeration (Conjunction), how can there be a *line* of it? If it were a *genus,* then even a single Palace might be called a *Line*'.—With regard to the *Line* (series) also, the notion of 'Long', 'Large' and so forth is equally impossible; as in the Palace, of which it is a substratum, the quality of 'one-ness' and the like is not present; and as regards the Wood and other materials (that go to make up the Palace), the intended *Length,* etc. are absent in them.

Then again, when there are several 'Lines of Palaces', it would not be possible to have the notion of 'Line' and 'Line' extending over all; as one *genus* cannot have another *genus.* This has been thus asserted—'Where there are several Lines, how can that term be applied? The genus cannot have another genus'.

Nor can it be right to seek shelter under 'figurative expression'; as the notion of 'largeness' is not found to be fallible in reference to things like the *Line*; and hence it cannot be regarded as *figurative.* What is not different from the direct connotation cannot be regarded as 'figurative'; otherwise it would lead to absurdities. This has been thus declared—'The notion of *Largeness* in regard to the Line, which has been held to be *figurative,* cannot be figurative, as it is the object of a Cognition which is in no way different from the direct connotation of the term'.—(650)

"There is the notion that 'this is *separate* from that'; and on the strength of this notion even a thing that is in contact with another thing is differentiated from it;—and that which is the cause or basis of this differentia-

tion is called '*Separateness*' (a distinct Quality—according to the *Naiyāyikas*). This 'Separateness' is something different from the Jar and other things,—because it forms the object of a cognition different from the cognition of these latter, as in the case dealt with before."

Such is the view of the other party (the *Naiyāyika*). Here also, as in the case of 'Dimension', the Reason is open to the charge of being 'Unproven' and 'Inconclusive'.—With this idea in his mind, the Author adds the following—

TEXT (651).

THE NOTION OF 'BEING APART', WHICH IS ASSUMED AS BEING DUE TO THE QUALITY OF 'SEPARATENESS',—WHY HAS IT NOT BEEN HELD TO REST IN THE VARIOUS THINGS OF DIVERGENT CHARACTERS ?—(651)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, as a matter of fact, no such thing as 'Separateness' as distinct from Colour, etc. ever appears in Perception ; so that the fact of its being cognised by a cognition different from the cognition of Colour, etc. cannot be *admitted*. Hence inasmuch as, while being perceptible, the intended quality is not perceived, it must be taken to be *non-existent*.—Nor can it be regarded as proved by the definite cognition 'this is *separate*'. Because those same things, Colour and the rest,—existing in their own character—when conceived of in relation to other things, from which they are found to be differentiated,—become the basis of the notion of the things being 'separate' ; and hence the said notion cannot prove the existence of any other thing (apart from those things themselves).—Hence the notion of 'being apart', which is described as proceeding from the quality of 'separateness',—why cannot that notion be held to rest in heterogeneous and homogeneous characters ? That is, it is best to regard it as resting upon that. This shows the 'inconclusiveness' of the Reason adduced by the other party. The compound '*vibhinna, etc.*' is to be expounded accordingly.—(651)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that the Reason cited is present in the contrary of the Probandum also :—

TEXT (652).

JUST AS COGNITION, PLEASURE AND THE REST, BEING DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER, ARE SPOKEN OF AS 'SEPARATE', AND HENCE BECOME THE BASIS OF THAT NOTION (OF SEPARATENESS), INDEPENDENTLY OF ANYTHING ELSE,—SO WOULD OTHER THINGS ALSO.—(652)

COMMENTARY.

In Pleasure and other Qualities, the Quality of 'separateness' cannot subsist ; because Qualities are devoid of Qualities (under the Opponent's

doctrine); and yet they are spoken of as 'separate', in the sense that they are mutually exclusive; and as such they become the 'basis'—cause—of that notion of 'being separate'. In the same manner, the Jar and other things also, which have been regarded as 'substance', should be devoid of any such quality as 'Separateness', distinct from themselves.—Nor can the said notion be said to be 'figurative'; as it does not differ in any way from the 'direct' notion.—Such is the sense of the Text.

Or, the *Text* may be taken as showing the notion of 'being separate' to be not based upon anything apart from the things concerned, and thereby points out the annulment of the Opponent's Conclusion by Inference.—This Inference may be formulated as follows:—Things that are mutually exclusive are not the substrata of any such quality as 'separateness', apart from themselves,—like Pleasure, etc.,—Jar and other things *are* mutually exclusive;—hence this is a natural Reason (for believing that the Jar, etc. cannot be the substratum of any such quality as 'Separateness').

It is impossible for any one thing to subsist in many things. As for *Subsistence* (which the Naiyāyika postulates as subsisting in many things), it is going to be rejected later on; and hence there can be no such relation as 'Subsistence'. An argument annulling the said notion is also available in the shape of the possibility of such relation being not present in Pleasure and the rest.—(652)

The Author next proceeds to criticise the qualities of *Conjunction* and *Disjunction*:—

TEXT (653).

Conjunction AND *Disjunction* AS RESTRICTED TO SUBSTANCES HAVE BEEN POSTULATED BY OTHERS AS CAUSES OF THE NOTIONS OF 'BEING JOINED' AND THE LIKE; THESE ARE ENTIRELY USELESS.—(653)

COMMENTARY.

The Opponent's scheme is that—"*Conjunction* and *Disjunction* are the bases, respectively, of the notions of 'being joined' and 'being disjoined'; they consist in the *contact of what has not been in contact,* and *the ceasing of contact of what has been in contact*;—and that they are brought about by the action of either one or of both, as also by Conjunction and Disjunction".

All this is a mere scheme; and there is no proof for the idea that these are real entities; hence they have been needlessly postulated by the other philosophers.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—That in support of which there is no proof (no means of Cognition) can never be regarded by intelligent persons as 'existing',—e.g. 'the Son of the Barren Woman';—the other party have no proof in support of 'Conjunction' and 'Disjunc-

tion'; hence there is non-perception of the wider condition (which makes the less extensive conclusion impossible).—(653)

The following *Texts* (654–663) set forth the arguments adduced by *Uddyotakara*, which are calculated to show that the Author's own Reasons are 'Unproven' (Not admitted):—

TEXTS (654–657).

"IF THERE WERE NO *Conjunction*, THEN THE SOIL, THE SEED, THE WATER AND THE EARTH AND SUCH THINGS SHOULD BE ALWAYS PRODUCING THEIR EFFECTS; AS THERE WOULD BE NO GROUND FOR DIFFERENTIATION.—AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER, THE SOIL, THE SEED, THE WATER AND SUCH THINGS ARE ALWAYS FOUND TO REQUIRE SOMETHING ELSE IN THE PRODUCING OF THEIR EFFECTS;—LIKE THE STICK, THE WHEEL AND WATER, ETC. (IN THE MAKING OF JAR). THAT THING WHICH THEY REQUIRE IS *Conjunction*; AND AS IT HAS A PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTIC, IT IS REGARDED AS DISTINCT (FROM OTHER THINGS). WHEN ONE IS TOLD TO 'BRING TWO CONJOINED THINGS', HE BRINGS ONLY THOSE TWO THINGS IN WHICH HE PERCEIVES THE CONJUNCTION, AVOIDING EVERYTHING ELSE."—(654–657)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows [in *Nyāyavārtika* on 2. 1. 33, Page 221, Bib. Ind.]:—"If Conjunction were not a distinct thing, then, of such things as the soil, the seed, etc.—each itself being always there,—they would always produce their effects in the form of the sprout, etc. As a matter of fact however, they do not do so. Hence from the fact of the non-production of the effects always, it is understood that the soil, etc. require the help of some other thing, in the producing of the effect in the shape of the sprout; just as in the producing of the Jar, the Clay, the Stick, the Water, the Thread, etc. require the help of the Potter. Hence it is established that this something else that they need is *Conjunction.*

"Then again, the Conjunction between two substances is perceived as a qualification of those substances, and hence it is directly perceived as something different from those substances. For instance, when someone is told by another person to 'bring two *conjoined* things', he brings only those two things in which he perceives the Conjunction, and not any Substance at random. If the Conjunction were not something real and different, he might bring anything.

"All these arguments put inversely are to be used in proving the existence of *Disjunction.*"—(654–657)

TEXT (658).

"IF CONJUNCTION AND DISJUNCTION WERE NOT THERE, THEN TO WHAT WOULD SUCH DISTINCT NOTIONS BE DUE AS—'THIS THING IS ATTACHED TO IT'—'THIS IS DETACHED FROM IT'?"—(658)

COMMENTARY.

"Further, even when there is no other difference between two things, one is said to be 'attached to it', and another to be 'detached from it';—how could there be such diverse notions, if Conjunction and Disjunction did not exist, as something distinct, in the two things? A particular notion in regard to a thing cannot be possible without the presence of something peculiar; otherwise everything would be possible always and everywhere."—(658)

TEXTS (659-660).

"IT SOMETIMES HAPPENS THAT EVEN WHEN ONE THING IS REALLY *detached* FROM ANOTHER, IT IS PERCEIVED AS *attached* TO IT,—AND WHEN THE THING IS REALLY CLOSE TO ANOTHER, IT IS PERCEIVED AS *detached* FROM IT;—THERE ARE THESE TWO MISCONCEPTIONS. AND A *misconception* HAS ALWAYS SOME PRIMARY FACTOR AS ITS COUNTERPART. THIS PRIMARY FACTOR HAS TO BE POINTED OUT IN THE TWO MISCONCEPTIONS CITED. IF SUCH A PRIMARY FACTOR IS ASSERTED, CONJUNCTION AND DISJUNCTION BECOME ESTABLISHED."—(659-660)

COMMENTARY.

"Further, it so happens sometimes that, even the *Dhava* and *Khadira* trees are really detached from one another, and to a man standing at a distance, they appear to be close (attached) together; and in the case of the line of Cranes seated on the thin top of a tree, even though they are close together, yet they appear as if detached; both these cognitions—apprehending things as they are not,—are *false*, misconceptions. And as a matter of fact, no misconception is ever produced without the apprehension of a primary factor; for instance, unless a man has had the perception of the Cow, he cannot have the misconception, as 'Cow', of the *Gavaya*; so that there must be some primary factor pointed out as the basis of the said two misconceptions. When such a primary factor is pointed out, the existence of Conjunction and Disjunction would become established. Apart from these two, there can be no basis for the said notion."—(659-660)

TEXTS (661-663).

"THEN AGAIN, ON WHAT BASIS IS THE NOTION OF 'THE MAN WITH EAR-RINGS' PRODUCED? IT COULD NOT PROCEED FROM THE MERE PRESENCE OF THE *Man* AND THE *Ear-ring*; FOR IN THAT CASE, THE SAID NOTION WOULD BE THERE ALWAYS.—FURTHER, IT IS ONLY SOMETHING THAT HAS BEEN PERCEIVED TO BE PRESENT IN ONE PLACE THAT IS DENIED IN ANOTHER PLACE. IF CONJUNCTION HAS NOT BEEN PERCEIVED, THEN HOW DOES IT COME TO BE DENIED IN SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS 'CHAITRA IS *without Ear-rings*'? HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE IS SOME SUCH REAL THING IN THE SHAPE OF CONJUNCTION, WHOSE AFFIRMATION AND DENIAL PROCEED WITH DUE DISTINCTION."—(661-663)

COMMENTARY.

"Then again, when there appears the notion that 'Devadatta is wearing Ear-rings',—on what basis does it appear? This needs to be explained. The said notion cannot be due to the mere presence of the Man and the Ear-ring; as Devadatta and the Ear-ring being lasting entities, the notion should appear constantly (even when Devadatta would not be wearing the Ear-ring).

"Further, it is only when a certain thing has been perceived to be present in a certain place that the notion of the negation of its presence is found to appear in reference to another place; under the circumstances, if you have never perceived Conjunction to be present, then how could you have the distinct notions of *Chaitra* being 'with Ear-rings' and 'without Ear-rings'? What is denied by the expression 'Chaitra is without Ear-rings' is not the *Ear-ring*, because it having been assumed to be existent in another place and at another time, it could not be denied entirely. Nor can it be the denial of *Chaitra*, the man; as he stands on the same footing as the Ear-ring. Hence what is denied must be Chaitra's *contact* (Conjunction) with the Ear-ring.—Similarly by the affirmative expression 'Chaitra with the Ear-ring', what is *affirmed* is neither the Ear-ring, nor Chaitra,—as both these are well-established entities;—hence, by elimination, all that can be affirmed is the Conjunction between these two, which has not been cognised by any other means.—From all this it follows that, there is such a real thing as Conjunction (and Disjunction), by virtue of which there appear such distinct affirmative and negative notions as '*Chaitra* with Ear-rings' and '*Chaitra* without Ear-rings'.

"The term '*ādi*' is meant to include the notion of 'qualification', as pointed out before."—(661-663)

With the following *Text*, the Author proceeds to answer the above arguments of Uddyotakara:—

TEXT (664).

THE ANSWER TO THE ABOVE IS AS FOLLOWS :—THE WATER AND THE REST DO NOT REMAIN THE SAME, AS ALL THINGS ARE MOMENTARY.— EVEN WHEN EXISTENT, THEY STAND IN NEED OF THAT CONDITION IN WHICH THERE IS NOTHING INTERVENING BETWEEN THEM.—(664)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued under *Text* 654 above that—" Seed, etc. would always be producing their effects " ; but the reason that has been urged—that they are not differentiated—i.e. they remain the same,—is not true, not admitted by us ; because all things being in ' perpetual flux ', it is only in a particularly differentiated condition that they are productive of their effects.

It has been argued under Text 655 above, that—" The soil, etc. are dependent upon something else, etc.".—If this is meant to prove merely the general fact that they are ' dependent ',—then the argument is superfluous (proving what is already admitted by us) ; this is what is shown by the words '*Even when existent, etc. etc.*' ; that is, it is held by us also that the seed, etc.—even when existent,—become capable of producing their effects in the shape of the sprout only when they are in that condition in which there is nothing intervening between them and so forth ; so that on this point the argument of the Opponent is superfluous.—The term '*avyavadhāna*' means that condition in which there is nothing intervening and so forth.—The phrase '*so forth*' includes such factors as *the absence of obstruction*, etc. ; that is to say, that particular condition in which (*a*) there is nothing intervening, (*b*) there is no remoteness among them, (*c*) there is no obstruction by a contrary force ;—all these being obstacles to the appearance of the effect. And as the ' condition ' of a thing is nothing different from the thing itself, the argument put forward does not prove the existence of Conjunction as something distinct.

If then what is intended by you to prove is the fact of the Seed, etc. being dependent upon a different thing in the shape of what you call ' Conjunction ',—then, as your Reason, not being found to be concomitant with any such character, becomes ' Inconclusive ' ; and the Corroborative instance also is devoid of the Probandum. This is what is meant by the *Text*.—(664)

The following might be urged :—" How do you know that the soil and the rest are dependent upon a particular condition of their own, in becoming the cause of producing the effect in the shape of the sprout,—and they are not dependent upon the Conjunction of something different from themselves ? and it is on the strength of this that you urge against us the fact of our argument being superfluous if mere *dependence* is meant to be proved ".

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (665).

IF THE WATER, ETC. NEEDED THE CONJUNCTION ONLY, THEN THEY WOULD APPEAR IMMEDIATELY ON THEIR COMING TOGETHER (CONJUNCTION), —OR NOT APPEAR AT ALL.—(665)

COMMENTARY.

If the Soil, Water and the rest needed only their Conjunction to bring about their effect in the shape of the sprout, then it should come about as soon as they come into contact with one another; because the Cause would be there in its perfect form,—exactly as it does later on. If the effect does not appear immediately on their first contact, then it should not appear at all, even later on ; as the Cause would even then be as defective as on the previous occasion. Nor would it be reasonable to suppose that the soil, etc. are dependent upon Conjunction which does not help them at all; as such a theory would lead to absurdities.—Nor again is it right to regard the Conjunction as appearing only occasionally; as the cause (basis) in the shape of the soil, etc. is always there.—It might be held that—"in the bringing about of the Conjunction also, there is need for such forces as those of 'Destiny' and the like ".—But this cannot be right ; because the same objection would be applicable against that view also. For instance, what would be the answer to the question—'Why does not the said Destiny bring about the effect at once ?'—The answer might be that—"it does not do so, because the requisite urge is absent in the Cause ".—Then comes the Question —why should there be this *absence of the requisite urge* ?—Such Questions would be everywhere inevitable under the theory of Causes being permanent entities.—For one, on the other hand, who holds all things to be impermanent (momentary),—as the chain of all (momentary) causes is beginningless, there can be no possibility of the anomaly of all things being produced at one and the same time ; because the succeeding causes would all be restricted by the preceding ones (in the same *Chain*), and hence the Causes of these could not be present at the same time by reason of their own causes not being present in their perfect condition. Thus it is only under your doctrine that there is possibility of the anomaly of the Soil, etc. producing the sprout at all times; hence it becomes established that the Soil, etc. do not require any such distinct thing as 'Conjunction'.—(665)

It has been asserted (under *Text* 656 above) that—"as Conjunction has a particular characteristic it is regarded as distinct ".—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (666).

WHEN A MAN SEES TWO THINGS HAVING COME CLOSE TOGETHER BY THEMSELVES, HE BRINGS THOSE THINGS IN THAT CONDITION (WHEN TOLD TO DO SO).—(666)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, what falls within the range of the perceiver's vision is not any distinct thing in the shape of *Conjunction*, by noticing which he

brings up the 'Conjoined things'; what happens is that he notices that the two things, which were previously in the condition in which there was an interval of space between them, have subsequently come into the condition in which they have come into juxtaposition,—these things come to be spoken of as 'conjoined things'; as it has been already proved that the term 'Conjunction' connotes only a particular *condition* of things. So that whenever one finds two things in this particular *condition* in which they become expressible by the term 'conjoined things', one brings these, and none others. No intelligent person ever acts on the strength of words, in regard to what is not expressed by those words.—(666)

It has been argued (under *Text* 658, above) that—" To what would such distinct notions be due as 'this thing is attached to it—this is detached from it'?"

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (667).

WHEN A THING IS PRODUCED IN THE *detached* FORM, IT BECOMES THE BASIS FOR THE NOTION OF BEING 'DETACHED'; ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN IT IS PRODUCED IN THE *attached* FORM, IT BECOMES THE BASIS OF THE NOTION OF BEING 'ATTACHED';—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE *House*, THE *Vindhya mountain* AND THE *Himālaya mountain*.—(667)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, it is a distinct object that is produced in a particular form that becomes the basis of a distinct notion; hence the Reason urged by the Opponent is Inconclusive. This is the upshot of the *Text* as a whole.

The construction is—'the thing that is produced in the *detached* form becomes the basis for the notion of *being detached*'.—*On the other hand,*—i.e. when it is produced as not-detached.

'*Just as in the case of the House, etc. etc.*';—these form examples of the said two notions.—Even under the doctrine of the opposite party, when two Houses have been produced as attached to one another, and are therefore of the nature of Conjunction itself,—there is no other Conjunction which serves as the basis of their being 'attached';—similarly when two Houses have been produced as *detached*, there is no other *Disjunction* which forms the basis of the notion of their being 'detached'.—In the case of the *Himālaya* and *Vindhya* Mountains also, the notion of their being 'detached' is not due to any other thing in the shape of 'Disjunction',—because your own idea is that 'Disjunction consists in *separation* following after *Contact*' [and certainly there never has been any contact between the two mountains].—(667)

It has been argued (under *Text* 659, above) that—" the notion of *being attached* that appears with regard to what is detached, etc. etc."—The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXTS (668-669).

A MISCONCEPTION DOES NOT APPEAR ALWAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PRIMARY CONCEPTION ; FOR INSTANCE, THE NOTION OF 'TWO MOONS' APPEARS INDEPENDENTLY OF ITS SIMILARITY TO ANY OTHER (PRIMARY) NOTION, THROUGH SOME INTERNAL DERANGEMENT, WHILE THE MIND IS TURNED ELSEWHERE.—OR, THE REQUISITE 'PRIMARY' IN THE CASE IN QUESTION MAY BE THAT SAME THING WHICH HAS BEEN PRODUCED IN THE *attached* FORM AND THE LIKE (BUT IS MISCONCEIVED AS BEING *detached* OR OTHERWISE).—(668-669)

COMMENTARY.

That all Misconceptions appear only through the perception of similarity (to a primary) cannot be admitted ; because there are some misconceptions which are produced, independently of all similarity, merely through some disorder in the sense-organs. For instance, when a man has the fancies of his Mind turned elsewhere, though what is actually before the eyes is a *single* Moon, yet, on account of the sense-organ concerned (the Eyes) being deranged by disease and darkness, there appears the cognition furnished by the form of *two* Moons ; and this is quite clear and free from all taint of being entirely fanciful.

The phrase '*while the Mind is turned elsewhere*' shows that the notion of 'two moons' is entirely indeterminate in character ; the idea being that in an indeterminate notion, there can be no perception of *similarity* ; as this latter is always in the form of the cognition of some sort of *unity* between the thing seen now and that seen previously ; and as such, it must be of the nature of some verbal expression relative to the previously perceived thing.

Or, granting that the previous Misconception is in the wake of a Primary Cognition,—even so, what the other party desires cannot be proved.—This is what is shown by the words—'*Or, the requisite Primary, etc. etc.*'—The phrase '*and the like*' is meant to include the thing born in the *detached* form. What is meant is that the same thing,—produced as *attached* or *detached*,—when conceived of as precluding things of the other kind, comes to be spoken by a name applied to it in accordance with that (attached or detached) form which has been perceived first ; and this may be regarded as the Primary (of the later misconception of the same *attached* thing as *detached*, or *vice versa*). So that the argument adduced by you does not prove what is desired by you.—(668-669)

It has been argued (under *Text* 661, above) that—"The notion of the *man with the Ear-ring, etc. etc.*"—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (670).

THE NOTION OF 'THE MAN WITH THE EAR-RING' ARISES ONLY WITH REFERENCE TO *Chaitra* (THE MAN) AND THE EAR-RING, IN WHOM A PARTICULAR CONDITION HAS COME ABOUT; AND IT ONLY APPEARS AS IF THE COGNITION WERE OF 'CONJUNCTION' (BETWEEN THE TWO).—(670)

COMMENTARY.

Just as what is called 'Conjunction' comes into existence only when Chaitra and the Ear-ring appear in a certain state,—and not always;—in the same manner, the notion also of 'the man with the Ear-ring' is due to a particular state of things, and as such, why should it appear always?

The compound '*Jātāvasthāvishēṣayoḥ*' is to be explained as 'the two, Chaitra and the Ear-ring, in whom a particular state has been produced'.—(670)

It has been argued (under *Text* 662, above) that—"It is only something that has been perceived to be present in one place that is denied in another place, etc. etc.".—The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (671).

IT IS THE ONE *peculiar condition* SEEN IN ONE PLACE WHICH IS DENIED IN ANOTHER PLACE.—AS REGARDS THE NOTION 'CHAITRA IS *without* THE EAR-RING', IT IS NOT *Conjunction* THAT IS DENIED; FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THIS CONJUNCTION HAS NEVER BEEN SEEN.—(671)

COMMENTARY.

The notion in question has been explained as being based upon a certain state of things; and when this state of things, which should be perceptible, is not perceived under another state of things,—then there is its denial (in regard to this latter state of things);—and what is denied is not the Conjunction that is assumed by you. For the simple reason that the 'Conjunction' has never appeared in any Cognition, apart from the things to which it is held to belong.

Thus our Reason is not open to the charge of being 'Unproven'.—(671)

The following might be urged (by the Opponent)—"If we have not been able to produce proofs in *support* of Conjunction,—what is your proof in annulment of it ?"

The answer is provided by the following—

TEXTS (672–674).

THE NOTION OF THINGS BEING 'CONJUNCT' CANNOT BE DUE TO THE *Conjunction* POSTULATED BY THE OTHER PARTY,—(A) BECAUSE IT IS THE NOTION OF 'BEING CONJUNCT',—LIKE THE NOTION OF 'BEING CONJUNCT' IN CONNECTION WITH THE MANSION AND SUCH THINGS ;—OR (B) BECAUSE IT APPEARS ONLY WHEN THERE IS MORE THAN ONE THING,—LIKE THE COGNITIONS OF SEVERAL DIFFERENTIATED YARNS.—THE SAME TWO ARGUMENTS MAY BE URGED *mutatis mutandis*, AGAINST *Disjunction* ALSO.—AND THE REASON ANNULLING (BOTH THESE CONCEPTIONS OF CONJUNCTION AND DISJUNCTION) CONSISTS IN THE FACT THAT IT CANNOT BE RIGHT FOR ONE THING TO SUBSIST IN MORE THINGS THAN ONE.—(672–674)

COMMENTARY.

The arguments may be formulated as follows :—The notion of 'being conjunct' is based upon the mere *Object*, which has nothing to do with the 'Conjunction' postulated by you,—just like the same notion in such expressions as 'the conjunct houses',—and the notion of 'Chaitra with the Earring' is the notion of 'being conjunct'; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as due to the nature of the thing itself).—Or, that which appears on the coming together of several things follows from the things themselves entirely devoid of the 'Conjunction' postulated by you,—as the notion of several yarns lying apart from one another ;—the notion of 'being conjunct' is a notion of this kind ;—hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as due to the nature of the things themselves).

'*Yuktadhīḥ*',—i.e. the notion of two things being conjunct.

These same two arguments may be put forward also for denying 'Disjunction' :—(*a*) Because it is the notion of 'being disjunct',—or (*b*) because

its appearance is dependent upon the absence of several things,—the notion of 'being disjunct', in the case of two *rams* and such things, must be due to the particular things themselves, irrespectively of the 'Disjunction' postulated by the other party,—just like the notion of 'being disjunct' that appears in relation to two Rams living far apart, or that which appears in relation to the *Himālaya* and the *Vindhya* Mountains.

Question :—"What is the reason that annuls the conclusion contrary to the Probandum in the above reasonings,—which would preclude the presence of the Reason in something where the Probandum is known to be absent?"

Answer :—'*The reason annulling, etc. etc.*'—That is, the fact that the subsistence of one thing in several things cannot be right, has been shown in detail in the Chapter on the '*Composite Whole*', under *Text* 607 (above); hence it is not set forth here.—(672–674)

The author proceeds to set forth objections against the Qualities of 'Priority' and 'Posteriority':—

TEXTS (675-676).

THE NAME (AND IDEA) OF 'PRIORITY' AND 'POSTERIORITY' HAVE BEEN ASSUMED AS THE BASIS OF THE NOTIONS OF 'FORE' AND 'AFT',—AS THESE NOTIONS CANNOT BE DETERMINED IN REFERENCE TO *Space* AND *Time*.—BUT JUST AS THE BLUE AND OTHER COLOURS, WHICH COME INTO EXISTENCE IN SUCCESSION (ONE AFTER THE OTHER), COME TO BE SPOKEN OF 'FORE' AND 'AFT', WITHOUT REFERENCE TO DISTINCTIONS DUE TO ANY OTHER CONDITIONS,—SO WOULD THE SAID NOTIONS BE IN REGARD TO OTHER THINGS ALSO.—(675-676)

COMMENTARY.

[The position of the *Nyāya-vaishēṣika* is as follows]—"That from which arise the notions 'this is before' and 'this is after' are the Qualities named 'Priority' and 'Posteriority', which are the basis of the said notions of 'fore' and 'aft' respectively.—The term '*ādi*' is meant to include the *idea* also of 'fore' and 'aft'. The argument may be formulated as follows:—The idea of 'fore' and 'aft' must be based upon something other than the Jar and other things, because it is different in character from the idea of these latter,—like the idea of Pleasure, etc.—For instance, when two objects are standing towards the same direction, there appears the notion 'this is

fore and that is *aft* '; this notion cannot be due to *Space* (Direction);—nor can it be due to *Time*; because even when two persons, one old and the other young, are present at the same time, but in uncertain directions, there appears the distinct notion of 'fore' and 'aft' (Senior and Junior); so that this distinction is there even though there is no difference in *Time*. Apart from these two—Space and Time,—there is nothing else which could be regarded as the basis of the notions in question. Hence it becomes established that what form the basis of these notions are the Qualities of 'Priority' and 'Posteriority'.—'*These notions cannot be determined in reference to Space and Time*';—that is to say, it cannot be held to be in reference to *near* and *far* objects in contact with points in Space and Time.—The terms '*Space*' and '*Time*' are used here figuratively, in the sense of *objects in contact with points of Space and Time*. So that what is meant is that Priority and Posteriority,—both kinds—have been explained by other people as being due to *Space* and *Time*. The manner in which these are said to be produced by Space is as follows:—When two objects are standing in the same direction,—then, in reference to the point near any one observer, taken as the standard-point, there appears, in regard to the object wherein Posteriority subsists, the notion of its being 'far off';—and on the basis of this idea, from the contact of the further point in Space, the Quality of Posteriority becomes produced;—and taking a point further removed from the observer as the standard-point, there arises the idea of the object being 'near', in reference to the object wherein Priority subsists; and from the contact of this with another point in Space, the Quality of Priority becomes produced.—The manner in which these Qualities are produced in reference to *Time* is as follows:—Between an old and a young man standing at the present time, in varying directions,—with regard to that person whose contacts with sunrise and sunset are deduced to have been larger in number,—from his wrinkles, grey hairs, growing beard and so forth,—there arises the idea of his being 'old' (Prior) in reference to the standard-point provided by the other man; and on the basis of this idea, from the contact of another point of Time, the Quality of 'Priority' becomes produced;—and from the standard-point provided by the older man, the idea of the other man having had lesser contacts with sunrise and sunset is deduced from the fact of his being *beardless* and so forth,—from which arises the idea of 'nearness' (proximity) in regard to the younger man; and through this idea, out of the contact of another point of *Time*, the quality of 'Posteriority' becomes produced."

The *Text* proceeds to show that the above Reasoning in support of Priority and Posteriority is 'Inconclusive', on account of the Reason being present in the contrary of the Probandum also—'*Just as the Blue, etc. etc.*'—'*Bhāva*' is *existence*, and the '*vyavasthiti*' qualified by this is *coming into existence*; when this is '*kramēṇa*', *in succession*, [it serves as the reason for what is going to be said]. That is to say, in the case of *Blue*, etc., on account of their coming into existence *in succession* (one after the other), the whole phenomenon is regulated by the conditions of *Time*, not by the conditions of any Quality,—and hence we have such notions of Priority and Posteriority as 'this is the prior or earlier Blue' and 'that the posterior

or later Blue',—even in the absence of any such Qualities as *Priority* and *Posteriority*; because no Quality can subsist in a Quality;—why cannot the same be accepted in the case of the *Jar* and other things also?

What is meant by this is as follows:—If what is meant by the Opponent is to prove the mere fact of being dependent on something else, then the Reason adduced is 'Inconclusive', as it is present in the contrary of the Probandum also.—If what is meant to be proved is the fact that the notion in question is based upon the particular Quality brought about by the eternal substances of *Time* and *Space*,—then there can be no Corroborative Instance.—The conclusion is also annulled by Inference; for instance, it is possible to set up the following inference—The notion of 'Fore' and 'Aft' is based upon a certain regularity in the successive appearance of things without any such quality as has been postulated by the other party,—because it is the notion of 'Fore' and 'Aft',—like the notion of 'Fore' and 'Aft' in regard to *Colour* and such things;—the notion in question in regard to *Jar*, etc. also is such a notion of 'Fore' and 'Aft';—hence it is a natural reason (for regarding it as being based upon the said regularity, etc.).

It might be argued by the Opponent that—"In the case of the *Blue*, etc., the notion of Priority of Posteriority is figurative, based upon the notion subsisting in the same object as the Blue, etc.; and hence the Reason is not open to the fallacy of 'Inconclusiveness'; and inasmuch as, in the case of the Blue, etc. also, the qualities of *Priority*, etc. are admitted to form the basis of the said notion, the Corroborative Instance cited is not devoid of the Probandum."

But this cannot be so; it has been already answered by the statement that as the notion is not found to be fallible, it cannot be regarded as 'figurative'; and further, as the two qualities are not perceived even in their own substratum, it is not right to accept any notion as based upon it; how then could it ever be based upon it in the case of *Blue* and the rest?—What too could be assumed to be the basis in the case of such things as Pleasure and the like? As there is no co-subsistence in the same substratum.

Further, as Time and Space have already been rejected above, they cannot be regarded as existent; the 'Priority' and 'Posteriority' based upon these should also be regarded as non-existent; how then could the notion be believed to be based upon those? Consequently any such idea cannot save the Reason from being 'Inconclusive'.—According to you again, Time and Space have no *parts*, from contact with which, as associated with 'unitary conception', the notion of 'Priority' and 'Posteriority' could be produced; the reason for this lying in their being essentially one and without parts. Nor can it be right to seek explanation for a state of things in a merely imaginary 'part' conceived figuratively; as all such assumptions are restricted within well-defined limits by the real state of things; and what is merely 'figurative' is essentially unreal and false. Hence our Reason is not Inconclusive.

As for the Reason adduced by the Opponent, it may be pointed out that it is 'Unproven', 'not admissible'.—(675-676)

With the following Texts, the Author anticipates and answers the arguments adduced in favour of such qualities as 'Number' and the rest:—

TEXTS (677-678).

IF IT BE HELD THAT—"*Number, Conjunction* AND THE REST CANNOT BE NON-DIFFERENT FROM *Substance*, BECAUSE THEY SERVE TO CHARACTERISE AND DIFFERENTIATE THIS LATTER,—LIKE THE *Stick*",—THEN [OUR ANSWER IS THAT] THERE IS PROVING OF WHAT IS ADMITTED BY US, IF WHAT IS MEANT IS THAT THEY HAVE AN 'ILLUSORY EXISTENCE'; BECAUSE WHAT IS 'IMAGINARY' CANNOT BE DEFINED EITHER AS 'THIS' OR 'NOT THIS'.—(677-678)

COMMENTARY.

Says the *Nyāya-Vaishēṣika*—"All the above-mentioned qualities, Number and the rest, cannot be non-different from Substance,—because they serve to characterise and differentiate Substances;—when one thing differentiates another, it cannot be non-different from the latter,—just as the stick, which differentiates Devadatta, cannot be the same as Devadatta."

If what is meant to prove by this argument is simply the denial of these being the same as Substance, then it is open to the charge of being futile. Because all things that have an 'illusory or imaginary existence' are non-entities, and as such it cannot be asserted in regard to them as to whether they are the same as, or different from, anything. And this is what is admitted by us also.—(677-678)

The following *Text* anticipates the Answer given to the above by *Aviddhakarṇa* :—

TEXT (679).

IF THE FACT OF THE 'GROUP' AND SUCH THINGS BEING *undefinable* IS DENIED (BY THE OPPONENT) ON THE GROUND THAT THEY HAVE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES,—JUST LIKE COLOUR, SOUND, TASTE AND OTHER THINGS,—[then our answer is as given in the next *Text*].—(679)

COMMENTARY.

He has argued as follows :—"The particular states of the *Group* and the *Chain* are not incapable of being defined as *this* or *not-this*,—because they are endowed with distinctive features,—just like Colour, Taste and such things."—(679)

The following *Text* supplies the answer to this argument (of *Aviddhakarṇa*) :—

TEXTS (680-681).

IN REALITY, THE 'GROUP' IS ABSOLUTELY FEATURE-LESS; HENCE, LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS', IT CAN HAVE NO SPECIFIC PROPERTIES; THEY ARE ALL FIGMENTS OF IMAGINATION.—EVEN WHEN STATED IN THIS FORM, THE REASONING ADDUCED WOULD BE 'FALLIBLE', IN VIEW OF THINGS LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS'. IN FACT, 'NON-DIFFERENCE' AS WELL AS 'DIFFERENCE' RESTS ALWAYS IN AN OBJECT.—(680-681)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant to be the Reason is the presence of *real* specific properties, then it cannot be regarded as 'admitted' (by both parties); because for the *Bauddha,* it cannot be admitted that the 'Chain' and other things which have merely 'illusory existence' are endowed with any real specific properties.—If however the Reason is meant to be put forward only in a vague general sort of way, then such *imaginary* properties as 'non-existence', 'incorporeality' etc. are present also in the 'sky-lotus' and such things; —hence the Reason adduced becomes 'fallible', 'inconclusive'.

'*Even when stated in this form*',—i.e. if the assertion is made in a vague general sort of way, without reference to any well-determined specific properties.

For the following reason also the Reason is 'fallible—inconclusive' :—Because 'non-difference'—sameness—and 'difference'—being something else,—*rest always in an object,*—not anywhere else. The 'Chain' and other things have a mere 'ideal' existence, and as such are not *objects*; how then could there be any *difference* or *non-difference* from these ?

Thus then, it has been shown that, in the first argument (propounded by *Aviddhakarṇa*), if what is meant to be proved is merely the denial of the *non-difference* of Number, etc. from Substance,—then there is 'futility'. —(680-681)

It might be argued that—"it is not mere *denial of non-difference* that we seek to establish, but, in view of the fact that two negatives make one affirmative, by means of the two negatives we are seeking to prove the *difference* of Number, etc. from Substance".

This is the reasoning that is refuted in the following text :—

TEXT (682).

THUS THEN, IF WHAT IS MEANT TO BE ASSERTED IS THAT NUMBER AND THE REST ARE OTHER THAN (DIFFERENT FROM) SUBSTANCE,—THEN THE REASON BECOMES OPEN TO THE FALLACY OF 'HAVING NO SUBSTRATUM',—BECAUSE NUMBER AND THE REST ARE NOT ADMITTED AT ALL. —(682)

COMMENTARY.

That is, what the other party seeks to prove is not that they *are not non-different*, but that they *are different*.—(682)

The following *Text* shows how Number and the rest are devoid of substratum :—

TEXT (683).

IF IT IS SUBSTANCE ITSELF, AS DIVERSIFIED THROUGH 'GROUP', ETC., THAT IS SPOKEN OF AS SUCH,—THEN WHAT THE ARGUMENT WOULD PROVE WOULD BE THE DIFFERENCE OF SUBSTANCE FROM ITSELF—THUS INVOLVING SELF-CONTRADICTION.—(683)

COMMENTARY.

'*Is spoken of as such*' ;—i.e. as 'one', 'two' and so forth.

It might be argued that—"what is to be proved is the difference of Number, etc. which are only forms of Substance."

The answer to this is—'*What the argument would prove, etc.*' ;—i.e. no entity can be different from its own form ; as it would become devoid of its own character.—'*Self-contradiction*',—i.e. contradiction of one another ; because 'Difference' and 'Non-difference', being of the nature of exclusion and inclusion, cannot co-exist in any single object.

Thus have all qualities ending with 'Posteriority' been rejected. The rest of the qualities (postulated by the *Nyāya-Vaishēṣika*)—beginning with *Cognition* and ending with *effort*—have been held to subsist in the Soul. They should therefore be taken as discarded by the rejection of the Soul itself.

As a matter of fact however, the Soul cannot be the substratum of these qualities. Because the Soul could be the substratum of these, either as being the cause of their production, or as being the cause of their subsistence. It cannot be the cause of their production, because,

the Cause (Soul) being always there in its perfect form, Pleasure and other effects would be produced always ; nor can there be any dependence upon auxiliaries for a Cause in which no peculiar properties can be produced by anything else ; as has been reiterated hundreds of times.—Nor again can an eternal Substance have the capacity of producing effects ; as such production could only be either successive or simultaneous, and it has been explained that in the case of an eternal substance there is incongruity both in successive and simultaneous activity.—Nor again can the Soul be the cause of the *subsistence* (of the Qualities in question) ; because 'subsistence' has no other form than that of the 'Subsistent' itself ; so that if the Soul were said to be the cause of *subsistence,* it would mean that it is the cause of the *subsistent* thing itself ; and this idea has just been rejected. Then again, the *subsistent* thing being a well-established entity, it can have no cause at all ; as there would be nothing therein that could be done by the Cause.—Even if the *subsistence* were something different from the *subsistent* thing, there could be nothing done by the cause in the latter, as it will have brought about only the *subsistence,* which *ex-hypothesi* is something different. And thus not producing anything in the *subsistent* thing, how could the Soul be its *substratum* ?—Nor will it be right to urge that—" inasmuch as the Soul will have produced the *subsistence* related to the *subsistent* thing, it would be a *helper* of the latter ; because the said relationship is not yet proved.—As a matter of fact, the Soul cannot be regarded as the cause of the *subsistence* ; because an eternal thing can have no such causal potency,—as has been explained before.

Further, the entity (in the shape of *subsistence*) that is established (by the Soul)—would it be of permanent nature ? or evanescent ? If the latter, then how can it be established by something else ? It would lose its character. If, on the other hand, it is permanent, then also its *establisher* (Cause) would be futile ; as by its very nature, the *subsistence* would be there always.

Further, as regards *corporeal* things, it is possible to assume for them, a substratum which prevents their falling downwards ; for the things in question however, which are *incorporeal,*——such as *Pleasure* and the rest,—there can be no *falling downward* ; then what would the 'substratum' do for them ?

Lastly, for what cannot be spoken of either as *existent* or as *non-existent,* there can be no *subsisting* at all.

In this manner Pleasure and other Qualities may be shown *mutatis mutandis* to be incapable of being regarded as *subsistent* ; from which it follows that there can be no such thing as 'Quality'.

Then again, *Buddhi* has been accepted by the other party as being of the nature of *Jñāna,* Cognition,—as declared in the following *Sūtra*—" *Buddhi, Upalabdhi, Jñāna,* are synonyms " (*Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 15). Even though *Buddhi* is of this nature, yet the other party have not admitted any such form of it as is apprehended by itself ; in fact they regard it as apprehended by another *Buddhi.* Thus, not having a self-sufficient existence, like Colour and other things,—it cannot rightly be regarded even as *Buddhi.* This is going to be explained later on.—(683)

Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Hatred and Effort,—are Qualities that have been held to be distinct from *Cognition* (*Buddhi*). These we are going to reject in course of the examination of the Means of Right Cognition (Chapters 17, 18 and 19).

As regards the Qualities of Gravity, Fluidity and Viscidity,—these are to be rejected in the same way as Colour and the rest.

In view of this, the Author proceeds next to reject the Quality of *Momentum* (*Saṁskāra*) :—

TEXTS (684-685).

MOMENTUM HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS BEING OF THREE KINDS—NAMED '*Vēga*', VELOCITY,—'*Bhāvanā*', IMPRESSION,—AND '*Sthitasthāpaka*', 'ELASTICITY'.—ALL THIS HOWEVER IS NOT COMPATIBLE ;—BECAUSE THINGS BEING *momentary*, THERE CAN BE NO *action* IN THEM, OF THE CONTINUITY OF WHICH THE MOMENTUM NAMED 'VELOCITY' COULD BE THE CAUSE.—(684-685)

COMMENTARY.

There are three kinds of Momentum : Velocity, Impression and Elasticity.

Of these the Momentum named 'Velocity' subsists in the five corporeal substances, Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Mind,—and is produced by an action due to Effort and Propulsion. It is the cause of action proceeding in a particular direction ; and prevents contact with tangible substances. For instance, in the Arrow, it is due to action produced by a particular effort ; by virtue of which it falls on the head of a remote object. That is why it is accepted as having its existence indicated by particular effects. In such things as the branch of a tree, the same quality is due to the movement produced by the stroke of the stone hurled at it.

The Momentum called 'Impression' is a quality of the Soul ; it has been said to be *produced* by Cognition, and also to be the *Cause* of Cognition. It is accepted as having its existence indicated by such particular effects as Remembrance and Recognition.

As regards the quality of Elasticity, it belongs to corporeal substances ; it is the quality that brings its solid and lasting substratum back to its previous position from which it had been torn away by some one's effort ; for instance, when the Palm-leaf which has been rolled up for a long time is spread out, and then let off,—it reverts to its former (rolled) position. The effect of this quality is seen in such things as the Bow, the Tree-branch, the Horn, the Teeth and also in Cloth and so forth, when they are bent and straightened.

'*All this*',—i.e. all the three kinds of Momentum.

Of the Momentum called 'Velocity', any such effect as connection with an action is not admitted ; because it has been proved that all things are in perpetual flux (momentary) ; hence immediately upon things coming into

existence, they cease to exist; so that no action is possible in them, of the continuity of which action, Velocity could be the cause.—If by 'continuity of action' is meant the production of things that is perceived to be separate from its constituent cause,—then even so, the Reason remains 'Inconclusive' (Fallible). Because what are inferred from the said 'continuity of action' are the previous Causal-Ideas of things produced in that way,—and not any such thing as the said 'Momentum'; because concomitance with this latter has nowhere been perceived.—Further, if the not-falling of the arrow were due to the quality of *Velocity*, then it should never fall at all; as the Velocity preventive of such falling would be always there. Under the circumstances, what could be the explanation of the fact of the arrow falling while moving in a particular region of *Ākāsha* ?—It cannot be said that—"the falling is due to the cessation of Velocity on account of its force having been destroyed by contact with such solid substances as Air and the like";—as, in that case, the falling should come about before it does; as the Air obstructing it is there all along.—It might be argued that—"Before the Arrow actually falls, the force of the Velocity is very strong, it pierces through the obstacle due to the Air, and carries the Arrow further to another place".—If that be so, to what is its subsequent weakness due whereby it does not carry the Arrow still further ? As a matter of fact, in all cases, it is found that the Arrow falls in the way, while moving through *Ākāsha*, over the whole of which the contact of Air is equally present. It cannot be said that the Velocity becomes altered later on; as there is no cause which could produce this alteration in the Velocity; as its inherent cause in the shape of the Arrow is the same all through.—It cannot be right to say that what qualifies it subsequently is the cause called 'Karma' ('Action'). Because that also would be open to the same objection. Even if the subsequent Velocity be different (from the initial one), as there would be no cause for the destruction of the former Velocity, it should continue as before and there should be no falling down of the Arrow.—The Contact of Air cannot be destructive of the previous Velocity; as if that were so, then the Arrow should fall down before it does,—as pointed out above; the Air being the same all through, its contact also would be there all through. So there is nothing in this explanation.—(684-685)

The following *Text* states the objections against the Momentum named 'Impression'.

TEXT (686).

THE MOMENTUM CALLED 'IMPRESSION' IS OF THE NATURE OF AN IMPRESS ON THE MIND. IT CANNOT BE A QUALITY OF THE SOUL; BECAUSE THIS HAS BEEN REJECTED.—(686)

COMMENTARY.

If Impression is postulated only in a general way as the cause of Remembrance, then the argument proves what is already admitted and is therefore futile. Because it is already admitted (by us) that the cause of Remembrance consists in *Impression* which is a form of the Mind itself,

being a potency produced in it by a previous apprehension; this is known by the name of '*Vāsanā*', 'Conception'.—If what is meant to be proved is Impression as a Quality of the Soul, then, as such an impression will never have been found to be concomitant with Remembrance, the Reason would be Inconclusive; and the Conclusion also would be one that is annulled by Inference. And inasmuch as its intended substratum, the Soul, has already been discarded before, and hence cannot exist, its quality also would be non-existent.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a number of things subsist in another thing, they can have no subsistence if the latter thing is non-existent,—e.g. the picture cannot exist if the wall is not there;—and under the Opposite party's view, the Momentum in question is subsistent in the Soul;—hence there is found in it a character that is contrary to what is concomitant with the Probandum. Hence what is desired is not proved. Specially as the Soul itself has been previously discarded. Thus the net result of the means of Right Cognition bearing upon the matter is that Impression should be regarded as being of the nature of an impress upon the Mind, and not a quality of the Soul. The sense is that while the former view is supported by proofs, the latter is not so supported.—(686)

The following *Text* points out objections against the third kind of Momentum (i.e. Elasticity):—

TEXT (687).

THERE CAN BE NO SUCH QUALITY AS 'ELASTICITY', BECAUSE THINGS ARE IN A 'PERPETUAL FLUX', AND HENCE NOTHING CAN BE LASTING (*sthita*); IF THERE WERE ANY SUCH THING, IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXIST IN THAT SAME FORM.—(687)

[The name of this Quality appears throughout in this work in the form '*Sthitasthāpaka*', though the form in which it is known from the *Nyāya-Vaishēṣika* books is '*Sthitisthāpaka*'. That the former form is not an error of the copyist or the printer is clear from this *Text*, where the first term in the compound is clearly stated to be '*sthita*'.]

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the '*Sthita*', 'lasting', thing, of which this Quality is said to be the '*Sthāpaka*', 're-establisher',—is that thing by itself *not-lasting*? Or is it by itself *lasting*? Only these two alternatives are possible.—If it is *not-lasting*, then as in a moment it will have ceased to exist, what would be there which the Quality in question would *re-establish*? On the other hand, if it is, by itself, *lasting*,—then, if the thing in question would be existent,—then, as all existing things continue to exist in their own form,—i.e. without deviating from it,—the thing would continue in the same form; and in that case, what would be the need for assuming a 're-establisher' of it, which would have nothing to do?—(687)

It might be argued that—"Even though all things are momentary, as each of them would exist for a moment, and would continue in the con-

tinuous 'Chain',—it is in regard to this that the Quality in question is said to function",—then, the answer is as follows :—

TEXT (688).

THE MOMENTARY EXISTENCE OF A THING CONSISTS MERELY IN ITS BEING PRODUCED FROM ITS CAUSE; AND THE 'CONTINUITY IN THE CHAIN' ALSO (OF EVERY SUCCEEDING THING) IS DUE TO BEING PRODUCED FROM EACH PRECEDING THING.—(688)

COMMENTARY.

Momentary things are admitted to exist only as being produced from their causes; and what is called their '*sthiti*', 'status', consists only in their *acquiring their own selves*,—and not in their taking up their form subsequently to their having acquired their status; as by themselves all things are momentary, and hence incapable of *staying* at any time subsequent to their coming into existence.—Or, if the thing did so exist, it would never cease to exist, it should be there as before; and even subsequently, it would remain the same; or else, it would have to renounce its own nature. —In the 'Chain', the production of each succeeding Product is due to the immediately preceding cause. So that even here, there is nothing that could be done by the Momentum in question.—(688)

Says the Opponent—"Well then, the Momentum in question would establish what is *not-momentary*".

Answer :—

TEXTS (689-690).

[WHAT IS NOT-MOMENTARY] DOES NOT APPEAR IN ANY OTHER FORM ;—OF WHAT THEN COULD THE MOMENTUM BE THE 'ESTABLISHER'?—NOR HAS THIS MOMENTUM BEEN FOUND TO HAVE CAUSAL CHARACTER; THE CAUSE THEN MAY CONSIST OF THIS MOMENTUM OR SOMETHING ELSE. FURTHER, THE MOMENTUM IN QUESTION HAS BEEN HELD TO BE A QUALITY THAT RE-ESTABLISHES WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY PRODUCED,—SUCH FOR EXAMPLE, AS THE *Cloth*.—WHAT THEREFORE HAS BEEN CALLED A 'QUALITY' AND 'MOMENTUM' IS NOT POSSIBLE.—(689-690)

COMMENTARY.

It has been already pointed out that the thing that is *not-momentary* can never become otherwise than it is, and hence its *status* is there always,—

so that there would be nothing to be *established* by the quality in question, *establisher of status*, Elasticity.

It might be argued that—" The Quality may not be the *establisher* ; it may be the *producer* of the *Moment* itself ".

The answer to this is that *this Momentum has not been found to have causal character* ; the conviction regarding the reality of the truth about things is always dependent upon the Means of Right Cognition ; and as a matter of fact the causal character of Momentum,—as something different from well-known causes—is not definitely recognised in things like the Cloth, by Perception and Non-apprehension,—or as something different from the ordinary effects, as in the organs like the eyes ; hence the notion in question cannot be based upon any such character.

If it be argued that—" even though its causal potency has not been perceived, yet the fact of its being the Cause might be presumed ".

If that be so, then Momentum, or anything else, like the Parrot, the Crane, etc., might be the Cause,—i.e. presumed to be as such. The fact of its not being perceived does not constitute a positive peculiar feature, by virtue of which it could be only by presuming the Momentum,—and nothing else,—even though its potency has not been perceived,—that you should be satisfied.

As a matter of fact, the Momentum in question has not been held by you to be the cause of *production* ; in fact it is held to be a quality in a thing—e.g. the Cloth is already produced, which re-establishes its former status ; and in this it is of no use, as already explained above.—And it is on admitting (for argument's sake) the possibility of its being the cause of production, that the above objection has been urged ; the idea being that there may be some one who may cross beyond the limits of even his own doctrine.

The last sentence—' *What therefore, etc. etc.* '—sums up all that has been said above.—(689-690)

The Author next points out objections against the Qualities of ' Merit and Demerit ' :—

TEXT (691).

Mind, Mind's Contact AND THE SOUL HAVING BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISCARDED,—THERE CAN BE NO ' UNSEEN FORCE ' OF THE KINDS POSTULATED BY THE OTHER PARTY.—(691)

COMMENTARY.

" The *Unseen Force* (Destiny) is what brings the fruits of an act to its Doer,—it is a Quality of the Soul,—is produced by the contact of the Soul and Mind,—and is destroyed by its own effect ; it is of two kinds—the two kinds being *Merit* and *Demerit* ; of these *Merit* becomes the cause of the Doer's happiness, welfare and liberation ; and *Demerit* becomes the cause of his unhappiness, calamities and sin."

Such is the account of the *Unseen Force* provided by the other party.

Inasmuch as the Soul, the Mind, and the contact of these—which have been regarded as the cause of the said Force,—have been already rejected before,—there can be no Cause for the said Force ; and hence it is concluded that it cannot be existent.

As regards *Sound*, that has been held to be the Quality of *Ākāsha*,—it has been already rejected above, when it came under review, apart from its proper place. Hence objections against it are not repeated here.—(691)

End of Chapter XI.

CHAPTER XII.

Examination of the Category of 'Action'.

COMMENTARY.

The Author next proceeds to set forth the objections against the *Vaishēṣika* category of '*Karma*', *Action* :—

TEXT (692).

IN THINGS THAT ARE IN A 'PERPETUAL FLUX', ANY ACTION, IN THE SHAPE OF 'THROWING UP' AND THE LIKE, IS IMPOSSIBLE ; BECAUSE IT CEASES AT THE VERY PLACE WHERE IT IS BORN, AND HENCE IT CANNOT GET AT ANY OTHER PLACE.—(692)

COMMENTARY.

"The *Sūtra* on this point is—'*Going up, going down, contracting, expanding* and *moving*—are the five Actions'.—Of these, *going up* is that act which is the cause of the Conjunction and Disjunction with upper and lower space (respectively). That is to say, when, by virtue of effort and such other agencies, there arises,—in some part of the body, or in some such solid substance as the clod of Earth which is connected with the body,—an action which becomes the cause of the conjunction of that thing (Limb or Clod) with the upper layers of *Ākāsha*, and also of its Disjunction with the lower layers of it,—that Action is called '*going up*'.—The Action which is the cause of effects contrary to these is '*going down*'.—When a straight object becomes curved, this Action is called 'contracting'; as has been thus described :—When of a straight object like the arm, the foreparts in the shape of the Finger and the rest, become disjoined (separated) from the points of *Ākāsha* with which they have been in contact,—while the hind part still remains in contact with those points,—then the whole object in the shape of the Arm becomes *curved*; and this action is called 'Contracting'.—When the Conjunction and Disjunction appear in a manner contrary to the one thus described, the whole object becomes straightened again; this Action is called 'Expanding'.—That which becomes the cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions with several stray objects in diverse places, is the Action called 'Going'.—The first four forms of Action are the cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions with well-defined parts of Space and *Ākāsha*, while *Going* brings about Conjunctions and Disjunctions with sundry points in space in various directions.—Thus there are only five kinds of Action. Such other actions as Going Round, Flowing, Evacuating and the like are all included under

'Going'.—All these five kinds of Action are established as having their existence indicated by such effects as Conjunction and Disjunction subsisting in solid objects. Conjunction and Disjunction are the effects common to all Actions ; this is what establishes the existence of the effects of Action. It is proved by direct Perception also ; as has been thus described—'Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority and Action subsist in coloured (solid) objects, and hence are perceptible to the Eye' (*Vaishēṣika-sūtra*)."

Such in brief is the scheme of the other Party.

As regards this, Conjunction and Disjunction having been already rejected, what has been put forward as the 'Effect' of Action cannot be admitted. If what is put forward as the Reason for postulating Action is its effect in the shape of such *Conjunction and Disjunction* as consist of *being produced in juxtaposition* and so forth,—even so, the Reason would be 'fallible' (and Inconclusive) ; because the concomitance of such Conjunction and Disjunction with *Action* is in nowise admitted (or proved).—On the other hand, the Reason is concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum ; so that it is also 'Contradictory'.—If merely the existence of a Cause is meant to be proved, then the Reasoning is superfluous ; because the fact of Air and such other things being the cause of the said Conjunction and Disjunction is accepted by us also.—If a particular character (of the Cause) be meant to be proved, then the Conclusion is annulled by Inference. For instance, when the Action appears in a Substance, does it appear in a momentary substance ? Or in a non-momentary (permanent) substance ? It cannot appear in the momentary substance, because it ceases to exist—becomes destroyed—at the very spot where it comes into existence, and hence it cannot get at any other spot. This Inference may be formulated as follows:—When a thing ceases to exist at a certain spot, it cannot subsequently get at any other spot,—e.g. the Lamp and such things ;—all the things in question do cease at the very spot where they come into existence ;—hence there is an apprehension which is contrary to a character wider than the one desired to be proved (by the opposite party).—(692)

The following *Text* shows that the Reason set forth (by the Buddhist, in the Inference just cited) is not 'Fallible' (or Inconclusive) :—

TEXT (693).

THE OTHER PARTY ALSO HAVE ASSERTED THAT THE TIME OF ACTION IS SUBSEQUENT TO THE TIME OF THE BIRTH OF THE OBJECT,—EVEN IN SUCH THINGS AS THE LAMP-FLAME, WHICH ARE ADMITTED (BY HIM ALSO) TO BE FLEETING IN THEIR CHARACTER.—(693)

COMMENTARY.

Some things are admitted to be fleeting in their character ;—e.g. the Lamp-flame is admitted to be something which ceases very quickly ; and

even in these, Action appears only *after* they are born,—i.e. come into existence; and have been held to last only for 'six moments', and only to that extent, *not-momentary* (lasting).—(693)

The following *Text* shows how this is so—

TEXTS (694-695).

(1) (AT THE FIRST MOMENT) THERE IS CONTACT WITH THE CAUSE,—
(2) THEN THE APPEARANCE OF THE GENERIC CHARACTER,—
THEN (3) SOME COMMOTION IN THE PARTS OF THE OBJECT,
—THEN (4) THE DISRUPTION OF THE PARTS,—THEN
(5) THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CONTACT,—THEN
(6) THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OBJECT;—IN
THIS WAY, EVEN IN THE CASE OF THE
LAMP-FLAME AND SUCH THINGS, WHAT
HAS BEEN HELD IS THAT THEY LAST
FOR *six moments* ONLY.—
(694-695)

COMMENTARY.

For instance: (1) what comes first is the moment of contact with the Cause,—(2) then the moment of the appearance of the generic character of the Thing produced,—(3) then action among the component parts,—then (4) the moment of disjunction of the Composite,—then (5) the destruction of the Conjunction that produced the object,—then (6) the destruction of the object itself;—in this way, in the case of things like the Lamp-flame, what has been held is that they last for *six moments* only. Thus, there being no momentary object (for the Opponent) which could have any action, the Action of all active objects must be such as appears *after* the birth of the objects.—So that our Reason is not 'unproven', as there can be nothing else that could be momentary (for the other party).—(694-695)

It might be asked—"Even if we admit the momentary character of Things, why cannot their action appear at the time of their birth?"

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXTS (696-697).

IT IS ONLY WHEN THERE IS SEPARATION FROM THE POSTERIOR SPOT, AND CONTACT WITH THE FRONTAL SPOT, THAT THE OBJECT MAY BE ASSUMED TO BE 'GOING' ('IN MOTION'), OR TO BE THE SUBSTRATUM OF ANY OTHER ACTION. WHEN THE MOBILE PERSON DOES NOT LAST EVEN FOR A MOMENT,—EVEN THOUGH SUCH A PERSON BE EXTREMELY SMALL, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF PASSING OVER TO ANOTHER SPOT REMOVED BY THE MINUTEST POINT.—(696-697)

COMMENTARY.

When it is possible for an object to become separated from the place behind it,—and to come into contact with the place before it, then it can be said to be 'going'; or for another thing, to be the substratum of such actions as *Expanding* and the rest; all this cannot be said in regard to any other things —such as *Ākāsha*.—The object that lasts only for one moment however cannot be so long as to admit of its abandoning the place behind it and then passing over to that before it; because at the moment of its existence itself it is within the clutches of disappearance (destruction); and as such it is unable to pass over to the other place.—Hence no Action is possible even at the time of the birth (of the object). Nor is it possible at either of the two ends; because at the time in question, this cannot be determined. Thus then, as regards the object which does not last even for a single moment,—the possibility of its passing over to a remote place may rest awhile; it is not possible for it to pass over even the minutest space. Under the circumstances, how can there be any Action in what is *momentary*?—(696-697)

Nor can there be Action in a *non-momentary* object;—this is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (698).

IN CASE THE OBJECT IS SOMETHING *lasting*, 'GOING' AND THE REST ARE ALL IMPOSSIBLE; BECAUSE SUCH AN OBJECT SHOULD REMAIN THE SAME UNDER ALL CONDITIONS.—(698)

COMMENTARY.

That object is said to be '*non-momentary*' which remains in the same form always; it is all the more impossible for any Action to appear in such an object; as, like *Ākāsha*, it remains always in the same condition.—This argument may be thus formulated:—If an object remains always the same, it can have no Action,—as in the case of *Ākāsha*;—the object regarded as 'non-momentary' is always of the same condition;—hence there is appre-

hension of something contrary to what is wider (than the Conclusion of the Opponent).—(698)

The following might be urged :—" Even if the non-momentary object is always the same,—inasmuch as, by its very nature, it has the form of the 'moving entity',—it could have Action; hence our Reason is not Inconclusive".

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXTS (699-700).

IF THE ACTION OF *Going* AND THE REST CONSTITUTED THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE 'MOVING ENTITY',—THEN, THIS LATTER COULD NOT STAY IMMOBILE FOR EVEN A SINGLE MOMENT; BECAUSE EVEN WHEN THE *Going*, ETC. ARE NOT THERE, THEY SHOULD CERTAINLY BE THERE,—INASMUCH AS THE OBJECT HAS NOT RENOUNCED ITS PREVIOUS FORM, AND IS EXACTLY AS IT WAS AT THE TIME OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE *Going*, ETC.—(699-700)

COMMENTARY.

If such objects as *Devadatta* and the like, which are held to be *non-momentary*, were, by their very nature, connected with the Actions of *Going*, *Throwing up* and the rest,—then, they should never stand unmoving; as the *Going nature* would always be there. Hence in the case of these, Devadatta, etc., who are endowed with the action of *Going*,—even when there is no *Going*—i.e. even when they are standing immobile,—the said actions of *Going*, etc. should be there,—just as at the time of the appearance of those acts; because the objects will not have abandoned their previous form or nature.—(699-700)

TEXTS (701-702).

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE OBJECTS WERE, BY THEIR NATURE, OF THE NATURE OF THE 'IMMOBILE ENTITY',—THEN *absence of going* SHOULD BE THERE ALWAYS, AND THERE WOULD BE NO MOVEMENT OF ANY KIND EVEN FOR A MOMENT. BECAUSE, EVEN WHEN *going* MIGHT BE THERE, THE OBJECT WOULD STILL BE OF THE NATURE OF THE 'IMMOBILE ENTITY',—BECAUSE IT WILL NOT HAVE RENOUNCED ITS PREVIOUS NATURE,—JUST AS AT THE TIME WHEN IT WAS NOT MOVING.—(701-702)

COMMENTARY.

If, from fear of the above criticism, it be held that the object, by its nature, is *immobile*,—then the *absence of going*, etc. should be there always ; because the object is of the same form always,—like *Ākāsha*.

The particle '*ādi*', 'etc.'; is meant to include the actions of *Throwing up* and the rest.

Under such circumstances, even when there would be actual *going*, etc., the object would be *immobile*; because it has not renounced its *immobile nature,*—exactly as in the unmoving condition.

'*Praspanda*' is Action.

In the term '*nishchalātmakakālavat*', the '*Vati*'—affix has been added to the compound with the Locative ending—[the meaning being 'as *at* the time, etc. etc.']—(701-702)

It might be argued that—"it is not of the same form; it is of both forms, *going* (mobile) and *not-going* (immobile); hence the criticism urged is not applicable; and the Reason too is 'unproven'."

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (703).

IF THE OBJECT WERE *mobile* AT ONE TIME AND *immobile* AT ANOTHER' THEN, INASMUCH AS TWO MUTUALLY DIFFERENT CHARACTERS WOULD BE THERE, IT WOULD BE TWO DIFFERENT OBJECTS.—(703)

COMMENTARY.

The '*cha*' after '*ēkadā*' should be construed after '*punaḥ*'.

What is meant is that, in the manner suggested, as the mutually contradictory characters of *mobility* and *immobility* would be imposed upon it, the object would cease to be *one*.—(703)

The following *Text* shows that for the above reason, it becomes established that the object is *momentary* :—

TEXT (704).

IT IS CLEARLY SEEN THAT THE TWO ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT; BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES;—LIKE TWO THINGS OF WHICH ONE IS MOVING AND ANOTHER NOT MOVING.—(704)

COMMENTARY.

'*The two*'—i.e. things in the *mobile* and *immobile* states.

'*Like two things, etc. etc.*',—i.e. such things as the Creeper (moving) and the Mountain (not moving).—(704)

Having thus established the annulment of the Opponent's conclusion by *Inference*, the Author proceeds to show that it is annulled by *Perception* also :—

TEXT (705).

THE ACTION THAT IS REGARDED AS *visible* IS NOTHING DIFFERENT FROM THE *object*. EVEN SUCH EXISTENCE OF IT AS WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH REASON, IS NEVER ACTUALLY PERCEIVED.—(705)

COMMENTARY.

If a perceptible thing is not perceived, it comes to be regarded by intelligent men as 'non-existent';—as Cloth not perceived at a certain place;—and *Action* is never perceived as apart from the Colour, etc. (of the object);—hence this is a reason for regarding it as naturally not-perceived (and hence non-existent). As a matter of fact, Action never becomes manifest in any Sense-perception, as anything apart from the Colour, etc. of the object as produced in a different position. As regards such notions associated with verbal expressions, as 'Throwing up', 'Throwing down' and the like,—they cannot be *Perception*, for the very reason that they are associated with verbal expression. Nor are they compatible with reason, if taken as associated with a distinct category in the shape of 'Action'; because what are really seen are only the *Colour*, etc. as produced under certain conditions; and the verbal expressions (names) also are applied only to these latter, in accordance with Convention.—This has just been explained, when it was pointed out that no movement is possible in things either permanent or impermanent.

Thus it is not proved, as asserted, that the existence of Action is proved by Perception itself.—(705)

The above arguments are summed up in the following—

TEXT (706).

THUS 'GOING' AND THE REST ARE IMPOSSIBLE EITHER IN PERMANENT OR IMPERMANENT THINGS; BECAUSE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THEM EITHER TO BE SEPARATED FROM THEIR FORMER PLACE, OR TO GET AT ANOTHER PLACE.—(706)

COMMENTARY.

'*Thus*',—i.e. because it has been discarded by Inference and Perception, as just shown above.

'*Because it is not possible, etc. etc.*';—i.e. because separation from the former place is not possible; and because junction with another place is not possible. The words are to be construed in the respective order.—(706)

Question—"If this is so, then how is it that people speak of *Going*?"
Answer;—

TEXT (707).

THE NOTION OF 'GOING' IS AN ILLUSION,—AS IN THE LAMP-FLAME,—DUE TO THE APPEARANCE OF DIFFERENT BUT SIMILAR THINGS BEING FOUND CONSECUTIVELY IN DIVERSE PLACES.—(707)

COMMENTARY.

'*Different but similar things*';—'different' and 'similar' are compounded first,—then that compound is compounded with 'things'.—Of these different and similar things,—there is *appearance* (birth)—which is *consecutive*,—i.e. in a place other than that of its own Cause,—when such *appearance* is seen, there arises, from it, the notion that it is 'going';—just as in the case of the *Lamp-flame*, when it is being carried by someone, there appears the notion that 'the Lamp-flame is moving'; while certainly the same Lamp-flame does not move from one place to another; because it has been held (even by the *Vaishēṣika*) to last for *six moments* only. Further, what is called the 'birth' (appearance) of a thing consists in mere *Being*, entirely devoid of any preceding or succeeding end; and the apprehension of such 'birth' or 'appearance' is only natural.

Or '*janmanaḥ*' may be construed as *Ablative*;—the sense being—'*because* things are born consecutively, therefore different and similar things are perceived in different places'.—(707)

End of Chapter on 'Action'.

CHAPTER XIII.

Examination of 'Sāmānya', the 'Universal'.

With the following *Text* the Author begins the criticism of the Category of 'The Universal':—

TEXT (708).

'SUBSTANCE' AND OTHER CATEGORIES HAVING BEEN REJECTED, THE 'UNIVERSALS' ALSO HAVE BECOME REJECTED; AS THEY HAVE ALL BEEN ASSUMED TO SUBSIST IN THE THREE CATEGORIES.—(708)

COMMENTARY.

'*The Universals*',—i.e. the Genuses. These are held to be subsistent in the three Categories,—Substance, Quality and Action; and hence become discarded by the rejection of these Categories themselves; as without the Substratum, the Subsistent cannot exist anywhere; for if it did, it would not be *subsistent* at all.

The mention of the 'Universal' is only by way of an illustration; the *Ultimate Individualities* also are held to be *subsistent*, as subsisting in Ultimate Substances; hence these also become discarded by the rejection of their substratum.—(708)

Even though the 'Universal' has been discarded, yet the Author is desirous of putting forward special objections against it; and as until the character of the thing is known, a criticism of it is not possible, he proceeds to describe the character of the 'Universal' and the 'Particular':—

TEXTS (709–711).

THE 'UNIVERSAL' IS POSTULATED BY THE OTHER PARTY IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: "IT IS OF TWO KINDS—'BEING' IS A 'UNIVERSAL' WHICH IS 'UNIVERSAL' ONLY,—AS IT PERVADES OVER ALL THINGS; 'SUBSTANCE' AND THE REST, WHILE BEING 'UNIVERSALS', ARE ALSO SPOKEN OF AS 'PARTICULARS'; BECAUSE IN REGARD TO THEIR OWN SUBSTRATA, THEY BECOME THE CAUSE OF THEIR COMPREHENSIVE NOTION, AND ALSO SERVE TO DIFFERENTIATE THEIR SUBSTRATA FROM ALL THINGS BELONGING TO OTHER 'UNIVERSALS';—AND IN THIS WAY THEY ALSO BECOME THE CAUSE OF THE EXCLUSIVE NOTION OF THOSE SUBSTRATA."—(709–711)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Universal' is of two kinds—the *Higher* and the *Lower*; 'Being' is the highest 'Universal'; it is called 'Universal', 'common', because it

forms the basis of only a comprehensive notion in regard to all its three substrata—Substance, Quality and Action; for this same reason it is not a 'Particular' at all.

The Lower kind of 'Universal' is in the form of 'Substance', 'Action' and so forth; this kind is called 'Universal' (Genus, Class) in so far as it is the basis of the comprehensive notion of its substrata, in the shape of Substances, etc.;—and though being 'Universal', it is also called 'Particular', in so far as it serves as the basis of the exclusive notion of its substratum as distinguished from things belonging to other 'Universals'. For instance, in regard to *Quality*, there arise such exclusive notions as 'it is not-Substance', 'it has no qualities' and so forth; and the cause (basis) of these must consist in such 'Universals' as 'Substance' and 'Quality',—not in anything else; because there are no such things as 'not-Substance' and so forth. There is no incongruity in the same thing being both 'universal' and 'particular', when it is taken relatively to other things. This is what the Text means.—(709–711)

The Author states the definition of 'Ultimate Individuality', as provided by the other party:—

TEXT (712).

"THERE ARE SOME 'PARTICULARS' WHICH SERVE AS THE BASIS OF 'EXCLUSION' ONLY; THESE HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS 'ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES SUBSISTING IN ETERNAL SUBSTANCES'."—(712)

COMMENTARY.

There are some 'Particulars' which are held to be 'Particulars' only, not 'Universals'; *because they serve as the basis of exclusion*—i.e. of 'exclusive notion'—only.

"Which are these?"

Answer—'*These have been defined, etc. etc.*';—it has been declared (in the *Vaishēṣika-Sūtra*) that—"*Ultimate Individualities* subsisting in eternal Substances are the ultimate (differentias)".—'*Subsisting in eternal Substances*',—i.e. subsisting in Atoms, *Ākāsha*, Time, Space, Soul and Mind. As *Atoms* are the two *ends*—beginning and end—of the Universe,—and liberated Souls and liberated Minds continue to exist till the end of the Birth-rebirth-Cycle, and hence forming one *end*,—the Specific Individualities subsisting in them have been called 'ultimate'; specially as it is only in these that the said Individualities are more clearly perceived. Their Subsistence too is always in the eternal Substance, like the Atom. This is the reason why they have been described both as 'ultimate' and as 'subsisting in eternal Substances'.—These are called '*Vishēṣa*', 'Specific Individualities', because they serve as the basis of the absolute exclusion of the eternal Substances from one another, and hence serve to 'specify', 'distinguish', their substratum from everything else.—(712)

The question arising—" How is the existence of these *Specific Individualities* proved ? "—the following answer is given :—

TEXT (713).

" INASMUCH AS IT IS ON THE STRENGTH OF THESE THAT MYSTICS HAVE THE NOTIONS,—IN CONNECTION WITH THE ATOM AND OTHER ETERNAL SUBSTANCES,—THAT ' THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT ',—THESE ARE REGARDED AS SUBSISTING IN EACH OF THESE SUBSTANCES."—(713)

COMMENTARY.

It is found that people like ourselves have, in regard to the Ox,—the notion of the ' Ox ' as distinguished from the ' Horse ', through the presence of a particular shape, qualities, action and constituents,—these notions appearing in the form respectively of ' the Ox, white, fast moving, fat-humped, with a large bell ' ;—in the same manner, in people different from us, such as Mystics, there appears,—in regard to each of the eternal objects, Atoms, Liberated Souls and Liberated Minds,—the exclusive notion that ' this is different from that ' ; and also when the same object is seen at another time and place, there is recognition of it as ' this is the same ' ; of such notions there being no other basis,—that to which they are due is held to consist in the ' ultimate Specific Individualities ', whose existence is inferred from the peculiar experience of the Mystics.—Each of these Individualities subsists in its own substratum, and their existence is proved by the direct perception of the Mystics.—(713)

Question—How is the existence of ' Universals ' (Genuses, Communities) proved ?

Answer :—

TEXT (714).

" SUCH ' UNIVERSALS ' (COMMUNITIES, GENUSES) AS ' BEING ', ' COW ' AND THE LIKE ARE VOUCHED FOR BY DIRECT PERCEPTION ; AS THE NOTION OF ' BEING ' AND THE REST ARE FOUND TO APPEAR ONLY WHEN THE SENSE-ORGANS ARE FUNCTIONING."—(714)

COMMENTARY.

It is a well-established principle that when one thing follows the presence and absence of another thing, the former proceeds from the latter ;—in regard to Substance and the rest, the appearance of the notion of ' Being ' (Existence), etc. follows the presence and absence of the functioning of the Sense-organs ;

wherefore then could the said notion not be regarded as produced by the Sense-organs,—just like any other Cognition through the Sense-organs? If it were not so regarded, then it would lead to an absurdity.—(714)

The following *Text* seeks to prove the existence of 'Specific Individualities' by means of Inference also :—

TEXT (715).

"THE EXISTENCE OF THESE IS COGNISED BY MEANS OF INFERENCE ALSO: A DISTINCTIVE NOTION MUST BE DUE TO A DIFFERENT CAUSE."—(715)

COMMENTARY.

'*A distinctive notion*'—a notion of a kind different from that of things like Substance, etc.

'*Due to a different cause*',—whose birth is due to other causes.

The inference may be thus formulated :—When one notion is different in form from another, it must be due to a cause other than the latter,—like the notion of 'Colour' in regard to the Cloth, the Leather and the Blanket ;—of this same kind is the notion of 'being' in regard to Substance, etc. ;—hence this is a natural reason [for assuming a different cause for it, in the form of the 'Universal'].—Such is the view of the other Party (the *Nyāya-Vaishēṣika*).—(715)

The sense of the same argument is shown by setting forth the arguments propounded by *Bhāvivikta* :—

TEXTS (716–720).

(A) "IN REGARD TO THE COW AND THE ELEPHANT, THE PECULIARITIES OF NAME—'COW' AND 'ELEPHANT',—AND IDEAS—MUST BE DUE TO CAUSES OTHER THAN CONVENTION, SHAPE, BODY, ETC.,—BECAUSE WHILE APPERTAINING TO THE COW AND THE ELEPHANT, THEY ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE NAMES AND IDEAS OF THESE LATTER ;—JUST LIKE THE NAMES AND IDEAS 'WITH CALF' AND 'WITH THE GOAD' (RESPECTIVELY) AS APPLIED TO THE SAME COW AND ELEPHANT. THE QUALIFYING CLAUSE HAS BEEN ADDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCLUDING THE 'HARE'S HORNS' AND SUCH OTHER NON-ENTITIES. THE NAME AND IDEA OF THE OTHER THINGS ARE THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE *per* DISSIMILARITY.

(B) "THE IDEA PERVADING OVER ALL COWS PROCEEDS FROM SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE BODY OF THE COW,—BECAUSE IT APPEARS AS A DIFFERENTIATOR,—LIKE THE IDEA OF THE 'BLUE' AND THE LIKE.

(C) "THE 'UNIVERSAL' *Cow* IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE 'INDIVIDUAL' *Cow*,—BECAUSE IT FORMS THE OBJECT OF A DIFFERENT IDEA;—LIKE THE IDEA OF THE COLOUR AND OTHER QUALITIES OF THE SAME *Cow*,—ALSO BECAUSE IT (THE UNIVERSAL) IS SPOKEN OF AS BELONGING TO THAT (THE INDIVIDUAL),—JUST AS THE HORSE IS SPOKEN OF AS BELONGING TO *Chaitra*."—(716–720)

COMMENTARY.

Bhāvivikta has argued as follows:—"In regard to such things as the Cow, Horse, Buffalo, Boar, Elephant, etc., the peculiarities of Name—'Cow', etc.—and Idea must be due to a cause related to the form of each animal, but different from such causes as Convention, Shape, Body and the like;—this is the Pronouncement (of the Conclusion).—[The Reason is this]—Because while appertaining to the Cow, etc., they are Names and Ideas different from the Names and Ideas of the Body, etc.;—just like such peculiar Names and Ideas relating to the same animals as—'the Cow with the calf', 'the Bullock with the load', 'the Boar with the dart', 'the Elephant with the goad' and so forth.—The Corroborative Instances *per dissimilarity* are the Names and Ideas of the forms of the Body and other things.—It follows from this that this 'other cause' must be the 'Universals', 'Cow', 'Elephant' and so forth."

The term '*abhidhāna*' stands for *Name*;—'*prajñāna*' for *Idea*, Cognition;—the peculiarities in the shape of these two are meant by the compound '*abhidhānaprajñānavishēṣāḥ*'.

'*Samaya*' is *Convention*;—'*Ākṛti*'—Shape;—'*Piṇḍa*'—Body;—the term '*etc.*' includes *Colour* and such details. Different from these are the Causes related to and in keeping with the Form of each of the animals in regard to its Name and Idea.

Or the compound may mean that the Causes of the names and notions of 'Being' and the rest are different from Convention and the rest. The rest being understood as before.

'*Proclamation*'—Proposition, Conclusion.

In order to avoid the 'fallibility' due to the Reason otherwise applying to non-entities like the Hare's Horn (which also has a distinct Name and Idea relating to it),—the qualification has been added in the form '*while appertaining to the Cow, etc.*'.

The compound setting forth the Reason is to be expounded as—'Because they have Names and Ideas different from the Names and Ideas relating to the Body, etc.'. The 'Names and Ideas of the Body' serve as the Corroborative Instance *per dissimilarity*; as in this instance, the *presence of a cause*

other than the Names and Ideas of the Body is absent ; and hence the Reason adduced is also absent in them.

Uddyotakara [under *Nyāyavārtika* on 2. 2. 61, page 319 *et seq.*] has stated the argument as follows :—" The Idea pervading over all Cows proceeds from a Cause other than the Body, etc.,—because it appears as a differentiator,—like the Idea of the *Blue*, etc.—Or again, the 'Universal' *Cow* is something different from the *individual* Cow,—because it is the object of a different Idea,—like Colour and Touch, etc.,—also because it is spoken of as belonging to this latter,—just as the Horse is spoken of as belonging to *Chaitra*, and as something different from *Chaitra*."

All these arguments have been set forth in these Texts. They are easily intelligible.—(716-720)

The Author answers all these arguments in the following—

TEXTS (721-722).

ALL THIS HAS NO ESSENCE IN IT ; IT IS AN ELABORATION OF A MERE THEORY ; THERE IS NO EVIDENCE AT ALL IN SUPPORT OF IT. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE NOTIONS OF 'BEING', ETC. ARE NOT FOUND TO PROCEED FROM THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SENSE-ORGANS ; THEY ARISE FROM A BODY OF CONVENTIONS.—(721-722)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued (under *Text* 714, above) that the fact of the notions of 'Being', etc. being of the nature of Sense-perception is deduced from the presence of the operation of Sense-organs.—If, by the Reason here adduced, it is meant that the said notions follow immediately after the operation of the Senses,—then it cannot be 'admitted' ; because as they are of the nature of 'determinate Cognitions', the body of Conventions (bearing upon the verbal expression) must interpose (between the Sense-operation and the resultant Determinate Cognition).—(721-722)

It might be urged—" without a comprehensive *something*, how can mutually distinct entities become the basis, directly or indirectly, of the notion of identity or unity ? "

In anticipation of this question, the Author supplies the following explanation :—

TEXTS (723–726).

IN THE CASE OF THE *Dhātrī*, *Harītakī*, ETC., IT IS FOUND THAT THERE IS PRESENT IN THEM, EITHER SINGLY OR COLLECTIVELY, THE POTENCY TO REMOVE VARIOUS DISEASES; AND YET THERE IS NO 'UNIVERSAL' (COMMUNITY) IN THEM WHICH HAS THAT POTENCY; BECAUSE THE CURE OF THE DISEASES IS FOUND TO BE QUICK AND DELAYED.—NOR CAN ANY DIVERSE PECULIAR PROPERTIES BE PRODUCED IN THE 'UNIVERSAL', THROUGH THE DIVERSITIES OF THE SOIL, ETC. BECAUSE IT REMAINS ALWAYS IN ONE AND THE SAME FORM; THE SAID DIVERSE PROPERTIES, HOWEVER, ARE PRESENT IN THE *Dhātrī*, ETC.—THUS THOUGH, AS A RULE, THINGS ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT, YET SOME OF THEM HAVING WELL-DEFINED POTENCIES ARE CONCEIVED OF AS *similar*, AND HENCE THESE THINGS BECOME THE BASIS OF THE CONCEPTION OF *similarity*, ETC.,—NOT OTHER THINGS.—(723–726)

COMMENTARY.

Dhātrī and some other fruits, though of entirely different forms, are yet, severally or jointly, endowed with the capacity to remove various diseases,—even without any comprehensive entity embracing them all.—It cannot be right to urge that—" even in this case it is only a comprehensive 'Universal' that does the effective act"; for the simple reason that there is no such common 'Universal' over them capable of performing the various fruitful acts. If there were such a common 'Universal', there could be no possibility of the notion that people have, of the capacity of removing diseases quickly or slowly that is found in only some *Dhātrī*, etc. and that at only certain times; as the 'Universal' would be of only one uniform character.—Nor can it be right to assert that—" the said *Universal* itself performs the diverse fruitful acts, when it acquires certain peculiar properties due to the soil as watered by milk and such things ";—because the 'Universal' is, *ex hypothesi*, eternal, and hence incapable of having any peculiar properties produced by anything else; and hence no such properties could be produced in it by the diversities of Soil and such things; because the 'Universal' is always of one and the same form. As for the *Dhātrī*, etc.; on the other hand, they are evanescent things and hence diverse properties are produced in them by the diversities of Soil, etc.; and hence they become endowed with the diverse potencies of curing diseases.—In the same manner, other things also, like the Jar, are produced out of their Causal Ideas in such forms that by their very nature they come to be conceived of as of one and the same form. Hence there is no difficulty in this case.

The term '*etc.*' in the expression '*the basis of the conception of similarity, etc.*', is meant to include the capacity to perform such fruitful acts as the holding of water and the like.—(723–726)

The question being—" How is it proved that 'the Body of Conventions' comes between (the functioning of the Senses and the appearance of the notions of Names, etc.) ? "—the Answer is provided in the following—

TEXTS (727–729).

ALL THAT THE EXPRESSION 'BEING' (EXISTENCE) IS MEANT TO CONVEY IS ONLY THE IDEA OF *capacity for action*; IT IS IN THIS SENSE THAT THE CONVENTION IS ESTABLISHED, IN REGARD TO THE THINGS IN QUESTION, OR TO ANY OTHER THING, ACCORDING TO THE WHIM (OF PEOPLE).—PERSONS USING THE TERM '*go*' ('OX' OR 'COW') ESTABLISH THE CONVENTION IN REGARD TO THE TERM AS APPLICABLE TO THINGS SERVING SUCH DIVERSE PURPOSES AS *carrying, yielding milk* AND SO FORTH.—THUS IT IS THAT ALL THESE NOTIONS OF 'BEING' AND THE REST ARE FOUND TO PROCEED FROM THE CONCEPTION OF THESE CONVENTIONS, AND NOT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SENSE-ORGANS.—(727–729)

COMMENTARY.

The notions of 'Being' and the rest can never appear in persons who are not cognisant of the Conventions bearing upon those terms; if they did, then there would be no use in establishing the Conventions at all. Thus it is that the makers of Convention apply the term 'existent' (Being), on noticing a certain identity (among things) indicated by the fact of their performing similar functions; and it is in regard to such things that the notion of 'Being' appears.

'*Or to any other thing*';—i.e. of the expression 'Entity'.

Similarly in the case of the terms '*go*' ('Ox' or 'Cow') and the rest, the Convention bearing upon them is made upon their capacity for such actions as *carrying* and the like. Hence, after the Convention has been made, when people come to use the term,—even when the Ox is seen, the previous Convention steps in and the name 'Ox' comes to the mind; and the idea that it 'exists' comes only later in a clear form. In some cases, through repeated use, the whole process passes through the mind so quickly that every step in it is not fully realised; but it is quite clearly distinguished by persons who have used the term for only a short time.

The whole matter is thus summed up:—From all this, it follows that on account of the intervention of the body of Conventions, the notions in question cannot be said to be *directly perceptible*; because it is not reasonable to regard as 'perceived' things that are cognised only indirectly; as such a process would lead to absurdities.—(727–729)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that for the following reason also, the notions of 'Being', etc. are effects of memory, and have to be treated as so many *Remembrances*, and cannot be regarded as 'Perception':—

TEXT (730).

AT FIRST, EVERY COGNITION APPEARS IN A FORM FREE FROM VERBAL EXPRESSION; THEN COMES IN THE BODY OF CONVENTIONS; HENCE THE NOTIONS IN QUESTION PARTAKE OF THE NATURE OF *Remembrance*,—FOR THAT REASON ALSO.—(730)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, there is no Convention bearing upon the 'Specific Peculiarity' (of Things); and it is only after one has seen the entity, prior to its determination, only as a point of 'Specific Peculiarity', free from all contact with verbal expression,—that there follows its Cognition based upon the functioning of the Sense-organ;—then there comes to the mind, the body of Conventions bearing upon that same entity;—then there appear the notions of 'Being' and the rest,—in accordance with the said Conventions,—in regard to the thing that has been seen; and these notions embody all the 'determination' with reference to the thing, and give verbal expression to them. How can these notions escape from being regarded as 'Remembrance'?

'*For that reason also*',—i.e. because they are 'determined' as seen.

'*The notions in question*',—i.e. those of 'Being' and the rest.—(730)

Question—"Whence has this sequence in the appearance of Cognitions been deduced?"

Answer:—

TEXT (731).

IT IS BECAUSE THE PROCESS IS AS DESCRIBED THAT WHEN A MAN HAS HIS MIND TURNED SOMEWHERE ELSE, THERE APPEARS ONLY THE VAGUE APPREHENSION OF THE MERE *thing* APART FROM ALL SPECIFIC PECULIARITIES.—(731)

COMMENTARY.

It is because the notions of 'Being', etc. appear in the above-mentioned sequence, that when a man has his mind fixed elsewhere,—i.e. he is absent-minded,—if he sees a thing lying before himself,—until there come to his mind the conventions and conceptions bearing upon that thing, the first perception that appears is that of the *mere thing, entirely devoid of all specific peculiarities*. If it were not so,—if this first Cognition were in the full-fledged form equipped with the verbal expression and all the rest of it,—then, why should the absent-minded man apprehend the mere thing devoid of all qualifications? It is not possible for two determinate Cognitions with verbal expressions to appear at the same time.

Thus it is proved that the assertion that "the notions of 'Being', etc. are positively and negatively concomitant with direct Sense-functioning" is not true.—(731)

It has been argued above (under *Text* 716) that—"In regard to the Cow and the Elephant, the peculiarities of *Name* and *Idea* must be due to causes other than Convention, etc. etc.".—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (732).

As regards the first Reason adduced,—it is superfluous; as the fact of the notions being brought about by the Body of Conventions is already admitted (by us); and that same Relative (Body of Conventions) is what is positively and negatively concomitant.—(732)

COMMENTARY.

If all that is sought to be proved is the general fact that the notions in question are due to other causes related to the character of the things concerned,—then it is superfluous—proving what is already admitted. Because the Body of Conventions bearing upon the *Cow*, etc. is that *other cause* related to and in keeping with the character of the things; as the said notions appear only when this Body of Conventions is there, and they do not appear when what is there is some heterogeneous Body of Conventions; which shows that it is this Body of Conventions, which is positively and negatively concomitant with them, that is the Cause of the notions in question; as these are found to follow on the wake of the positive and negative concomitance of these Conventions. Thus the attempt to adduce Reasons for this is entirely futile.—(732)

TEXTS (733-734).

If the said 'Body of Convention' is included in the 'Subject' (of the Inference propounded by the Opponent), then the Corroborative Instance cited becomes 'devoid of the Probandum'; as the external things mentioned,—the *Calf* and the *Goad*, etc.—are not the direct causes of the notions; because the Name and such other qualifications have no bearing upon the 'Specific Peculiarity' of things; as the 'Specific Peculiarity' of things is something beyond the reach of Verbal Expression.—(733-734)

COMMENTARY.

If the 'Conventional Conception' is included in the 'Subject' (of the Opponent's Reasoning), and then it is sought to be proved that all these

notions are due to their connection with an eternal and all-embracing Entity named 'Universal', which is apart from all those,—then what has been cited as the Corroborative Instance would be 'devoid of the Probandum'; because the concomitance of the things with such a Probandum has nowhere been perceived. As a matter of fact, the *Calf*, the *Goad* and such things that have been cited as the cause (basis) of the notion of the *Cow* being 'with Calf', or the *Elephant* being 'with the Goad', have not been proved to be so. Specially because when these things—the Calf and the Goad,—revert to the position of their 'Specific Peculiarity', they are not found to be the direct cause of any *Names* and *Ideas*,—for the simple reason that all 'Specific Peculiarity' is, by its very nature, beyond the reach of verbal expression. Thus the Corroborative Instance cited is 'devoid of the Probandum'. —If they be regarded as the *indirect* cause of the notions, then that would lead to an absurdity, because *indirectly*, everything is of use in the producing of everything.—(733-734)

Question—"How is it then that people regard such external things (as the Calf and the Goad) as the cause of the notions (of the Cow being *with the Calf*, and the Elephant being *with the Goad*)?"

TEXT (735).

IN FACT, ALL THESE NOTIONS PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THINGS LIKE THE *Goad*, WHICH CONSIST IN MERE 'IDEA' AND ARE ILLUSORY, ON WHICH 'EXTERNALITY' IS IMPOSED.—(735)

COMMENTARY.

It has been already pointed out that the 'Specific Peculiarity' of Things which forms the root-cause of the Idea of the 'Goad' and such things, is not touched by an 'imposition' (or qualification). As regards the 'Illusory' form of things, it is a mere product of the art of Imagination; it consists in mere 'Idea', and is not an *external* object. People regard it as an '*external* thing', because they are unable to distinguish between what they see and what they imagine, and hence they regard the form cognised as 'external'; so that the external existence of the Goad and such things cannot be admitted.

'*Avalambya*' is to be construed with '*aṅkushādikam*'.

What is meant is that the notions proceed to apply to the Goad, etc. which are purely illusory, which consist in mere 'Idea' and on which the external character is superimposed.

'*Antarmātrā*' is *Buddhi, Idea, Cognition.*—(735)

In the same argument (under 716), the Opponent has introduced the qualification "while pertaining to the Cow". This again is not right; as it cannot exclude anything (and hence is useless as a qualification).—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (736-737).

'THE NEGATION OF ACTION, QUALITY AND NAME' IS ALSO DESCRIBED (BY YOU) AS THE CAUSE OF THE NOTION OF 'NON-EXISTENCE'; HENCE THE QUALIFICATION SERVES NO USEFUL PURPOSE.—THE SAID DESCRIPTION (OF THE CAUSE OF THE NOTION OF NON-EXISTENCE) ALSO IS NOT RIGHT; BECAUSE IF IT IS A CAUSE, THEN IT MUST BE A POSITIVE ENTITY, AS POSSESSING A DEFINITE POTENCY. LASTLY, THE NOTION OF 'NON-EXISTENCE' WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO 'BEING' AND SUCH 'UNIVERSALS' ALSO. —(736-737)

COMMENTARY.

Of the notion of 'non-existence' also, the 'Negation of action, quality and name' has been described as the Cause.—This cannot be right; because what has been said to constitute the character of the 'Cause' is *the potency to produce the effect*;—this Potency can reside only in a Positive Entity; as the Positive Entity alone is characterised by the said Potency. If then, Negation also had the said Potency imposed upon it, how could it not attain the character of the Positive Entity? As the presence of that Potency alone constitutes the nature of the Positive Entity. In this way the Negation would lose its negative character itself. As 'negation' consists only in the cessation of the character of the 'Positive Entity'.

Then again, if 'the negation of Action, Quality and Name' were the Cause of the notion of *Non-existence*, then the notion of being 'non-existent' would apply to 'Being' and other Universals also; as therein also is present 'the negation of Action, Quality and Name'—just as much as in such non-entities as the 'Hare's Horns'.—(736-737)

The following *Text* shows that the Reason cited (by the Opponent under *Text* 716) is 'unproven' (not admitted):—

TEXT (738).

THE FACT OF THE NOTIONS IN QUESTION BEING DIFFERENT FROM THE NOTIONS OF THE BODY, SHAPE, ETC. IS NOT ADMITTED (OR PROVED); HENCE THE REASON PUT FORWARD IS ALSO OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF BEING 'UNPROVEN'.—(738)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the notions of the *Cow* and such things do not have for their objective anything other than the Body, etc. (of the animals); by virtue of which they could be held to be distinct from these latter.—(738)

The Conclusion also (of the Opponent's Argument) is annulled by Inference :—

TEXT (739).

THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION (OF ALL COWS, FOR INSTANCE) MANIFESTS WITHIN ITSELF THE *verbal expression* AND THE CONSTITUENT INDIVIDUALS ; WHILE THE 'UNIVERSAL' IS DESCRIBED AS DEVOID OF ALL TINGE OF *colour, shape* AND *verbal expression.*—(739)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows :—What is meant by you to be proved is the fact that the basis of comprehensive notions consists of something different from the Body, etc. ;—this however is not right ; as no such thing enters into the notions at all ; and also because what does appear in these notions is something quite different, in the shape of Colour, Shape, etc. That is to say, you describe the 'Universal' *Cow* to be devoid of all tinge of *Colour, Shape* and *Verbal Expression* ; and yet the actual Cognition that appears is always apprehended as accompanied by the manifestation of *Colour*, etc. ; how then could the basis of such Cognition consist of what is devoid of *Colour*, etc.? Certainly a Cognition of one form cannot have its basis in something of an entirely different form ; if it did, it would lead to absurdities.

The argument may be formulated as follows :—When a Cognition manifests an object distinct from some other object, it cannot be regarded as apprehending this latter object ;—e.g. the Cognition of *Sound* cannot be regarded as apprehending *Colour* ;—and as a matter of fact, the comprehensive notion manifests within itself *Colour* and the rest which are something different from the pure 'Universal' ;—so that what is actually perceived is contrary to the premiss (cited by the Opponent).

'*Manifests within itself the Verbal Expression, etc. etc.*' ;—'*verbal expression*', i.e. the name 'Cow' ;—'*constituent individuals*', in the form of colour, shape and the rest ; '*avabhasavān*', containing the manifestation of these.

'*Akṣara*', '*Letters*', stands for the verbal expression '*gauḥ*', which is made up of the letters '*ga*', '*au*' and the *Visarga.*—(739)

Shaṅkarasvāmin has argued as follows :—"The 'Universal' *Blue* also is of the form of *Blue* ; if it were not so, then there would be no such comprehensive idea as 'Blue' ; thus the Reason adduced by the Buddhist being *not admitted*, there is no annulment of the Naiyāyika's Conclusion by Inference (as urged in the preceding *Text*, by the Author)."

This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (740–742).

IF THE 'UNIVERSAL' ALSO WERE IN THE FORM OF 'BLUE', THEN, WHAT WOULD BE ITS DIFFERENCE FROM 'QUALITY'?—AS A MATTER OF FACT, HOWEVER, NO ALL-COMPREHENSIVE 'BLUE' IS EVER PERCEIVED. EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE MANIFESTING ITSELF, IT IS NEVER PERCEIVED IN A DIFFERENTIATED FORM. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOW COULD THE *Idea* AND *Name* APPLY TO THE INDIVIDUAL, ON THE BASIS OF THE SAID COMPREHENSIVE NOTION?—FURTHER, THE OTHER PARTY HOLDS THE NOTION OF THE 'UNIVERSAL' TO BE DEFINITE AND CERTAIN; CONSEQUENTLY, ITS NON-PERCEPTION CANNOT BE RIGHT, AS THAT WOULD IMPLY THAT IT IS INCOGNISABLE.—(740–742)

COMMENTARY.

Such being the case, there can be no difference between the *Quality* 'Blue' and the 'Universal' *Blue*; as, *ex hypothesi*, both have the same form.

It might be urged that—"the *Quality* 'Blue' is not something *comprehensive*, while the 'Universal' *Blue* embraces all that is *blue* at all times and at all places; and in this sense there is a difference between the forms of the two".

The answer to this is that '*no all-comprehensive Blue is ever perceived*'. That is, as a matter of fact, any such comprehensive 'Blue' as distinct from the *Quality* Blue,—embracing all that is of the form of *Blue*,—is never perceived to manifest itself; as all that appears in Perception is a specific 'Blue' alone by itself. Even in the 'determinate' Cognition, there does not appear any *second* Blue; as that Cognition only 'determines' what has been perceived (by the previous *indeterminate Perception*).

It might be argued that—"Just as for the *Bauddha*, the Momentary Character of Things, though apparent, is not actually apprehended in its differentiated form by people with dull intelligence,—so the 'Universal' also".

This cannot be right; as even so, the theory propounded by you—that "on the strength of the *perception* of the *Universal* there appear the single identical Name and Idea in regard to Individuals that are diverse",—would become untenable; because if the *qualifying factor* is unperceived, there can be no perception of the *qualified thing*; e.g. until the *Stick* is seen, there can be no such notion as 'the man *with the stick*'. Similarly in the case in question. Because the idea put forward by you is that Diversities (Individuals) by themselves are beyond the reach of Verbal Expression and Cognition;—and these diversities, which are by themselves beyond the reach of Cognition and Verbal Expression, would (under your theory) be cognised only on the strength of the perception of the 'Universal';—how, then, can the *Cogniser* not 'perceive' the *Universal* itself?

Further, for the man for whom Perception is always 'indeterminate', it may be right to say that 'even though *apparent*, it is not *apprehended*'; as 'Apprehension' involves the functioning of the idea of *Certitude*; but for you, who hold all Perception to be *determinate*, it is not right that there should be no apprehension; as that would mean that there is no Cognition of it at all. In fact, the apprehension of objects by all certain Cognitions consists in their bringing about *certitude*; if then, they do not bring about this certitude, it comes to this that they do not cognise or apprehend the object at all.—(740–742)

Even granting that the existence of something other than the 'Blue' is proved, there can be no proof for what you desire to prove; as your Conclusion itself is barred by Inference, and to that extent, the Premiss also cannot be admitted.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (743).

EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE TAKEN AS ESTABLISHED THAT THE NOTIONS IN QUESTION HAVE A DIFFERENT CAUSE, THE EXISTENCE OF THE 'UNIVERSAL' AS COMPREHENSIVE, AND FREE FROM IMPERMANENCE, DOES NOT BECOME ESTABLISHED; BECAUSE THE NOTIONS IN QUESTION APPEAR IN SUCCESSION.—(743)

COMMENTARY.

'*Free from impermanence*',—i.e. free from non-eternality,—eternal.

"Why is it not established?"

'*Because the notions in question appear in succession*'; i.e. the notions of the 'Cow' and the rest. If these were due to any such commonality as the 'Universal', then they would not appear in succession,—as their cause being always present in its perfect form, they should all appear simultaneously; just like several things produced simultaneously. Specially because a cause that cannot be helped does not need anything else.—(743)

Now, even admitting the Reason, the Author shows that it is 'fallible' ('not true', 'Inconclusive'):—

TEXT (744).

ON WHAT BASIS DOES THE TERM 'CATEGORY' ('*Padārtha*') REST WHEN APPLIED TO THE SIX (*Vaishēṣika* CATEGORIES)? AS ALSO THE NOTION 'IT EXISTS' WHICH IS FOUND TO BE PRESENT IN 'BEING', ETC.?—(744)

COMMENTARY.

There is not (even for the *Vaishēṣika*) any such 'Universal' as '*Padārthatva*' (the genus 'Category') subsisting in all the six Categories,—on the

basis of which there should be such a comprehensive notion as 'this is a *Category*—this is a *Category* and so forth';—similarly in the 'Universal', the 'Specific Individuality' and 'Inherence', the 'Universal' *Being* does not subsist; by virtue of which each of these could be conceived of as 'existing'; because (according to the *Vaishēṣika*) 'Being' subsists only in the three Categories of 'Substance', 'Quality' and 'Action'.—As regards the three Categories of Substance and the rest, the Opponents hold the name to be based upon the presence of the 'Universal'; hence the fallibility of the Reason has not been urged in regard to these.—(744)

The following argument may be put forward:—"Even in the Categories named, the property of 'existence' is present in the form of being the object of the right Cognition that 'it exists'; so that here also the name is due to something other than the object itself; and hence the Reason is not *untrue*".

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXTS (745-746).

IF IN REGARD TO THE CATEGORIES MENTIONED, THE NOTION THAT 'IT EXISTS' IS DUE TO SOMETHING ELSE,—THEN, IN REGARD TO THIS 'SOMETHING' ALSO THE NOTION THAT 'IT EXISTS' IS PRESENT; AND SO ON AND ON, THERE WOULD BE AN INFINITE REGRESS,—AND THE CHARACTER OF 'HAVING THE PROPERTY' WOULD CEASE. IN VIEW OF THESE, THE REASON WOULD BECOME 'FALLIBLE' (UNTRUE).—THEN AGAIN THE ALL-EMBRACING CONCOMITANCE OF THE REASON HAS NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED.—(745-746)

COMMENTARY.

Even if it be admitted that the notions in question are due to something else, the defect of 'Fallibility' remains; because even in regard to the *property* mentioned by the Opponent, there is the notion that 'it exists', which is expressed by the words 'this property of *existence is* there';—so this notion of *is-ness* will have to be attributed to something other than 'Existence' (or *Being*); and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress; as also the anomaly that other things also would be receptacles of the Property, and hence 'things possessing that property'; and the result thus would be that there would be no such restriction of number as that 'there are *only six* Categories' which can have properties.—If, in order to avoid the Infinite

Regress, a further property (of *is-ness*) is not postulated, then, *in view of these* notions,—as appearing in connection with the Categories, or with the property of *Existence*,—the Reason would have to be regarded as 'fallible' (untrue).

It may be that the 'inconclusiveness' of the Reason is not due to its being *Too Wide*; even so, how could the defect of its negation being open to 'doubt' be avoided?—This is what is pointed out in the words—'*Then again, etc. etc.*';—what is meant by '*all-embracing concomitance*' is the cognition of the fact of the Reason being invariably concomitant with the whole of the thing in which the Probandum is sought to be proved.

The following argument might be urged:—"The required concomitance is there all right; because, if there were no other Cause, how could the notion in question (of the Universal 'Cow', etc.) be different from the notion of the thing itself? There can be no difference among notions of the same object, even when they are many. If there were such difference, then, there could be no diversity even among the notions of different things, like Colour, Taste and so forth; because diversity among *things* is always due to the diversity among *Cognitions*."

This is not right; as a matter of fact, there can be no idea of 'Universal' in regard to the 'Specific Peculiarity' of things. Because the 'Specific Peculiarity' never forms the object of any notion associated with verbal expression.—But,—even in the absence of any 'Universal',—if the view be held that each thing by itself is one only and is excluded, from other things, on some basis,—and it is through this basis that there come about various assumptions and verbal expressions of an all-embracing character, in accordance with conventions and the experience of people;—if such were the view, then there would be no opposition to it. This is the reason why the Text speaks of the 'absence of concomitance'.—(745-746)

It has been argued (above, under *Text* 719) that—"The comprehensive idea that appears in regard to the Cow and other things, etc. etc.".—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (747).

THE ARGUMENT IN PROOF OF THE 'UNIVERSAL' THAT HAS BEEN URGED AFTER THE ONE JUST DISPOSED OF, ALSO BECOMES REJECTED BY THIS; BECAUSE THE FALLACY OF 'FUTILITY' AND THE REST ARE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO THAT ALSO.—(747)

COMMENTARY.

'*By this*',—i.e. by the refutation just explained.—As the same objections are equally applicable to that also; for instance, the defect of being 'futile',

'superfluous' (proving what is already admitted) and the rest are applicable to this argument also.

The phrase '*and the rest*' includes the fallacies of the Corroborative Instance 'being devoid of the Probandum', the Reason being 'unproven', and 'fallible' (Inconclusive) and so forth.—(747)

The following *Text* points out the 'Fallibility' of the Opponent's Reason in another manner :—

TEXTS (748-749).

WITHOUT ANY ALL-EMBRACING BASIS, THERE IS—(*a*) A PARTICULAR COGNITION IN REGARD TO THE 'COOK'; (*b*) SIMILARLY THERE IS THE NOTION OF 'NEGATION' IN REGARD TO NEGATION ITSELF; AS ALSO (*c*) IN REGARD TO PERSONS AND THINGS CREATED BY IMAGINATION, AND (*d*) IN REGARD TO DEAD AND UNBORN PERSONS.—IN VIEW OF ALL THESE COGNITIONS, THE REASON BECOMES OPEN TO THE FALLACY OF 'FALLIBILITY'.—(748-749)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the notion of the 'Cook', the 'Teacher' and the like, there are no such all-embracing bases as the *character of being Cook*, the *character of being the Teacher* and so forth, on which comprehensive notions of the 'Cook' and the 'Teacher' could be based. Similarly in regard to the four kinds of Negation,—Prior Negation and the like,—how could there be any such comprehensive notion as 'Negation'? Certainly there could be no 'Universal' in this case,—as this must rest in *positive entities*.—Similarly in regard to persons and things created by imagination,—such as the poetical character of *Chandrāpīḍa* (in *Kādambarī*) and White Palaces in the sky and so forth,—and also in regard to persons dead and unborn—such as *Mahāsammata*, *Shaṅkha* and the rest,—how could there be any notion without there being any comprehensive character? Surely there is no 'Universal' in these cases; which are all based upon *individuals*.—(748-749)

The following Texts explain the notions of the 'Cook', etc. :—

TEXTS (750–754)

IN FACT, THERE IS NO SINGLE BASIS FOR THE NOTIONS OF 'COOK' AND THE REST.—IF IT BE SAID THAT "THE ACT (OF COOKING) IS THE BASIS",—THEN, THE ANSWER IS THAT THE ACT VARIES WITH EACH INDIVIDUAL PERSON; AND YOU HAVE POSTULATED THE 'UNIVERSAL' AS EMBRACING ALL INDIVIDUALS ONLY, ON THE GROUND THAT UNLESS THERE IS AN ALL-EMBRACING ENTITY, THERE CAN BE NO COMPREHENSIVE NOTION OF THINGS WHICH ARE DIFFERENT.—IF, EVEN WITHOUT SUCH ALL-EMBRACING CHARACTER, THE ACT BE REGARDED AS THE BASIS (OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION) THEN WHY SHOULD NOT THE INDIVIDUALS THEMSELVES BE REGARDED AS CAUSES OF IT ?—FURTHER (IF THE ACT WERE THE BASIS, THEN) THE NOTION OF 'COOK' COULD NOT APPEAR IN REGARD TO THE MAN AFTER HE HAS DESISTED FROM THE ACT (*of cooking*); SURELY EVEN THE OTHER PARTY DO NOT REGARD THE *Act* AS PRESENT THERE AT ALL TIMES,—LIKE THE 'UNIVERSAL'.—IF IT BE HELD THAT "THE NOTION AND NAME OF THE COOK, ETC. IS BASED ON PAST AND FUTURE ACTION",—THEN SUCH AN ACT CANNOT BE THE CAUSE AT ALL, FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT IT IS NOT PRESENT AT THE TIME.—(750–754)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be right to say that the notion in regard to the *Cook* is due to the act of *cooking*; because this Action also is held to be different with each person,—just like the individuality.

You postulate the 'Universal' as embracing all individuals, on the ground that, in regard to diverse things, there could not appear any comprehensive notion, in the absence of an all-embracing entity. Under the circumstances, if even without this all-embracing character, the Action were the basis of regarding diverse things as one,—then why should there be an aversion to the individuals, whereby ignoring these, the 'Universal' has been postulated as the basis of that notion ?

Then again, if the notion in regard to the *Cook* were due to the Action, then after the man has desisted from the Action, and is not doing any *cooking*, the notion of *Cook* could not appear in regard to him. You do not regard the Action to be ever present, like the 'Universal', by virtue of which the notion could appear even when the Action had ceased. When one thing is due to another, it cannot appear in the absence of this latter.

Nor can past and future Action be rightly regarded as the basis of the said notion; because what is past or yet to come cannot be there, and what is not there cannot serve as the cause of anything.—(750–754)

Shaṅkara-svāmin argues as follows:—"The comprehensive idea of the *Cook* is based upon the presence of that particular *Action* which is related to the 'Universal' (or Genus) 'Action'; hence, even after the actual act of

cooking has ceased, the permanent basis of it (in the shape of the Universal) is always there, and from that there arises the idea of the *Cook*".—This view is anticipated in the following—

TEXT (755).

IF THE IDEA BE SAID TO BE DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE ACT RELATED TO THE 'UNIVERSAL' *Action*,—AND THIS PERMANENT BASIS IS ALWAYS INDICATED BY IT EVEN WHEN THE PARTICULAR ACT HAS CEASED,—[then, the answer is as given in the following *Text*].—(755)

COMMENTARY.

'*By it*',—i.e. by the action.

'*Permanent basis*',—in the shape of the 'Universal' *Action*.—(755)

The answer to this is given in the following—

TEXT (756).

WHEN THE PARTICULAR ACT HAS CEASED, THE PERMANENT 'UNIVERSAL', EVEN THOUGH INDICATED, CANNOT REALLY EXIST; FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT ITS RECEPTACLE HAS CEASED TO EXIST.—(756)

COMMENTARY.

'*Its receptacle*',—i.e. the receptacle of the Universal; i.e. the particular act.

As a matter of fact, the 'Universal' cannot be perceived,—or even exist,—by itself, apart from its receptacle; otherwise it would have to be regarded as *baseless*.—(756)

The following argument might be urged :—"When once the Universal has been indicated and perceived,—even if its receptacle, in the shape of the particular act, ceases, the Idea based upon it still continues".

The answer to this argument is as follows :—

TEXTS (757–760).

IN THE CASE OF SUCH 'UNIVERSALS' AS THE '*Stick*', THE '*Armlet*' AND THE LIKE,—EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN INDICATED AND PERCEIVED ONCE (IN ONE PERSON),—THE IDEA OF THE 'MAN WITH THE STICK' (OR 'THE MAN WITH THE ARMLET') DOES NOT CONTINUE ON THE REMOVAL OF THE STICK OR ARMLET.—IF THE 'UNIVERSAL' *Cook* WERE SOMETHING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT (FROM THE INDIVIDUAL PERSONS), THEN (AS A PERMANENT ENTITY) IT SHOULD BE PRESENT IN THE NEW-BORN CHILD ALSO, WHO ALSO COULD BE CONCEIVED OF AS A 'COOK'.—IF IT BE HELD THAT, LIKE THE IDEA OF 'BEING' (EXISTENCE), IT DOES NOT SUBSIST IN A CERTAIN SUBSTRATUM (THE CHILD JUST BORN F.I.),—THEN, LATER ON, ALSO IT COULD NOT SUBSIST IN IT; AS THE CONDITIONS WOULD BE THE SAME.—IT MAY BE THAT AT THE INITIAL STAGE (WHEN THE CHILD IS JUST BORN) THERE IS NO INHERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO (THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR) BECAUSE OF THE DEFECTIVE CHARACTER OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP. BUT IF SO, THEN, HOW COULD THERE BE THAT INHERENCE, EVEN AFTERWARDS, WHEN THE DEFECT WOULD STILL BE THERE?—(757–760)

COMMENTARY.

There would be many absurdities. For instance, such 'Universals' as 'Stick' and the like having been perceived once,—when *Dēvadatta* had given up the Stick, the idea of his being 'with Stick', or 'with the Ear-ring', would be there.

Nor is it right to say that even in the man who has given up *cooking*, the 'Universal' *Cook* is present; because, the 'Universal' being eternal, it would be present in the new-born child also.

The Opponent might argue thus:—"The idea of 'being existent', though due to the 'Universal Being' (Existence), does not come about always; in the same way, the 'Universal' *Cook* also, being inherent in a certain particular substratum, would not appear at all times; so that it would not inhere in the new-born child.—'Inhering' is mentioned only by way of illustration; the 'Universal' would not be *manifested*;—this also has to be understood".

But in that way, it comes to this that it may not inhere in it at all. Because the non-inherence of the 'Universal' in the new-born child, at the earlier stage, could be due only to some defect in the character of the relation between the 'Universal' and the Particular Object; and this defect would be present there at the later stages also;—how then could the 'Universal' inhere in it at all? According to your view, the Object is not momentary,—by which at the subsequent stages the Object (Child) would be a different entity.

'*That*'—i.e. *inherence*.

'*Their relationship*'—i.e. the relation between the 'Universal' and the Particular Object.

'*Tādātmyē*',—i.e. the previous defective form not having been abandoned.—(757–760)

Even when the Object is admitted to be evanescent, the objection stated remains in force ;—this is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (761).

IF THE PARTICULAR OBJECT BE *not permanent*, IT MIGHT ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL CHARACTERS ; BUT EVEN SO, THE DEFECTIVE NATURE OF THE 'UNIVERSAL' WOULD NEVER CEASE.—(761)

COMMENTARY.

It may be that the Particular Object, being impermanent, will acquire additional qualities later on ; but the 'Universal', being permanent, will always retain its character of being averse to Inherence ; hence how could it be 'inherent' even at a later stage ?—Nor can it be right to assert that—"the 'Universal' remains for ever in a state which is not averse to subsequent Inherence" ;—because in that case, the Particular Object also would have to be regarded as eternal ; as the 'Universal' related to it would be eternal ; because in the absence of one relative, the other relative cannot be said to be devoid of the defect preventing its related nature.—(761)

The following *Text* puts forward the answer given by *Uddyotakara* :—

TEXT (762).

"THE NAME '*Cook*' IS MEANT TO BE APPLIED TO THAT WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THE ACT OF *cooking* ; AND THIS 'PRINCIPALITY' IS PRESENT IN ANOTHER COOK ALSO."—(762)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows (in *Nyāyavārtika,* Sū. 2. 2. 8, page 320) —"It is through ignorance of our Reason that our Opponent has urged that —'just as the term *Cook* is comprehensive in its connotation, and yet there is no such Universal as *Cook,*—so also is the comprehensive character of the connotation of the term *Cow*'.—Because what is meant by our Reason is that 'Particular Cognition cannot be accidental (without cause)' ; and what this means is that the Idea which is different from the idea of the individual object must be due to a different cause ;—and not that all comprehensive ideas are based upon 'Universals'. Such being the case, that which is the principal cause of the action of *cooking* is what is spoken of by the name 'Cook' ; and this principal character is present in other persons also ; hence the objection urged against us has no force."

This argument is answered in the following—

TEXT (763).

WHAT IS IT THAT IS CALLED 'PRINCIPAL CHARACTER'?—IT CANNOT BE A POTENCY; BECAUSE THIS DOES NOT SUBSIST (IN OTHER INDIVIDUALS). —FOR THE SAME REASON IT CANNOT BE SAID TO CONSIST IN THE NATURE OF THE SUBSTANCE, QUALITY OR ACTION, ETC.—(763)

COMMENTARY.

What is this 'Principal Character'?

If it is a Potency, that cannot be right; as potency is restricted to each individual substratum, and must therefore vary with each individual object, and cannot subsist in another object.

For the same reason, it cannot consist in the 'nature'—essence, self-sufficiency,—of Substance, etc.; as this also cannot belong in common to several objects.

The term '*etc.*' is meant to include any entity that may be held to be distinct from Substance, Quality and Action.

As regards the explanation offered (by *Uddyotakara*) of the assertion that "the appearance of the notions in question is due to other causes",—this has already been answered by pointing out that if some sort of a Cause is meant, then the argument is futile, as we also admit it as being due to Conventional Conception;—if on the other hand any particular Cause is meant, then there is 'absence of concomitance' and also 'Falsity', in view of such notions as those of the *Cook* and the like.—(763)

The following *Texts* sum up the Author's position—

TEXTS (764-765).

THUS THE NOTION THAT APPEARS IN REGARD TO THE 'COOK' IS DEPENDENT ONLY UPON THE DIVERSITY OF CONVENTION, AND APPREHENDS ONLY THE FORM THAT PRECLUDES ALL UNLIKE THINGS.—FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT ALL NAMES AND NOTIONS PROCEED DIVERSELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONVENTION, WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY ALL-EMBRACING ENTITY.—(764-765)

COMMENTARY.

'*Thus*',—because no other cause is found, on examination, for the notions of the *Cook* and the rest, therefore,—even in connection with diverse

objects like the Cook, etc., the comprehensive notion—idea—which ultimately apprehends only something distinguished from all things unlike itself—proceeds in accordance with Convention; as this *exclusion of the unlike* is always present.

Because this is so, therefore it follows that in the case of the 'Cow', etc. also, notions partaking of a uniform character, as also Names, should proceed on the basis of Convention,—even without any entity like the 'Universal'.—So that the Reason put forward by the other party remains 'Inconclusive', (Fallible, Untrue).—(764-765)

The following *Text* further supports the argument (urged under *Text* 748, above) based upon the notion of 'Negation' with regard to Negation—

TEXT (766)

THUS THE NOTION OF NEGATION WITH REGARD TO *Negation* IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE; NOR IS THE COMPREHENSIVE NAME (INCOMPATIBLE); BECAUSE THEY PROCEED FROM CONVENTION, WHICH DOES NOT INVOLVE THE ASSUMPTION OF ANY OTHER ENTITY.—(766)

COMMENTARY.

The only basis for a comprehensive notion, that will apply to all cases, consists in the Body of Convention; otherwise, the incongruity of the comprehensive notion that we have in regard to all Negations,—as also of the very term 'Negation'—cannot be denied. Because in the case of Negations, there can be no 'Universal', which subsists only in *entities* (not in non-entities).

Why it is not incompatible is shown by the words—'*Because they proceed etc., etc.*'; the Convention is called '*anartha*' in the sense that it does not involve the assumption of any other entity in the shape of the 'Universal' and so forth; from such convention, *they porceed*;—i.e. the Name and the Idea follow the presence or absence of the said Convention.—(766)

The following *Texts* anticipate and answer *Shaṅkarasvāmin's* answer to the Bauddha's criticisms—

TEXTS (767-770).

" SUCH NOTIONS (OF NEGATION) AS ' THE *previous negation* OF THE JAR ', ' THE *Destruction* OF THE JAR ' AND THE LIKE, APPREHEND NEGATIONS WITH POSITIVE ENTITIES AS THEIR ADJUNCTS ; AND THE COMPREHENSIVE CHARACTER OF THE SAID NOTION OF ' NEGATION ' IS DUE TO THE COMPREHENSIVE CHARACTER OF THOSE ADJUNCTS ".—IF THIS IS URGED, THEN (OUR ANSWER IS THAT) THIS CANNOT BE SO ; (*a*) BECAUSE THERE IS DISPARITY AND (*b*) BECAUSE IT CANNOT REST UPON THAT.—(*a*) THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION OF THE ' JAR ' MAY BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS BEING DUE TO THAT ; NOT SO THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION OF ' NEGATION ' ; THE NOTION OF ' PRESENCE ' (AFFIRMATION) IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE NOTION OF ' ABSENCE ' (NEGATION). (*b*) THE NOTION OF THE ' COW ' OR THE ' HORSE ' IS NOT HELD TO BE DUE TO THE ' UNIVERSAL ' *Being*. IF IT DID, THEN ONLY ONE ' UNIVERSAL ' WOULD HAVE TO BE POSTULATED AS ACCOMPLISHING EVERYTHING (AS BEING THE BASIS OF ALL NOTIONS).—(767-770)

COMMENTARY.

Shankarasvāmin has argued thus :—" The notions of Negations are never found to be free from adjuncts [the Negation is always *of something*] ; for instance, in all such notions of Negation as ' the *previous negation* of the Jar ', ' the *Destruction* of the Jar ' and so forth,—they are found to rest upon Negations associated with certain positive entities as adjuncts ; which shows that in all cases the notion of Negation has its comprehensive character dependent upon the ' Universal ' permeating the said adjuncts ; so that there is no ' fallibility ' in our Premiss ".

' *Tasyāḥ* '—of the said notion (of Negation).

The above argument is answered in the words—' *It cannot be so, etc., etc.* '. —The compound ' *Vailakṣaṇyātadāshrayāt* ' may be construed to mean either (*a*) ' because there is the *fact that it cannot rest upon that,* along with the fact that *there is disparity* ', or as (*b*) ' because *there is disparity,* and also because *it cannot rest upon* that '.

The first of these two reasons—' because there is disparity '—is explained in detail, in the words—' *The comprehensive notion of the Jar, etc., etc.* ';—it is not right that notions of diverse forms should be based upon one and the same adjunct ; as in that case a single ' Universal ' would serve all purposes, and it would be useless to postulate several ' Universals '. Thus then notions of positive entities like the ' Jar ' etc. may be due to the ' Universal ' ' Jar ',—how could the notions of ' Negations ' be based upon those ' Universals ', being, as they are, entirely different from these latter in character ? For example the notion of the universal ' Cow ' does not proceed on the basis of the ' Universal ' *Being*.—(767-770)

Bhāvivikta has argued as follows :—" It is not held that in every case, the Notion is exactly in keeping with its Cause (or basis). For instance,

the number 'Plurality' subsisting (*a*) in Elephants and Horses, or (*b*) in the *Dhava* and *Khadira* trees, forms the *basis* of the notions of (*a*) the '*Army*' and (*b*) the 'Forest';—similarly the mixture of several heterogeneous substances forms the basis of the notions of 'drinks', 'fermented gruel' and the like. Otherwise (i.e. if the resultant notion must be exactly in keeping with its basis) the notions in question should have been of (*a*) 'Many' and (*b*) 'Mixture'".

This is the argument that is anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXTS (771-772).

"In all cases the notion is not in exact accordance with its basis,—inasmuch as the notions of 'army', 'forest' and the like have Number, etc. for their basis";—if such be the view, then, why should not the said notion in regard to these diverse things also be held to be based upon the diversity of the Body of Conventions set up by one's own whim?—(771-772)

COMMENTARY.

'*The said notion*',—i.e. the Comprehensive notion.

The 'diversity'—i.e. Peculiarity of the Conventions.—(771-772)

Question :—"What is the peculiarity on the basis whereof this statement is made?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (773-774).

When there is cognition of diversity, then there arises the desire to set up a Convention;—then the Convention is set up;—then comes the hearing of the Name in accordance with that Convention;—then the 'body' or 'form' of the Convention;—then the *notion* (in accordance with that Convention). That this is the cause (basis) of the said Notions is thus known definitely through affirmative and negative Premisses. In regard to other causes, there would be an infinite regress.—(773-774)

COMMENTARY.

The relation of Cause and Effect is ascertainable only by means of affirmative and negative premisses: and in regard to the comprehensive notion in

question, the only cause that is so ascertained is the Body of Conventions set up by the desire of man. For instance, first of all, there appears the cognition of difference among things ;—after this cognition has come, there comes the desire to set up a Convention ;—from that desire proceeds the setting up of the Convention ;—then the hearing of the same at the time of actual usage of the name ;—from that hearing of the usage, there follows the 'body' or 'form' of the Convention ; from this Body of the Convention, comes the using of the name in regard to the diverse things in question ;—and then finally the notions of 'Jar' and the like come into appearance.

Among all people, down to the veriest cowherd, the idea of such being the cause of the notions in question is definitely recognised with certainty.

As for the 'Universal' on the other hand, its capacity has nowhere been seen; if then it were regarded as the Cause of the notions, it would lead to absurdities ; for, after having assumed that as the Cause, why could you not assume another cause, of which also the capacity may not be known and so on ?—(773-774)

The following *Texts* continue the same line of reasoning—

TEXTS (775-776).

THE ASSUMPTION OF SOMETHING ELSE (AS THE CAUSE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION) IS BASED UPON THE IDEA THAT THE CORRELATIVE OF A THING SHOULD BE OF THE SAME NATURE AS THAT THING. BUT, EVEN SO, WHEN THE NOTIONS ARE DIVERSE, IT IS FAR BETTER TO ACCEPT WHAT HAS BEEN JUST SUGGESTED (BY US) ; AS IN THIS CASE, THE RESTRICTION IS DUE TO THE CAPACITY OF THINGS ; AND IT IS FAR BETTER TO ASSUME THAT WHICH HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE TRUE IN REGARD TO THINGS WHOSE CAPACITY IS WELL KNOWN,—THROUGH AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE PREMISSES.
(775-776)

COMMENTARY.

When you were expounding the reason for your conclusions to consist in the fact that they should have a basis similar to themselves, you had to postulate millions of 'Universals'. If the 'Universal' also produces notions of diverse forms, then it is far better to assume this,—that is, that which has been actually found to have the capacity (of producing the said notions). As in so doing, there would not have to be an assumption of anything not actually seen.

Further, when you are asked the question—How is it that one and the same 'Universal' produces diverse notions?—You will have to say that "such is the restricted capacity of things that even though itself *one*, it is capable of producing notions of diverse forms".—If such be the case, then why should not the assumption be that the determining factors consist in the diverse things themselves whose capacities are well known and fully ascertained? In doing this, nothing would be done which is not in strict accordance with experience.—(775-776)

The following might be urged—"Of the 'Universal' also, the capacity is well known and fully ascertained".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (777).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO AFFIRMATIVE CONCOMITANCE (OF THE NOTIONS) WITH THE UNIVERSALS: AS THEIR NOTION IS NOT ALWAYS PRESENT; AS FOR NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE, THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF WHAT ARE ETERNAL.—(777)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact the notions of 'Being' and such other Universals do not appear at all times; and hence it can never be right to assert the affirmative concomitance of these with the Universals. If the notions were really concomitant with the presence of the Universals, then, as the Universals would be there at all times, why could not the notions appear at all times? Specially as the Universal does not need anything else; because other things cannot create any peculiar capacities in it. Hence there can be no affirmative concomitance with these Universals.

Nor is negative concomitance possible. Because at the time that the notions of Being, etc. do not appear,—it cannot be said that the cause of this non-appearance lies in the non-existence of the Universal; because eternal things must be always present, and hence their *non-existence* (absence) is impossible. Consequently there can be no negative concomitance with the Universals.—(777)

Thus then, there being objections against the view that Comprehensive notions should have their cause in something different (from the individual things),—the following assertion of the other party also becomes discarded:—"When in regard to *Quality*, there arises the notion that *it is not-substance, it is not-Action* and so forth, the basis for this lies in the particular-Universal 'Quality'; while *Inherence in the same object* is the basis for the compre-

hensive notion of the 'Universal' that appears in regard to the pure Universals 'Being' and the like ".

This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (778).

THE VIEW THAT "THE UNIVERSAL 'QUALITY' IS THE BASIS OF THE NOTION OF 'NOT-SUBSTANCE' AND THE LIKE" IS NOT REASONABLE; FOR THE SAME REASON THERE CAN BE NO 'INHERENCE IN THE SAME OBJECT' IN THE CASE OF THE NOTION OF THE 'UNIVERSAL'.—(778)

The following *Text* shows that the Theory in question involves an absurdity also—

TEXT (779).

AS FOR 'INHERENCE IN SEVERAL THINGS', THIS IS PRESENT IN NUMBER, ETC. ALSO, JUST AS IN THE 'UNIVERSALS'; HENCE THE NOTION OF 'UNIVERSAL' MUST BE THERE IN REGARD TO NUMBER, ETC. ALSO.—(779)

COMMENTARY.

If 'Inherence in several things' were the basis of the Comprehensive notion in regard to 'Universals', then,—as such 'subsistence in several substances' is found in such things also as *Number, Conjunction, Disjunction, Composite Substances* and so forth,—the notion of 'Universal' should appear in regard to these also; because the basis of such notion would be equally present in this case also.

As for the character of 'forming the object of one and the same cognition', this also is restricted to the universals 'Being', etc. as appearing in the forms of the 'existing,' etc.; and it does not touch any other 'Universal'; so that, on the strength of that also, the comprehensive notion of 'Universal—Universal' cannot appear in regard to the several Universals. Consequently the following assertion of *Kumārila* is entirely irrelevant :—" The subsistence of one in several different things is the basis of the name 'Universal' as applied to *Being*, etc.; or it may be due to their being the basis of one and the same cognition ". (*Shlokavārtika-Ākṛtivāda*, 24).—(779)

So far the author has explained the Reason 'Because there is disparity' [put forward by himself under *Text* 768, against the opponent's explanation of the comprehensive notion of 'Negation' in regard to the several kinds of Negation]. He next proceeds to explain the other Reason 'Because it cannot rest upon that':—

TEXTS (780–782).

UNIVERSALS CALLED 'JAR' AND THE REST SUBSIST ONLY IN THE JAR; THEY CANNOT SUBSIST IN NEGATIONS; HOW THEN DOES THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION (OF NEGATION) ARISE IN REGARD TO THESE LATTER?—THE (COMPREHENSIVE) NOTION AND NAME CANNOT BE APPLIED TO ONE THING ON THE BASIS OF WHAT SUBSISTS IN SOMETHING ELSE; FOR INSTANCE, THE NOTION AND NAME 'CANCER' CANNOT BE BASED UPON THE UNIVERSAL 'ELEPHANT'. AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN 'SUBSISTENCE IN ONE AND THE SAME THING' IS NOT PRESENT HERE. NOTIONS OF TASTE, COLOUR, AND HEAVINESS MIGHT ARISE FROM THEIR 'SUBSISTENCE IN ONE AND THE SAME THING'; IN THE CASE IN QUESTION (OF NEGATION) HOWEVER, EVEN THIS SUBSISTENCE IS NOT THERE; FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT NEGATION DOES NOT SUBSIST IN ANYTHING AT ALL.—(780–782)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the 'Universal' subsists only in the Jar and such entities, never in Negations, because these latter are non-entities. How then could there appear, in regard to these Negations, any comprehensive notion associated with the form of a Universal, on the basis of the 'Universal' *Jar* which subsists in something other (than the Negations)? For instance, the 'Elephant' does not become the basis of a comprehensive notion regarding the Cancer.

"But a notion is actually found to appear in connection with one thing on the basis of something that subsists elsewhere; e.g. such notions as 'the sweet Taste is viscid, cool and heavy".

This is answered in the words—'*Even subsistence in one and the same thing, etc., etc.*':—In the example cited, the qualities of 'Coolness' and the rest subsist in that same substance wherein the sweetness subsists; so that on the strength of this 'subsistence in the same substratum', there is co-existence; while Negation never subsists in any substance along with Universals like the 'Jar'; for the simple reason that that which has no colour and form cannot subsist in anything.—(780–782)

The following *Text* anticipates the answer given by *Uddyotakara*—

TEXTS (783-784).

IF IT BE ARGUED THAT—"IN THIS CASE THERE IS THE RELATION OF *Qualification—and—Qualified*",—THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT SUCH A RELATION IS ASSUMED ONLY WHEN SOME OTHER RELATION IS ALREADY THERE; FOR INSTANCE, THE RELATION OF *Qualification and Qualified* IS ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF THE CLOSE PROXIMITY (CONTACT) BETWEEN THE TWO FACTORS CONCERNED; IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH CONTACT, THE RELATION IN QUESTION CANNOT BE POSSIBLE, AS THERE WOULD BE NO BASIS FOR IT.—(783-784)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows:—"The relation between the Universal 'Jar' with the particular Jar is of the nature of *Inherence*, while the relation of Negations is of the nature of *Qualification and Qualified*; so in both cases the '*relation* of the same thing' is the basis for the common name".

The answer to this is that '*Such a relation, etc., etc.*'; that is, the relation of *Qualification and Qualified* among Entities is always brought about by some other relation; e.g. the relation of *Qualification and Qualified* between *Devadatta* and his *stick* is due to *conjunction* (contact) between them, and the same between the *King* and his *officer* is due to the relation of *Master and Servant.* In the case of Negations however, there is no such other Relation which could form the basis of the relation of *Qualification and Qualified*; how then could any such relation be possible? If it were possible, then there would be an absurdity; everything could be the qualification of everything'.—(783-784)

The question then arising as to—"how, in the absence of any other relation, such notions are current among people as 'the Prior Negation of the Jar'?"—the following *Texts* supply the answer—

TEXTS (785-786).

AS REGARDS SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS 'THE PRIOR NEGATION OF THE JAR', IT IS A CREATION OF MERE FANCY; JUST LIKE THE DESCRIPTION OF 'BRAVERY' IN REGARD TO AN IMAGINARY PERSON. IN CASES WHERE THE RELATION OF *Qualification and Qualified* IS BASED UPON A REAL ENTITY, THERE IS BOUND TO BE SOME OTHER RELATION (REGARDED AS ITS BASIS).—(785-786)

COMMENTARY.

When it is found that a thing which was not there has come into existence,—and there is a desire to speak of it,—there appears an imaginary

notion which indicates 'Prior Negation' as something different from the thing concerned, and related to it by the relation of *Qualification and Qualified*; it is on this imaginary basis that the relation of *Qualification and Qualified* is mentioned, and there is no such relation in reality;—just as in the case of the picture drawn by an artist, the qualities of 'bravery' and the like are assumed. In cases where you postulate the said relation of *Qualification and Qualified*,—some other relation (as its basis) has surely to be looked for; otherwise there would be no regularity or restriction.—(785-786)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that the answer given by *Shaṅkarasvāmin* is not relevant to the objection urged by us—

TEXT (787).

THE OBJECTION URGED BY US WAS IN REGARD TO SUCH NOTIONS AS 'THIS NEGATION', 'THAT NEGATION'. AS REGARDS THE 'UNIVERSAL' SUBSISTING IN THE ADJUNCT, THAT SUBSISTS ONLY IN ITS OWN SUBSTRATUM.—(787)

COMMENTARY.

What we had urged was as follows:—In the case of the *Negation of the Jar*, the *Negation of the Cloth*, the *Negation of the Hare's Horn* and so forth,—we find the comprehensive notion of 'Negation' appearing, even when there is no such 'Universal' as 'Negation',—hence in other cases also the assumption of the 'Universal' is useless; and we did not raise the objection against the 'Prior Negation' and other Negations that are conceived of in connection with a large number of things of the same kind.

"If that is so, what then?"

As regards the 'Universal' subsisting in the adjunct, etc., etc.—That is, the Universal 'Jar' subsisting in the adjunct, the particular Jar, *subsists only in its own substratum*,—i.e. only in the Jar, not in the Cloth and other things. How then could there arise, from that, the notion regarding the 'Prior' and other Negations of such heterogeneous things as the Cloth and the rest? This is what is meant.—(787)

It might be argued that—"there is one all-embracing *Universal* everywhere";—the answer to that is as follows—

TEXT (788).

NOR IS IT HELD THAT THE SINGLE ALL-EMBRACING UNIVERSAL 'BEING' SUBSISTS IN THEM ALL. BECAUSE NOTIONS OF 'NEGATION' DO NOT APPEAR APART FROM THE SIX CATEGORIES.—(788)

COMMENTARY.

There is no one Universal embracing several such heterogeneous things as the Cloth and the like,—upon which the notion in question could be based.—It might be argued that—" there is the *Great Universal* (the Summum Genus) called 'Being', and the notion of Negation would arise on the basis of that ".—That however cannot be right ; as it is not true ; that is to say, you have such notions of *Negation* as are involved—(*a*) in the denial of such things as 'Dissociation from Impurities' ['*Pratisankhyānirodha*', a technicality postulated by the *Bauddha*, but denied by his opponents] as apart from the six Categories,—and (*b*) in the true denial of such imaginary characters in stories like *Kapiñjala* ;—to which adjunct would such notions of 'Negation' be due, which could be regarded as their basis ? Surely according to your view there is no real 'Being' (existence) in the case of such things as the said 'Dissociation from Impurities' and the like.

This same *argument* answers also the following assertion of *Kumārila's* :—"If it be urged that 'in the case of Prior Negation, etc. there is no Universal posited',—the answer is that *Being* itself is the Universal in these, *as qualified by non-appearance*" [*Shlokavārtika-Apohavāda*, 11] ; where the last qualification means that the 'Being' that subsists in the Negations is qualified by the character of being *not-produced*.

The objection that we have urged above applies to this view also. Because there can be no 'Being' (Existence, Reality) in the things postulated under other systems, or in character and things created in imaginary tales, etc.,—on which basis the notion of 'Negation' could arise in regard to them.

" What is conceived in the case of these things is the imaginary 'Being', which has no counter-part reality in the external world."

If that is so, then why is not the denotation of all terms admitted to consist in mere fancy, entirely devoid of any single permanent Universal in the shape of 'Being' ? Otherwise, if a Universal in the shape of the one eternal 'Being' be postulated,—inasmuch as all such terms as 'Being', 'Man' and the like would equally connote only the 'exclusion of other things', why should there be divergent notions regarding these ?—There can be no answer to this objection.—(788)

It has been urged by the author above (under *Text* 749) that—'in regard to persons created by imagination, and in regard to dead and unborn persons,—the notions of Negation appear without any all-embracing basis'. This argument is further elaborated in the following—

TEXTS (789–795).

In the case of things created by imagination, there can be no Universal subsisting in them; because there is no possibility of the existence of the Individuals (that would make up the universals). Hence the 'fallibility' of the opponent's Reasons remains as before.—Similarly with regard to past and future things,—if there is a cognition of an eternal universal, then no such pure 'universal' (without the constituent Individuals) can ever be apprehended. Or, if such a pure Universal by itself were apprehended, then it could not be the 'universal' of any Particulars. Such a Universal could not be manifestable by Particulars; just as the *Himālaya* is not manifestable by the *Vindhya*.—Nor can the Universal be tied down to the Particulars through its birth being dependent upon these.—Nor lastly can the Universal be dependent upon the Particulars for its cognition, because it is eternal and because it is apprehended purely by itself.—There is also no possibility of its being dependent upon any such thing as the contact of its own substratum with the sense-organ concerned. Consequently this Universal could either be apprehended at all times, or not apprehended at any time at all.—As regards its capacity to bring about its own cognition by itself, it may or may not have this capacity; whichsoever way it is, it would always remain so. Its natural form,—with or without the said capacity,—would be unshakeable, because it is itself permanent. Who then, could ever shake what is unshakeable?—(789–795)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*ichchhārachita, etc.*' is to be expounded as 'that of which the form is created by imagination': The term '*ādi*' includes *dead and unborn* things.—There is no Universal subsisting in such imaginary things, on which the said notion could be based.

"There may be no Universal in regard to imaginary things; in regard to the past and future things, the notion could be due to the Universal".

This is not true; the nature of things subsisting in other things is not such that they exist by themselves, without their substratum; if they did not exist, then they would cease to be *subsistent*.

Even if the subsistent things existed by themselves,—even so, the difficulty remains; because the other party also does not admit the apprehension of the Universal by itself. This has been thus declared by them—"The Universal depends for its cognition upon the contact of its substratum with the sense-organ".

Further, if the Universal could be apprehended by itself, the cognition of the Particular Individuals could not be held to follow from the cognition of the Universal; because the Particular does not exist at the time that the Universal is apprehended by itself.

Nor would there be any connection between the Particulars and the Universal,—such as is involved in the notion that 'this is the Universal of these Particulars'; as there would be no basis for such a connection.

For instance, if there were a basis for such connection, it could consist either, (*a*) in the fact of its being manifested by them, or (*b*) in its being produced by them, or (*c*) in its cognition being dependent upon their cognition.—(*a*) The Universal cannot be regarded as connected with these Particulars on account of its being manifested by them; because being permanent, it can have no peculiarity produced in it by anything else, hence it could not be manifested by anything else; when one thing does not confer any benefit upon another thing, it cannot serve as its *manifester*; for instance, the *Himālaya* is not the manifester of the *Vindhya*. The Particulars in the same way cannot be the manifester of the Universal. Hence the notion involved in the proposition is contrary to a wider proposition. If a thing that confers no benefit were to be regarded as the *manifester*, then there would be the absurdity that everything would be the manifester of everything else.—(*b*) For the same reason, because the Universal is held to be eternal, therefore it cannot be right to regard it as dependent upon the Particulars for its *production*.—(*c*) Inasmuch as there is apprehension of the pure Universal by itself, it could not be held to be dependent upon the Particulars for its *cognition*.—Thus all the three alternatives are impossible.

Hence the assertion that—"the Universal has its apprehension dependent upon the contact of its substratum with the sense-organ"—is not right; because there can be no 'substratum' for the Universal; how then could the Universal be dependent for its cognition upon the contact of the sense-organ with any such 'substratum'?

The particle '*ādi*' includes such conditions as the contact of the Mind and Soul, and the like (postulated by the *Vaishēṣika*).

Then again, as the Universal is eternal, and hence can have no peculiar features introduced into it by other things,—it cannot be dependent upon anything else. Consequently, if it is capable of bringing about its own cognition, then it should bring it about at all times; if it is incapable of bringing it about, then it could not bring it about at any time at all. Whatever its nature be—capable or incapable,—it could not alter it; or else it would lose its permanence; this has been thus declared—'Its capacity or incapacity, which rests in its very nature,—who can destroy? As it is eternal and hence not amenable to treatment'.—(789–795)

It has been argued (by *Bhāvivikta,* under *Text* 720) that—" the Universal *Cow* is something different from the Cow, etc., etc. "—The following *Text* shows that the Reason adduced there is found to be false, in view of the case of such notions as those of the 'Cook' and the like—

TEXTS (796-797).

" THE *Universal* 'COW' IS SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM THE *individual* COW, BECAUSE IT FORMS THE OBJECT OF A DIFFERENT IDEA,—LIKE COLOUR, TOUCH AND THE LIKE ;—ALSO BECAUSE IT IS SPOKEN OF AS BELONGING TO THAT, JUST AS THE HORSE IS SPOKEN OF AS BELONGING TO CHAITRA ".—THIS ARGUMENT MAY BE SHOWN TO BE 'FALLIBLE' (UNTRUE) IN VIEW OF THE NOTION OF THE 'COOK' AND SO FORTH.—IN THIS SAME MANNER, OTHER WRONG ARGUMENTS ALSO ARE TO BE DISCREDITED.—(796-797)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, even though the Universal 'Cook' is not held to be anything different from the individual Cook, yet it does become the object of diverse cognitions,—such as 'this is a *cook*—that is a *cook*' and so forth ; there are also such verbal expressions as '*Devadatta's Cook-ship*', where the two things are expressed by words with different case-terminations. Thus the Reason adduced by the other party is found to be 'Inconclusive' because 'too wide'.

'*Other wrong arguments*' ;—such as those put forward by *Kumārila* and others.

The following are the 'wrong arguments' set forth by *Kumārila* :—" (1) In regard to the diverse particular cows there appears the notion of 'cow',—this must be due to a single entity in the shape of the *Universal* 'Cow',—because it manifests the cow and is of one form ;—just like the notion in regard to a single individual cow.—Or again (2) The notion of 'Cow' cannot be due to a *particular* Cow, the Black one for instance, or it must be due to something different from this *particular* Cow ;—because it appears even when this particular Cow is not present ;—just like the notion of 'being made of Clay' in regard to the Jar.—If it is asked how this Universal is said

to subsist in all particular individuals,—our explanation is as follows :—This notion of 'Cow' (the Universal) has for its object something that subsists in everyone of the individuals ;—because each individual is found to contain the whole form of the thing,—like the notion in regard to each individual.—The one-ness also of the Universal is fully established. Because even though the Universal subsists in its entire form in every individual, yet it is *one* only,—because it is apprehended by a cognition of one and the same form ; just as the *exclusion of the Brāhmaṇa* by such negative terms as 'non-brāhmaṇa'.—It cannot be urged against this that—'this notion of identical form in regard to things that are different must be wrong, and hence it is not right to determine the nature of things on the strength of that notion'.—Because there is no defect in the source of this notion; nor is there any subsequent cognition that annuls this notion. Hence there being none of the causes of mistake, the assertion that it is wrong cannot be right".

All these arguments have been thus formulated (by *Kumārila*, in *Shlokavārtika—Vanavāda* 44–49) :—"The Idea of *Cow* in regard to the different individual cows is based upon the one Universal 'Cow',—because it manifests the cow and because it is of one form,—just like the notion of the individual Cow.—The Idea of the 'Cow' cannot be based upon the individual Black Cow,—or it must be based upon something other than this individual,—because it is present even when the individual is not present,—just as the notion of 'being made of clay' in regard to the Jar.—The Idea of the 'Cow' has for its object everyone of the individuals in which it subsists, because it subsists in everyone of them in its complete form,—just like the notion in regard to each individual.—Even though the Universal subsists in each individual, yet it is only one,—because it is cognized as one—just like the *exclusion of the Brāhmaṇa* in the case of the negative term (like '*non-brāhmaṇa*').—The notion of 'one-ness' in regard to the Universal *Cow* cannot be regarded as wrong ;—because there is no defect in its source, nor any subsequent cognition annulling it".

In the *first* of these arguments, the Corroborative Instance is 'devoid of the Probandum'; because a single Universal 'Cow' is not admitted ; hence the fact of the notion of the one individual cow being based upon that cannot also be admitted.—If what is proved is the general fact of its having a single basis, then it is superfluous ; because it is admitted by us also that the notion is due to the *exclusion of the non-cow,* which is one only, which serves to distinguish the Cow from all heterogeneous things.

In the argument that the notion of 'Cow' cannot be based upon any particular Black Cow,—if what is denied is the fact of its being produced directly from it, then it is superfluous ; because the producing is interposed by the apprehension of the 'specific peculiarity' and the 'conception of the Convention'. If what is denied is the fact of even *indirect* production, of the notion from the individual, then the Proposition is annulled by direct experience and the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum.

Even when what is meant to be proved is that the notion is based upon something other than the individual,—if the fact of the notion being due to something else be sought to be proved even when the Black Cow is close by,—then this also is contrary to direct experience. Because as a matter of fact,

it proceeds from the cognition of the Cow close by. The Corroborative Instance also is devoid of the Probandum.—If, on the other hand, what is sought to be proved is that when the Black Cow is not there, the notion of Cow that appears in the presence of the Cow of variegated colour is due to something different from the Black Cow,—then the argument is superfluous.—If then what is meant to be proved is the fact of its being due directly to the entity itself,—then the Reason is 'inconclusive'; as it has been explained that there is no real entity (like the Universal 'Cow') which could form the basis of the said notion.

As for the argument that has been adduced to prove that the Universal subsists in its entire form in every individual,—there also if the fact is meant to be proved in a vague general way, then it is superfluous. Because in regard to every individual thing, its notion is based upon the notion of the thing as excluded from every other thing.

If what is meant to be proved is the fact that the notion has for its object a real entity called 'Universal' which subsists in its entire form in every individual,—then the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum and the Reason is 'inconclusive'. As the concomitance of such a character is not known of anywhere. If a single thing subsisted in its entire form in several things, then all the diverse individuals would be of one and the same form; because every one of them would be associated with the same entity, 'Universal', subsisting in every single individual. Or the *Universal* itself would have to be regarded as being of diverse forms,—because at one and the same time, it subsists in its entire form in several things; just like the *Bilva* and other fruits placed in several vessels kept at varying distances. So that the argument is annulled by this Inference also.

For this same reason, the assertion that "there is no annulling cognition to the contrary" is not true. As the annulling cognition has been pointed out above and is also going to be pointed out later on.

As regards the argument in proof of the one-ness of the Universal,—there also, as it is not admitted that the Universal subsists in each individual, the fact of its being apprehended by a single cognition cannot be admitted; hence the Reason is one whose very basis is *not admitted.*—As regards the *Exclusion of the Brāhmaṇa,* it is not really one,—because it is a non-entity; hence the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum.—If the 'one-ness' be meant to be imaginary, then the reasoning is superfluous; because if it is imaginary, then it is already admitted by us in the form of '*Apoha*' (Exclusion of the Contrary).

As regards the statement that "there is no defect in the source of the notion",—that also cannot be admitted,—because the defect of the source is always there, in the shape of the beginningless influence of Ignorance.

In this same way all wrong arguments are to be disposed of.—(796-797)

Having thus pointed out the defects in the arguments adduced by the other party, for the proving of the *Universal,* the Author proceeds to advance arguments against the very Conception of the Universal:—

TEXTS (798–801).

IT IS AVERRED THAT THE 'UNIVERSAL SUBSISTS IN SEVERAL THINGS'. WHAT IS THIS 'SUBSISTENCE' MEANT TO BE?—IS IT *staying*? OR *being manifested*? AS FOR 'STAYING', WHICH STANDS FOR *not deviating from its own form*,—THIS BELONGS TO THE UNIVERSAL BY ITS VERY NATURE;—ANY RECEPTACLE OF IT COULD NOT PRODUCE THIS IN IT, BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THAT SUBSTRATUM COULD BE REGARDED AS 'THAT WHICH MAKES IT *stay*'. AS FOR *preventing its movement* (WHICH IS ANOTHER FORM OF 'SUBSISTENCE'), IT CANNOT BELONG TO THE UNIVERSAL, AS IT DOES TO THE JUJUBE FRUIT (CONTAINED IN THE CUP); BECAUSE THE UNIVERSAL IS, BY ITS NATURE, IMMOBILE; HENCE IT CANNOT HAVE A RECEPTACLE.—IF IT BE HELD THAT 'STAYING' IS *inherence*,—THAT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; AS IT IS THE EXACT NATURE OF THIS 'INHERENCE' THAT IS BEING EXAMINED. IN THE FORM OF THE RELATION OF THE *sustainer and sustained* WHICH SUBSISTS AMONG THINGS NEVER FOUND APART FROM EACH OTHER, SUCH 'INHERENCE' IS ADMITTED BY US ALSO.—(798–801)

COMMENTARY.

It is essential that the subsistence of the Universal in the diverse Individuals should be admitted; if it were not, then how could there be, on the basis of that Universal, any comprehensive notion of one and the same form specifically in connection with those things?—Now this 'subsistence' of the Universal, when it is there, could be either in the form of *staying* or in that of *being manifested*. *Staying* also is of two kinds—*not deviating from its own form* and *having its downward movement checked*.—The former is not possible in the case in question; because, being eternal, the Universal would, by its own nature, never deviate from its own form. Nor can it be the latter; because the Universal is incorporeal and all-pervading, and hence it can have no movement; so that *downward movement* would not be possible; hence it cannot be right to assume the *checking* of any movement.

The answer that what is meant by the 'subsistence' of the Universal in the diverse things is its *inherence* in these,—would be no answer at all; as it is just this 'Inherence' the exact nature of which is being considered.—For instance, 'Inherence' has been defined as the relation of *sustainer and sustained* that subsists in things never found apart from each other. Now what is being considered is whether this character of *being sustained* is of the nature of its *staying being restricted*, or of *being manifested*. In the case of entirely distinct things, it cannot be right to postulate any such distinct thing as 'Inherence' which can serve no useful purpose; as such postulating would lead to absurdities,—as in that case everything would 'inhere' in every other thing. Because 'Inherence' has been postulated as that which combines things which are distinguished from one another; but even when there is such a distinct thing as 'Inherence', things which

are essentially different do not assume one another's form; for, if they did, they would lose their own form.—In giving the name of 'Inherence' to that other thing, there can be no dispute.—From all this it follows that the 'staying' (of the Universal in the diverse things) cannot be anything different. —(798–801)

The following *Texts* proceed to show that it is absolutely incongruous to assume a 'receptacle' for the 'Universal'—

TEXTS (802–804).

IN THE CASE OF WATER AND SUCH THINGS, THERE MAY BE A 'RECEPTACLE' WHICH PREVENTS THEIR DOWNWARD MOVEMENT; IN THE CASE OF UNIVERSALS HOWEVER, WHICH ARE IMMOBILE, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF RECEPTACLES ?—IN THE CASE OF WHAT IS CAPABLE OF BRINGING ABOUT ITS OWN COGNITION, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF ANY CAUSES OF MANIFESTATION ?—AND ALSO IN THE CASE OF WHAT IS INCAPABLE OF BRINGING ABOUT ITS OWN COGNITION, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF ANY CAUSES OF MANIFESTATION ? IF WHAT WAS *incapable* YESTERDAY WERE MADE *capable* (TO-DAY), THEN THE THING WOULD BE IMPERMANENT,—JUST LIKE THE JAR MANIFESTED BY THE LAMP.—(802–804)

COMMENTARY.

'*Agatīnām*', '*Immobile*'—which are devoid of movement. The absence of movement in the Universal is implied by its incorporeality and all-pervading character.

Nor can the 'subsistence' of the Universal in the Individuals be of the nature of *being manifested.* Because the 'manifestation' of the Universal could only consist in *bringing about its Cognition*, not in any strengthening of its character, because the character of an eternal thing cannot be changed. Under the circumstances, if the Universal has the capacity of bringing about its own Cognition, then why should it need any other cause for its 'manifestation' ?—If, on the other hand, it does not possess the capacity of bringing about its own Cognition, then it would not be reasonable to assert its dependence on something else, as by its very nature, the Universal is such that nothing can be introduced into it by other things.—If it be held that other things do introduce peculiar features into the Universal, then, like the Individual, it would become *specific*, and cease to be *Universal.*

The thing, etc. etc.—The entire category 'Universal' is held to be based upon the *name* and *notion* of 'existence', [hence '*bhāva*' here stands for the thing Universal, in that sense].

The argument may be formulated as follows :—When there is no basis for one thing subsisting in another, then it cannot subsist in this latter,—e.g. the *Himālaya* in the *Vindhya* ;—there is no basis for the subsistence of the Universal in the Individuals ;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider 'term' (which implies the negation of the narrower term).—(802–804)

The following *Text* sets forth another objection—

TEXT (805).

THE VARIOUS UNIVERSALS, 'JAR' AND THE REST, COULD SUBSIST EITHER IN THEIR OWN RESPECTIVE RECEPTACLES OR IN ALL PLACES,—LIKE THE 'HIGHEST UNIVERSAL' (SUMMUM GENUS).—(805)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ghaṭādi, etc.*'—i.e. such diverse 'Universals' as the 'Jar' and the rest.

The Universals 'Jar', 'Clayey' and the like have been described as all-pervasive, and yet would they be described as pervading only over their own substratum—or as pervading over all space, even where there are no individuals at all ?—There are only these two views possible.

'*Like the Highest Universal*' ;—'Being' is called the 'highest' Universal because it comprises the largest number of things. It is this widest Universal as comprising the largest number of things that has been cited as the instance, and not any such Universal as pervades over only such space as happens to lie between two individuals ; as the said character is not perceived in this latter.—(805)

Out of the two alternatives set forth above, the Author sets forth the objection against the first alternative :—

TEXT (806).

WHEN THE THING COMES INTO EXISTENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE, IT IS NOT UNDERSTOOD HOW THE UNIVERSAL IS PERCEIVED THERE, OR HOW IT GAINS SUBSISTENCE THEREIN.—(806)

COMMENTARY.

When in a place entirely devoid of the Jar, a Jar comes into existence (on being made),—how the particular Universal 'Jar' comes to be perceived in that Jar,—or how it subsists in it,—it is not understood.—(806)

The following *Text* explains why it is not understood—

TEXT (807).

THE UNIVERSALS CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE COME INTO EXISTENCE ALONG WITH THE NEW JAR,—BECAUSE THEY ARE ETERNAL ; NOR CAN THEY BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN THERE ALREADY, BECAUSE (*ex hypothesi*) THEY ARE NOT ALL-PERVADING ; NOR CAN THEY BE SAID TO HAVE COME FROM ELSEWHERE, BECAUSE THEY ARE IMMOBILE.—(807)

COMMENTARY.

In the said case the Universal 'Jar' could either come into existence along with the different individual Jars,—or it would be there already,—or

it would come in from another place;—only under these three conditions could the Universal be perceived, or subsist, in the Jar newly come into existence. As a matter of fact however, the Universal could not be produced along with the new Jar,—as it is eternal (and hence cannot be produced). Nor could it have been there already, because it is not all-pervading in character. Nor lastly could it come in from elsewhere, because it is immobile. How then could the Universal subsist, or be perceived, in this case?

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When in any place a thing is not produced, nor has it been already there, nor has it come from elsewhere, then it cannot be perceived, nor can it subsist,—just like the Horn on the Hare's head;—where the Jar is produced in a place which had been devoid of it, the Universal is neither produced, nor has it been there already, nor has it come from elsewhere;—hence the wider character is not perceived (which implies the absence of the narrower character).—This Reason is not *Inconclusive*, because there is no other way (apart from the three mentioned) in which the Universal could subsist or be perceived.—(807)

The following *Text* sets forth the objection against the second alternative view (mentioned in *Text* 805, that the Universals 'Jar' and the like are all-pervading, subsisting in all things):—

TEXT (808).

WHEN THE CONTACT OF ITS SUBSTRATUM WITH THE SENSE-ORGAN AND SUCH OTHER CONDITIONS WOULD BE PRESENT AND BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE UNIVERSAL,—THAT UNIVERSAL WOULD BECOME PERCEIVED EVERYWHERE; BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO DIVISION IN ITS FORM.—(808)

COMMENTARY.

'*The contact, etc. etc.*'—i.e. the causes of Perception.

'*Such other conditions*';—this is meant to include the contact of the Mind and Soul and so forth.

What is meant is that the Universal being perceived in one particular individual, it should be perceived in other and heterogeneous individuals also, as also in the interval between two individuals; because it is of one uniform character which cannot differ from the one that is actually perceived.—(808)

This same argument is further elucidated in the following *Text*—

TEXT (809).

(*a*) IF THE UNIVERSAL (IN THE NEW INDIVIDUAL) BE NOT-DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH HAS BEEN ALREADY PERCEIVED,—THEN THERE SHOULD BE PERCEPTION OF THAT UNIVERSAL ALSO; —OR (*b*) LIKE IT, THE OTHER ALSO SHOULD NOT BE PERCEIVED;—OR (*c*) THERE SHOULD BE DIFFERENCE.—(809)

COMMENTARY.

(*a*) That is to say, if the form of the Universal subsisting in other heterogenous individuals and in the intervals were *not-different* from the form of the Universal subsisting in the Individual that is seen,—then, the former also should be seen, as it would be not-different from what is seen, like the form of this latter.—(*b*) If however there is no perception of the said Universal, then there should be no perception of that Universal as subsisting in the perceived individual which is non-different from what is not perceived.—(*c*) Lastly, if the Universal in question be held to be of both kinds,—then that would involve a diversity of nature; two mutually contradictory characters being present; and for any clear-minded person, it cannot be right to regard as *one* what is found to be obsessed by the two mutually contradictory characters of *perceptibility* and *imperceptibility*; as such an idea would lead to absurdities; as in that case the whole Universe would be a single substance, which would imply the anomaly of the whole being produced and destroyed at one and the same time. If it were not so, then they would be 'one' only in name; and there can be no difference of opinion regarding mere names.—(809)

Thus having discredited the whole conception of the 'Universal', the Author proceeds to formulate the arguments against it:—

TEXTS (810-811).

THE NOTIONS OF 'TREE' AND SUCH THINGS CANNOT BE BASED UPON THE 'UNIVERSALS' POSTULATED BY THE OTHER PARTY;—BECAUSE THINGS APPEAR IN SUCCESSION, AND BECAUSE THEY ARE COMPREHENSIVE,—LIKE THE NOTIONS OF THE 'COOK' AND SUCH THINGS.—THE FACT THAT WHAT IS ETERNAL CANNOT BE PRODUCTIVE (OF EFFECTS) ALSO SERVES TO ANNUL THE OPPONENT'S PROPOSITION.—ALL THE OBJECTIONS THAT WERE URGED AGAINST 'CONJUNCTION' ALSO SERVE TO ANNUL THE OPPONENT'S CONCLUSION.—(810-811)

COMMENTARY.

Notions that are endowed with the properties—of appearing in succession, being comprehensive, being entities, being produced, and so forth—cannot

proceed from the eternal, one all-pervading 'Universal', as conceived by the other party;—like the notions of the 'Cook';—the notions of the 'Tree', etc. are of the said character; hence there is perception of a character concomitant with the contrary of the Opponent's conclusion. As *being in succession* and the rest are all concomitant with *non-eternality,* which is contrary to *eternality* (postulated by the Opponent). What is eternal cannot have any effective action, either successive or simultaneous,—as both are incompatible; hence the Reason adduced by us cannot be regarded as 'Inconclusive'. As regards the fallacy of our Corroborative Instance being 'devoid of the Probandum', that has been already disposed of by us in detail; hence the Instance also cannot be said to be 'unproven'.

The Author states another argument in annulment of the Opponent's conclusion—*All the objections, etc. etc.*;—these objections were set forth under *Text* 674, above, where it has been shown that one thing cannot subsist in several things; similarly in the section dealing with the *Composite,* under *Text* 607.—(810-811)

The following *Text* sums up the section—

TEXT (812).

THUS HAS BEEN REJECTED THE 'UNIVERSAL' AS AN ENTIRELY DISTINCT ENTITY. AS REGARDS THE 'UNIVERSAL' POSTULATED BY THE FOLLOWERS OF *Jaimini,* THAT IS GOING TO BE REJECTED UNDER THE CHAPTER ON 'SYĀDVĀDA' (CHAPTER XX).—(812)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Universal' has been postulated by the *Vaishēṣika* and his followers as something entirely distinct from the Individuals; and we have stated the objections against this doctrine. The *Jainas* and the followers of *Jaimini* have postulated the 'Universal' as *non-different from the Individual,* and also of both kinds; and this will be examined, in due course, under the Chapter on '*Syādvāda*'; on the present occasion, we had set out to criticise the doctrine of the *Nyāya-vaishēṣika*; hence we do not take up the other doctrine, which would be somewhat irrelevant to the Context.—(812)

End of the Examination of the 'Universal'.

CHAPTER XIV.

Examination of the Vishēṣa : 'Ultimate Individuality'.

COMMENTARY.

The Author sets forth the objection against the Category of 'Ultimate Individuality':—

TEXT (813).

THEN AGAIN, THE 'ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES' THAT HAVE BEEN POSTULATED AS EXISTING IN ULTIMATE ENTITIES, HAVE BEEN ALREADY PROVED TO BE IMPOSSIBLE, BY THE REJECTION OF THE 'ETERNAL SUBSTANCE'; THEY ARE MERE 'MOMENTS'.—(813)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Ultimate Individualities' have been defined as 'subsisting in eternal substances and as existing in ultimate substances'. This cannot be a definition at all; as it is open to the charge of being *impossible*; there is no substance that is *eternal*; it has been already rejected under the Chapter on the *Examination of Substance*; under the circumstances, how could these Individualities be admitted as subsisting in *eternal* substances?—(813)

The existence of these 'Ultimate Individualities' has been sought to be proved on the basis of the peculiar experience of Mystics; but the Reason in that case is 'inconclusive'. This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (814–816).

AMONG ATOMS, *Ākāsha*, SPACE AND SUCH THINGS (IN WHICH THE ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES ARE HELD TO SUBSIST),—IF THEIR FORMS ARE DISTINCT FROM EACH OTHER,—THEN THE APPREHENSION OF DISTINCTION AMONG THEM NEED NOT BE DUE TO ANYTHING ELSE IN THE SHAPE OF THIS ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITY.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE THEIR FORMS MIXED UP WITH EACH OTHER, THEN, EVEN THOUGH THERE MAY BE DIFFERENCE, THE APPREHENSION OF ABSOLUTE DISTINCTION COULD NOT BUT BE WRONG.—HOW TOO IS THE DISTINCTION AMONG 'ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES' APPREHENDED? IF BY THEMSELVES,—THEN WHY IS NOT THE SAME HELD TO BE THE CASE WITH ATOMS AND OTHER THINGS ALSO?—(814–816)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the form of Atoms, etc. may be either distinct from each other, each having its own specific character, or, mixed up.—If it is the former,

then, as the things would themselves be always apprehended in their unmixed—distinct—forms, the assumption of any further 'Individualities' for the purpose of the Mystics' apprehending their distinct forms would be useless.—If the second alternative is accepted, then, even in the presence of the distinct Category of the 'Ultimate Individualities', how could the Mystics' cognition of the Atoms, etc. as distinct,—when their forms are (*ex hypothesi*) not entirely distinct—be free from error ? It would be clearly wrong, being the cognition of things as what they are not; and the Mystics, in that case, would not be true Mystics, on account of entertaining a wrong notion of things.

Then again, if the distinct cognition of things were not possible without a distinct category in the shape of 'Ultimate Individualities',—then, how could there be distinct cognitions regarding these Individualities themselves ? As there are no further 'Ultimate Individualities' in them; if they were there, then there would be an infinite regress; it would also be contrary to the Opponent's doctrine that these Individualities are ultimate and subsist in eternal substances; as these other Individualities would be subsisting in the Ultimate Individualities also (which are not *Substances*). If, for these reasons, it be admitted that the Ultimate Individualities themselves become the basis of the distinct cognitions of themselves,—then, in the case of Atoms, etc. also, they themselves may be regarded as the basis of their distinct cognitions; why should there be this aversion against them that, even though they have their individual forms mutually exclusive, their capacity to bring about distinct cognitions of themselves is not admitted,—while such capacity is admitted in the 'Ultimate Individualities' ? We find no reason for this aversion, except stupidity.—(814–816)

The following *Texts* anticipate the answer to the above given by *Prashastamati*—

TEXTS (817-818).

"JUST AS THE UNCLEAN CHARACTER BELONGS TO THE DOG'S FLESH BY ITSELF, AND TO OTHER THINGS BY CONTACT WITH IT,—SO IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO;—AND JUST AS BETWEEN THE JAR AND THE LAMP, THE LAMP, BY ITSELF, IS ALWAYS THE ILLUMINATOR OF THE JAR, BECAUSE IT IS OF THE NATURE OF LIGHT,—SO ALSO IN THE CASE IN QUESTION."—(817-818)

COMMENTARY.

Prashastamati has argued as follows:—"The Dog's flesh is unclean by its very nature, and other things become unclean by coming into contact with it; in the same manner, the 'Ultimate Individualities' by themselves are the basis of exclusive notion—on account of their being of the nature of exclusion,—while Atoms and other things become such basis only through the presence in these of the said Individuality.—Then again, even if a thing

may not be of a certain nature, yet its notion may come about through the presence of something else; e.g. the cognition of the Jar is brought about by the Lamp; while the cognition of the Lamp is not brought about by the Jar.—'*Ayam*' stands for the *Jar*.—'*So also in the case in question*';—that is, the apprehension of distinction among Atoms, etc. is due to the presence of the Ultimate Individualities; while that of the Individualities themselves is due to their very nature."

This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (819–822).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THIS 'UNCLEAN CHARACTER' IS SOMETHING PURELY *illusory*, NOT *real*; HOW THEN COULD IT BE THERE EITHER 'BY ITSELF' OR 'THROUGH SOMETHING ELSE'?—OR, EVEN IF THE UNCLEAN CHARACTER BE SOMETHING REAL, IT MAY BE THAT OTHER THINGS BECOME 'UNCLEAN' THROUGH CONTACT WITH THE DOG'S FLESH; NOTHING LIKE THIS IS POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF ETERNAL SUBSTANCES, BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO 'BECOMING' (BEING BORN) FOR THEM.—THROUGH THE INFLUENCE OF THE LAMP, MOMENTARY OBJECTS,—LIKE THE JAR, THE ORNAMENT AND SO FORTH,—BECOME THE CAUSE OF THE PRODUCTION OF COGNITIONS; BUT THE APPREHENSION OF DISTINCTION CANNOT COME ABOUT THROUGH THE INFLUENCE OF THE 'ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES' IN QUESTION,—BECAUSE IT COMES ABOUT IN SUCCESSION,—LIKE PLEASURE AND THE REST.—(819–822)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the 'Unclean Character' of things is purely illusory, hypothetical, and not real; because it does not remain fixed; for instance, one and the same substance may appear to be 'unclean' for a Vedic scholar, but quite clean to the Hunter; and it cannot be possible for one and the same thing to combine within itself two mutually contradictory characters; as it would, in that case, cease to be *one and the same*.

Or, the 'Unclean Character' of things may be something *real*. Even so, it cannot serve as a Corroborative Instance; because what happens in the case of such things as food-grains and the like is that when they come into contact with an unclean thing, like the Dog's flesh, they abandon their previous *clean character* and become born again as endowed with the *unclean character*; hence it is right that in their case the *unclean character* is adventitious, due to something else. There is however no such basis in the case of Atoms and other eternal substances; by virtue of which any such adventitious distinctive feature could come into them; because they are eternal and hence they cannot be *born* with the new character.

Similarly, in the case of the *Lamp* also, the character of being the cause of cognitions, as found in the *Jar*, may be held to be adventitious, due to something else (in the shape of the *Lamp*).

The last text sets forth the argument against any such explanation in the case of *Ultimate Individualities.* The exact form of this Inference and the Premiss upon which it is based may be stated in the manner indicated above.—(819–822)

End of Chapter XIV.

CHAPTER XV.

Examination of 'Samavāya' (Inherence, Subsistence).

COMMENTARY.

The following *Texts* proceed to set forth objections to the Category of 'Inherence':—

TEXT (823).

"INHERENCE (SUBSISTENCE) IS APPREHENDED ON THE BASIS OF THE NOTION OF 'THIS SUBSISTS IN THAT',—SUCH AS IS FOUND IN THE EXPRESSIONS 'THE CLOTH CONSISTS OF (SUBSISTS IN) THESE YARNS', 'THE MAT CONSISTS OF (SUBSISTS IN) THE REEDS'."—(823)

COMMENTARY.

"In regard to things that are inseparable, and among things where one is the *container* and the other the *contained*,—there is the notion of 'this subsisting in that'; and the relation upon which this notion is based is 'Inherence (Subsistence)'. This is apprehended as something different from *Substance* and the other categories, on the basis of the particular notions of 'subsistence' present in such conceptions as 'the Cloth subsists in these yarns'.—In the case of such Universals as 'Being', 'Substance' and the rest, it is found that they bring about cognitions like their own, of their substratum,—and on this basis they are regarded as different from one another and also from their substratum;—the same is found to be the case with 'Inherence' also; in regard to all the other five categories, there are such notions as—'The Universal *Substance* subsists in this substance', 'the Universal *Quality* subsists in this quality', 'the Universal *Action* subsists in this action', 'the Ultimate Individualities subsist in these substances' and so forth; and on the basis of these notions, it is concluded that Inherence is something distinct from these five (Substance and the rest).—This argument may be formulated thus:—When a notion is found to appear in regard to a thing in a form different from that of that thing, that notion must be based upon something different from that thing,—for example, the notion of 'the man with the stick' in regard to *Dēvadatta*;—of this same kind is the notion of 'this subsists in that' that appears in regard to the five Categories;—and this is regarded as justifying the conclusion (that the notion is due to a distinct category in the shape of *Inherence*)."—(823)

The Author proceeds to explain the character of this *Inherence*:—

TEXTS (824–826).

"IF THERE WERE NO SUCH THING (AS *Inherence*), WHAT WOULD BE THE BASIS OF THE SAID NOTION? NO PARTICULAR NOTION IS FOUND TO APPEAR WITHOUT A PARTICULAR CAUSE.—INASMUCH AS THE SAME NOTION OF 'SUBSISTING HEREIN' IS EQUALLY PRESENT IN ALL CASES, INHERENCE DOES NOT VARY, LIKE CONJUNCTION. IN FACT IT IS PERCEIVED IN ALL THINGS AS ONE AND THE SAME, JUST LIKE 'EXISTENCE'.—INASMUCH AS ITS CAUSE IS NEVER APPREHENDED, IT IS ETERNAL,—LIKE 'EXISTENCE'. BY NO MEANS OF VALID COGNITION IS ITS CAUSE APPREHENDED."—(824–826)

COMMENTARY.

"Unless there is some basis for the notion, the notion of 'existence', etc. would always be there;—this is the Inferential argument subversive of your doctrine.

"Thus under the theory of the *Vaishēṣika*, 'Inherence' is *inferred* from the presence of the notion of 'subsisting in this'; while according to the *Naiyāyika*, it is directly perceived in the notion of 'subsisting in this'. That is to say, when the sense-organ is functioning, there appears the perception that 'the Cloth subsists in these yarns', and on the basis of this, they declare this notion to be 'Perception'.

"This Inherence (which is a form of Relation) does not vary with the various correlatives,—as Conjunction does; in fact, like 'Existence', 'Being'—it is one and the same everywhere; for the simple reason that its indicative feature,—the notion of 'subsisting in this',—is everywhere the same.

"'*Like Conjunction*'—is an Instance *per dissimilarity*.

"*Having no cause*,—Inherence is eternal,—again like 'existence'. The fact of its having no cause is proved by the fact of no Cause of it being cognised by any means of Cognition."—(824–826)

With the following *Text*, the Author proceeds to set forth the objections against 'Inherence':—

TEXT (827).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE IDEA OF 'SUBSISTING IN THIS' EXISTS FOR OUR OPPONENTS ONLY; AND IT IS DUE ENTIRELY TO THEIR INFATUATION WITH THEIR OWN DOCTRINE; IT IS NEVER MET WITH IN COMMON EXPERIENCE. —(827)

COMMENTARY.

This points out that the Opponent's Reason is open to the fallacy of its substratum being 'unknown'. Such ideas as 'the cloth *subsists in* these

yarns' are only assumed through one's infatuation with his doctrines; in ordinary experience, no such ideas are ever found to appear; hence the very basis of the Probandum turns out to be one that does not exist at all.—(827)

The following *texts* lend further support to the same objection:—

TEXTS (828-829).

IF THE 'CONTAINER' AND THE 'CONTAINED' WERE PERCEIVED AS DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER, THEN ALONE WOULD THERE BE ANY SUCH NOTION AS 'THIS SUBSISTS IN THAT',—AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE FRUITS AND THE PIT (WHERE THE FRUITS LIE);—THE CLOTH AND THE YARNS HOWEVER ARE NEVER PERCEIVED AS DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER,—BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THERE COULD APPEAR ANY SUCH NOTIONS AS 'THIS SUBSISTS IN THOSE'.—(828-829)

COMMENTARY.

It is only when two things have been found to be distinct from one another, when one is found to be contained in the other, that there appears the notion that 'this subsists in that'; such is our ordinary experience; as is found in the case of the notion 'these *Bēl* fruits are contained in this pit'. In the case of the Cloth and the Yarns however no such difference has been perceived; in fact, no such difference exists; how then could there be any such notion as 'the Cloth subsists in the Yarns'.—(828-829)

The following might be urged:—"It may be that the said notion has been assumed by us on the strength of our own doctrine; but even so, it behoves you to explain the basis of such a notion."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (830).

IN THE CASE OF THIS NOTION IMAGINED BY MERE WHIM,—AS IN THE CASE OF MERELY ASSUMED THINGS,—IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO QUESTION THE OTHER PARTY REGARDING ITS BASIS.—(830)

COMMENTARY.

When one does not wish to find a cause, how could he be questioned regarding such cause for an effect which you have yourself assumed? In

fact, you have to question yourself, who have assumed the effect, under your own whim; whims do not always follow the real state of things; they are essentially free from all restraint; hence nothing can be proved on their basis; as it would lead to an infinite regress. For instance, for what is assumed by you, another person might assume something entirely different. —(830)

Then again, it is not that notions like 'this subsists in that' do not appear at all; in fact, the notions that do appear are to the contrary. This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (831–834).

The notion that does appear in ordinary experience is in the form 'the Branches *in* the Tree', 'the stones *in* the Hill'; and this notion proceeds from the fact that the two (the Branch and the Stones) are perceived to be in close contact with the other portions of the two 'immovables' (Tree and Hill). The notion that 'those two (Tree and Mountain) *subsist in* these (Branches and the Stones)' however that is put forward (by the Opponent) is one that is beyond all ordinary experience.—What such notions as 'This Colour or that Action in this Jar' apprehend is *identity*; the general terms 'Colour' ('Action'), 'Jar' connote these things generally, in all states and conditions; hence for the purpose of mentioning their particular forms, they are spoken of in the manner expressed in the said notions; and it is on the basis of those particular forms that the notion appears in that form,—not on the basis of 'Inherence'; because the distinction among all these is not perceived. —(831–834)

COMMENTARY.

In ordinary life such notions are met with as 'The Branches in the Tree', 'The Stones in the Hill',—and not such as 'The Tree in the Branches', 'the Hill in the Stones'. That notion also of 'the Branches in the Tree' is not due to 'Inherence'; it is due to the fact that the two (Branches and Stones) are perceived in close contact with portions of 'the two immovables', other than the Tree and Stones spoken of,—those other portions being the Trunk of the Tree, and the Base of the Hill.—The term '*immovables*' is meant to stand for both, the Tree and the Hill, in view of the fact that both are equally immovable.

'*Those two*' ;—the Hill and the Tree.

'*In these*' ;—in the Stones and in the Branches.

Question—" There are many such well-known notions among people as 'The Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, and Action *in the Jar*' ; what could be the basis of such a notion, except *Inherence* ? "

Answer :—'*What such notions, etc. etc.*'—'*Identity*', i.e. Being of the nature of the Jar ; this is what is apprehended by the said notion,—or by men. When 'Colour' is spoken of as 'in the Jar', what is meant is that the *Colour is of the nature of the Jar*, not that it is the *same* as the Jar. When there is a desire to speak of certain common potencies like those of *Colour* and the rest, and yet to distinguish those present in things other than the Jar, one introduces the term 'Jar' (and uses the expression 'the Colour in the Jar'). Each of the terms 'Colour' and the rest, by itself, is used for the purpose of connoting the specific capacity of each of those factors to bring about the *visual* and other cognitions specifically ; thus it is that the term 'Jar' just indicates those diverse factors ; thus there being no co-ordination between the two, the *sameness* of form is explained on the basis of different substratum.

" Why then are both the terms used ? "

Answer :—'*The general terms, etc. etc.*' :—The term 'Colour' connotes Colour in general, in all sorts of conditions ; for instance, just as the Colour in the *Jar* is spoken of as 'Colour', so also is the colour in the *Cloth* ; hence the word 'Colour' by itself does not connote anything in particular,—as to which particular Colour is meant. When, however, the expression used is 'the Colour *in the Jar*', the Colour connoted is that particular one which is in the form of the Jar, as distinguished from that in the Cloth and other things. Similarly, the term 'Jar' also connotes the Jar under all conditions,—white, yellow, moving, not moving and so forth ; hence the word by itself does not connote anything particular ; but when the expression 'the white colour in the Jar' is used, the notion that appears is that of the white Jar as distinguished from other jars. Thus it is that when one wishes to speak of this particular Jar, the words are used in the form 'Colour in the Jar'.

It is on the basis of such expressions that there appears the notion of the *Colour in the Jar*, in reference to the Jar. It is not on the basis of any such thing as 'Inherence'. The reason for this is next stated—'*Because the Distinction, etc. etc.*' ;—there is no difference apprehended among 'Inherence', 'Jar' and 'Colour',—on the basis of which the said notion could be said to be based upon 'Inherence'.

What is meant by this is that the Reason adduced by the Opponent is 'inconclusive' and his Conclusion is annulled by Inference and other means of cognition.—(831–834)

It has been argued by the Opponent (under *Text* 825, above) that—" Inasmuch as one and the same notion of 'this subsisting in that' is equally present in all cases, Inherence does not vary like Conjunction ".—This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (835–839).

IF THERE WERE ONE AND THE SAME INHERENCE IN ALL THINGS, THEN THE NOTION OF 'CLOTH' SHOULD APPEAR IN THE POTSHERD ALSO; IT WOULD ALSO FOLLOW THAT THE UNIVERSAL 'COW' SUBSISTS IN THE ELEPHANT ALSO; SO THAT THE ELEPHANT ALSO SHOULD HAVE THE FORM OF THE COW, JUST LIKE THE *Variegated Cow*.—THE NOTION THAT 'THE CLOTH SUBSISTS IN THE YARNS' IS BASED UPON INHERENCE; THIS SAME INHERENCE BEING PRESENT IN THE POTSHERDS ALSO, WHY IS IT THAT THERE IS NO SUCH NOTION AS THAT 'THE CLOTH SUBSISTS IN THE POTSHERDS'?—IF IT BE URGED THAT THIS IS SO FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE CLOTH DOES NOT SUBSIST IN THE POTSHERDS,—THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT IN THE YARNS ALSO, IT SUBSISTS ONLY BY INHERENCE; IS THIS INHERENCE THEN NOT PRESENT IN THE POTSHERDS? IN FACT THE INHERENCE OF THE CLOTH IN THE YARNS MUST BE THE SAME AS THE INHERENCE OF THE CLOTH [READ '*paṭasya*' ACC. TO COMM.] IN THE POTSHERDS; AND HENCE THERE COULD BE NO RESTRICTION IN THE NOTION AT ALL.—(835–839)

COMMENTARY.

If there were only one 'Inherence' in all the Three Worlds, then, such notions also should appear as 'the Cloth in the Potsherds', and also that the Universal 'Cow' subsists in the House; and hence just as the notion of 'Cow' appears in regard to the *variegated Cow*, so should it appear also in regard to the Elephant.

Then again, the notion that 'the Cloth subsists in the Yarns' has been explained as being due to the influence of Inherence; this Inherence of the Cloth is present in the Potsherds also; why then should there not be a similar notion—'The Cloth in the Potsherds'—in regard to the Potsherds also?

It might be argued that—"inasmuch as the Cloth does not subsist in the Potsherds, the said notion does not appear."

This cannot be true. Because the notion that the Cloth subsists in the *yarns* is also said to be so only on the strength of Inherence; is not this same Inherence present in the Potsherds also—on account of which there could be no such notion as 'the Cloth subsists in the Potsherds' also, just as in the Yarns?—As a matter of fact, that Inherence of the Cloth which is said to be present in the *yarns* should be the same as that of the Cloth in the Potsherds. Under the circumstances, wherefore should not there be an admixture of the notions of things (and the consequent confusion)? For these reasons, *there could be no restriction in the notion at all*; and as a result of this, the relation of Substance, Quality and Action with their respective qualifications—in the shape of the Universals 'Substance', 'Quality' and

'Action',—being one and the same, any division among the said Categories would be impossible.—(835–839)

The following *Text* propounds the possibility of the notion of 'Cow' in regard to the Elephant :—

TEXT (840).

SIMILARLY, THE INHERENCE OF THE UNIVERSAL 'ELEPHANT' IN THE ELEPHANT SHOULD BE ONE AND THE SAME AS THE INHERENCE OF THE VARIOUS UNIVERSALS 'COW' AND THE REST IN THEIR RESPECTIVE SUBSTRATA.—(840)

COMMENTARY.

In the following *Texts* (841–845), the author sets forth the answer given by *Prashastamati* :—

TEXT (841).

"EVEN THOUGH INHERENCE IS ONE, THE RESTRICTION OF *container and contained* IS ALWAYS THERE ; BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THE UNIVERSAL 'SUBSTANCE' IS PRESENT IN SUBSTANCES ONLY, AND THE UNIVERSAL 'ACTION' IS PRESENT IN ACTIONS ONLY."—(841)

COMMENTARY.

Prashastamati has argued as follows :—"Though Inherence is one, yet there is no likelihood of an admixture among the five Categories ; because there is always a restriction as to what is contained in what ; that is to say, the Universal 'Substance' is contained in Substances only, the Universal 'Quality' is contained in Qualities only, the Universal 'Action' is contained in Actions only ; and so on, the notion of the Universals 'Substance' and the rest appear as restricted to a particular substratum only."—(841)

In anticipation of the objection that—'in that case, Inherence would vary with each object',—*Prashastapati* offers the following explanation :—

TEXTS (842-843).

"FROM THE PERCEPTION OF THE FACT THAT THE NOTION OF 'SUBSISTING IN THIS', WHICH ARISES OUT OF 'INHERENCE', IS PRESENT IN ALL CASES, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT 'INHERENCE' IS ONE ONLY; AT THE SAME TIME, FROM THE PERCEPTION OF THE FACT THAT SUCH BASES AS THE UNIVERSALS 'SUBSTANCE' AND THE REST ARE ABSENT IN CERTAIN CASES, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE NOTIONS OF THESE UNIVERSALS 'SUBSTANCE' AND THE REST ARE RESTRICTED IN THEIR SCOPE."—(842-843)

COMMENTARY.

"The notion of 'subsistence in this', which is based upon Inherence, is found to appear in all cases in one and the same form, from which it follows that Inherence is one only. However, even though Inherence is one, the notions based upon the Universals 'Substance', etc. are found to appear in distinct forms as resting in distinct substrata; and thus they are found to be absent,—not present—in all cases; from this it is concluded that these Universals are distinct and diverse; so that there can be no admixture of the five Categories."—(842-843)

In answer to the question—How is it that there is this restriction of the *Container and Contained,* when the relation (of Inherence) is one and the same?—the following answer is provided (by *Prashastamati*):—

TEXTS (844-845).

"EVEN THOUGH 'CONJUNCTION' IS ONE ONLY, YET THE RELATION OF *Container and Contained* IS RESTRICTED TO THE PIT AND THE CURD (PLACED THEREIN); SIMILARLY THERE WOULD BE RESTRICTION IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO. SO THAT, EVEN THOUGH INHERENCE IS ONE ONLY, YET AS THERE WOULD BE DIVERSITY IN THE CHARACTER OF BEING THE *manifester and manifested,* THERE WOULD BE NO INCONGRUITY IN IT AT ALL."—(844-845)

COMMENTARY.

"Even though Conjunction is one only, yet in the case of the Curd and the Pit, the relation of *Container and Contained* is restricted;—similarly, in the case of the Universals 'Substance', etc., even though Inherence is one only, yet, by reason of the diversity in the capacity of *manifester and*

manifested, there would be restriction regarding the relation of *Container and Contained.*

"'*In it*'—i.e. in the restriction of the relation of *Container and Contained.*"—(844-845)

The answer to the above arguments (of *Prashastamati*) is given in the following—

TEXTS (846-847).

IF INHERENCE IS ONE ONLY, THEN ANY RESTRICTION REGARDING THE *Container and Contained* IS IMPOSSIBLE. THE UNIVERSAL 'SUBSTANCE' IS HELD TO SUBSIST IN SUBSTANCE ONLY;—HOW COULD THAT BE DUE TO INHERENCE? THIS SAME INHERENCE OF THE SUBSTANCE IS PRESENT IN QUALITY, ETC. ALSO; AS THESE LATTER ARE RELATED TO THE UNIVERSALS 'QUALITY', ETC.;—AND INHERENCE IS THE SAME IN BOTH.—(846-847)

COMMENTARY.

According to us, there is no such relation of *Container and Contained* as is held to subsist between the Universal 'Colour' and the particular Colour; it is admitted by you only; and this is impossible for you who regard Inherence to be one only. These and other incongruities in the Opponent's standpoint are now pointed out.

For instance, the Opponent accepts the restriction that the Universal 'Substance' subsists in Substances alone; and he does so on the basis of 'Inherence';—now the 'Inherence' of the Universal as 'Substance' is present in Qualities also; because those are related to the Universal 'Quality'.

Question:—"Even though the Relation is there, how is it concluded that that Relation is that of Inherence?"

Answer:—'*Inherence is the same in both*'.—'*Both*'—i.e. the two Universals 'Substance' and 'Quality'. Thus the notions having the same basis in both cases, admixture and confusion are inevitable.—(846-847)

TEXT (848).

IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN THIS (INHERENCE) WOULD BE DIFFERENT IN THE VARIOUS UNIVERSALS LIKE 'QUALITY', ETC.,—JUST AS CONJUNCTION VARIES WITH EACH CONJUNCT FACTOR. —(848)

COMMENTARY.

'*If it were not so*',—i.e. if the Inherence of the Universal 'Quality' in particular Qualities were not the same as the Inherence of the Universal

'Substance' in particular Substances,—then Inherence should vary with each substratum; just as Conjunction does.—(848)

It has been argued (by *Prashastamati,* under *Text* 843, above) that—"From seeing the absence of such basis as the Universal of 'Substance', etc. it is concluded that the scope of these Universals is restricted."—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (849).

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE ABSENCE OF NOTIONS BASED UPON THE UNIVERSAL 'SUBSTANCE',—WHEN THE BASIS IS THERE. FOR THE SAME REASON THERE CANNOT BE RESTRICTION OF IT.—(849)

COMMENTARY.

So long as the cause is there in its perfect condition, there cannot be absence of the effect; if it were there, then, it would not be the effect of that cause. Thus then the absence of the said notion being impossible, the restriction regarding the relation of *container and contained* also cannot be right.—(849)

"The restriction could be based upon such common expressions as 'The Universal *Substance* is contained—subsists—in Substances only'."
Answer :—

TEXT (850).

THE EXPRESSIONS OF 'BEING CONTAINED' AND 'SUBSISTING' AND THE LIKE ALSO ARE BASED UPON THE SAME 'INHERENCE'; HENCE THESE ALSO CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF RESTRICTION.—(850)

COMMENTARY.

The use of expressions like 'being contained', 'subsisting' and so forth also are explained by you as based upon the same 'Inherence'; and as this is the same everywhere, how could it serve to restrict anything? Hence these notions of 'contained in', etc. cannot serve as the basis of restricting the relation of Container and Contained. Because the notions in question stand upon the same footing as this latter relation.—(850)

"In that case the Restriction may be due to the limitations relating to the capacity *to manifest and be manifested.*"
Answer :—

TEXT (851).

THE DIFFERENCE IN THE CAPACITY *to manifest and to be manifested* ALSO IS BASED UPON INHERENCE ITSELF; IT CANNOT BE DUE TO ANYTHING ELSE; BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO 'PRODUCING' OF THINGS THAT ARE ETERNAL.—(851)

COMMENTARY.

Substances have been held to be the *manifester* of the Universal 'Substance', —and this on the strength of Inherence itself; because it is on account of the fact that the Universal 'Substance' *inheres* in a particular substance that it is said to be manifested by it.

'*It cannot be due to anything else*';—i.e. to any such circumstance as *the production of the character capable of bringing about an idea,* which has been postulated by the Buddhist. Because Inherence has been held to exist even in eternal things like 'Being' and the like,—and it is not right that there should be any 'production' of what are eternal.—(851)

The same line of argument is further supported in the following:—

TEXT (852).

BY THE MERE PRESENCE OF THE LAMP, THE LAMP DOES NOT BECOME CAPABLE OF PRODUCING ANY NOTIONS; SO ALSO THE UNIVERSALS LIKE 'JAR' (CANNOT BECOME CAPABLE OF PRODUCING NOTIONS).—(852)

COMMENTARY.

The case of the 'Pit and the Curd' has been put forward as an example (under Text 844, by *Prashastamati*). The following *Text* shows that this is not admitted by us:—

TEXT (853).

THAT THE CONJUNCTION IN THE CASE OF THE CURD AND THE PIT IS ONE ONLY HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED BY US BEFORE; ANY RESTRICTION ON THAT BASIS IS NOT POSSIBLE; AS THAT WOULD LEAD TO ABSURDITIES.—(583)

COMMENTARY.

'*Before*'—i.e. in the Chapter on the Refutation of the Quality of Conjunction.

Conjunction may be one only, yet the objection remains—this is what is shown in the text—'*Any restriction, etc.*'.

'*On that basis*',—i.e. on the basis of Conjunction.

The 'absurdity' referred to lies in the possibility of such notions as 'the Pit in the Curd'; as the only ground for it—in the shape of Conjunction,—would be equally available in this also.—(853)

It has been argued above (under *Text* 826) that "Inherence must be eternal, because no Cause of it is perceived".—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (854).

BY THE ETERNALITY OF INHERENCE ALL THINGS BECOME ETERNAL; BECAUSE ALL THESE ARE EVER PRESENT, BY INHERENCE IN THEIR OWN SUBSTRATUM.—(854)

COMMENTARY.

If Inherence is eternal, then the Jar and other things also will have to be regarded as eternal; as they exist for ever in their own substratum. In fact, it is on the ground of Inherence that these things are held to subsist in their substratum,—and this Inherence is eternal;—why then should not the things persist for ever?—(854)

In the following *Texts*, the Author anticipates and answers the Opponent's reply:—

TEXTS (855-856).

"THINGS BECOME DESTROYED EITHER THROUGH THE DISRUPTION OF THEIR COMPONENTS, OR THROUGH THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE,—JUST LIKE ACTION,—ON ACCOUNT OF CONJUNCTION AND SUCH OTHER CAUSES";—IF THIS IS URGED, THEN, THAT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE THE INHERENCE OF THESE COMPONENTS ALSO IN THEIR SUBSTRATUM IS HELD TO BE ETERNAL. IF THESE CAME TO DESTRUCTION, THEN INHERENCE ALSO WOULD BECOME DESTRUCTIBLE."—(855-856)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged by the Opponent:—"The Jar and other things become destroyed either through the disruption of their component parts or through the destruction of the parts; just as, while the Jar is in the state of being whirled or baked, its action (motion) becomes destroyed by the contact of a solid substance. This has been thus declared—'By the contact of solid substances, the action becomes destroyed, as also the action unfavourable to the production of the effect'. Similarly one Cognition becomes destroyed through another Cognition; one Sound becomes destroyed through another Sound."

Such is the Opponent's scheme. What he means is that, even though the Inherence may be there as the basis of the object's continued existence,

if other auxiliary causes are absent, and contrary circumstances become operative, the Jar cannot remain for ever.

This is answered in the words—'*That cannot be so*'.—What has been urged cannot be right; because of the said components also there are components wherein their Inherence lies for ever; how then could there be any *destruction* or *disruption* ?

This is so not only in regard to the substances composed of those components; it is so in regard to Action, etc. also; this is what is indicated by the particle '*api*'.

If it be admitted that there is destruction of the components of the object, then the Inherence also would have to be regarded as liable to destruction.—(855-856)

"Why so ?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (857-858).

WHEN THE *Relative* HAS CEASED TO EXIST, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE *Relation* TO EXIST. WHEN THE *conjunct* OBJECT HAS BEEN DESTROYED, THE *Conjunction* CAN NO LONGER BE THERE. AND JUST AS THE *conjuncts* ARE THERE WHILE THE *Conjunction* IS THERE,—SO ALSO THE *Inherents* SHOULD EXIST WHILE THE INHERENCE IS THERE.—(857-858)

COMMENTARY.

He supports the same idea, in the words—'*When the Conjunct object, etc. etc.*'

What is meant is that, on account of the *Relative* having ceased to exist, the Inherence comes to be non-eternal, just like the Conjunction which ceases on the destruction of the *Conjunct*, Or the other alternative is that the relatives continue to exist, because of the *Relation* not having ceased; these relatives being like the two substances, the Conjunction between whom has not ceased.—If it were not so, then, in both cases, the Relation in question would lose its character.—(857-858)

The Opponent urges the following argument :—

TEXT (859).

"EVEN ON THE DESTRUCTION OF ONE RELATIVE, THE INHERENCE CONTINUES TO EXIST, BECAUSE THE OTHER RELATIVE IS STILL THERE.—NOR WOULD THE SAME BE THE CASE WITH CONJUNCTION; BECAUSE THERE IS DIFFERENCE."—(859)

COMMENTARY.

What the Opponent means is as follows :—"In the first Reason (adduced by the Buddhist), if what is meant is the destruction of *all* Relatives,—then

it is partly 'unproven', 'not admitted'; because the destruction of all Relatives is not possible; as even at Universal Dissolution, the Atoms remain. —If then the Reason is put forward with a view to some sort of Relatives having ceased to exist, then it is Inconclusive; because even when a certain Relative may have ceased to exist, other Relatives would still be there.— It might be urged against the Opponent that, 'by the same reasoning process, Conjunction also should have to be regarded as eternal'.— Anticipating this, the Opponent says—*It cannot be so, because there is difference*; that is to say, Conjunction varies with each conjunct object; hence it is only right to regard it as evanescent; Inherence, on the other hand, is only one in the whole world, because its basis, in the shape of the notion of 'subsistence herein', remains always the same; hence it cannot be right to regard Inherence as evanescent; as it is always perceptible in another Relative (even on the cessation of one Relative)."—(859)

The above argument is answered in the following—

TEXTS (860–864).

If it is as explained, then when certain *inherent* objects like the Jar have ceased to exist,—what is it that continues to exist? (*A*) Is it that *Inherence* which has been assumed to constitute the existence of those objects, which Inherence continues to exist in the other Relatives? Or (*B*) is it something else, as in the case of Conjunction, Plurality and so forth?—(*A*) It cannot be the former; if the Inherence of that kind continues to exist, then the said objects—Jar, etc.—also should be there. If they were not there, then the Inherence that constitutes their existence could not remain there; or it might be there in mere name.—From all this it follows that even before, as after, the objects could not be subsisting in their substratum, through any such thing as 'Inherence'. Thus this 'subsistence' of theirs cannot be real.—(860–964)

COMMENTARY.

When the Jar, and other things that are held to 'inhere' in their cause, cease to exist—what is it that continues to exist?—(*A*) Is it the 'Inherence' that has been assumed as constituting their existence in their cause,—this Inherence continuing to exist in Relatives other than the Jar, etc.? —(*B*) Or is it something else,—like Conjunction and Plurality, which vary with each Conjunct?—The term '*ādi*' is meant to include Disjunction.

If the former alternative is accepted, then the Jar, etc. should still continue to exist, because there would be no falling off of the nature of their existence, which (in the shape of *Inherence*) would be just as it was before

their destruction. Or, if the Jar, etc. did not continue to exist, as their *existence* would not be there, the Inherence also could not be there; or otherwise the Inherence could not constitute the *existence* of those things. If the mere existence of Inherence were postulated as something independent of all things and not benefiting anything,—then it would be something only in name; and there would be no corresponding reality; and under the circumstances to assert that 'Inherence constitutes the existence of things' would be mere verbiage.

This is what is made clear in the words—'*From all this it follows, etc. etc.*'—'*They*'—the Jar, etc.—could not be subsisting in their substratum, on the strength of any such thing as 'Inherence'.—'*As after*',—i.e. after the destruction of their constituent cause, when they have really no existence at all.

'*Thus this, etc.*'—explains the real sense of the Reason adduced.—(860–864)

TEXTS (865-866).

(*B*) IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE 'INHERENCE' THAT CONTINUES TO EXIST, WHILE THE OTHER RELATIVE IS THERE, IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT,—AS IN THE CASE OF CONJUNCTION, DISJUNCTION, PLURALITY AND SO FORTH,—THEN, IN THAT CASE, THERE WOULD BE PLURALITY OF INHERENCE ALSO, JUST AS THERE IS OF CONJUNCTION, ETC.—THUS, IF 'INHERENCE' IS POSTULATED TO EXIST, THEN THERE WOULD BE THIS AND MANY OTHER INCONGRUITIES.—(865-866)

COMMENTARY.

(*B*) If the second alternative,—that what continues to exist is something else,—is accepted, then, there should be plurality of 'Inherence', just as there is of Conjunction, etc.; and this would involve the surrendering of the doctrine that there is no diversity in Inherence.

'*This and many other incongruities*';—this is meant to include such incongruities as—(*a*) 'the Futility of the Cause', (*b*) 'the contradiction of several aphorisms', (*c*) incompatibility with facts of Perception, etc., (*d*) 'the simultaneous birth of all things'.

(*a*) For instance, the 'birth' of a thing is described as 'inherence in the cause' or 'inherence in Being'; and Inherence is eternal; hence causes could not have any capacity to bring about the birth of the effect; hence causes would be futile.

(*b*) There would be contradiction of such (*Vaishēṣika*) aprorisms as—"Conjunction is brought about by the action of either of the two factors, by the action of both, and by Conjunction", "Cognition is produced by the contact of the Sense-organ and the object, etc. etc."

(*c*) The doctrine in question goes against the idea of the Eye, etc. being the cause of Perceptional and other cognitions.

(*d*) Birth, in the shape of 'Inherence', being eternal, there can be no sequence in the birth of things,—which will have to be regarded as simultaneous; this would be an incongruity; and it would also go against the Opponent's own doctrine that "the non-simultaneity of Cognitions is indicative of the Mind."

Lastly, the *Birth* of things being eternal,—the entire world would consist of things which could not benefit, or be benefited by, others; and hence the propounding of the Philosophy would be futile; and so on and so forth, there would be many incongruities, which would cut off and smash the entire fabric of the Opponent's Philosophy.—(865-866)

End of Chapter XV.

CHAPTER XVI.

Examination of the Import of Words.

COMMENTARY.

The Author proceeds to set forth the Introduction to the arguments in support of the view (set forth in Text 2) that the Truth is 'amenable to Words and Cognitions only in an assumed (superimposed) form' :—

TEXTS (867-868).

"IF ADJUNCTS DO NOT EXIST IN REALITY, THEN ON WHAT BASIS WOULD THERE BE SUCH COGNITIONS AND VERBAL EXPRESSIONS AS 'THE MAN WITH THE STICK', 'THE *white*', 'MOVE', 'EXISTS', 'COW', 'HERE' AND SO FORTH ?—THEY CANNOT BE HELD TO BE BASELESS. NOR CAN THEY APPLY PROMISCUOUSLY TO ALL THINGS."
—(867-868)

COMMENTARY.

"What is apprehended by Word and Cognition is a Real Entity; hence what words express by means of affirmation and denial is only the real state of things" ;—such is the view of the Realists.—The view of the Negationists (Apohists), on the other hand, is as follows :—"There is nothing *real* that is expressed by words; all verbal cognition is wrong, because it proceeds by imposing *non-difference* upon things that are really *different*; in a case where there is indirect connection with an entity, there is some sort of agreement with the object, even though the Cognition is really wrong". Such is the view of these people. The one uniform, non-different, form that is imposed upon things proceeds on the strength of the apprehension of things in the form of the 'exclusion of other things'; and it being itself of the nature of the 'exclusion or negation of other things', it is mistaken by people under the spell of illusion to be one with that which is excluded by it,—and it ultimately brings about the apprehension of the thing 'excluded' from others ;—for these reasons it comes to be known as 'excluded from other things'. On this ground it has been held that what is expressed by words is *Apoha*, the 'negation of others'.

The Realists urge the following objections (against the Apohist, Negationist, *Bauddha*) :—"If,—according to you,—for Verbal Cognition, there is no real basis as the adjuncts—qualifying factors—in the shape of *Substance, Quality, Action, Universal, Ultimate Individuality* and *Inherence*,—then how is it that among people, there are such verbal expressions and

cognitions as 'the man with the stick', which are all based upon adjuncts in the shape of substance, etc.? For instance, such expressions and notions as 'the man with the stick', 'the animal with horns' are known to be based upon adjuncts in the shape of *substances*; such expressions and notions as 'white', 'black' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of qualities; such expressions and notions as 'moves', 'wanders' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of *Action*; such expressions and notions as 'is', 'exists' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of 'Being'; such expressions and notions as 'Cow', 'Horse', 'Elephant' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of *Universals and Particulars*; and the expression and notion 'The Cloth in these yarns' are based upon *Inherence*.—If then, there did not exist any of these Substance and the rest, the expressions and notions of the 'Man with the stick' and other things would become baseless.—The term '*ādi*' goes with every member of the compound. So that every one of such similar expressions and notions become included, as 'the umbrella-holder', 'the horned animal' and so forth.—As for the *Ultimate Individualities,* they are cognizable by mystics only; hence these are not meant to be included here.

"And yet it is not right that these expressions and notions should be regarded as entirely baseless. If they were so, they would be equally liable to appear everywhere.

"Nor are they found to apply promiscuously to all things, without distinction.

"From all this it follows that *Substance* and the rest do really exist.

"The argument may be formulated as follows:—Expressions and notions that appear in mutually distinct forms must have a real basis,—like the Auditory and other notions;—the expressions and notions of the 'stick-holder', etc. do appear in distinct forms;—hence this is a natural reason (for regarding them as having a real basis).—If they had no such basis, things would appear in all places without distinction;—this is the argument setting aside a contrary conclusion."—(867-868)

The Author proceeds to refute the above Reasoning (of the Realist) in the following—

TEXT (869).

THE ANSWER TO THE ABOVE IS AS FOLLOWS:—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO REAL BASIS FOR THESE EXPRESSIONS AND NOTIONS; THE ONLY BASIS FOR THEM CONSISTS IN THE SEED LOCATED IN THE PURELY SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS.—(869)

COMMENTARY.

If what the Realist desires to prove is the fact that the notions and expressions in question have a real basis in the external world, then the Reason adduced is Inconclusive; as there is nothing to annul the contrary conclusion. If what is meant to be proved is only that they have some sort

of basis, then the argument is futile; because we also hold that they have their basis in the awakening of the Tendencies and Impressions embedded in the inner consciousness; though not in the external object; because the first cognition being always verbal, is wrong, and it cannot have any real basis.

'*Located, etc.*',—i.e. embedded in consciousness; i.e. in the form of Tendencies and Impressions.—(869)

This same line of thought is further supported by reference to the scriptures :—

TEXT (870).

WHATEVER IS SAID TO BE THE OBJECT OF A VERBAL EXPRESSION IS NEVER REALLY COGNISED; SUCH IS THE VERY ESSENCE OF ENTITIES.—(870).

COMMENTARY.

'*Whatever*',—i.e. 'Specific Individuality', 'Universal' and the like.

'*Such is the very essence of things*';—this character, of being beyond the reach of words, forms the very essence of things. This has been thus declared —'By whatever name a thing is spoken of, that thing is not really cognised there; such is the very essence of things'.

Question :—"What is the proof for Verbal Cognition being wrong and baseless?"

Answer :—The proof has already been asserted by us to the effect that, inasmuch as Verbal Cognitions impose non-difference upon things that are different, they are all wrong. For instance, when one thing is cognised as what it is not, that cognition is wrong; e.g. the cognition of Water in the Mirage;—Verbal Cognition consists in the imposing of non-difference on what is different;—hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as *wrong*). There is no real entity in the shape of the 'Universal' which could be the object of Verbal Cognition—by virtue of which the Reason might be regarded as 'Unproven'. Because the 'Universal' has been already discarded in great detail.—Even granting that there is such a thing as the 'Universal';—even so, if that Universal is held to be something different from the particular things, the cognition would still be one of non-difference where there is difference; and hence *wrong*. Because a set of things cannot be the same as others when they are held to contain these. If, on the other hand, the Universal be held to be *non-different* from the particular things,—the entire Universe would really form the *single object* of the 'Universal'; and hence the cognition of it as 'Universal' must be wrong, because the notion of the 'Universal' does not appertain to a single thing; as the cognition of the 'Universal' is always preceded by the perception of diversity.

When Verbal Cognition is thus proved to be wrong, it must also be *objectless*, baseless; because the object productive of the cognition having surrendered its form, there can be nothing left which could be the basis of the cognition.

Or, we may prove the *objectlessness* of Verbal Cognitions in another manner: That alone can form the import of words whereto they have been

applied by Convention ; nothing else can form their import ; as if it did then that would lead to absurdities. And there is no object wherein the application of any words has been fixed by Convention. Hence all Verbal Cognitions and Expressions must be entirely baseless.

The argument may be formulated as follows :—When words have not been fixed by Convention at their very inception, upon certain things, they do not really denote these things ;—e.g. the word ' Horse ' which has *not* been applied by convention to *animals with the Dewlap* (i.e. the Cow) does not denote the cow ;—all words have not been applied by Convention, at the very inception to any things ; hence the wider conception is never apprehended ; that is, *Denotativeness* is invariably concomitant with *being fixed by Convention*, and this latter is absent in the case of words.—(870)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that the Reason adduced is not ' unproven '—

TEXT (871).

' Specific Individuality ', ' Universal ', ' Relation to Universal ', ' Something endowed with the Universal ', ' Form of the Cognition of the object ',—none of these really find a place in the ' Import of Words '. —(871)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, when the ' Import of words ' is held to consist in an object in regard to which a Convention has been duly apprehended,—such import would consist, either (1) in ' Specific Individuality ', or (2) in ' Universal ', or (3) in ' Relation to the Universal ',—the pronoun ' *tat* ' in the compound ' *tadyogaḥ* ' standing for the Universal,—or (4) in ' something endowed with the Universal ',—or (5) in ' the form of the Cognition of the object '. These are the only alternatives possible.—In the case of everyone of these, no Convention is possible ; and hence it cannot form the ' Import of Words '.

' *Really* ' ;—this has been added in order to indicate that the author does not deny the *illusory* ' import of words ' ; and hence there is no self-contradiction in terms ; otherwise there would be a self-contradiction involved in his Proposition ; inasmuch as it could not be possible to *assert* that ' Specific Individuality and the rest do not constitute the Import of words ', without speaking of them by means of these words ; so that by speaking of these by their names, for the purpose of proving his proposition, he would be admitting the fact that these are capable of being *expressed by words* ;—and yet this fact is denied in the Proposition ; so that there would be self-contradiction.

This explanation answers *Uddyotakara's* assertion to the effect that " if words are inexpressive, then there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Premiss ".—Because we do not entirely deny the fact of words having their ' import ' ; for the simple reason that this is well-known even

to the meanest cowherd. What we do deny, however, is the character of *Reality* which the other party impose upon the Import,—not the Import itself.—(871)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that 'Specific Individuality' cannot form the 'Import (or Denotation) of Words' because there can be no Convention in regard to it :—

TEXT (872).

OF THESE, 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' CANNOT BE DENOTED BY WORDS ; BECAUSE IT CAN HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH THE TIME OF CONVENTION AND USAGE.—(872)

COMMENTARY.

'*Cannot be denoted by words*' ;—that is, because there can be no Convention in regard to it.

Question :—" Why can there be no Convention in regard to it ? "

Answer :—Because there is '*viyoga*', absence,—of connection with the time related to Convention and Usage,—'*there can be no Convention in regard to the Specific Individuality*' [this has to be supplied].

What is meant is that Convention is made for the purposes of usage ; and not through mere love for it ; hence people can rightly make Conventions only with regard to things present at the time related to that Convention and Usage ;—not with regard to anything else. As regards 'Specific Individuality', it cannot be present at the time of the Convention and Usage ; hence there can be no Convention in regard to it.—(872)

Question :—" Why is it not possible for the Specific Individuality to be present at the time of Convention and Usage ? "

Answer :—

TEXTS (873-874).

THINGS OF THE NATURE OF INDIVIDUALS CANNOT BECOME INTER-RELATED AMONG THEMSELVES,—BECAUSE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES (AMONG THEM) OF PLACE, TIME, ACTION, POTENCY, MANIFESTATION AND THE REST.—FOR THIS REASON, THE THING CONCEIVED BY CONVENTION IS NEVER MET WITH IN ACTUAL USAGE ; AND THAT IN REGARD TO WHICH NO CONVENTION HAS BEEN APPREHENDED CAN NEVER BE COMPREHENDED THROUGH WORDS,—LIKE ANY OTHER THING.—(873-874)

COMMENTARY.

The variegated Cow, etc. are so many distinct Individuals,—and as such have their individual forms excluded from each other, through differences of

place, etc. ; and as such, they never become inter-related among themselves. Consequently, when a man has set up a Convention in regard to one of these individuals, he could not carry on usage, on that basis, in regard to other individuals.—In the phrase 'manifestation and *the rest*', the term 'the rest' is meant to include Colour, Shape, Condition and other peculiarities.

'*Is never met with in actual usage*' ;—what is meant is that, in this way, there being no Convention in regard to it, the Reason adduced by the Author cannot be said to be 'unproven'.

That the Reason is not 'Inconclusive' is shown by the words—'That *in regard to which no Convention has been comprehended, etc. etc.*'

'*Like any other thing*',—i.e. like things of other kinds.

'*Dhvanēḥ*',—Through Words.

What is meant is as follows :—If the Word denoted a thing in regard to which no Convention has been apprehended, then the term 'Cow' also should denote the *Horse* ; and in that case, the making of Conventions would be useless. Hence the possibility of this anomaly annuls the contrary conclusion ; and thereby the Author's Premiss becomes established.

This same Reason, 'Because no Convention can be made', has been indicated by the Teacher *Diṅnāga* in the declaration—'The Word denoting a Universal cannot be denotative of Individuals, because of endlessness' ; what is meant by 'endlessness' is the impossibility of Convention.

This also sets aside the following argument of *Uddyotakara* (*Nyāyavārtika* 2. 2. 63, p. 327) :—"If you make 'Words' the subject of your argument, then, as *endlessness* is a property of things (denoted by words), it would be a Reason that subsists elsewhere than the Subject. If, on the other hand, the diverse things themselves are the Subject, then neither affirmative nor negative corroborative Instances would be available. So that 'endlessness' cannot serve as a valid Reason".

The same writer has also urged as follows (in *Nyāyavartika* 2. 2. 63, page 326) :—"The objection urged is applicable to those (Buddhists) who hold that what are denoted by words are things without any qualifications ; as for ourselves, what are denoted by words are Substances, Qualities and Actions *as qualified by Being, etc.* ; so that wherever one perceives the Universal 'Being', etc., one uses the word 'existent' and so forth. The Universal 'Being' is one only ; hence in regard to things characterised by that Universal, it is quite possible to set up Conventions. So that *endlessness* cannot serve as a valid reason for you."

This is not right. It has been already proved that there are no such real entities as Universals like 'Being' and the rest which are either different or non-different from individual things.—But even granting that there is such a thing as the Universal ;—even so, as it is possible for several Universals to subsist in one Individual, there could be no use of such words as 'Being' and the like, free from confusion. Further, until it has been explained by means of words that '*Being*' is so and so', the person making the Convention could not indicate the things denoted by those words by means of 'Being' and other Universals ;—and until the Convention has been made, words like 'Being', etc. cannot be used. So that there would be the incongruity of mutual interdependence.

The following argument might be urged :—" The person concerned himself comes by the usage and then, through affirmative and negative concomitance, comes to establish the connection between the word and its denotation and therefrom becomes cognisant of the relevant Convention."

This cannot be right. No one person can ever come by the entire usage bearing upon any subsequent thing.

"What happens is that having once found that the term 'existing' is frequently applied to things endowed with *existence*, he concludes that the same word is applicable to even unseen things of the same kind."

That cannot be true ; as such is not found to be the case. In fact no Convention can apply to unseen things which are endless and which differ widely regarding their being past and future. If Convention were applicable to such things, it would lead to an absurdity.

" One really does comprehend such Convention in regard to the things when he speaks of them as conceived of by Determinate (conceptual) Cognition (which involves verbal expression also)."

If that is so, then it comes to this that the application of words appertains to only such things as are purely fanciful—and not to *real* things. So that the past and future not being before the man at the time, if there did appear a 'determinate cognition' of those, it could only be objectless, and hence what is made known by it must be a non-entity.—How then could the Convention relating to such things be anything *real* ? We desist from further augmentation on this point.

Lastly, as our Reason is present in all cases where the Probandum is present, it cannot be said to be Contradictory.

Thus it becomes established that words cannot have 'Specific Individualities' for their 'import' (denotation).—(873-874)

The following might be urged :—" There are certain things, like the *Himālaya* Mountain, which remain permanently in one and the same form,—so that there can be no diversity in them due to Place, Time and Distinction ; —consequently, as they would be present at the time of Convention and Usage,—your Reason becomes partially 'inadmissible'."

The answer to this argument is as follows :—

TEXT (875).

EVEN IN THE *Himālaya* AND SUCH THINGS WHICH DO NOT DIFFER WITH TIME AND PLACE,—THERE ARE ATOMS WHICH ARE DIVERSE AND MOMENTARY, AS PROVED ABOVE.—(875)

COMMENTARY.

'*And such things*'—is meant to include other mountains like the *Malaya*. All these are aggregates of many Atoms ; hence there can be no Convention relating to all their component parts ; also because it has been proved that all these things are destroyed immediately after their appearance. Thus,

in the case of these things also, there can be no presence, at the time of usage, of the character that was present at the time of the making of the Convention. Hence our Reason is not 'unproven'.—(875)

It has thus been established that there can be no Convention bearing upon 'Specific Individuality,—because Usage being impossible in connection with it, the Convention would be useless. It is now going to be shown that no Convention is possible in regard to it because no Action is possible :—

TEXTS (876-877).

As a matter of fact, there can be no assumption of Convention in regard either to the *born* or to the *unborn* thing. There can be no real Convention relating to the *unborn*,—as there can be none relating to the Horse's Horn ;— nor one in regard to the *Born* thing ; because Convention is made only on the recalling to mind of things apprehended beforehand ;—how could this be done in regard to what has passed away long ago ?—(876-877)

COMMENTARY.

It has been already proved that all things become destroyed immediately after appearance (birth) ; if then Convention were made regarding them, it could be made either before they were born, or after they were born ;—it is not possible for any real Convention to be made relating to what is still unborn ; because what does not exist can have no character at all and hence cannot be the substratum of anything.—The Text has used the term '*real*' in order to exclude the *illusory*. Hence the assertion does not become vitiated by the well-known case of the Convention whereby the name of an unborn son is fixed upon beforehand ; because such convention is purely illusory, bearing, as it does, upon an object which is the creation of fancy.

'*As in the Horse's Horn*' ;—the affix '*vati*' is added to the word ending with the Locative.

Nor can the Convention be made relating to the thing after it is *born* ; because a Convention regarding anything can be made only when the thing has been apprehended, and this apprehension has been followed by the remembrance of its name and distinguishing features ; it could not be made otherwise than this ; as it would lead to incongruities. Thus then, at the time of the remembrance of the name and the distinguishing features, the 'Specific Individuality' of the thing—being momentary—will have long disappeared ; so that, as in regard to the *unborn*, so in regard to the *born* thing also, there can be no real Convention ; as at the time of the making of the Convention, both would be equally absent. In fact, even at the time at which thing is actually apprehended, the 'Specific Individuality' that forms

the basis of that apprehension, being momentary, is not in existence; how much less possible is it at a later time, when there is remembrance of the uniformity of things appearing long after that apprehension ?—(876-877)

It might be argued that—"the Convention could be made in regard to that momentary entity in the series of momentary entities born through the potency of the entity apprehended which appears at the moment that the Convention is made".—The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (878).

AS FOR THE OTHER THING OF THE SAME KIND WHICH APPEARS THROUGH THE POTENCY OF THE THING APPREHENDED AT FIRST, THE BODY OF CONVENTION IS NOT POSSIBLE IN REGARD TO THAT ALSO. AS FOR SIMILARITY, THAT ALSO IS ONLY IMAGINARY.—(878)

COMMENTARY.

Though at the time of the making of the Convention, another 'momentary entity' is present, yet, as the Convention could not bear upon it, no Convention is possible; when a maker of Conventions apprehends a Horse, and then remembers its name and makes up the Convention, he does not make the Convention bear upon the *Cow* that may be present at the time, but which has not formed the subject of that Convention.

It might be argued that—"There is a similarity among all *Specific Individualities*, and on this basis they might be regarded as one and the Convention made regarding them".—The answer to this is—'*As for similarity, etc. etc.*'; that is, similarity is imposed upon things by 'determinate' (conceptual) cognitions; so that if these are what are denoted by words, then it would mean that the *Specific Individuality* is not denoted at all.

Thus there can be no Convention in regard to the Specific Individuality (of *Things*). Nor can it be in regard to the Specific Individuality of the *Word*. Because all that the maker of Convention does is to apply to a particular thing a particular Name which has been recalled to Memory; while Memory cannot recall the name that has been really apprehended previously, because that ceased to exist long ago; and the name that he actually pronounces is not the one that he has known previously; so that there could be no real Remembrance of it; and what has not been apprehended by the Memory cannot be recalled by it. Hence it follows that what is recalled by Memory and remembered is only a creation of fancy, and not the Specific Individuality (of the word). Thus there can be no Convention relating to any Specific Individuality. Hence it becomes established that Specific Individuality is something that cannot be named at all.—(878)

The Author next states another proof in support of the view that Specific Individuality cannot be denoted by words :—

TEXT (879).

THE IDEA OF 'HEAT' THAT FOLLOWS ON THE UTTERANCE OF THE NAME ('HOT') IS NOT SO CLEAR AND DISTINCT AS THE PERCEPTION OF THE (HOT) THING BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE SENSE-ORGAN.—(879)

COMMENTARY.

The cognition of the Hot *thing* brought about by the Senses is clear and distinct,—not so the cognition that is brought about by the word 'hot'; people whose Visual, Gestatory and Olfactory organs have been impaired do not cognise the Colour and Taste, etc. of things on the hearing of the mere name—'*mātuliṅga*' (Citron), for instance; while people whose eyes are intact have a clear perception of those through that sense-organ. This has been thus declared—'The man who has been burnt by fire has the idea of having been burnt, on the contact of fire,—which idea is entirely different from the idea of burning arising on the utterance of the word *burn*'.

The perception of the thing, etc. etc.—is an Instance *per* dissimilarity.—(879)

"Even if the idea is not so clear and distinct, why cannot *Specific Individuality* form the denotation of the word?"

TEXT (880).

IT IS NOT RIGHT THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY AND THE WORD; NOR DOES THE THING APPEAR IN THE COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE WORD; JUST AS *Taste* DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE COGNITION OF *Colour*.—(880)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be thus formulated.—When a thing does not appear in the cognition brought about by a certain other thing, it cannot form the denotation of that;—for instance, Taste in the cognition brought about by Colour;—Specific Individuality does not appear in the cognition brought about by Words;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider term (which implies the absence of the narrower term).—The Proof annulling the conclusion of the other party consists in the anomaly pointed out here. For instance, when a Word is said to be denotative of a certain thing, all that is meant is that it brings about the cognition of that thing,—nothing else; and a cognition cannot be said to be of that thing whose form does not appear in it at all; if it did, it would lead to an absurdity. Nor can one and the same thing have two forms—one distinct and the other indistinct,—by virtue of which the indistinct form could be the one denoted by Words;

because *one* is incompatible with *two*; and it has been shown that things existing at different times are mutually incompatible.—(880)

The *Naiyāyikas* declare as follows :—" *The Individual, the Configuration and the Universal,—all these constitute the Denotation of the Word*—(*Nyāyasūtra*, 2. 2. 63).—The term '*padārtha*' here stands for the '*artha*', denotative, '*padasya*', of the Word.—The term 'Individual' stands for Substances, Qualities, Actions and Ultimate Differentia; this has been defined in the *Sūtra*—*The Individual consists of particular Qualities, Actions and Substances* (Nyāyasūtra, 2. 2. 64). The meaning of the *Sūtra*, according to the author of the *Vārtika* (Uddyotakara), is as follows :—'Differentia' is that which is differentiated; '*guṇavishēṣa*' is *that which is differentiated from Qualities*, i.e. Action. This same term '*guṇavishēṣa*' taken a second time is meant to be an *Ēkashēṣa* Compound,—standing for Quality; the term '*vishēṣa*' 'particular', in this case is meant to exclude the Configuration, which is essentially a form of Conjunction, and Conjunction is included under the category of 'Quality'; hence if the qualifying epithet 'particular' were not there, Configuration also would become included; and yet this is not meant to be included under the 'Individual', as it has been mentioned by a separate word.—The term '*āshraya*', 'Receptacle', in the *Sūtra* stands for Substance; Substance being the receptacle or substratum of the said particular Qualities and Actions. This Substance has been indicated by the *Sūtra* wherefrom the term '*tat*' has been eliminated. The compound '*Guṇavishēṣāshrayaḥ*' therefore has to be expounded as—'*Guṇavishēṣāḥ* (Particular Qualities)—*Guṇavishēṣāḥ* (Actions)—*Tadāshrayaḥ* (Substances)'. This is a collective copulative Compound, and yet the Neuter ending has not been used as the use of the particular gender depends upon the whim of people. Thus the sense of the *Sūtra* comes to be this: 'That which is *guṇavishēṣāshraya* is the *Individual*, also called *Mūrti*, Composite'. When the name '*mūrti*' 'composite' is applied to *substance*, it is to be taken *locatively*—as 'that *wherein* component parts adhere'; when it is applied to *Colour*, etc., it is to be taken *nominatively*, in the sense of 'those that adhere—inhere—in substances'; as for the term '*vyakti*', it is applied to Substances *accusatively* and to Colour, etc. *instrumentally*.—According to the author of the *Bhāṣya* (*Vātsyāyana*) however, the *Sūtra* is to be taken exactly as it stands —'That which is the receptacle of distinctive qualities is the *Individual*, and that also is the material Body'. Thus it has been said that—That Substance which is the receptacle of the particular qualities,—Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch,—and also of Gravity, Fluidity, Solidity, Faculty, and also of the non-pervasive Dimension,—is called '*mūrti*', 'composite body', on account of its being made up of *component* parts.—The term '*ākṛti*', 'Configuration', denotes the contact of the limbs of living beings, in the shape of Hands, etc. along with their components, Fingers, etc. Says the *Sūtra* (*Nyāya*, 2. 2. 65)—'*Configuration* is that which indicates the universal and its characteristics'; on this the *Bhāṣya* says—'That should be known as *Configuration* which serves to indicate the Universal and the characteristic features of the Universal. This *Configuration* is nothing apart from the definite arrangement of the parts of an object and the components of those

parts '.—The term 'arrangement' stands for a particular form of contact; and the term 'definite' serves to exclude artificial contacts.—The 'characteristic features of the Universal' consist of the limbs of living beings,—the Head, the Hand and so forth,—as it is by these that the Universal (or genus) 'Cow' and the like is indicated. In some cases, the genus is manifested directly by the Configuration; e.g. when the genus 'Cow' becomes manifested on the perception of the exact shape of the Head, Legs, etc.; in some cases it is manifested by the characteristics of the genus; e.g. when the genus 'Cow' is manifested by the Horns and other such limbs which are perceived severally. Thus it is that the Configuration becomes the indicative of the genus and of the characteristics of the genus.—The term '*Jāti*' 'Genus', denotes that entity which is called '*Sāmānya*', *Universal,* which is the basis of the comprehensive names and notions of things. Hence the next *Sūtra* (Nyāya, 2. 2. 66)—'*Jāti, Universal,* is the basis of comprehensive cognitions'; that is to say, the Universal is the source from which comprehensive notions arise."

Of these three—Individual, Configuration and Universal,—the idea of the Individual and the Configuration, being denoted by words, should be taken as rejected by the foregoing rejection of the idea of the Specific Individuality forming the denotation of words.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (881).

IN THIS SAME MANNER THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONFIGURATION ALSO MAY BE REJECTED; INASMUCH AS OTHERS REGARD BOTH THESE ALSO AS BEING OF THE NATURE OF 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY'.—(881)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the rejection of the Universal will come later.

'*Rejection*'—as forming the 'import' of words.

"Why?"

Inasmuch as '*both these*'—Individual and Configuration,—are held by others to be of the nature of 'Specific Individuality'; so that just as 'Specific Individuality' cannot be denoted by Words, because there can be no Convention bearing upon it,—so also, in regard to these two also, there can be no Convention; hence the Reason cannot be said to be either 'Unproven', or 'Inconclusive'.—(881)

Further, the 'Individual', in the shape of Substance, Quality and Particular Qualities,—'Configuration', in the shape of Contact,—and all these, Substance and the rest,—have been already rejected. For this reason also it cannot be right to regard these as being denoted by Words.—This is shown in the following—

TEXT (882).

INASMUCH AS THE REFUTATION OF SUBSTANCE, ETC. AND OF CONTACT, HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY SET FORTH,—IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO REGARD THESE AS FORMING THE REAL 'IMPORT' OF WORDS.—(882)

COMMENTARY.

Having thus explained the impossibility of Convention regarding Specific Individualities, the Author proceeds to explain its impossibility regarding the other three—Universal, Connection of the Universal and That Which is Endowed with the Universal (as mentioned under 871) :—

TEXT (883).

THE UNIVERSAL AND THE CONNECTION HAVING BEEN ALREADY REJECTED IN DETAIL,—THE OTHER THREE KINDS OF 'IMPORT OF WORDS' NO LONGER REMAIN POSSIBLE.—(883)

COMMENTARY.

'*The other*',—i.e. barring 'Specific Individuality', the three—(1) the Universal, (2) the Contact of the Universal, and (3) the One Endowed with the Universal.—As regards the Universal and its Connection, these simply do not exist; and hence in regard to *what is endowed with the Universal*, also no Convention can be possible; as all naming is done only in reference to Universals; and that which is so endowed can only exist in the form of Specific Individuality; so that the objections urged against this last are equally applicable to the other also.

The *Universal* forms the denotation of words—says *Kātyāyana*. *Substance* forms the denotation of words,—says *Vyāḍi*.—Both (Universal and Substance) form the denotation of words,—says *Pāṇini*.—All these views become discarded by what has been said above; because the 'Universal' can have no connection,—'Substance' is of the nature of 'Specific Individuality'; and hence the objections urged against this latter remain applicable to it.—(883)

The Author sums up his position in the following—

TEXT (884).

FOR THESE REASONS THE ASSERTION THAT 'THE INDIVIDUAL, THE CONFIGURATION AND THE UNIVERSAL ARE DENOTED BY WORDS' IS IMPOSSIBLE; BECAUSE ALL THESE ARE FORMLESS.—(884)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tat*'—For these reasons.

'*Formless*'—Featureless; devoid of character.—(884)

TEXT (885).

As regards the 'Form of Cognition', it rests in the Cognition itself, and does not follow either the object or another Cognition; hence that also cannot serve the purpose (of the other party); as that also cannot really be denoted (by words).—(885)

COMMENTARY.

As regards the 'Form of Cognition', it is of the same essence as the Cognition itself, and as such rests therein; as such, like the Cognition itself, it does not follow either the Object cognised or another Cognition; consequently, as it cannot be present at the time of the Convention and Usage, no Convention can be made relating to it, just as there can be none relating to Specific Individuality. Even if it were present at the time of the Usage, it is not possible that users should make any Convention in regard to it. As a matter of fact, when a man desires to do something on the basis of certain words, he has got to know the words likely to be useful for that purpose, and then make use of them; and it is under this impression that people make use of expressive words; and not through a mere whim. The *form of the Cognition,* which is rooted in Fancy, cannot be able to accomplish any such desired purpose as the alleviation of cold and the like; because, in actual experience, it is found that mere apprehension does not accomplish any such purpose. Thus then, as there can be no Convention bearing upon this also, our Reason—'because no Convention can be made regarding it'—cannot be stigmatised as 'Unproven'.—(885)

The following might be urged—"There are other 'imports of words', in the shape of what is denoted by the verb 'to be' and the like; and as the Convention could be made regarding these, the said Reason remains 'Unproven' to that extent."

The answer to this is supplied by the following—

TEXT (886).

These same arguments serve to set aside such 'import of words' as has been held to consist in the denotation of the verb 'to be' and the like. Still we are going to say something regarding these.—(886)

COMMENTARY.

'*The same arguments*',—i.e. those urged against Specific Individuality, etc. forming the Import of Words.—[These serve to set aside those]—because this also is included under the said 'Specific Individuality, etc.'.—(886)

The following *Text* proceeds to show what are the denotations of the verb 'to be' and so forth :—

TEXT (887).

THEY SAY THAT WHAT IS DENOTED BY THE VERB 'TO BE' CONSTITUTES THE 'IMPORT' OF ALL WORDS,—IN CONNECTION WITH THE COW AND SUCH THINGS ; IT IS JUST AS IN THE CASE OF WORDS LIKE *Apūrva* (UNSEEN FORCE), *Dēvatā* (DEITY) AND *Svarga* (HEAVEN).—(887)

COMMENTARY.

The particle '*iti*' is misplaced ; it should be construed with '*astyarthaḥ*'. What is meant is as follows :—What is cognised as denoted by the verb 'to be' forms the 'Import' of all words ; i.e. it represents the denotation of all words ; i.e. it forms the 'Import of words'. Hence, in the case of the Cow and such objects, what forms the import of the words 'Cow' etc. is similar to the Import of such words as 'Unseen Force', 'Deity' and 'Heaven'.—This is what these people say. That is to say, the word 'Unseen Force' does not introduce into the Cognition the form of any object,—and all that is understood from it is that such a thing does *exist* to which the term 'Unseen Force' is applied ;—so also is the case with words the things expressed by which are visible,—such as the word 'Cow' for instance. Because from these words also what is understood is that there *is* a thing which is spoken of by the word 'Cow', or which is related to the 'Universal' *Cow*. As regards the particular form of this Cognition, which enters into the consciousness of some people,—that is due to the influence of their own doctrines.—(887)

Text 886 has spoken of 'denotation of the verb *to be* and the like' ; the term 'and the like' is a reference to certain other theories that have been propounded regarding the 'Import of Words'. These theories are now set forth (under Texts 888 to 892) :—

TEXT (888).

SOME PEOPLE ASSERT THAT WHAT IS DENOTED BY WORDS IS (*a*) AN AGGREGATE FREE FROM DISTRIBUTIVE AND COLLECTIVE DETERMINATION ; OR (*b*) AN UNREAL RELATIONSHIP.—(888)

COMMENTARY.

(*a*) Some people assert that what the word—'*brāhmaṇa*' for instance—denotes is the aggregate of austerity, caste, learning, etc. without any conceptual determination either collective or distributive ; just as the word 'forest' denotes the *Dhava* and other trees. That is to say, when the word

'forest' is uttered, the notion that appears is not a determinate or well-defined, one,—either of the *Dhava or* the *Khadira or* the *Palāsha or* any particular tree (distributively),—or of the *Dhava and* the *Khadira* and the *Palāsha* and other trees (collectively);—it is only a vague indefinite conception of the *Dhava* and other trees in general;—similarly when the word '*brāhmaṇa*' is uttered, the notion that appears is not a well-defined one—either of Austerity *or* Caste *or* Learning, (distributively), or Austerity *and* Caste *and* Learning (collectively); what are cognised are Austerity and the rest conceived of as one aggregated whole as differentiated from other correlatives.—The term '*vikalpa*' (in the Text) stands for the distinct conception of any one individual from among a group consisting of an indefinite number of individuals; and '*Samuchhaya*' stands for the distinct conception of a definite number of individuals related together;—and the notion brought about by words is free from both these conceptions.

(*b*) Others however have held that what is denoted by the word is the relation of a thing—substance, f.i.—to an undefined 'Universal'—'Substance', f.i.;—and this is said to be 'unreal' because the individual correlatives are not really denoted by the word.—Or, it may be that, like the dark complexion and other properties, *Austerity, Caste,* etc. also appear in the notion as a single unity,—and hence it is the relationship of these that is called 'unreal'. Because these are not really apprehended together in their own forms; what is apprehended is only the aggregate of these perceived like the whirling fire-brand, without reference to the individuals making up the aggregate.—(888)

TEXT (889).

(*c*) OR THE REAL WITH UNREAL ADJUNCTS IS THE 'IMPORT OF WORDS'.—(*d*) OR 'IMPORT OF WORDS' MAY CONSIST IN THE WORD ITSELF IN THE STATE OF '*abhijalpa*' (COALESCENCE).—(889)

COMMENTARY.

Others have declared that the Real with Unreal adjuncts is what is denoted by words. For instance, the adjuncts, in the shape of such details as bracelets, rings and such things, are 'unreal' so far as the denotation of the word is concerned; and yet these adjuncts belong to something that is 'real'—in the shape of the *Gold* which has a generic form and permeates through a number of particular things. This 'Real with Unreal adjuncts' forms *the Import of Words,*—i.e. is what forms the denotation of the word.

Others again declare that it is the word itself in the state of 'Coalescence' that constitutes the Import of Words.—(889)

The following *Text* explains what is meant by this 'Coalescence':—

TEXT (890).

WHEN THE FORM OF THE WORD BECOMES IDENTIFIED WITH THE OBJECT THROUGH THE CONCEPTION THAT 'THIS IS THAT',—THAT WORD THEY REGARD AS IN THE 'STATE OF COALESCENCE'.—(890)

COMMENTARY.

When the character of the *object* is imposed upon the *Word*—by such expressions as 'Word is the Object'; on the basis of this imposition, when the form of the Word becomes identified with the Object,—the Word in the state of this unification with the object is said to be 'in the state of coalescence'.—(890)

(*e*) Others have held the following view:—"When the form of an external object is impinged upon the Idea, and is apprehended as an external object, it becomes manifested in the form of the Idea; and it is this Idea that is denoted by Words". This is the view set forth in the following—

TEXT (891).

WHEN AN OBJECT FORMS THE CONTENT OF THE IDEA, ON THE BASIS OF AN EXTERNAL OBJECT,—AND IT COMES TO BE COGNISED AS 'AN EXTERNAL OBJECT'; THIS (MIXTURE OF IDEA—OBJECT) HAS BEEN REGARDED BY SOME PEOPLE AS FORMING THE 'IMPORT OF WORDS'.—(891)

COMMENTARY.

'*Content of the Idea*',—i.e. revolving in the Idea, subsisting in the Idea. '*On the basis of an external object*';—i.e. that for the manifesting of whose form recourse is had to the real-unreal external thing,—in the shape of the letter-symbols.

'*It comes to be cognised as an external object*';—i.e. manifested in the form of the *Idea*, but apprehended as something *external*. That is to say, so long as the form of the Idea is not impinged upon the objects and is cognised, on due consideration, as Idea itself,—it is not recognised as forming the import of words; because what is purely subjective can have no connection with any form of activity; for instance, actions spoken of in such words as

'Bring the Cow', 'Eat the Curd', are not possible for the mere Idea; and what words denote is a thing capable of action; hence what is apprehended as an *Idea* cannot be denoted by words. When, however, the form of the Idea becomes impinged upon the external object, the observer becomes influenced by its external character and comes to regard it as capable of action, and thus it becomes denoted by words.

Question :—" What is the difference between this theory and the theory of '*Apoha*'? The upholder of '*Apoha*' also asserts that what is denoted by the word is the form of the Idea apprehended as something external; as has been declared in the following passage :—' There is nothing incongruous in the statement that that object forms the Import of words which follows from the impinging of the form of the Idea and the cognisance of the *exclusion of other things*'."

This is not right. The upholder of the Theory of the Idea-form being impinged upon things holds that what is denoted by the word is what has a *real* existence in the form of the Idea, and is impinged upon Substance and other things, which also are *real*,—and which therefore along with its object is not false or wrong; and he does not admit that the said idea is without real basis, and rests entirely on the imposition of non-difference upon things that are different, and is, on that account, false (wrong), and dependent entirely upon *mutual exclusion* among things [as held by the upholders of *Apoha*].—If the upholder of the Theory under review really held the view held by us and expressed in the following declaration—' all this apprehension of things as *one* is a false notion,—its basis lies in *mutual exclusion*, which is what is expressed by the name',—then his argument would be entirely superfluous [as what he would be seeking to prove would be what is already admitted by us]. This is what is going to be asserted later on in the passage—' If the basis of this lies in *mutual exclusion*, then that is exactly our view'.—As for the *Apohist*, on the other hand, he does not hold anything denoted by words, or the form of the Idea, to be real. Because what he holds is that that alone forms the Import of the word which appears to be apprehended by the verbal cognition; and (under the Theory under review) what is apprehended by the verbal cognition is not the form of the Idea, but the external object which is capable of effective action.—And yet the external object is not really apprehended by it,—because the apprehension is not in strict accordance with the real state of things; on the contrary the thing is accepted in accordance with the apprehension; so that the Import of words is something that is *superimposed*; and what is superimposed is nothing; so in reality, *nothing* is denoted by words.—As for what has been said by the *Apohist* (in the passage quoted by the other party in line 21 on the preceding page of the Text) regarding ' that being the denotation of words',—that has been said with a view to the superimposed object. The upholder of the Theory however, regards the form of the Idea to be *really* denoted by words. Thus there is a great difference between the two theories.—(891)

(*f*) Others have held that—" By repeated usage Word comes to produce an intuition, and it does not actually denote any external object".—This view is set forth in the following—

TEXT (892).

IN SHORT, ALL WORDS ARE PRODUCTIVE OF INTUITION, THROUGH REPEATED USAGE ; AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF MAKING THINGS KNOWN TO CHILDREN AND ANIMALS.—(892).

COMMENTARY.

'*Repeated usage*',—finding the word applied to a certain object again and again.

'*Intuition*',—is a mental capacity which tends to bring about the notion of a certain activity as due to a certain cause; this capacity is produced by the word as associated with frequent usage; it varies with each sentence and with each person; as its diversity is illimitable, on account of the usage of words being endless, it cannot be described; hence all that is said is that it *is like making things known to children and animals*;—the stroke of the driving Hook, used for making things known to the elephant, comes to produce an Intuition in the animal; in the same manner all expressive words,—such as 'tree', etc. etc.—through repeated usage, come ultimately to produce only an Intuition and they do not actually denote anything directly. Otherwise, how could there be mutually contradictory interpretations of Texts ? How too could there be any imaginary stories and other compositions which speak of things created by the imagination of the writer ? —(892)

The Author now proceeds to refute the various theories (regarding the Import of Words, that have been set forth in *Texts* 887–892):—

TEXTS (893-894).

What is expressed by the Verb 'to be' IS SAID TO BE DENOTED BY WORDS;—IS IT MEANT TO BE THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' OF THINGS ? OR THE 'UNIVERSAL' ? OR THE CONTACT ? OR SOMETHING ELSE WHICH REFLECTS THE COGNITION ? —THE OBJECTIONS TO EVERYONE OF THESE ALTERNATIVES HAVE BEEN ALREADY SET FORTH ABOVE. FURTHER, AS FOR *what is expressed by the Verb 'to be'*, WHICH HAS BEEN HELD TO FORM THE IMPORT OF WORDS,—THERE CAN BE NO DIVERSE USAGE BASED UPON THAT.—(893-894)

COMMENTARY.

If 'what is expressed by the Verb *to be*' is held to be of the nature of what has been expounded before,—then it is open to the same objections that

have been previously set forth.—Further, as no definite form can be conceived of in regard to 'what is expressed by the verb *to be*',—if that alone were denoted by Words, there could be no such divergent usage of words as 'Cow', *gavaya*', 'Elephant' and so forth; as these animals would not be denoted by the words at all.—(893-894)

The following text anticipates the answer of the other party—

TEXT (895).

"IT (USAGE) WOULD BE BASED UPON THE MERE '*Being*' *of things* AS QUALIFIED BY THE UNIVERSAL 'COW' AND THE WORD ('COW'); AND THE OPINION THAT HAS BEEN HELD IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THERE ARE SUCH DIVERSITIES OF FORM AS THE PRESENCE OF HORNS, THE PARTICULAR SHAPE, THE PARTICULAR COLOUR 'BLUE' AND SO FORTH."—(895)

COMMENTARY.

The following may be the answer of the other party:—"The diverse usage would proceed on the basis of the cognition of the mere '*Being*' *of the Thing concerned* (which is what is expressed by the verb 'to be'), as qualified by the Universal *Cow* and the word ('Cow'), but devoid of such distinctions as *being of variegated colour* and so forth.—If that is so, then why is the denotation of the word said to consist in only *what is expressed by the Verb* '*to be*',—when such particulars as the 'Cow', etc. are also said to be denoted?—The answer to this given by the other party is—'*The opinion, etc. etc.*';—that is, as a matter of fact, the idea of the Horn and other particulars does not proceed from the word; it is for this reason that the opinion has been held that 'what is denoted is what is expressed by the verb *to be*,—and not the Universal *Cow*, etc.'; the reason for which opinion lies in the fact that the qualifying factors—the Universal *Cow* and the word (name) 'Cow'—are not cognised through the word.—Hence there is no incongruity in our opinion."—(895)

The above is refuted in the following—

TEXT (896).

IF THIS BE SO, THEN THERE SHOULD BE DENOTATION OF THE THING AS EQUIPPED WITH THOSE, AS ALSO OF THE DIVERSE PARTICULARS. AND IN THAT CASE, THE SAME OBJECTIONS WOULD BE APPLICABLE. APART FROM THESE, THERE IS FOUND NOTHING 'EXPRESSED BY THE VERB *to be*'.—(896)

COMMENTARY.

If the view is that the object alone as qualified by the Universal 'Cow', etc. is denoted by the word,—then it becomes admitted that there is denota-

tion of the object as possessing that 'Universal'. In that case, as the 'Universal' and also its 'Inherence' have been already rejected, there would be no possibility of there being any object equipped with these; so that the same objections would be applicable.

Further, as the object equipped by these particulars would be of the nature of the 'Specific Individuality', there could be no Convention bearing upon it, and there could be no usage of words; the notions obtained too would be hazy,—as already pointed out before.

If it be said that *What is expressed by the verb 'to be'* is something different from 'Specific Individuality' and other things,—then the answer to that is that, *apart from these, etc.*—i.e. apart from 'Specific Individuality' and other things, there is nothing 'expressed by the verb *to be*' which is within the range of our cognition.—(896)

The following *text* sets forth the objections against the theory of the 'Aggregate' being denoted by Words (as expounded under *Text* 888):—

TEXT (897).

UNDER THE VIEW THAT WHAT IS DENOTED IS THE 'AGGREGATE', THERE IS CLEAR CONCEPTION OF 'UNIVERSALS' AND 'PARTICULARS', AS WHAT ARE DENOTED ARE AUSTERITY, CASTE, CONDUCT AND THE REST COLLECTIVELY.—(897)

COMMENTARY.

Even under the view that what is denoted is the 'Aggregate', a much clearer conception of 'Universals' and 'Particulars',—in the shape of Austerity and the rest,—is admitted; hence all the objections that have been urged against the denotation of each of these singly, are all applicable to the view in question.—(897)

The author next states the objections against the two views set forth (under Texts 888 and 889) regarding 'the Unreal Contact, etc.':—

TEXT (898).

ANY SORT OF RELATION AMONG SUBSTANCE AND THE REST, WHOSE NATURE HAS BEEN DULY ASCERTAINED, AS ALSO ANY REAL 'UNIVERSAL', —HAS BEEN ALREADY DISCARDED.—(898)

COMMENTARY.

In course of the examination of the Six Categories, any such relation as Conjunction and Inherence has been rejected;—under the examination of the Sāṅkhya doctrines, we have rejected the idea that the 'Universal' is real and consists of the three Attributes, and is not-different (from the Particular

Products);—and the 'Universal' as something different from the Particulars has been rejected in course of the examination of the Six Categories;—hence the Import of Words cannot consist either of 'the conjunction of the Unreal', or of 'the Real Universal with Unreal Adjuncts'.—(898)

The following *Text* points out objections against the view that what is denoted is 'Coalescence':—

TEXTS (899–901).

INASMUCH AS THE IMPORT OF WORDS CANNOT CONSIST OF PARTICULARS OR UNIVERSALS, THERE CAN BE NO FORM OF THE WORD AS COALESCED (IDENTIFIED) WITH ITS DENOTATION. THEN AGAIN, THIS 'COALESCENCE' ALSO MUST RESIDE IN THE COGNITION ITSELF, INASMUCH AS IT IS DIFFERENT FROM EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIP. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT WOULD BE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS VIEW AND THE VIEW THAT THE COGNITION OR IDEA ITSELF CONSTITUTES THE IMPORT OF WORDS?—AS REGARDS THE VIEW THAT THE FORM OF THE IDEA (OR COGNITION) IS WHAT IS DENOTED BY WORDS,—THAT HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED, ON THE GROUND THAT IT WOULD BE NOTHING DIFFERENT FROM THE IDEA AND AS SUCH COULD NOT BE PERVASIVE.—(899–901)

COMMENTARY.

If there were such a thing as the 'denotation' of the word, then it might become coalesced with it; but in so far as it has been proved that no 'denotation' of the Word is possible, in the form of 'Specific Individuality' and the rest,—how could there be any 'coalescing' with it?

Then again, the said 'Coalescence' also must reside in the Cognition only. Because the external Word and the external Object (denoted) must be distinct by reason of their being perceived by different sense-organs and so forth; hence any real coalescence or identification of these cannot be right. The 'Coalescence', therefore, that is proper is only of such Word and Object as reside in the Cognition. So that when the Word, having taken up the form of the denoted Object, has its verbal character obscured, and appears in the Cognition,—it introduces the objective element into its subjective form; and it is then that it comes to be described as '*abhijalpa*', 'Coalescence'. This must be a form within the Cognition itself, and nothing exterior to it; because what is *exterior* must be of an entirely distinct character.

Under the circumstances, what would be the difference between this view and the other one by which the Cognition or Idea itself is regarded as the Import of Words?—None at all. In both cases the denotation would be purely subjective; the only difference being that the word and the denotation had coalesced and become one.

Both these views would be open to the same objection. How could that which is non-different from Cognition be something different? This is what is shown in the words—'*As regards the view that the form of the Cognition, etc. etc.*'.—(899–901)

The Author points out the objections against the view that it is 'Intuition' that is brought about by words (set forth in *Text* 892):—

TEXTS (902–905).

As regards 'Intuition', which has been regarded as the 'Import of Words',—if it appertains to the external object, then, inasmuch as the external object has one particular character, how could there be various 'Intuitions'?—If the 'Intuitions' be held to be objectless, and existing only in the form of Faculties,—then how could there be either comprehension or activity regarding external things? —If it be held that these two (Cognition and Activity) abandon the external form and rest within themselves,—then the Import of Words becomes unreal, false—as proceeding through illusion.—Nor can Intuition be held to be baseless; as in that case, it should appear everywhere.—If the basis of it be held to consist in the 'mutual exclusion' among things,—then that is exactly our view.—(902–905)

COMMENTARY.

If 'Intuition' is really based upon the external object, then it cannot be possible for various Intuitions to appear in persons living at mutually incompatible times, relating to any single thing like Sound; because what is one cannot have several natures.

If Intuitions are devoid of objects, then Activity and Comprehension in connection with objects should not be possible; as the word would have no connection with objects.

If it be held that—"the Comprehension and Activity come about under illusion, the object being imposed upon what is objectless",—then the Import of Words becomes illusory, mistaken; and of this Illusion, some cause has to be found; otherwise, if there were no cause of the Illusion, it should appear everywhere and at all times.—If the *mutual exclusion* among things be held to be the cause of the illusion, then you support our own view, and as such your argument becomes superfluous.—(902–905)

The following Text sets forth the objection that applies to all the various theories on the subject :—

TEXT (906).

AGAIN, IS ALL THIS MOMENTARY OR NOT ? IF IT IS MOMENTARY, THEN THERE CAN BE NO CO-ORDINATION. IF OTHERWISE, THERE SHOULD BE NO SUCCESSIVE COGNITION.—(906)

COMMENTARY.

All this—' Specific Individuality ', ' Universal ' and so forth (which has been held to be denoted by words)—is it momentary or not-momentary ?—In the former case, as there could be no co-ordination between what existed at the time of the Convention and what exists at the time of Usage,—no Convention could apply to the case at all.—If, on the other hand, it be held that it is all *not-momentary,* then,—inasmuch as what is *successive* cannot proceed from what is *not-successive,* there would be no cognition relating to Words and their Import,—as such cognition can only be *successive.*

' *Otherwise* '—i.e. if it is *not-momentary.*—(906)

Other people have asserted as follows :—" The Word brings about the Inference of the desire to speak (of a certain thing), as declared in the statement that ' There is no other means save the Word of inferring the desire to speak '."—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (907).

THIS SAME ARGUMENT SERVES TO SET ASIDE THE ' DESIRE TO SPEAK ' AS (HELD TO BE) COGNISED THROUGH WORDS. WHEN, AS SHOWN ABOVE, THERE CAN BE NO ' DENOTATION OF WORDS ', HOW COULD THERE BE ANY ' DESIRE TO SPEAK ' ? OR EVEN THE WORD ITSELF ?—(907)

COMMENTARY.

If the ' desire to speak ' is really held to be appurtenant to the *real* ' Import of Words ',—then it is ' unproven ' ; because there can be no ' Import of Words ' in the shape of any such thing as ' Specific Individuality ' and the rest. Hence there can be no *real* ' desire to speak ' of any object ; as there is nothing to which the word may be related.

Nor can there be a word denotative of the object ; this is what is stated in the words—' *or even the word itself* '.—' *Shruti* ' stands for the *Word.* If the ' desire to speak ', is what is expressed by the Word, then the *Word* cannot be applied to any external object ; as it would not be expressed, like any other thing.—(907)

The idea may be that—" there is some sort of similarity between what appears in the ' desire to speak ' and the external object,—and on the basis

of this similarity, the word may be applied to the external object, even though it may not be directly expressed; as happens in the case of twins".—
This is answered in the following—

TEXT (908).

HOW CAN THE WORD BE APPLIED,—MERELY THROUGH SIMILARITY,—TO WHAT IS NOT EXPRESSED BY IT? AND THE VIEW THAT IT IS THROUGH SIMILARITY, AS IN THE CASE OF THE NAMES OF TWINS, IS ALSO DISCARDED BY THIS SAME ARGUMENT.—(908)

COMMENTARY.

Such being the case, the application of words to external objects can never be possible; in fact it might be possible to apply the word to an object not figuring in the 'desire to speak' at all; as in the case of twins.

The *Vaibhāṣika* postulates, as mark of the object called 'Name' and 'Basis', a distinct faculty.—This theory also becomes discarded by this same argument. Because if the said 'Name' is momentary, then there can be no co-ordination; if it is not-momentary, then there can be no *succession*; and there is the anomaly of the word being applied to an external object; and it could not always be on the basis of similarity.—All these objections descend upon this theory in a body.

Or the phrase '*by this same argument*' may be taken to refer to the objections urged against 'Specific Individuality' and the rest. That is to say, in the present connection also, it may be said that—'The nature of the Name, etc., which contains nothing else, is such that there can be no Convention in regard to them; similarly what does not exist cannot be denoted by words'.—(908)

It has been asserted above by the Author that if words denote things that figure in the 'desire to speak', then they cannot apply to external objects. The following *Text* anticipates the Opponent's answer to this:—

TEXT (909).

"WHEN TWO PERSONS THINK OF THE FORM FIGURING IN THE 'DESIRE TO SPEAK' AND IN THE 'INFERENCE' AS SOMETHING EXTERNAL, THEN THE WORD BECOMES APPLIED TO IT";—IF THIS VIEW BE HELD, THEN THAT AGAIN IS EXACTLY OUR OPINION.—(909)

COMMENTARY.

"The 'Desire to speak' is present in the 'Chain' of the Speaker, and the 'Inference' based upon that Desire is present in the 'chain' of the Hearer;

the form that is connected with these two,—i.e. which figures in these;—when the two persons—the Speaker and the Hearer—think of the object as so figuring,—then the Word comes to be applied to that external object. That is to say, though in reality what the speaker is cognisant of is what is figuring in his own consciousness, yet he thinks that he is speaking to the other man of an external object; and the Hearer also has the impression that 'this man is speaking to me of an external object'; hence, just as two men suffering from defective vision see two moons, so also is all this use of words."

If this is so, then, you have fallen on our side; and all your argumentation is futile.

'*Again*',—i.e. once you had come to our side when you postulated the 'Intuition' as the 'Import of words'.

It is thus established that the Reason (put forward by the Author)—'because no Convention can be made',—cannot be regarded as 'unproven'. The idea that it may be 'Inconclusive' or 'Contradictory' has been already rejected before.—From all this it follows that all that is brought about by words is the '*Apoha*', 'Exclusion of others'.—(909)

On hearing the term '*Apoha*', the other party, having his mind perturbed, and not knowing the exact nature of this *Apoha*, proceeds to urge against that doctrine the fact of its being contrary to experience:—

TEXTS (910-911).

"WHY DO YOU SAY THAT THE WORD BRINGS ABOUT THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHERS'? AS A MATTER OF FACT MERE NEGATION IS NOT APPREHENDED IN THE IDEA BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE WORD; ON THE CONTRARY, IN THE CASE OF ALL SUCH WORDS AS 'COW', '*Gavaya*', 'ELEPHANT', 'TREE' AND SO FORTH,—THE VERBAL COGNITION THAT RESULTS IS ALWAYS IN THE POSITIVE FORM."

COMMENTARY.

The particle '*iti*' is to be taken as understood after '*anyāpohakṛt*'. The meaning is—"Why do you say that what is brought about by the word is the *exclusion of others*?"

Why should not this be asserted?

"Because, *as a matter of fact, mere negation, etc. etc.*; that is, 'the exclusion of others' is intended to be a mere negation; and mere negation does not figure in Verbal Cognition; on the contrary, Verbal Cognition is always found to apprehend the positive form of things; and what does not figure in Verbal Cognition cannot be rightly regarded as the 'import of words'; as such an idea would lead to absurdities. Thus the Proposition (of the *Apohist*) is contrary to experience."—(910-911)

The next three *Texts* state the fact of the Buddhist's Proposition being contrary to experience,—in accordance with the opinion of *Bhāmaha* :—

TEXT (912).

"IF THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF THE WORD 'COW' IS SERVED BY THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHERS',—THEN, PLEASE FIND SOME OTHER WORD WHICH BRINGS ABOUT THE NOTION OF 'COW' IN REGARD TO THE COW ITSELF."—(912)

COMMENTARY.

"If the word 'Cow' only serves the purpose of denoting the 'exclusion of others', then,—as it would be taken up in that,—that term 'Cow' could not bring about the idea of the *animal with the dewlap*; hence it would be necessary to seek for some other word which could bring about the notion of 'Cow' in regard to the said *animal with the dewlap*."—(912)

It might be said (by the other party) that—"one and the same word 'Cow' would bring about both the notions, and hence the second word need not be sought after"—To this, *Bhāmaha* makes the following reply :—

TEXT (913).

"IN FACT, COGNITION IS THE FRUIT OF WORDS; AND NO SINGLE WORD CAN HAVE TWO FRUITS. HOW TOO COULD BOTH *Affirmation and Negation* BE THE FRUIT OF ANY ONE WORD?"—(913)

COMMENTARY.

"Words have for their fruit the cognition of affirmation and of negation.—'What then?—*No single word can have two fruits*; of any one word,—be it affirmative or negative,—there cannot be two fruits appearing at one and the same time; that is, no such is ever found.—Nor again is it possible for mutually contradictory cognitions of affirmation and negation to be the fruit of a single word."—(913)

In the following *Text, Bhāmaha* puts forward his comprehensive argument (against *Apoha*) :—

TEXT (914).

"WHEN ONE HEARS THE WORD 'COW' UTTERED, HE SHOULD, FIRST OF ALL HAVE THE IDEA OF THE *non-cow*,—AS THE WORD 'COW' WOULD HAVE BEEN UTTERED FOR THE PURPOSE OF NEGATIVING THE 'NON-COW'."—(914)

COMMENTARY.

"If it is the *negation of the non-cow* that is mainly expressed by the word 'Cow', then, on hearing the word 'Cow', the first idea in the mind of

the hearer would be that of the 'non-cow'; because that is held to be the 'import' of the word the notion regarding which appears *directly and immediately* after the word; the notion of the 'negation of the non-cow' does not appear *directly and immediately* after the word 'Cow'.—Thus, on account of the incongruity of there being no notion of the *Cow*, and on account of the incongruity of the first appearance of the notion of the *non-cow*, '*Apoha*' (Negation of others) cannot form the Import of Words." —(914)

The Author next proceeds to set forth objections against *Apoha*, from the point of view of *Kumārila* :—

TEXT (915).

"THOSE WHO HAVE ADMITTED THE UNIVERSAL 'NEGATION OF THE NON-COW' AS THE IMPORT OF THE WORD HAVE, BY THE EXPRESSION, ADMITTED THE UNIVERSAL 'COW' AS AN ENTITY."—[Shlokavārtika—*Apoha* 1]—(915)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila has argued as follows :—"When the Universal 'Negation of the Contrary' is asserted to be the Import of words, it could be either in the form of 'Preclusion' or 'the negation of what is possible';—If it be the former, then the Proposition is open to the charge of being 'futile',—inasmuch as we also hold that what is denoted by the word 'Cow' is the *Universal* named 'Cow'; and this is exactly what you also assert in other words when you declare that 'what is denoted by the word *Cow* is the *Universal* in the shape of the *negation of the non-cow*'; so that the dispute is only in regard to the name (of the Universal)."—(915)

Question :—How is it the same thing asserted in different words?
Answer—

TEXT (916).

"INASMUCH AS ALL 'INEXISTENCE' HAS BEEN HELD TO BE OF THE NATURE OF SOME OTHER 'EXISTENCE',—PLEASE SAY WHAT THAT 'INEXISTENCE' IS WHICH IS OF THE NATURE OF THE 'NEGATION OF THE HORSE (AND OTEHR NON-COWS)'?"—[*Ibid.* 2]—(916)

COMMENTARY.

"Since all 'Inexistence', in the four forms of 'Previous Inexistence' and the rest, has been found to be of the nature of *existence*';—as declared in the following words—'while the Curd is not present in the Milk, it is called previous *Inexistence*; when the Milk is not present in the Curd, it is called

Inexistence per Destruction; the absence of the House, etc. in the Cow is called *mutual Inexistence*; when portions of the head of the Hare are flat and devoid of a hard protuberance, it is said to be *absolute Inexistence,* in the shape of the Hare's Horn . . . These thus are not so many kinds of non-entity. Hence *Inexistence* must be an entity' (*Shlokavārtika*: *Abhāva*, 2–4 and 8).—What is *meant* is that it is Milk itself which, while not present in the form of the Curd, comes to be known as the 'Previous Inexistence' (of the Curd); and similarly with other forms of *Inexistence.*—Thus *Inexistence* being only a form of *Existence,* what is that Inexistence which is meant by you to be the 'Negation of the Horse, etc.'; please tell us this."—(916)

The *Bauddha* might say—What is to be said? What we mean is none other than the 'Specific Individuality' of the Cow.

"The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (917-918).

"YOU DO NOT ADMIT OF ANY INDIVIDUALITY IN THE NATURE OF SOMETHING *uncommon* (UNIQUE), BECAUSE IT IS DEVOID OF CONCEPTUAL CONTENT; SO ALSO (YOU DO NOT ADMIT) THE 'VARIEGATED ANIMAL' AND THE LIKE; AS IN THAT CASE THE IMPORT WOULD NOT BE UNIVERSAL (COMMON).—HENCE THE IDEA OF THE 'COW' MUST BE BASED UPON THAT FORM WHICH SUBSISTS IN COMMON IN EVERY SINGLE INDIVIDUAL (COW); [AND IN THIS THERE CAN BE NO DISPUTE BETWEEN US]."—[*Ibid.* 3 & 10]—(917-918)

COMMENTARY.

That which is the unique (uncommon) Individuality is not held by you to constitute the 'negation of Horse and other non-cows';—why?—*because it is devoid of conceptual content* (or determination); that is, all determination ceases in it; it is only the *Common* Universal that is held to form the object of determination (conceptual thought).; while that entity which is *uncommon, unique* is beyond all determination; as declared in the following words—'What is perceptible by the senses is the self-cognisable, inexplicable form'. The ground for regarding anything as an Individual consists in its uncommon (unique) character; hence what is meant by the words of the Text is 'that which is an Individuality by reason of its uncommon character'.

Hitherto the Text has made only a general statement. It reasserts same thing in reference to a particular instance—'*So also, etc. etc.*':—that is, just as you do not admit of the Import of the word 'Cow' to consist in any unique individual in the shape of the 'negation of the Horse and other non-cows', so also you do not admit of any positive entity in the form of the

'negation of the Horse, etc.' as forming the Import of such words as the 'variegated cow' and the like.—Why not ?—*Because in that case the Import would not be universal* ;—that is, if it were so admitted, then, the Universal could never form the Import of the word ; as it would have no connection with the word. Because it is so, therefore there can be no common entity in the shape of the 'negation of the Horse, etc.' ; consequently the conclusion must be that the idea of 'Cow' is based upon that character which resides completely in each one of the members of the same class—the *variegated* and other cows ; and this can be only the *Universal* 'Cow'.—If you speak of this same as the 'negation of the non-cow', then the difference is only in name and your proposition thus is open to the charge of being 'superfluous'.—(917-918)

The following *Text* takes up the second alternative (mentioned under Text 915)—that the '*Apoha*' is of the nature of the 'negation of what is possible' :—

TEXT (919).

"IF THE IMPORT OF WORDS BE ASSUMED TO BE OF THE NATURE OF MERE NEGATION, THEN IT WOULD ONLY BE ANOTHER KIND OF 'VOID' SPOKEN OF BY MEANS OF THE NEGATIVE WORD."—(919)

COMMENTARY.

'*Spoken of by means of the negative word*' ;—the 'Negative Word' is the word expressive of the negation in the form of the 'negation of the non-cow' ; and what would be denoted by this word would only be the '*Void*', *the absence of the external world* ; since the form of the 'entity' would be denied.

'*Another kind*' ; this 'Void' you (Buddhist) had postulated, and we had rejected under the chapter on *Idealism* (*Vijñānavāda* of the *Shlokavartika*) ; and on the present occasion of examining the nature of the Import of Words, the same 'Void' is again put forward under the garb of '*Apoha*' ; which denies the object whose existence is vouched for by experience.—(919)

" Where is the harm if that is so ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (920).

"IN THAT 'VOID' THERE WOULD BE AN APPREHENSION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE *cognitions* THEMSELVES OF THE HORSE AND OTHER THINGS ; AND IN THAT CASE IT WOULD BE USELESS TO POSIT THE '*Apoha* (NEGATION) OF OTHERS' AS THE IMPORT OF WORDS."—[*Ibid.* 37]—(920)

COMMENTARY.

If the 'Void' is what is denoted, then it comes to this that in all Verbal Cognitions what is comprehended is only the factor of 'Cognition' itself ;

as *ex hypothesi*, there can be no apprehension of the form of any thing external. —"Even so, what is the harm?"—In that case, it would be futile to assert that the *Apoha* is denoted by words; as what would become the Import of Words would be the form of the *Cognition* which would be a *positive* entity independent of all tinge of anything external. What is meant is that in this way there would be a contradiction of your own doctrine—by this Proposition of yours.—(920)

The same idea is further explained:—

TEXT (921).

"IN THAT CASE, THE 'FORM OF THE COGNITION', WHICH IS POSITED AS THE 'IMPORT OF WORDS', WOULD BE THE *Universal*."—[*Ibid.* 38]—(921)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the 'form of the Cognition' itself, in the form of the positive entity, 'Universal',—would be the Import of Words.—(921)

The following might be urged—'Even without a substratum (in the external world), the cognition in question would appear in the form of the 'exclusion of the heterogeneous Cow, etc.'; hence the postulation of the '*Apoha*' is quite right.'

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (922).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHENEVER THE SAID COGNITION APPEARS IN CONNECTION WITH THE IMPORT OF WORDS, IT IS ALWAYS IN THE FORM OF A POSITIVE ENTITY; HENCE IN SUCH CASES, THE IMPORT COULD BE ASSUMED TO CONSIST OF THE POSITIVE ENTITY ONLY,—A COGNITION *not* OF THE NATURE OF '*Apoha*'."—[*Ibid.* 39]—(922)

COMMENTARY.

'*Vasturūpā*';—in the form of a positive entity.

The said cognition',—i.e. the cognition the Horse, without a real substratum in the external world.

'*In connection with the Import of Words*',—as relating to the Horse and other things conceived of.

'*To consist of a positive entity*';—in the shape of the Idea embracing the notion of the *Horse and other non-cows.*

The effect of the emphasis is explained—*a cognition not of the nature of Apoha*; i.e. that Import of Words, in the shape of Idea, wherein the *Apoha* does not enter at all; the compound '*buddhyanapohakam*' being expounded as 'the non-exclusion of the Idea',—i.e. without any *exclusion of other Ideas*.—Or the compound '*buddhyanapohakam*' may be explained as follows—'*apohaka*' is *that which excludes*,—'*anapohaka*' is that which *does not exclude*;—the compound thus standing for 'that which does not exclude the Idea'.—What is meant is as follows:—Though one Cognition is always different from another Cognition, yet when it appears, it does not tend to the exclusion of the other cognition; it always tends to the positive cognition of such entities as the Horse and the like. Consequently the most reasonable thing is to accept the view that what is denoted is a positive entity, not *Apoha*; because one Cognition cannot exclude (be of the nature of the *Apoha*, negation, of) another.—(922)

Then again, this *Apoha* that you have postulated as the Import of Words,—has been held to be denoted by the word as taken out of a Sentence; but what is expressed by the Sentence must be of the nature of *Intuition*; as has been declared in the following—"Hitherto has been discussed the denotation of the Word as taken out of a Sentence; but what is brought about first of all is what is expressed by the Sentence, which has been called *Intuition*".—In this connection we have the following *Text*:—

TEXT (923).

"EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE CORRESPONDING EXTERNAL OBJECT THERE IS *Intuition* EXPRESSED BY THE SENTENCE; SIMILAR MAY BE THE CASE WITH WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORD ALSO; WHY SHOULD THE *Apoha* BE POSTULATED AT ALL?"—[*Ibid.* 43]—(923)

COMMENTARY.

Just as, even in the absence of an external object denoted by the Word,—you describe the meaning of the Sentence to be of the nature of *Intuition*, not of the nature of '*Apoha*',—even so, the meaning of the word,—like the meaning of the Sentence,—also may be of the nature of Intuition. Under the circumstances, why is any such thing as '*Apoha*' postulated at all? That is to say, the Import of both Sentence and Word may be of the positive character.—(923)

The following might be urged:—In the case of Intuitions also, there is always exclusion of one Intuition by another; hence *Apoha* is postulated.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (924).

"IN THE CASE OF A COGNITION, NO 'EXCLUSION OF ANOTHER COGNITION' IS APPREHENDED; IN FACT, APART FROM THE COMING ABOUT OF ITS OWN FORM, THE COGNITION CARRIES WITH IT NO OTHER FACTOR."—[*Ibid.* 41]—(924)

COMMENTARY.

It might be said that—"even though it is not apprehended, it may be there all the same"; hence it is added—'*In fact, etc. etc.*';—even though there may be exclusion of one Cognition from another, yet the Word has got nothing to do with it. Because as a matter of fact, when the Cognition is brought about by the Word, it does not bear within itself any factor expressed by the word, apart from its own appearance, in the shape of the exclusion of other Cognitions; on the contrary, it is always found to appear in the positive form. And the factor of an entity which is not expressed by the word cannot form the Import of that word; otherwise we would be landed in an absurdity.

The sense of all this is that the Proposition (of the Buddhist regarding *Apoha*) is annulled by actual experience.—(924)

Kumārila again shows, by means of an Incongruity, that the doctrine of *Apoha* is contrary to experience:—

TEXT (925).

"IF *Apoha* FORMED THE IMPORT OF WORDS, THEN ALL WORDS WOULD BE SYNONYMOUS,—THOSE THAT DENOTE DIVERSE UNIVERSALS, AS WELL AS THOSE THAT DENOTE PARTICULARS."—[*Ibid.* 42]—(925)

COMMENTARY.

The words denotative of diverse Universals,—like 'Cow', 'Horse', etc.—as well as those denotative of Particulars,—the 'Variegated Cow', etc.—would all become synonymous for you; as there would be no difference in their meanings,—just like the words '*vṛkṣa*' and '*pādapa*' (both of which denote the *tree* and are hence synonyms).—(925)

Question:—Why is there no difference in the meaning?

Answer:—

TEXT (926)

"THERE CAN BE NO DIFFERENCE AMONG *Apohas*, BECAUSE THEY ARE NON-ENTITIES, AND DEVOID OF ALL SUCH CONCEPTIONS AS 'RELATED', 'ONE' AND 'MANY'.—[*Ibid.* 45]—(926)

COMMENTARY.

Such conceptions as 'related', 'one' and 'many' are possible only in regard to an entity, not to a non-entity; and as *Apohas* are *non-entities*,

there can be no such conceptions in regard to them as being 'mutually related' and so forth; how then can there be any difference among them?—(926)

"If difference is admitted among *Apohas*, then surely they become *entities*".—This is shown in the following:—

TEXT (927).

"IF THE *Apohas* ARE DIFFERENT, THEN THEY MUST BE ENTITIES, BECAUSE OF THAT DIFFERENCE,—JUST LIKE THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY OF THINGS. IF THEY ARE NON-ENTITIES, THEN THEY CANNOT BE MANY, AND HENCE THEY CANNOT ESCAPE FROM BEING SYNONYMOUS."—[*Ibid.* 46]—(927)

COMMENTARY.

'*Vastu*'—states the Probandum.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—Those that differ among themselves must be entities,—like the Specific Individualities;—*Apohas* differ among themselves;—hence this is a natural Reason (for regarding them as *entities*); and if they are *entities*, then it becomes established that the Import of Words is *positive*.

This means that the Proposition of the Apohist is annulled by Inferential Reasoning.

On the other hand, if *Apohas* be held to be *non-entities*, then, there can be no plurality among them; and under the circumstances, it is certain that they are synonymous.—(927)

The following text anticipates the *Bauddha's* answer to the above:—

TEXT (928).

THERE WOULD CERTAINLY BE DIFFERENCE AMONG *Apohas*, BASED UPON THE DIFFERENCE AMONG THE HORSE AND OTHER THINGS.—[*Ibid.* 47]—(928)

COMMENTARY.

This argument has been thus stated:—'They are diverse, through the diversity of the things excluded; but they are absolutely inert in the matter of difference among themselves'. So that, even though there is no difference among the *Apohas* themselves, yet, as there is difference in the Horse and other things excluded (by the *Apoha* denoted by the word 'Cow'),—there would be difference among the *Apohas* also, which are of the form of the

exclusion of non-cows (and *non-cows* are many and diverse); thus they could not all be synonymous.—(928)

This answer is rejected in the following—

TEXT (928).

"IN FACT, THERE CAN BE NO DISTINCTION AMONG *Apohas*—EITHER BY THEMSELVES, OR THROUGH OTHERS."— [*Ibid.* 47]—(928)

COMMENTARY.

There can be no diversity or plurality in the *Apoha* itself,—because it is of the essence of mere negation. If it were diverse through others,—then this could be only imaginary, not real. Because it is not right that a nature that does not belong to a thing by itself should come to it through others. —(928)

Why should not this be right?
Answer :—

TEXT (929).

"WHEN EVEN THE SUBSTRATA TO WHICH THEY ARE RELATED DO NOT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE IN THE FORM OF THE *Apohas*,—THAT THEY WOULD BE DIFFERENTIATED BY THE *excluded things*, WHICH ARE EXTERIOR TO THEM, WOULD BE AN ASSUMPTION THAT IS TOO FAR-FETCHED."— [*Ibid.* 52]—(929)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, when the things to which they are related, the *variegated* and other Cows—which are their substrata—enter into their very constitution,—are unable to produce any difference in the essence of the *Apohas*, —inasmuch as even among the several cows, variegated and the rest, the *Apoha*, in the shape of the 'Exclusion of the non-cow', is held to be one only,—then how could this *Apoha* be rendered diverse by the objects excluded —such as the Horse, etc.—which are exterior to it? A thing that cannot be diversified by that which enters into its very constitution cannot certainly be diversified by what is exterior to it; as in that case the latter would cease to be exterior.

For this reason, what has been suggested is too much of an assumption.— This has been said in a joking spirit.—(929)

It might be argued that—in that case the inner correlates in the shape of the substrata themselves may be taken as serving the purposes of the differentiation.

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXTS (930-931).

"In the same manner, its diversity cannot be due to the diversity of its substratum ;—diversity in the relative of a thing does not justify the assumption of diversity in the thing also. How much less there is exclusion possible for that which is a non-entity, unrelated, undifferentiated, unspecified, vague and undetermined ? "—
[*Ibid.* 48-49]—(930-931)

COMMENTARY.

'*Its*'—of *Apoha.*

Why is it not possible ?

Answer—'*Diversity in the relative, etc. etc.*' ;—the idea that the non-entity cannot be diversified by the diversity of its relative—because it has no character at all,—may rest for a while ; as regards *entities* also, no diversity is ever found to be due to the diversity in relatives ; for instance, when *Devadatta,* who is a single entity, occupies, either simultaneously or successively, different seats, he continues to be perceived as the same without having become diverse. How much more so is this then in the case of the 'exclusion of others', which is a pure *non-entity* ? Because it is a *non-entity,* therefore it is '*unrelated*'—not connected with anything,—'*undifferentiated*'—not distinguished from anything heterogeneous,—simply because it is a *non-entity* ; for the same reason, it is also '*unspecified*' ;—how can such a non-entity acquire diversity merely through diversity in its relatives ?—(930-931)

"Further, it may be granted that diversity is due to diversity in relatives ; even so, as you do not admit of the 'Universal' as an entity, it is not possible for your *Apoha* to have the relative, in the shape of its substratum ; the diversity of which could account for the diversity in the *Apoha* ".—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (932).

"As a matter of fact, no one can conceive of the Cow and other things—any similarity of form among whom is not admitted,—to be the substratum of *Apoha.*"—(932)

COMMENTARY.

If a real similarity among *Cows* were admitted, then they could be accepted as the substratum of the *Apoha,* of Horse and other things, on the basis of that common similarity ;—not otherwise ; hence one who desires

to have these Cows as the substratum of *Apoha*, must admit of the *similarity* ; and in that case, that *similarity* as the 'Universal' would form the Import of the Word, and there would be no use for the assuming of *Apoha*.

The term '*Viṣaya*' in this Text, stands for *substratum* or *receptacle* ; just as in such expressions as '*Jalaviṣayā matsyāḥ*'.—(932)

For those people also who assume the diversity of *Apoha* to be based upon *what is excluded* (by it),—even that diversity is not possible without an entity in the shape of the 'Universal'.—This is shown in the following—

TEXT (933).

"IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMMON PROPERTY, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE THINGS EXCLUDED (BY *Apoha*). FOR THIS REASON ALSO THERE CAN BE NO *Apoha*."—[*Ibid.* 72]—(933)

COMMENTARY.

If there were some property common to the Horse and all other *non-Cows*, then they could all be 'excluded' by the word 'Cow' ; not otherwise ; as no other ground for distinction is perceptible. If such a common property is admitted, then the postulating of the *Apoha* becomes useless. Thus, for this reason, there can be no *Apoha*.—(933)

"Further, it is held by you that the *Apoha* is indicated by the Word and by the Inferential Indicative ; now both these, Word and Indicative, cannot be operative in the absence of a positive 'Universal' ; hence (for you) how is the *Apoha* indicated ?"

This argument is set forth in the following—

TEXT (934).

"OF THE WORD AND THE INDICATIVE, NO OPERATION IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT CONCOMITANCE ;—AND WITHOUT THESE (WORD AND THE INDICATIVE), THERE CAN BE NO *Apoha* ;—AND THERE CAN BE NO CONCOMITANCE FOR WHAT IS 'UNCOMMON' (UNIQUE, SPECIFIC)."—[*Ibid.* 73]—(934)

COMMENTARY.

'*Anvayavinirmuktā*'—i.e. without co-ordination.

'*These*'—i.e. the Word and the Indicative.—Without these, the *Apoha* '*cannot be apprehended*',—this has to be taken as understood.

It might be said that—"the Word and the Indicative may operate on the basis of concomitance with the Specific Individuality".

The answer to this is that '*there can be, etc. etc.*'. That is, the Specific Individuality is something *uncommon*, not partaking of anything else ; how

can there be any concomitance with it ?—Thus Word and Indicative can have no bearing on the assumption of '*Apoha*'.—(934)

"Even if there be operation of Word and Indicative,—the authority or validity attached to these (by the Apohist) becomes shaken."

This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (935).

"WHILE THE *Apoha* ITSELF HAS NOT BECOME ACCOMPLISHED,—WHERE COULD THE CONCOMITANCE BE ASSERTED (WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF ALL INDICATIVES) ? AND IF THE CONCOMITANCE IS NOT PERCEIVED,—THERE WOULD BE NO VALIDITY IN THESE (WORD AND INDICATIVE)."—[*Ibid.* 74]—(935)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Word and Indicative can be valid only when there is no absence of concomitance of what is to be affirmed ;—in the case in question, *Apoha* is what is meant to be affirmed ;—now, as it is of the form of mere Negation, and hence devoid of any (positive) character, it cannot be an accomplished entity ; under the circumstances, wherein could the 'concomitance', or 'absence of non-concomitance' of the Word and Indicative be asserted ?

What would be the use of asserting the concomitance ?

Answer :—If the concomitance is not perceived, etc. etc.

'*In these*'—in Word and Indicative. Because validity consists in *absence of non-concomitance.*—(935)

It might be argued that—even without their concomitance being apprehended, the Word and the Indicative would indicate their object merely through the 'non-perception of the heterogeneous'.

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (936).

"THEY COULD NOT SIGNIFY ANYTHING BY MERE *non-perception* ; BECAUSE NON-PERCEPTION BEING COMMON IN ALL CASES, THERE COULD BE NO DISTINCTION.—[*Ibid.* 75]—(936)

COMMENTARY.

'*Mere*' ;—this serves to exclude the perception of concomitance.

Question :—Why could not they signify it ?

Answer :—'*Because non-perception, etc. etc.*'—'*In all cases*'—i.e. in regard to heterogeneous things, to homogeneous things, and also to the particular thing concerned.—Hence there could be no such distinctive cogni-

tions as—'this is the thing itself', and 'that is something else'; in fact, the word could not indicate its own objective; as the concomitance would be not-apprehended there also, just as in any other thing.

In some places the reading is '*pratyāyyo*' (in place of '*pratyayo*'); in which case the meaning is that there could be no distinction in the thing indicated; —i.e. it could not differ.

In this way, there being a possibility of the loss of validity of the operation of Words and Indicatives, it cannot be right to regard the *Apoha* as the Import of Words.—(936)

It has been argued (under 932, above) that—"no one can conceive of any similarity of Cow, etc. etc.".—The following *Text* anticipates the Buddhist's answer to that argument:—

TEXT (937).

"IT MIGHT BE ARGUED THAT—EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF SIMILARITY OF FORM, THERE COULD BE ASSUMPTION OF *Apoha*;—THEN WHY IS THE *Apoha of the 'non-cow'* NOT ASSUMED IN THE CASE OF THE *Cow and the Horse*?"—[*Ibid.* 76]—(937)

COMMENTARY.

If, even in the absence of similarity, the *apoha of the non-Cow* be assumed in the case of the Variegated and other Cows,—then why can it not be assumed in the case of the *Cow and the Horse* also? The *absence of similarity* would be common to both cases.

The Author has used the form '*gavāshvayoḥ*', evidently forgetting the rule embodied in the *Sūtra* '*Gavāshvaprabhṛtīni cha sanjñāyām*'.—(937)

The said presence of common conditions in the two cases is further explained:—

TEXT (938).

"*Difference from the Spotted Cow* IS THE SAME IN THE *Black Cow* AND IN THE *Horse*. SO THAT IF NO OTHER 'COMMONALTY' IS ADMITTED, WHERETO WOULD THE *Apoha of the non-Cow* APPLY?"—[*Ibid.* 77]—(938)

COMMENTARY.

'*Whereto, etc. etc.*'—Just as the '*Apoha* of the non-Cow' is not applied to the *Horse*, on the basis of its difference from the *Spotted Cow*,—so, inasmuch as the *Black Cow* also is different from the *Spotted Cow*, the said '*Apoha* of the non-Cow' should not apply to the *Black Cow* also. So also to the *spotted* and other Cows; 'difference' being equally present in all cases. [And the Buddhist does not accept any such *commonalty* as that subsisting among all *Cows*, but not in any other animal.]—(938)

"Further, just as it is not right to regard the Specific Individuality and other things as denoted by words,—on the ground of the absence of Convention,—so also it cannot be right in the case of *Apoha* also".—This is shown in the following—

TEXT (939).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE *Apoha of the non-Cow* HAS NEVER BEEN PREVIOUSLY PERCEIVED BY THE SENSE-ORGANS;—AND THE OPERATION OF WORDS DOES NOT LIE ANYWHERE ELSE. ON THE PERCEPTION OF WHAT THEN WOULD THE WORD BE USED?"—[*Ibid.* 78]—(939)

COMMENTARY.

The Convention-maker sets up the Convention on the basis of his firm conviction regarding the denotation of the word;—the *Apoha* however is never perceived by the Sense-organs;—'*previously*'—i.e. prior to the using of the word, at the time of fixing up the relation between the *name* and the *named*.—It cannot be perceived, because it is a non-entity, and Sense-organs operate only upon entities.

It might be argued that the Word could be used on the apprehension of the Specific Individuality as differentiated from other things.

The answer to that is that '*the operation of words, etc. etc.*';—'*anywhere else*',—i.e. in anything other than '*the Apoha of others*',—in the shape of the Specific Individuality.—(939)

It might be argued that—"the *Apoha* may not be apprehended by the Sense-organs; it could be apprehended by means of Inference".—This is answered in the following—

TEXT (940).

"BY WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE, THERE CAN BE NO INFERENCE EITHER, IN THIS CASE; AND FOR THE SAME REASON THERE CAN BE NO CONCEPTION OF ANY CONNECTION OF THIS."—[*Ibid.* 79]—(940)

COMMENTARY.

'*What has gone before*',—under *Text* 934, above.

'*There can be no, etc. etc.*';—*connection of this*—i.e. with the *Word*.

The particle '*api*' is meant to imply that the said absence of diversity is not the only reason.

'*Tēna*'—for the same reason.

Thus it has been shown that the Reason adduced by the *Bauddha* (against the denotation of Words)—'because no Convention can be made'—is 'incon-

clusive'; inasmuch as the application of words to the *Apoha* is admitted, even though no Convention can be made in regard to it.—(940)

The following text again proceeds to show that there can be no Convention in regard to the *Apoha* :—

TEXT (941).

"How could one apprehend the fact of something not being denoted by the word 'Cow'?—'It could be learnt from the fact that the word *Cow* was not found to be applied to it at the moment of the apprehension of the connection of that word'. [This is what the Bauddha may say.]"—[*Ibid.* 81]—(941)

COMMENTARY.

It behoves you to explain this:—How do you know that the *Horse and other non-Cows* are denoted by the word 'non-Cow' —i.e. they are *not denoted* by the word 'Cow'?

The *Bauddha* answers—'*It could be learnt, etc. etc.*'—'at the *moment, etc. etc.*',—i.e. at the time of the comprehension of the Convention.—(941)

The Opponent (*Kumārila*) rejects this explanation (provided by the *Bauddha*) :—

TEXT (942).

"In that case, all things, with the sole exception of the single individual cow, would become excluded by the *Apoha*; and in that case it would not be proved that any *commonalty* constitutes the Import of Words."—[*Ibid.* 82]—(942)

COMMENTARY.

If it is your opinion that the word 'Cow' cannot apply to anything except the one that was perceived at the time of the apprehension of the *Convention*,—then, with the exception of the one *Spotted Cow* which has been the object of the Convention, every thing else,—even the *Black* and other Cows,—would have to be excluded by the word 'Cow'; and in that case, it could not be established that any *Commonalty* is denoted by the Word.—(942)

The following *text* shows that no Convention could be made regarding the *Apoha*, as it would involve mutual interdependence :—

TEXTS (943-944).

"IT IS ONLY A WELL-ESTABLISHED ENTITY IN THE SHAPE OF THE *non-Cow* THAT COULD BE EXCLUDED BY THE *Apoha* (DENOTED BY THE WORD 'COW') ;—AND THE *non-Cow* IS OF THE NATURE OF THE *negation of the Cow* ;—HENCE IT HAS TO BE EXPLAINED WHAT THIS *Cow* IS WHICH IS NEGATIVED (IN THE NON-COW).—IF THIS *Cow* IS OF THE NATURE OF THE *negation of the non-Cow*, THEN THERE IS MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE.—IF THE COW IS ADMITTED AS AN ENTITY FOR THE SAKE OF THE *Apoha*, THEN THE POSTULATING OF THE *Apoha* BECOMES FUTILE."—[*Ibid.* 83-84]—(943-944)

COMMENTARY.

The *Cow* is apprehended through the 'exclusion of the *non-Cow*' ;—the 'non-Cow' is of the nature of the *negation of the Cow* ;—hence the second term in the word 'non-Cow' has got to be explained, which is negatived by the negative particle in the word 'non-Cow'; there can be no negation of anything, the exact nature of which is not known.

It might be argued that—'what is it that has to be explained ? It is already known that the *Cow* is of the nature of the *negation of the non-Cow.*'

The answer to that is—'*If this Cow, etc. etc.*' ;—'*this*' stands for the *Cow*. Thus then, the *Cow* being of the nature of the *negation of the non-Cow*, it could be apprehended only through the apprehension of the *non-Cow* ;—and the *non-Cow* being of the nature of the *negation of the Cow*, it could be apprehended only through the apprehension of the *Cow* ;—thus this would be a clear case of mutual interdependence.

It might be argued that—'The *Cow* that is negatived by the word *non-cow* is a well-established positive entity, for the sake of *Apoha*,—i.e. for the fulfilment of the *Apoha* in the shape of *the exclusion of the non-cow*,—so that there would be no interdependence.

The answer to this is—'*If the cow is an established entity, etc. etc.*' ;—That is, if that be so, then it is useless to assume that *Apoha* forms the denotation of all words ; inasmuch as you admit the Import of words to consist of a positive entity. Consequently (to be consistent) you should not admit of any positive entity to be denoted by a word ; and if you do not admit it, then the objectionable 'interdependence' becomes inevitable.—(943-944)

The following *Text* sums up the same mutual Interdependence :—

TEXT (945).

"UNLESS THE *Cow* IS ESTABLISHED, THERE CAN BE NO *non-Cow*; AND IF THERE IS NO *non-Cow*, HOW CAN THE *Cow* BE THERE ? BETWEEN TWO NEGATIONS, THERE CAN BE NO SUCH RELATION AS THAT OF THE *Container and the Contained* AND THE LIKE."—[*Ibid. Apoha* 85]—(945)

COMMENTARY.

For the purpose of proving the relation of *qualification and qualified* (between the two), the Teacher *Diṅnāga* has declared as follows :—' Such terms as *Blue Lotus* and the like signify things qualified by the *negation of other things* '.

The Opponent shows the impropriety of this view, in the words—' *Between two negations, etc. etc.* '—When between two things, a real relationship is known to exist, then it may be correct to say that one is *qualified* by the other; in the case of the *Blue-Lotus* however, inasmuch as the two are of the nature of the *negation of Blue and negation of Lotus*, which are mere negations, and hence devoid of any form,—there cannot be any such relation between them as that of *Container and Contained* and the like.

The term ' and the rest ', includes such relations as those of Conjunction, Inherence, Inherence in a common substratum and so forth.

In the absence of any real relation, it is not right that there should be a notion of one being qualified by the other. If it were so, then there would be an incongruity.—(945)

The following might be urged (by the *Bauddha*) :—' It is not meant by us that in the case of the expression *Blue Lotus*, the *negation of the non-lotus* is qualified by *the negation of the non-blue*; hence the said objection cannot apply to us. What we mean is that there is an entity which is excluded from the *non-blue and the non-lotus*; and what is denoted by the word is that entity as qualified by the exclusion of other things .'

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (946).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, ANY THING UNCOMMON (UNIQUE, SPECIFIC) IS NEVER COGNISED AS QUALIFIED BY THE *Apoha*. HOW TOO COULD ANY RELATIONSHIP BE ASSUMED BETWEEN AN ENTITY AND A NON-ENTITY ? "—[*Ibid. Apoha* 86]—(946)

COMMENTARY.

That is, because the Specific Individuality cannot be expressed by words, and also because all the objections urged against that view are applicable in the present case also.

Even if the uncommon entity be apprehended—even so, it cannot be *qualified* by the *exclusion of other things*; this is what is shown by the words—'*How too, etc. etc.*';—the '*non-entity*' is the *Apoha,* the 'Entity' is the uncommon thing; and there can be no connection between the entity and the non-entity; because connection always rests upon two *entities.*—(946)

"Further, the connection may be there; even so, the *Apoha* cannot be regarded as the qualifying factor";—this is shown in the following—

TEXT (947).

"IN FACT, NOTHING CAN SERVE AS A *qualification* BY ITS MERE EXISTENCE; IT IS ONLY WHEN IT COLOURS THE *qualified* WITH ITS OWN COGNITION THAT IT BECOMES ITS *qualification.*"—[*Ibid.* *Apoha* 87]—(947)

COMMENTARY.

The *Blue* does not become a qualification of the *Lotus* by its mere existence;—what then?—When one thing, on being cognised, colours the qualified thing with the cognition tinged with its own form, then alone it is said to be the *qualification* of that thing.—(947)

This process of qualification is not possible in the case of *Apoha*; this is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (948).

"THE TERMS 'HORSE' AND THE REST DO NOT BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE *Apoha*; AND THE IDEA OF THE *qualified* THAT IS HELD IN THIS CONNECTION CANNOT BE ONE IN WHICH THE *qualification* IS NOT COGNISED."—[*Ibid.* *Apoha* 88]—(948)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the cognition of the *Horse* and other *non-cows* does not apprehend the *Apoha*; it apprehends a positive *entity*; and thus there being no possibility of the *Apoha* being cognised, it cannot colour the Horse, etc. with its own cognition.

It might be urged that—"Even without being itself cognised, the *Apoha* could be the qualification".

The answer to this is that '*the Idea of the qualified, etc. etc.*';—there can never be a cognition of the *qualified* thing of which the *qualification* is not apprehended.—(948)

"Granting that there is cognition of the *Apoha*,—even so, inasmuch as there can be no cognition of that form in regard to any thing, it could not rightly serve as its qualification".—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (949).

"THE QUALIFICATION CANNOT BRING ABOUT A COGNITION WHICH IS LIKE SOMETHING TOTALLY DIFFERENT; FOR HOW CAN THAT BE SAID TO BE THE QUALIFICATION IN A COGNITION WHICH IS LIKE SOMETHING DIFFERENT?"—[*Ibid. Apoha* 89]—(949)

COMMENTARY.

Every qualification is found to bring about in regard to the qualified thing a cognition in keeping with its own form; and one kind of qualification does not bring about a cognition like something else; e.g. the *Blue* does not produce in regard to the *Lotus* the cognition of *Red*; nor does the *stick* bring about in regard to the *Stick-holder*, the idea of his *wearing ear-rings*.—In the case in question also, the verbal cognition that appears in connection with the *Horse, etc.* is not coloured by *negative* character; on the other hand, it partakes of the *positive* character.

It might be argued that—"Even when bringing about a cognition unlike itself, a qualification can be so called."

The answer to that is—'*How can, etc. etc.*'—'*Like something different*',—i.e. unlike the qualification itself.—(948)

Question :—"What would be the harm if it did?"
Answer :—

TEXT (950).

"IF A QUALIFICATION BE REGARDED AS SUCH EVEN IN REGARD TO THE QUALIFIED THING WHICH IS TOTALLY DIFFERENT, THEN, EVERYTHING CAN SERVE AS THE QUALIFICATION (OF EVERYTHING)."—[*Ibid. Apoha* 90]—(950)

COMMENTARY.

If, for you, there were an assumption of something being a qualification, even in regard to a Qualified thing, which is unlike, and not like,—in accordance with the form of,—that Qualification,—then everything,—*Blue* and the rest,—could be the Qualification of everything; and there would be no restriction at all.—(950)

It might be argued that—'the *Apoha* does colour the Qualified Entity with its own Cognition (Idea)'.

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (951).

"IF THE QUALIFIED THING IS COGNISABLE IN THE FORM OF NEGATION, THEN IT CANNOT BE AN ENTITY; CONSEQUENTLY FOR YOU, THERE CAN BE NO ENTITY THAT COULD BE DENOTED BY WORDS AS QUALIFIED BY *Apoha*."—[*Ibid. Apoha* 91]—(951)

COMMENTARY.

'*Negation*'—i.e. the *Apoha*;—'*cognisable in the form*'—i.e. cognised as being of the same form as;—if the *Qualified thing* has its character such that it is cognisable in the form of negation;—i.e. if the thing is cognised in the form of Negation,—then it ceases to be a positive *Entity*; as the 'negative' and 'positive' are contradictory terms.

The argument is summed up in the words—'*Consequently, for you, etc. etc.*'.—(951)

The following might be urged—'As a matter of fact, Words and Inferential Indicatives are found to operate only in regard to things as *excluded from others*, and not as devoid of such *exclusion* (*Apoha*); and it is on that ground that it is asserted that the *Apoha* is established by Words and Indications; and it is not on the basis of the pointing out of what is *excluded*; so that all that has been urged regarding the theory being contrary to experience is not relevant at all'.

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (952).

"EVEN THOUGH THE WORD AND THE INDICATIVE MAY NOT OPERATE UPON ANYTHING DEVOID OF *Apoha*,—YET THE COGNITION RESTS UPON THE ENTITY WHICH IS WHAT IT APPREHENDS."—[*Ibid. Apoha* 92]—(952)

COMMENTARY.

Even though the thing may be 'excluded from others',—yet when Cognition arises in regard to it, through Words and Indicatives, it does not rest upon that 'Exclusion of others' which may be there, but upon the element of 'Entity'; as it is to this latter that it is attached. That factor of the thing which is apprehended by the Verbal or Inferential Cognition is really the object of that Cognition, and not anything else which, even though present, is not apprehended. For instance, even though the smell and other properties of the flower are there, yet these are not held to be denoted by the word '*Mālatī*'.—(952)

Nor is it right to assert that—'the Word and the Indicative operate upon the thing as 'excluded from others'.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (953).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE *Uncommon* THING NEVER FIGURES IN THE COGNITION; NOR AGAIN CAN IT BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS *Cognisable*, BECAUSE IT IS 'INDETERMINATE'."—[*Ibid. Apoha* 93]—(953)

COMMENTARY.

When a thing is 'excluded from others', it can, under your doctrine, be only the Uncommon Specific Individuality,—and yet it is your view that this latter does not figure in Cognition brought about by Words and Indicatives—on the ground that it is apprehensible only by 'indeterminate, *non-conceptual* cognition', while Cognition born of Words and Indicatives appertains to *commonalty*.

If it be held that this latter Cognition does apprehend the Specific Individuality,—then this cannot be in accordance with Reason; this is what is shown in the words—'*Nor again can it be rightly, etc. etc.*'—that is to say, the Uncommon (Specific) Entity cannot be apprehended by Cognition born of Words and Indicatives; because all conceptual ideas are absent in that Entity; as Conceptual Thought operates only through the contact of the 'Universal' and such other qualifications and never through the pure *Thing-in-itself*.—(953)

It might be argued that—'Even though the Uncommon Entity may not be apprehended by *Words*, it can be said to be qualified by *Exclusion*'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (954).

"THE STATEMENT THAT 'WHAT IS NOT APPREHENDED BY THE WORD IS YET QUALIFIED' IS TOO BOLD. FOR ALL THESE REASONS THE *Commonalty* SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE OBJECT OF WORDS AND INDICATIVES."—[*Ibid. Apoha* 94]—(954)

COMMENTARY.

The author proceeds to prove, in another way, the fact of Commonalty (Universal) being a real entity:—

TEXT (955).

"WHEN INDIVIDUALITIES COULD NOT BE WHAT IS 'EXCLUDED BY *Apoha*' BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT DENOTED BY WORDS,—THEN THE COMMONALTY (UNIVERSAL) ALONE IS WHAT COULD BE 'EXCLUDED'; AND BECAUSE OF ITS 'EXCLUSION', IT MUST BE AN ENTITY."—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 95]—(955)

COMMENTARY.

'*Individualities*'.—That is, the *Uncommon* (Specific) Entities—cannot be expressed by words; hence they cannot be regarded as 'excluded'; because what is not spoken of cannot be denied (or excluded).

The Commonalty alone is what could be excluded,—that is, because that alone is what is expressed by words.—(955)

It might be asked—'if the Commonalty (or Universal) were *excluded*,—even so, how could that establish it as an *entity*?'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (956).

"MERE NEGATIONS CANNOT BE OBJECTS OF 'EXCLUSION',—FOR, IF THEY WERE, THEY WOULD LOSE THEIR NEGATIVE CHARACTER. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS CLEAR THAT WHEN THERE IS AN 'EXCLUSION' (*Apoha*) OF ANOTHER 'EXCLUSION' (*Apoha*), IT CAN BE ONLY OF A POSITIVE ENTITY IN THE SHAPE OF THE COMMONALTY (OR UNIVERSAL)."—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 96]—(956)

COMMENTARY.

'*Negations*'—i.e. *Apohas*, Exclusions.

If there were exclusions of these Exclusions, they would be positive entities.

The reason for this is set forth—'*For if they were, etc. etc.*'—That is, the negative character would be abandoned by those exclusions. What is meant is as follows:—If *Exclusions* were excluded, then their negative character would be denied; and when there is this denial, the Negations would abandon their negative character; and thence the Negations in the shape of the *Exclusions* having abandoned their negative character, they would become *positive entities*.—This is the explanation given by some people.

Others explain the words of the text '*abhāvābhāvavarjanāt*' to mean 'because there can be no negation of negations'; i.e. it is not right that 'Exclusions' (*Apohas*) which are *negative* should be 'excluded'; because all 'exclusion' (denial) is of the *positive* entity.

From all this it is clear that when there is (exclusion) of one *Apoha*, the Cow, in another *Apoha*, the Horse,—it could be an exclusion of the 'Universal' only. It is established therefore that the Universal, being the object of 'Exclusion', must be a positive entity.—(956)

Then again, the *Apohas* could be either different or non-different among themselves. If they are held to be different, then there are objections to that view.—This is shown in the following—

TEXT (957).

"IF THE NEGATION OF A NEGATION IS DIFFERENT FROM IT,—THEN IT MUST BE A POSITIVE ENTITY. IF NOT, THEN THE *Cow* WILL BE THE SAME AS THE *Non-Cow* FOR YOU."—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 97]—(957)

COMMENTARY.

If, '*Of the negation*'—i.e. of that negation which is denoted by the word 'non-cow',—'the negation'—i.e. that which is denoted by the word 'cow',—were different from the former Negation,—i.e. something other than it,—then it would be a *Positive Entity*; because the *positive character* consists only in the *absence of negation.*

If it is not different from it, then, for you, the *Cow* also should be *Non-Cow*; because what is *not-different* must be understood to be the *same.*—(957)

The following might be urged—'What are *excluded* by the words *Cow* and *Horse* are only the Specific Individualities as excluded from one another; and it is not *Negations* that are excluded; hence the contingency of their becoming positive entities cannot be unacceptable to us'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (958).

"THOUGH IN THE CASE OF OTHER WORDS, A POSITIVE ENTITY MAY BE WHAT IS 'EXCLUDED',—YET IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'SAT' ('BEING'), NOTHING APART FROM 'NEGATION' IS REGARDED AS 'EXCLUDED'.—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 98]—(958)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of words other than 'Being'—e.g. such words as 'Cow' and the rest,—it may be that what is excluded is an entity, in the form of the *Hill* and other things; but in the case of the word 'Being' itself, there is nothing that could be held to be excluded except that which is called 'Negation'; that is, Negation alone can be excluded; because the word

'Being' is used only in the sense of excluding what is *non-being*, (Non-existent).—(958)

Question :—'What is the harm if that is so ?'
Answer :—

TEXT (959).

"IN THAT CASE, EVEN THE *Non-existent* (NON-BEING) WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE CHARACTER ; WHICH WOULD BE A GREAT CALAMITY.— AND WHEN THERE IS NO NEGATION, THERE WOULD BE NO *Existence* (POSITIVE) AT ALL ; AND (AS A CONSEQUENCE) *Non-existence* ALSO WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE."—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 99]—(959)

COMMENTARY.

As shown before (under 956, above) 'Negations would abandon their negative character';—hence if there were exclusion of the *non-existent*, it would be a positive entity ; and as this would involve the idea of the non-existent also being a positive entity, which would be contrary to the Apohist's doctrine,—this would be a great calamity for him.

It might be said—'The Negation may be an *entity*, what then ?'

The answer is—'*When there is no Negation, etc. etc.*'—When there would be no Negation, there would be no 'existence' of anything at all ; because, according to your view, *existence* is only the *exclusion* or *negation of non-existence* ; so that, when Negation is 'excluded', it becomes an Entity, and loses its character ; hence there can be no *non-existence* either ; as that also is only the *exclusion* or *negation of existence*, and *existence* does not exist, as shown above.—(959)

It has been asserted before—(*a*) that 'they would be differentiated by the excluded things' (*Text*, 929), and (*b*) that 'there can be no difference among *Apohas* because they are non-entities' (*Text*, 926).—These arguments have been thus answered by certain *Bauddhas* :—'The difference among *Apohas* is due, not to the difference of substrata, nor to the difference among the excluded things ; what happens is that on diverse external objects there are superimposed *Apohas* which are themselves featureless, and consist only in the form of those objects, and hence appearing as diverse ; they are so superimposed by cognitions, which, though rather objectless, rest upon diverse unreal objects, and are related to variegated conceptual Impressions extending over all time without beginning ;—and being thus superimposed, these *Apohas* appear as diverse and as *existing* ; so that the *diversity* and *positive character* of *Apohas* would be due to the diversity of the said Impressions'.

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (960).

"EITHER DIVERSITY OR THE POSITIVE CHARACTER OF *Apohas* CANNOT BE ASSUMED TO BE DUE TO THE DIVERSITY OF IMPRESSIONS; BECAUSE IMPRESSION CANNOT BE HELD TO EXIST WHEN THERE IS NO ENTITY."—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 100]—(960)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, no one holds the view that Impressions or Tendencies belong to the non-entity.—That there is no *objectless* Cognition has also been thoroughly discussed and proved in course of our examination of Idealism. Hence there can be no conceptions based upon unreal objects; how then can there be any Impression resting upon such conception?

'*Avastuni*',—i.e. when there is no Entity which could be its substratum; and when there can be no Cognition without objects,—as there could be no cognition that could produce the Impression—how could there be any Impression? And when there is no Impression, how could the diversity among *Apohas* or their positive character, be due to Impressions?—(960)

Having thus discarded '*Apoha*' as the 'denoted', the Opponent of the Buddhist proceeds to discard it also as held to be the 'denotative':—

TEXTS (961–963).

"YOU CANNOT BASE THE DIVERSITY AMONG *Words* ALSO UPON THE SAID CONDITIONS. THERE CAN BE NO 'UNCOMMON' DENOTATIVE WORD, AS NO SUCH COULD HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED BEFORE. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF A 'COMMONALTY' WERE ASSUMED IN THE SHAPE OF THE '*Apoha* (EXCLUSION) OF OTHER WORDS',—AS IT COULD ONLY BE A NON-ENTITY, AS SHOWN ABOVE, THERE COULD BE NO DIVERSITY AMONG WORDS.—JUST AS AMONG DENOTATIVE WORDS, SO BETWEEN THE 'DENOTED' AND 'DENOTATIVE' ALSO THERE COULD BE NO DIFFERENCE. THAT THERE CAN BE NO 'DIFFERENCE' BASED UPON THE DIFFERENCE IN THE 'EXCLUDED THINGS' HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED."—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 102, 104, 105]—(961–963)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*Shabdabhēdaḥ*' stands for the mutual difference among words denotative of diverse Universals and those denotative of Particulars.

'*Upon the said conditions*',—i.e. based upon the diversity of Impressions or on the diversity of the 'Excluded *Apohas*'.

Objection:—'Among words, diversity is clearly perceived, as based upon their source and upon the imposition on them of mutually contradictory characters'.

Answer:—'*There can be no uncommon word, etc. etc.*'—What is said here is with reference to the denotative word; and what is meant is that

the *uncommon word,* which is apprehended in auditory Perception, as of the nature of a 'Specific Individuality', cannot be denotative.—Why ?—*Because no such could have been perceived before*; that is, the Word that is there at the time of usage will not have been perceived before that usage,—i.e. at the time of the making of the Convention relating to it; and the word that was perceived at that time will have long ceased to exist, so that there could be no usage of that word; nor is it right that there should be any usage based upon the word that was not perceived at the time of the Convention; as that would lead to incongruities.—From all this it follows that the Specific Individuality cannot be denotative.

In fact, among you yourselves, there is a difference on this point; as it has been stated (by one of yourselves) that—'no particular thing can be denoted, and no particular word can be denotative, because it has not been perceived before; it is the Commonalty (Universal) that will be so, as is going to be explained'.—Hence no objection can be taken to what we have said regarding the denotative word.

Such being the case, if it be held that what is denotative is the 'Exclusion of other words,' in the form of the 'Word—Universal',—in the same way as the 'Exclusion of other things' is of the form of the 'Thing—Universal',—then, *as shown above,* under *Text* 926,—as there can be no diversity among the *denoted Apohas,* so there can be no diversity among the *denotative Apohas* also; because these latter are featureless.

And just as there can be no difference among the denotative *Apohas,* so also there can be no difference between the *denotative* and the *denoted* Apohas; because these also are featureless.

It might be argued that there may be difference among these, due to the differences among the *Excluded things.*—The answer to that is—'*That there can be no difference, etc. etc.*';—that is, how there can be no difference due to difference among the *excluded things* has been already explained above, under *Text* 928.—(961–963)

So far it has been shown that the Proposition (of the *Bauddha*) is contrary to experience and to his own doctrines. *Kumārila* now proceeds to prove that it is open to the charge of involving the incongruity of the relation of 'denoted and denotative' being impossible, and also to that of being contrary to the Opponent's own doctrines:—

TEXT (964).

"There could be no relation of *denoted and denotative* between the two *Apohas,* because they are non-entities, under your view; just as the 'Sky-flower' and the 'Hare's Horn' are, according to ordinary people."—
[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 108]—(964)

COMMENTARY.

The relation of *denoted and denotative* cannot lie between what are non-entities; e.g. there can be no such relation between the 'Sky-flower'

and the 'Hare's Horn';—and the denoted and denotative *Apohas* are both non-entities;—hence there is perception of a character contrary to the character of wider extension.—(964)

Objection against the above:—'There is cognition of the *absence of Rain* from the *absence of clouds* (where both are non-entities); hence the Reason put forward is not conclusive'.

Answer:—

TEXT (965).

"IF SOME ONE, PERCEIVING THE SAID RELATION BETWEEN THE NON-EXISTENT RAIN AND THE NON-EXISTENT CLOUD, WERE TO URGE 'INCONCLUSIVENESS' AGAINST OUR REASON,—THEN, ACCORDING TO OUR VIEW, THERE IS AN *entity* IN THE CASE CITED ALSO; BUT HOW COULD IT BE UNDER YOUR VIEW?"—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 109]—(965)

COMMENTARY.

On seeing that between the Rain and the Cloud both of which are non-existent, i.e. mere negations—['*asat*' in the compound standing for the abstract noun '*asattva*', *non-existence*],—the relation of *denotative and denoted* (indicator and indicated) is present,—if the *Bauddha* were to argue that our Reason,—'because they are non-entities'—is 'Inconclusive',—then that cannot be right; because according to our view, in this case of the Cloud and Rain also there is an entity present, in the shape of the *clean sky*; because according to us Negation is an entity. For you, *Bauddha*, on the other hand, how could it be? That is, how could there be the relation of *Indicator and Indicated* in the case cited? It could not be possible at all.

The particle '*api*', 'also', is misplaced; it should have come after '*adaḥ*'; so that the meaning is as follows:—It is not only in the case of the two *Apohas* that it is not possible for you to have the relation of *Denoted* and *Denotative* (Indicator and Indicated), it is not possible *also* in the case of the Rain and the Cloud.—(965)

"Then again, you hold the opinion that the Word and the Inferential Indicative,—in both of which *affirmation* forms the subordinate, and *negation* the predominant factor,—are expressive of their objects; and you have also made the following statement—'When the denotation of another word has not been perceived, the relationship of the Word is easily deduced from the perception of even a part of what is denoted by it; and there can be no fallibility in this'.—All this is not right, under the theory of *Apoha*."—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (966).

"WHEN ONE DOES NOT ADMIT THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD TO BE POSITIVE (AFFIRMATIVE) IN CHARACTER, THERE CAN BE NO NEGATION ALSO FOR HIM; AS THIS IS ALWAYS PRECEDED BY THAT."—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 110]—(966)

COMMENTARY.

'*Preceded by that*',—i.e. preceded by affirmation; that is Negation is only the denial of what has been affirmed.

Further, under the *Apoha-theory*, there is no possibility of the relation of *qualification and qualified* between *Blue and Lotus*, and the co-ordination between them,—which is perceived in actual experience.—(966)

"With a view to explaining these,—the relation of *qualification and qualified* and the *co-ordination*,—the *Bauddha* has made the following statement:—'Words denote diverse things on account of the diversity of the things 'excluded'; they are ineffective in the matter of their own diversity. They become the *qualification* and the *qualified* when bringing about the same effect; and the difference being based upon that fact alone, it is not abandoned by their own Commonalty; and yet the said difference has not been asserted, as there is doubt regarding it; and when the two are equal and similar, then they serve the same purpose'.

The following *Text* proceeds to show that all this cannot be right:—

TEXTS (967–969).

"IT IS HELD THAT WHAT IS DENOTED IS *Apoha* ONLY; UNDER THIS THEORY, THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBILITY OF THE RELATION OF *qualification and qualified* OR OF *co-ordination*, IN THE CASE OF SUCH VERBAL EXPRESSIONS AS 'BLUE-LOTUS', WHICH HAVE A MIXED CONNOTATION; BECAUSE THE 'EXCLUSION OF THE *non-blue*' DOES NOT INVOLVE THE 'EXCLUSION OF THE *non-lotus*',—NOR DOES THE LATTER INVOLVE THE FORMER. HENCE THE RELATION OF *qualification and qualified* IS NOT POSSIBLE (BETWEEN THE BLUE COLOUR AND THE LOTUS).—NOR WOULD THE SAID RELATION BE POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE WORDS APART FROM WHAT THEY DENOTE."—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 115–117]—(967–969)

COMMENTARY.

What was rejected before was the possibility of the relation of *qualification and qualified* between the things denoted; what is rejected now is the same relation between words; hence there is no repetition.

The relation of *qualification and qualified* consists in each of the two serving to differentiate the other; and this is held to be present only in

a number of words connected together,—such as 'Blue lotus'. It appears also in the case of expressions where the terms are not co-ordinated; e.g. in the expression 'King's officer'. It is said to be a case of 'co-ordination' when two words, having different connotations, are applied to the same object; such 'co-ordination' is held to be present only in compounds like 'Blue-lotus'.

Now in regard to such verbal expression as 'Blue-lotus,' and the like,—whose connotation is mixed,—there is 'co-ordination',—and this would not be possible under the *Apoha-theory.*

'*Mixed connotation*'—i.e. a connotation of mixed character. As declared in the statement—'The *Blue-lotus* is neither *Blue only* nor the *Lotus only,* because what is denoted is the combination of both'.

Question:—Why is this not possible under the *Apoha-theory*?

Answer:—'*Because, etc. etc.*'. Because on the 'exclusion of the *non-blue*', there is no 'exclusion of the *non-lotus*'. Nor does the *latter*—i.e. 'Exclusion of the *non-Lotus*'—involve the *former*—i.e. the 'exclusion of the *non-blue*'.—[In some texts, the reading is '*itarā*' for '*itaraḥ*'; where the Feminine form may be taken as with reference to the term '*Chyutiḥ*'; '*itarā*' thus standing for the '*Chyuti*', exclusion, of the Non-Blue].—What is meant is that these two do not stand in the relation of *container and contained,* because both are featureless. And when there is no relation, there can be no relation of *qualification and qualified*; if there were, we would be landed in absurdities.

What is meant by this is that under your theory there can be no *mixed connotation,* as all words denote mere *negation*; and hence the relation of *qualification and qualified* is not possible.

It might be argued that—'there may be no relation of *qualification and qualified* between what are denoted by the words,—why should it not subsist between the words themselves?'

The answer to this is—'*Nor would, etc. etc.*', that is, it is only through their denotations that the relation of *qualification and qualified* becomes attributed to the words; hence when the said relation is not possible between what are denoted, how can there be any attributing of it to the denotative words?—(967–969)

Kumārila now proceeds to deny 'co-ordination'—

TEXT (970).

"CO-ORDINATION IS NOT POSSIBLE, AS THE *Apohas* ARE DIFFERENT.—IF IT BE HELD TO SUBSIST ON THE BASIS OF WHAT IS DENOTED, THEN WHAT SORT OF 'SUBSISTENCE' WOULD THERE BE BETWEEN THE TWO?"—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 118]—(970)

COMMENTARY.

It is only when two words are applied to the same object that there is 'co-ordination' between them; and (under the *Apoha-theory*) it is not possible

for the words 'blue' and 'lotus' to apply to the same object; because what are denoted by them are, respectively, 'the exclusion of the *non-blue*' and 'the exclusion of the *non-lotus*',— and these two are distinct. For instance, it has been asserted by yourself that 'words have diverse denotations because the things excluded by them are diverse'. The argument may be formulated as follows :—Words like 'Blue Lotus' cannot form the object of co-ordination, because they pertain to different things, like the words 'jar', 'cloth' and so forth.

It might be argued that 'the exclusion of *non-blue* also stands where there is exclusion of *non-lotus*; and thus the *Apohas* denoted by the two words may be applied to the same thing; and hence, through these denotations, co-ordination may be said to lie between the words also'. '*Tat*' stands for *co-ordination.*

The answer to this is—'*What sort of subsistence, etc. etc.*'—'*Tayoḥ*'—'*between the two*',—i.e. between the 'Exclusion of the *non-blue*' and the 'Exclusion of the *non-lotus*'. That is to say, there can be no real *subsistence* in these; as what is formless cannot subsist anywhere, like the 'son of the Barren Woman'.—(970)

Then again, there may be some sort of subsistence in the case of things like the Blue and the Lotus; but even though present, it could not be expressed by words.—This is shown in the following—

TEXT (971).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, NOTHING 'UNCOMMON' IS EVER APPREHENDED; AND ANYTHING ELSE DOES NOT EXIST FOR YOU. WHERE THEN WOULD BE THE USE OF THE CO-ORDINATION OF WORDS, WHICH IS NOT APPREHENDED AT ALL?"—

[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 119]—(971)

COMMENTARY.

No 'uncommon' thing in the shape of the Blue Lotus and the like is ever apprehended through words, because all conceptions are absent therein,—as has been declared (by the Apohist).—Under the circumstances when the thing which is the substratum is not known, how can the subsistence of the *Apohas* subsisting therein be cognised? That is, the cognition of the property is concomitant with that wherein the property subsists.

It might be argued that—'as there is a substratum of these *Apohas* which is entirely different from the *Uncommon Entity*, the said objection is not relevant'.

The answer to this is—'*Anything else does not exist*—for you'.

It might be urged that—'even if the co-ordination is not actually cognised, yet it is there all the same, in the actual state of things'.

The answer to this is—'*Where would be, etc. etc.*'—'*Aikārthyam*' is *co-ordination.*

'*Where would be the use*'—i.e. nowhere at all.—Because even if a thing exists, if it is not cognised (known), it cannot form part of the usage of people. —(971)

The following might be urged :—'If it were mere *exclusion* that is denoted by the word, then there would be room for the said objection ; as a matter of fact, however, what is denoted is the *entity along with the exclusion* ; consequently the two words having the two exclusions as their adjuncts could very well apply to a single entity alone with the *Apoha* ; so that the co-ordination would be there all right '.

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (972).

"IF IT BE SAID THAT WHAT IS DENOTED IS THE ENTITY ALONG WITH THE *Apoha*,—THERE ALSO, CONCOMITANCE WITH THE WORD WOULD BE UNATTAINABLE, AS IT WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON SOMETHING ELSE."—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 120]—(972)

COMMENTARY.

'*There also*',—i.e. *in the Entity along with the Apoha* being regarded as denoted by the word,—the 'concomitance'—i.e. indication—of the various variations of the *non-blue Lotus* with the word 'Blue'—*would be unattainable* ;—why ?—because the word—'Blue'—*would be dependent upon something else* ; inasmuch as it denotes the object only as subordinate to the *Exclusion*,—and not directly ; and as there is no direct denotation, there could be no indication of its variations ; just as the word 'sweet' does not indicate the *white colour* ; though as things stand, the *white* colour *is* a variety of the *non-sweet*, yet, the potency of the word lies in the indication of the varieties of only that which it denotes *directly*, and not in that of the variety of what is denoted through the intervention of something else. Consequently, as there would be no indication, by the word '*blue*', of the varieties of the *Lotus*, this latter could not be its variety ; and when it could not be its variety, no co-ordination would be possible.

Thus, then, the objection that you have yourself urged against the denotation of the *Individual as endowed with the Universal*,—by the statement that 'the word cannot denote *that which possesses the Universal*, because it is not independent',—is applicable also to the view that what is denoted is the *entity along with the exclusion*. This is what has been made clear by the Text. That is to say, if the denotation of the word consisted of the Entity along with the 'Universal', then the word 'Sat', 'Being', 'Existence', would express the substance with the form of the 'Universal' as its subordinate factor, and not directly ; because it does not indicate the varieties in the shape of the Jar and other things ; and in the event of the varieties not being indicated, there can be no co-ordination, as already pointed out. This same incongruity is equally applicable to the view that what is denoted is the *entity along with the Exclusion* ; as in this case also the word '*sat*' would

express the substance with the Exclusion as its subordinate factor, and not directly; and the non-indication of varieties would be present here also. What then would be the difference between the 'Universal' and the 'Exclusion'—or between 'that having the Universal' and 'that having the Exclusion'?—(972)

The following *Text* points out another objection:—

TEXT (973).

"THERE CAN BE NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE *Apoha* AND GENDER, NUMBER, ETC. AS THE INDIVIDUAL IS INEXPRESSIBLE, THERE CAN BE NO CONNECTION THROUGH THAT EITHER."—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 135]—(973)

COMMENTARY.

'*Gender*'—Masculine, Feminine and Neuter.

'*Number*'—Singular, Dual, Plural.

'*Etcetera*'—Stands for the connection of Action (Verb), Time (Tense) and so forth.

There can be no connection between those and *Apoha*, as this latter is a *non-entity*; while the factors mentioned are all properties of *Entities*. Nor can the word ever denote anything devoid of the said Gender, etc. What is meant is that in this way the Proposition (of the Apohist) is contrary to experience.

It might be argued that—'The Particular (Individual) which forms the substratum of *Exclusion* is an entity, and it can therefore have the necessary connection with Gender, etc. and through that, these can be attributed to the *Apoha* also'.

The answer to this is—'*As the Individual, etc. etc.*';—that is to say, the said Individual, being 'indeterminate' (hence *inexpressible*), cannot be spoken of as connected with Gender, Number, etc.; how then could these be attributed to the *Apoha*, through the Individual?—(973)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that what has been held regarding *Apoha* being the *denoted* and *denotative* is not all-embracing (not applicable to all words).

TEXT (974).

"IN THE CASE OF VERBS, THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHERS' IS NEVER COGNISED; BECAUSE IN THEIR CASE THERE IS NOTHING TO BE DENIED WHICH COULD FORM THE OBJECT OF EXCLUSION."—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 139]—(974)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of Verbs—words with conjugational endings, like '*pachati*' ('cooks'), '*gachchhati*' ('goes') and the like, wherein action forms the

predominant factor, no 'exclusion of others' is apprehended;—why?—because '*in their case, etc. etc.*'; in the case of nouns—terms like '*ghaṭa*' (Jar), etc.—with declensional endings,—there are certain well-established entities in the shape of the *non-jar*, etc. which are negatived and can figure in the 'exclusion' (expressed by the word 'Jar'); not so in the case of verbs, like '*pachati*', etc. where no well-established counter-entities are ever apprehended.—(974)

The following might be urged—'There may be nothing to be negatived actually figuring in the *exclusion*, even so, there may be a probable counter-entity (*na-pachati*) of which there could be negation in the form *na-na-pachati*.' [So that the denotation of the verb *pachati* would be *na-na-pachati*]:

This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (975-976).

"EVEN WHEN *na-na* WOULD BE UTTERED, THERE WOULD BE NEGATION OF NEGATION ONLY; SO THAT THE *pachati* (ACTION OF *cooking*) WOULD REMAIN THERE IN ITS OWN (POSITIVE) FORM.—SIMILARLY IN THE CASE OF VERBS THERE IS THE IDEA OF *being in course of accomplishment*, AS ALSO THAT OF THE *past*, ETC.; AND AS *Apoha* IS SOMETHING WELL-ESTABLISHED, THESE IDEAS WOULD BE BASELESS (IF *Apoha* WERE ALL THAT IS DENOTED BY WORDS)."—[Shlo.-Va. *Apoha* 140-141]—(975-976)

COMMENTARY.

Even when the expression '*na-na-pachati*' is uttered, what is expressed is only the negation of a probable negation.

'What is the harm in that?'

Answer:—So that the '*pachati*', *etc. etc.*; that is to say, two negatives always denote an *affirmation*; so that on the use of the said expression, the action of '*pachati*' remains there in its *positive* form; hence the denotation of the word would be *positive* (not *negative*, in the shape of *Apoha*).

Then again, the verb '*pachati*' signifies an *act in the course of being accomplished*; and that action is regarded as *in the course of being accomplished* of which some portions have been accomplished while some are still unaccomplished, and of which therefore the portions happen to be in a certain order of sequence.—Similarly in the case of such verbs as '*abhūt*' (Past Tense) and '*bhaviṣyati*' (Future Tense), there are ideas of *past* and *future* points of time.

—In regard to the *Apoha* however, no such ideas of *being in course of accomplishment,* etc. is possible; because it is a fully accomplished thing consisting entirely of Negation. Consequently, under the view that *Apoha* is denoted by words, the idea of *being in course of accomplishment* and also the idea of 'past', 'future' and the like can have no basis at all; hence it is contrary to experience.

'*Bhūtādirūpaṇam*',—the conception, idea, of the Past, etc.—(975-976)

The following *texts* proceed to show that the theory cannot cover all cases and as such it is contrary to experience:—

TEXTS (977–979).

"IN THE CASE OF THE WHOLE MASS OF DENOTATIONS LIKE *Injunction* AND THE LIKE,—THERE IS NO IDEA OF THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHERS'. HOW COULD THERE BE ANY *Apoha* EVEN WHEN THE NEGATIVE IS COUPLED WITH NEGATION?—PARTICLES LIKE '*Cha*' AND THE REST CAN HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH THE NEGATIVE; HENCE HERE ALSO NO *Apoha* IS POSSIBLE.—IN THE CASE OF WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY A SENTENCE, THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHERS' CANNOT EVEN BE INDICATED.—IN THE CASE OF SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS '*ananyāpoha*' ('NON-EXCLUSION OF OTHERS'), NO DENOTATION IS APPREHENDED AT ALL (APART FROM THE POSITIVE).—WHEREFORE TOO COULD THERE BE ANYTHING 'EXCLUDED' IN THE CASE OF SUCH WORDS AS '*Pramēya*' AND '*Jñēya*' (WHICH EMBRACE ALL CONCEIVABLE THINGS)?"—[Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 142–144]—(977–979)

COMMENTARY.

'*And the like*'—is meant to include *Invitation, Addressing* and the like. There is '*no idea*'—apprehension—of the '*exclusion*'—denial—of other things; and the reason for this lies in the fact that 'there is nothing to be denied that could figure in the denial', as pointed out above (under *Text* 974).

In such expressions as '*na na-pachati devadattaḥ*' ('Devadatta is not non-cooking'), where one negative is coupled with another negative,—what sort of *Apoha* could be possible? None at all; since two negatives always imply the *affirmative*.

Further, in the case of particles like '*cha*',—i.e. of all *nipāta* adverbs, prefixes, prepositions, and so forth,—all which have been regarded as *words*;

and yet these can have no connection with the *negative*, as such a combination would not be expressive of anything at all. That is to say, in the case of the word 'Jar', when it is connected with the negative in the expression 'non-jar', one has the notion of something else, in the shape of the *Cloth*; and hence the denotation of the word 'Jar' without the negative is held to consist in the 'negation (exclusion) of that other thing (Cloth)'; in the case of the particles 'cha' and the like, there is no connection with the negative, in such expressions as '*na cha*'; and what is not connected with the negative cannot be *negatived* (or excluded). Hence in this case no *Apoha* is possible; i.e. there must be absence of *Apoha*.

Further, in the case of sentences, what is expressed by them is held to be of one mixed form, like the *variegated colour*; consequently the 'exclusion of others' cannot be indicated in their case; because there is no counter-entity known to exist in any accomplished form. It has been asserted that 'in the case of such sentences as *Chaitra, bring the cow*, the 'exclusion of others' is assumed to be in parts—such as that of 'non-chaitra' and the rest. But this would be a case of denotation of *words*, not of the *Sentence*. As it is one impartite whole, and does not admit of such dissection. Thus then your theory of the denotation of words does not cover all cases.

Then again, in the case of such expressions as '*Na anyāpohaḥ Ananyapohaḥ*', there is nothing apprehended as denoted, except something *positive*,—Because what is understood to be denoted is not merely the form of the *Apoha*; as the double negative always expresses the *positive*.

The particle '*ādi*' (in the compound '*ananyāpohashabdādau*') stands for such synonyms as '*ananyavyāvṛtti*', '*ananyavyavachchhēda*' and so forth.

Objection:—'What is said here has already been said (under 977) in the words '*Nañashchāpi nañā*, etc.; so that there is needless repetition'.

True. But the reiteration is made with a view to showing that the words of the Apohist himself—that 'the denotation of words consists in the *Exclusion of Others*'—show that he regards the denotation to be *positive*. Because what the term '*anyāpoha*', 'Exclusion of Others', excludes (or denies) is what is denoted by the term '*ananyāpoha*', 'Non-exclusion of Others'; and this latter is clearly understood to be positive.

Then there are such words as 'cognisable', 'knowable', 'predicable' and so forth; and there is nothing that is excluded by these; as all things are 'cognisable', etc. by their very nature. If anything were assumed to be excluded by these words, it would be entirely *cognised* in the form of 'exclusion'; and as such would remain 'cognisable'; because what is not cognised cannot be excluded. Then, as there is nothing that could be excluded in this case, the theory of the Apohist cannot be universally true.—(977–979)

Objection:—'In the *Hētumukha* (a work of that name) it has been declared that there is Inference of the *Cognisable* as consisting of the *Exclusion* of the *Non-cognisable* which is assumed for the purpose. So that how can our *Apoha*-theory fail to apply to the case of these words?'

Answer:—

TEXTS (980-981).

"RATHER THAN ASSUME THE THING TO BE EXCLUDED, IT IS FAR BETTER TO ASSUME THE ENTITY ITSELF.—AS THE IDEA OF THINGS BEING OF THE FORM OF COGNITIONS HAS BEEN REJECTED, WHAT IS DENOTED CANNOT BE ANYTHING INTERNAL (SUBJECTIVE); NOR IS IT POSSIBLE FOR ANY SUBJECTIVE THING TO BE 'EXCLUDED'. THUS THERE CAN BE NO *Apoha* IN THE CASE OF THE WORDS IN QUESTION.—LASTLY, IN THE CASE OF SUCH WORDS AS '*ēva*', NOTHING IS FOUND TO BE 'EXCLUDED'.— [Shlo.-Vā. *Apoha* 145-146] —(980-981)

COMMENTARY.

If all that is cognisable is assumed to be excluded as 'cognisable',—then it is far better to admit the positive entity itself to be denoted by the word; which is what is accepted by all men. That is to say, in so doing there would be no assumption of the Unseen, nor the denial of the Seen. That is why it is spoken of as 'far better'.

Some (Buddhists) have held the view that—'what is denoted by all words is only the reflection of conceptual thought, and it is this that is excluded, differentiated and expressed'.

The answer to this is—*As the idea of things, etc. etc.* That is, we have already rejected the idea that things are of the nature of cognitions; and we have done so on the ground that Cognition is formless, while the thing has a form and is clearly perceived as existing in the external world; consequently there being no internal (subjective) form resting in Cognition, it cannot be right to regard any such thing as denoted by words.

Nor is it possible for any such subjective thing to be rejected,—for the same reason that no such thing exists.

In the case of the words in question—i.e. words like 'Cognisable'.

Then again, there are such words as '*ēvam*' ('thus'), '*ittham*' ('in this way') and so forth; in the case of these, nothing is found that can be 'excluded'; as there is no counter-entity in this case, in the form of what could be excluded.

It might be argued that—'in such expressions as '*na ēvam*' ('not thus') there is something probable that could be regarded as 'excluded'.

This also is not possible in this case, as already pointed out. Because here also, in the expression '*na naivam*', there is negation of negation; and the '*ēvam*' remains in its own *unnegatived*—positive—form. So the same reason that we had urged before becomes applicable here also.—(980-981)

All the above has been set forth as put forward by *Kumārila*. With the following *Texts*, the Author proceeds to set forth objections put forward by *Uddyotakara* against *Apoha* [In *Nyāyavārtika* on 2. 2. 63, pp. 332-333]:—

TEXTS (982–988).

"IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'ALL' ('*sarva*') WHAT IS IT THAT IS ASSUMED TO BE THE 'EXCLUDED'? THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS THE *non-all*, WHICH COULD BE EXCLUDED.—IF IT BE URGED THAT '*one* AND THE REST' ARE THE *non-all*, THEN IT COMES TO BE THE EXCLUSION OF THE DENOTATION ITSELF; AS THE *parts* WOULD BE EXCLUDED, AND NO *whole* IS ADMITTED.—SIMILARLY, IN REGARD TO THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD 'GROUP' ('*Samūha*'), THE CONSTITUENTS WOULD BE EXCLUDED; AND NOTHING APART FROM THIS IS ADMITTED; HENCE ALL SUCH WORDS BECOME DEPRIVED OF THEIR MEANING.—AS REGARDS THE WORDS 'TWO' AND THE REST, WHICH ALSO ARE APPLIED TO *groups*, AS THE 'ONE' AND OTHER CONSTITUENTS WOULD BE EXCLUDED, THEY COULD NO LONGER BE SO APPLICABLE.—THEN AGAIN, THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD 'COW' IS SAID TO BE THE 'NON-NON-COW';—NOW IS THIS *positive* OR *negative*? IF IT IS *positive*, IS IT THE *Cow* OR THE *Non-cow*?—IF IT IS THE *Cow*, THEN THERE IS NO DISPUTE; AS THE DENOTATION TURNS OUT TO BE OF THE POSITIVE CHARACTER. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT IS THE *non-Cow* THAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD 'COW',—THAT WOULD EXHIBIT A WONDERFUL INSIGHT INTO THE MEANINGS OF WORDS INDEED!—NOR CAN IT BE *negative*; AS, IN THAT CASE INJUNCTION AND THE REST WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE.—NOR DOES ANY ONE EVER COMPREHEND A *negation* FROM THE WORD 'COW'."—(982–988)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara has argued as follows:—"It cannot be right to say that words denote the *Apoha* of other things; because this explanation cannot apply to all words; that is to say, in the case of words where there are two mutually exclusive contradictions, it may be that when one is affirmed the other is denied; as for instance, it may be true that when the word 'Cow' is heard, the *Cow* is affirmed and the *non-Cow* is denied. But this is not possible in the case of the word '*Sarva*' ('all'), as there is no such thing as *non-all*, which could be denied by the word 'all'.—'But in this case also, there is denial or preclusion of *one and the rest*; so that our explanation takes in this case also'.—You mean that *one and the rest* are the contradictories of *all*, the *non-all* which are excluded by the word 'all'.—But this is not right; as it involves the incongruity of words abandoning their own meaning. If the word 'all' excludes *one and the rest*,—inasmuch as these latter are what go to make up the *All*, and (for the Buddhist) the *whole* has no existence apart from its constituents, the exclusion of *one and the rest* would mean the exclusion of everything that goes to make up the *All*, and there would be

nothing left for the word 'all' to denote: and this word would thus become meaningless.—[The word '*aṅga*' stands for *part*].—Similarly all *collective* words, like 'group' and the rest, would become meaningless, if they were used for the exclusion of their own constituents; as it is held that the *group* has no existence apart from the members that make up that group. —As for the words 'two' and the rest, they also pertain to groups (of Two, Three, etc.); so that, if they denoted the exclusion of *one and the rest*,—as these, being precluded, would not be there to make up the said groups, the words would become meaningless."

This is the argument that is indicated by the words—'*They would not be so applicable*' (Text 985). What is meant is that the words in question are accepted as applicable to groups; but they would cease to be so applicable.

"Further, when it is asserted that what the word 'Cow' denotes is the '*Apoha* of other things',—i.e. something that is 'not non-Cow',—is this something (A) Positive or (B) Negative?—(A) If it is Positive, is it the *Cow* or the *non-Cow*?—If it is the *Cow*, then there is no quarrel between us.—If it is the *non-Cow* that is held to be denoted by the word 'Cow',—this shows a wonderful insight into the meanings of words!—(B) Nor can it be something Negative; as nothing negative can form the subject of any injunction or comprehension thereof; as a matter of fact, when one hears the word 'Cow', neither the Injunction nor its comprehension pertains to anything merely negative."

This is the argument that is indicated in the words '*Nor can it be negative, etc., etc.*'—'*Praiṣa*' stands for *Praiṣaṇa*, Injunction; that is, the urging of the hearer by the Speaker to something; this belongs to the Speaker; while '*Comprehension*' belongs to the hearer.—The term '*and the rest*' is meant to include such nouns as 'carrier', 'milker' and the like.

Lastly, it is by actual experience that the meaning of words is comprehended; and as a matter of fact, no one ever comprehends *negation* from the word 'Cow'.—(982–988)

"Further, *Apoha, Exclusion*, being an *Action*, it behoves you to point out its object (i.e. the object excluded). That is to say, you explain '*Apoha*' as 'not being the non-Cow'; now is this object of the *Apoha*, the *Cow* or the *non-Cow*?—If it pertains to the *Cow*, how can there be *negation* of the Cow in the Cow itself?—If, on the other hand, it pertains to the *non-Cow*, how can the *Apoha* or Exclusion of one thing (non-Cow) lead to the comprehension of another thing (the Cow)? Certainly, when the *Khadira* tree is cut, the *cutting* does not fall upon the *Palāsha* tree.—Further, if the phrase 'the Cow is not the non-Cow' is explained as the negation, in the *Cow*, of the *non-Cow*,—then you should explain who has ever conceived of the *Cow* as the *non-Cow*,—which conception would be negatived by the said *Apoha*?"

The Arguer regards the first two alternatives as irrelevant, hence he sets forth the third alternative [that there is preclusion, in the *Cow*, of the *non-Cow*]:—

TEXTS (989-994).

"WHY IS THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD ('COW') HELD TO BE THE *Apoha*—IN THE FORM 'THE COW IS *not non-Cow*'? WHO HAS EVER ATTRIBUTED THE CHARACTER OF THE *non-Cow* TO THE COW—THAT IT IS DENIED HERE?—IT IS HELD THAT IT IS THE 'EXCLUSION OF THE *non-Cow*' IN THE COW, WHICH FORMS THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD;—IS THIS HELD TO BE SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE COW? OR NON-DIFFERENT?—IF IT IS *different*, DOES IT ABIDE—OR *not* ABIDE—ANYWHERE? IF IT DOES ABIDE, THEN IT BECOMES A *Quality*, AND THE WORD CANNOT BE DENOTATIVE OF THE *Substance*;—AND THUS AS THE WORD 'COW' WOULD DENOTE ONLY A *Quality*, THERE WOULD BE NO CO-ORDINATION IN SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS 'THE COW MOVES', 'THE COW STANDS'.—IF IT DOES NOT ABIDE IN ANY THING, THEN WHAT WOULD BE THE SENSE IN WHICH IT COULD BE MENTIONED, FOR THE PURPOSE OF *exclusion*, BY THE TERM '*Agoḥ*', 'OF THE NON-COW'?—IF, LASTLY, THE '*Apoha*', 'EXCLUSION OF OTHERS' IS HELD BY YOU TO BE *non-different* (FROM THE *Cow*),—THEN IT COMES TO BE THE SAME AS *Cow*; WHAT MORE WOULD, IN THAT CASE, BE EXPRESSED (BY THE TERM '*Apoha*')?"—(989–994)

COMMENTARY.

The particle '*cha*' (in Text, 989) has the collective sense; what is meant by the sentence is—why do you assert the denotation of the word 'Cow' to be the *Apoha* in the form of 'Not non-Cow'?

'Why should it not be so asserted'? (asks the Buddhist).

The answer is—'*Who has, etc. etc.*'

"For the following reason also *Apoha* cannot be accepted:—Because none of the alternatives possible under that theory is admissible: The *Apoha, or Exclusion, of the non-Cow* in the Cow,—is this (A) Different, or (B) Non-different—(from the Cow)?—(A) If it is different; (*a*) does it abide (in the Cow)? Or (*b*) does it not abide in it?—(*a*) If it does abide in it, then, inasmuch as it abides in it, it becomes a Quality; that is, the word 'Cow' denotes a Quality, and not the Substance, the animal, *Cow*; and under the circumstances, there can be no such Co-ordination as that expressed in the words 'the Cow is standing', 'the Cow is moving'.—(*b*) If, on the other hand, it does not abide in it, then what is the significance of the Genitive ending in the phrase '*agoḥ apohaḥ*' ('the Apoha *of the non-Cow*')?—(B) If, lastly, the *Apoha* is *non-different* from the *Cow*, then it is the same as the *Cow*, and the postulating of it is entirely futile."—(989–994)

TEXTS (995-996).

"IS THIS *Apoha* ONE AND THE SAME IN CONNECTION WITH ALL THINGS? OR IS IT SEVERAL?—IF ONE, THEN, BEING RELATED TO SEVERAL COWS, IT WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE *Universal*—'*Cow*'.—IF IT IS SEVERAL, THEN IT WOULD BE ENDLESS,—LIKE SO MANY INDIVIDUAL OBJECTS. CONSEQUENTLY, JUST LIKE THE DIVERSE INDIVIDUALS, THIS ALSO COULD NOT BE 'DENOTED'.—
(995-996)

COMMENTARY.

[*Uddyotakara* continues]—"You should explain whether this *Apoha* is one and the same in regard to all things? Or is it different with each individual thing? If it is one and the same, and is related to several cows, then it is the same as the *Universal* 'Cow'. If on the other hand, it is many (differing with each individual cow), then it is as endless as the individual objects themselves; so that no conception of it would be possible; which means that it cannot be denoted."—(995-996)

TEXTS (997–1000).

"THIS *Apoha*, 'EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS'—IS IT ITSELF *denoted* OR *not-denoted*? EVEN IF IT IS *denoted*, IS IT DENOTED AS SOMETHING *positive*? OR ONLY AS THE 'NEGATION OF OTHER THINGS'? —IF IT IS DENOTED AS SOMETHING *positive*, THEN YOU SHOULD ABANDON YOUR EXTREMIST VIEW, WHEREBY IT HAS BEEN ASSERTED THAT '*in every case* IT IS *the exclusion of other things* THAT IS DENOTED BY WORDS.'—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SAID 'EXCLUSION' (*Apoha*) IS DENOTED IN THE FORM OF THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS',—THEN SUCH A VIEW WOULD INVOLVE AN INFINITE REGRESS. —IF THEN IT BE HELD BY YOU THAT THE SAID *Apoha* (EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS) IS *not denoted*, THEN YOUR ASSERTION, THAT 'THE WORD ALWAYS BRINGS ABOUT THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS', WOULD BECOME ANNULLED."—(997–1000)

COMMENTARY.

"You have to be questioned—is this *Apoha* denoted or not denoted? If it is denoted, is it denoted as something positive? Or as the 'exclusion of other things'?—If it is denoted as something positive, then the assertion that 'The denotation of words consists in the *exclusion of other things*'

is not universally true.—If it is denoted as the 'exclusion of other things', then that 'exclusion of others' would itself have to be denoted as another 'exclusion of other things'; and so on and on, there would be no end to it. —If then the *Apoha* is held to be *not-denoted,* then that would contradict the statement that 'the word brings about the exclusion of what is denoted by other words'."—(997–1000)

All this has been set forth by *Uddyotakara.* In answer to this, the revered *Diṅnāga* has declared as follows :—'In all cases, the substratum being the same, there is no disruption, and all that is desired is duly accomplished; hence in due course, all characteristics of the 'Universal',—such as *one-ness, eternality, complete subsistence in every component*—subsist in the *Apoha* itself. Consequently, on account of the superiority of its excellence, the only theory that is right is that 'the denotation of words consists in the *exclusion of other things*'.

In reference to this, *Kumārila* argues as follows, thereby summing up the arguments against the doctrine of *Apohà* :—

TEXTS (1001-1002).

"FURTHER, *one-ness, eternality and subsistence in every individual,*—
ONE WHO WOULD ATTRIBUTE THESE TO *Apohas* WHICH ARE
FEATURELESS, WOULD BE MAKING CLOTH WITHOUT YARNS.—
FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE ELEMENT OF
'EXCLUSION OF OTHERS' COULD BE PRESENT
ONLY IN THE DENOTATION OF THOSE WORDS
WHEREIN THE NEGATIVE TERM IS PRESENT;
IN ALL OTHER CASES THE THING ITSELF
IS WHAT IS DENOTED." [*Shloka-*
Vartika-Apoha—163-164.]
—(1001-1002)

COMMENTARY.

'*In those words alone where the negative term is present*',—e.g. in such expressions as '*abhakṣyo grāmasūkaraḥ*', 'the tame hog is *not-to-be-eaten*'.

'*The thing itself*'—in the positive form.

'*In all other cases*'—where the negative term is not present.—(1001-1002)

Having thus set forth the opinions of others, in order of importance, the Author sets forth the answer to these :—

TEXTS (1003-1004).

ALL THESE ARE WRONG VIEWS BASED UPON IGNORANCE OF WHAT IS MEANT BY THE '*Apoha*, NEGATION, OF OTHER THINGS'.—PEOPLE WHO ARE THEMSELVES DAMNED DAMN OTHERS ALSO.—AS A MATTER OF FACT, *Apoha* IS OF TWO KINDS DUE TO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN—(1) *Paryudāsa* (RELATIVE NEGATION, CONTRADISTINCTION, EXCLUSION) AND (2) *Niṣēdha* (ABSOLUTE NEGATION, DENIAL, PROHIBITION). *Paryudāsa* AGAIN IS OF TWO KINDS —(*a*) DUE TO DIFFERENCE OF *Conception* (IDEA), AND (*b*) DUE TO DIFFERENCE OF CONCEPT (OBJECT).—(1003-1004)

COMMENTARY.

'*Due to difference, etc. etc.*' ;—i.e. because there is Relative Negation and Absolute Negation, there are two kinds of *Apoha*, Negation.

'*Due to difference in Conception, etc. etc.*'—i.e. due to difference of the nature of the Conception, and due to difference of the nature of the Concept. Of these '*the nature of Conception*' consists in the appearance of cognition of several things in one comprehensive form ;—and '*the nature of Concept*'—consists in the nature of the object, as contradistinguished from unlike objects,—i.e. in the form of 'Specific Individuality'; and the two kinds of *Paryudāsa* are based upon difference of these two ;—such is the sense of the compound.—(1003-1004)

The following *Text* points out the form of Negation (*Paryudāsa*, Exclusion) in the form of *Conception*—

TEXTS (1005-1006).

IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED ON A PREVIOUS OCCASION (TEXT 723) THAT THINGS LIKE THE *Harītakī* AND OTHER THINGS, THOUGH DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER, BECOME THE BASIS OF UNITARY CONCEPTION. ON THE BASIS OF SUCH THINGS, THERE APPEARS A *reflection* IN THE DETERMINATE COGNITION,—WHICH REFLECTION IS DEFINITELY APPREHENDED (CONCEIVED OF) AS 'OBJECTS', EVEN THOUGH THE OBJECTIVE CHARACTER IS ABSENT IN IT. [AND IT IS THIS CONCEPTION OF THE REFLECTED IMAGE THAT IS CALLED '*Apoha*'].—(1005-1006)

COMMENTARY.

'*On a previous occasion*'—i.e. in the chapter on the examination of the 'Universal', under Text 723 *et seq.* It has been explained there that,—

many such things as the *Harītakī* and the rest, without any commonalty among them, perform the same function of allaying fever and other diseases,—and exactly in the same manner the *Black* and other Cows, even though different among themselves, become, by their very nature, the basis of the unitary conception, even without any such entity as the Commonalty or the Universal.

'*Abhayādisamāḥ*',—i.e. like the *Harītakī*, etc.—the similarity consisting in fulfilling the same purpose.

'*On the basis of such things, etc. etc.*';—on the basis of consisting in objects like the *Harītakī* and the rest,—brought about by the apprehension of the action of such causes,—is the *determinate Cognition*;—in this cognition there is the *reflection*,—reflected image—of the objects,—i.e. there appears a reflection which is apprehended as the same as the objects;—and it is to this apprehension that the name '*Apoha*' has been applied.

'*Determinate*',— this is an adjective qualifying '*cognition*'.

'*Arthātmatābhāvē*';—even though the character of the 'external object' is wanting.

'*Nishchitam*'—definitely apprehended.—(1005-1006)

Question:—"Why has the name '*Apoha*' been given to it?"
Answer:—

TEXTS (1007–1009½).

(1) BECAUSE IT APPEARS AS 'EXCLUDED' (DISTINGUISHED) FROM OTHER 'APPEARANCES',—(2) BECAUSE IT IS THE BASIS (CAUSE) OF THE COGNITION OF A THING AS 'EXCLUDED' FROM OTHERS,—(3) BECAUSE IT IS COGNISED THROUGH AN ENTITY 'EXCLUDED' (FROM OTHERS),—AND (4) BECAUSE IT IS APPREHENDED IN THE FORM OF THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' CONSISTING IN THE 'EXCLUSION' OF UNLIKE THINGS, BY PERSONS CONFOUNDED BY ITS SAMENESS—THE NAME '*Apoha*, EXCLUSION, OF OTHERS' HAS BEEN GIVEN TO IT, ON THE SAID BASIS.—(1007–1009½)

COMMENTARY.

The name '*Apoha*' has been applied to it on four grounds:—(1) Firstly and chiefly, because it itself appears as 'excluded' (distinguished) from the appearances imposed by other conceptions,—the name '*Apoha of others*' has been applied, in the sense of *what is excluded*—'*apohyatē*'—*from others*—'*anyasmāt*'.—On the other three grounds the name rests only indirectly (figuratively). (2) For instance, through imposing the character of the *Effect* upon the *Cause*; as when the name is applied because it is the cause of the cognition of a thing as 'excluded' from others;—(3) it is applied

through imposing the character of the *Cause* upon the *Effect*; as when the name is applied '*ashlisṭavastu-dvārā*'; i.e. '*through*'—by means of—*an* '*entity*' which is '*ashlisṭa*'—i.e. '*excluded from others*'; i.e. it proceeds from the apprehension of the said conception;—(4) the fourth ground lies in the fact that it is apprehended by persons confounded by its sameness with the 'exclusion of unlike things'.

'*Its sameness*';—i.e. the sameness of the reflection of the object in the conceptual thought.

'*On the said basis*';—i.e. on the basis of the four facts, in the shape of its *appearing as excluded from other appearances* and so forth.—(1007-1008)

The following *text* shows the form of the *Apoha* in the form of the *object*:—

TEXT (1009).

SO ALSO, IN REGARD TO THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' WHICH IS THE BASIS OF THE SAID 'EXCLUSION';—ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS IN IT THE 'EXCLUSION' OF OTHERS.—(1009)

COMMENTARY.

The words of the preceding text—'the name *Exclusion of others* has been given to it on the said basis',—have to be construed along with this text also.

The basis (for this *Apoha*) is pointed out—'*On the ground, etc. etc.*';——that is, on the ground of the presence therein of the differentiation—exclusion—from *other*—i.e. unlike, heterogeneous,—things; i.e. because the *exclusion of unlike things* is there. What is meant by this is that to the 'Specific Individuality', the name '*Apoha*, Exclusion, of others' is applicable in its primary sense.—(1009)

The following *Text* points out the form of *Apoha* in the form of 'Negation Absolute':—

TEXT (1010).

'NEGATION ABSOLUTE' WE HAVE IN SUCH INSTANCES AS 'THE *Cow* IS NOT *non-Cow*'; IN THIS THE 'NEGATION OF THE OTHER' IS VERY CLEARLY APPREHENDED.—(1010)

COMMENTARY.

Having thus set forth the nature of the three kinds of '*Apoha*', the Author proceeds to connect it with the subject-matter under discussion, the *Denotation of Words*:—

TEXT (1011).

IT IS THE *first* OF THESE *Apohas* THAT IS EXPRESSED BY WORDS; BECAUSE THE COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY WORDS APPREHENDS THE EXTERNAL OBJECT.—(1011)

COMMENTARY.

'*First*'—i.e. that which consists in the Reflection of the object, as described above (in *Text*, 1006).

The reason for this is explained—'*Because the cognition, etc. etc.*';—that alone should be regarded as the 'denotation of words' which actually appears in the Verbal Cognition;—and as a matter of fact, in Verbal Cognition, there is no apprehension of *Negation Absolute,* nor that of the 'Specific Individuality', as there is in Sense-cognition; what actually appears in it is that Verbal Cognition only which apprehends the external object. Hence it is only the reflection of the External Object, which appears directly in Verbal Cognition as identical with it, that can be rightly held to be the denotation of the word.—(1011)

As regards the well-known relation of the *denotative and denoted* which subsists between the word and its denotation,—it is none other than the relation of *Cause and Effect*; in fact it is of the nature of the relation of *Cause and Effect* itself.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1012).

WHEN THE COGNITION OF THE REFLECTION IN THAT FORM HAS RESULTED FROM THE WORD, THERE HAS COME ABOUT THE RELATION OF *Denoted* and *Denotative,* IN THE SHAPE OF *Cause and Effect.*—(1012)

COMMENTARY.

'*The Reflection in that form*'—is that reflection which is of the nature of the apprehended external object;—when the birth—appearance—of the cognition of that—has been brought about—produced,—the relation that has resulted is, on reflection, found to be that of *Cause and Effect.* For instance, the Word, as bringing about the Reflection, is called 'denotative'; and the Reflection, brought about by the Word, is the 'denoted'.

Thus the assertion made by the Opponent—that 'mere negation does not figure in Verbal Cognition' (Text, 910)—is irrelevant; because mere negation is not regarded as the denotation of words.—(1012)

It has been shown that *Apoha,* in the form of 'Reflection', being brought about directly by words, forms the *primary* denotation of words. The Author now proceeds to show that there would be nothing incongruous in

describing the other two kinds of *Apoha* (described under 1007-1008) as forming the *secondary* (indirect) 'denotation of words':—

TEXTS (1013–1015).

THE DIRECT FORM (OF *Apoha*) HAVING BEEN EXPLAINED AS ABOVE, *Absolute Negation* ALSO IS APPREHENDED BY IMPLICATION,—IN THE FORM THAT THE NATURE OF THIS THING IS NOT THE NATURE OF THE OTHER THING.—WHEN THERE IS CONNECTION (OF THE WORD) WITH CERTAIN THINGS, THERE COMES ABOUT, BY IMPLICATION, THE APPREHENSION OF 'EXCLUDED' THINGS ALSO.—HENCE THIS ALSO IS FIGURATIVELY SPOKEN OF AS THE 'DENOTATION' OF THE WORD. —THESE TWO KINDS OF VERBAL *Apoha* ARE NOT DIRECTLY SPOKEN OF AS SUCH. —(1013–1015)

COMMENTARY.

'*As above*',—as something brought about.

Question:—"How is Absolute Negation apprehended by implication?"

Answer:—*That the nature, etc. etc.*—That is, on the basis of the fact that the nature of *this thing*—the reflection of the Cow—is not the nature of *the other thing*—the reflection of the Horse and other things.

Having thus shown that the notion of the *Apoha* in the shape of Absolute Negation forms, on the ground of invariable concomitance, the secondary denotation of words, the Author proceeds to assert the same in regard to 'Specific Individuality' also:—'*When there is connection, etc. etc.*';—the 'connection' of the Word with the object meant here is the indirect one of invariable concomitance in the shape of that of *Cause and Effect*; in the following way:—First of all there is the apprehension of the object as it stands; then the speaker's desire to speak of it; then the movement of his palate and other organs of speech; then the utterance of the word; in this way when there is this indirect connection between the word and the objects spoken of—such as Fire and the like,—then there follows the cognition, through Presumption, of the object as 'excluded from unlike things'.

Thus both these kinds of *Apoha*,—Absolute Negation and that in the form *excluded from others*,—are figuratively spoken of as *denoted*, by the word.

'*This also*';—i.e. the Specific Individuality; '*also*' refers to the Absolute Negation.—(1013–1015)

As against the Revered *Diṅnāga*, *Uddyotakara* has urged the following (in *Nyāyavārtika*, 2. 2. 63, pages 333-334):—"If the *Apoha* is not denoted by the word ('*Apoha*'), then you have to explain what the word can signify apart from what is denotable by it? If that same (*Apoha* itself) forms

the denotation of the word, then, this would be incompatible with your declaration that 'a word is said to denote something when it is found that it brings about, in its denotation, the exclusion of what is denoted by other words'; as the only meaning that this declaration could have (under the theory that *Apoha* is *not denoted*) would be that the non-denotative word denotes something—(which is absurd)".

The following *Text* proceeds to explain that this assertion has been made through ignorance of the meaning of the words (of the Teacher), and to show that there is no incongruity in those words:—

TEXT (1016).

WHEN THE WORD BRINGS ABOUT THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS, IT IS SAID TO '*denote* ITS OWN MEANING'; AND THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN THIS.—(1016)

COMMENTARY.

The Specific Individuality also is the word's 'own meaning', by implication,—as explained before;—and when in its 'own meaning' in the shape of the Specific Individuality, the Word brings about—produces—the 'exclusion of other things'—i.e. the *Apoha* in the form of Reflection, as excluded (distinguished) from other Reflections,—then it is said to 'denote' it. And there is nothing incongruous in the words of our Teacher.—(1016)

The following *Texts* explain this same declaration of *Diṅnāga's*:—

TEXTS (1017–1018).

THE WORD IS SAID TO 'DENOTE', BECAUSE IT PRODUCES A REFLECTION OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE EXTERNAL THING; IT DOES NOT TOUCH THE EXCLUSIVE FACTOR IN THE SHAPE OF THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY; APART FROM THE SAID PRODUCTION OF THE REFLECTION, THERE IS NO OTHER DENOTATIVE FUNCTION OF THE WORD.—(1017–1018)

COMMENTARY.

What the revered Teacher means is as follows:—Of the word, there is no function of denoting external things, other than the producing of the Reflection of the Conception apprehending those things; because all entities are devoid of activity. Hence when the word produces the Reflection of the conception tending to the apprehension of the external thing, it is said that 'it denotes its meaning'. It does not touch *the exclusive factor*, in the shape of Specific Individuality as excluded (distinguished) from like and unlike things; as this would serve no useful purpose.

'*Apart from, etc. etc.*';—i.e. apart from the producing of the said *Reflection*, there is no other denotative function of the word.—(1017-1018)

Having thus explained the nature of *Apoha*, the Author now proceeds to meet and set aside the objections urged by others.

It has been urged (by *Bhāmaha*, under Text 912) that—"if the word 'Cow' serves the only purpose of excluding other things, then please point out some other word which would produce the notion of *Cow* in the Cow."

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (1019).

It is only when the Reflection has been cognised that there follows the 'exclusion of other things', by implication; because the idea of 'others' does not form part of the Reflection at all.—(1019)

COMMENTARY.

It is the idea of the *Cow* itself which is produced by the word; as regards the 'exclusion of others', that is understood only by implication,—and from the word itself; because the Reflection of the Cow is free from the touch of any other appearance (or reflection). If it were not so, then, it would never be apprehended in its specific form. That is why, for the bringing about of the idea of the Cow, another word is not sought after; because the said idea of the Cow is produced by the word 'Cow' itself.—(1019)

It has been urged (under 913 above) that—"words have their fruits in Cognitions, and any one word cannot have two fruits, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1020).

As in the case of the sentence speaking of 'not eating at night', the word in question has two fruits (resultants),—one direct and the other by implication; and it is so because there is no affirmation entirely without negation.—(1020)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the sentence 'Fat *Devadatta* does not eat during the day', the direct meaning consists of the denial of 'eating during the day', and the implied meaning consists of the affirmation of 'eating during the night'; in the same manner, in the case of the word 'Cow', which is affirma-

tive (positive) in character, the idea of affirmation is the direct resultant, and the idea of negation is the indirect resultant due to implication.

The reason for this is stated—'*And it is because, etc. etc.*' ;—because there is no affirmation without negation ; in fact, affirmation is always concomitant with the negation of the unlike ; as there can be nothing which is not excluded (differentiated) from things unlike itself.

Thus there is nothing incongruous in a single word having two resultants.—(1020)

Question :—" Why is it so ? "
Answer :—

TEXT (1021).

BECAUSE THE WORD DOES NOT DIRECTLY BRING ABOUT BOTH THESE,—(1) THE IDEA OF ITS OWN DENOTATION, AND (2) THE EXCLUSION OF ANOTHER THING.—(1021)

COMMENTARY.

There would be incongruity if it were held that both the resultants—affirmation as well as negation—are brought about by the word at the same time ; when however, the view is that,—as in the case of 'not eating during the day',—only one is brought about directly, while the other is got at only by implication,—then there is no incongruity.

As for the argument (urged in 914) that—" on hearing the word *cow* uttered, the first idea that one should obtain would be that of the *non-Cow* ",—this also is rejected by what has been just said ; because no such view as indicated has been held by us ; that is to say, we have never held the view that the *negation* (*exclusion*) *of the non-cow* is done by the word *directly* ; in fact, it has been already explained that this is obtained only by implication.—(1021)

It has been argued (by *Kumārila*, under *Text* 915, above) that—" Those who have accepted the commonalty in the shape of the *negation of the non-cow* as denoted by the word, have admitted the positive entity, the *Universal* 'Cow' to be so denoted ".

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (1022).

THE *Universal* 'COW' ALSO IS HELD TO BE AN APPEARANCE OF THE SAME KIND ; INASMUCH IT IS APPREHENDED AS COMMON TO ALL COWS—THE *Variegated* AND THE REST.—(1022)

COMMENTARY.

'*Of the same kind*',—that is, superimposed upon, reflected in, the Cognition, as something external.

The reason for this view is next stated—'*Inasmuch as, etc. etc.*'; all cows, variegated and the rest, are apprehended as 'Cow', 'Cow', as of common form; and it is on this account that this is called 'Commonalty' or 'Universal'.—(1022)

As regards its *externality*, that also is spoken of as such only by persons under illusion; it is not real.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1023).

BECAUSE IT IS COGNISED AS A POSITIVE 'ENTITY', THEREFORE IT IS CALLED A 'POSITIVE ENTITY';—THIS MISTAKEN COGNITION IS PRODUCED QUICKLY FROM ITS SEED.—(1023)

COMMENTARY.

Objection:—"If in any case, there were a positive entity in the shape of the Commonalty based upon an external object actually apprehended, then it might be possible to have an illusion of the Commonalty based upon similarity; when however, there is no real primary 'Commonalty' (according to the Buddhist), the said illusion of commonalty is not possible for you."

Answer:—'*This mistaken cognition, etc. etc.*'—'*Quality*';—i.e. the cognition in question appears, independently of the perception of any real Commonalty,—through some internal aberration,—like the conception of 'two moons'; all illusions do not really proceed from the perception of similarity; they appear through mental aberration also. Hence there is no incongruity in our view.—(1023)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that our view is not open to the charge of 'futility'—of having a Probandum that is already proved:—

TEXT (1024).

THAT SAME 'FORM OF THE COGNITION' CALLED THE '*Apoha*', IS THE 'DENOTATION OF THE WORD',—ALSO (REGARDED AS) A 'POSITIVE ENTITY', IN THE FORM OF THE 'COMMONALTY'; ON ACCOUNT OF ITS BEING APPREHENDED AS SUCH, THROUGH MISTAKE.—(1024)

COMMENTARY.

The 'form of the Cognition' described above, as imposed upon it as something external, is called '*Apoha*',—which is the 'denotation of the word'; and it is spoken of as an external thing, in the shape of the *Commonalty* (or Universal).

The reason for this is stated—'*On account, etc. etc.*';—i.e. because it is apprehended in the form of the Commonalty, and in the form of a positive entity.

The reason for its being called 'the denotation of the word' and the 'Apoha' has already been explained above, under *Texts* 1017 and 1007.—(1024)

Question—"Wherefore is not that a real *Commonalty* (Universal)?"
Answer:—

TEXT (1025).

IT IS NOT RIGHT TO REGARD ITS CHARACTER OF *Universal entity*, AS REAL; BEING NON-DIFFERENT FROM THE COGNITION, HOW COULD IT APPERTAIN TO ANOTHER THING?—(1025)

COMMENTARY.

In reality, the *Apoha* is not anything entirely different from the Cognition; how then could it appertain to another thing,—by virtue of which appertenence, it could be the 'commonalty' of several things? It has been declared above—'How can what is non-different from the Cognition appertain to another thing?'

For this same reason, our reasoning is not open to the charge of being 'redundant' (seeking to prove what is already admitted); because you do not admit the Universal named 'Cow' to be of the form of Cognition and not of the form of an entity; on the other hand, you postulate the Universal 'Cow' as a real entity embracing all cows—variegated and the rest. Hence our reasoning is not 'redundant'.

It has been urged (under 919) that—"If mere negation be assumed to be the denotation of words, this would be only the *void* expressed differently". As no such assumption is made by us, it does not affect our position.—(1025)

It has been urged (under 920, by *Kumārila*) that—"There would be apprehension therein of part of the cognition of the Horse itself, etc. etc".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1026).

THOUGH THIS FORM OF '*Apoha*' IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE FORM OF THE COGNITION, YET ITS *external character* IS APPREHENDED ONLY BY DELUDED PERSONS.—(1026)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(1026)

It has been argued (under 921, by *Kumārila*) that—"if the denotation of words is independent of things, then the assumption of *Apoha* is useless".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1027).

IT IS NOT ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT OF THE OBJECT, INASMUCH AS THE NOTION OF THAT COMES IN INDIRECTLY ; AND YET IN THAT FORM, THE CHARACTER OF POSITIVE ENTITY DOES NOT BELONG TO IT, AS EXPLAINED BEFORE.—(1027)

COMMENTARY.

There is an indirect concomitance with the object ; hence, even though the conception is primarily mistaken and illusory,—yet it is not entirely independent of the external object ; just as the idea of 'jewel' in the brightness of the jewel (though wrong, is not independent of the jewel). Hence 'independence of the external object' is something not admitted by us.

As regards the argument (urged in Text 922, by *Kumārila*) that—"the cognition that is produced in regard to the denotation of words is in the form of the positive entity",—the answer is given in the words—'*and yet in that form, etc. etc.*',—that is, even though the cognition is in the form of the positive entity, yet, the positive character that belongs to it is not in the form of something *external,* nor in the form of another cognition ; as has been explained under *Text* 1014.—This also sets aside the view that 'the *Apoha* of other Cognitions' is not apprehended by a Cognition ; because it is actually apprehended indirectly, by implication.—(1027)

It has been urged (under 923, by *Kumārila*) that—"Even in the absence of the external thing, just as there is *Intuition* denoted by the Sentence so would it be in the case of the word also".

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (1028).

THAT *Apoha* WHICH IS IN THE FORM OF REFLECTION, AND WHICH ALSO IS CALLED 'INTUITION', IS PRODUCED BY THE WORD ALSO ; AND WE READILY REGARD THIS AS THE DENOTATION OF WORDS.—(1028)

COMMENTARY.

We have described the meaning of the *Sentence* as of the form of Reflection, named 'Intuition' ; so also is the meaning of the word described. Because by the *Word* also, what is produced is the *Apoha* in the form of Reflection ; so that for us the *Apoha* in the form of the Reflection is held to be the denotation of the *Word* also, not only of the *Sentence.* This is what is meant by the term 'also'. Thus there being no difference of opinion between us, the complaint against us is not right.—(1028)

It has been argued (under 924, by *Kumārila*) that—" the exclusion of one Cognition from another is not apprehended ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1029).

OWING TO THE FACT OF ITS NOT BEARING ANY FACTOR APART FROM THE APPEARANCE OF ITS OWN FORM, ITS 'EXCLUSION FROM ANOTHER COGNITION' BECOMES DULY APPREHENDED.—(1029)

COMMENTARY.

It is because the Cognition does not bear within itself any factor apart from the manifestation of its own form, that—on account of its being restricted within its own form,—the exclusion of one cognition from another becomes apprehended; otherwise, if the Cognition bore the form of another, how could it be apprehended as excluded from that another ?

'*For that reason*'—i.e. because it does not apprehend any form other than its own.—(1029)

It has been argued (under 925, by *Kumārila*) that—" Words that are denotative of diverse Universals and those that are denotative of Particulars would all be synonyms ".

This is answered as follows :—

TEXT (1030).

IN THE CASE OF WHAT DOES NOT EXIST, ANY DIFFERENCE THAT MAY BE THERE CANNOT BE REAL; SO ALSO WOULD BE ITS NON-DIFFERENCE; AND HENCE THE WORDS WOULD CERTAINLY BE SYNONYMOUS.—(1030)

COMMENTARY.

Apoha, being featureless, has no form; and hence it is said that there is no difference among *Apohas*; similarly it is said that there is no non-difference among them. Thus there being no really non-different thing, how can the contingency of all words being synonymous be urged against us ?—(1030)

This same idea is explained more clearly in the following—

TEXT (1031)

'NON-DIFFERENCE' CONSISTS IN *being of the same form*; HOW CAN THIS BE THERE IN WHAT ARE *formless*? WORDS BECOME SYNONYMS ONLY WHEN WHAT IS DENOTED BY THEM IS ONE AND THE SAME.—(1031)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—"If there is no *one form* in *formless* things, why should words not be synonymous?"

Answer :—'*Words become synonyms, etc. etc.*'—(1031)

The following might be urged—"If among formless things, there cannot be *presence of the same form*, in reality,—even so it would be there in imaginary form; and on the basis of that the incongruity of all words being synonymous can be rightly urged".

Answer :—

TEXT (1032).

JUST AS, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF FORM, THERE IS IMAGINARY UNITY (UNIFORMITY),—IN THE SAME MANNER, *difference* ALSO COULD BE IMAGINARY; WHENCE THEN COULD THE WORDS BE SYNONYMOUS?—(1032)

COMMENTARY.

'*In the absence of form*'—i.e. in the absence of any characteristic features.—(1032)

Question:—"If that is so, then how is there any such notion among people that these words are synonymous, and those others are not synonymous?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1033).

IN REALITY, WORDS ARE NEITHER SYNONYMOUS NOR NOT-SYNONYMOUS; AS IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT WHAT IS DENOTED BY THEM IS NEITHER *one and the same* NOR *diverse*.—(1033)

COMMENTARY.

If what is denoted by words were really different or non-different, then they could be either synonymous or not-synonymous. As a matter of fact, however, it has been explained above (under *Text*, 871) that neither Specific Individuality, nor the Universal, nor what is possessed of the Universal, can be really denoted by words.—(1033)

"How then is there the restriction regarding words being synonymous and not-synonymous ?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1034).

BUT WHENEVER MORE THAN ONE THING IS SEEN TO BE PERFORMING ONE AND THE SAME FUNCTION, THE PROPERTY OF 'ONENESS' IS IMPOSED ON THEM AND THE SAME WORD IS APPLIED TO THEM.—(1034)

COMMENTARY.

Even without there being any Commonalty (or Universal), there is restriction regarding the application of a common word to a number of things,—and the basis of such application lies in the fact of several things performing the same fruitful function. By their very nature, some things, even though many, perform the same fruitful function; and for the purpose of expressing the fact of their performing the same fruitful function, people speaking of them,—for the sake of brevity—impose upon them a common form, and apply to them a common name. For instance, when the various things—Colour, etc.—are found to perform the same function of containing Honey, Water and other things,—the name 'Jar' is applied to them.—(1034)

Question :—"Without a single comprehensive (all-embracing) factor, how can a single word be rightly applied to several things ?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1035).

IN THE CASE OF THE EYE AND OTHER THINGS, ALL TENDING TO BRING ABOUT THE SINGLE EFFECT IN THE SHAPE OF THE COGNITION OF COLOUR,—IF SOMEONE WERE TO APPLY A COMMON NAME, EVEN WITHOUT A COMPREHENSIVE (COMMON) ELEMENT [IN THE SAME MANNER WOULD IT BE IN OTHER CASES ALSO].—(1035)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the application of words to things depends entirely upon the whim (of people). For instance, the Eye, Colour, Light and Mind, all tend to bring about the single effect of Colour-cognition; if some one, through sheer whim,—even without there being a common element,—were to apply a single word (name) to them,—would there be any one to prevent him from doing so ? Among all these things, the Eye and the rest, there is no Common Element, in the form of 'being productive of visual perception'; specially because you regard the Universal, the Ultimate Differentia and Inherence also to be productive of visual perception'; and in the things in question, there is no Universal or Inherence either ;

because the Universal cannot belong to a Universal, and in Inherence also there cannot be a second Inherence.—(1035)

Says the Opponent :—" How can the Jar and such things be spoken of as *performing the same function*—when, their actions, in the shape of holding water and the rest,—as also the Cognitions apprehending them,—differ from one another, on the ground of the difference among their ' Specific Individualities ' ? "

Answer :—

TEXTS (1036–1037).

THOUGH THE ACTION OF THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS, IN THE SHAPE OF HOLDING WATER, ETC.,—AND ALSO THE COGNITION OF THOSE THINGS,—ARE DIFFERENT (DIVERSE),—YET, AS IT FORMS THE BASIS OF A SINGLE (COMPREHENSIVE) CONCEPTION, THE COGNITION IS SAID TO BE *one* ONLY ; AND AS THIS COGNITION FORMS THE BASIS, THE THINGS ALSO ARE SPOKEN OF AS NOT-DIVERSE (ONE).—(1036–1037)

COMMENTARY.

Even though the effects differ on account of the difference in their ' Specific Individualities ', yet, the effect in the form of Cognition,—inasmuch as it serves as the basis of the single comprehensive conception, —is spoken of as *one* ; and on account of this one Cognition being the basis, the things,—in the shape of the Holding of Honey, Water, etc., and in the shape of the individual Jar, etc.,—also are spoken of as *one*.—This is what is meant by the text—' *And as this cognition, etc. etc.*'.

The previous singular form ' *uchyatē* ' has, in construing, to be changed into the plural form ' *uchyantē* '.

The particle ' *api* ' is to be construed after ' *arthāḥ* '.

In the way shown, it is quite reasonable to regard these as ' performing the same fruitful function '.

Objection :—" But in this way there would be infinite regress. The said Conception also would be diverse on account of the diversity of the Specific Individualities ; so that that also could not be accepted as *one* ; hence for establishing the oneness of that, it would be necessary to postulate a further comprehensive conception, and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress. So that there being no single effect or action, it would not be possible to apply a single name to several things."

Answer :—It is not so ; the oneness of the comprehensive conception is not attributed to the performance of a single function ; it is based upon the fact of its apprehending the same thing. So that there will be no infinite regress. Because all comprehensive conceptions by their very nature apprehend one and the same thing. The meaning of this therefore comes to be this :—Inasmuch as it is the basis of one uniform comprehensive

conception, the effect in the shape of Cognition is spoken of as *one*; and because of its being the basis again, the things—Jar, etc.—also come to be spoken of as 'one'.—(1036-1037)

Thus then, even without a positive entity in the shape of the 'Universal', the words 'Jar', etc. come to be the common denotative of several things. This is the conclusion asserted in the following—

TEXT (1038).

OF THESE, WORDS LIKE 'JAR' HAVE BEEN SAID TO BE COMMON DENOTATIVES, ON THE SINGLE BASIS OF THE REFLECTION DISTINGUISHED (EXCLUDED) FROM UNLIKE THINGS'.—(1038)

COMMENTARY.

The following *text* shows that even with regard to one and the same thing,—even without a positive 'Universal' or 'Particular',—there is application of several words independently of one another:—

TEXT (1039).

SIMILARLY, WHEN PERFORMING SEVERAL FRUITFUL FUNCTIONS, EVEN A SINGLE THING IS SPOKEN OF AS IF IT WERE MANY,—BY VIRTUE OF THE MULTIPLICITY OF THE EXCLUSIONS OF THINGS NOT PERFORMING THOSE FUNCTIONS.—(1039)

COMMENTARY.

Sometimes, even while only one, by its nature, a thing comes to perform several functions, through the intervention of other accessories; and in such cases, even without any diverse elements in the shape of positive commonalties and the like, several characters are imposed upon it on account of the multiplicity of 'exclusions' of things not performing those functions; and as a consequence of this, several words come to be applied to that thing.—(1039)

An example of this is cited in the following—

TEXT (1040).

FOR INSTANCE, *Colour* IS SPOKEN OF AS AN 'OBSTACLE' AND ALSO AS 'VISIBLE';—AND *Sound* IS SPOKEN OF AS 'COGNISED AFTER EFFORT', AND ALSO AS 'AUDITORY' OR 'AUDIBLE'.—(1040)

COMMENTARY.

Colour is spoken of as an 'obstacle' when it prevents the appearance of another colour in its own place; and it is also spoken of as 'visible',—because it serves to bring about visual perception.

A second example is cited :—' *And Sound, etc. etc.*' ;—even though sound is a single entity, yet, on being the resultant of the cognition following upon effort (of the speaker), it is spoken of as ' Cognised ' ; and as the resultant of auditory perception, it is spoken of as ' auditory ' ; ' *shravaṇa* ' stands for ' *shruti* ', audition, i.e. Auditory Perception ; and what appears therein is ' auditory '. Or the term ' *shrāvaṇa* ' may be explained as ' perceived by the auditory organ '.—(1040)

It has thus been shown that several words are applied to a thing which, as performing a single function, is *one* only. It is now shown that in some cases, words are applied even on the basis of the diversity of other causes :—

TEXT (1041).

IN SOME CASES, THE WORD IS APPLIED, ALSO ON THE BASIS OF THE DIVERSITY OF OTHER *Causes* ; E.G. SOUND ARISING FROM EFFORT, AND THE HONEY PRODUCED BY THE LARGE BEES.—(1041)

COMMENTARY.

' *Produced by the large bees* ', as distinguished from that produced by the smaller bees.—(1041)

Thus it has been shown that diverse words are applied to the same thing, on the basis of the multiplicity of effects (function) and causes. The following *Text* is going to show that diverse words are applied to the same thing, even without a commonalty, where there is desire to express only the exclusion of its effect and cause :—

TEXT (1042).

IN SOME CASES, THE WORD IS APPLIED ON THE BASIS OF THE EXCLUSION OF THE EFFECT AND CAUSE OF THE THING ; AS FOR EXAMPLE, *Colour* IS SPOKEN OF AS ' INAUDIBLE ', OR *Lightning* IS SPOKEN OF AS ' NOT PRODUCED BY EFFORT '.—(1042)

COMMENTARY.

The term ' *Kāryahētu* ' stands for the things of which the previously-mentioned factors are the *Effect and Cause* ;—the ' *Vishlēṣa* ' of these is their *exclusion* (denial).

" What are the words like this ? "

' *Inaudible, etc. etc.* ' ;—Colour is spoken of as ' inaudible ', when what is meant is the exclusion of Sound which is the effect of Auditory Perception ;—similarly, for the purpose of excluding things produced by effort, the term ' not produced by effort ' is applied to Lightning.—(1042)

Having thus explained that, even in the absence of any positive entity in the shape of a Commonalty, Words are applied with distinction merely on the basis of *exclusion*, the Author proceeds to show that there is no possibility of the incongruity of all words becoming synonymous :—

TEXTS (1043-1044).

DUE TO THE SAID AND OTHER DISTINCTIONS, 'EXCLUSIONS' ARE POSTULATED ON THE BASIS OF DIFFERENTIATED THINGS; AND SO ALSO ARE THE WORDS AS APPLIED TO THOSE THINGS. THUS WORDS, AS DENOTING DISTINCT THINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONVENTION, ARE APPLIED WITH DUE DIFFERENTIATION; AND AS SUCH THEY ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS UNDER OUR VIEW. —(1043-1044)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*other*'—includes words expressive of different ages—such as 'child' and the like,—and also such words as '*nairātmya*', ('absence of soul', or 'featurelessness').

'*On the basis of differentiated things*';—i.e. exclusions, of which the basis consists in things differentiated from one another.

'*So*'—associated with 'exclusion'.

'*Applied to those things*';—i.e. applied to the 'excluded' (i.e. differentiated) things.—Because, indirectly, they are the cause of the apprehension of the said denotation of the word.

'*Shrutayaḥ*'—Words.—(1043-1044)

The following might be urged :—" The words may not be synonymous,—because a distinction is assumed in the things; but how can there be the difference between words denoting Universals and those denoting Particulars, unless there are Universals and Particulars?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1045).

NOR IS THERE ANY INCONGRUITY IN UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS BEING DENOTED BY WORDS, AS APPERTAINING TO LARGER AND SMALLER NUMBER OF THINGS,—ON THE BASIS OF THE INFERENCE OF THE RELEVANT CONVENTION.—(1045)

COMMENTARY.

For example, the word 'Tree' brings about the 'Reflection' inferred in the shape of the 'Exclusion of non-trees',—in regard to *all trees*—the *Dhava, Khadira, Palāsha* and so forth; hence, as appertaining to a larger number of things, what is denoted by the word is spoken of as the 'Universal' (Commonalty).—On the other hand, in the case of the word '*Dhava*', there is 'exclusion of the *Khadira* and other trees', which brings about the conception of only a few of the trees (the *Dhava* ones only); hence what is denoted by it is said to be a 'Particular'.—(1045)

In regard to what has been asserted (under *Text* 928, as coming from the *Bauddha*), the Author says :—

TEXT (1046).

THE SAID 'EXCLUSIONS' OF THINGS, CREATED BY MERE ASSUMPTION, CANNOT REALLY DIFFER, THROUGH DIFFERENCE IN THE 'EXCLUDED THINGS', OR THROUGH THAT IN THE SUBSTRATUM.—(1046)

COMMENTARY.

If the diversity in the *Apoha* were held (by us) to be real and based upon the diversity of 'excluded things', or upon the diversity of the 'substratum',—then the objection urged would have been applicable. As a matter of fact, however, the 'Exclusions' are *not real*, but assumed on the basis of the diversity among like and unlike things.—(1046)

The following *Text* shows that the said *exclusions* appear as distinct things, only on account of the said assumption,—not in reality :—

TEXT (1047).

THE *externality* THAT IS ATTRIBUTED TO THESE EXCLUSIONS IS ONLY ASSUMED (IMAGINARY), NOT REAL. IN REALITY, DIFFERENCE AND NON-DIFFERENCE SUBSIST ONLY IN REAL THINGS.—(1047)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—" Why is it not real ? "
Answer :—' *In reality, etc. etc.* '.—(1047)

The following Texts proceed to show that in reality it is the assumptions (assumed conceptions) only that differ among themselves :—

TEXTS (1048-1049).

WHAT DIFFER AMONG THEMSELVES ARE THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENTS APPREHENDING THE SAID EXCLUSIONS ;—AND THOSE DIFFERENCES ARE DUE TO THE INFLUENCE OF THEIR ROOT, THE THING AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM SEVERAL THINGS, AND CONVENTION. THINGS, CONSISTING OF 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITIES' DO NOT BECOME EITHER UNIFIED OR DIVERSIFIED IN PARTS ; IT IS ONLY THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT THAT VARIES.—(1048-1049)

COMMENTARY.

'*Their Root*',—in the shape of Wind and other Humours, and the Tendency to conceptual thought ;—the thing as differentiated from several things,—and the Convention ;—it is due to the '*influence*'—force—of these that the *Conceptual Contents*, apprehending the thing as excluded from several

unlike things, become diversified; it is not the *things* that are diversified. For instance, the *Dhava* and other trees do not become *unified* in the form of the *Universal* 'Tree'; nor do they become diversified, in parts, in the form of the momentary individual trees; all that varies is the conceptual content. This has been thus declared—'Things by themselves do not become either aggregated or diversified, in reality; that their form is one or many is due to the fluctuations of the Cognition'.—(1048-1049)

It has been argued above (under *Text* 932) that—"No one can be able to conceive, in regard to the Cow, the unknown similarity in the object of *Apoha*, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1050).

EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO COMMON PROPERTY, YET *what are excluded* AND WHAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE *Exclusion* ARE APPREHENDED AS DIFFERENT, BY REASON OF THEIR APPEARING AS DIVERSE IN THE SUBSEQUENT DETERMINATE JUDGMENT.—(1050)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*apohyāpohagocharāḥ*' is made up of the '*apohya*' 'what are excluded'—i.e. (in the case of the word 'Cow') the Horse and other animals,—and the '*apohagochara*', 'what are contained in the exclusion',—i.e. the Variegated and other Cows; these are so spoken of as the 'exclusion of the non-Cow' pertains to them.

Thus, though there is no concomitance of any *commonalty*, yet, those that bring about the determinate judgment of *non-different* things are regarded as having their similarity well known,—while those that bring about the determinate judgment of *diverse* things,—are regarded as otherwise (i.e. as having their similarity unknown).—(1050)

The following might be urged—"In the absence of some one *Commonalty*, how can the things that bring about a single determinate judgment become diverse?"

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1051).

IT WOULD BE ONLY A FEW THINGS WHICH, WHILE BEING DIVERSE BY THEMSELVES, WOULD BRING ABOUT A SINGLE DETERMINATE JUDGMENT; AS ALREADY EXPLAINED BY US.—(1051)

COMMENTARY.

It has been explained in course of our examination of the 'Universal' that the *Dhātrī* (Āmalakī and other fruits), without commonalty, come to

perform a single fruitful action; in the same way, it would be only a few things that would bring about the single determinate judgment and yet be many and diverse.—(1051)

It has been argued (under Text 934, by *Kumārila*) that—" Words and Inferential Indicatives do not apply to what is devoid of concomitance, etc. etc. "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1052).

THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' CONSISTS OF THE THING-BY-ITSELF, AS 'EXCLUDED FROM WHAT IS NOT ITSELF';—AN ASSERTION OF CONCOMITANCE CAREFULLY MADE IN THIS FORM WOULD NOT BE INCONGRUOUS.—(1052)

COMMENTARY.

Even though there is no entity in the shape of the Commonalty (Universal), yet, if an assertion of concomitance is made in regard to mere 'Specific Individuality' as excluded (differentiated) from unlike things,—that would not be incompatible (with our view).—(1052)

Question :—" Why so ? "

Answer :—

TEXTS (1053-1054).

THAT WHEREIN SUBSISTS THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY (*Smoke*) DIFFERENTIATED FROM *Non-smoke*,—IN THAT SAME SUBSISTS ALSO THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY (*Fire*) DIFFERENTIATED FROM *Non-fire*; AS IN THE *Kitchen*; AND HEREIN (IN THE HILL) THERE IS THE *Specific Individuality differentiated from Non-smoke*;—HENCE *the Specific Individuality differentiated from Non-fire* ALSO MUST BE THERE.—(1053-1054)

COMMENTARY.

'*That*'—i.e. that place.

'*Herein*'—subsists the *Specific Individuality distinguished from non-smoke*; this proposition asserts the presence of the Inferential Indicative (Probans) in the subject of the Inference (Hill).

'*Hence, etc. etc.*'—asserts the resultant cognition (Conclusion) brought about by the Premises.

Or, the meaning may be that all the five factors of the Inferential Process may be shown by indicating the concomitance in connection with Specific Individualities.—(1053-1054)

The above is an example of the Inference where the Probans is the effect of the Probandum. The following texts cite an example of the Probans in the form of the nature of things :—

TEXTS (1055-1056).

THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY THAT IS DIFFERENTIATED FROM 'MAN'S HORNS' AND OTHER NON-EXISTENT THINGS IS ALSO DIFFERENTIATED FROM PERMANENT THINGS,—JUST AS THE COGNITION, THE LAMP-FLAME, ETC. ARE ;—THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY OF SOUND, ETC. IS NOT A *non-existent thing*.—IN THIS WAY THERE CAN BE THE ASSERTION OF CONCOMITANCE THROUGH DIFFERENCES AS INDICATED.—(1055-1056)

COMMENTARY.

That Specific Individuality which is differentiated from the *non-existent*, because it is not non-existent,—is also differentiated from *Permanent Things*, —as we find in the case of Cognition, Lamp-flame and such things.

The necessary concomitance can be asserted in this way,—without touching upon any *particulars* ; and there would be nothing incongruous in this.

The concomitance shown here is in regard to the Probans 'because it exists' ; [the inference being in the form—'The Specific Individuality of Sounds, etc. is differentiated from Permanent Things, *because it exists*,—like Cognition, Lamp-flame, etc. '].—(1055-1056)

Question :—" If there is concomitance with the Specific Individuality only, then how is there Inference in regard to things partaking of the nature of the 'Universal ?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1057).

THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY ITSELF, WHEN ITS DISTINCTION IS NOT MEANT TO BE EMPHASISED, HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS CONSTITUTING THE 'UNIVERSAL' (OR COMMONALTY) ;—NOTHING ELSE ; AS NOTHING ELSE IS ACCEPTABLE.—(1057).

COMMENTARY.

That same Specific Individuality,—when its distinctive features are not meant to be emphasised,—constitutes the 'Commonalty' ; as has been already explained.

The term '*Sāmanyalakṣaṇa*' means *that which is indicated by the common character*,—not taking into account the distinctive characters.

'*Nothing else*',—in the shape of the 'Universal' as postulated by the other philosophers. As such 'Universal' cannot be acceptable to the Buddhist.

This has been thus declared :—'As it is apprehended through its own form as well as through another, its object has been held to be two-fold' ;—and again—'Inasmuch as it is based upon the Thing—by—itself as differentiated from things not of that form, the Indicative of the absence of diversity has been declared to appertain to the Commonalty'.

For this reason, the concomitance also, of the Inferential Indicative and the Word, is declared to pertain to the Specific Individuality itself.

Thus we conclude that there is no Inferential Indicative in support of the conclusion contrary to ours,—not merely from the fact that no such Indicative is actually perceived,—but because there is non-apprehension of a particular kind.—(1057)

It has been argued above (under *Text*, 938, by *Kumārila*) that—"The difference from the *Variegated Cow* is equally present in the *Black Cow* and in the *Horse*, etc. etc".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1058).

THE DIFFERENCE FROM THE *Variegated Cow* BEING EQUALLY PRESENT IN THE *Black Cow* AND THE HORSE, WHY IS IT THAT THE UNIVERSAL 'COW', AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM THE *Horse*, SUBSISTS IN THAT ?—(1058)

COMMENTARY.

It behoves you to say—when the *Horse* is equally different from the *Variegated Cow* and the *Black Cow*,—how it is that the Universal 'Cow', as differentiated from the *Horse*, subsists in the Variegated and other *Cows*, and not in the *Horse* ?—(1058)

The reply to this may be as follows :—"What is there to be said here ? It is clear that it is only the Variegated and other *Cows*—and not the *Horse*—that are capable of manifesting the Universal 'Cow'; hence the said Universal subsists in the *Cows*, not in other things. Nor will it be right to urge the question—'why the Variegated and other *Cows* alone have the capacity to manifest the said Universal'. Because such restriction is due to the very nature of things; and there can be no complaint against the nature of things; as all such restrictions are due to the series of causes that have brought about the things."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1059).

IF IT BE HELD THAT 'THAT ALONE HAS THE CAPACITY TO MANIFEST IT' —THEN, EVEN THOUGH THE SUBSEQUENT DETERMINATE JUDGMENT IS THE SAME, THAT ALONE HAS THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE IT, AND NOT THE *Horse*.—(1059)

COMMENTARY.

'*Manifest it*'—i.e. the particular Universal 'Cow'.

'*That alone*',—i.e. the Variegated and other *Cows*, not the *Horse*.

If that be so, then, even when there is diversity, and there is no Commonalty, the variegated and other *Cows* alone,—not the *Horse*—would have the capacity to bring about the determinate judgment; even though this judgment would be the same. This view of ours also would not be incompatible.—(1059)

Question :—"What is the upshot of all this ?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1060).

THUS THEN, IN WHATEVER THING THE SAID DETERMINATE JUDGMENT IS PRESENT,—TO THAT THE 'EXCLUSION OF THE NON-COW' BECOMES APPLICABLE,—EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE UNIVERSAL 'COW'.—(1060)

COMMENTARY.

In whatever thing—Variegated Cow, etc.—the said determinate judgment is present—in the form 'this is a *Cow*', 'that is a *Cow*',—to that,—even in the absence of the Universal 'Cow', as a positive entity,—the 'exclusion of the *non-Cow*',—in the form of the *Reflection*—becomes applied.—(1060)

It has been argued above (under *Text*, 939, by *Kumārila*) that—"The *Exclusion of the non-Cow* is not apprehended, at first, by the Sense-organs, etc etc".

The following *Texts* show that this statement is not admissible :—

TEXTS (1061-1062).

THAT THING WHICH IS 'DIFFERENT FROM THE *non-cow*' IS CERTAINLY APPREHENDED BY THE SENSE-ORGANS; THE REFLECTION ALSO WHICH IS SUPERIMPOSED UPON IT IS APPREHENDED BY ITS OWN COGNITION. IT IS ON NOTICING THIS THAT PEOPLE USE THE WORD; THE RECOGNITION OF ITS RELATION ALSO BECOMES CLEARLY EXPLAINED ON THE SAME BASIS.—(1061-1062)

COMMENTARY.

The *Apoha* in the shape of the 'Specific Individuality' is apprehended through the sense-organs themselves.

As for the *Apoha* in the form of the Reflection of what is denoted by the Word, it is really of the nature of Cognition itself, and as such vouched for directly by its own cognition (it being self-cognised).

The particle ' *cha* ' is meant to include the *Apohas* not directly mentioned. So that the *Apoha* in the form of Absolute Negation also is apprehended by implication; as has been shown under the *Text* 1014, by the words ' the nature of one is not the nature of the other '.

Thus it is on noticing the *Apoha* in the form of ' Specific Individuality ' and the rest, that people come to use words,—not on noticing a positive entity in the shape of the Universal; because no such Universal exists and because no such Universal figures in any cognition. And that through perceiving which people use the words must also be the basis upon which rests the relations of those words,—not on any other basis; if it did, it would lead to absurdity.—(1061-1062)

It has been argued above (under *Text* 941, by *Kumārila*)—" How could the fact of anything being denoted by the word ' non-cow ' be cognised ? "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1063).

WHEN, IN REGARD TO ANYTHING, THERE IS NO SUCH DETERMINATE JUDGMENT, THE FACT OF ITS BEING DENOTED BY THE WORD ' NON-COW ' BECOMES CLEARLY PERCEIVED.—(1063)

It has been argued above (under *Texts*, 943-944, by *Kumārila*) that—" It is only the well-established non-Cow that could be *excluded*, and it is of the nature of the *negation of the Cow*, etc. etc. ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1063–1065).

THE *Cow* AND THE *Non-cow* ARE BOTH WELL-ESTABLISHED,—AS THERE ARE DISTINCT DETERMINATE JUDGMENTS IN REGARD TO BOTH; IT IS ONLY THE WORD THAT IS NOT WELL-ESTABLISHED; AND HENCE IT IS APPLIED ACCORDING TO THE SPEAKER'S WHIM.—AS A MATTER OF FACT, A DISTINCT THING DOES NOT NEED FOR ITS APPREHENSION, THE APPREHENSION OF ANOTHER THING; HENCE THERE IS NO ROOM HERE FOR THE CHARGE OF ' MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE '.—(1063–1065)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, things like the Cow, by themselves, bring about distinct determinate judgments regarding themselves, and as such, are well

known in their distinct forms. For the purpose of speaking of them, people make use of words, which are not well known, through their whims. Under the circumstances, if the form of a distinct thing required, for its own apprehension, the apprehension of another different thing,—then there might have been mutual interdependence. As a matter of fact, however, the distinct thing is apprehended without the apprehension of another thing; and when it is definitely known as something distinct bringing about a distinct determinate judgment,—and then the Convention is made in the form 'this is a *Cow*', 'that is a *Cow*' and so forth,—according to the man's wish,—how then, can there be any mutual interdependence ?

'*Vittau*'—stands for '*vittyartham*', *for the apprehension*.—(1064-1065)

It has been argued (under *Text* 945, by *Kumārila*), that—"There can be no relationship *of Container and Contained, etc.* between two negations".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1066-1067).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, VERBAL COGNITION, NOT TAKING COGNIZANCE OF ANY EXTERNAL OBJECT, APPREHENDS ITS OWN MARK AS SOMETHING EXTERNAL, ON ACCOUNT OF STRONG ILLUSION. —THIS IS ALL THAT IS DONE BY WORDS ; AND WORDS DO NOT EVEN TOUCH THE OBJECT ; NOR IS ANY OBJECT DENOTED AS QUALIFIED BY *Apoha*.—(1066-1067).

COMMENTARY.

In reality, no object qualified by *Apoha* is denoted by words. Because it has already been explained that no object is touched by Words anywhere, for the simple reason that the necessary conditions are absent. For example, Verbal Cognition, even though not pertaining to any external object, actually appears as apprehending its own *mark*—i.e. form—as something external; and it does not really touch the form of the object; because its apprehension is not in accordance with the real state of things.—(1066-1067)

Question :—"If that is so, then, why has the Teacher declared that 'words like *Blue-Lotus* express things qualified by the *exclusion of other things* ?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1068).

AS FOR THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE AUTHOR OF THE *Lakṣaṇa*—THAT 'WORDS EXPRESS THINGS QUALIFIED BY THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS', WHAT IT MEANS IS AS FOLLOWS.—(1068)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—"What does it mean ?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (1069-1070).

THOSE THINGS THAT ARE QUALIFIED BY THE *Exclusion of other things*,—EITHER AS THEIR CAUSE OR THEIR INSTRUMENTS—ARE DEFINITELY COGNISED AS NOT MIXED UP WITH THINGS OF OTHER KINDS. THE WORD EXPRESSES THESE THINGS. AND, BECAUSE IT BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION APPREHENDING THOSE THINGS, THERE IS DENIAL OF THE 'UNIVERSAL' AND SUCH OTHER COMMONALTIES.—(1069-1070)

COMMENTARY.

Things are of two kinds—*external* and *imposed upon the Cognition*; in regard to the external thing, there is no denotation by words; and it is only on account of words bringing about the conceptual content pertaining to them that it is said, figuratively, that 'the word denotes things'; and the purpose served by such figurative expression is the denial of the denotation of the Universal. Such is the meaning of the Texts as a whole.

The meaning of the words is explained:—'*By the exclusion of other things*';—i.e. by differentiation from other things;—this differentiation being either the Cause or the Instrument,—the *Tree* and other things are definitely Cognised as qualified; that is they are definitely differentiated from other things. This shows that in the compound '*arthāntaranivṛtti-vishiṣṭān*', the term '*nivṛtti*' is to be construed as with the Instrumental Ending.

'*Dhvāna*' is *Word*.—(1069-1070)

As regards the thing imposed upon the Cognition, that is denoted by words primarily and directly.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1071).

THOSE THINGS HOWEVER WHICH APPEAR IN THE COGNITION—THESE INTERNAL (SUBJECTIVE) THINGS THE WORD DENOTES DIRECTLY; AND THE FACT OF THESE THINGS BEING QUALIFIED BY 'EXCLUSION' HAS JUST BEEN EXPLAINED.—(1071)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ayam*'—stands for the *word*.

Question:—"How can the character of being qualified by the *exclusion of other things* be attached to them?"

Answer:—'*The fact, etc. etc.*'

'*Just*'—that is, under *Text* 1069, it has been explained that things imposed upon the Cognition are excluded (or differentiated) from other things.—(1071)

Objection:—"If no objective factor is expressed by the word, then how is it that the Teacher has declared that it is only a certain part of the Thing that is apprehended by the 'exclusion of other things'?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1072).

WHEN IT IS SAID THAT 'A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE THING IS APPREHENDED BY THE *Exclusion of other Things*',—IT IS THE SAID REFLECTION THAT IS MEANT.—(1072)

COMMENTARY.

Objection:—"*Reflection* being a property of the Cognition, how can it be a 'portion of the object'?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1073).

IT IS SPOKEN OF AS A PORTION OF THE OBJECT, BECAUSE IT PROCEEDS ON THE BASIS OF THE PERCEPTION OF THE OBJECT AS 'EXCLUDED FROM OTHER THINGS', AND BECAUSE IT IS SUPERIMPOSED UPON THE OBJECT.—(1073)

COMMENTARY.

Because it comes about through the perception of the object 'excluded from other things',—and because it is superimposed upon *it*—i.e. upon the Object excluded from other things—by deluded persons,—therefore that same Reflection is figuratively spoken of as 'part of the object'.—(1073)

In the following *Text* the author applies the Instrumental ending in the compound '*arthāntaraparāvṛttyā*' in the case in question:—

TEXT (1074).

AS BEFORE, THE INSTRUMENTAL ENDING MAY SIGNIFY EITHER THE *Cause* OR THE *Instrument*. OR IT MAY SIGNIFY THAT IT IS 'IN THAT FORM'.—IF THE THING WERE NOT DIFFERENTIATED FROM UNLIKE THINGS, THEN IT COULD NOT BE SO.—(1074)

COMMENTARY.

'*As before*';—i.e. just as under Texts 1068–1070,—where it is said that 'the Word expresses things as qualified by the exclusion of other things',—so the same may be applied here also.—Or in all cases, the Instrumental Ending may be taken as signifying the idea of being 'in that form';—this is what is mentioned by the words '*tēna vātmanā*'.

Question :—" The *exclusion of other things* is a property belonging to the *Object* ; as such, how can it be either the *Cause* or the *Instrument* of the apprehension of the Reflection ? "

Answer :—' *If the thing, etc. etc.* '—That is, if the Thing were not excluded (and differentiated) from unlike things, then, in the form of its Reflection, it could not be apprehended as something excluded from unlike things. That is why the *exclusion from other things* is to be regarded as the Cause and the Instrument.—(1074)

It has been argued above (under *Text*, 949, by *Kumārila*) that—" one kind of qualification cannot bring about the cognition of a different kind, etc. etc. ".—This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (1075–1077).

WHAT IS MEANT BY (THE COW) BEING 'DIFFERENT' IS ONLY THE 'EXCLUSION OF THE NON-COW'; AND THIS *exclusion* IS OF THE NATURE OF THAT SAME DIFFERENCE.—EVEN WHEN THE DIFFERENCE HAS BEEN ASSERTED, THE THING ITSELF DOES NOT ENTIRELY DISAPPEAR. THUS EVEN WHEN IT HAS THE NATURE OF THE QUALIFICATION, THE COGNITION OF THE THING DOES NOT CEASE. EVEN WHEN THERE IS NON-DIFFERENCE, THE QUALIFICATION IS THERE AS A CREATION OF FANCY. THAT CHARACTER, HAVING BEEN WITHDRAWN THEREFROM, HAS BEEN PLACED THERE AS IF DIFFERENT; WHEREBY IT BECOMES ITS QUALIFICATION, LIKE THE STICK AND OTHER THINGS. —(1075–1077)

COMMENTARY.

If the ' exclusion of other things ' were meant to be something *positive* qualifying the Thing, then all the objections urged would be applicable. As a matter of fact, however, the ' exclusion of other things ' which is held to be the qualification is in the form of *the thing itself* ; so that the notion of the *qualified* is naturally in accord with that of the qualification. For instance, when one speaks of the ' exclusion ' of the Cow ' from the non-Cow ', this ' exclusion ' is only of the nature of the ' difference of the Cow from the Horse and other things ',—not anything else.—Hence, even though the *exclusion*, of the Cow, from the *non-Cow*, is mentioned in the negative form, when all that is meant is the negation of other things,—yet in reality, it forms the very essence of the *Cow* itself,—just like the ' difference ' ; that is, ' difference ' is not anything different from the *different thing*,—it is that same ; otherwise that thing could not figure in the ' difference ' at all.

' *Tat* '—i.e. thus—*even when the ' exclusion of others ' is of the nature of the qualification*, the idea of the ' Thing ' itself does appear in regard to what is qualified by that qualification.

It might be argued as follows :—" In ordinary life the *qualification* is known to be something different from the *qualified*, as the *stick* of the *Man*

(stick-holder); and 'Exclusion' is (as you say) not different from the Thing; how then can this Exclusion be the qualification of the Thing ?"

The answer is—'*Even when there is non-difference, etc. etc.*'.—In reality, nothing can be *qualified* by anything; because what does not accord any help cannot be a *qualification*;—if the according of help be admitted, then, in cases where the Cause may not exist at the time of the coming about of the effect, there could be no relation of *qualification and qualified* between the two things not existing at the same time;—while in the case of both existing at the same time, as the things would be already there in their accomplished forms, there would be no mutual help; and hence there could be no relation of *qualification and qualified.* Consequently, in the case of all things, what happens is that, though each of them stands separately, on its own footing, like so many iron-bars,—yet there is a jumbling up of them as a creation of fancy.

Thus then, though, in reality, there is no difference between the 'Exclusion' and that wherein the Exclusion subsists, yet, on the basis of an imaginary difference, there would be the relation of *qualification and qualified* between them.—(1075–1077)

It has been argued above (under *Text* 955, by *Kumārila*) that—"when Individuals, not being denoted, cannot be 'excluded', then what would be 'excluded' would be the Universal".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1078-1079).

DISCRIMINATORS OF TRUTH DECLARE THAT WHAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD IS MERE 'REFLECTION'. PEOPLE, NOT KNOWING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS 'PERCEIVED' AND WHAT IS 'FANCIED' REGARD IT TO BE SOMETHING 'EXTERNAL'.—AS THAT IS WHAT IS APPREHENDED (BY WORDS), INDIVIDUALS *are* DENOTED BY WORDS.—IN REALITY HOWEVER THERE IS NOTHING THAT IS DENOTED BY WORDS,—AS HAS BEEN PROVED ALREADY.—(1078-1079)

COMMENTARY.

The reason 'because Individuals are not denoted' is *not-admitted*. Because the 'non-denotability' of words that we have asserted is only in view of the real aspect of things, not in regard to the illusory aspect. Under the illusory aspect, it is only Individuals that are denoted,—as is happily accepted by people wanting in true insight, and is well known; so that the Reason adduced is *not-admitted.*

What is '*perceived*' is the *external* thing, in the shape of Specific Individuality;—what is '*fancied*',—imaginary—is the 'Reflection' that figures in Determinate Conception.

If the Reason adduced by you is the *real* 'non-denotability of Individuals',—then we also do not admit of any *real* 'exclusion' of Individuals; so that in that case your argument proves only what is already admitted by us, and is, as such, superfluous, futile.—This is what is shown by the sentence—'*In reality, etc. etc.*'.—(1078-1079)

The following *Text* reasserts the fact of the Opponent's Reason being 'not-admitted':—

TEXT (1080).

THUS, INDIVIDUALS BEING DENOTED BY WORDS, THEY ARE ALSO CAPABLE OF BEING 'EXCLUDED'. AS REGARDS THE UNIVERSAL, THERE CAN BE NO 'EXCLUSION'. EVEN IF THERE WERE 'EXCLUSION' OF IT, IT COULD NOT HAVE THE CHARACTER OF THE 'ENTITY'.—(1080)

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted (under 955) that—"in that case what would be *excluded* would be the Universal; and as subject to Exclusion, this Universal would be an entity";—and the author now shows that the Reason—'Because Individualities cannot be excluded' is 'not admitted' and it is also 'Inconclusive'—by the words '*As regards the Universal, etc. etc.*'—there can be no exclusion of it; because it has been shown that there can be *exclusion* of Individuals only.

'*Even if there were, etc.*'—that is to say, if the said Reason is put forward in support of the conclusion contrary to the Opponent's, there would be nothing to set aside such a conclusion.—(1080)

It has been argued (under *Text* 956, by *Kumārila*) that—"Negation cannot be subject to *exclusion*, etc. etc".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1081).

NEGATION IS NOT 'EXCLUDED' (DENIED) IN THE WORDS 'NEGATION IS NOT NEGATION'; IT IS HOWEVER CLEARLY 'EXCLUDED' (DENIED) IN SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS 'THE ENTITY IS NOT OF THE NATURE OF NEGATION'.—(1081)

COMMENTARY.

Negation is not 'excluded' in the words 'Negation is not Negation',—by virtue of which it would abandon its negative character (as urged by *Kumārila*). But, what is an *Entity* has the *positive* character, and as such remains distinct from the *Negative*; hence by implication, the Negation becomes subject to 'Exclusion'; this is what is meant by us.—(1081)

This same idea is further clarified in the following—

TEXT (1082).

WHEN ONE THING IS NOT OF THE NATURE OF ANOTHER, IT IS CALLED ITS '*Apoha*' (EXCLUSION, NEGATION), AND THE ENTITY IS NOT OF THE NATURE OF NEGATION. BUT EVEN THOUGH THERE IS '*Apoha*' OF NEGATION, IT DOES NOT ACQUIRE THE CHARACTER OF THE POSITIVE ENTITY.—(1082)

COMMENTARY.

Though in this way, there is *Apoha* of Negation, yet it does not become a positive entity.—(1082)

The author is going to cite an example which is accepted by both parties, and through that, is going to make it clear how the Reason of the Opponent is ' Inconclusive ' :—

TEXT (1083).

EVEN THOUGH IT IS URGED THAT 'THINGS ARE NOT PRODUCED BY PRIMORDIAL MATTER OR GOD AND SO FORTH',—THE *character of being produced by Primordial Matter, God and so forth* DOES NOT BECOME A POSITIVE ENTITY.—(1083)

COMMENTARY.

You, *Mīmāmsakas,* also do not admit the fact of Things having been created by Primordial Matter, or God, or Time and other Causes ; but the negation (denial) of this fact does not make it a positive entity ;—in the same manner, even though there is *Apoha* (negation, denial) of Negation, yet that does not make the Negation a positive entity. Consequently, the Reason adduced by you is *Inconclusive.*—(1083)

It has been argued (under *Text* 959, by *Kumārila*) that—" there would be a great calamity in that the *Non-existent* would become a positive entity ".

The following *Text* shows that this also becomes answered by the above pointing out of the *Inconclusive* character of the Opponent's Reason :—

TEXT (1084).

THUS THEN THERE IS NO SUCH CALAMITY AS THAT OF THE NON-EXISTENT BECOMING A POSITIVE ENTITY. IN FACT, EVEN ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEGATION, THE *existence* REMAINS THERE (IN THE ENTITY),—AND THE NON-EXISTENCE (OF THE NEGATION) BECOMES ESTABLISHED THEREBY.—(1084)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued (under the same *Text* 959) that—" if Non-existence is not established, there can be no *Existence* ; nor can *Non-existence*

be established ".—The answer to this is that—even on the establishment of the Negation, in the above manner, the *existence* of the Positive Entity does become established; as that rests upon its own nature. And the above-mentioned establishment of Negation also constitutes its *non-existence.*

The answer to this argument has been made out of its turn (along with that to *Kumārila's* argument put forward under 955 et seq.), because the same answer is applicable to both.—(1084)

The Author now reverts to the order of sequence of the Opponent's arguments, and takes up that put forward in Text 957, to the effect that—" If the Negation of the Negation is different in character from the Negation itself, then it becomes a positive entity ".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1085).

THE *Cow*, WHICH IS 'THE NEGATION OF THE NON-COW' IS HELD TO BE A POSITIVE ENTITY, AND OF A CHARACTER DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE NON-COW; BUT BY THIS THE *Non-cow* DOES NOT BECOME THE *Cow*, FOR ME.—(1085)

COMMENTARY.

That it would become a positive entity does not indicate an undesirable contingency for us; as it is quite agreeable to us. Because the Cow is actually held by us to be a positive entity quite different in character from the 'Non-cow' in the shape of the Horse and other animals,—it is not held to be of the nature of Negation. So that it would be a positive entity. And as the difference of the *Cow* from the *Non-cow* is what is admitted by us, there is no such contingency as that of the *Non-cow* becoming the *Cow.*—(1085)

It has been argued (under *Text* 960, by *Kumārila*) that—" Impressions cannot pertain to the Non-entity ".—The following Texts show that this is both 'Not-admitted' and 'Inconclusive':—

TEXTS (1086-1087).

EVEN IN REGARD TO NON-ENTITIES, THERE CAN BE IMPRESSIONS, CREATED ONLY BY THE MIND (COGNITIONS),—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THINGS OF VARIOUS KINDS CREATED BY IMAGINATION. THIS DIVERSITY AMONG *Apohas*, AS ALSO THEIR POSITIVE CHARACTER, WOULD BE ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF THE DIVERSITY AMONG IMPRESSIONS; JUST AS IN THE CASE OF CREATIONS OF IMAGINATION.—(1086-1087)

COMMENTARY.

That the Mind (Cognition) does not operate upon non-entities cannot be admitted. Because, the Mind (Cognition) does operate through the

imposing of the form of things created by mere imagination ; and the Mind (Cognition) thus does create Impressions in the subsequent mind, which tends to bring about future homogeneous conceptual contents. Because, again, through the development of the 'Chain', it may get at an awakening cognition, which brings about a similar Mind (Cognition). In the same manner, in the case of *Apohas,* there would be difference among themselves and also the positive character, due to the influence of assumptions and imagination.

Thus the Reason adduced by *Kumārila* is 'inconclusive'.

The meaning of the words of the Text is clear ; hence we have not explained them in detail.—(1086-1087)

It has been argued (under 961, by *Kumārila*) that—" you cannot secure diversity among words also, on the basis of Impressions ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1088).

JUST AS WE HAVE EXPLAINED THE FACT OF 'THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS' BEING DENOTED BY WORDS,—EXACTLY IN THE SAME MANNER SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHER *words*' ALSO.—(1088)

COMMENTARY.

'*Just as, etc. etc.*' :—i.e. as being in the form of Reflection ; of which the difference from other Reflections is clearly perceived.

Hence what has been discussed in detail (by the Opponent) is entirely irrelevant.—Such is the sense of the *Text*.—(1088)

It has been argued (under Text 964, by *Kumārila*) that—" There could be no relation of *Denoter and Denoted* between two *Apohas* ".—The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1089).

INASMUCH AS THE *Apohas* ARE APPREHENDED AS 'THINGS', THEY CANNOT BE REGARDED AS NON-ENTITIES ; THIS IS WELL KNOWN AND ADMITTED AS PERTAINING TO THE *Illusory* ASPECT OF THINGS. AS REGARDS THE *Real* ASPECT, WHAT THE OPPONENT SEEKS TO PROVE IS ACCEPTED BY US ALREADY.—(1089)

COMMENTARY.

If by the reason adduced—" *Because they are non-entities* "—it is meant to be a general statement of fact, then that is *not admitted* ; because the two *Apohas* in question—which are in the form of *Reflections*—one of which is the *denoter* and the other is the *denoted*,—are actually recognised by deluded

persons as *external things*; and hence they are endowed with *illusory reality.*—(1089)

If, on the other hand, the Reason adduced pertains to the Real Character of 'Entity',—then the argument is superfluous. Because in fact, we do not accept anything as being the *denoter* or *denoted, in reality.*—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1090).

In reality, THERE CAN BE NOTHING THAT CAN BE EITHER *denoter* OR *denoted*,—AS ALL THINGS BEING IN PERPETUAL FLUX, NO CONCOMITANCE IS POSSIBLE.—(1090)

COMMENTARY.

'*Because no concomitance is possible*';—that is to say, the Specific Individuality cannot be concomitant with—present at the time of—the making of the Convention and that of the using of the word.—(1090)

The following might be urged by the other party:—"We are not denying the *real* relation of *Denoted and Denoter*; what we are denying is the *illusory* relation of *Denoted and Denoter* which is based upon the *real* fact of the two *Apohas* being non-entities; so that our Reason is not *not-admitted*; nor is our conclusion open to the defect of being superfluous".

The following *Texts* proceed to show that, if both are regarded to be illusory and real, then the two objections do become applicable:—

TEXTS (1091-1092).

IF IT IS THE *illusory* RELATION OF DENOTER AND DENOTED THAT IS DENIED, ON THE BASIS OF THE *real* FACT OF THE TWO *Exclusions* BEING NON-ENTITIES,—EVEN SO, 'FALSITY' BECOMES UNAVOIDABLE; IN VIEW OF SUCH WORDS AND THINGS DENOTED BY THEM AS ARE THE CREATION OF IMAGINATION.—(1091-1092)

COMMENTARY.

Under the circumstances, the Reason would be Inconclusive; as in the case of such creatures of imagination as *Mahāshvētā* and the like, and also words denoting these,—even though they are non-entities *in reality*, yet the *illusory* Relation of Denoter and Denoted is actually present.—(1091-1092)

The following might be urged by the other party:—"In the case of things like *Mahāshvētā*, the denoted thing, in the shape of the Universal, is

real,—and also the word denoting them; and hence their case does not falsify our Premiss."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1093).

As a matter of fact, there is no 'Universal' (Commonalty) in the case of the things in question, which could be denoted; nor is there any Universal word denotative of that Universal; Nor does the denotative character belong to the Word, as Specific Individualities are all in perpetual flux.—(1093)

COMMENTARY.

In course of our examination of the 'Universal', we have rejected, in great detail, the whole conception of the 'Universal'; hence the assertion that the 'Universal' is the *denoted and denoter* in the case in question makes the Reason 'false' (Inconclusive).

'*Tasya*'—of the *Universal.*

The term 'Universal' has to be taken as understood after 'denotative' which connects it with the context.

It might be argued that—"Even though there is no real entity denoted in the case, yet the *denotative* certainly is there in the shape of the Specific Individuality of the word '*Mahāshvētā*,' *etc.*".

The answer to this is—'*Nor does the denotative, etc. etc.*';—that is, it has been shown that the 'Perpetual Flux' embraces all things; hence the Specific Individuality of words cannot be denotative, because as it is momentary, it could not form the subject of any Convention; also because it could not be concomitant with the time of usage; as explained before.—(1093)

The following *Text* sums up the argument:—

TEXT (1094).

Hence both of these should be held to consist in the illusory 'Reflection' etc.—Thus in view of these, the 'falsity' remains unshaken.—(1094)

COMMENTARY.

'*Both*'—i.e. the *denoted* thing as well as the *denotative* Word.

'*Reflection, etc.*'—The '*etcetera*' is meant to show that even under the view that *Ideas* (Cognitions) are *formless,* it would be necessary to admit the existence, within the Idea itself, of another specific Idea in the form of the conception of 'object' where there is no real object.

'*In view of these*'—i.e. things created by imagination.

'*Tat*' stands for '*tasmāt*', 'therefore', 'thus'. Or it may mean 'of that'—i.e. of the Reason,—the 'falsity' remains unshaken.—(1094)

It has been argued (under *Text* 966, by *Kumārila*) that—"one for whom there is nothing positive denoted by words,—for him there can be no negation either".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1095-1096).

FOR THE MAN BY WHOM THE DENOTATION OF WORDS IS NOT ADMITTED TO BE ANYTHING POSITIVE, THE MIND (COGNITION) REFLECTING THE THING IS WHAT IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE WORD, AND THIS COGNITION ULTIMATELY BRINGS ABOUT THE IDEA OF THE THING. WHEN WORDS EXPRESS THEIR MEANINGS, THERE IS, BY IMPLICATION, THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS; AND THROUGH THE PRESENCE OF THIS THERE IS *negation* ALSO, AS PRECEDED BY THE APPREHENSION OF THE *positive* THING.—(1095–1096).

COMMENTARY.

It is not that we absolutely do not admit the fact of words denoting positive things ;—by virtue of which you have urged the undesirable contingency against us. As a matter of fact, it is admitted by us that the word produces the 'mental condition' (Cognition) which ultimately provides the idea of the Thing; so that in our opinion also what is denoted by the word is a positive entity which is illusory in character. In reality however, there is nothing that is denoted by words ; hence it is only the *real* positive character of things that is denied by us ;—so that the *illusory* positive character of the thing denoted by words being accepted by us,—whenever there is anything positive denoted by the word,—the *negation* of other things becomes apprehended by implication ; and hence it is quite possible to have this negation as preceded by the apprehension of the positive thing.—(1095-1096)

The following might be urged by the other party :—"If it is admitted that the Word does denote positive entities, then, how is it that in the

Hētumukha, the *Lakṣaṇakāra* has spoken of the 'impossibility of the positive' ?"

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1097).

THE 'IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE POSITIVE' HAS BEEN AVERRED ON THE GROUND THAT SUCH THINGS AS THE 'UNIVERSAL' AND THE LIKE CANNOT FORM THE SUBJECT OF WORDS AND DETERMINATE CONCEPTIONS.—(1097)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as there are no real 'denoted things' or 'denotative words' in the shape of the 'Universal' and the like,—there can be no *real* subject for Words and Determinate Conceptions,—it has been asserted by the great Teacher,—in view of the *real* state of things,—that 'there is impossibility of the Positive'; hence there is no contradiction at all.—(1097)

It has been argued (under *Texts* 967, etc., by *Kumārila*) that—"If it is held that it is mere *Apoha* that is denoted, etc. etc.".—The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1098).

FROM THE TERM 'BLUE-LOTUS', ONLY ONE THING IS COGNISED,—AND THAT IS THE REFLECTION EXCLUDED (DIFFERENTIATED) FROM THE 'NON-BLUE' AND THE 'NON-LOTUS'.—(1098)

COMMENTARY.

What the term 'Blue-lotus' expresses is, not mere *negation*, but—the single Reflection of the object—as excluded from the 'non-blue' and the 'non-lotus',—partaking of the nature of both. Consequently, in the case of words like 'Blue-lotus', there certainly is the denotation of things of mixed character,—which has to be admitted on the strength of actual cognitions appearing in that form ; and on the basis of this the necessary co-ordination becomes quite possible.—(1098)

It has been argued (under *Text* 972, by *Kumārila*) that—"If it be asserted that what is denoted is the thing endowed with the *Apoha*, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1099–1101).

WE DO NOT HOLD THAT WHAT THE WORD DENOTES IS THE THING ENDOWED WITH THE 'EXCLUSION (*Apoha*) OF OTHER THINGS'; BECAUSE FOR US, THERE IS NO 'EXCLUSION' OTHER THAN THE THING EXCLUDED FROM SOMETHING ELSE. HENCE THE OBJECTION THAT 'IT IS DEPENDENT UPON SOMETHING ELSE' IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 'DENOTATION OF WORDS' AS HONESTLY EXPLAINED,—IN THE WAY THAT IT IS TO THE THEORY OF THE 'UNIVERSAL' (BEING DENOTED BY WORDS). BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE *Relation of qualification and qualified* AND 'CO-ORDINATION'. CONSEQUENTLY THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN THE THEORY THAT IT IS *Apoha* THAT IS DENOTED BY WORDS.—(1099–1101)

COMMENTARY.

If *exclusion* were something entirely different from the *Thing excluded,* then there would be the possibility of the incongruity that has been urged against the view that 'what is denoted is the Thing as endowed with the *Apoha*'. As a matter of fact however, for us, *exclusion* is not something different from the *Thing excluded* from others;—in fact, it is the *excluded thing* itself that is spoken of as 'exclusion', when what is meant to be stressed is the mere negation of other things.—Consequently, the incongruity that has been urged against the Denotation of Universals,—in the form that, if the Universal is what is primarily denoted by words, the denotation of the Thing endowed with that Universal would be dependent upon that (Universal), and consequently there being no indication of the varieties of the said Thing, there is no possibility of co-ordination or any other relationship with it,—does not apply to the theory of *Apoha,* as there is no denotation (under this theory) of anything equipped with the 'Exclusion of other things', as something different.

This is what is meant by the words '*Hence the objection, etc. etc.*'.

'*Tat*'—'*tasmāt*'—*Hence.*

'*Avadātam, etc. etc.*'—i.e. to the 'denotation of words' as expounded by the Teacher *Diṅnāga,* with the purest conviction.

The grounds for this inapplicability are next stated—'*Because there is no difference, etc. etc.*'.—That is, there the *Denotation of words*—in the shape of the 'Exclusion of other things'—is not different from,—not anything other than—*that which is excluded from others.*

'*Qualification and qualified, etc. etc.*'.—This is easily understood.—(1099–1101)

The following *Texts* show how co-ordination, etc. is not incompatible:—

TEXTS (1102–1104).

WHEN THE WORD ‘ BLUE ’ IS UTTERED ALONE, THE PARTICULAR ‘ REFLECTION ’ THAT APPEARS IS ONE THAT SCINTILLATES THROUGH ALL BLUE THINGS SUCH AS THE CUCKOO, THE LOTUS, THE BLUE BEE AND THE LIKE.—WHEN THE WORD ‘ LOTUS ’ IS ADDED TO IT, THEN THE CUCKOO, THE COLLYRIUM AND OTHER BLUE THINGS BECOME ‘ EXCLUDED ’, AND THE RESULTANT REFLECTION IS ONE THAT IS FURTHER PARTICULARISED AND BECOMES DEFINITELY APPLIED TO ONE BLUE THING ONLY.—THUS THE NECESSARY CO-ORDINATION IS NOT RENDERED IMPOSSIBLE. ALL THIS EXPLANATION IS ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE UNDER THE THEORY OF THE OTHER PARTY. (1102–1104)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, when the word ‘ blue ’ is pronounced, there appears the Conceptual Reflection (the Image) of a doubtful form, inasmuch as it serves to exclude the ‘ yellow ’ and other colours and things having these colours, and envisages all blue things, such as the Blue Bee, the Cuckoo, the Collyrium and so forth.—When the word ‘ lotus ’ is added (to the word ‘ blue ’), the same Reflection becomes apprehended as differentiated from the Cuckoo and the rest, and particularly restricted to the thing *excluded from the Non-lotus.* Thus in relation to the said Conceptual Reflection, there is a mutual relation of *differentiation and differentiated* between the two words ‘ blue ’ and ‘ lotus ’ ; and hence there is nothing incongruous in their being related to each other as *qualification* and *qualified.*

Or (another explanation possible is that) both the words together express the thing in the form of a single Reflected Image excluded from the ‘ non-blue ’ and the ‘ non-lotus ’ ; so that both pertaining to the same thing, there is co-ordination between them.

Such is the meaning of the *Texts* as a whole. The meaning of the words is as follows :—‘ *Scintillating* ’,—i.e. not restricted to any particular thing, doubtful.—The word ‘ *pika* ’ here stands for the *Cuckoo.*—The rest is easy.

It might be argued (by the Opponent) that—“ under our theory also, the co-ordination would be all right ”.

The answer to this is—‘ *All this explanation is, etc. etc.*’ ;—that is, the above-described explanation of ‘ co-ordination ’, etc.—(1102–1104)

Question :—“ Why should it be impossible under our theory ? ”
Answer :—

TEXTS (1105-1106).

BY THE SINGLE WORD, THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY BECOMES EXPRESSED IN ITS ENTIRETY ; AND WHEN THAT HAS BEEN DENOTED, WHY SHOULD THERE BE NON-COGNITION OF OTHER THINGS,—FOR THE SAKE OF WHICH ANOTHER WORD WOULD BE PRONOUNCED,—WHEN, IN REALITY, THE THING HAS BEEN DENOTED IN ITS ENTIRETY ?—IF NOT, THEN IT BECOMES *more than one.*
—(1105-1106)

COMMENTARY.

Under the theory of those who hold that words denote positive entities when the single word ' blue ' expresses the Specific Individuality of the Lotus and other (blue) things,—why should there be any absence of cognition of such other particular things as the Lotus and the Collyrium,—since the *Blue Thing* has been denoted in its entirety ? Because the idea that one and the same thing should be both known and unknown to the same person involves self-contradiction. This is what is pointed out in the text by the words ' *Why should there, etc. etc.*'.—' *Non-Cognition* ' stands for *bad cognition,* i.e. doubtful and wrong cognition.

Thus there being no doubtful or wrong cognition, there can be no desire on the part of the speaker to pronounce any other word, such as ' Lotus ' and the like. This is shown by the words '*for the sake of which, etc. etc.*' :—'*For the sake of which* ',—i.e. for the purpose of removing which non-cognition.

It might be argued that—" when the *Blue* thing has been denoted by the single word ' blue ', it has been denoted only in part, not in its entirety ; hence for the purpose of speaking of other characteristics of the Blue Thing, another word is sought after ".

The answer to this is—' *When in reality, etc. etc.*'. There are no *parts* in any single object, by virtue of which there could be denotation *in part* ; because the *one* (whole) and the *many* (parts) are mutual contradictories, one being the negation of the other ; so that what your explanation does is to establish as many distinct things as there may be parts ; and hence there would be no such concepts as ' one ' and ' many '.—(1105-1106)

The following might be urged by the other party :—" The word ' blue ' does not denote a particular *substance* ; it denotes either the *quality* called ' Blue ' or the Universal ' Blue ' inhering in that quality ; the word ' lotus ' also denotes the Universal ' Lotus ', not any particular substance ; hence, as the two words denote two different things, it is only right that there should be a need for the word ' lotus ' (after the utterance of the word ' blue ')."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1107-1108).

IF THE UNIVERSAL 'BLUE', OR THE QUALITY *Blue*, IS DENOTED BY THE WORD 'BLUE', THEN THE WORD 'LOTUS' (PRONOUNCED WITH THAT WORD) SHOULD DENOTE ANOTHER UNIVERSAL 'LOTUS';—SUCH BEING THE CASE, THERE WOULD BE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO WORDS, JUST AS THERE IS BETWEEN THE WORDS '*Bakula*' (A KIND OF FLOWER) AND '*Utpala*' (LOTUS); SO THAT ANY CO-ORDINATION, ETC. BETWEEN THEM WILL BE ALL THE MORE IMPOSSIBLE.—(1107-1108)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*anyēndīvarajāti*' is to be taken as a *Karmādhāraya*,—'*anyā*' qualifying '*indīvarajātiḥ*'.

'*Vyavasēyā*'—i.e. should be denoted.

'*Utpalashrutēḥ*'—has the Ablative ending.

Thus under this theory co-ordination would be all the more impossible; since, like the words '*bakula*' and '*utpala*', the words 'blue' and 'lotus' would not be applicable to the same thing. There can be no such expression as '*bakulam utpalam*'.—(1107-1108)

The following might be urged by the other party:—"Though the word 'blue' denotes a particular Universal and a particular Quality, yet, through those, it also denotes the substance related to the Blue Quality and the 'Blue' Universal;—similarly the word 'lotus', through the Universal 'Lotus', denotes the substance;—in this way their application to the same thing being possible, there would be co-ordination between them; which would not be possible in the case of the words '*bakula*' and '*utpala*'."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1109-1110).

IF IT IS THE SUBSTANCE RELATED TO THE QUALITY AND THE UNIVERSAL THAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD 'BLUE', THEN THE WORD 'LOTUS' WOULD BE USELESS. AS WHAT IS RELATED TO THE SAID TWO FACTORS (QUALITY AND UNIVERSAL) IS EXACTLY WHAT IS EQUIPPED WITH THE UNIVERSAL 'LOTUS'; AND AS THIS WILL HAVE BEEN ALREADY EXPRESSED BY THE WORD 'BLUE', THE WORD 'LOTUS' WOULD BE USELESS.—(1109-1110)

COMMENTARY.

'*The Quality*'—called 'blue';—the 'Universal'—as the Universal 'blue'; that which is related to these is '*Guṇatajjātisambaddham*'.

'*The word Lotus would be useless*',—as the substance will have been already expressed by the word 'blue'. This is explained by the words—'*As what is related, etc. etc.*';—'the two factors' are the Quality and the Universal.

The following might be urged (by the other party)—"Even though the word 'blue' denotes the substance possessing that quality and belonging to that Universal,—yet, inasmuch as the word 'blue' has been found to be applicable to several substances, the man who hears the word pronounced does not obtain any definite idea of the Lotus, specifically;—as the Cuckoo and other things are also 'blue'; hence, the use of the word 'lotus' becomes useful, in that it serves to dispel the suspicion that other substances might be meant".

This is not right; as this assertion is made because the person making it does not know the subject under consideration. The subject under discussion is that under the theory that words denote positive things, there can be no co-ordination, etc. If then, the word 'lotus' is used only for the dispelling of the said suspicion,—and not for the denoting of a substance,—then, in that case, a positive entity would not form the denotation of the word; as all that the word 'lotus' will have done would be the dispelling of the form wrongly imposed upon it. Then again, it is a self-contradictory statement that is made, when it is asserted that "the word 'blue' denotes the substance *Lotus*" and yet "there is no certainty produced in the mind of the hearer". That cannot form the denotation of a word, in regard to which no certainty is produced. If it did, that would lead to absurdities. Nor again is there any room for suspicion in what has been cognised with certainty; as 'Certain Cognition' and 'Uncertain Cognition' are mutually destructive.

It might be said that—"Even though the words *Blue* and *Lotus* are not applicable to the same thing, yet what are denoted by them—viz. the Quality and the Universal—do subsist in the same substance,—and hence through their denotations, there would be co-ordination between them."

This cannot be right; as it would lead to absurd contingencies. In the manner stated, there would be co-ordination between the words 'Colour' and 'Taste' also; as what are denoted by them—i.e. Colour and Taste—subsist in the same substance, Earth. Further (under the explanation offered) there would be no possibility of the expression 'blue lotus' bringing about the cognition of a single thing; as the two words would be *separately* denoting the Quality and the Universal subsisting in the single substance; and unless the words bring about the cognition of the same thing, there can be no co-ordination between them.—Enough of this!—(1109-1110)

The following might be urged:—"The word 'lotus' does not denote exactly the same thing that is related to the quality *Blue* and the Universal 'Blue'; it denotes something different. Hence the word 'lotus' cannot be useless."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1111).

IF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNIVERSAL 'LOTUS' IS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS RELATED TO THE QUALITY AND UNIVERSAL (BLUE),—THEN THE WORDS 'BLUE' AND 'LOTUS' CANNOT BE CO-SUBSTRATE (CO-ORDINATED).—(1111)

COMMENTARY.

There is a hiatus after the particle '*yadi*' ('if').

'*They cannot be co-substrate*';—i.e. they cannot be co-ordinated.—(1111)

The following might be urged :—"Though the same Substance is denoted by the word 'blue', and also by the word 'Lotus',—yet the word 'blue' denotes the Substance, not as something related to the Universal 'Lotus', but as related to the Quality *Blue* and the Universal 'Blue'; consequently, the word 'Lotus' is used for the purpose of expressing the fact of the substance being related to the Universal 'Lotus'; and as such it cannot be useless."

This argument is raised and answered in the following :—

TEXTS (1112–1114).

IF THE WORD 'BLUE' DOES NOT DENOTE THE SUBSTANCE RELATED TO THE QUALITY AND THE UNIVERSAL (BLUE) AS RELATED TO THE UNIVERSAL 'LOTUS',—THEN THE SUBSTANCE AS RELATED TO THE UNIVERSAL 'LOTUS' SHOULD BE SOMETHING TOTALLY DIFFERENT; AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHAT IS RELATED TO THE UNIVERSAL 'LOTUS' IS THAT SAME SUBSTANCE THAT IS RELATED TO THE OTHER TWO (QUALITY AND UNIVERSAL '*Blue*'); AND THAT SUBSTANCE HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPRESSED, IN ITS ENTIRETY—NOT IN PART,—BY THE WORD 'BLUE',—AND HAS ALSO BEEN APPREHENDED BY THE VERBAL COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THAT WORD ;—SO THAT THE WORD 'LOTUS' WOULD BE ENTIRELY USELESS.—(1112–1114)

COMMENTARY.

If the word 'blue' does not denote the Substance related to the Quality and the Universal 'Blue', as related to the Universal 'Lotus',—then (there is the following incongruity).

The *substance as related to the Universal 'Lotus'* is not something entirely different from the *substance as related to the Quality and Universal 'Blue'*,—on the basis whereof on the denotation of the Substance related to the Quality and Universal 'Blue', there might be no denotation of the Substance as related to the Universal 'Lotus'. As a matter of fact, however, there is

no difference between the correlatives in the two cases ; and hence the two substances must also be the same ; and hence it cannot be right that on the denotation of one there should be no denotation of the other.

Further, even admitting what has been said,—the substance related to the Universal 'Lotus' may be different from that related to the Quality and the Universal 'Blue'; even so the word 'Lotus' would be useless. Because that impartite thing which is related to the Universal 'Lotus' is exactly what is related to the two factors of the Quality and the Universal 'Blue',—it is not anything different from it; and as that thing is impartite, it must have been denoted *in its entirety*, by the word 'blue'; and it would also have figured in the Verbal Cognition—brought about by that word ;—hence what would be left there undenoted in the denoting of which the word 'Lotus' would have its use ?—(1112–1114)

Uddyotakara has argued as follows :—"The assumption (made by the Buddhist) that 'the object being impartite, whenever it is cognised, it is in its entirety, not in part' is not possible ; because the word '*sarva*', ('entire', 'whole'), is applied to things *not-one* (several), while the word '*ēka*' is applicable to the *part*."

Anticipating this argument, the Author provides the following answer to it :—

TEXTS (1115-1116).

IF (IT BE SAID THAT), IN REGARD TO A THING DEVOID OF PLURALITY, THE ASSUMPTION OF THE ALTERNATIVES OF 'ENTIRETY' AND 'SEVERALTY' ('PLURALITY') IS NOT POSSIBLE,—SUCH AN ASSERTION COULD ONLY PROCEED FROM IGNORANCE OF THE MEANING OF THE SENTENCE (USED BY US). WHAT WE MADE CLEAR WAS THAT THE FIRST WORD 'BLUE' ITSELF EXPRESSED ALL THAT HAD TO BE EXPRESSED, AND NO PART OF ITSELF WAS LEFT (UNEXPRESSED).—1115-1116)

COMMENTARY.

'*Devoid of plurality*'—i.e. the thing without parts.

'*The assumption, etc. etc.*',—the assumption of the alternatives—viz.: whether what figures as the object of the cognition is the thing *in its entirety*, or *in parts*.

This assertion proceeds from ignorance of what our statement means. For instance, what is meant by our statement that 'by the very first word 'blue' the thing has been expressed *in its entirety*' is as follows :—What has been expressed is the thing exactly as it stands, and no aspect of it has been left out, for the denoting of which the word 'lotus' would be required ; because the thing has no parts.—Such being our meaning, the argument urged

by *Uddyotakara* is in the nature of *Verbal Casuistry* (attributing a meaning to our statement never intended by us).—(1115-1116)

Thus, just as the word 'lotus' would be useless, so also the use of such words as 'non-eternal' would be useless; or if they were used, they would be only synonyms,—like the words '*taru*' and '*pādapa*' (both of which stand for *tree*).—This is the application of the said reasoning to other cases indicated in the following—

TEXT (1117).

IN THIS SAME WAY, THE UTTERING OF OTHER WORDS ALSO WOULD BE FRUITLESS. IN FACT, THE UTTERANCE OF SUCH WORDS WOULD ONLY MEAN SO MANY SYNONYMS.—(1117)

COMMENTARY.

'*Udīraṇam*'—i.e. use, utterance.

'*Uktau*'—i.e. in the uttering.

This idea has been expressed in the following statement:—'A certain thing having been entirely taken up by a word—or by an idea,—there remains nothing else that could be expressed by another word or Idea; hence these would be synonyms'.—(1117)

The following might be urged:—"Under the theory of the Buddhist also, when a certain thing has been expressed by a word, there could be no doubtful or wrong cognition in regard to other aspects, and hence why should there not be the incongruity of no other words being used?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1118-1119).

FOR US, NO EXTERNAL THING IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORD; NOR IS ANY IDEA OF EXTERNAL THINGS HELD TO PROCEED FROM WORDS,—BY VIRTUE OF WHICH, THE THING IN ITS ENTIRETY HAVING BEEN TAKEN UP BY THESE TWO, ANY SUBSEQUENT WORD WOULD BE A MERE SYNONYM OF THAT WORD.—(1118-1119)

COMMENTARY.

'*These two*'—i.e. the said *word* and the said *Idea*.

'*Subsequent*',—coming later on.—(1118-1119)

Question:—"Why is not the objection regarding the *absence of co-ordination* applicable to the view under which the denotation of words is 'illusory'?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1120-1121).

WHAT IS PRODUCED BY THE WORD, IN DUE COURSE, IS ONLY THE *Reflection*; AND IT IS THROUGH DELUSION THAT THIS APPEARS AS *one* AND AS *external*. THE CO-ORDINATION AND OTHER RELATIONS ARE DUE TO THE REFLECTION. IN REALITY, ALL THESE WORDS ARE HELD TO BE OBJECTLESS.—(1120-1121)

COMMENTARY.

When the word 'blue' is uttered, what it brings about first of all is the conceptual Reflection, excluded (differentiated) from all *non-blue* things, and scintillating over the Lotus and other (blue) things and hence not excluding these latter, and conceived (objectively) in the external form; then when subsequently, the word 'Lotus' is uttered, what it brings about is the conceptual Reflection, excluded from all that is *non-lotus*, and with the form of only one external thing superimposed upon it;—in this way, *in due course*, there is brought about an *illusory* (conjunct) conceptual Reflection, excluded from the 'non-blue' and the 'non-lotus', with the one external form imposed upon it;—and it is in consequence of this that an illusory co-ordination becomes possible.

"Why is it not so, *in reality*?"

Answer:—In reality, all these words are held to be objectless.—(1120-1121)

It has been argued (under *Text* 973, by *Kumārila*) that—"there can be no connection between the *Apoha* and Gender, Number, etc".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1122).

AS FOR THE CONNECTION OF GENDER AND NUMBER, IT IS NOT PRESENT IN INDIVIDUALS ALSO; IN FACT, SUCH CONNECTION IS BASED ENTIRELY UPON CONVENTIONS SET UP BY THE WHIMS OF PEOPLE; IT IS NOTHING REAL.—(1122)

COMMENTARY.

The fact of Gender, Number, etc. belonging to things is not admitted. In fact it is due entirely to Conventions set up at whim.

'*In Individuals also*'—the term 'also' is meant to include the *Apoha*.

The argument may be formulated thus:—When one thing does not follow the presence and absence of another thing, then it cannot belong to it;—e.g. Coolness and Fire;—Gender and Number do not follow the presence and absence of individual things,—hence there is non-perception of the wider term (which implies the non-existence of the narrower).—(1122)

The following *Text* shows that the Reason just adduced cannot be said to be 'not admitted':—

TEXT (1123).

THERE ARE THREE WORDS (DENOTING THE SAME THING)—'*Taṭaḥ*' (MASCULINE) '*Taṭam*' (NEUTER) AND '*Taṭī*' (FEMININE); AND YET ANY ONE THING CANNOT HAVE THREE FORMS; FOR IF IT DID, THEN, ALL COGNITIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE VARIEGATED IN CHARACTER.—(1123)

COMMENTARY.

If Gender really belonged to things, then, on account of the three words—'*taṭaḥ*', '*taṭam*' and '*taṭī*'—in three genders, being applicable to the same thing (Bank of rivers);—the thing would have three forms; and it is not possible for one and the same thing to have the three forms—Masculine, Neuter and Feminine; if it did, it would cease to be *one* thing. If, even in the presence of mutually incompatible properties, things were to be *one*, then the entire universe would become a single thing; and in that case it would all be produced and destroyed at one and the same time.

Then again, on account of all things being expressed, by either one word or by another, as having the three genders, all cognitions relating to them would have to be variegated in character.—(1123)

The following might be urged:—"Even though all things may have three genders, yet the cognitions of things would appear exactly as envisaging that form alone which the speaker may desire to speak of; hence they could not be of variegated character."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1124).

IF THEY WERE DEPENDENT UPON THE SPEAKER'S WHIM, THEN THE COGNITIONS WOULD NOT ENVISAGE THE THINGS AT ALL. UNDER THAT WHIM, THE COGNITIONS SHOULD BE OF ONE FORM, AND YET THE THING IS NOT OF ONE FORM.—(1124)

COMMENTARY.

'*If they, etc.*'—i.e. if the cognitions were dependent upon the whim.

If, through the Speaker's whim, the Cognitions be of one form, then the Cognitions in question could not envisage things of three kinds (as having three Genders); because no single thing has that (mixed) form; and it would thus be as objectless as the visual cognition of sound!

'*Tadvashāt*',—i.e. through the speaker's whim.—(1124)

Some people think that "the three genders in the case of the words cited may be explained as pertaining to the three states of the thing concerned (River-bank),—the three states being those of *destruction, appearance* and *continuance*".

That this also cannot be right is shown in the following—

TEXT (1125).

IF THE APPLICATION OF THE GENDERS WERE BASED UPON THE STATES OF *continuance, appearance and destruction*,—THEN, ALL THE THREE GENDERS WOULD BECOME APPLICABLE TO ALL THINGS.—(1125)

COMMENTARY.

There is a hiatus after '*syāt*' (the conditional clause ending there).

If the '*application*'—regulation—of genders were based upon the states of *continuance* and the rest, then all the three genders would be applicable to all things,—like the River-bank, the Chain and so forth. Because, as in the case of the River-bank, so elsewhere also, all the three states of *continuance* and the rest would be there. Otherwise, there should not be three genders in the case of the three words '*tataḥ*', '*taṭī*' and '*taṭam*' also; as there is no difference between the two cases. Thus the definition proposed becomes *too wide*.—(1125)

The definition is 'too narrow' also, because it is not true in all cases;—this is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1126).

THERE ARE THREE WORDS USED (IN CONNECTION WITH NON-ENTITIES)—'*Abhāvaḥ*' (MASCULINE), '*Nirupākhyam*' (NEUTER) AND '*Tuchchhatā*' (FEMININE); WHAT SORT OF CONNECTION WITH THE STATES OF *continuance*, ETC. COULD BE ASSUMED IN REGARD TO THE NON-ENTITIES (SPOKEN OF BY THESE WORDS)?—(1126)

COMMENTARY.

Even in the case of non-entities,—such as the *Hare's Horn* and the lake,—the states of *continuance*, etc. are not there; and yet in regard to them words of all three genders are applied—in the shape of '*abhāvaḥ*' (Masculine, Non-existent), '*Nirupākhyam*' (Neuter, Featureless) and '*Tuchchhatā*' (Feminine, Insignificant). So that the proposed regulation of genders cannot include such cases; hence it is *too narrow*.—(1126)

TEXTS (1127–1130).

OF THINGS,—'APPEARANCE' IS *Birth*; 'DESTRUCTION' IS *perishing*; AND 'CONTINUANCE' IS *the Thing in its own form*. NOW IN *Birth* THERE IS NO *perishing*; WHY THEN IS IT SPOKEN OF AS '*Utpattiḥ*' (FEMININE)? NOR IS THERE *existence in its own form*; WHY THEN IS IT SPOKEN OF AS '*janma*' (NEUTER)? IN *Destruction* ALSO, THE OTHER TWO STATES ARE NOT THERE; WHY THEN IS IT SPOKEN OF AS '*tirobhāvaḥ*' (MASCULINE), '*nāshaḥ*' (MASCULINE) AND '*tirobhavanam*' (NEUTER)? AS REGARDS *Continuance* ALSO, ON WHAT GROUND IS IT SPOKEN OF AS '*sthitiḥ*' (FEMININE) AND '*svabhāvaḥ*' (MASCULINE)?—IF THE FORM OF THESE IS NOT DIFFERENTIATED, THEN THEY SHOULD ALWAYS BE IN ONE AND THE SAME GENDER.—(1127–1130)

COMMENTARY.

For the following reason, the explanation provided is too narrow.—Because in connection with the same said states of Continuance and the rest, it is found that to each of these, words of all the three genders are applied. For instance, *Appearance* is spoken of as '*utpādaḥ*' (Birth, Masculine); *Destruction* is spoken of as '*nāshaḥ*' (Perishing, Masculine); *Continuance* is spoken of as '*ātmasvarūpam*' (its own form, Neuter).—Now as regards *Appearance*, there can be no 'continuance' or 'destruction' in it; how then could such words as '*utpattiḥ*' (Feminine) and '*janma*' (Neuter) be applied to it? Similarly as regards *Destruction*, there can be no 'continuance' or 'appearance' in it; how then could it be spoken of by such terms as '*tirobhāvaḥ*' (Masculine), '*vināshaḥ*' (Masculine) and '*tirobhavanam*' (Neuter)?—The particle '*api*' in the *Text* serves to show that Destruction itself could not be spoken of by that same word.—Similarly, as regards *Continuance*, Destruction and Appearance being impossible therein,—it has to be explained on what grounds it is spoken of as '*sthitiḥ*' (Feminine) and '*Svabhāvaḥ*' (Masculine).

It might be said that—"inasmuch as these, *Continuance* and the rest, are not differentiated among themselves, each of them may be capable of taking all the three Genders".

The answer to this is stated in the words—'*If the form of these, etc. etc.*';—that is, if the form of these is not differentiated from each other, then there should, in reality, be only *one*, not *three*, Genders.—(1127–1130)

The other party says:—"The Feminine, Masculine and Neuter are so many different Universals, like the Universal 'Cow' and the like."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1131).

IF THE FEMININE AND THE REST BE HELD TO BE SO MANY DIFFERENT UNIVERSALS,—THEN ALL SUCH SHOULD BE REGARDED AS DISCARDED BY THE REJECTION OF THE 'UNIVERSAL' ITSELF.—(1131)

COMMENTARY.

On a previous occasion, in course of the Examination of the 'Universal', all particular Universals also have been discarded; hence there can be no such particular Universals as 'Feminine' and the rest. Hence the definition provided is an 'impossible' one.—(1131)

Then again, in connection with the particular Universals, we find,—even without any other Universal, the application of such words as '*jātiḥ*' (Feminine), '*bhāvaḥ*' (Masculine), '*sāmānyam*' (Neuter);—hence the definition provided turns out to be 'too narrow'.—This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXT (1132).

SUCH WORDS ARE APPLIED TO PARTICULAR UNIVERSALS, AS '*jātiḥ*' (FEMININE), '*bhāvaḥ*' (MASCULINE) AND '*sāmānyam*' (NEUTER). NOR IS IT POSSIBLE FOR UNIVERSALS TO SUBSIST IN OTHER UNIVERSALS THEMSELVES.—(1132)

COMMENTARY.

'*Nor is it possible, etc. etc.*'.—Because the doctrine (of the other party) is that Universals are devoid of Universals. This has been said on the basis of the doctrine of the *Vaishēṣikas.*

The *Vaiyākaraṇas*, Grammarians, however regard Universals as subsisting in Universals also; as declared in the following passage—'Even when the object and the Universal are denoted, all words are denotative of the Universal, inasmuch as all things exist in the form of their functions (*Vākyapadīya*, 3. 16).—What these people mean is as follows:—The theories laid down in regard to Universals by other philosophers need not necessarily be accepted by Grammarians; as a matter of fact, Universals are inferred from the effects of the functions of the connection between the word and the resultant cognition; and there can be no limit placed upon such Universals. Hence the basis of the term 'Universals' consists in that Universal which has a common substratum as inferred from the perception of the effects of the said functions. What is meant by the Universal 'existing in the form of their functions' is that their special character is restricted by the functions of the word and the resultant Idea.

This theory should be taken as rejected by what has been said (under Text 1131, second line) that 'all such Universals should be taken as dis-

carded by the rejection of the Universal itself (in the chapter on *Universals*).'—(1132)

The following *Text* states the objection that is equally applicable to all :—

TEXT (1133).

HOW TOO CAN THERE BE SUCH WORDS AS '*Abhāvaḥ*' (MASCULINE), '*Nirupākhyam*' (NEUTER) AND '*Tuchchhatā*' (FEMININE) ?—FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE ENTIRE SCHEME OF THREE GENDERS IS PURELY CONVENTIONAL.—(1133)

COMMENTARY.

There is no Universal in non-entities like the Hare's Horns ; because it is a property of entities ; consequently the application of the words '*abhāva*' and the rest to non-entities should be impossible. Consequently the said rule regarding Genders is 'too narrow'.

Thus it follows that the entire scheme of the three Genders is based solely upon Conventions made according to the whim of speakers.—(1133)

The following *Text* shows that *Number* also (like Gender) cannot follow the presence and absence of the real state of things :—

TEXT (1134).

Number ALSO IS PURELY CONVENTIONAL, AND IS ASSUMED THROUGH THE WHIM OF THE SPEAKER, EVEN WHEN THERE IS DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN DIFFERENCE AND NON-DIFFERENCE ; AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF WORDS LIKE '*Dārā*' (WIFE), ETC. AND '*Vipina*' (FOREST), ETC.—(1134)

COMMENTARY.

Number also is purely conventional, not real. In the case of words like '*dārā*' (which stands for *wife*, and is yet treated as Masculine, and always Plural), though there is no difference (in what is denoted by this word and that denoted by other words like '*patnī*', etc.), yet its peculiar gender (and number) has been determined by mere whim.

Thus the Reason put forward by us cannot be said to be 'Unproven'. For instance, the Plural or the Singular Number of words is not always based upon the real multiplicity and singularity of things ; e.g. in the case of

such words as '*dārāḥ*', '*sikatā*', '*varṣā*', etc.—even though there is no real *multiplicity,* yet they are used in the Plural Number. Similarly in the case of such words as '*Vana*', '*Tribhuvana*', '*Jagat*', '*Ṣaṇṇagarī*',—even though there is *no singularity,* yet they are used in the Singular Number. Hence our Reason cannot be said to be 'Unproven'.

Nor is our Reason 'Inconclusive'; for, if it were so, then everything would belong to everything.

Lastly, because our Reason subsists in things where the Probandum is known to be present, therefore it cannot be said to be 'Contradictory'.—(1134)

In the following *Texts* the Author urges the fallacy of 'being unproven' against the Buddhist's Reason—from *Kumārila's* point of view :—

TEXTS (1135-1136).

"IF WORDS LIKE '*Dārāḥ*' ARE USED IN REFERENCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL AS WELL AS THE UNIVERSAL, IT IS SO APPLICABLE ON THE BASIS OF THE NUMBER OF EITHER INDIVIDUALS OR THE COMPONENTS.—THE WORD '*Vana*' DENOTES EITHER INDIVIDUALS AS QUALIFIED BY THE NUMBER OF THE UNIVERSAL, OR THE UNIVERSAL AS SUBSISTING IN A PLURALITY OF INDIVIDUALS." [*Shlokavārtika-Vanavāda* 92–94.]—(1135-1136)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila argues as follows :—"The word '*dārāḥ*' is applied sometimes to the Universal and sometimes to the Individual; when it is applied to the Universal, then it is used according to the Number of the Individuals,—and these Individuals consist in the *many women*; when however it is applied to the Individual, then it is used in accordance with the Plurality of the Components of the Individual, in the form of her hands, feet and other limbs.—In the case of the word '*Vana*', what are denoted are the Individuals, in the shape of the Mango, *Khadira, Palāsha* and other particular trees, as qualified by the Number (Singular) of the Universal 'Tree' subsisting in all those individual trees; and that is why the word is used in the Singular Number '*vanam*'; as what it denotes is the Substance qualified by the Number of the Universal. Or what is denoted by the word '*vana*' is the Universal itself as subsisting in the Individual trees, *Dhava* and the rest; hence it is used in the Singular Number, the said Universal being one only."—(1135-1136)

The answer to the above is as follows :—

TEXT (1137).

IN THIS WAY ALL WORDS IN THE SINGULAR NUMBER BECOME DOOMED.—IF IT BE ARGUED THAT "IN THE CASE OF OTHER WORDS (IN THE SINGULAR NUMBER) THE SPEAKER'S WISH DOES NOT LIE THAT WAY",—THEN THAT *wish* ITSELF MIGHT BE THE BASIS IN THE CASES IN QUESTION ALSO.—(1137)

COMMENTARY.

In the way described above,—all words in the Singular Number,—like '*vṛkṣah*'—*become doomed*,—discarded; as the said reasoning would apply everywhere. As in regard to every word in the Singular Number, it might be said that "if the word is used in reference to the Individual, etc.". (*Kumārila's* words in the preceding Text.)

It might be argued that—"in the case of other words,—like '*vṛkṣah*'—the Speaker's wish does not lie towards speaking of the Individuals and the Universals".

In that case, Number (in words) would not be in accordance with the number of things,—on the contrary, the presence and absence that would determine the Number (in words) would be the Speaker's wish itself. In that case, in the case of words like '*dārāḥ*' also, that same wish may very well form the determining factor; the idea being that, even when there is no diversity (multiplicity) in the thing, the Plural Number is used because there is the Speaker's wish to speak of it as *many*.

Thus our Reason is not 'unproven'.—(1137)

It has been asserted (by *Kumārila*, quoted under Text 1136) that—"the word '*vana*' denotes the Individuals as qualified by the Number of the Universal".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1138).

THERE CAN BE NO NUMBER IN THE UNIVERSAL AT ALL.—EVEN IF THE NUMBER WERE THERE IN THE UNIVERSAL, HOW COULD THE INDIVIDUALS BE QUALIFIED BY THAT NUMBER?—"[THEY COULD BE SO QUALIFIED] THROUGH THE *connection of what is connected* (INDIRECTLY), OR THROUGH DIRECT CONNECTION ITSELF".—[IF THIS BE HELD THEN THE ANSWER WOULD BE AS IN THE FOLLOWING *Text.*]—(1138)

COMMENTARY.

There can be no Number in the Universal; as it subsists in *substance* only.

This has been said in accordance with the doctrine of the *Vaishēṣikas*. In case that doctrine is not accepted, and it is held that Number does belong to the Universal,—then, in what way could it be established that the Individuals, *Dhava* and other trees, are qualified by that Number (of the Universal)?

The following explanation might be offered:—"It could be so established *either* (*indirectly*) *through the connection of the connected, or through direct Connection itself*; that is, if the Number is something different from the Universal, then the Universal would be *connected* with the Singular Number,—and without Universal there would be *connection* of the Individuals, trees, *Dhava* and the rest; thus the qualifying of the *Dhava* and other Individual Trees would be done indirectly;—if, on the other hand, the Number is not something different from the Universal, then that would be *directly* connected with the Individual Trees, which would thus become qualified by that Number. In this way it would be established that the Individuals are 'qualified by the Number of the Universal'.—(1138)

The following *Text* supplies the answer to the explanation given (in the latter part of the preceding *Text*):—

TEXT (1139).

IF IT BE SO, THEN EVEN A SINGLE TREE COULD BE SPOKEN OF AS '*Vana*' (FOREST); SEVERAL TREES ALSO ARE SPOKEN OF AS SUCH ONLY THROUGH *Connection*, AND THAT IS PRESENT IN THE SINGLE TREE ALSO.—(1139)

COMMENTARY.

If the application of the word '*vana*' to Individual Trees, *Dhava* and the rest, be due only to the presence of the *connection of the Connected*, or of *Connection* itself, then even a single tree could be spoken of as '*Vana*'; as the basis of the application would be present there. For instance, even the several trees—*Dhava* and the rest—are spoken of as '*Vana*', only through the connection of the Number of the Universal,—and not through anything else; and this connection is present in the single Tree also;—why then should this also not be spoken of as '*vana*'?—(1139)

It has been asserted (in *Text* 1136, by *Kumārila*) that "the word '*vana*' may be taken as denoting the Universal subsisting in the many individual trees)".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1140).

THAT (UNIVERSAL) WHICH SUBSISTS IN THE *many* INDIVIDUAL TREES IS THE SAME THAT SUBSISTS IN THE SINGLE INDIVIDUAL (TREE),—THE BASIS THEREOF BEING THE SAME IN BOTH CASES; CONSEQUENTLY, THE IDEA OF '*Vana*' (FOREST) SHOULD BE THERE IN CONNECTION WITH THE SINGLE TREE ALSO.—(1140)

COMMENTARY.

Under the said view also, a single Tree could be spoken of as '*Vana*'. Because what the word '*vana*' denotes is the Universal as subsisting in the many Individuals ; and that same Universal subsists in the single Individual tree, *Dhava* also ; thus the basis of the notion of '*vana*' being the same in all cases, why should the notion of '*vana*' not appear in connection with the single tree also ?—(1140)

In the following *Text,* the Author sums up his Reasoning :—

TEXT (1141).

THUS THE USE OF WORDS IN THE SINGULAR AND OTHER NUMBERS SHOULD BE REGARDED THROUGH CONCOMITANCE AND NON-CONCOMITANCE, AS DEPENDING ENTIRELY UPON THE SPEAKER'S WHIM,—NOT UPON THE REAL STATE OF THINGS ; AS IT IS NOT ALWAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS LATTER.—(1141)

COMMENTARY.

'*As it is, etc. etc.*' ; because the real state of things is not exactly as expressed by the words.—(1141)

It has been argued (under *Text* 973, by *Kumārila*) that—" the *Apoha* can have no connection with Gender and Number, etc."; where the '*etcetera*' is meant to include the connection of Action, Time and so forth.

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (1142).

THE CONNECTION OF ACTION, TIME, ETC. HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED BEFORE. HENCE ALL THESE ALSO ARE PURELY CONVENTIONAL, AND DO NOT *really* SUBSIST IN INDIVIDUALS ALSO.—(1142)

COMMENTARY.

'*Before*',—i.e. in course of the rejection of such concepts as Action, Time and so forth, the connection also of Action, etc. has been discarded ; hence these also cannot belong to things.

'*Conventional*'—created by Convention.—(1142)

Even granting that these (Gender, Number, Action, etc.) belong to things, —inasmuch as the *Apoha* in the form of the 'Reflected Image' is apprehended by deluded persons as something external,—through this apprehension, connection with Gender, Number and the rest would be there through the Individual.—Hence what has been asserted (by *Kumārila,* under 973) to the effect that—"the Individual being something that cannot be spoken of by words, the connection cannot be through that either",—is 'Inconclusive'.

It is also 'unproven', 'unadmitted', under the theory that all this is purely 'illusory'; this latter fact is shown in the following—

TEXT (1143).

IN FACT, THE *Apoha* IS DENOTED AS APPREHENDED IN THE FORM OF THE INDIVIDUAL; AND THE APOHA THEREFORE IS CONNECTED WITH GENDER, ETC. THROUGH THAT INDIVIDUAL.—(1143)

COMMENTARY.

'*Apoha is denoted*'—by the Word.
'*Tat*'—Therefore.
'*Asya*'—of the *Apoha*.—(1143)

It has been argued (under 974, by *Kumārila*) that—"in the case of Verbs, '*the exclusion of other things*' is not apprehended".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1144).

THE WORD IS USED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE THING INTENDED; HENCE THE 'EXCLUSION OF WHAT IS NOT-INTENDED' BECOMES APPREHENDED BY IMPLICATION.—(1144)

COMMENTARY.

That "in the case of Verbs the *exclusion of other things* is not apprehended" cannot be admitted. Because when a person uses a word, it is not because he is addicted to such use, but for the purpose of bringing about the cognition,—in the person hearing the word—in regard to a certain thing that is intended, desired, to be known. Consequently, when the desired thing is apprehended, the *exclusion of the undesired thing* also becomes apprehended by implication; as the 'desired' and the 'undesired' are mutually exclusive.—(1144)

It might be argued that "all things are *desired*".—The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (1145).

ALL THINGS CANNOT BE *desired*; AS, IN THAT CASE, THERE WOULD BE NO RESTRICTION REGARDING ANY DENOTATIONS. HENCE IN THE CASE OF WORDS LIKE 'COOKS' AND THE LIKE, THERE IS CLEARLY 'SOMETHING EXCLUDED'.—(1145)

COMMENTARY.

If all things were 'desired' (to be expressed), then there could be no restriction regarding the denotation of words; in that case, it would not be possible for the hearer to undertake any activity that might be called for on the hearing of the word; consequently it cannot be right that all things are desired (to be expressed).

From all this it follows that in the case of words like 'cooks' (Verbs) there is 'exclusion of the undesired', by implication; and it is quite clearly apprehended.—(1145)

The following *Texts* also proceed to show how the said 'exclusion of the unintended' is expressed by implication :—

TEXTS (1146-1147).

WHEN THE VERB '*pachati*' ('COOKS') IS UTTERED, WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD IS THAT 'HE IS NOT DOING NOTHING,—NOR IS HE *eating* OR *gambling*'—WHERE THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHER ACTS' IS CLEARLY APPREHENDED. THUS, WHATEVER IS INTENDED (TO BE SPOKEN), THERE IS ALWAYS SOMETHING 'EXCLUDED' BY THE 'RELATIVE NEGATION',—THIS SOMETHING BEING 'DOING NOTHING' AND ALSO OTHER ACTS (THAN THE ONE MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF BY THE VERB USED).—(1146-1147)

COMMENTARY.

From the above it is clear that the verb '*pachati*' (cooks) excludes 'doing nothing', and also other acts like *Eating, Gambling* and the like,—which thus are the 'excluded', through 'Relative Negation'. Hence the assertion that "there is nothing that is denied in the form of Relative Negation" (Text 974) is not true.

In the compound '*Paryudāsātmakāpohyam*',—'*paryadāsatmakam*' is to be taken as qualifying '*apohyam*'.

'*Whatever is intended to be spoken of*',—by that, there is something to be 'excluded' through Relative Negation, in the shape of 'doing nothing' and the rest.—(1146-1147)

It has been asserted (in *Text* 975, by *Kumārila*) that—" the ' cooking ' remains un-negatived in its own form ".

The following *Text* shows that this assertion involves self-contradiction on the part of *Kumārila* :—

TEXTS (1148-1149).

YOUR ASSERTION THAT " THE *Cooking* REMAINS UN-NEGATIVED IN ITS OWN FORM " INVOLVES SELF-CONTRADICTION; BECAUSE THE WORDS ' IN ITS OWN FORM ' CAN ONLY MEAN THAT ' THERE IS NEGATIVING OF THE FORM OF OTHER ACTS ' ; OTHERWISE THE EMPHASISING WOULD BE MEANINGLESS.—(1148-1149)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—" In what way is there self-contradiction ? "

Answer :—' *Because what the words, etc. etc.* '.—That is, when it is asserted that ' the Cooking remains un-negatived *in its own form* ', the emphasis laid upon the last phrase indicates that the *Cooking* remains itself by *negativing the forms of other acts.* If that were not the meaning, then the emphasis that you have laid upon the phrase ' in its own form ' would be meaningless, as there would be nothing that would be precluded by that emphasis.—(1148-1149)

It has been argued (under *Text* 976, by *Kumārila*) that—" the idea of something *to be accomplished,* as also the idea of the *Past,* etc. would be baseless ".

This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (1150-1151).

Apoha BEING FEATURELESS, WHAT SORT OF ' ACCOMPLISHMENT ' COULD THERE BE OF IT ? CERTAINLY THERE IS NO ' ACCOMPLISHMENT ' OF THE ' SKY-LOTUS ' ETC.—IF IT BE URGED THAT " INASMUCH AS IT IS APPREHENDED AS A *thing,* IT APPEARS AS *with features* ",—THEN (WE ASK) WHAT IF IT IS SO ?—[IT MAY BE SAID THAT] " FROM THIS IT WOULD FOLLOW THAT IT HAS THE SAME PROPERTIES AS ENTITIES."—(1150-1151)

COMMENTARY.

If the *Apoha* has been apprehended by you as *featureless,* then how can you say " because it is *accomplished* " ? Certainly there is no *accom-*

plishment of such things as the 'sky-flower'; and that because all such are featureless.

The following might be urged—" Even though *Apoha* is featureless *in reality,* yet by deluded persons it is conceived as something external, and hence, it comes to appear as *with features* ".

The answer to this is—What if it is so ? That is, even if the *Apoha* appears to be *with features,* how does that help you in the present context ?

The other party replies—" *In that case, etc. etc.* ;—that is, what follows from it is that, just as the positive entity is apprehended in *accomplished* form, so *Apoha* also, being cognised as having the same properties as positive entities, is apprehended as something *accomplished* ; hence the assertion that 'it is accomplished' is quite right ".—(1150-1151)

The answer to the above argument of the opponent is that, if it is as just explained, then you yourself have shown the basis of the notion of 'being accomplished' and of that of 'past' and so forth, and consequently you should not say that all this becomes baseless.

This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1152).

THUS THEN, THE NOTION OF 'BEING ACCOMPLISHED', AS ALSO THE CONCEPTION OF THE 'PAST' ETC.,—BEING OF THE SAME FORM AS POSITIVE ENTITIES,—COMES TO BE BASED UPON THAT SAME.—(1152)

COMMENTARY.

'*Based upon that same*',—i.e. based upon the apprehension of the fact that they are of the same character as Positive entities.—(1152)

It has been argued (under *Text* 977, by *Kumārila*) that—" In the case of all such denotations as *Injunction* and the rest, there is no idea of the *exclusion of other things* ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1153).

IN THE CASE OF ALL SUCH DENOTATIONS AS THE *Injunction* AND THE LIKE,—WHAT IS 'EXCLUDED' (NEGATIVED) IS 'NON-EXISTENCE', ETC.,—EXACTLY THAT WHICH IS NOT MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF ; BUT THIS IS DONE BY IMPLICATION,—NOT DIRECTLY BY THE WORD.—(1153)

COMMENTARY.

All such Denotations as the *Injunction* and the like are always differentiated from 'Negation' and the rest, and are apprehended as such ;

so that what is 'excluded' and negatived in their case is 'non-existence', which is what is not meant to be spoken of by the word concerned. Thus there is here also the apprehension of the 'exclusion of other things'.—(1153)

It has been argued (under Text, 977, by *Kumārila*) that—" In the case of a negative appearing with another negative, what sort of *Apoha* could be there ? "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1154–1156).

OF SIMILAR KIND WOULD BE THE *Apoha*, WHEN A NEGATIVE IS JOINED WITH ANOTHER NEGATIVE ; JUST AS IT IS APPREHENDED WHEN THERE ARE FOUR NEGATIVES. IN SOME CASES, WHEN A NEGATIVE IS ASSOCIATED WITH ANOTHER NEGATIVE, WHAT IS APPREHENDED FROM IT IS SOMETHING POSITIVE ; THE THIRD NEGATIVE EXPRESSES THE NEGATION (ABSENCE) OF THAT POSITIVE THING ; AND WHEN FOR THE NEGATIVING OF THAT AGAIN A FOURTH NEGATIVE IS USED, IF THAT IS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF, WHAT IS DENOTED BY IT IS THE 'EXCLUSION OF ANOTHER'.—(1154–1156)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tachchatuṣṭaya, etc.*'—where there are four negatives.

Question :—" In what form is it apprehended ? "

Answer :—'*When a negative, etc. etc.*'.—The word '*arthaḥ*' is to be taken as co-ordinated with the word '*vidhiḥ*'.

'*Negation of that*',—i.e. the negation of the said positive thing.

'*For the negativing of that*',—i.e. for the negativing of what has been expressed by the third negative (by itself), as apart from the positive factor.

'*Turīyaḥ*'—is *fourth* ;—the form being due to the rule which lays down the addition of the affix '*yat*' in the sense of *making up*, to the term '*chatur*', and the elision of the first letter.

'*If that is meant to be spoken of*',—i.e. on the use of the fourth negative.

'*By it*'—i.e. by the fourth negative.

'*The exclusion of another is denoted*' ;—i.e. it expresses the Reflection, in the positive form, as differentiated from the negation expressed by the third negative.—(1154–1156)

The Author makes this same idea clear by means of an Example :—

TEXTS (1157-1158).

WHEN IT IS SAID '*nāsau na pachati*' ('IT IS NOT THAT HE DOES NOT COOK') WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD IS THAT 'HE COOKS'; IF A THIRD NEGATIVE IS ADDED, WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD IS EITHER THAT 'HE IS DOING NOTHING' OR THAT 'HE IS DOING SOMETHING OTHER THAN COOKING';—AND WHEN A FOURTH NEGATIVE IS ADDED, WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD IS SOMETHING DIFFERENTIATED FROM THIS LAST, THAT IS, 'HE IS COOKING'. SO THAT HERE THE 'EXCLUSION OF ANOTHER' IS SIMILAR TO THAT IN THE CASE OF THE *affirmative sentence*.—(1157-1158)

COMMENTARY.

'*Differentiated, etc.*'—i.e. from the idea of his doing nothing, or of his doing something other than *cooking*.

'*Exclusion of another is similar to that in the case, etc. etc.*';—Just as in the case of the affirmative sentence 'He is cooking', what is expressed by implication is the negation of his *doing nothing* or *doing something else*,—so also in the case of the second negative, it is seen that it expresses the negation of the same *doing nothing, etc.* It is only for the purpose of making things clearer that the use of *four* negatives has been cited.—(1157-1158)

It has been argued (under *Text* 978, by *Kumārila*) that—"in the case of the particles *cha* and the rest, there can be no connection with the negative".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1159).

OF PARTICLES LIKE '*cha*' THE MEANING INTENDED IS SOMETHING LIKE 'COMBINATION'; AND THUS THERE WOULD BE 'EXCLUSION', BY THAT, OF THINGS OTHER THAN THAT, IN THE SHAPE OF 'OPTION' AND THE LIKE.—(1159)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*ādi*' is meant to include such terms as '*vā*', which denote *option*,—the term '*api*', which denotes *probability, connection*, etc.,—the term '*tu*' which denotes *qualification*,—and the term '*ēva*' which denotes *emphasis*.

'*Other than that*',—i.e. other than *Combination*, etc.

'*By that*'—i.e. by the term '*cha*'.—(1159)

It has been argued (under Text 978, by *Kumārila*) that—" In the case of the meaning of the Sentence, 'exclusion of other things' cannot be indicated ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1160-1161).

'THE EXCLUSION OF OTHERS' IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD IN THE CASE OF THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE. IT IS ONLY THE DENOTATIONS OF CERTAIN WORDS CONSTRUED TOGETHER THAT IS SPOKEN OF AS 'THE MEANING OF THE SENTENCE'; WHAT WOULD BE 'EXCLUDED' BY THESE WORDS WOULD CLEARLY BE THE THINGS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE DENOTED BY THESE WORDS; SO THAT THE SAME WOULD BE 'EXCLUDED' BY THE MEANING OF THE SENTENCE ALSO. BECAUSE THE *meaning of the Sentence* IS NOTHING APART FROM THE MEANINGS OF THE WORDS (COMPOSING IT).—(1160-1161)

COMMENTARY.

'*Construed together*'—Related, as cause and effect.

'*Things excluded*'—by the words.

Objection :—" The *denotation of words* is one thing, and totally different from that is the *meaning of the Sentence*; why then is it said that what are 'excluded' by the denotation of the words would also be 'excluded' by the meaning of the sentence ? "

Answer :—'*It is nothing apart from that*';—the *meaning of the sentence* is not anything different from the denotations of the words,—in the shape of something of a mixed character, like the colour of the *Kalmāṣa*; because such a thing, if it existed, would be perceived, and yet it is not perceived.—(1160-1161)

This same idea is made clearer by means of an Example :—

TEXT (1162).

WHEN THE MEANING OF THE SENTENCE—'*Chaitra*, BRING THE COW',—HAS BEEN COMPREHENDED, WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD, BY IMPLICATION, IS THE *Apoha* (EXCLUSION) OF OTHER AGENTS, OTHER OBJECTS AND SO FORTH (THAN THOSE EXPRESSED BY THE WORDS OF THE SENTENCE).—(1162)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the said sentence, nothing else comes into the mind except what is expressed by the words—'*Chaitra*' etc.—composing it; and

when *Chaitra* has been comprehended, *the exclusion of non-chaitra* also becomes comprehended through implication. Otherwise,—if the *exclusion of other Agents*, etc. were not meant, then the mention of *Chaitra*, etc. would be meaningless; and hence no such sentence could be addressed by any person to any one; and there would be an end to all usage in the world.—(1162)

It has been argued (under *Text* 979, by *Kumārila*) that—" nothing is comprehended in the case of such words as 'Non-exclusion of others' ('*ananyāpoha*')".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1163).

IN THE CASE OF SUCH WORDS AS '*ananyāpoha*' ('NON-EXCLUSION OF OTHERS'), WHAT IS COMPREHENDED CANNOT BE SOMETHING POSITIVE, AS DESIRED BY THE OTHER PARTY; BECAUSE THE UNIVERSAL AND SUCH OTHER LIKELY POSITIVE DENOTATIONS HAVE BEEN ALREADY DISCARDED.—(1163)

COMMENTARY.

It is true that, in reality, nothing positive,—in the shape of the *Universal*, etc. is comprehended; because all these have been rejected in detail in the Chapters dealing with the *Universal*, etc.—(1163)

Question :—" What, then, is it that is comprehended ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (1164).

IN FACT, THE CONCEPTION THAT FOLLOWS FROM THIS WORD ENVISAGES SOMETHING POSITIVE; AND IT IS ONLY LATER ON THAT THERE APPEARS THE IDEA OF THE NEGATION (EXCLUSION) OF WHAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD '*Apoha*'.—(1164)

COMMENTARY.

Objection :—" If it is held that there appears the idea of the negation of what is denoted by the word '*Apoha*',—then *Apoha* only should not be regarded as the denotation of the word; as that is negatived by it."

Answer :—

TEXT (1165).

WORDS LIKE THIS, HOWEVER, ARE UNCONFORMABLE, AS THERE IS ABSENCE OF CONNECTION. ALL VERBAL COGNITIONS DO NOT ALWAYS ENVISAGE THINGS AS THEY ACTUALLY EXIST.—(1165)

COMMENTARY.

'*Words like this*'—i.e. Like '*ananyāpoha*'.

'*Unconformable*',—i.e. not in conformity with any real state of things.

Question :—" Why so ? "

Answer :—'*As there is absence of connection*' ;—i.e. there is no connection with any such thing as is expressed by the word ; because any positive entity in the shape of the Universal, etc. as denoted by words has already been rejected.

Question :—" If that is so, then how is it that the word '*Ananyāpoha*' brings about the idea of the 'negation of what is denoted by the word '*Apoha*' (as just declared by you) ? "

Answer :—'*All verbal cognitions, etc. etc.*'.—That is, there are some verbal cognitions, as arising out of impressions due to repeated false conceptions, which envisage things that do not exist ; and either the existence or non-existence of things cannot be proved on the basis of such cognitions.—(1165)

It has been argued (under *Text* 979, by Kumārila) that—" in the case of such words as *cognisable, knowable* and the like, there can be nothing that is 'excluded' ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1166).

IN THE CASE OF SUCH WORDS AS 'COGNISABLE' AND 'KNOWABLE',—WHICH IS IT IN WHOSE CASE THERE IS NOTHING 'EXCLUDED' ? CERTAINLY, SUCH A WORD IS NEVER USED BY INTELLIGENT MEN, ALONE BY ITSELF AND SUDDENLY.—(1166)

COMMENTARY.

Among the words 'cognisable' and the like, which is it in whose case it is said that there is nothing 'excluded' ?—If it is said in regard to the word 'knowable' alone by itself, apart from any sentence, and independently of all connection with other words,—then the argument is superfluous ; because a word alone by itself is never used, and hence has no meaning at all.

This is what is shown in the text by the words—'*Certainly such a word, etc. etc.*' ;—'*alone*',—without any other words.—'*Suddenly*'—without any context.

As a matter of fact, it is for the benefit of the listeners that words are uttered,—not because the speaker has the habit of using them ;—and a single word could not confer any benefit on the listener, in the shape of remov-

ing his doubt or ignorance. For instance, if the word did bring about in the listener a cognition free from all doubt, after setting aside his doubts and misconceived notions,—then it would have conferred a benefit on him; no such benefit can be said to be conferred by any word used singly by itself.—(1166)

In fact, the use of the word has its use only in helping to remove the doubt and ignorance of the listener and bring about his well-ascertained cognition; and hence it can be usefully used only in a sentence;—this is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1167-1168).

In fact, the Word is used by intelligent persons only for the purpose of removing the doubtful and wrong ideas that some one may have in regard to a certain thing. Consequently, it is only when used by such men and when bringing about cognitions free from doubt and mistake that the Word becomes useful.—(1167-1168)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ārēka*' is *Doubt.*
'*Some one*'—i.e. the listener.
'*In regard to a certain thing*'—some object.
'*For removing it, etc.*'—i.e. for removing doubt and wrong notions.
'*Tēna*'—by such words as 'knowable' and the like.
'*Taiḥ*'—by the intelligent persons.—(1167-1168)

If what the opponent has said is with reference to the words in question as occurring in a sentence,—then what is said cannot be admitted.—This is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1169-1170).

What is regarded by dull-witted persons as open to doubt is what is 'excluded' by the word in question; otherwise, the utterance of the word would be useless.—If he does not regard anything as open to doubt, then why does he ask (another person) about it?—If one utters a word that does not bring about embellishment (enlightenment),—how can he be regarded as a sane-minded person?—(1169-1170)

COMMENTARY.

What is 'excluded' by the word 'knowable' occurring in a sentence is just that which is regarded by *dull-witted persons*—persons with dull in-

telligence,—as open to doubt. Hence it cannot be admitted that in the case of words like 'knowable', there is nothing that can be 'excluded'.

'*Otherwise*';—if it does not 'exclude' what is doubted by dull-witted persons.

It might be argued that—"The listener may have not doubted anything".

The answer to that is—'*If he does not regard, etc. etc.*'.—If the listener has no doubts regarding anything, then why does he seek for advice from another person? It is only for ascertaining things that one questions another person; otherwise he would be mad.

It might be argued that—"Even if the listener has any doubts regarding anything, that doubt cannot be removed by the word in question."

The answer to this is—'*If one utters a word, etc. etc.*';—'*Saṁskāra*' is *embellishment,* in the form of *the removal of the listener's doubt*; the word that has this *embellishment* is one that brings about the said *removal*; the affix '*kap*' is added according to *Pāṇini's Sūtra* '*Shēṣād vibhāṣā*'.

'*Bruvan*',—the explainer using the word.

'*How can he, etc. etc.*'—That is, he would be insane. Because it is only for the embellishment (enlightenment) of listeners that words are used.—(1169-1170)

Question:—"What, and in what sentence, is that which is open to doubt in the mind of the dull-witted person,—which is 'excluded' by the word in question?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1171).

WHEN IT IS ASSERTED THAT 'COLOUR IS *cognisable* BY VISUAL PERCEPTION'—THIS CERTAINLY SERVES TO 'EXCLUDE' (DENY) SOMETHING SUPPOSED BY SOME PERSON.—(1171)

COMMENTARY.

'*This*'—i.e. the sentence 'Colour is cognisable by Visual Perception'.—(1171)

Question:—"What is it that is *supposed*?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1172).

[THE SUPPOSITION IS]—"IT IS NOT BY THE COGNITION THROUGH THE EYE ALONE THAT THE BLUE AND OTHER COLOURS ARE COGNISABLE,—BUT ALSO BY THE ONE ETERNAL COGNITION, THROUGH THE *Ear* ALSO."—(1172)

COMMENTARY.

The dull-witted man might suppose that Colour is cognisable also by the Eternal Cognition through the Ear;—and it is this supposition that is 'excluded' (negatived) by the sentence 'Colour is cognisable by the

Cognition through the Eye'; the meaning being that—'Colour is cognisable by Cognition through the Eye only, *not by Cognition through the Ear and other organs*'.—(1172)

TEXTS (1173-1174).

THE WORD 'COGNISABLE' IS USED WHEN THERE ARE SUCH DOUBTS AS—(*a*) 'ARE ALL THINGS COGNISABLE AS MOMENTARY, OR NOT ?—(*b*) ARE ALL THINGS COGNISABLE BY THE COGNITION OF AN ALL-KNOWING PERSON ? (*c*) ARE NEGATIONS, WHICH DO NOT BRING ABOUT ANY COGNITION, COGNISABLE ?—(1173-1174)

COMMENTARY.

(*a*) 'Are all things cognisable as *momentary*, or not ?'—(*b*) 'Are all things cognisable by the Cognition of an Omniscient Person ?'—(*c*) 'Are *Negations*,—which are of the nature of the absence of all determining features, and which do not even bring about a cognition—cognisable ?'—When such doubts appear, then, it is said—'all things are *cognisable* as momentary;—and they are *cognisable* by an Omniscient Person;—and Negations also are *cognisable*'.—And in all these what is 'excluded' (negatived) is the supposition that 'things are *cognisable* as non-momentary' and so forth.—(1173-1174)

Question:—"Is all this supposition negatived by the mere assertion (of *cognisability* in a certain form) ?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1175).

THAT THEY ARE *cognisable* IN THE FORMS ASSERTED FOLLOWS FROM THE FACT THAT IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT ALL THINGS ARE *momentary* AND SO FORTH. NEGATION ALSO IS *cognisable* AS *illusory*, AS IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT IT IS IN THAT FORM.—(1175)

COMMENTARY.

'*In the forms asserted*'—i.e. as 'momentary' and the rest; as all this has been established by proofs.

Question:—"How is Negation cognisable ?"

Answer:—'*Negation also is cognisable, etc. etc.*';—'*in that form*',—i.e. in the form of Negation.

As a matter of fact, even non-entities are also somehow proved to exist, hence they are regarded as *cognisable*; if they were not so, then there could be no usage regarding them.—(1175)

Says the Opponent:—"Are Words *cognisable as evanescent* (non-eternal), or not ?—When this doubt is raised, and the answer is—'cognisable';—

if the man who is ignorant of the context in which the word 'cognisable' has been uttered, hears only the word 'cognisable', there does appear in him some sort of a cognition of a nebulous character.—If then the word 'cognisable' by itself (apart from a sentence) had no denotation, then how is there the said cognition that is expressed by it ?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (1176-1178).

THAT WORDS LIKE 'KNOWABLE', 'COGNISABLE' SERVE AS THE MEANS OF PRODUCING COGNITIONS (IDEAS) HAVING BEEN PERCEIVED ONLY WHEN THEY APPEAR IN A SENTENCE,—IF, AT SOME OTHER TIME, THEY ARE FOUND TO BE USED ALONE BY THEMSELVES, THE IDEA THAT IS PRODUCED BY THEM, IN REGARD TO THINGS THAT ARE NEBULOUS, IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHAT HAS BEEN FOUND IN THE CASE OF THEIR USE IN A SENTENCE.—IN FACT, IN THE CASE OF WORDS LIKE 'JAR' ALSO, IT IS THE SAME; SO THAT THE WORDS 'KNOWABLE' AND THE LIKE ARE JUST LIKE THE WORDS 'JAR' AND THE REST.—(1176-1178)

COMMENTARY.

What the whole of this means is as follows :—As a matter of fact, there is no Cognition following from the hearing of the word ('cognisable') *by itself*; what happens in such cases is that the man has previously heard the word used in a sentence as conveying a definite meaning,—so that when he subsequently hears it pronounced alone by itself, he has his mind influenced by the similarity of the word in the two cases, and he comes to presume that he has understood its meaning. That this is so is shown by the fact that under this latter presumption, the nebulous and wavering idea that the listener has is of those same things which he cognised on previous occasions, when the word was used in sentences. This is exactly the same as in the case of the ordinary words like 'Jar'.—For instance, the question having been put—'Shall I bring water in a Jar or in the Hands ?—The answer is 'In the Jar'; if the man who hears this last word alone is ignorant of the context in which it has been uttered,—the idea that he has is in accordance with the meaning of the word 'Jar' that he had understood in those previous sentences that he had heard with that word in them.

Thus then it follows that words like 'cognisable' are just as denotative of particular things as other denotative words. This is what is pointed out in the *Text* by the words—'*So that, etc. etc.*'.—(1176-1178)

It has been argued (under *Text* 980, by *Kumārila*) that—"Rather than assume the Thing 'excluded', it is far better to assume the thing itself".

This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (1179-1180).

THE STATEMENT THAT, "RATHER THAN ASSUME THE 'EXCLUDED' THING IT IS FAR BETTER TO ASSUME THE THING ITSELF", IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY; AS IN EVERY CASE THERE IS 'EXCLUSION OF SOME OTHER THING'. THAT THING ALONE IS ASSUMED WHICH IS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF; HENCE THERE IS IMPLICATION OF THAT WHICH IS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF; BUT ALL THINGS ARE NOT MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF.—(1179-1180)

COMMENTARY.

'*Thing itself, etc. etc.*'.—It is an *Entity*,—not not a non-entity—meant to be spoken of, which is assumed by us, on the basis of actual cognition, to be 'denoted' by the word; hence when that is apprehended, there is, through Implication, the 'Exclusion' of what is not meant to be spoken of; so that our explanation of the word and its denotation does not fail to apply in any case.

In fact, it is in reference exactly to those cases where doubts are likely to arise in the mind of the dull-witted person that our Teacher has made the following statement:—'Having assumed the *non-cognisable*, through the exclusion of that, we have the inference of the *cognisable*'.—(1179-1180)

It has been argued (under *Text* 980, by *Kumārila*) that—"Inasmuch as the idealistic form of things has been denied, nothing internal (purely subjective) can be denoted by words".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXTS (1181–1183).

AS FOR THE DENIAL OF THE *Idealistic form of things*,—SUCH DENIAL IS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE THE FACT IS SELF-EVIDENT; AS ACTUALLY THERE ARE SEVERAL IMPOSITIONS WITHOUT ANY BASIC REALITY.—IT HAS TO BE ADMITTED THAT THERE MUST BE SOMETHING IN THE IDEA (OR COGNITION) ITSELF WHICH APPERTAINS SPECIFICALLY TO EACH OBJECT ENVISAGED BY IT; AND THAT IS PRECISELY ITS 'NATURE';—AND THIS SAME 'NATURE' OF THE IDEA HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF BY US AS 'FORM', 'REFLECTED IMAGE', 'APPEARANCE', 'FIGURING', 'MANIFESTATION'. SO THAT THERE IS ONLY A DIFFERENCE IN THE NAME, WITHOUT ANY REAL DIFFERENCE.—(1181-1183)

COMMENTARY.

'*Impossible*'—to make.

Question:—"In what way is the fact of the Thing being of the form of the Idea (cognition) self-evident?"

Answer :—'*As actually there are, etc. etc.*'.—In Dreams and other forms of cognition, it is found that, even in the absence of a real substratum, there are imposed cognitions, clearly known to the meanest cowherd,—and this fact is self-evident to every man in his own experience. It cannot be right to say that "in these cases what is cognised is the real thing as existing at other places and at other times";—because the thing cognised is not cognised in that form; and one thing cannot be cognised in the form of any other thing; for if it did, then it would lead to an absurdity.

Further, you will have to admit that there is some peculiarity in the Cognition itself due to the cognised object,—by virtue of which, even though *as Cognition,* every Cognition is the same, yet every individual cognition differs from the other, so that in one there is apprehension of the *Blue,* not of the *Yellow* colour; and on this basis there is a differentiation in Cognition.—And when you admit this, then, by implication, it would also become admitted that the Cognition has *form.* Because without such form it would be impossible to definitely ascertain the particular nature of the Cognition. Hence what you speak of as 'nature' of the Cognition is nothing other than what we speak of as 'Form', 'Figuring' and so forth; so that the only dispute between us is one regarding names.—(1181–1183)

It has been argued (under *Text* 981, by *Kumārila*) that—"Nothing *excluded* is noticed in the case of such words as '*ēvam*' and the like".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1184).

IN THE CASE OF THE WORD '*ēvam*' (THUS), THERE IS '*naivam*' (NOT THUS) WHICH IS CLEARLY 'EXCLUDED'; IN THE SENSE OF 'IN ANOTHER MANNER'.—(1184)

COMMENTARY.

'It is *thus*—and *not thus*', in this way there is the idea of 'another manner' which is what is 'excluded'—differentiated—by the word '*ēvam*', 'Thus'; and this is clearly apprehended.—So that our theory of Verbal Denotation does not fail to apply to this case also.—(1184)

In this way the criticisms urged by *Kumārila* have been answered. The Author now proceeds to answer those urged by *Uddyotakara.*

It has been argued (under *Text* 982, by *Uddyotakara*)—"What is it that is assumed to be *excluded* in the case of the word '*sarva*', 'all'?"

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (1185).

IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'ALL' ALSO, AS PRESENTED IN ACTUAL USAGE, THERE IS SOMETHING 'EXCLUDED'; AND WHAT IS REGARDED AS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF HERE ALSO IS THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHERS'.—(1185)

COMMENTARY.

Here also, as in the case of words like 'knowable', the word 'all' is never used alone by itself; it is always used in a sentence; hence what is 'excluded' by it would be just that in regard to which there may be doubt in the mind of dull-witted persons.

'*Abhidhitsitaḥ*'—meant to be spoken of.—(1185)

Question :—"What is it that is meant to be spoken of?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1186).

'*All* THINGS ARE SOULLESS', '*all* MEN ARE GONE',—IN SUCH SENTENCES, WHAT IS APPREHENDED IS *entirety*, AND WHAT IS 'EXCLUDED' IS A CERTAIN FACTOR.—(1186)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—"What is the factor that is excluded?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1187).

THERE ARE SUCH MISCONCEPTIONS AS—'ONLY EXTERNAL THINGS LIKE THE JAR ARE SOULLESS', 'ONLY SOME MEN CAN GO'; AND IT IS THESE THAT ARE 'EXCLUDED'.—(1187)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued (under Text 983, by *Uddyotakara*) that—"If it be held that *one* and the rest are excluded by the word 'all', etc. etc".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (1188).

IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'ALL', THE NEGATION OF ALL PARTS IS NOT WHAT IS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF; HENCE THE INCONGRUITY OF THE 'EXCLUSION OF ITS OWN MEANING' THAT HAS BEEN URGED HAS BEEN SO UNDER IGNORANCE.—(1188)

COMMENTARY.

If it were meant that when the word 'all' is used in a sentence in the course of usage, there is negation of *all parts*,—then there might be 'exclusion

of its own meaning'.—As a matter of fact however, what is held to be negatived is only that which is open to doubt by the dull-witted person; how then can there be any '*exclusion* of its own meaning'?

The same reasoning applies to the case of such words as '*ādi*' and the like.—(1188)

It has been asked (under *Text* 986)—"Is it *positive* or *negative*?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1189).

IT IS NEITHER *Positive* NOR *Negative*; IT IS NEITHER *diverse* NOR *same*; IT IS NEITHER *subsistent*, NOR *non-subsistent*; IT IS NEITHER *one* NOR *many*.—(1189)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"Why is it not *positive*?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1190).

IN REALITY, IT DOES NOT EXIST IN THE FORM IN WHICH IT IS APPREHENDED; HENCE IT CANNOT BE POSITIVE. NOR IS IT NEGATIVE, AS IT IS APPREHENDED AS AN ENTITY.—(1190)

COMMENTARY.

By deluded people it is apprehended as something *external*, and yet it does not exist in that form; and as having no external form, it is not Positive.

Question:—"Why cannot it be *negative*?"

Answer:—'*Nor is it negative, because it is apprehended as an entity*'; and yet, as it presents itself as something *external*, it cannot be said to be entirely *negative*.—(1190)

Question:—"Why cannot *Apoha* be of the nature of 'diversity' or of 'sameness'?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1191).

'DIVERSITY' (DIFFERENCE) AND 'SAMENESS' (NON-DIFFERENCE), ETC. ARE RESIDENT IN *entities*; WHILE THE 'DENOTATION OF WORDS' IS ENTIRELY FEATURELESS; HENCE THE SAID CHARACTERS HAVE NO PLACE HERE.—(1191)

COMMENTARY.

'*Diversity and sameness, etc.*'—i.e. Difference and Non-difference, etc.—the 'etc.' including 'being subsistent' and 'non-subsistent' and so forth.

All these are properties residing in *Entities* only ; how could they reside in the *Apoha* which has its body created only by the artist of Conceptual Thought ?

It has been argued that—" *Apoha* being of the nature of *Action*, its objective has to be pointed out ".

The reason put forward is not admitted ; because the *Apoha* denoted by the Word is of the nature of a ' Reflected Image ' ; and this Reflected Image, being in the form of the apprehended external object, cannot be a mere *negation*.

For the same reason there is no room for the optional alternatives set forth (by *Uddyotakara*)—as to whether it has, for its objective, the *Cow*, or the *Non-Cow* ; as it is always apprehended as something positive, appertaining to the *Cow* [hence the question of its pertaining to the *Non-Cow* does not arise].—(1191)

It has been asked (under *Text* 989)—" Who has attributed the character of the *Non-Cow* to the Cow, that it has to be 'negatived' (by the *Apoha*) ? "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1192–1194).

FOR US THE WORD DOES THE ' NEGATIVING OF OTHER THINGS ' DIRECTLY ; AND AFTER THE *negativing* HAS BEEN DONE BY THE WORD, IT BECOMES APPREHENDED THROUGH ITS OWN FORCE,—IN THE FORM ' ITS NATURE IS NOT THE NATURE OF ANYTHING ELSE ',—AS HAS BEEN EXPLAINED IN DETAIL (UNDER *Text* 1013) ; HENCE WHAT IS URGED ON THE PRESENT OCCASION—' WHO HAS ATTRIBUTED THE CHARACTER OF THE *Non-Cow* TO THE *Cow*, THAT IT HAS TO BE NEGATIVED ? '—IS THROUGH IGNORANCE OF THE VIEW OF THE OTHER PARTY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THIS IS NOT WHAT IS HELD TO BE ' NEGATIVED ' BY THE WORD DIRECTLY.—(1192–1194)

COMMENTARY.

What has been urged would have been true only if the Word had expressed ' the negation of others ' primarily ; as a matter of fact, however, what the Word produces, first of all, is only the Reflected Image of the Thing (spoken of) ; and it is only after that has been comprehended that, through the force of its implication, the said ' negation ' (exclusion) becomes comprehended. Apparently this doctrine of ours is not known to the other party, and what he has urged is something insignificant, beneath notice. Such is the upshot of the *Text*. The rest is easy.—(1192–1194)

As regards the optional alternatives put forward—regarding *Apoha* being *different* or *non-different* and so forth,—all that has been already discarded.

It has been asked (under *Text* 997, *et seq.*, by *Uddyotakara*)—whether the *Apoha is denoted or not denoted,* etc. etc.—

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXTS (1195–1199).

THE 'DENOTABILITY' THAT YOU ASK ABOUT—IS 'DENOTABILITY' BY WHICH *word*? IS IT 'DENOTABILITY' BY THE WORD '*Apoha*'? OR BY THE WORD 'JAR' AND THE REST?—AS REGARDS THE QUESTION—WHETHER THE *Apoha* THAT IS DENOTED IS ITSELF OF THE NATURE OF *Apoha* (NEGATION, EXCLUSION) OR IT IS SOMETHING POSITIVE,—WHEN WE COME TO THINK OF IT, WHAT IS COGNISED IS THE *Apoha* THAT FIGURES IN THE COGNITION.—OUR VIEW IS THAT WHAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD DIRECTLY IS THE REFLECTED IMAGE,—AND AS REGARDS 'THE NEGATION OF OTHER THINGS', LIKE THE UNIVERSAL ETC.,—THAT IS COMPREHENDED ONLY INDIRECTLY, THROUGH IMPLICATION.—WHAT ALL SUCH WORDS AS 'JAR', 'TREE' AND THE LIKE DENOTE IS THE SAID REFLECTED IMAGE, AS IT IS THE COGNITION OF THIS THAT THEY PRODUCE DIRECTLY; AND ANYTHING ELSE, THEY IMPLY ONLY INDIRECTLY.—THUS THEN, THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY REGARDING THE POSITIVE CHARACTER; NOR IS THERE ANYTHING UNDESIRABLE FOR US.—AS REGARDS THE ALTERNATIVE OF *Apoha* NOT BEING 'DENOTABLE',—THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT; AND HENCE THAT IS NOT OUR VIEW.—(1195—1199)

COMMENTARY.

As regards the alternatives set forth regarding the denotability of 'the exclusion of others',—if it is urged in regard to the term 'exclusion of others'—then, inasmuch as it is held by us that what is denoted by this term is something *positive*,—that should not have been urged against us as an undesirable contingency.

That is to say, when the question is raised,—as to whether what is denoted by the word is something *positive*, or the 'exclusion or negation of others'—and it is said that 'it is the *negation of others* that is denoted by the word',—there appears in the listener the idea envisaging the 'negation of others', in the form of a Reflected Image; and if there is an idea of the negation of positive entities as forming the denotation of the word, that comes only by implication.

If what is urged is with reference to the words 'Jar' and the like, then, what these words bring about directly is the *Apoha* in the shape of the Reflected Image, which is denoted by those words in the *positive* form, and the idea of the 'negation of others' is obtained by implication; so that there is no undesirable contingency for us.

Nor is our view open to the objection that there would be no resting ground or finality (in the assumption of *Apoha* after *Apoha*); because the 'negation of others' is held to be comprehended only by implication,—and hence to be only an appendage to actual Denotation;—the view that it is not expressed is not accepted by us; and hence there can be no room for those incongruities that have been urged against that view.—This is what is indicated by the words—'*As regards the alternative, etc. etc.*'.—(1195–1199)

It has been urged (under *Text* 1001) that—" Singularity, eternality, etc. cannot be attributed to *Apoha* ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1200).

THE IDEAS OF ' ONE-NESS ', ' ETERNALITY ' AND THE LIKE ARE PURELY IMAGINARY, NOT REAL. HENCE YOUR LAUGHTER AT US ON THIS POINT IS INDICATIVE OF A VERY HIGH GRADE OF LEARNING (ON YOUR PART) !—(1200)

COMMENTARY.

If ' one-ness ' and the rest had been mentioned by us as *real*, then there might have been some cause for your laughing at us. As a matter of fact, however, it has been mentioned by our Teacher only as something purely imaginary (subjective, conceptual),—and he has mentioned it only in view of common misconceived notions. Under the circumstances, how can a learned person find any cause for laughter in this ? On the contrary, you yourself, by criticising what you have not understood, have become an object of derisive laughter.—(1200)

It has been asserted (under *Text* 1002, by *Kumārila*) that—" for these reasons, the element of the *negation of others* could be there only in the case of words that are associated with the negative particle, etc. etc. "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1201).

EVEN IN CASES WHERE THE THING ITSELF IS APPREHENDED, THE ' EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS ' IS ALSO APPREHENDED,—AS IS INDICATED BY THE FORCE OF THE EMPHASISING TERM (USED BY YOU) ; IF IT WERE NOT, THEN, THE EMPHASISING WOULD BE USELESS.—(1201)

COMMENTARY.

The factor of the ' exclusion of other things ' is cognised, not only in cases where the negative term is present ; also where the negative term is not present, the same is cognised. This has been made clear by yourself when you said that ' the Thing *itself* is apprehended ', where you have emphasised the ' itself '. If this is not what you mean, then that emphasising word is useless. Thus when it is said that ' the thing *itself* is cognised ', it is all the more clearly implied that the ' exclusion of others ' is also cognised.—(1201)

In the following Text, the other Party proceeds to show that the Buddhist theory of *Apoha* cannot apply to all cases.—

TEXT (1202).

"In the case of such terms as 'son of the Barren Woman',—where there is no external object which would be the 'contrary' (excluded),—wherein would the *Apoha* subsist which is said to be denoted by it?"—(1202)

COMMENTARY.

"In the case of the term 'son of the Barren Woman',—there is no such thing as the external *son*, which would be the *contrary*, and hence the object of the *exclusion*; then wherein would that *Apoha* rest which is said to be denoted by that term? It is essential that there should be an entity which is the substratum or object of the *Apoha*; as such substratum would be non-different from 'what is excluded by another'."—(1202)

The above is answered in the following—

TEXT (1203).

As non-entities have no form, words appertaining to those cannot be even suspected of being denotative of the Universal and such things. In fact, it has been fully established that they are only indicators of the Reflection.—(1203)

COMMENTARY.

Such non-entities as the 'son of the Barren Woman' have no form,—no character;—hence words relating to those cannot even be suspected of being denotative of the *Universal*, etc. It is only in the case of words relating to entities that there could be any question as to whether what is denoted by them is some *form* or only a Reflection. As regards non-entities (or Negations) they are entirely different from Entities, hence how could words applied to them be even suspected of pertaining to entities? From this it is clear that the words in question have no object (denotation at all); all that they produce is the mere Reflection of things; and this Reflection is what is actually apprehended. Thus there is no room for the objection that has been urged.

The same is further explained:—

TEXT (1204).

WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY WORDS IS ONLY THE REFLECTION THAT APPEARS, AS CREATED SOLELY BY IMPRESSIONS MADE BY OBJECTLESS (EMPTY) CONCEPTIONS.—(1204)

COMMENTARY.

'*Words*'—like 'Son of the Barren Woman'.—(1204)

Those words however that relate to entities, denote only the Reflection;—the formal proof for this is stated in the following—

TEXT (1205).

THE WORDS IN QUESTION ARE DIRECTLY EXPRESSIVE OF THAT (REFLECTION) ALONE,—BECAUSE THEY ARE DEPENDENT UPON CONVENTION,—LIKE WORDS EXPRESSING IMAGINARY THINGS.—(1205)

COMMENTARY.

[The argument may be formulated thus]—Words that are dependent upon Convention are expressive of only the Reflection of the Conceptual Content produced by the impressions made by objectless (empty) conceptions,—as for instance, words like 'the son of the Barren Woman';—the words in question—i.e. words like 'Jar' and the like, which form the subject of the present discussion, are dependent upon Convention; and this is a natural reason (for holding that they are expressive only of the Reflection, etc. etc.).—(1205)

Having established his own position, the Author next proceeds to adduce arguments for rejecting the views of the other party :—

TEXT (1206).

THESE WORDS ARE NOT DENOTATIVE OF THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' AND THE REST, THAT HAVE BEEN ASSUMED BY OTHERS. HENCE THESE SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE LIKE THOSE JUST MENTIONED.—(1206)

COMMENTARY.

'*Bhēda*' stands for 'Specific Individuality'.
'*And the rest*'—includes the *Universal*, etc.
'*Hence*',—i.e. on account of their being dependent on Convention.
'*Like those*',—like words speaking of imaginary things.—(1206)

The Author shows that the two Reasons adduced are not 'Inconclusive':—

TEXT (1207).

THAT THERE CAN BE NO CONVENTION IN REGARD TO 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' AND THE REST HAS BEEN ALREADY PROVED BEFORE. HENCE THE REASONS ADDUCED ARE NEITHER 'DOUBTFUL' NOR 'CONCOMITANT WITH THE CONTRARY OF THE PROBANDUM'.—(1207)

COMMENTARY.

It has been already proved before—on the ground of the 'Impossibility of Conventions' (under *Text* 876 *et seq.*) and on that of its 'not bearing upon anything else',—that Convention is impossible and also useless.

'*Tat*'—Hence, therefore.

The two Reasons are not *Doubtful* or *Concomitant with the Contrary of the Probandum.*—(1207)

In the following *Texts*, the Opponent argues that the first of the two Reasons adduced is 'Inconclusive':—

TEXTS (1208-1209).

"UNDER THE THEORY OF *Apoha* ALSO, HOW IS CONVENTION POSSIBLE? HOW TOO IS IT FRUITFUL?—WHEN IT CANNOT BE KNOWN TO BOTH, THE SPEAKER AND THE LISTENER; AS THE IDEA OF ONE CANNOT BE KNOWN TO THE OTHER. WHAT TOO WAS SEEN AT THE TIME OF THE MAKING OF THE CONVENTION IS NOT SEEN AT THE TIME OF THE USE OF THE WORD."—(1208-1209)

COMMENTARY.

"Just as, in the case of Specific Individuality and the rest, there is impossibility of Convention and Futility, so it would be also in the case of *Apoha*; so that, inasmuch as there would be no Convention made, the denotation by words of the *Apoha* alone cannot be right; hence the Reason adduced is Inconclusive.

"*How too is it fruitful?*—That is, how is fruitfulness possible—'*Tasya*' —stands for the Convention.

Question:—Why is Convention not possible in this case?

"*Answer*:—*Because it cannot be known to both.*—The term '*hi*' denotes *reason*; the meaning being—*Because* the *Apoha* in the shape of Reflection cannot be one and the same, as the object of Convention, for both, the Speaker and the Listener.

Why?

"*Because the Idea of one, etc. etc.*;—people of limited vision are cognisant of only their own ideas; no one with limited vision can be cognisant of the

idea in another's mind; and in reality the *Apoha* in the form of Reflection is nothing different from Idea (Cognition); so that as between the Speaker and the Listener, what would be known as the subject of a Convention could not be known to the other; hence wherein could the Convention be made or comprehended? Unless the Speaker knows the thing, he cannot make any Convention relating to it; nor can the Listener comprehend it. If he did, it would lead to absurdities. For instance, the *Reflection of the object*, which is what the Speaker cognises as figuring in his cognition, is not cognised by the Listener; and what is cognised by the Listener is not cognised by the Speaker; as every man is cognisant only of what appears to himself.

"The futility of Convention is next shown—'*What too, etc. etc.*'—The Reflection that was apprehended at the time of the making of the Convention, by the Listener or by the Speaker, is not apprehended at the time of the use of the word; as the former, being in a perpetual flux, has long ceased to existence; and that which is apprehended at the time of the use of the word was not seen at the time of the making of the Convention; as what was apprehended at that time was something entirely different. And it is not right that usage should be based upon a Convention that rests upon something different; as such usage would lead to absurdities."—(1208-1209)

This argument is answered in the following—

TEXT (1210).

EVEN THOUGH EACH PERSON IS COGNISANT OF WHAT APPEARS TO HIMSELF, YET THERE IS SOMETHING IN THE COGNITION OF EXTERNAL THINGS WHICH IS COMMON TO BOTH PERSONS.—(1210)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, *the form of the cognition* also is not accepted by us to be denoted by words,—in view of which the impossibility of Conventions relating to that could be reasonably urged against us. Because, for us, all verbal usage is purely illusory, being assumed in accordance with the notions of individual persons,—it is as illusory and false as the idea of *two moons* that appears in the man of disordered vision; all that is produced by words is a Conceptual Content relating to the Thing, through the arousing of the Impressions of objectless conceptions; and it is the Reflection of this that is called the 'Denotation' *of words*, because it is produced by words,—not because they are denoted (expressed) by them.—So that though, in reality, the Speaker and the Listener are cognisant of what appears in their own consciousness,—yet inasmuch as the root of illusion is equally present in both men,—just as in the case of the man with the disordered vision,—the apprehension that the two men have of the external object is similar; and yet the idea in the mind of the Speaker is that 'the thing that I cognise is also cognised by this man'; the Listener also has the same idea.—It might be asked—How is the fact of both of them apprehending the same thing known to each of them?—The answer to that is that in reality it

is known to them; and yet the source of the Illusion being there, equally in both, there is—as already explained by us—a mistaken usage in accordance with each man's own apprehension,—just as in the case of the perception of two moons by the man of disordered vision.—Thus then, both men having the apprehension of the same thing, the making of Convention is quite possible.—(1210)

An example is cited to illustrate the above :—

TEXT (1211).

JUST AS THE MAN WHOSE EYE HAS BEEN ATTACKED BY A DISORDER SAYS TO ANOTHER LIKE HIMSELF THAT 'THERE ARE TWO MOONS',—SO ALSO IS ALL VERBAL USAGE.—(1211)

COMMENTARY.

'*Who is like himself*',—i.e. to the other man, with disordered vision.—(1211)

Nor is the Convention futile in this case ;—this is shown in the following—

TEXT (1212).

THE CONCOMITANCE OF THE CONVENTION HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE NOTIONS OF MEN ; IN FACT, ALL COGNITIONS BROUGHT ABOUT BY WORDS ARE ULTIMATELY FALSE.—(1212)

COMMENTARY.

The idea that the Convention is concomitant with the two points of time,—that of its making and the consequent usage,—is admitted only on the basis of the apprehension of Reflection of the Thing apprehended by the Speaker and the Listener; it is not really true; the idea, in fact, is based upon the fact that at the time of usage both the Speaker and the Listener have the (false) notion that the thing seen now and that seen at the time of the making of the Convention are one and the same.

Question :—" Why is this not accepted as being so *in reality* ? "

Answer :—'*In fact, all cognitions, etc. etc.*'.—(1212)

End of Chapter XVI.

CHAPTER XVII

Examination of the Definition of "Sense-perception".

COMMENTARY.

On the subject of the *Means of Right Cognition,* there are four kinds of difference of opinion bearing upon (1) their Nature, (2) their Resultant, (3) their Object, and (4) their Number. And by setting aside these diverse opinions, the clear idea of the Means of Right Cognition can be obtained. In order to show this and to support the idea that 'the Truth is ascertained by means of Two Means of Right Cognition which are endowed with the true characteristics of the Means of Right Cognition' (as asserted under *Text* 3, of the Introduction),—the Author proceeds with the following—

TEXT (1213).

THE SENSE-PERCEPTION AND THE INFERENCE, WHICH OTHERS HAVE PUT FORWARD, IN PROOF OF THEIR CONCEPTS,—ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE. THEY ARE OF THE NATURE DESCRIBED BELOW.—(1213)

COMMENTARY.

'*In proof of their concepts*'—i.e. such concepts as—Quality, Substance, Action, Universal, Inherence and so forth.

'*Others*'—The *Vaishēṣika* and others.

'*Ēvam*'—as going to be described.—(1213)

'Sense-perception' as a Means of Cognition consists of the Eye and the rest and is (*a*) *conceptual* (determinate), or (*b*) of the nature of 'Non-cognition'. Such is the diversity of opinion regarding the nature of Sense-perception.—By rejecting this, the Author propounds his own definition of it :—

TEXT (1214).

Sense-perception IS FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND NOT ERRONEOUS.—'CONCEPTUAL CONTENT' IS IDEA ASSOCIATED WITH VERBAL EXPRESSION ; IT IS NOT [REGARDED AS] THE BASIS OF VERBAL EXPRESSION, ETC.—(1214)

COMMENTARY.

The character of being 'Sense-perception' is what is predicated of that Cognition which has been described as 'free from conceptual content and not erroneous' ; as in every case, it is the defined thing (distinguishing

feature) that is predicated. [The meaning therefore is—'That Cognition which is free from conceptual content and is not erroneous is Sense-perception'];—as is found in the case of such expressions as 'That which shakes is the *Ashvattha*'.—The thing defined here is Sense-perception; as it is the definition of this that forms the subject-matter of the present Context. It is not the definition of 'freedom from conceptual content and non-erroneousness' that is the subject-matter of the Context; by virtue of which this latter could be taken as predicated in the sentence.

The 'Cognition' has not been mentioned, because it is already implied in the negation of 'Conceptual Content'; just as in the case of the sentence 'Bring the milch one without the calf', where the *cow* is not mentioned, as it is already implied by the negation of the *calf*.

Question:—"What is it that is meant by the term 'Conceptual Content' ('*Kalpanā*'), freedom from which serves as the differentia of Sense-perception?"

Answer:—'*Conceptual Content is idea associated with verbal expression*'.

Question:—"Is that *Kalpanā* also to be admitted, against which, in the character of being the *basis of verbal expression*, Shaṅkarasvāmin and others have urged objections in great detail?"

Answer:—No; *it is not the basis of verbal expression*;—'regarded as'—this has to be taken as understood. Hence the objections that have been urged on that score are not applicable to our view; because we do not accept that view.

'*Klrpti*' is *verbal expression* ('being spoken of', 'being named'); and the basis for such expression consists of the *Universal*, the *Name* and so forth; since there can be no *speaking of* things without such distinguishing features as consist of the Universal, etc.

The term '*ādi*' (*etcetera*)—in the *text* is meant to include such characteristics as Doubt and Deliberation, as leading to association with words etc., and also the assumption of the apprehender and the apprehended and so forth.

'*Abhilāpa*'—is *expressive word*; and it is in a generic form; that Idea which appears as associated with that word is called '*abhilāpinī*'.—(1214)

Question:—"How is it known that there is such an *Idea* (or Cognition)?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1215).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE COGNITION THAT IS CAPABLE OF CONNECTING THE THING AND THE WORD ALWAYS APPEARS AS *associated with verbal expression* (*words*),—EVEN WHEN THE WORDS—LIKE 'TREE' AND THE LIKE—ARE NOT ACTUALLY USED.—(1215)

COMMENTARY.

The construction may be as—'even when the words like *tree*, etc. are not used',—or as 'which is capable of connecting the thing and the word, in the shape of *tree*, etc.'.

This indicates the Conceptual Content as something directly perceived ; the said Idea being recognised by the experience of all living beings.—(1215)

The following *Text* shows that the said Conceptual Content is well known as the source of all activities of persons from infancy onwards :—

TEXT (1216).

THROUGH THE CONTINUANCE OF THE IMPRESSION LEFT BY THE CONSTANT ASSOCIATING OF THE THING AND ITS NAME DURING PAST LIVES,—EVEN THE NEW-BORN INFANT BECOMES CAPABLE OF ACTIVITY, BY REASON OF THE SAID CONCEPTUAL CONTENT.—(1216)

COMMENTARY.

'*Atīta-bhava*' is *past lives* ;—during these there has been '*nāmārtha-bhāvanā*', constant associating of things with their names ;—this constant associating leaves its '*Vāsanā*', Impressions, or capacity in the mind;—through the '*anvaya*', continuance of this capacity, even the infant has ideas associated with words ; and it is through the presence of this Conceptual Content (Idea associated with words), that the infant becomes capable of activity,—such as smiling, crying, sucking the breast, becoming pleased and so forth.—From this effect its cause in the shape of the said Conceptual Content is assumed in the infant. This has been thus declared—' All activity in the world is based upon words, which even the infant has recourse to, through the impressions left by past lives '.

This Conceptual Content, presenting the object, as associated with vague verbal expressions and existing only in the subjective form,—as if it were something external,—appears in the mind of Infants also, by virtue of which in their later life, they become capable of comprehending the relevant Conventions.—(1216)

The Author shows again how the existence of the Conceptual Content is vouched for by Perception :—

TEXT (1217).

THAT WHICH IS CLEARLY COGNISED AT THE TIME OF REFLECTION AND IMAGINATION AS IF INTERPENETRATING THEM,—CANNOT BE SET ASIDE BY MERE WORDS.—(1217)

COMMENTARY.

The following *Text* shows that the existence of Conceptual Content is proved by Inference from its effect in the shape of Verbal Usage :—

TEXT (1218).

The connection between Words and Things, due to Conceptual Content, is illusory; hence as it cannot be based upon anything else,—if there were no Conceptual Content, the said connection, even as it is, would not be possible.—(1218)

COMMENTARY.

Any *real* connection between Words and Things has been negatived by our predecessors, and it has also been proved that it is all illusory. Under the circumstances, if this Conceptual Content were not there, then the said connection,—*even as it is*—i.e. even in the illusory form,—would not be possible; as that connection is based upon the Conceptual Content; and as it has been proved that anything external,—in the form of Specific Individuality, Universal and the like,—cannot form the denotation of words. —(1218)

Question:—"Other people describe the Conceptual Content not only as 'the idea associated with words', but also as that which is capable of being connected with the Universal, Quality, Action and so forth. Why do not you accept these?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1219).

Some people have regarded the Conceptual Content to be that which is capable of being connected with the Universal and the rest;—that view cannot be right, as the Universal, etc. have all been rejected, and they are never perceived.—(1219)

COMMENTARY.

'*They are never perceived*'—i.e. the Universal, etc. are never actually perceived.

This answer has been given on the assumption (for the sake of argument) that the Universal, etc. do exist.—(1219)

The said 'non-perception' of the Universal, etc. is further emphasised in the following—

TEXT (1220).

THE UNIVERSAL AND THE REST BEING NEVER PERCEIVED,—AND THEIR CONNECTION BEING NEVER MANIFESTED,—HOW CAN THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THINGS BE POSSIBLE,—AS BETWEEN MILK AND WATER, ETC. ?—(1220)

COMMENTARY.

'*Like Milk and Water, etc.*'—When Milk and Water are mixed up, they do not appear separately,—and hence it is no longer possible to connect the two; in the same manner, even if the Universal and the rest do exist, they never appear as distinguished from their substratum; and hence it is not possible to connect them with their substratum.—(1220)

"If then the Conceptual Content in the form of association with the Universal is not possible, then, how is it that the propounder of the definition (*Diṅnāga* in his *Nyāyamukha*) has asserted that 'Conceptual Content' consists in connection with Name, Universal and so forth'?"

The Answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1221).

TWO KINDS OF CONCEPTUAL CONTENT HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN THE TWO ASSERTIONS, IN ORDER TO SET FORTH THE TWO VIEWS THAT HAVE BEEN HELD BY PERSONS BELONGING TO OUR OWN PARTY AND BY THOSE BELONGING TO OTHER PARTIES,—IN ORDER TO SHOW WHICH IS TO BE ACCEPTED AND WHICH TO BE REJECTED.—(1221)

COMMENTARY.

What is to be rejected is the Conceptual Content in the form of connection with the Universal, etc. which is the view accepted by the other party; and what is to be accepted is the view of our own party that it consists in *association with name*. In order to set forth this distinction, both views relating to Conceptual Content have been asserted.

Question:—"How do you know that it is so?"

Answer:—'By the two assertions';—that is the words used by the Teacher are '*nāmajātyādiyojanā*',—'connection or association with *Name* and *Universal*, etc.', where both the *Name* and the *Universal, etc.* have been mentioned, as representing the two views. If this were not intended, then the expression used would have been either 'association with Name, etc.' or 'association with the Universal, etc.' Nor is the enumeration meant to

be exhaustive; as in that case the addition of '*etcetera*' would be meaningless.—(1221)

Says the Opponent:—"Conceptual Content is a property of the Cognition; what forms the subject-matter of the present context is the view that the said Content is absent (in Sense-perception); as it is Sense-perception that is being considered; and it is not intended to expound the absence of the *Object*; as regards the 'association of Name, Universal, etc.', on the other hand, it is a property of the Object, not of the Cognition. So that what the propounder of the *Lakṣaṇa* has asserted appears to be entirely irrelevant."

Anticipating this criticism, the Author supplies the following answer:—

TEXT (1222).

THIS 'CONNECTION WITH NAME, ETC.' REMAINS THERE AFTER HAVING INDICATED ITS OWN IMMEDIATE CAUSE; HENCE THE ASSERTION IS NOT IRRELEVANT.—(1222)

COMMENTARY.

'*Anantaram*'—immediate—'*nimittam*'—cause; and that cause is in the form of the *verbally-associated Idea*;—and this is called 'connection' because it appears in a form envisaging two things;—and there is no connecting of one thing by another; as properties of things have no functions to perform.

The indication of this immediate cause is done in two ways; and why this 'connection' comes in has been explained.

The compound '*nāmādiyojanā*' is to be explained as 'that whereby the connection of the two things is brought about'; there being Bahuvrīhi compound even when there is no co-ordination between the factors concerned.—Or the compound may be explained on the basis of the assumption that the Cause is spoken of as the Effect. The purpose served by this indirect expression is that it serves to bring out the efficiency of the cause as bringing about an effect different from other causes.

[So that the expression '*nāmādiyojanā*' stands, indirectly, for the *Conceptual Content* itself.]—(1222)

Or, the expression '*nāmajātyādiyojanā*' may be explained in another way (as standing for *kalpanā*, Conceptual Content, itself):—'*Yojanā*' is that *wherewith one is connected*;—and this '*yojanā*' of 'Name, Universal, etc.' would be the same Conceptual Content, explained as 'Idea associated with verbal expression'; so that there is nothing defective in the definition propounded by Diṅnāga.

This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (1223).

NAME, UNIVERSAL AND ALL THE REST ARE *connected by the* SAID CONCEPTUAL CONTENT ; HENCE WHAT IS SPOKEN OF (BY DIṄNĀGA'S DEFINITION) IS THE SAME CONCEPTUAL CONTENT WHICH HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS 'THE IDEA ASSOCIATED WITH VERBAL EXPRESSION'.—(1223)

COMMENTARY.

The following *Text* supplies another answer to the criticism (urged against Diṅnāga's definition) :—

TEXT (1224).

OR, WHAT HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF (IN THE DEFINITION IN QUESTION) IS THE SAME *Conceptual Content* THAT WE HAVE OURSELVES ASSERTED ; —(THIS INTERPRETATION) BEING BASED UPON THE FACT THAT IN ALL CASES THINGS ARE SPOKEN OF BY THEIR NAME (THIS BEING THE MEANING OF THE COMPOUND '*nāmādiyojanā*').—(1224)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—" If it be as asserted above, then how do you explain the explanatory words of the Teacher ? For instance, he has declared as follows :—In the case of Proper names, like *Ḍittha*, what is denoted is an object qualified by a *Name* ; in the case of common nouns like 'Cow' what is denoted is the object qualified by the *Universal* 'Cow' ; in the case of adjectives, like 'white', what is expressed is the object qualified by the *Quality* of 'whiteness' ; in the case of verbal nouns what is denoted is the object qualified by the *Action* ; and in the case of words speaking of substances,—like 'stick-holder', 'horned' and the like—what is denoted is the object qualified by the substance.—By this text the Teacher has made it quite clear that things qualified by the qualifications of the 'Universal', etc. are also separately denoted by words."

The answer to this is that '*In all cases, etc. etc.*'—'*In all cases*'—i.e. even in the case of words denoting the Universal, etc.—What is meant is as follows :—Just as when Proper names are pronounced, what is denoted is the object *qualified by the Name*,—so also in the case of words expressive of the Universal, etc.,—like 'Cow'—what is denoted is the object *qualified by that Name* ;—similarly in all cases [what is denoted is an object *qualified by, connected with, a name*].—(1224)

Question :—" In that case, how are we to construe the Instrumental in the words '*jātyā*', '*guṇēna*' etc. (*by the Universal, by the Quality*) ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (1225).

IT IS THROUGH THESE THAT THE INSTRUMENTAL ENDING BECOMES USEFUL ; SO THAT THE MEANING COMES TO BE THAT THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT BECOMES CONNECTED WITH THE NAME, THROUGH THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE UNIVERSAL, ETC.—(1225)

COMMENTARY.

The particular thing spoken as ' Cow ' is that which is connected with that Name through the Instrumentality of the Universal ; similarly, through the instrumentality of the Quality, etc. It is in this sense that the Universal, etc. become the *Instrument* (of Connection), and thus the Instrumental Ending becomes useful.

Question :—" If that is so, then how are the words (of Diṅnāga)—' *nāmajātyādiyojanā* '—to be construed ? "

Answer :—' *It is through these, etc. etc.* '. That is the words are to be construed as ' *nāmnaḥ jātyādibhiḥ yojanā* ', [' connection *with the Universal, etc., of* the Name '].

' *Sēyam* '—This stands for the *Conceptual Content* itself, which is implied by the force of the compound, which is to be explained as follows :—' *Jātyādiyojanā* ' means ' *jātyādibhiḥ yojanā* ', ' connection with the Universal, etc. ' ; ' *nāmajātyādiyojanā* ' means ' *nāmnaḥ jātyadiyojanā* ', ' connection *with* the Universal, etc., *of* the Name '.—(1225)

Objection :—" If that is so, then in the case of Proper Names, there would be nothing to denote the Universal, etc., and hence the said explanation cannot apply to their case."

In anticipation of this objection, the Author provides the following answer :—

TEXT (1226).

INASMUCH AS THERE *is* THE UNIVERSAL EXPRESSED BY THE PROPER NAME, THE EXPLANATION SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS NOT APPLICABLE TO IT. IT HAS BEEN MENTIONED SEPARATELY ONLY IN VIEW OF POPULAR USAGE.—(1226)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows :—Such words as ' *Ḍittha* ' which are known as *Proper Names,* also take up a ' Universal ' as their denotation, which

Universal subsists in an entity restricted within a limited period of time; they denote such a Universal because they are incapable of denoting any object marked by a momentarily fluctuating character, while each of these (Proper Names) continues to remain attached to one entity from birth to death. If the Proper Name did not denote such a Universal, then,—having been applied to the individual in his childhood, how could it denote that same individual in his old age, who would have become a different individuality ?—Even for those persons who hold the view that the body is not momentary, but lasts for some time,—it is admitted that in course of time, the component parts of the body go on deteriorating, by reason of which deterioration,—or by reason of its connection with such deterioration of the components,—the body in a later age is different from that in the earlier age.—Even under the view that it remains the same body undergoing developments and changes,—the Name that has been associated with a certain thing at one stage of its development, could not denote the same thing when it has reached a further stage of development ; e.g. the name 'milk' which has been associated with the Milk in the first stage, is not applicable to the *Curd*, which is only a later stage in the development of milk. In the same way in the case of the Body also, the name applied to it in childhood could not be applied to it in youth or old age. For these reasons, the Universal must be admitted (even in the case of the Denotation of Proper Names).

Or, even if there be no such entity as the Universal (in this case),—even so, our explanation does not cease to apply to the case of Proper Names. Because it is only the diverse Individuals that are conceived of as common—when their distinct individualities are not meant to be emphasised,—when they become included under Common names denotative of the 'Universal'. Consequently the Teacher propounding the definition under question has mentioned the Proper Names separately from Common names. This is what is explained by the words—'*It has been mentioned separately, etc. etc.*'. In common parlance, the word 'Cow' is known as a *Common* name (denoting a Universal) while the word '*Chitrāṅgada*' is known as a *Proper* Name (applied to a single Individual) ; that is why the two have been mentioned separately. —(1226)

The Opponent raises the following objection :—

TEXT (1227).

"INASMUCH AS THE 'EXCLUSION (*Apoha*) OF OTHERS' IS THE ONLY DENOTATION OF WORDS, ALL WORDS SHOULD BE 'COMMON' ONLY. OR, INASMUCH AS THEY ARE DEPENDENT UPON THE SPEAKER'S WHIM, THEY SHOULD ALL BE 'PROPER' ONLY."—(1227)

The answer to this is given in the following—

TEXT (1228).

IT IS TRUE THAT WHAT THE PROFESSOR OF THE SCIENCE OF REASONING HAS SAID IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POPULAR IDEA OF THINGS ; AS IT IS ONLY ON THESE LINES THAT VERBAL USAGE ACTUALLY PROCEEDS.—(1228)

COMMENTARY.

'*On these lines*' ;—i.e. under the fivefold division of Proper Name, Universal, Quality, Action and Substantive.—(1228)

Says the Opponent—" If what is meant by Diṅnāga, is the '*Kalpanā*', Conceptual Content, as understood by the Buddhists themselves, then how is it that, having asserted that 'others have held that things are denoted by words which have no corresponding objects', he has, later on, stated his own view of '*Kalpanā*' ?"

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1229).

The said 'Universal' and the rest are nothing different from what is known by these words among people ;—IT WAS WITH A VIEW TO EMPHASISE THIS FACT, THAT THE STATEMENT 'OTHERS ETC.' HAS BEEN MADE.—(1229)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows :—As a matter of fact, anything in the shape of the Universal, as apart from the 'Individuals—'spotted cow' and the like—has no real existence,—it is all purely illusory ;—it is with a view to emphasise this fact that the Teacher has made the assertion in question,—and not with a view to indicate a separate kind of '*Kalpanā*'.

'*Others*'—other Buddhists.

'*Words which have no corresponding objects*',—i.e. words which denote only *Apoha*, independently of any such things as 'Universal' and the rest.

Such is the meaning of the passage quoted from the Teacher's work.—(1229)

It is not only we who regard the Conceptual Content as 'Idea associated with words' ; in fact, others also have got to accept it as such ; otherwise there would be no usage in the world.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1230–1233).

EVEN THOSE WHO ARE WEDDED TO THE NOTION THAT CONCEPTUAL CONTENT CONSISTS IN 'CONNECTION WITH THE UNIVERSAL AND THE REST', HAVE TO ADMIT THAT IT IS 'IDEA ASSOCIATED WITH WORDS'.—OTHERWISE, JUST AS THE TWO CONNECTED THINGS ARE NON-EXISTENT, SO THEIR *Connection* ALSO WOULD BE NON-EXISTENT,—ALL THINGS BEING CONCEIVED SEVERALLY EACH BY ITSELF; AND THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR POSTULATING THE 'CONCEPTUAL CONTENT'. AND THE RESULT OF THIS WOULD BE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO USAGE IN THE WORLD; BECAUSE USAGE HAS BEEN REGARDED AS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNIVERSAL AND THE REST,—AND ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNIVERSAL AND THE REST IS INSEPARABLE FROM ASSOCIATION WITH WORDS. THUS ALONE COULD THE EXPRESSION 'SPOKEN OF' USED BY THE TEACHER BE FRUITFUL.—(1230–1233)

COMMENTARY.

Even when Conceptual Content is regarded by others as 'association with Universal, Quality, Action and Substance',—in reality 'association' with *Name* alone constitutes the Conceptual Content. Because as a matter of fact, whenever a thing is apprehended as distinguished by the Universal, etc. it is so only through the *Name*; if it were not so, then—like the apprehension of several distinct things, there being connection independently by itself,—how could there be any 'Conceptual Content'? And the result of this would be that the world would become dumb.—It is for this reason that even on seeing the *man with the stick*, one does not connect the various factors implied in the notion of the 'stick-holder', until he recalls the particular *Name*.

Just because all such connection is invariably concomitant with the *association of words*, the words of the Teacher—to the effect that 'what is *spoken of* in the case of words like 'Cow' is the thing qualified by the Universal'—become *fruitful* (have some sense). Otherwise, without the *Name*, how could the (passive) term 'is spoken of' be used?—As the action of *speaking* (expressing) belongs to the word.—(1230–1233)

The following *Text* sums up the arguments in favour of the notion of the Conceptual Content:—

TEXT (1234).

THUS 'CONCEPTUAL CONTENT' IS SOMETHING THAT CAN BE EASILY PROVED WITHOUT EFFORT, AS THERE IS NO DISPUTE REGARDING IT AMONG TEACHERS WHO TAKE THEIR STAND UPON ALL TRUE DOCTRINES.—(1234)

COMMENTARY.

The following *Text* explains what *Diṅnāga* really means by asserting the Conceptual Content in two forms.—

TEXTS (1235-1236).

IT WAS IN VIEW OF ALL THIS THAT THE ASSERTION OF 'NĀME, UNIVERSAL AND THE REST' WAS MADE; AND HEREIN THE TEACHER MADE MENTION OF HIS OWN VIEW AS ALSO THE VIEW OF OTHERS; WITHOUT INDICATING THE DIFFERENCE BY ACTUALLY SAYING THAT 'MY OWN VIEW IS SO AND SO'. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE SUBSEQUENTLY ADDED THE STATEMENT THAT 'OTHERS HAVE HELD, ETC.'.—(1235-1236)

COMMENTARY.

As to which of the two views is to be accepted and which rejected has been already indicated by us when we showed that even 'association with Universal, etc.' is invariably concomitant with 'association with Name'.

'*The assertion of Name, etc.*'—this is to be construed with '*akarot*', 'made' (in the second line).

The assertion of his own view as also the view of others has been made for the purpose of showing which is to be accepted and which to be rejected.—(1235-1236)

Question:—"How then are the words of *Diṅnāga* in his *Nyāyamukha* to be construed?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1237).

THUS IN THIS WAY IS THE PASSAGE FROM THE *Nyāyamukha* TO BE EXPLAINED. BY MENTIONING THE 'COGNITION', IT IS THE 'IDEA ASSOCIATED WITH WORDS' THAT HAS BEEN INDICATED.—(1237)

COMMENTARY.

The relevant passage from the *Nyāyamukha* is as follows:—'That Cognition of the form of things which, through the imposed identity of the qualifying and denotative adjuncts, appears as non-determinate, in connection with each of the sense-organs,—is Sense-perception'.—Here the 'qualifying adjunct' stands for the Universal, etc.—and the 'denotative adjunct' for the Name; the 'imposition of the identity of these two'—with the things possessing the Universal, etc. and also with the thing bearing the Name.—The 'imposition of identity' is mentioned only by way of illustration; in some cases where the adjuncts are apprehended as distinct—e.g. when it is said 'the Universal *Cow* subsists in this', 'the name of this is so and so',—there also the presence of the Conceptual Content is admitted.

Objection:—"It has nowhere been said that the subsequent resultant Idea constitutes the Conceptual Content; how then do you get at the idea of the said Conceptual Content (from the words of the passage cited)?"

Answer :—'*By mentioning the Cognition, etc. etc.*'—That is to say, when the passage, in contradistinction to the Conceptual Content, mentions the Cognition as 'Sense-perception', it clearly indicates that the Conceptual Content is a property of the Cognition. Thus the meaning of the passage comes to be this :—That Cognition, which, through the imposition of the identity of Name, etc. appears as non-determinate, is *Sense-perception*; that Cognition, on the other hand, which is *determinate* is of the nature of the Conceptual Content, and hence it is not *Sense-perception*; and the implication of this is that Conceptual Content consists in the *Idea associated with words* as contradistinguished from *Sense-perception*.—In this way the passage has presented the Teacher's own as also other people's views.—(1237)

Or, it may be that in the passage under reference, the Teacher has stated only his own view.—This is explained in the following—

TEXT (1238).

OR, THE TERM '*vishēṣaṇa*' ['QUALIFYING ADJUNCT', AS OCCURRING IN THE PASSAGE QUOTED FROM THE *Nyāyamukha*, ON P. 372, BOTTOM] MAY BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR 'DIFFERENTIATION', 'EXCLUSION', —BY VIRTUE OF WHICH WORDS BRING ABOUT THE '*Apoha*, EXCLUSION, OF OTHERS'; [IT IS CALLED 'DIFFERENTIATION'] BECAUSE IT DOES THE *differentiating* (OR *excluding*) OF THE UNIVERSAL, ETC.—(1238)

COMMENTARY.

In the compound '*vishēṣaṇābhidhāyakābhedopachāra*' (in the passage quoted from the *Nyāyamukha*, in the commentary of Text 1237), the term '*vishēṣaṇa*' stands for *differentiation*, i.e. *exclusion*;—and the Word is the '*abhidhāyaka*', denoter, of this *Exclusion*, not of *Universal*, etc.; and there is 'imposition of the identity' of this; in this way is the compound to be explained.—(1238)

Objection :—"If Conceptual Content is 'Idea associated with words', then it is something having properties, an *object*; it is not likely for one object to belong to another object, in view of which its negation or denial could be brought about as a property of it; hence what is asserted is most incoherent. Thus if Sense-perception is 'free from conceptual content', then how is it spoken of by the word 'Sense-perception'?"

This is the objection that is urged by *Bharga*, *Bhāradvāja* and others, who think that the term 'free from Conceptual Content' is synonymous with 'inexpressible by words'.

The Author says that this objection has been answered already :—

TEXTS (1239–1242).

CONCEPTUAL CONTENT BEING HELD TO BE AS ACTUALLY UNDERSTOOD AND DESCRIBED ABOVE, IT IS THE DENIAL OF THE SAMENESS OF THIS WITH SENSE-PERCEPTION THAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED; AND THIS IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE FACT OF ITS BEING SPOKEN OF BY SUCH WORDS AS '*Adhyakṣa*' ('*Pratyakṣa*') AND THE LIKE. IN SENSE-PERCEPTION THERE IS ABSENCE OF CONCEPTUAL CONTENT, BUT 'CONCEPTUAL CONTENT' IS NOT THE SAME AS 'EXPRESSED BY WORDS'. OTHERWISE, COLOUR, ODOUR AND THE REST WOULD BECOME DETERMINATE (AS THEY ARE 'EXPRESSED BY WORDS').—THUS THERE IS NO ROOM FOR WHAT THE DULL-WITTED PERSONS HAVE URGED.—IF THE WORD 'SENSE-PERCEPTION' ACTUALLY DENOTES *Sense-perception*, THEN HOW CAN ITS BEING SAID TO BE 'FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT' BE HELD TO BE IMPROPER ?—(1239–1242)

COMMENTARY.

'*Denial of the sameness*';—when *Diṅnāga* says that 'where there is no Conceptual Content, that is Sense-perception' what he does is to deny the sameness of the two; the meaning being [that Sense-perception is] that Cognition which is *not* of the nature of the said Conceptual Content;—it does not deny what is contained in the 'content'.

This disposes of the first objection.

The second objection also is not proper; because 'freedom from Conceptual Content' is not 'inexpressibility by words', it is only 'freedom determining concepts'. Even though the Cognition is non-determinate, yet it is regarded as *expressed by words*, by reason of its being actually found to be so expressed; and yet it does not become '*determinate*, being, in this respect, like Colour and other things (which, though expressed by words, do not become determinate on that account). This is only by the way.—(1239–1242)

The following might be urged:—"Conceptual Content may be as described. But how does Sense-perception become proved to be 'free from Conceptual Content'?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1243).

THAT SENSE-PERCEPTION IS 'FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT' IS RECOGNISED VERY CLEARLY; SINCE IT IS FOUND THAT EVEN WHEN ONE HAS HIS MIND ATTRACTED BY SOMETHING ELSE, HE HAS THE PERCEPTION OF THE BLUE COLOUR AND OTHER THINGS THROUGH HIS SENSES.—(1243)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that the absence of Conceptual Content is clearly perceived in one's own experience.—(1243)

It might be urged that—" It is the Conceptual Content itself attracted by other things, which perceives the Blue Colour and other things ".

Answer :—

TEXT (1244).

THIS SAME CONCEPTUAL CONTENT DOES NOT APPREHEND THE SAID OBJECT ; BECAUSE IF IT DID, IT WOULD ABANDON THE EXPRESSING OF THE 'PAST', ETC. AND THERE WOULD BE THE INCONGRUITY OF ITS BEING CONNECTED WITH THE NAME OF THAT OBJECT.—(1244)

COMMENTARY.

If that same Conceptual Content apprehended the said object (Blue Colour, etc.), then it would abandon the signifying of past and other things, and would contain within itself the name of the 'Blue' itself.

The 'abandoning of the signifying of the past and other things' has been asserted, because the Conceptual Content cannot be associated with two sets of words.

The Compound '*tannāma, etc.*' is to be explained as—'There would the incongruity of the connection of the name of the object before the perceiver'.—(1244)

It might be argued that—" In that case, there may be some other Conceptual Content that would apprehend the object ;—why is not this view accepted ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (1245).

AT THE PARTICULAR TIME, THERE IS NO OTHER CONCEPTUAL CONTENT WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NAME OF THAT OBJECT ; BECAUSE THERE IS NO RECOGNITION OF ANY SUCH PERCEPTIBLE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT, AND THE SIMULTANEOUS PRESENCE OF BOTH CANNOT BE DESIRABLE.—(1245)

COMMENTARY.

There are two answers pointed out in due sequence—(1) the opponent's idea being contrary to perceived facts, and (2) its being contrary to his own doctrines ; inasmuch as it involves the presence of two Conceptual Contents at the same time.

'*Both*'—i.e. the two Conceptual Contents.—(1245)

The following *Text* sums up the subject :—

TEXT (1246).

As a matter of fact, what makes the cognition determinate appears along with the Cognition itself; hence the Cognition brought about by the Senses is clearly *non-determinate* (free from Conceptual Content).—(1246)

The Opponent might urge that the fact of the 'determining factor' appearing along with the Cognition cannot be accepted. This is the argument put forward in the following—

TEXT (1247).

If it be held that "Cognitions appear in succession (never simultaneously), and the idea of simultaneous appearance is due to the quickness of the succession; as in the case of the whirling fire-brand"—[then the answer is as stated in the following Text].—(1247)

COMMENTARY.

The question being raised as to why the Cognitions are perceived as appearing simultaneously, if, in reality, they appear in succession,—the answer given is that '*the idea of simultaneous, etc. etc.*'; as in the case of the *whirling fire-brand*. That is, in the case of the whirling fire-brand, it is found that when the whirling is done very quickly, the idea produced is that of a single flaming circle; all the several perceptions being mixed up as *one*; in the same manner, cognitions appearing very quickly one after the other, there is the idea of their appearing together as *one*.

Or, the term '*alāta*' may be taken as standing for the perceptions of the fire-brand,—the *cognition* being spoken of figuratively as the *object*; the sense of the affix '*vati*' remains the same as before, in this interpretation also.—(1247)

The above argument of the Opponent is answered in the following—

TEXT (1248).

What has been asserted is that there is no perceptible Conceptual Content which is associated with the name of the object before the man's eyes.—(?)—(1248)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—What is being dealt with is not the fact of the two appearing together, but the absence of Conceptual Content in the

Perception ; and this absence is proved by the fact that even when a man has his mind elsewhere at the time of the apprehension of the object before his eyes, he does not apprehend the otherwise apprehensible Conceptual Content associated with the name of that object. And the Opponent has urged no criticism against this. Because, even if the two cognitions are actually apprehended in succession,—the Conceptual Content is not apprehended ; so that the attack does not affect our main position.—(1248)

The following *Text* shows that the idea of the simultaneous appearance of the two cognitions is entirely mistaken :—

TEXT (1249).

THAT THE SAID IDEA (OF THE SIMULTANEITY OF THE OTHER CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND THE COGNITION) [CANNOT] BE WRONG HAS JUST BEEN MADE CLEAR. AND THIS SAME SIMULTANEITY BETWEEN THE OBJECT AND THE COGNITION IS ALSO QUITE CLEAR FOR THAT SAME REASON.—(1249)

COMMENTARY.

'It *cannot* be wrong '—such is to be the construction along with what has gone before.

Its idea—i.e. the idea of the two appearing at one and the same time.

As a matter of fact, an idea is regarded as *wrong* when it is annulled by a valid cognition to the contrary ; in the present case there is no such cognition to the contrary, by virtue of which the idea in question could be regarded as *wrong*.

"How do you know that there is no such cognition to the contrary ?"

Answer :—This has just been made clear ;—that the cognition of the object before the man's eyes appears at the same time as the mind is attracted by something else—is clearly perceived ; and it is this cognition that is called 'Sense-perception' ;—wherefore then is there anything wrong in this ?—(1249)

It is not only that there is nothing to prove that the idea of the said simultaneity *is wrong*,—in fact, there is proof to the contrary (to show that it is *not wrong*). This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1250–1253).

IN THE STATE OF THINGS ATTENDING UPON THE WATCHING OF THE DANCING GIRL, THE WHOLE LOT SENSATIONS IS APPREHENDED AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME, EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE MANY INTERVENING FACTORS. IF THIS ALSO WERE REGARDED AS A MISTAKE DUE TO THE QUICK SUCCESSION IN WHICH THE SENSATIONS APPEAR,—THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) THERE IS STILL QUICKER SUCCESSION IN THE CASE OF COGNITIONS PRODUCED BY THE TWO WORDS '*latā*' AND '*tāla*' WHEN PRONOUNCED TOGETHER; WHY THEN IS THERE NO IDEA OF SIMULTANEITY IN THIS CASE ?—THEN IN A CASE WHERE THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND ALONE ARE CONCERNED, NO SUCCESSION SHOULD BE PERCEIVED, BECAUSE ALL COGNITIONS (MENTAL OPERATIONS) OCCUR IN QUICK SUCCESSION AND DO NOT STAY FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME. SO THAT IN ALL THESE CASES (OF QUICK SUCCESSION), NO SUCCESSION COULD BE PERCEIVED. THE NOTION OF SIMULTANEOUS COGNITION HOWEVER WOULD BE THERE, JUST AS IN THE CASE OF PERCEPTION OF SOUND, ETC. (IN THE CASE OF THE DANCING GIRL).—(1250–1253)

COMMENTARY.

Under such conditions as the witnessing of the dancing girl, we find that each single sensation, even though intervened by five other sensations, appears to be close to, and unseparated from, the other ; for instance, at the same time that one *sees* the girl dancing, he also *hears* the song and its accompaniments, goes on *tasting* the camphor and other spices, smells the sweet fragrance of flowers placed before the nostrils, *touches* the air proceeding from the fans and *thinks* of making presents of clothes and ornaments. [All this goes on simultaneously.] Thus even when there are so many intervening factors, among the several cognitions, there appears the illusion that all these appear at one and the same time,—this illusion being due to the quick succession in which the cognitions appear ;—such being the case even when there are several intervening factors, it becomes all the more possible that there should be the notion of the letters being pronounced at one and the same time, in cases where two words like '*latā*' and '*tāla*',—or '*saraḥ*' and '*rasaḥ*' are pronounced, where the utterance of the syllables is so much quicker ; so that in the case of such utterances as '*saraḥ-rasaḥ*', when the words are heard, there should be no recognition of the two different words or the two different things denoted by them.—Further, in a case where there is Conceptual Content in the form of pondering over several philosophical and literary problems,—which ponderings are not interrupted by heterogeneous sensations through the Eye, etc.,—the appearance of the ideas is extremely quick ; and hence it would not be possible to form any idea of succession in them. And as all Cognitions are momentary, and cannot continue for any length of time they always appear quickly ; so that the cognition of nothing could be successive at all ;—'*just as in the case of the perception of sound, etc.*' ;—i.e. just as in the

case of the perception of sound, taste, etc. while seeing the girl dancing.—(1250–1253)

As regards the instance of the 'Whirling Fire-brand', it is 'devoid of the Probandum';—this is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1254–1256).

IN THE CASE OF THE WHIRLING FIRE-BRAND, THE ILLUSION OF SIMULTANEITY APPEARS IN THE FORM OF THE CIRCLE; THIS NOTION OF THE CIRCLE IS NOT DUE TO THE CONNECTING OF THE VARIOUS PERCEPTIONS OF THE FIRE-BRAND AS IT IS WHIRLED ROUND; BECAUSE THE (CONTINUOUS) CIRCULAR FORM IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED. IN FACT, THE SAID CONNECTING OF THE VARIOUS PERCEPTIONS COULD BE DONE ONLY BY REMEMBRANCE, NOT BY DIRECT PERCEPTION; AS NO PERCEPTION CAN APPREHEND WHAT IS PAST AND GONE.—THE OBJECT ALSO OF THE REMEMBRANCE COULD NOT BE VERY CLEAR, AS IT HAS ALREADY DISAPPEARED; FOR THIS SAME REASON, THE APPEARANCE OF THE CIRCLE ALSO COULD NOT BE VERY CLEAR (IF IT WERE DUE TO THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE MANY COGNITIONS).—(1254–1256)

COMMENTARY.

When this mental illusion appears, it does not appear as combining the several visual perceptions (of the Fire-brand); it appears only as the Sense-born single perception of the Circular form, through the force of certain accessory circumstances; that this is so is clear from the fact that the perception is quite clear; and it would not be so clear if it were accompanied by the Conceptual Content. Because such combination of perceptions could be done only by Remembrance, not by Sense-born Perception; as the latter functions only when the object perceived is close by, and hence it could not apprehend what is past and gone. The object too of such a Remembrance could not be clear;—why?—because it will have already disappeared.—Hence, as the perception of the Whirling Fire-brand, if it were an illusion, would be indistinct,—it cannot be an illusion; in fact, it is a sense-born regular Perception. Thus the Instance cited by the Opponent is devoid of the character sought to be proved.—(1254–1256)

Having thus established—by means of *Perception* itself—the fact of Sense-perception being 'free from Conceptual Content',—the Author proceeds to prove it by means of *Inference*:—

TEXTS (1257–1260).

OR AGAIN, WHEN THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A THING IN A CERTAIN FORM,—THAT THING IN THAT FORM IS NOT ADMITTED AS REAL, BY THE WISE. FOR INSTANCE, THE WHITE HORSE IS NOT ADMITTED TO BE THE COW BECAUSE THE DEWLAP AND THE OTHER FEATURES OF THE COW ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE HORSE. IN THE CASE OF SENSE-PERCEPTION THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE PRESENCE OF THE *determinate character* (THE CHARACTER OF BEING ASSOCIATED WITH CONCEPTUAL CONTENT), WHICH COULD BRING ABOUT THE APPREHENSION OF THE THING ALONG WITH ITS PROPERTIES. —SPOTTED AND OTHER COWS ARE INSTANCES TO THE CONTRARY. IF IT WERE NOT SO, IT WOULD LEAD TO ABSURD CONTINGENCIES.— THE REASON ADDUCED CANNOT BE SAID TO BE 'UNPROVEN' (OR NOT-ADMITTED); AS THE UNIVERSAL AND OTHER QUALIFYING FACTORS HAVE ALL BEEN REJECTED. NOR ARE THE PROPERTIES COGNISED AS APART FROM THOSE FACTORS. NOR ARE THERE ANY SUCH PROPERTIES.—(1257–1260)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be thus formulated :—When the basis of the idea of a thing in a certain form is absent, that thing is not accepted by intelligent persons to be of that form ;—for instance, the White Horse is not accepted as of the form of the Cow, because the basis of the 'cow-idea', in the shape of the dewlap and other characteristics of the Cow, is absent in the Horse ;—in the case of Sense-perception, which is produced on the basis of the specific object *Blue*,—the basis for its being regarded as associated with Conceptual Content (i.e. Determinate), in the form of the apprehension of the object along with its properties, is absent ; and thus there being no apprehension of the Cause [the effect, in the shape of its being associated with Conceptual Content cannot be there]. The Spotted and Black Cows supply the Corroborative Instance *per contra*. Lastly, there is the possibility of the incongruity that all things might become accepted to be of all forms and that the person accepting things would come to be regarded as stupid.—Such is the upshot of the Inference put forward.

'*Karka*' is *white Horse*.

'*Universal, etc.*'—i.e. the qualifying factors (postulated by the Realists).

Even if the Universal and the rest are real entities, our Reason is not 'Unproven' ;—this is what is meant by the words—'*Nor is the thing, etc.*' ; i.e. as apart from Colour and the rest which have been held to be qualified by the Properties (Universal, etc.).

Question : "If there is no cognition of Properties as distinct from what is qualified, then, why should it not be a qualifying factor ?"

Answer :—'*Nor are there any such Properties*'—i.e. as differentiated from the thing.

From all this it follows that there is no apprehension of anything along with its properties. Hence the Reason adduced by us cannot be said to be 'Unproven'.—(1257–1260)

It might be argued that—"There may be no qualifying Properties in the shape of the Universal and the rest; the form of the word itself will be the distinguishing property."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1261–1263).

THE NAME ALSO, WHICH WOULD BE THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' OF THE WORD, CAN NEVER BE DENOTATIVE; AS THE IDEA OF THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' BEING THE DENOTER OR THE DENOTED HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED.—IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE IDEA OF THE DENOTER AND DENOTED HAS BEEN REGARDED AS SOMETHING SUPERIMPOSED (UPON THINGS);—WHILE WHAT ONE APPREHENDS BY SENSE-PERCEPTION IS SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT SUPERIMPOSED; BECAUSE THIS PERCEPTION IS THERE ONLY WHEN THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' IS THERE,—AND IT IS NOT THERE WHEN THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY IS NOT THERE—THROUGH THE INTERVENTION OF SOMETHING ELSE OR SOME SUCH REASON.—(1261–1263)

COMMENTARY.

There can be no Convention in regard to the 'Specific Individuality',—not even to the 'Specific Individuality' of the Word; for the simple reason that there can be no connection with Convention at the time of usage; and apart from its 'Specific Individuality', there is no other form of the Word; nor again can the Word be connected with anything with regard to which there has been no Convention; if it did, it would lead to absurdities;—nor can there be any Conceptual Content without connection with words;—from all this it follows that the whole idea of the *Denoter and Denoted* is something 'superimposed'—imaginary—not real.

It might be argued that—"even so, the Perception shall become *associated with Conceptual Content* (Determinate) through apprehending the 'superimposed' thing."

The answer is that '*what one apprehends, etc. etc.*'

'*When it is not there*',—i.e. *through its absence,*—the word '*vyatirēkataḥ*' being construed here; the sense being that 'it is through the absence of the Specific Individuality (that the Perception also is absent)'.

Question:—"When is there absence of the Specific Individuality?"

Answer:—'*Through the intervention, etc. etc.*'—The term 'some such reason' stands for the distance of time, place and so forth.—(1261–1263)

The following *Text* adduces another proof for the same :—

TEXT (1264).

THE NATURE OF THE BLUE AND OTHER THINGS, BEING INDIVIDUALLY SPECIFIC, IS INCAPABLE OF HAVING ANY CONVENTION IN REGARD TO IT; THE PERCEPTION OF THESE THINGS, THEREFORE, CANNOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH WORDS.—(1264)

COMMENTARY.

The nature—essence—*of the Blue and other things* is such that no Convention can be made in regard to them.

The question being—"why is it so ?",—the answer is '*being individually specific*'; that is, it is incapable of being present at the time of usage; and Convention is for the purpose of usage alone; hence there can be no Convention in regard to it.

Further, there is Convention only when the thing concerned has already become cognised,—not while it remains uncognised, unknown; and until the Perception has come about, it cannot apprehend the Blue, etc.; and as soon as it has come about, it would (according to the Opponent) at once associate it with words; but at the time that the Perception actually appears, —and also at the time of the apprehension of the related verbal expression,— the perceived thing, being momentary, cannot be present, and hence the Perception cannot apprehend it; by what then, and with what, would the Word be associated ? From all this it is clear that *the nature of the Blue and other things is incapable of having any convention in regard to it.*

'*Of these*'—i.e. of the Blue and other things.

'*Cannot be associated, etc. etc.*'—i.e. the verbal expression cannot enter into it.

The argument may be formulated thus :—When a thing is such that no Convention is known in regard to it,—there can be no 'determinate' Perception of it,—e.g. the Visual Perception of Odour ;—and the Perception of the Blue, etc. is such that no Convention is known in regard to it,—hence the idea of the Perception being 'determinate' would involve a notion contrary to a wider proposition.—(1264)

In the following *texts*, the Author sets forth the 'inadmissible character' of the Reason put forward by himself (under Texts 1257–1260),—this criticism being urged from the standpoint of the *Digambara* (Jaina) philosopher, *Sumati* :—

TEXTS (1265–1267).

"NAME (UNIVERSAL) AND THE REST MAY NOT BE THE DISTINGUISHING PROPERTIES PERCEIVED, IN THE OBJECT (OF SENSE-PERCEPTION) ;—EVEN SO, THE REASON PUT FORWARD DOES NOT CEASE TO BE *inadmissible* ; BECAUSE IF THERE IS NO APPREHENSION OF THE THING AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER THINGS, THEN, THERE WOULD EITHER BE AN APPREHENSION OF THE THING BY ITSELF ONLY, OR NO APPREHENSION AT ALL ; AS IN THE CASE OF THE JAR,—IF THERE IS NO APPREHENSION OF THE JAR AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER JARS, THEN THERE IS EITHER APPREHENSION OF THE JAR BY ITSELF ALONE, OR NO APPREHENSION OF THE JAR AT ALL."—(1265–1267)

COMMENTARY.

Sumati describes all things as existing in two forms—the Universal and the Particular ; the Universal again is of two kinds—one determined by the Particular, e.g. the 'Cow', and that not so determined (conceptual), e.g. 'Being', 'Entity'. That Universal which exists only in the *undetermined* (non-conceptual) form is of only one form and is amenable to *non-conceptual* Perception (Perception free from Conceptual Content), in the form of mere *observation*, purely *subjective Ideation* ; while the other—i.e. the Universal determined by particulars—is amenable to *Conceptual* Perception.—Such is *Sumati's* scheme of Perception.

Kumārila however describes the Non-Conceptual Perception, purely subjective Ideation, as apprehending the 'Specific Individuality' of the particular (or Individual) ; and the Conceptual Perception as apprehending the 'Universal'.

Sumati, in examining the nature of Perception in the form of purely *subjective Ideation* as posited by *Kumārila* and others, has argued thus—"One who holds this view should be asked the following question.—In this Perception, is the Thing before the eyes of the observer apprehended purely by itself, as characterised by its own form which is impossible anywhere else ? Or is it not so apprehended ?—If he says it is not so perceived, then our answer to him is as follows :—If there is *non-apprehension of the Thing in a form distinguished* from other things ;—that is, in a form distinguished from a thing other than the intended thing,—i.e. the form or character of the intended thing which is not present in the other thing ;—if there is non-apprehension of the Thing as qualified by such a form,—then, either *there would be apprehension of the Thing itself only*,—i.e. the said Thing even without the character impossible in other things ;—or, if even this is not apprehended, then there would be no perception of the Thing at all.—'*As in the case of the Jar*' ;—this cites an example.

This example is explained in the next text (1267) :—"In the case of the perception of the Jar, if there is no apprehension of the Jar in the form that is impossible in another Jar, to which it may be compared,—then either there would be apprehension of the Jar by itself alone,—without any quali-

fication as that of being of silver or of copper and so forth;—or, if there is no apprehension of the Jar by itself, then there would be no apprehension of any Jar at all,—not even of the one intended; so that there would be no apprehension of the Jar at all.—In the same manner, in the case in question if the distinguishing character is not apprehended, there would either be apprehension of the thing alone by itself,—or there would be no apprehension at all; there could be no escape from these alternatives ".—(1265–1267)

[*Sumati's*] *Pūrvapakṣa* (Criticism) against us thus would be as follows :—

TEXT (1268).

"If Perception is regarded as apprehending the Thing as distinguished from other apprehensible things,—then this cognition would be *Conceptual* (Determinate), just like the cognition of the Tree and other things."—(1268)

COMMENTARY.

"If Sense-perception is intended to be apprehensive of the Thing as characterised (distinguished) by a character not found anywhere else,—then it becomes *Conceptual*; because it apprehends the thing as *characterised* or qualified by some character; just like the Perception in the form 'This is a tree'."—(1268)

The following argument might be urged against *Sumati* :—'There is no such thing as the *Thing itself* which could be apprehended as qualified by a character; what there *is* is only that *qualified thing* which is held by you, and also by me, to be the Particular (or Individual); it is this only that exists and is apprehended'.

To this *Sumati* makes the following answer :—

TEXT (1269).

"There is no Particular (or Individual) without a touch of the Universal. If this is not touched in the apprehension, then the Particular, becoming devoid of Being, cannot be apprehended."—(1269)

COMMENTARY.

"The term '*mātra*', 'itself', in the Opponent's statements stands for the Universal, that which is called 'Being'; and absolutely independent of this Universal, there is no Particular (or Individual) which could be apprehended.—It might be said—'Under your view there may be such a Universal, but this is not touched at all at the time of the apprehension'.—Our answer to that is—*If this is not quite clear in the apprehension, that is due to its having*

become devoid of Being:—that is, if, at the time of apprehension, the said Universal 'Being' is not touched by Sense-perception,—and the Particular (or Individual) alone is apprehended,—then this Particular by itself, if apprehended at all, would be devoid of existence, as devoid of the character known as 'Being';—and thus it could become characterless; and as such could not be apprehended by Sense-perception, because it would be *devoid of Being*,—having lost its Being or Existence, and become like the 'sky-flower'."—(1269)

TEXT (1270).

"THE ASSERTION THAT THE COGNITION APPREHENDS A *qualified* THING, AND YET IT IS NOT *Conceptual* IMPLIES GREAT TEMERITY INDEED! CERTAINLY, NO 'QUALIFICATION' IS POSSIBLE EXCEPT THROUGH CONNECTION WITH QUALIFICATIONS."—(1270)

COMMENTARY.

"From all this it follows that your assertion—that the Cognition apprehends a *qualified* object, and yet there is in it no Conceptual Content implies great temerity on your part, in making an assertion opposed to all canons of Right Cognition."

This sums up the criticism against the Buddhist doctrine.

"The Reason for this is provided, in the words—'*Certainly no qualification, etc. etc.*'—that is to say, just as a man does not become a *stick-holder*, without the *stick*,—so a thing cannot be *qualified* without connection with *qualifications*.—Hence that cognition which apprehends the qualifications is '*Conceptual*' (with Conceptual Content).

"The argument may be formulated as follows:—The Apprehension of the qualified thing, which is under dispute, *is Conceptual*,—because it apprehends a qualified thing,—like the cognition 'This is a piece of Cloth'."—(1270)

The following *Text* proceeds to answer the above criticisms of *Sumati*:—

TEXT (1271).

WHEN THE COGNITION IS HELD TO APPREHEND THE QUALIFIED THING,—IT IS BY REASON OF ITS APPREHENDING THE THING AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM OTHER HOMOGENEOUS AND HETEROGENEOUS THINGS,—AND NOT OF THE CONNECTION OF QUALIFICATIONS.—(1271)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant by *Sumati's* Reason—'because it apprehends the qualified thing' is the presence of a qualification which is something distinct

from itself,—then it is 'inadmissible'; because for the Buddhist, there is no such thing as the 'qualification', through connection with which the cognition would apprehend things along with qualifications; according to the Buddhist, what is apprehended is only the Thing itself as differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous things; and it is by reason of this latter apprehension that the Cognition is said to apprehend the 'qualified' thing.—(1271)

Question :—"Then are all such expressions as 'qualified', 'being distinguished', 'qualified character', and so forth purely *negative* ?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1272).

WHAT IS MEANT BY 'BEING QUALIFIED' (DISTINGUISHED) IS 'DIFFERENCE' —NOT THE *connection of qualifications*. BUT THE IDEA ALSO THAT 'THIS IS *different*' IS NOT COGNISED AS ASSOCIATED WITH WORDS.—(1272)

COMMENTARY.

'*Difference*'—i.e. Differentiation (Preclusion) from homogeneous and heterogeneous things;—and this is not anything different from the thing differentiated; it is the thing itself which is spoken of in that form, through the exclusion of other things, when this exclusion is meant to be emphasised.

The following might be urged—"If there is always the apprehension of the Thing as distinguished from homogeneous and heterogeneous things, then the Apprehension becomes '*determinate*' (Conceptual); because it appears in the Verbal form 'This is different'. Otherwise how could it apprehend the 'difference', if it appeared in any other form? When a certain apprehension appears in one form, it cannot be said to apprehend another; if it did so, it would lead to an absurdity."

The answer to this is—'*But the idea also, etc. etc.*'—(1272)

Question :—"How is it then that it is *said* to be 'different'?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1273).

IT IS ONLY AFTER THE THING HAS BEEN APPREHENDED AS THE 'NEGATION OF ALL THINGS OTHER THAN ITSELF',—THAT THERE APPEARS THE CONCEPTUAL COGNITION IN THE SAID FORM. —(1273)

COMMENTARY.

'*Svabhāvāt*'—other than its own self.—When the Thing has been apprehended *as the negation of*—as differentiated from—all other things,—and when the (non-conceptual) perception in the specific form of the Blue has

appeared,—then there follows the Conceptual Content associated with the words 'it is different'. If this were not so, then it would be something of the nature of purely verbal expression, or the essence of the thing as associated with the verbal expression, through which the thing could be associated with the name 'different' or 'non-different', and apprehended as such.

From all this it follows that our Reason is not 'inadmissible'.—(1273)

In case the Reason adduced by the Opponent—'because it apprehends a qualified thing'—is based on the idea that through 'negation' (differentiation) itself the thing becomes *qualified*,—even though it be not *qualified* in the sense of being connected with a qualification in the shape of some other thing,—even so our Reason cannot become 'Inconclusive'.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1274).

Other people regard the Universal as not distinguished by qualifications,—which Universal they regard as apprehended by Non-conceptual Perception. What has been urged is applicable to that also.—(1274)

COMMENTARY.

The Universal has been held to be of two kinds—(1) distinguished by qualifications, and (2) not distinguished by qualifications. That which is not distinguished by qualifications has been held to be apprehended by Non-conceptual Perception.

'*To that*'—i.e. to the Universal.—Hence the charge of being apprehended by Conceptual Perception would apply to these also.—(1274)

Question:—"How so?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1275).

The Universal is recognised as 'distinguished' from the Particular; hence the Perception of it would have to be regarded (under the opponent's contention) as Conceptual.—(1275)

COMMENTARY.

That is understood to be the Universal which is 'qualified'—i.e. distinguished'—from the Particular; if it were not so, then there would be no Universal at all, if it were not excluded—distinguished—from the Particular.—Such being the case, the Perception that apprehends this Universal, as distinguished from the Particular, becomes 'Conceptual', as it apprehends

something that is *qualified.* And yet, according to your view, this cognition is *not* conceptual ; hence your Reason is itself Inconclusive.—(1275)

The said *Sumati* himself, anticipating the objection that his own Reason becomes 'Inconclusive' by the case of the Universal, has answered it. This answer is shown in the following—

TEXT (1276).

"A THING IS CALLED 'UNIVERSAL' WHEN IT IS APPREHENDED WITHOUT DISTINCTION ; HENCE IT IS NOT RIGHT TO REGARD THE UNIVERSAL AS SOMETHING DISTINGUISHED FROM THE PARTICULAR."
—(1276)

COMMENTARY.

There is no 'Universal' apart from the *Particulars,* by virtue of which on being apprehended it would be amenable to Conceptual Perception ; in fact, it is only when the Particulars are apprehended without distinction that they are called 'Universal' ; that is to say, when they are not cognised, each in its own distinctive form, they are called 'Universal'. Consequently, how could the Universal be 'distinguished' from the Particulars, by virtue of which its apprehension would become 'conceptual'.—(1276)

Question :—How then can there be a clear division between the Universal and the Particular ?

Answer (provided by *Sumati*) :—

TEXT (1277).

"WHEN THESE (PARTICULARS) ARE COGNISED AS SIMILAR OR DISSIMILAR, THEY INDICATE THE EXISTENCE IN THEMSELVES, OF THE CHARACTER OF THE 'UNIVERSAL' OR THE 'PARTICULAR'."—(1277)

COMMENTARY.

"These same Particulars, according as they are cognised as similar or dissimilar, become spoken of as 'Universal' or 'Particular', respectively

and in this way they bring about a division between the use of the two names, 'Universal' and 'Particular'."—(1277)

The above criticism of *Sumati's* is answered in the following—

TEXTS (1278-1279).

IF THE SAID 'SIMILARITY' AND 'DISSIMILARITY' ARE HELD TO BE DIFFERENTIATED, THEN THE FACT OF THE UNIVERSAL BEING DISTINGUISHED FROM THE PARTICULARS REMAINS AS BEFORE.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY ARE NOT HELD TO BE DIFFERENTIATED, THEN, HOW CAN THE CLEARLY MARKED DIVISION BE POSSIBLE, WITHOUT CROSSING EACH OTHER? THERE IS NO OTHER WAY IN WHICH THEY COULD BE CONCEIVED.—(1278-1279)

COMMENTARY.

'*Differentiated*':—Not mixed up; i.e. the Universal being one thing and the Particular being another thing.

That the Universal is distinguished from the Particular is said only by way of illustration; in fact the Particular also is distinguished from the Universal; as both these having distinct characters are clearly distinguished from one another.

'*The fact, etc.*'—'*Asaṅkīrṇā*' is *unmixed*. This has been declared by the same *Sumati* in the following words—"The Particular is perceived only as infused with the character of such Universals as 'Being' and the like, not otherwise; hence it is only right that what is *qualified* should form the object of a qualified (determinate, conceptual) Perception; as for the Universal, on the other hand, it is capable of being perceived independently of all Particulars; and hence there can be nothing incongruous in its forming the object of the non-conceptual Perception".—This clearly marked distinction would not be there.

It might be argued that—"It is not held to be either distinguished or undistinguished."

The answer to that is—'*How can, etc. etc.*'—As a matter of fact, among things so related that the presence or absence of one must imply the absence or presence of another,—the negation of one is inseparable from the affirmation of another; consequently, there can be no other alternative.—(1278-1279)

Then again, to speak of the Particulars as apprehended 'without distinction' involves a contradiction in terms.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1280-1281).

OF THE PARTICULAR THINGS THERE IS NO OTHER CHARACTERISTIC EXCEPT THAT OF BEING 'PARTICULAR' (OR 'DISTINCT'); HOW THEN CAN THERE BE ANY APPREHENSION OF THEM WHICH DOES NOT ENVISAGE THE 'DISTINCT' FORM? EVEN IF THEIR FORMS ARE ENVISAGED, THEY ARE APPREHENDED ONLY AS DISTINCT FROM OTHER PARTICULARS; SO THAT THEIR PERCEPTION WOULD BE 'CONCEPTUAL'. —(1280–1283)

COMMENTARY.

There is no 'Particular' apart from the various Things. If then, the Particular were not envisaged in the apprehension of the Universal, how could the various Things be apprehended? That is to say, being non-different from the nature of what is not apprehended, the Particulars also would be not-apprehended.

If it be held that the various Things *are* apprehended,—then, if these forms are envisaged,—and are apprehended,—the *Particular* also would be apprehended, being, as it is, non-different from what has been apprehended. So that, in regard to these various things, the Cognition that is held to be apprehensive of the *Universal* turns out to be *conceptual*.—(1280-1281)

Further, it may be that the Universal being non-different from the Particulars, it may not be 'distinguished' from those; even so, the Universal would certainly be 'distinguished' from such featureless non-entities as the 'Hare's Horn'; and it would thus become apprehensible by Conceptual Perception; and yet it is not so; hence your reason remains 'Inconclusive'.

This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (1282–1283).

THE UNIVERSAL IS COGNISED AS 'DISTINGUISHED' (DISTINCT) FROM THE *featureless* THING; HENCE FOR YOU, IT SHOULD BE COGNISABLE BY CONCEPTUAL PERCEPTION.—IF IT BE URGED THAT "THE UNIVERSAL CANNOT BE REGARDED AS *distinguished* FROM A NON-ENTITY",—THEN (WE ASK) IS IT OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE NON-ENTITY? IF NOT, THEN WHY IS IT NOT ADMITTED THAT IT IS 'DISTINGUISHED' FROM IT?—(1282-1283)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged:—"There can be no distinction made between the Universal and the Non-entity; nor can there be any similarity

between them. Because that is supposed to be a *non-entity* which is *not anything*; and such a thing cannot be either 'distinguished' from, or similar to, the Universal. If it were, it would be an *Entity*.—Even if the Void—i.e. the Non-entity—were 'distinguished' from the Universal, then also it would be an *entity*; because a *non-entity* cannot have the character of 'being distinguished'; and without the character of 'being distinguished' a thing cannot be regarded as 'distinguished'.—Nor can the Non-entity be 'similar' to the Universal; as even so it would have to be an *entity*. *A non-entity* cannot have a form similar to something else; and unless a thing has a form similar to another's, it cannot be regarded as 'similar' to it; as otherwise it would lead to an absurdity.—Hence relatively to the *Void* (Non-entity), the Universal cannot be said to be either *distinguished* (distinct) or *similar*. Because when one thing is either distinct or similar in relation to another thing, then this latter also has to be regarded as distinct from, or similar to, the former. If it were not so, then the others also could not be perceived as distinct from, or similar to, it.—Further, there is no such thing as 'non-entity' apart from *entity*; when an entity is not found to be another entity, it is called 'non-entity' in relation to it; how then could it be 'distinguished'?"

All this has been argued by *Sumati*; as against all this, the Author proceeds to urge as follows :—

TEXT (1284).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, IN THE CASE OF THE *entity* ALSO, BEING 'DISTINGUISHED' CONSISTS IN *not being that same*; AND AS THE UNIVERSAL IS *not the same* AS THE NON-ENTITY, WHY CAN YOU NOT REGARD IT AS BEING 'DISTINGUISHED' FROM THE NON-ENTITY?—(1284)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the *entity* also, when it is 'distinguished' from *Non-entity*, this 'being distinguished' is not anything different; it is only the *negation of sameness*; the meaning being that it is not the same as the other; and this can be equally so in the case of the Universal also, in relation to the Non-entity, like the Hare's Horn. Because the Hare's Horn is a *non-entity* in the sense that it is not capable of any action whatever;—the Universal on the other hand is not regarded as so incapable;—so that its *being distinguished* from the Non-entity is quite clear. That there should be the distinction of the Universal from the Non-entity, and yet the Non-entity does not become an entity,—that is nothing very important.

As regards the *Non-entity*, the assertion (made by *Sumati*) that it is nothing different from *Entity* and so forth,—it is clear that the writer has not pondered over the meaning of his own assertion: Because when it is said that 'an Entity is not found to be another entity', the fact of its being 'distinguished' from it becomes asserted; because it speaks of its *preclusion* from it.—All

that has been urged, therefore, is only the effect of blindness. Hence we desist from further argumentation.—(1284)

The upshot of his whole argument is stated by the Author in the following—

TEXT (1285).

FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT WHATEVER COGNITION APPEARS IN REGARD TO THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' OF THINGS APPERTAINS TO WHAT IS BEYOND THE RANGE OF WORDS AND IS HENCE *non-conceptual*.—(1285)

COMMENTARY.

With the following *Texts*, the Author proceeds to present the view of *Kumārila*; and thereby indicates the charge against his own Reason (Premiss) —put forward (under *Text* 1257 above), to the effect that 'when there is no basis for the existence of a thing in a certain form, that thing, in that form, cannot be admitted as real',—that it is partly 'inadmissible' as not present in a part of the Subject of the Reasoning:—

TEXTS (1286–1288).

"AT FIRST THERE IS ONLY A *pre-cognition*, WHICH IS *non-conceptual*, LIKE THE COGNITION OF THE INFANT AND THE DUMB AND THE LIKE;—IT IS BORN PURELY OF THE THING (COGNISED); AT THAT MOMENT, NEITHER THE UNIVERSAL NOR THE PARTICULAR CHARACTER IS APPREHENDED; ALL THAT IS APPREHENDED IS ONLY A CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL WHICH IS THE SUBSTRATUM OF BOTH THOSE CHARACTERS.—(*Shlokavārtika—Sense-perception*, 112-113).—SUBSEQUENTLY, THE THING BECOMES APPREHENDED ALONG WITH THE PROPERTIES OF THE 'CLASS-CHARACTER' AND THE REST; AND THE COGNITION ALSO BY WHICH IT IS THUS APPREHENDED IS REGARDED AS 'SENSE-PERCEPTION'.—(*Shlokavārtika*—SENSE-PERCEPTION, 120)."—(1286–1288).

COMMENTARY.

All sense-perceptions are made here the Subject (of the Argument); and the sense is that the Premiss (of the Buddhist)—that 'the basis of *conceptuality*, in the shape of the apprehension of the thing qualified by qualifications, cannot be there'—is not admissible. Because, as a matter of fact, except in the *initial Pre-cognition*, in all other Sense-perceptions, 'the apprehension of the thing as qualified by qualifications' is present.—If the Buddhist puts forward his Premiss in reference to the *Pre-cognition*, then the argument is superfluous.

Such is the view of the Opponent (*Kumārila*).

'*Like the cognition of the infant and the dumb*' ;—i.e. like the infant's cognition, and like the dumb person's cognition.—'*And the rest*' is meant to include the man in a swoon. The only point of similarity in all these cases is *the absence of association with words*'.

'*Purely*' ;—what is meant by this 'purity' is freedom from the two Universals.

This same idea is made clearer in the second text (1287)—'*Neither the Universal nor the Particular, etc. etc.*'—The term '*Particular*' stands for the intermediate Universal, 'Cow' and the like ; and '*Universal*' for the Summum Genus, 'Entity' and the like.—'*The substratum of both these*' ;—this indicates the *pure* thing.

'*Subsequently, etc.*'—This makes clear the partial 'inadmissibility' of the same Premiss. '*Subsequently*'—i.e after the apprehension of the apprehension of the pure thing,—that cognition, by which the thing is apprehended along with the qualifications of the class-character and the rest, is also regarded as 'Sense-perception'.

'*By the class-character, etc.*'—This indicates the apprehension of the Thing as qualified by qualifications.

This shows that the said cognition apprehends what has not been already apprehended ;—and also that the Premiss (of the Buddhist) is inadmissible.—(1286–1288)

TEXT (1289).

"AGAIN AND AGAIN, AS MORE AND MORE CONCEPTUAL CONTENTS COME IN, THERE FOLLOW FURTHER APPREHENSIONS, IN CONNECTION WITH THE SAME ; AND ALL THIS IS REGARDED AS 'SENSE-PERCEPTION'."—(*Shlokavārtika*—SENSE-PERCEPTION, 125).—(1289)

COMMENTARY.

'*Again and again*' ;—i.e. at the third and subsequent moments.

'*There follow further apprehensions*',—i.e. such as apprehend what has not been already apprehended.

'*In connection with the same*' ;—i.e. in accordance with the connection of the sense-organ concerned.—(1289)

The following might be urged (against *Kumārila*) :—If, at the first operation of the Sense-organ concerned, the Thing does not appear as equipped with all its properties in the shape of the Universal and the rest,—then, it should not so appear even subsequently ; as the circumstances are the same in both cases.

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (1290).

"WHEN A MAN RETURNS FROM BRIGHT LIGHT INTO AN INNER ROOM, THINGS DO NOT MANIFEST THEMSELVES TO HIM IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS ENTRANCE; BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT LATER ON HE DOES NOT PERCEIVE THOSE THINGS BY HIS SENSE-ORGANS."—(*Shlokavārtika*—SENSE-PERCEPTION, 126).
—(1290)

COMMENTARY.

'*Uṣṇāt*'—i.e. from bright light.

The construction is '*uṣṇāt praviṣṭamātrāṇām*', 'who have just come in from bright light'.

'*He does not perceive, etc. etc.*'—The particular intonation implies that things are actually apprehended by the sense-organs.—(1290)

Having thus cited the Example, he applies the same idea to the case in question:—

TEXT (1291).

"JUST AS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCES, HE PERCEIVES A MERE SEMBLANCE OF THE THING AND SUBSEQUENTLY HE PERCEIVES THEM IN THEIR TRUE FORM,—SO ALSO WITH THE PROPERTIES OF 'CLASS-CHARACTER' AND THE REST."—(*Shlokavartika*—SENSE-PERCEPTION, 127).—(1291)

COMMENTARY.

In the inner room, the Man apprehends the mere semblance of the thing; later on he apprehends the thing more specifically as 'blue' and so forth;—in the same manner in the case in question, having, at first apprehended the thing in its mere outline, one would subsequently come to have the Perception of the thing equipped with the Class-character and other properties. So that there is no incongruity at all.—(1291)

If such be the case,—and all the cognitions that appear after the initial Pre-cognition are valid,—then, in a case where the man has had the pre-cognition of the thing, and then closing his eyes, conceives of the thing as connected with the Class-character and other properties (as the Conceptual Content), then, inasmuch as this latter apprehends things not apprehended before, this also would have to be regarded as *Sense-perception*.

The answer to this (from *Kumārila*) is as follows:—

TEXT (1292).

"IF AFTER HAVING PRE-COGNISED THE THING, THE MAN CLOSES HIS EYES AND THEN IMPOSES CONCEPTUAL CONTENTS,—THIS LATTER WOULD NOT BE 'SENSE-PERCEPTION';—BECAUSE IT IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONNECTION (OF THE SENSE-ORGANS)."—(*Shlokavārtika*—SENSE-PERCEPTION, 128).
—(1292)

COMMENTARY.

'*Having pre-cognised*'—i.e. having apprehended by Pre-cognition.

'*Eyes*'—to be construed with 'closes'.

'*It is not in accordance, etc. etc.*':—i.e. it has not been brought about by the contact of the sense-organ concerned.—This has been thus asserted by *Kumārila*—"Thus then the process of conceptual content being similar in the two cases, that cognition which follows upon the contact of the sense-organ has the character of *sense-perception*;—this is well-known among people, even without any definition". (*Shlokavārtika*—Sense-perception, 254).—(1292)

To all these arguments of *Kumārila*, the answer is as follows:—

TEXTS (1293-1294).

WHAT HAS BEEN URGED IS NOT RIGHT. IF THE COGNITION IN QUESTION APPERTAINS TO THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY OF THE THING,—THEN, EVEN ON THE APPREHENSION OF THE UNIVERSAL AND OTHER PROPERTIES, IT SHOULD REMAIN FREE FROM VERBAL EXPRESSION. BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN PROVED BEFORE THAT THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY OF THINGS CANNOT BE DENOTED BY WORDS; HENCE THE COGNITION THAT RESTS UPON THAT MUST BE FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT (AND ASSOCIATION WITH WORDS).—(1293-1294)

COMMENTARY.

'*Even on the apprehension, etc.*'—The word 'even' means 'even granting that the Universal exists'. In reality, the Universal, etc. having been already rejected, how could there be any validity in the apprehension thereof? Well, granting that they do exist, even so, on their apprehension, the Cognitions that appear subsequently to the initial Pre-cognition, having only the Specific Individuality of Things as their object, must be free from Conceptual Content; just as the Pre-cognition is. Because the Universal and other properties have been held to be not-different from the Specific Individuality.

The argument may be formulated as follows :—That Cognition which apprehends the Specific Individuality must be free from Conceptual Content, —like the Pre-cognition ;—the Cognition that is held to be the subsequent Perception does apprehend the Specific Individuality ;—so this is a natural reason (proving its non-conceptual character).

This argument is only in the nature of a *Reductio ad absurdum.*—The Reason cannot be said to be Inconclusive. Because, that the Specific Individuality cannot be denoted by words has already been proved in the Chapter dealing with the 'Exclusion of other Things' (as forming the denotation of words).

Nor is the Reason Contradictory ; as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is known to exist.—(1293-1294)

It might be urged that—" The Reason is Inadmissible, as it pertains to the Universal only ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1295).

IF THE UNIVERSAL ALONE WERE APPREHENDED, THEN THE QUALIFICATION (PROPERTY) WOULD BE SOMETHING ABSOLUTELY DISTINCT ; AND THIS IS NOT WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER PARTY, AS ASSERTED (BY HIMSELF).—(1295)

COMMENTARY.

'*The qualification would be something absolutely distinct*'—from the Thing qualified.

'*This is not acceptable to the other party*',—i.e. this absolute distinction between the qualification and the qualified.

" How do you know that it is not acceptable ? "

Answer :—' As has been asserted '—i.e. by himself.—(1295)

Question :—" What is it that has been asserted by him ? "

Answer :—[*Kumārila* says as below]—

TEXT (1296).

" IF THE QUALIFICATION WERE ABSOLUTELY DISTINCT FROM THE QUALIFIED, THEN HOW COULD IT BRING ABOUT IN THE *qualified* A COGNITION IN KEEPING WITH ITSELF ? "—[*Shloka-vārtika*—SENSE-PERCEPTION, 142].—(1296)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'absolutely' has been added in view of the fact that some sort of indirect distinction *is* admitted; inasmuch as his view is that the

Universal and other qualifications are different as well as non-different (from the qualified), but not absolutely different, or absolutely non-different. He has asserted as follows :—" As their cognitions are distinct, Colour, etc. cannot be one and the same ; what is held is that they are one as well as diverse, as conceived in the form of ' Being ' (when they are *one*) and in the form of ' Colour ', etc. (when they are diverse) ".—(*Shlokavārtika*, Sense-perception, 158).—He has again asserted that—" For us, the Universal and the rest are not other than the Individual "—(*Shlokavārtika*, Sense-perception, 141).—' *Paratvam* ', ' difference ', here stands for ' other than '.

'*In keeping with itself*'—i.e. tinged with the form of the qualifying factors ; as the *qualification* is so called only because it brings about the apprehension of the qualified thing which is tinged by the qualifying factor ; otherwise, it would not be a *qualification* at all ; as it has been declared that—' The Qualification is so called because it colours the qualified thing with its own cognition '.—(1296)

The following might be urged :—" As a matter of fact, the subsequent cognitions envisage both (the Universal as well as the Particular), inasmuch as what they apprehend is the *Particular as characterised by the Universal* ; so that they cannot be said to apprehend the Specific Individuality only ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1297).

ONE AND THE SAME COGNITION CANNOT COMPREHEND BOTH THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY AND THE UNIVERSAL ; BECAUSE, IF SUCH A COGNITION WERE ' CONCEPTUAL ', THERE COULD BE NO COMPREHENSION OF THE FORMER,—ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT WERE OTHER-WISE, THERE COULD BE NO COMPREHENSION OF THE LATTER.—(1297)

COMMENTARY.

It is not right that one and the same Cognition should apprehend the Specific Individuality as well as the Universal.—Because, would that Cognition be *Conceptual* or *Non-conceptual*? If it were *Conceptual*,—Determinate,—then there could be no apprehension of the '*former*',—i.e. the Specific Individuality.—If '*otherwise*',—i.e. if it is *Non-conceptual*,—then there could be no apprehension of the '*latter*'—i.e. of the Universal.—(1297)

It has been proved that if the subsequent Cognitions apprehend the Specific Individuality, they must be ' Non-conceptual '.—The Author now proceeds to show that—even granting that the said cognitions are ' Conceptual ', as they would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended (by the previous *Non-conceptual* Cognition), no *validity* could attach to those Cognitions :—

TEXT (1298).

ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING NO ABSOLUTE DISTINCTION (BETWEEN THE UNIVERSAL AND THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY),—IF THE UNIVERSAL AND OTHER PROPERTIES HAVE BECOME ALREADY APPREHENDED BY THE INITIAL COGNITION,—THEN THE SUBSEQUENT COGNITION WOULD BE APPREHENDING ONLY WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY APPREHENDED,—AND IT WOULD THUS BE LIKE REMEMBRANCE.—(1298)

COMMENTARY.

The Universal and the rest are not regarded as absolutely distinct from the Individual; as has been declared by *Kumārila* (in *Shlokavārtika*, Sense-perception, 141) that—" The Universal and the rest are not anything other than the Individual ". Under the circumstances, as the Universal and the rest will have been already apprehended by the initial (non-conceptual) Pre-cognition, the subsequent definite (conceptual) cognition of the same Universal and the rest would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended,—and thus being like Remembrance,—it must have to be regarded as *invalid*.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—The Cognition apprehending what has been already apprehended cannot be valid,—e.g. Remembrance;—the Conceptual Cognition following on the wake of Perception apprehends what has been already apprehended;—hence there is perception of a character contrary to the wider notion (of validity).—(1298)

[Says the Opponent]—" If the Reason adduced here is that " the Universal, etc. are already apprehended as differentiated from all imposition (Doubts and Misconceptions),—then it is one that is 'not-admitted'; if it means that they are apprehended somehow, then it is Inconclusive, in view of the character of Inference ".

This is the argument that is set forth in the following—

TEXTS (1299–1300).

" (AT THE INITIAL STAGE), THERE IS ONLY A VAGUE IDEA OF SEVERAL UNIVERSALS, AND THERE IS NO DEFINITE IDEA OF ANYTHING; THE DEFINITE IDEA COMES ONLY LATER; AS THIS APPREHENDS THE THING AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM ALL IMPOSITIONS (DOUBTS AND MISCONCEPTIONS). JUST AS INFERENCE APPREHENDS THE OBJECT AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM IMPOSITIONS, SO ALSO DOES THE (LATER) DEFINITE COGNITION."—(1299-1300)

COMMENTARY.

" At the first stage, the Thing is apprehended by Pre-cognition only in a vague, not in the well-defined form; the well-defined cognition comes only

later, and this is valid, as it apprehends the Thing as differentiated from impositions,—like Inference. For instance, after the subject, Sound, has been apprehended by Perception, there appears, through the fact of its being a *product,* the well-defined (inferential) idea that it is non-eternal; and this subsequent Inferential Cognition of the non-eternality of sound is valid; in the same manner the subsequent Perceptional Cognition becomes well-defined when it apprehends the thing as differentiated from impositions. On this point of well-defined cognition apprehending things differentiated from imposition, you also do not hold a different opinion; as is clear from your assertion to the following effect—'Between well-defined cognition and imposed cognition subsists the relation of the *annuller* and the *annulled*; and it is understood that the well-defined cognition becomes operative on the thing being differentiated from impositions'."—(1299-1300)

The answer to the above is as follows :—

TEXTS (1301–1303).

As a matter of fact, the validity of Inferential Cognition does not rest upon its apprehending a thing differentiated from impositions; if that were so, then Remembrance also would have to be regarded as *valid*. What really happens is that after the Sense-perception (of a certain thing) there appear certain impositions (Doubts and Misconceptions), and it is by reason of setting aside these impositions that Inferential Cognition has been regarded as valid.—This is not possible for you; because in the case of such cognitions as 'The white—cow—walking'—after the sense-perception, no imposition is found to appear, which could be negatived (by the subsequent valid Cognition).—(1301–1303)

COMMENTARY.

The validity of Inference lies in its precluding the imposition *that has crept* in, and not merely in precluding an imposition; in the latter case validity would attach to Remembrance also. In the case of the (initial *non-conceptual*) Perception being followed by the *conceptual* perception of the 'white—cow—walking', there is no preclusion of an imposition *that has crept in,* because no such imposition *has* actually come in.

"How do you know that it has not come in ?"

Answer :—'*In the case of such cognitions, etc. etc.*';—when a Concept does come in, it does not remain uncognised; hence, being capable of being cognised, if the Imposition is not cognised, it follows that it has not come in at all.—(1301–1303)

All this has been said after taking it for granted that the Universal and the rest do exist. Now the Author proceeds to show that in reality, the

Universal and the rest do not exist at all, and hence the Perception apprehending them cannot be *conceptual* :—

TEXTS (1304-1305).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, UNIVERSAL AND THE REST DO NOT EXIST, EITHER AS NON-DIFFERENT, OR AS DIFFERENT, FROM (INDIVIDUALS),—BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THE CONCEPTUAL COGNITION OF THOSE COULD HAVE THE CHARACTER OF 'PERCEPTION'.—(*a*) [THEY CANNOT BE THE SAME AS THE INDIVIDUALS] BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMPREHENSIVENESS. (*b*) [NOR CAN THEY BE DIFFERENT FROM THE INDIVIDUALS] BECAUSE THEY DO NOT APPEAR AS DIFFERENT FROM THE INDIVIDUAL.—(*c*) [NOR CAN THEY BE BOTH DIFFERENT AND NON-DIFFERENT] BECAUSE *Difference and non-difference* ALWAYS REMAIN MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.—(1304-1305)

COMMENTARY.

The Universal and the rest (if they existed) could be either (*a*) non-different from the Individuals,—or (*b*) different from them,—or (*c*) both, different and non-different.

(1) The first alternative cannot be right ; *because there is no comprehensiveness* ; i.e. there is absence or negation of pervasion ; that form is called 'Universal' which pervades over several things ; there is no such 'pervasion' among individuals, whereby they themselves could become the 'Universal' ; if there were such pervasion, the entire universe would come to be of the same form ; so that there could be no Universal at all ; as the Universal must subsist in several things.

(2) Nor is the second alternative possible [i.e. the Universal, etc. cannot be *different* from the Individuals] ; '*because they do not appear as different from the Individuals*' ;—the term '*bhedāt*' stands for *Individuals* ;—and what does not appear cannot be *perceived*. This has been thus declared—'Individuals do not pervade over one another ; there is no other pervasive entity ; how then can anything be different from Cognition ?'

(3) Nor is the third alternative possible ; '*because the two views of difference and non-difference are mutually exclusive*',—that is to say, when two things are mutually exclusive, the negation of one must mean the affirmation of the other ; and difference and non-difference *are* so mutually exclusive, because the nature of one is such that it must preclude the nature of the other. Hence there can be no third alternative (in addition to difference and non-difference).—(1304-1305)

Says the Opponent :—" If Sense-perception is *non-conceptual,* how is activity carried on on its basis ?—' This is a means of bringing happiness ', ' this is a source of unhappiness ',—one always makes up his mind definitely on these lines and then betakes himself to activity for the securing of the former and the avoiding of the latter.—Further (under your view) there can be no idea of Inference or Inferred ; because at the time of Inference, the character in question, as also the subject wherein it is sought to be proved, must be such as have been previously cognised in a definite form ;—and they could not be regarded as definitely cognised by a Perception that is itself uncertain. Nor could it be regarded as cognised by Inference ; as that would mean an infinite regress of Inferences. There is no third Means of Right Cognition (for the Buddhist, except Perception and Inference). So that under your view, there would be an end to all forms of activity.—From all this, and on the basis of the Reason that activities are actually carried on on the basis of Inference, etc., it becomes established that the idea of Perception being *non-conceptual* is ruled out by Inference ".

To one who would argue thus, the Author offers the following answer :—

TEXT (1306).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN THE *non-conceptual* PERCEPTION HAS THE POTENCY TO BRING ABOUT THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT ; HENCE THROUGH THAT, IT BECOMES A FACTOR IN ALL ACTIVITY. —(1306)

COMMENTARY.

' *Through that* '.—That is, through the Conceptual Content, the *Non-conceptual* Perception also becomes the cause of definitive cognition and thereby becomes a factor in all activity. For instance, even though Sense-perception is ' free from Conceptual Content ', yet, whenever it appears, it appears as qualifying, through the manifestation of its form in consciousness, the Thing perceived—like Fire, for instance—as differentiated from all other homogeneous and heterogeneous things ;—and as this perception apprehends one definite thing with a well-defined form,—and is also accompanied by the idea of the thing as differentiated from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things,—it renders manifest, in that same thing, certain positive and negative concepts—such as ' this is Fire ',—' this is not a bunch of flowers ' ; as these two concepts are only indirectly related to the Thing concerned, they are not regarded as valid, even though they are in perfect accord with the real state of things ; and the reason for this lies in the fact that it involves the unification of what is *seen* and what is *conceived,* and as such cannot be regarded as the apprehension of what is not already apprehended, (and hence valid).

It is for the reason stated above that the non-conceptual Perception, being the cause of the said two concepts, becomes the cause of the indication of a third kind of negation also. For instance, whenever a cognition appears

in regard to anything, it envisages it because it bears its semblance; and as anything other than that thing is not perceived, it distinguishes the former thing from all else; in connection with all things, there are these two poles—*what is perceived* and *what is other than the perceived*; consequently it is indicated that there is no third alternative.

"If that is so, then, if the Subject,—Sound, for instance—has been apprehended by Perception itself, the inferential concept of *non-eternality* that appears in connection with it cannot be valid".

That does not affect our position. Even though the Perception be brought about, yet that aspect of the thing alone is said to be 'apprehended' (by the Perception) in regard to which the resultant definite cognition is produced and which alone lends itself to activity; while that aspect in regard to which it is not able to produce a definite cognition, because of the operation of an imposition based on misconception,—even though such an aspect might be apprehended as fit for lending itself to activity,—it is regarded to be as good as not-apprehended; and it is in regard to this that, for the purpose of setting aside the said imposition, Inference becomes operative and hence valid;—no such validity can belong to the Conception that follows in the wake of the Sense-perception; as in the latter case, there is no setting aside of any imposition that has come in.

Question:—"What is the reason that, though the apprehension appears in regard to the form of the thing which is different from that of all other things, yet the resultant Idea is not certain and definite?"

Answer:—The reason lies in the fact that it is dependent upon other causes. Merely because a thing has been *apprehended* it does not follow that the Idea in regard to it is certain and definite; because it depends upon other causes, in the shape of repetition, the man's interest, the vividness (of the original perception) and so forth. Just as, when one has the same person as his Father and Teacher, when he sees him coming, the definite idea in his mind is 'My *Father* is coming', not 'my *Teacher* is coming'.—(1306)

Bhāvivikta and others, who take exception to the idea that 'the non-conceptual Perception leads to activity through bringing about the Conceptual Content', bring forward certain arguments;—these are set forth in the following—

TEXT (1307).

"THE *non-conceptual* CANNOT BRING ABOUT THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT,—(*a*) BECAUSE THEIR OBJECTS ARE DIFFERENT,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE COGNITION OF COLOUR, ETC.,—AND ALSO BECAUSE IT IS *non-conceptual*—LIKE THE EYE, ETC."—(1307)

COMMENTARY.

The cognition produced by the Senses (which is non-conceptual) cannot bring about the *conceptual* cognition, which is mental,—(*a*) because their objects are different, as in the case of the cognitions of Colour, Touch, etc.;—and also (*b*) because it is *non-conceptual*,—like the Eye and other organs.

In support of the Reason 'Because their objects are different', the instance cited is '*as in the case of the cognitions of colour, etc.*'; and in support of the Reason 'Because it is non-conceptual', the instance cited is '*like the eye, etc.*'—(1307)

The following Text points out the defects in the above reasoning:—

TEXT (1308).

THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND THE SAID REASONS; NOR IS THERE DIFFERENCE IN THEIR OBJECTS; AS THE OBJECT APPREHENDED BY THE ONE IS THE SAME AS THAT APPREHENDED BY THE OTHER.—(1308)

COMMENTARY.

Both the Reasons adduced (in the preceding *Text*) are 'Inconclusive'; as no incompatibility has been indicated between the Reasons and the contrary of the conclusion sought to be proved by them.

'*Anayoḥ*'—of the two Reasons.

'*Nor is there difference, etc. etc.*';—that is to say, even though the Conceptual Content is objective (has an object), yet the assertion that 'their objects are different' is 'inadmissible'.—(1308)

In reality however the Conceptual Content is not *objective,* it is without an object; hence the Reason cited is all the more inadmissible. This is shown in the following—

TEXT (1309).

IN REALITY, THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT PROCEEDS WITHOUT ANY OBJECTIVE BASIS; IT HAS NO OBJECT AT ALL, WHICH COULD DIFFER FROM ANYTHING ELSE.—(1309)

COMMENTARY.

The following *Text* shows that the Corroborative Instance (cited by *Bhāvivikta,* in 1307 above) "as in the case of the cognition of Colour, etc.", is devoid of the Probandum (the character sought to be proved):—

TEXT (1310).

AMONG THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND, ETC., MUTUAL CAUSAL RELATION IS ACTUALLY PRESENT; HENCE THE INSTANCE THAT HAS BEEN CITED IS ONE IN WHICH THE PROBANDUM IS NOT KNOWN TO EXIST.—(1310)

COMMENTARY.

—As among the Cognitions of Colour, Sound, etc., mental causal relation is actually present,—consisting in the fact of their following in the wake of one another.—(1310)

Again, the Text is going to show that the reason "Because their objects are different" (cited by *Bhāvivikta* in *Text* 1307) is Inconclusive, by reason of its presence in a thing where the Probandum is definitely known to be absent :—

TEXT (1311).

INASMUCH AS BETWEEN THE *Cognition of Fire* AND THE *Cognition of Smoke*, THERE IS THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT,—THE SAME COULD BE POSSIBLE IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO ; HENCE THE REASON CITED IS FOUND TO BE INCONCLUSIVE ALSO.—(1311)

COMMENTARY.

'*Etasmin*' stands for the Reason cited—"Because their objects are different".

The Cognition of the Middle Term 'Smoke' is the cause of the cognition of the Major Term 'Fire',—even though the objects of the two cognitions are different. The same may be the case here (with the non-conceptual and the conceptual). So that the Reason adduced is Inconclusive.—(1311)

Having thus proved the fact of Sense-perception being 'free from Conceptual Content', the Author next proceeds to explain the use of the other qualification, 'not erroneous' (in the definition of Sense-perception propounded by himself under *Text* 1214) :—

TEXT (1312).

THE EPITHET 'NOT-ERRONEOUS' HAS BEEN ADDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCLUDING SUCH ILLUSIONS AS THOSE OF THE '* *Keshoṇḍraka*' (HAIR-TUFT) AND THE LIKE ; AS THESE ARE NOT REGARDED AS 'VALID COGNITION' ON THE GROUND OF THEIR BEING 'ERRONEOUS'.—(1312)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'not-erroneous' should be understood as 'not incongruent' —and not as 'having for its basis a form as it really exists'.—If this latter were meant, then, as under the view of the *Yogāchāra* (the extreme Idealist) there can be no *real basis*, the definition, thus interpreted, would not be applicable to Sense-perception as accepted by both theorists (the Realist *Sautrāntika* and the Idealist *Yogāchāra*).—As regards 'being non-incongruent', what it means is 'the presence of the *capacity* to envisage a thing which is capable of the intended fruitful activity',—not actually *envisaging* it ; as obstacles are likely to appear in the actual envisaging.

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* '*Keshoṇḍraka*', 'Hair-Tuft'.—It is not clear what is meant by this. It is supposed to stand for the idea one has on closing the eyes of tufts of hair floating in the regions of the eye; which idea is 'erroneous', as there is no real Hair-Tuft there.

Question:—"If that is so, then let there be only the qualification 'not erroneous'; what is the use of mentioning the 'freedom from conceptual content'?"

Answer:—That cannot be right; as in that case the inferential concept also would have to be regarded as *Sense-perception*.—(1312)

TEXTS (1313-1314).

SOME PEOPLE HAVE HELD THAT ILLUSION IS PURELY *mental*. BUT THAT IS NOT SO; AS IT IS FOUND TO APPEAR ONLY WHEN THE SENSE-ORGAN IS PRESENT (AND OPERATIVE) AND TO CEASE WHEN THIS LATTER (BECOMES DISORDERED, CEASES). IF IT WERE PURELY MENTAL, IT SHOULD CEASE LIKE THE ILLUSION REGARDING A SERPENT, EVEN WHEN THE DISORDER OF THE SENSE-ORGAN HAS NOT CEASED; AND YET IT CONTINUES TO BE PERCEIVED QUITE CLEARLY.
—(1313-1314)

COMMENTARY.

The idea of these 'some people' is that it is not necessary to add, to the definition of Sense-perception, the qualifying term 'not erroneous' (for the purpose of excluding Illusion which, being purely *mental*, can never be 'Sense-perception').

Against this view the following might be urged:—Granting that Illusion is *mental*; even so, it is not necessary to add the qualifying term 'not erroneous'; because what the person propounding the definition under review wanted to do was not to provide a definition of only that 'Sense-perception' which is brought about by the Sense-organs, but also of that Sense-perception which appears in the Mystic and which is purely mental; as in this latter Dream-cognition also is non-conceptual, as it appears quite distinctly; and yet it is *not* 'non-erronoeus'; hence for the exclusion of this, the addition of the qualifying term 'non-erroneous' is necessary.

This is true; but there are Illusions possible through the Senses also [and they are not always *mental*]; hence the said view of 'some people' is not right.

The author explains how Illusions may be sense-born—'*But that is not so, etc. etc.*'.—The illusion appears only when the Sense-organ is there, and when the Sense-organ is in any way disordered, i.e. hurt—the Illusion ceases; which shows that like any other sense-born cognition, this Illusion of the 'Hair-tuft' and the like also is Sense-born.

Further, if the Illusion belonged entirely to the Mind, then the mental aberration would be the sole cause of the Illusion, and hence the Illusion would cease on the cessation of the mental aberration, though the disorder

of the Sense-organ may still be there.—The illusion regarding the serpent and such things is cited as an example.

That the Illusion should not be very clear is another incongruous possibility cited. What is mixed up with Conceptual Content cannot bring about a very clear apprehension of the Thing; as the said Content operates only through the presentation of the Universal (which is always vague).—(1313-1314)

The following *texts* sets forth the objection of the other party:—

TEXTS (1315–1320).

"(*a*) As regards the reason that 'the Illusion is there only when the Sense-organ is there',—in its direct sense, it is Inadmissible; and in its indirect sense, it is Inconclusive; as it is present in Remembrance also.—(*b*) As regards the Reason 'Illusion is an aberration brought about by the disorder of the sense-organ',—that is clearly found also in the case of effects produced indirectly,—for example, in the case of the *Mule* and such things.—(*c*) As regards the idea that 'all mental Illusions cease after reflection',—this also is *not quite true* (inconclusive), in view of such ideas as 'Entity' and 'Universal'. If it be held that these notions do cease on the subsequent notion that 'these are not found in the Specific Individuality of Things',—then the answer is that such cessation is possible also in the case of such illusions as that of 'Two Moons'.—If it be urged that the *existence* of these does not cease',—then, the same may be said in regard to the notions of the Universal, etc. also—As regards the Illusions regarding God and such other Beings, appearing in persons who are bent upon believing in them, there is no cessation at all, even on listening to millions of Reasons; in fact, these dull-witted persons declare that these Reasons are no Reasons at all."—(1315–1320)

COMMENTARY.

(*a*) If the fact of Illusion being there only when the Sense-organ is there is cited as a Reason in the direct sense, then it is Inadmissible for one or the other of the two parties; for the other party, it is not proved that Illusion is produced *directly* from the Sense-organs; as that is exactly what is still to be proved. On the other hand, if it is meant in the indirect sense, that the Illusion being there only when the Sense-organ is there is cited as the Reason;—then it is Inconclusive; because such indirect concomitance with the Sense-organ is present in Remembrance also (which is not regarded as Sense-born).

(*b*) As regards the Premiss that 'the Illusion is an aberration brought about by the disorder of the Sense-organ,'—that also is Inadmissible in the direct sense; and if taken in the indirect sense, this also is Inconclusive; as in the case of the Mule, which is born of the Mare from the Ass,—all the embryonic stages intervene between the contact of the animals and the birth of the Mule—and it is only when the final product is subsequently found to resemble the Ass that the idea comes about that it is born of the Ass; but that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is produced from the Ass *directly*.

(*c*) The assertion that "Mental Illusion ceases on reflection' is also Inconclusive,—*in view of the ideas of Entity and Universal'*. That is, for you the Buddhist,—who, relying on Reasoning, hold that there is no such thing as the Universal,—the generic idea that there is in regard to things like the Jar being 'entities' or 'universals' does not cease at all.—If you think that—"when one comes to reflect over them, the said ideas do disappear, through such notions as 'these ideas do not appertain to the Specific Individuality",—then we say that this is no answer at all. In the case of the Illusions regarding 'Too Moons' and the like,—when one comes to ponder over them, they also cease through the notion that 'these do not appertain to the Specific Individuality'; and yet these do not become 'mental'.

It might be urged that "the *existence* of these does not cease".

The same may be said in regard to the notions of the Universal, etc. also; as the *existence* of these also does not cease.—(1315–1320)

The following *Texts* supply the Author's answer to the above arguments :—

TEXTS (1321–1323).

THE IDEA OF THE ILLUSION BEING THERE WHEN THE SENSE-ORGAN IS THERE CANNOT BE SAID TO BE 'INADMISSIBLE', IN ITS DIRECT SENSE. BECAUSE THERE IS NO INTERVENTION BY ANY UNMISTAKEN (RIGHT) NOTION; AS NO SUCH INTERVENING RIGHT NOTION IS EVER APPREHENDED.—EVEN WHEN THE MAN HAS HIS MIND NOT TURNED TO OTHER THINGS, HE HAS THE CONTINUOUS PERCEPTION OF 'TWO MOONS'; WHICH SHOWS THAT THE PRODUCTION (OF THE ILLUSION, BY THE SENSE-ORGAN) IS NOT *indirect*.—AS REGARDS THE IDEAS OF 'ENTITY', 'UNIVERSAL' AND SO FORTH,—WHERE THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR BEING RETRACTED,—CESSATION IS QUITE POSSIBLE, IF THE PERSON SO WISHES. SO ALSO IN THE CASE OF THE IDEA RELATING TO GOD.—(1321–1323)

COMMENTARY.

'*Cannot be Inadmissible*',—i.e. it must be admissible.—Why ?—Because there is no intervention by any unmistaken notion—of the *One Moon*;—

because while it would be cognisable if it were there, no such notion is cognised at all.

This same idea is made clear in the sentence—'*Even when the man, etc. etc.*'.—'*Continuous*'—is to be construed with '*perception of the Two Moons*'.

For this same reason the Premiss, that 'illusion is an aberration produced by the aberration of the Sense-organ', also is not 'Inconclusive'. As this also is not interrupted,—in view of which the case of the *Mule* would render it false, inconclusive.

As regards the notions of 'Entity', 'Universal' and so forth,—when the person retracts them by his own wish, there is cessation of these also.

But in the case of the Illusions like that of the 'Hair-tuft', there can be no retraction at will; hence our premiss is not Inconclusive.

It might be argued that—"even in the case of Perception through the Senses, there can be cessation at will, by closing one's eyes for instance".

The Visual Perception does not cease immediately on the appearance of the wish; in fact what is brought about by the man's wish is only the closing of the eyes; and it is only when the Eyes have ceased to function that the Visual Perception ceases. In the case of *mental* Illusion, on the other hand, it ceases directly after the wish of the man; hence the two cases are not analogous. It has to be borne in mind that, when the Eyes are fixed upon a thing, even though the man may not wish to look at the thing, the thing *is* actually seen; so that the *wish* has no direct influence upon the Visual or other Perceptions.—(1321–1323)

TEXT (1324).

THERE ARE OTHERS WHO DECLARE THAT—"NOTIONS LIKE 'THE YELLOW CONCH-SHELL', EVEN THOUGH ILLUSORY, ARE VALID,—INASMUCH AS THEY ARE NOT INCONGRUENT WITH EFFECTIVE ACTION."—(1324)

COMMENTARY.

There are some people belonging to our own party (Buddhists) who do not wish to have the qualification 'not-erroneous' (in the definition of Sense-perception); because (they argue that) even the illusory idea of the 'Yellow conch-shell' is *Sense-perception*. Because it cannot be Inference, as it is not brought about by an Inferential Indicative. And that it is valid is clear from the fact that it is not incongruent with reality. It was for this reason that the Teacher *Diṅnāga* did not introduce this qualification—'not erroneous'—in his definition of Sense-perception. *Error, Illusion, Ignorance,*

Inference—these he has mentioned as having the ' Semblance ' of Perception, which shows that the definition intended by him was that ' it is free from Conceptual Content and is not incongruent with the real state of things '. He has also included the '*taimiram*' (among the Semblances of Perception), where '*timira* (Darkness) stands for *ignorance* :—as found in such expressions as '*Timiraghnañcha mandānām*'; and that which proceeds from *Timira*—Ignorance—is '*Taimira*', i.e. *incongruent*.—(1324)

The answer to the above is provided in the following—

TEXTS (1325-1326)

THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT. THE EFFECTIVE ACTION AVAILABLE IS NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE FORM APPREHENDED. OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE INCONGRUITIES ; AS IN THE COGNITION WHERE THERE IS APPEARANCE OF THE *Hair* AND SUCH THINGS, THERE IS COMPATIBILITY, THOUGH ONLY WITH THE LIGHT (WHICH IS NOT APPREHENDED) AND OTHER DETAILS ; HENCE THE VALIDITY OF THIS WOULD BE IRRESISTIBLE (UNDER THE OPPONENT'S VIEW). —(1325-1326)

COMMENTARY.

The validity of a cognition is of two kinds—(1) when there is compatibility with the *appearance*, and (2) when there is compatibility with the *Apprehension*.—In the case in question (of the idea of the ' yellow conch-shell '), the ' absence of incongruence '—(i.e. compatibility)—is not in accordance with the *appearance*, as what appears—what is apparent—is the *yellow* conch-shell ; and yet what is found (on touching) is not the yellow thing ;—nor is its compatibility in accordance with the *apprehension*, because it is the *yellow thing* itself that is apprehended as capable of a particular fruitful activity ; and yet no fruitful activity in that form is actually found.—Nor can there be validity even when there is compatibility with what is not apprehended at all ; as that would lead to absurdity ; as in the case of the cognition of the Hair-tuft also, what is actually got at is only the light (whose reflections create the impression of the Hair-tuft).—(1325-1326)

If you think that " though the apprehended *Colour* is not obtained, yet the *shape* is certainly obtained ",—then our answer is as follows :—

TEXT (1327).

THERE CAN BE NO *shape* APART FROM THE *Colour* ; AND WITH THE APPARENT COLOUR, THERE IS NO COMPATIBILITY (IN THE CASE IN QUESTION).—(1327)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(1327)

The Author now sums up his arguments :—

TEXTS (1328-1329).

IF, WITHOUT REGARD TO THE FORM OF THINGS, *validity* WERE PRESUMED ON THE GROUND OF MERE COMPATIBILITY WITH FRUITFUL ACTION, —THEN HOW WOULD THIS NOT CONTRADICT SUCH ASSERTIONS (OF YOURS) AS THAT ' THE DEFINITE COGNITION OF THE THING IS IN THE FORM OF THE THING ' ?— AS REGARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF ' COMPATIBILITY ' (IN THE CASE OF THE NOTION OF THE ' YELLOW CONCH-SHELL '), THAT CAN ONLY BE THE RESULT OF THE IMPRESSION (OF A PREVIOUS COGNITION).—1328-1329)

COMMENTARY.

Validity cannot be presumed merely on the basis of the compatibility of effective action, without regard to the form ; as in that case the cognition in the form of the thing itself might have to be regarded as invalid.

' *In the form of the thing* '—i.e. in the form that appears in the cognition.

' *Such assertions as* ' ;—this is meant to show that the presumption in question would go against such assertions of the Teacher as—' As the form of the thing figures in the Cognition, in that form is the thing rightly cognised '.

As regards ' compatibility with effective action ', (in the case) in question, it should be understood to be the result of the Impression left by previous apprehensions. That is to say, the idea of the ' yellow conch-shell ' is the effect of the Impression left by a previous apprehension of the ' white conch-shell '. And the ' compatibility with effective action ' (that has been said to be present in the case) is due to this Impression.—(1328-1329)

The Author now proceeds to show how the character of ' Sense-perception ' belongs to the Sensation of Pleasure, etc. :—

TEXT (1330).

THE REASONING THAT IS USED IN PROVING THE NON-CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER OF THE COGNITIONS PRODUCED BY THE MENTAL SENSE-ORGAN, ALSO SERVES TO PROVE THE NON-CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER OF THE SENSATIONS OF PLEASURE, ETC.—(1330)

COMMENTARY.

'*The Reasoning, etc.*'—that is, the argument based upon the impossibility of Conventions and so forth.

Even though this Reasoning has nowhere been urged specifically in regard to mental cognition, yet the Reasoning that has been urged in regard to Cognitions through other Sense-organs,—in the shape of the impossibility of Conventions,—is equally applicable to Mental Cognitions also.

Or, the 'mental' cognition meant here may be the cognition of the Mystic, which is going to be referred to later on. The Mental Perception has not been defined here, as its character is well-known to Buddhists.

What the *Text* means is that the fact of the Buddhist view of the sensations in question being not annulled by any means of right cognition, has been fully explained by the Teacher; hence we do not seek to prove it here.—(1330)

The following *Text* sets forth the *Vaisheṣika* view (regarding the exact nature of the sensations of Pleasure, etc.):—

TEXT (1331).

"THEY (PLEASURE, ETC.) ARE NON-APPREHENSIVE OF ANOTHER THING; HOW THEN CAN THEY CARRY THEIR OWN COGNISANCE WITH THEM? IN FACT, THEY BECOME COGNISABLE ONLY BY THE COGNITION WHICH SUBSISTS IN THE SAME SUBSTRATUM AS THEMSELVES".—IF THIS IS URGED—[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING *Texts*].—(1331)

COMMENTARY.

"It is not only that they are not self-cognised; they are not apprehensive of any external thing either; that is, they are of the nature of Cognition. In fact Pleasure, etc. become cognised only by that Cognition which subsists in the same substratum as themselves—i.e. the Soul".

Such is the doctrine of the *Vaisheṣikas*.—(1331)

The above view is answered in the following—

TEXTS (1332–1339).

As a matter of fact, Pleasure, etc. are felt immediately after the perception of the external object; why is it that they are always felt at that same time ?—It is regarded as cognised by Mental Perception; but this Perception is not there at the time; as cognitions have been described as appearing *in succession* (not at the same time).—If it be urged that "it is only simultaneous *birth* of cognitions that is not admitted, not their simultaneous *existence*",—then the answer is that there can be no (continued) *existence* of anything; as all things have been proved to be momentary. —If it be urged that "there is an illusion of simultaneity, due to the quick succession of the cognitions",—this also has been rejected already.—If the Pleasure, etc., were amenable only to Remembrance, then the feeling could not be vivid (as it is).—If it be assumed that the said illusion is in the form of 'agreeable' and 'disagreeable',—then it comes to this that the existence of Pleasure and Pain rests in themselves (and they are thus self-cognised).—When the Mystics cognise, by Sense-perception, the Pleasure, etc. of other persons,—then, on account of the similarity of experience, they would themselves be unhappy (at the unhappiness of other people). For you, the feeling of Pain consists, not in the existence of the Pain itself, but in the cognition of which that Pain is the object; and that is another 'Chain'. —The same applies to the Inference of another person's Pain also, as Inference has been described (by others) as *objective* (with object), and not purely *subjective* (not touching objects). —(1332–1339)

COMMENTARY.

It is meant to show that the Proposition (of the *Vaishēṣika*) is contrary to perceived facts.

When, as a matter of fact, Pleasure, etc., are apprehended at the same time as the Cognition of the external object upon which they rest,—then by which particular cognition subsisting in the same substratum as themselves would they be apprehended ?—Certainly not by that Visual Cognition of the external object; as this rests upon the external object, while Pleasure, etc. are felt within and as such they are held to be cognisable by mental Cognition only. And yet at the time concerned there can be no mental Cognition; because the theory held is that Cognitions appear in succession, one after the other.

It might be held that—"it is only the *birth* of Cognitions that has been held to be *in succession*, not their *existence*".

That cannot be right; as it has been established that all that is born has only a momentary existence.

As regards the explanation that "there is only an illusion of simultaneity, due to the quickness of the succession",—this has been already refuted.

Then again, under the view suggested, the clear perception of Pleasure and Pain, in the form of *joy* and *grief*, would not be possible; because the view held is that Pleasure and Pain, envisaging Conceptual Contents, are apprehended only by Mental Perception; and Mental Perception is Conceptual; and what is conceptual cannot make the appearance of things quite clear. Under our view on the other hand, what is regarded as *Sense-perception* is that which is brought about by the Cognition brought about by the Sense-organs, which is aided by the object coming into existence immediately after the object of the said Sense-perception.

Further, if Pleasure and Pain were actually apprehensible, their manifestation would be as something separate, as in the case of the *Blue* and other things; and yet if they were separated from the cognition, they could not be felt as *agreeable* and *disagreeable*.

It might be argued that—"as there is no difference from the Cognition, the idea of *agreeableness* and *disagreeableness* must be wrong".

In that case it becomes established that the existence of Pleasure and Pain rests in their own cognition; because Pleasure and Pain have no other form apart from what is *agreeable* and *disagreeable*; and if it is admitted that the Cognition has this form, then it also becomes admitted that Pleasure and Pain also are of the nature of Cognition itself. Any other form not being admitted, it cannot be admitted that they are mere illusions.

'*Agreeable*' is that which is favourable, and the opposite of this is 'disagreeable'.

The term 'and the rest' (after 'Pleasure') includes *Indifference*.

If then the existence of Pleasure, etc., consists only in the appearance of their own 'Chain',—and it is not accepted that the same constitutes their *apprehension* also,—but it is held that their apprehension must consist in the appearance of the cognition regarding themselves,—then, in that case, when Mystics apprehend the Pleasure, etc., of other persons, they should be just as unhappy as the persons actually experiencing the Pain, etc., and it is not open to you to say that "it cannot be so, as they belong to separate *chains*"; because you do not admit that their continuance consists in the fact of their appearance in the same 'chain'; what you accept is only the appearance of the Cognition of the Pain; and the cognition is present in the 'chain' of other people also; so that the incongruity remains.

If, as the cause of Pleasure, etc. you accept both,—then, inasmuch as the Pleasure, etc. would be present in their own 'chains', it becomes proved that they are *self-cognised*. In this way, 'presence in one's own *chain*' serves to distinguish them from those 'present in other *chains*'.

Question:—"If Pleasure, etc. are of the nature of their own cognition, then, how can the said incongruity of mystic perception be urged against those—*Mīmāmsakas* for instance,—who do not admit of any *mystics*?"

Answer :—'*The same applies, etc. etc.*'—Except Buddhists, there are no philosophers for whom Inference is, in reality, devoid of *objectivity* ; hence, for one who *infers* the Pain of other persons (just as the Mystic who perceives it), there would be the same experiencing of pain—[so that the said incongruity would be there all the same].—(1332–1339)

TEXT (1340).

[SAYS *Shaṅkarasvāmin*]—"PLEASURE, ETC. ARE APPREHENDED ONLY AS 'PLEASURE, ETC.' ; THEY ARE NOT APPREHENDED AS 'COGNITION' ; CONSEQUENTLY LIKE THE JAR, ETC., THEY CANNOT BE *Cognition*."—(1340)

COMMENTARY.

Shaṅkarasvāmin says :—"Pleasure, etc. cannot be of the nature of *Cognition*, because they are never spoken of as 'Cognition' ;—just like the Jar, etc.".—(1340)

The objection to this view is as follows :—

TEXT (1341).

IF DIFFERENCE IS TO BE ACCEPTED ON THE BASIS OF CONVENTION, THEN COGNITION ITSELF MAY NOT BE SPOKEN OF AS 'COGNITION',—AND ON THE BASIS OF THAT, COGNITION WOULD BECOME NON-COGNITION.—(1341)

COMMENTARY.

If difference of nature were based upon Convention (i.e. the use of words, which is purely a matter of Convention),—then, there may be some one who might set up the Convention that the *Cognition* should be spoken of as 'non-cognition', and in accordance with this Convention, Cognition would become *Not-cognition*, for you !—(1341)

TEXT (1342).

IF IT BE URGED THAT—"BEING CLEARLY OF THE NATURE OF LIGHT, IT COULD NEVER BE AS ALLEGED",—THEN, YOU ARE FACED WITH THIS CONTINGENCY—IS NOT ALL THIS THE SAME IN THE CASE OF PLEASURE AND PAIN ALSO ?—(1342)

COMMENTARY.

If the view is that—"Cognition, being of the nature of Light, can never be *non-cognition*",—then the answer is that all this is equally there in the case of Pleasure and Pain also.

The Reason also is false, 'Inconclusive' ; so this is nothing.—(1342)

TEXT (1343).

AS REGARDS THE MYSTIC'S COGNITION, WE ARE GOING TO DESCRIBE IT, ON THE BASIS OF SPOTLESS REASONS, AS ARISING OUT OF THE CONTEMPLATION OF THINGS AND BEING FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND ERROR.—(1343)

COMMENTARY.

'*We are going to describe*',—under the chapter on *The Omniscient Being*.—(1343)

The Author next proceeds to set aside the diversity of opinion regarding the 'Fruit' (ultimate effect) of 'Sense-perception' as a means of Cognition :—

TEXT (1344).

THE *cognition of the object* IS HELD TO BE THE 'FRUIT' OF THE MEANS OF COGNITION,—WHEN THE 'MEANS OF COGNITION' CONSISTS IN THE 'SAMENESS OF FORM' (BETWEEN THE COGNITION AND THE COGNISED) ;—OR *Apprehension of itself* IS THE FRUIT, AND THE MEANS, IN THIS CASE, CONSISTS IN 'CAPABILITY'.—(1344)

COMMENTARY.

(*a*) When the external object is what is *cognised*,—then the cognition of that object is the *Fruit*, and *Sameness of form* the *Means*, of the Cognition ; as even in the case of the self-cognition, the Cognition is of the same form as what is cognised.—(*b*) When what is *cognised* is of the nature of *Cognition*, then the 'apprehension of itself' is the *fruit*, and *capability* the *Means*, of the Cognition. The said *capability* belongs to the Cognition only which carries with it the cognisability of its own function ; by virtue of which *capability*, it is Cognition alone—and not the Jar and such things,—that apprehends itself ;—hence it is by the instrumentality of this *capability* that Cognition is found to be *self-manifested* ; hence *Capability* is said to be the 'Means', the Instrument, of the Cognition of the Cognition itself. This has been thus declared—'The Cognitions of Cognitions themselves, being neither the one nor the other, are *capable* of such self-apprehension ; hence their capability is the *Instrument* (Means) and they themselves are the *cognised*, and their own apprehension is the *fruit*'.—(1344)

In the following the Author sets forth the objection urged by *Kumārila*—

TEXT (1345).

"JUST AS, WHEN THE CUTTING WEAPON STRIKES AT THE *khadira*-TREE, THE RESULTANT *Cut* DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE *Palāsha*-TREE,—IN THE SAME WAY NOWHERE IN THE WORLD IS THE (CUTTING) AXE FOUND TO BE THE SAME AS THE *Cut* ITSELF" [*Shlokavārtika*—SENSE-PERCEPTION, 75).—(1345)

COMMENTARY.

The *Bauddha* has addressed the following argument to the person who asserted that the *Means* of Cognition was different from its *Fruit* :—If there is difference between the Means of Cognition and its Fruit, then the objective of these two—the *Means* of Cognition and the *Fruit* of Cognition—also must be different; and yet this cannot be right; when, for instance, the cutting weapon, the Axe, is struck at the *Khadira*-tree, the *Cut* does not appear in the *Palāsha*-tree; hence it must be admitted that the objective of both is the same and hence there is no difference between them.

It is in answer to this that *Kumārila* says—"If one who desires the objective to be the same should declare the Means of Cognition to be the same as its Fruit, then he would be setting aside the well-known distinction between Cause and Effect; just as, when the cutting weapon strikes at the *Khadira*-tree, the *Cut* does not appear in the *Palāsha-tree,* so also nowhere in the world is the Axe found to be the same as the Cut itself" (*Shlokavārtika*—Sense-perception, 74-75).

The word '*Chhēdana*', 'Cutting weapon', stands for *that by which something is cut.*—(1345)

The following *Text* supplies the answer to this argument of *Kumārila's* :—

TEXT (1346).

THE DISTINCTION OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT' DOES NOT REST UPON THE SUBSTRATUM OF THAT DISTINCTION; COGNITION BEING FORMLESS, THE SAID DISTINCTION CANNOT BE POSSIBLE.—(1346)

COMMENTARY.

The apprehension of *Blue* is not the apprehension of *Yellow,*—this distinction in the cognition of things is based upon the *sameness of form,* nothing else; so that the distinction of Cause and Effect is made through the relation of *what is distinguished* and *what distinguishes,* not through the relation of the *Produced* and *Producer*; because the relation of the *Acting Agent,* the *Instrument* and the rest is not real; because all things being momentary, they cannot have any action. When the Cognition is produced in the form

of the Object, it appears to be characterising the object and hence active. Herein lies the action of the Cognition in presenting the object,—not in mere invariable concomitance. For instance, the sprout does not cease to be invariably concomitant with the seed. Thus the Cognition itself cannot be the *Means* of Cognition.—It is for this reason that the nature of the *Means of Cognition* is stated through the distinction that it is the Cognition *with a form*,—not the *formless* Cognition—which is the Means of Cognition. This distinction too should be understood to be made through the Conception that follows in the wake of the Cognition.—(1346)

The following *Text* shows that the Buddhist view is not nullified by common experience :—

TEXT (1347).

THUS THEN, THE (COMMONLY KNOWN) DISTINCTION (BETWEEN THE COGNITION AS *Means* AND COGNITION AS *Fruit*) IS PURELY IMAGINARY,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE BOW. THE DISTINCTION CANNOT BE HELD TO BE BASED UPON THE RELATION OF THE *Producer and Produced*.—(1347)

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the Bow, there are such notions as—(*a*) 'The *Bow* pierces', (*b*) 'He pierces *with the Bow*', (*c*) 'the arrow proceeding *from the Bow*, pierces',—where the same *Bow* is spoken of as (*a*) 'Agent', (*b*) 'Instrument, and (*c*) 'Ablative';—and this distinction is only imaginary (not real) ; and yet it is not incongruous ; so it is in the case in question also.—(1347)

TEXT (1348).

WHEN THE COMPACT FIBRE OF THE WOOD IS RENT ASUNDER BY THE CUT OF THE AXE, THE AXE IS (POPULARLY) CALLED THE 'CUT' ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO THE FIBRE ; AND IT IS IN THIS WAY THAT THERE IS *sameness* (BETWEEN THE AXE AND THE CUT).—(1348)

COMMENTARY.

When the cutting of the Trees with the Axe comes to be examined, it is found that the *cut* consists in the entering of the Axe into the wood-fibre ; and this *entrance* is a property belonging to the Axe itself ; so that in this sense there is sameness between the Axe and the Cut ; and there is no incongruity in this.—(1348)

The same idea is further elucidated :—

TEXT (1349).

WHEN ONCE THE DISTINCTION HAS BEEN MADE,—IT MAY BE ASSUMED TO BE OTHERWISE ALSO ;—IT IS ONLY THE FORM OF THE DISTINCTION THAT IS SPOKEN OF IN THE FORM OF THE *Producer and Produced*.—(1349)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila has in his *Shlokavārtika* (Sense-perception, 78), in the words "The Cognition can be the Means as bringing about the apprehension, etc. etc."—based the distinction between the *Means* and *Fruit* on the relation of *Producer and Produced*. And in this there is nothing incompatible with our view. As our Teacher has declared as follows :—'The attributing of the name *Pratyakṣa* to the Eye and other *causes* is not incompatible'.—All that we say is as follows :—It is essential that in the beginning the relation of *Cause and Effect* can be based only upon the distinction previously made ; until the difference in the *Cognitions* has been distinctly recognised, nothing can proceed on the basis of the difference in *objectives* ; and for the recognition of the difference among Cognitions there can be no basis other than the *sameness of form* ; and from this it follows by implication that the *sameness of form* is the *most efficient instrument* ; and it is on the basis of *this sameness of form* that the Cognition proceeds to prompt people to activity ; and the fact of the prompter being the Means of Right Cognition can be determined only by one who is seeking to engage in the activity concerned ; and not merely as a whim. It has been thus declared—'Every wise person seeks to determine what is the proper means of cognition and what is not so, only for the purpose of some fruitful activity'. It is for this reason that that factor alone in the Cognition has to be brought out by which it serves to prompt men to activity. But in drawing the distinction between the Means of Cognition and its *fruit* on the basis of the relation of *Producer and Produced*, there is no recognition of that *sameness of form* which is the only prompting factor ; consequently the said distinction between the Means of Cognition and its fruit on the said basis would be absolutely useless. This is the reason why the Teacher had recourse to a figurative (indirect) interpretation, as he felt that the determining of the character of the Means of Cognition on the said basis cannot take any part in the prompting to activity.

Thus when the distinction has once been made, it may subsequently be explained on the basis of the relation of *Producer and Produced* ;—and there would be nothing objectionable in that—[only the initial distinction has to be made *first*, and hence it cannot be due to that relation].—(1349)

The following *Texts* sets forth the character of the 'Fruit' as proposed by *Kumārila* :—

TEXTS (1350-1351).

"THE 'FRUIT' CONSISTING IN THE APPREHENSION OF THE OBJECT, THE CHARACTER OF THE 'MEANS OF COGNITION' MUST BELONG TO WHAT GOES IMMEDIATELY BEFORE IT. HENCE IF THE COGNITION BE HELD TO BE THE 'MEANS', THEN THE 'FRUIT' MUST BE SOMETHING ELSE.—IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO ATTRIBUTE THE CHARACTER OF THE 'FRUIT' TO THE SELF-RECOGNITION (BY THE COGNITION), AS THIS IS GOING TO BE REFUTED LATER ON. NOR CAN IT BE RIGHT TO ASSERT THAT THE 'MEANS' CONSISTS IN THE FORM OF THE OBJECT (COGNISED) ; AS IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD BE A DIVERSITY OF OBJECTIVES" [*Shlokavārtika*—SENSE-PERCEPTION, 78-79].—(1350-1351)

COMMENTARY.

'*What goes, etc. etc.*'—i.e. the Eye and the other sense-organs.

'*The Fruit must be something else*' ;—in the form of *rejecting* or *acquiring* or *ignoring* the thing cognised ;—this also has been declared by *Kumārila* himself.

As regards 'self-recognition' (by the Cognition), that has been refuted ; hence that cannot be regarded as the 'Fruit' of Right Cognition.

If the *form of the object* be held to be the Means of Cognition, then the objectives of the Means and the Fruit would be different ; for instance, the *form of the object* would be something external (*objective*), while the self-recognition of the Cognition would have the form of the Cognition itself (which is purely *subjective*).—(1350-1351)

The above argument is answered in the following—

TEXT (1352).

'SELF-RECOGNITION' CANNOT BE DENIED ; AS THAT WOULD INVOLVE THE INCONGRUITY OF THERE BEING NO COGNITION AT ALL.—NOR CAN THE OBJECTIVES BE DIFFERENT ; AS 'SELF-RECOGNITION' ASLO IS HELD TO BE THE COGNITION OF THE OBJECT.—(1352)

COMMENTARY.

In accordance with the maxim—'He who has no apprehension of Sense-perception can have no perception of anything'—there would be incongruity of there being no perception of anything, if the cognition of the cognition itself were denied ; hence this 'self-recognition' cannot be denied.

Nor can it be right to hold that the two cognitions have two different objectives ; because 'self-recognition' also is held to be the cognition of the *object*, because it is the effect of that, not because it consists entirely of that ;

as it has been explained that the self-recognition has the same form. Hence there is no incongruity at all.—(1352)

Shaṅkarasvāmin urges the following argument :—

TEXT (1353).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE MEANS OF COGNITION MUST BRING ABOUT AN EFFECT OTHER THAN ITSELF,—BECAUSE IT IS AN ACTIVE AGENT,—LIKE THE HATCHET" ;—IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS FOLLOWS] :—(1353)

COMMENTARY.

"The Means of Cognition must be one that brings about an effect different from itself,—because it is an active agent,—like the Hatchet, etc."—(1353)

The answer to the above is as follows :—

TEXTS (1353–1355).

THE ARGUMENT IS FUTILE ; AS A DIFFERENT 'FRUIT' HAS BEEN ADMITTED ; AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH REASONS ALREADY EXPLAINED (UNDER *Text* 1348), THERE IS NO 'DIFFERENT' FRUIT AT ALL.—AS REGARDS THE MEANS OF COGNITION BEING AN 'ACTIVE AGENT',—THAT IS NOT ADMISSIBLE BY US, IF WHAT IS MEANT BY IT IS THAT IT IS *productive* ; IF WHAT IS MEANT IS THAT IT IS THE *Regulator*, THEN THERE CAN BE NO OBJECTION TO IT ; AND IN THAT CASE THE REASON BECOMES 'INCONCLUSIVE', AS IT INDICATES NO INCONGRUITY.—(1353–1355)

COMMENTARY.

'*Futile*',—because it seeks to prove what is already proved; inasmuch as *different* 'fruit' or 'effect' has been already admitted in the form of 'characterisation' (specification).—The particle '*hi*' connotes *reason* (for what is said).

The corroborative instance cited—'*like the Hatchet*',—is one that is 'devoid of the Probandum'; because it has been already shown that the *Hatchet* is the same as the *Cut* (vide *Text*, 1348).

The premiss—'*because it is an active agent*'—is 'inadmissible' if what is meant is that it is *productive* of its effect ; if it is meant that it is the *Regulator*,—then that is accepted by us.

But even if it is meant that it is the *Regulator*, the Reason is Inconclusive, as there is no incongruity (indicated).

If ' activity ' *in general* be what is meant, then also the Reason is Inconclusive, as there is no incongruity indicated.—(1353–1355)

Objection :—" If the Cognition were of the form of the Object, then the *sameness of the object* might constitute the character of the ' Means of Cognition ' ; as a matter of fact, however, the Cognition that is brought about is only of a form *similar* to that of the Object, and of the same character ;—hence it cannot be as suggested ; just as the *Colour and Taste* of a thing belong to a category quite different ".

This is what is anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXTS (1356-1357).

IF IT BE ARGUED THAT—" THE COGNITION CANNOT HAVE THE SAME FORM AS THE OBJECT APPREHENDED,—BECAUSE IT BELONGS TO A DIFFERENT CATEGORY,—LIKE THE COGNITION OF COLOUR, TASTE, ETC.",—[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS FOLLOWS]—IN DUE ACCORDANCE WITH OUR DOCTRINE WE HAVE CLEARLY EXPLAINED THIS AND ALSO OTHER THINGS IN COURSE OF OUR REJECTION OF THE IDEA OF A *real* OBJECT BEING APPREHENDED.—(1356-1357)

COMMENTARY.

We who are followers of the doctrine of Idealism readily accept what has been urged ; it does not affect our position at all. In fact, the objection that you have urged against the object *apprehended* has been only indistinctly (vaguely) stated ; while this is exactly that we have stated quite clearly, while examining—i.e. rejecting—the *idea*—conviction—that there is something *real* that is apprehended.—(1356-1357)

Question :—" What is that *clear* statement in proof of your doctrine ? '
Answer :—

TEXT (1358).

IF THERE WERE ABSOLUTE *sameness of form*, THEN *Cognition* WOULD BECOME *Non-cognition* ; AS FOR PARTIAL *sameness of form*, THAT WOULD MAKE EVERY COGNITION APPREHENSIVE OF EVERYTHING.—(1358)

COMMENTARY.

' *Absolute sameness of form* ' would consist in the fact of the *Cognition* being ' excluded ' from exactly those homogeneous things from which the

cognised object is 'excluded',—while 'partial sameness' would consist in 'exclusion' from only a few of those.—(1358)

Question :—"If that is so, then, why has the *validity* of the Cognition been said to consist in its *being of the same form* as the Object ?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (1359–1361).

BUT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF THE REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD, THE POSSIBILITY OF THE *sameness of form* HAS TO BE ACCEPTED ; THAT IS WHY IT HAS BEEN MENTIONED.—UNDER THE DOCTRINE, HOWEVER, OF COGNITION BEING A MERE REFLECTED IMAGE,—EVEN IF THE *Cognition* DIFFERS FROM THE *cognised* OBJECT, THE *sameness of form* BELONGS TO THE REFLECTION ; AND THE COGNITION CAN BE ONLY FIGURATIVE.—LASTLY, FOR ONE WHO DOES NOT ADMIT THE COGNITION TO BE THE RECEPTACLE OF THE SEMBLANCE OF THE OBJECT,—THERE IS NOT EVEN THE SAID METHOD POSSIBLE FOR THE COGNISING OF THE EXTERNAL OBJECT.—(1359–1361)

COMMENTARY.

'*It has, etc.*'.—'It' stands for 'the possibility of the sameness of form', or the 'form' itself.

'*Nirbhāsi*', '*Reflected Image*' :—'*Nirbhāsa*', 'Reflection', is *sameness of form with the object* ; and that which has this sameness of form, is the '*Reflected Image*'.

'*From the cognised object*',—i.e. from the external object.

'*Belongs to the Reflection*',—i.e. to the Reflection in the form of the Cognition.

'*Sameness of form*',—with the object.

'*Figurative*',—Indirect, Secondary.

'*Cognition*'—i.e. of the object.

'*Receptacle*'—substratum.

As regards the divergence of opinion regarding the *object* of Cognition, the Universal as a real entity has been already rejected ; hence for Perception which has been regarded as having an entity for its object, there can be no other object except the Specific Individuality, and this having been already pointed out as being got at by implication, no special effort has been made for setting aside the said divergence of opinion.

Some people have argued as follows (against the Buddhist's definition of Sense-perception) :—"The definition suggested is not a proper one ; the definition put forward is that of the *Means of Cognition,* with the view that other people may, through that definition, come to understand what the Means of Cognition is, and then regulate their action accordingly ; and it is not

put forward only for satisfying a whim. And (in so far as the proposed definition is concerned) the knowledge that Sense-perception is 'free from Conceptual Content' and all that cannot, in ordinary life, either prompt a man to activity, or make him desist from it."

This is not right. The nature of things cannot be made or determined according to one's wish; by virtue of which one could frame a definition accordingly; what has to be done, however, is to take the thing as it stands, and to put forward a definition embodying that particular aspect of the thing which one wishes to bring out. For example, one points out 'roughness' as a characteristic of the Earth. If it were not thus, then the definition put forward might be open to the charge of being an 'impossible' one.

As regards *Sense-perception,* there is nothing else to indicate its character, except 'freedom from Conceptual Content' and 'freedom from error'.—For instance, it must be 'free from error', because it is a *valid* means of Cognition; and it must be 'free from Conceptual Content', because it directly apprehends the Specific Individuality of things; and it has been proved that the Specific Individuality is something in regard to which no Convention can be made, and hence its cognition must be free from *association with words.*—It is for this reason that all intelligent persons regard this definition as entirely in accordance with reason.

Nor is it true that this definition cannot bring about either activity, or desisting from activity, on the part of intelligent persons. For instance, in connection with such cognitions as—(*a*) the Idea of the *Jar,* the action of *Throwing up,* the *Universal,* the Number and so forth, (*b*) the idea of Recognition, and (*c*) the idea of the 'yellow conch-shell',—some persons have been led to regard all these as 'Sense-perception', in accordance with the definition provided by other parties,—and then they find that all these are either *Conceptual* or *Erroneous,* and then,—in accordance with the definition provided by us,—they conclude that these cannot be 'Sense-perception'; thereupon they desist from (give up) the notion that Number and the rest are *real entities*;—and they also conclude that what *is* an entity is only that Specific Individuality—of the '*Blue*' for instance,—which is inexpressible by words, and hence they betake themselves to activity towards that.—How even the *non-conceptual* Cognition can lead to activity has been already explained before.

Says the Opponent :—"If this is so, then let there be a single item in the definition—'free from Conceptual Content', and 'free from error' need not be added. Because that fact alone which is already known prior to the intended activity, should be put forward as a definition for the benefit of persons desirous of undertaking activity in accordance with that definition; and no unknown thing; as the latter is as good as non-existent. And as a matter of fact, any certainty regarding 'freedom from error' cannot be there until it has been found to be compatible with the fruitful activity undertaken; in fact people with limited powers of perception are not able to ascertain the truthful character of a cognition, except through the perception of its practical effect; because for such persons the capacity of things can only be inferred from its effects; it has been shown above that 'truthful-

ness '—i.e. conformity with the real state of things—of the Cognition consists only in its capacity to make people actually get at the thing cognised. So that if this conformity were learnt only subsequently, it would serve no useful purpose ; as after that, there is no further activity."

Answer :—There is no force in this objection. It has been already explained that it is necessary to add the qualification 'free from error', in order to save the definition from the defect of being 'too wide' by reason of the possibility, under the definition, of notions like those of the 'Hair-tuft', etc. being regarded as *valid cognition*.—As regards the argument that before the activity has actually taken place, people with limited powers of vision have no means of ascertaining the truth of the cognition,—this also is *Inconclusive*. Where is there any such hard and fast rule that people with limited vision cannot ascertain the capacity of anything ? If that were so, then, they would be unable to be certain of anything ; which would mean that they are *unconscious* beings ; because even animals and infants, through repeated experience, come to have their impressions aroused, are able to feel certain that 'this thing brings pleasure', 'that other brings pain', and are found to act accordingly,—even before their present activity,—and then avoid the precipice and take to the mother's breasts. Also in the case of people who are constantly thinking of something that has never existed before, and have their mind disturbed by excessive desire, grief, fear and so forth,—even without remembering any points of similarity, etc.—it is found that the mere repetition of the vivid idea has the capacity to bring about the cognition. In a case where there is no repetition, there alone,—not everywhere—is the potency to be only inferred from its practical effects.

This same explanation applies to the certainty attaching to the perception of Inferential Indicatives, like *Smoke* ; as here also, the effect, in the shape of *Smoke*, is, by its very nature, something entirely different (from the Fire), and the certainty regarding its difference is due to repeated observation, whereby the idea of the Inferential Indicative also becomes possible, and consequently there is no rejection of Inference.

Says the Opponent :—" The repetition would be there only after the first activity has taken place ; it has to be explained how *that* first activity comes about ".

Answer :—That activity proceeds from the doubtful cognition.

Question :—" How can the Perception which gives rise to Doubt have any validity ? "

Answer :—How can there be validity in the Perception that brings about certainty ?

" It is due to the fact that this Perception brings about a definite Cognition and the man seeking for it takes up his activity."

This same may be said also with regard to Perception leading to Doubt.

Even though in this case, the cognition is contrary to the form of what is sought after, yet it is not in that form that the Perception leads to activity, because what is so cognised is not what is wanted ; nor does it lead to desisting from activity ; because it is only when there is cognition of the thing as desired that there can be any activity on the part of the man. Otherwise,

from Perception leading to Doubt, no one could act or desist from acting. But this does not so happen; on the contrary, it so happens that that activity is all the more powerful which proceeds on the part of persons who do not apprehend any evil consequences from the activity in question. So far as this aspect is concerned, there is no difference between the Perception leading to Doubt and that leading to Certainty. It is only where the Perception brings about a cognition entirely contrary to the thing cognised,—or where it brings about no cognition at all,—that there is no activity on the part of the man seeking for something; and hence it is only this Perception that is invalid,—not any other.—(1359–1361)

End of the Chapter on Sense-perception.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Inference.

COMMENTARY.

The Author proceeds to state the definition of *Inference* :—

TEXTS (1362-1363).

INFERENCE IS HELD TO BE OF TWO KINDS, AS DIVIDED INTO—(1) *For one's own benefit,* AND (2) *for the benefit of others.* (1) INFERENCE 'FOR ONE'S OWN BENEFIT' CONSISTS IN THE COGNITION OF THE INFERRED OBJECT DERIVED FROM THE THREE-FEATURED PROBANS; AND (2) INFERENCE 'FOR THE BENEFIT OF OTHERS' CONSISTS IN THE STATEMENT OF THE THREE-FEATURED PROBANS. THAT PROBANS WHICH HAS ONLY *one* OR *two* FEATURES (OUT OF THE NECESSARY THREE) IS REGARDED AS A 'SEMBLANCE OF THE PROBANS'.—(1362-1363)

COMMENTARY.

Inference is of two kinds—as divided into 'for one's own benefit' and 'for the benefit of others'.—The former should be understood to be that Cognition of the inferred object which is derived from '*the three-featured Probans*',—the Indicative that fulfils the three conditions of (1) 'being present in the Subject', (2) 'being present in that wherein the Probandum is known to be present', and (3) 'being entirely absent where the Probandum is known to be absent'.—The Inference 'for the sake of others' should be understood to consist in the verbal expression of the said three-featured Probans.

Question :—"Why has not the definition of the Wrong Inference been provided ?"

Answer :—'*That Probans which, etc. etc.*'—'Sound is eternal, (*a*) because it is a product, and (*b*) because it is corporeal, and (*c*) because it is non-cognisable',—in this Inference only one of the 'three features' is present in each ; e.g. in (*a*) the character of *being a Product* fulfils the single condition, of *being present in the subject* (Sound) [while it does not fulfil the condition of *being present where the Probandum is known to be present,* as the Probandum, *Eternality,* is known to be present in *Ākāsha, Soul,* etc., which are not *Products* ; nor does it fulfil the condition of *being absent where the Probandum*

is absent, as the Probandum, *Eternality,* is absent in the *Jar,* where the character of *being a Product* is *not* absent];—(*b*) the character of *being corporeal,* fulfils only the second condition, of being present where the Probandum is known to be present and does not fulfil the first condition of being present in the Subject (Sound), because Sound is *not corporeal*; nor does it fulfil the third condition of *being absent where the Probandum is absent,* as it is *not absent* in the *Jar* (which is corporeal) where the Probandum (Eternality) is known to be absent;—and (*c*) the character of *being non-cognisable* fulfils only the third condition, of being absent where the Probandum (Eternality) is known to be absent (e.g. in the *Soul,* etc. which are *cognisable*) [and it does not fulfil the other two conditions, as it is not present in the Subject, *Sound,* which is cognisable; nor is it present where the Probandum is known to be present, e.g. the Soul, etc. which are cognisable]. —Those fulfilling only two of the three conditions are the Probans in the following argument—'Sound is non-eternal,—(*a*) because it is visible, (*b*) because it is audible, and (*c*) because it is incorporeal';—where respectively only the following conditions are not fulfilled—(*a*) 'Because it is visible' does not fulfil only the condition of being present in the subject; (*b*) 'Because it is audible' does not fulfil the only condition of being present where the Probandum is known to be present; and (*c*) 'Because it is incorporeal' does not fulfil the only condition of being absent where the Probandum is known to be absent.—This has been thus expressed.—'Sound is eternal, because it is a product, because it is corporeal and because it is non-cognisable;—and Sound is non-eternal, because it is incorporeal, because it is audible and because it is visible'.—(1362-1363)

In the following *Text,* the Author sets forth the objection urged by *Pātrasvāmin* :—

TEXT (1364).

"THE CHARACTER OF THE VALID PROBANS IS FOUND IN WHAT IS 'IMPOSSIBLE OTHERWISE',—AND NOT WHEN THIS CONDITION IS NOT FULFILLED, EVEN WHEN THE 'THREE FEATURES' ARE PRESENT. HENCE THE 'THREE-FEATURED' PROBANS ARE IMPOTENT (INFRUCTUOUS)."—(1364)

COMMENTARY.

Pātrasvāmin argues as follows :—"The Probans is valid only when it is found to be 'otherwise impossible'; and not when it has the 'three features'. Because it is found that even when the Probans has the said three features, it is not valid, when it does not fulfil the condition that it is 'otherwise impossible'; e.g. in the case where the Probans is cited in

the form 'Because he is the Son of so and so' [therefore he must be dark]'. Consequently the 'three-featured' Probans are infructuous, inefficient".

In the term '*otherwise impossible*', the term 'otherwise' stands for 'without the Probandum'; that is to say, the valid Probans is that which exists in the Probandum only.—(1364)

In the following *Texts, Pātrasvāmin* justifies the view that the true Probans is that which has the one characteristic of being 'otherwise impossible',—by showing in detail that there is positive as well as negative concomitance (between the definition and the thing defined) :—

TEXT (1365).

"THAT WHICH IS 'OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE' IS HELD TO BE THE PROBANS, WHILE THIS IS ONLY 'ONE-FEATURED'; IT MAY OR MAY NOT BE REGARDED AS 'FOUR-FEATURED'."—(1365)

COMMENTARY.

'*One-featured*'—That which has only one characteristic, that of being 'otherwise impossible'; that alone—none other,—is regarded as 'Probans', by ordinary men as well as by investigators. Through Presumption this same character implies the three features of 'Being present in the Subject' and so forth; and hence it may be regarded as 'four-featured';—or it may not be so regarded, because in several cases, the Probans is found to be valid even when it has only one or two or three features.

Inasmuch as 'being otherwise impossible' is its one characteristic feature,—it is called 'one-featured'.—Along with 'being otherwise impossible', if it is found to exist in like things and not to exist in unlike things, then, it becomes 'two-featured'; and when along with 'being otherwise impossible', it is also existent in like things and also to be absent where the Probandum is known to be absent, then it is 'three-featured'; and it is not called 'three-featured' on account of the presence of the three features of 'presence in the Subject' and the rest (mentioned in the Buddhist's definition); because a Probans of this latter kind cannot bring about a valid cognition.—(1365)

"Or, the Probans is spoken of as 'one-featured' in view of the one character of 'being otherwise impossible', because this is its principal characteristic; and it is not spoken of in terms of the other features of 'presence in the Subject' and the rest, because these latter are secondary, or because they do not serve any useful purpose."—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1366).

"JUST AS AMONG PEOPLE, THE MAN WHO HAS *three* SONS IS SPOKEN OF AS 'HAVING ONE SON', ON ACCOUNT OF THE ONE SON BEING A GOOD SON,—SO IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE ALSO."—(1366)

COMMENTARY.

Says the other party :—On account of the relation of Invariable Concomitance, the character of the Probans should be rightly attributed to the 'three-featured' Reason only.

The answer to this (from *Pātrasvāmin*) is as follows :—

TEXT (1367).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE RELATION OF INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE IS NOT PRESENT IN THE 'THREE-FEATURED' REASONS ; IT IS REALLY FOUND ONLY IN THOSE REASONS WHICH HAVE THE ONE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF 'BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE'."—(1367)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*anyathāsambhava, etc.*' is to be expounded as 'those Reasons in whom there is the single character of *being otherwise impossible*'.—(1367)

The same idea is re-affirmed in the following—

TEXTS (1368-1369).

"THAT ALONE IS THE TRUE PROBANS WHICH HAS THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE'; AS FOR CORROBORATIVE INSTANCES, THEY MAY BE THERE, OR THEY MAY NOT ; AS THEY ARE NOT THE MEANS. IF THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE' IS *not* THERE, WHAT IS THE USE OF THE 'THREE FEATURES' ? AND IF THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE' *is* THERE, WHAT IS THE USE OF THE 'THREE FEATURES' ?"—(1368-1369)

COMMENTARY.

'*Corroborative Instances*',—in the form *similarity* and *dissimilarity*.

'*They are not the Means*'—of proving the Probandum.

It would be better to read the second line of 1369 before the first line.—(1368-1369).

The following *Text* proceeds to show that there can be no Invariable Concomitance in the 'three-featured' Probans :—

TEXT (1370).

"THE REASONING IN THE FORM—'HE MUST BE DARK, BECAUSE HE IS THE SON OF SO AND SO,—LIKE OTHER SONS OF HIS WHO ARE FOUND TO BE DARK',—CONTAINS THE 'THREE FEATURED' PROBANS, AND YET IT CANNOT LEAD TO ANY VALID DEFINITE CONCLUSION."—(1370)

COMMENTARY.

In the following Texts, it is shown, by a number of examples, that it is only the 'one-featured' Probans that has the requisite capacity (of leading to a valid conclusion) :—

TEXT (1371).

"AN EXAMPLE OF THE *One-featured* PROBANS WITHOUT CORROBORATIVE INSTANCES, WE HAVE IN THE REASONING—'POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ENTITIES ARE ESSENTIALLY *existent*—BECAUSE THEY ARE CAPABLE OF BEING APPREHENDED SOMEHOW'."—(1371)

COMMENTARY.

The Reasoning is in the form 'Positive and Negative entities are somehow *existent*, because they are apprehensible somehow'.—In this case there are no external corroborative Instances, either of similarity or dissimilarity, either in the form of a statement or in the form of actual things; because all things have been included under the Subject (Minor Term) 'Positive and Negative entities'; and there is nothing apart from these. As regards the character of 'being present in the Minor Term', this is 'otherwise impossible', and is nothing apart from this latter; hence the Probans here is 'one-featured'.

'*Somehow*',—under some such term as 'Cognisable' or its synonyms.

'*Are essentially existent*',—'somehow' has to be construed with this also.—Hence the full Reasoning is—'Because they are *somehow apprehensible*, therefore they are somehow existent'.—(1371)

In the following *Texts*, examples of the 'two-featured' Probans are cited :—

TEXTS (1372–1379).

" (1) 'THE *Shasha-lāñchhana* (HARE-MARKED) IS NOT *Non-Moon*,—BECAUSE IT IS SPOKEN OF AS THE *Moon*';—HERE WE HAVE A 'TWO-FEATURED' PROBANS.—(2) ANOTHER IS THUS STATED :—'I THINK THAT THIS PAIN OF MINE HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE FALLING INSECT,—BECAUSE ITS APPEARANCE WAS FELT ON THE TOUCH OF THE FALLING INSECT'.—(3) 'IN BRINGING ABOUT THE EFFECT IN THE SHAPE OF THE PERCEPTION OF COLOUR, THE EYE IS ENDOWED WITH A UNIQUE POTENCY,—BECAUSE IT IS USED FOR THAT PURPOSE,—OR, BECAUSE COLOUR IS FOUND TO BE ACTUALLY PERCEIVED BY ITS MEANS'.—(4) 'THE SOUL, THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS ARE SOMEHOW ESSENTIALLY *non-existent*,—BECAUSE THEY ARE SOMEHOW INAPPREHENSIBLE IN ANY WAY, LIKE THE HORNS OF THE HARE'.—(5) 'EVEN THE HARE'S HORN AND SUCH THINGS ARE SOMEHOW EXISTENT,—BECAUSE THEY ARE SOMEHOW APPREHENSIBLE,—JUST LIKE THE SOUL, THE JAR AND SUCH THINGS'.—(6) 'IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT YOUR FATHER IS IN THIS HOUSE,—BECAUSE YOUR FATHER'S VOICE IS HEARD IN THE HOUSE'.—(7) IN THE CASE OF WORDS, LAMPS AND SUCH THINGS,—IT IS FOUND THAT THEY ARE ACTUALLY INDICATIVE (OF THINGS) THROUGH THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE', EVEN THOUGH THEY DO NOT RESIDE IN THE SUBJECT (MINOR TERM).—HENCE FOR US, IT IS THE 'ONE-FEATURED' PROBANS THAT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE INDICATIVE (PROBANS),—ON THE GROUND OF ITS BEING THE MOST IMPORTANT ; WHAT IS THE USE OF ASSUMING SUCH CHARACTERS AS 'RESIDING IN THE SUBJECT' AND SO FORTH ? "—(1372–1379)

COMMENTARY.

The proposition may be stated either in the form 'The Hare-marked is not Non-Moon', or 'The Hare-marked is the Moon'; and the Probans is 'because it is spoken of by the well-known popular name *Moon*', or 'because it is spoken of as the *Moon*';—the Corroborative Instance *per* dissimilarity being supplied by the *clod of earth* and such things.

(2) Another Probans is next mentioned, which is 'two-featured':—'This pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect,—because its appearance was felt on the touch of the falling insect';—i.e. the '*udaya*', appearance, of which was '*pratilabdha*', felt, on the '*sparsha*', touch, of the falling insect.—The feminine affix '*ṭāp*' is not added at the end of the compound, because it is intended to be a common factor.

(3) [Another example]—'The Eye has the potency of the most effective instrument in bringing about the apprehension of the Colour existing at the present time,—because, while it is not damaged, it is that which is used as the Instrument, by a man who desires to see Colour and acts intelligently'—or—'because it is actually found to bring about the cognition of Colour';

the Ear, etc. being the Corroborative Instance *per* dissimilarity.—' *Tasya* '—of the Colour.

In all these three Reasons, there being no Corroborative Instances *per* Similarity, they have only *two features.*

(4) [Another example]—' The Soul, the Jar and other things are somehow essentially non-existent,—because they are somehow not-apprehended,—like the Hare's Horn '.—In this case, there is no Corroborative Instance *per* dissimilarity; as ' the Jar and other things ' include the entire group of Positive Entities and they have been mentioned in the Proposition as *essentially* non-existent; and the negative entity has been put forward as the Instance; and apart from the ' Positive ' and the ' Negative ', there is no third category,—wherein it could be pointed out that the exclusion of the Probandum implies the exclusion of the Probans.

(5) [Another example]—' Things like the Hare's Horn are somehow essentially existent, as they are somehow apprehensible ' ;—the absence of the Instance *per* dissimilarity here also may be explained as above.

(6) [Another example]—' This house is understood as having your father within,—because your Father's voice is heard '.—Here also there is no Instance *per* Similarity ; hence the Probans is only ' two-featured '.

(7) In the case of Words, Lamps and such things, it is found that, even though they do not subsist in the Subject (Minor Term), yet they indicate (make known) things, in the same way as the Inferential Probans in the shape of *Smoke*, etc. Words and Lamps are not properties subsisting in the Jar and such things indicated by them ; and yet the Thing is actually apprehended through them ; hence in this case the two conditions are present—that of ' absence where the Probandum is known to be absent ', and ' being otherwise impossible ' ; hence the Probans here is a ' two-featured ' one.—(1372–1379)

The following *Text* supplies the answer to the above arguments of *Pātrasvāmin* :—

TEXT (1380).

IS THE PROPOSED DEFINITION MEANT TO BE GENERAL ? OR, IN REFERENCE TO A *particular* SUBJECT ON WHICH KNOWLEDGE IS SOUGHT ? OR IN REFERENCE TO THE *Instance* ?—(1380)

COMMENTARY.

The proposed definition of the Probans is that (it is ' otherwise impossible ', which means that) *it should not exist apart from the Probandum* ; —(1) now is this meant to be general (applicable to *all* Probans) ? Or is it meant to be applicable to any particular object ? and in the latter case, (2) is it meant to be in reference to a particular object in which the existence or otherwise of the Probandum is sought to be known ? Or (3) in reference

to that object which forms the Corroborative Instance.—These are the alternatives possible.—(1380)

The following *Text* points out objections against the *first* alternative :—

TEXT (1381).

IF IT WERE UNDERSTOOD TO BE *general*, THEN, WHAT WOULD BE INDICATED WOULD BE THE EXISTENCE OF THE PROBANS IN THE OBJECT WHERE THE PROBANDUM IS PRESENT ; AND IT WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH WHAT IS SOUGHT TO BE ACCOMPLISHED.—(1381)

COMMENTARY.

The mere fact of its *not existing apart from the Probandum*,—without the other fact of its existing wherever the Probandum is known to exist,—does not make 'visibility'—[which *does not exist apart from the Probandum, Non-eternality*; but is not present in *all* cases where Non-eternality is present],—does not prove the *Non-eternality* of *Sound*.—Hence the first alternative cannot be right.

'*It would not accomplish, etc. etc.*'—that is, it could not establish the desired conclusion regarding the presence of the Probandum in the object.—(1381)

Question :—" Why so ? "
Answer :—

TEXTS (1382-1383).

FOR INSTANCE, 'VISIBILITY' IS KNOWN TO BE INSEPARABLE (NOT EXISTING APART) FROM 'DESTRUCTION', IN A GENERAL WAY ; AND YET IT (VISIBILITY) CANNOT PROVE IT (DESTRUCTION) IN SOUND.—IF, THEN, IT BE SAID THAT ITS PRESENCE IN THE OBJECT IS MEANT,—THEN, IN THAT CASE, UNDER YOUR VIEW ALSO, THE PROBANS BECOMES 'THREE-FEATURED' AS BEFORE.—(1382-1383)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tat*'—Visibility.
'*Tasya*'—of Destruction.
'*Cannot prove it*'—cannot indicate its presence.

It might be said that—" in order to guard against the said objection, recourse may be had to the qualification that the Probans should be actually present in the object ".—In that case, under your view also, the Probans comes to have the same ' three-featured ' character that it had under ours.—(1382-1383)

Question :—" How so ? "
Answer :—

TEXT (1384).

' BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE ' INCLUDES POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE ; AND BY ITS *presence in the object* ITS PRESENCE IN THE MINOR TERM BECOMES ADMITTED.—(1384)

COMMENTARY.

' *Positive Concomitance* '—is *presence wherever the Probandum is known to be present.*

' *Negative Concomitance* '—is *absence where the Probandum is known to be absent.*

' *Saṁshraya* '—is *admission, i.e. acceptance.*—(1384)

The following *Text* shows that there is no incompatibility with the opinion of our Great Teacher :—

TEXT (1385).

A SIMILAR ABBREVIATED DEFINITION HAS BEEN INDICATED BY OUR TEACHER ALSO : WHO SAYS THAT ' THE PROBANS EXISTS IN THE COGNISABLE OBJECT AND IS PERVADED BY A PART OF IT '.—(1385)

COMMENTARY.

' *Grāhyadharmaḥ* ',—i.e. existing in the *cognisable object,*—i.e. the object in which the Probandum is sought to be proved ; i.e. in the Minor Term.—(1385)

The following *Texts* point out the objections against the second alternative noted above (under *Text* 1380) :—

TEXTS (1386–1388).

IF THE PROPOSED DEFINITION OF THE PROBANS IS MEANT TO BE ONE THAT IS FOUND IN THE MINOR TERM ONLY,—THEN THAT SAME MEANS OF COGNITION WHICH HAS MADE THE PROBANS KNOWN WOULD MAKE KNOWN THE PROBANDUM ALSO. IF THE PROBANDUM DOES NOT BECOME KNOWN, THEN THE PROBANS ALSO CANNOT BECOME KNOWN. THUS THE PROBANS WOULD BE USELESS, THE PROBANDUM HAVING BECOME KNOWN BY OTHER MEANS.—THERE WOULD BE THE INCONGRUITY OF 'MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE' ALSO, IF THE DEFINITE COGNITION OF THE PROBANDUM FOLLOWED FROM THE PROBANS; AND BETWEEN THESE TWO, THE COGNITION OF ONE WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THE COGNITION OF THE OTHER.—(1386–1388)

COMMENTARY.

The Probans may be defined as *being inseparable from the Probandum in the Minor Term only,*—as asserted in the following words—" The character of the Probans is held by others to exist in the Instance and to be not seen apart from the Probandum; in my opinion however, it is *that which does not exist in the Minor Term apart from the Probandum*; the followers of *Shabara* derive this knowledge from Presumption, and the followers of *Bhikṣu,* from Inference; for us, Inference is something totally different, like *Narasimha* (having a dual character) ".

[In this passage]—' *Dharmiṇi* '—In the Minor term;—i.e. that in which the existence of the Probandum is sought to be proved;—' *Amunā* '—i.e. what is sought to be proved. *That which is incapable of existing in the Minor Term apart from the Probandum*;—this is meant to be the definition (of Probans).

If such be the definition of the Probans, then that same Means of Cognition by which the Probans would be known as inseparable from the Probandum, as existent in the object where the Probandum is sought to be proved,—that same Means of Cognition would have made known the Probandum also (as present in the Minor Term);— so that the Probans would be entirely useless.

If the Probandum is not known, then the Probans also is not known; because the Probans has been defined as what is present in the Minor Term inseparably from the Probandum; and this *inseparability from the Probandum* cannot be known if the Probandum is not known; so that the Probandum would remain 'unknown', because the cognition of *inseparability* depends upon the Cognition of both.

It might be urged that—" The Probans may be known by other means of cognition ";—then what is the use of the Probans, the Probandum having become known already?

Further, if the definite cognition of the Probandum were dependent upon the Probans, then there would be the incongruity of *mutual interdependence.*

Question :—" How ? "

Answer :—' *If the definite Cognition, etc. etc.* ' ;—the cognition of the Probandum would be dependent upon the cognition of the Probans,—as therein alone lies the use of the Probans,—and the cognition of the Probans, which is characterised by inseparability from the Probandum, would be dependent upon the cognition of the Probandum ; thus there would be clear mutual inter-dependence '.—(1386–1388)

The following *Text*—takes note of the third alternative set forth above (under *Text* 1380) :—

TEXT (1389).

EVEN IF THE PROBANS WERE KNOWN AS EXISTENT IN THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE, THAT WOULD NOT BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE PROBANDUM IN THE MINOR TERM. BECAUSE ITS INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE WILL NOT HAVE BEEN DEFINITELY COGNISED ALL OVER.—(1389)

COMMENTARY.

' *In the Corroborative Instance* ',—i.e. in the object that serves as the Corroborative Instance,—which object is different from that in which the Probandum is sought to be proved.

' *If it were known* ',—i.e. if the Probans were known.

What is meant is as follows :—If the inseparability (concomitance) of the Probans is held to be in the object which forms the Corroborative Instance,—and which is something different from the Minor Term, in which the Probandum is sought to be proved,—and *not* ' all over '—everywhere—along with the Minor Term,—then how could such a Probans bring about the cognition of the Probandum in the Minor Term ?

Why it could not bring it about is explained—' *Because its invariable concomitance, etc. etc.* '.—(1389)

With the following *Text,* the author proceeds to point out defects in the examples cited (by *Pātrasvāmin,* in Texts 1371 to 1378) :—

TEXT (1390).

AS REGARDS THE PROBANS THAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD (UNDER 1371), IN THE FORM ' BECAUSE IT IS APPREHENDED SOMEHOW ',—THE OBJECT OF THIS IS NOT OPEN TO UNCERTAINTY ; HENCE IT IS USELESS.—(1390)

COMMENTARY.

As regards the Probans that has been put forward, in the form—' Because it is somehow apprehended ',—this is absolutely futile ; as its object is not open to doubt ; that is, it asserts what is already known ; and what is already

known cannot be the objective of the Probans; it is only a doubtful matter that is dealt with by the Probans; because 'a Reason is stated only in reference to what is doubtful'.—What too is known only in an isolated form cannot be the substratum of the Probans; as the Probandum would be already known (under the definition propounded by *Pātrasvāmin*).—(1390)

It might be urged that—"here also what forms the object of the Probans is what is open to doubt".—The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (1391).

THAT THE POSITIVE ENTITY IS ESSENTIALLY EXISTENT IS KNOWN TO ALL PERSONS; THEN HOW IS IT SAID THAT IT IS KNOWN '*somehow*'?—(1391)

COMMENTARY.

When all persons somehow know it for certain that the Positive Entity is existent, why do you state your Proposition in the form 'The Positive Entity is *somehow existent*'?—

'*Tadātmatvam*'—being essentially existent.

The mention of the 'Positive Entity' is only by way of illustration; the *Negative Entity* is also meant.

'*Somehow*'—i.e. in the form of 'being cognisable',—it is known for certain that all this is *existent*; hence the Probans is absolutely futile.—(1391)

It might be argued that—"the said fact is not admitted by the *Sāṅkhya* and others; hence it is sought to be proved".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXTS (1392-1393).

EVEN UNDER THE DOCTRINE THAT "ALL THINGS ARE ONE",—ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIVERSITY IN THE NATURE OF THE MODIFICATIONS, WHAT IS MANIFESTED IS ALWAYS IN SOME DEFINITELY CLEAR FORM. EVEN THOSE WHO REGARD ALL THINGS AS 'FEATURE-LESS' (DEVOID OF CHARACTER), ALWAYS HAVE RECOURSE TO SUCH QUALIFYING TERMS AS 'TRULY' AND THE LIKE.—(1392-1393)

COMMENTARY.

'The doctrine of all things being one' is the one that is held by the *Sāṅkhyas*; for those who take their stand upon this doctrine, what is manifested—apprehended—is always in some definite form.

Question:—"How so?"

Answer:—'*On account of, etc. etc.*';—'*nature of the Modifications*',—i.e. in the form of Modifications.

The term '*ādi*' is meant to include the 'unmixed (Pure) Primordial Matter, consisting of Pleasure, Pain, etc.' and 'the Spirits as distinguished from one another, and from Primordial Matter'.

'*Even those*'—i.e. the *Mādhyamikas*, Idealists.—These also, in asserting the 'featurelessness' of all things, always add the qualifying term 'truly', and they do not assert them to be *absolutely* so; because they do admit of their being produced at least in the Ideation.

'*Truly*'—i.e. strictly logically.

The term '*ādi*' includes such qualifying terms as 'in reality' and the like.

In fact it must be admitted by all men that the fact that a *thing* is *somehow existent* is quite certainly recognised.—(1392-1393)

TEXT (1394).

OTHERWISE, IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED THAT 'IT IS SOMEHOW APPREHENDED'.—IF IT IS *Usage* THAT IS SOUGHT TO BE PROVED,—THEN SOMETHING WELL KNOWN SHOULD FORM THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE.—(1394)

COMMENTARY.

'*Otherwise*',—i.e. if what has been just said is not admitted, then—the Probans—in the form 'because it is somehow apprehended'—cannot be admitted.

Previous to this the defect pointed out in the statement of the other party was that it was *futile*; it is now pointed out that it is *inadmissible.*

If it is Usage that is meant to be proved,—then the Corroborative Instance could be found in the case where the use had been made; and in this case, the Probans would become 'three-featured'. Otherwise, if there were no Corroborative Instance, the Usage also could not be known.—(1394)

The following *Text* points out the defect in the second Reasoning put forth (by *Pātrasvāmin*, in *Text* 1372, where the 'two-featured' Probans is exemplified):—

TEXT (1395).

AS REGARDS 'BEING SPOKEN OF AS THE MOON', THIS IS PRESENT ALSO IN THINGS WHERE THE PROBANDUM IS KNOWN TO BE PRESENT;—OR IT IS ALSO SOMETIMES PRESENT IN THE *Man* (WHO IS SPOKEN OF AS THE MOON), OR IN *Camphor*, *Silver* AND SUCH OTHER THINGS (WHICH ARE ALSO CALLED 'MOON').—(1395)

COMMENTARY.

'*Māṇavakē*'—i.e. in Man.—(1395)

Objection:—"If a three-featured Probans is possible, for the proving of the 'Moon', then how is it that your Teacher has asserted that, when a

man declares that the Moon is *not the Moon,*—for the proving of its being the *Moon* against such a person, there can be no Inference,—as he has asserted in the following passage—'In the case where there can be no Inference on account of the thing in question being *unique,* it is excluded by its contrary which is well known in its verbal form; when, for example, it is said that *the Hare-holder is the Moon because it is an entity*; in a case like this there is no *Minor Term*'?"

In anticipation of this objection, the following answer has been provided:—

TEXT (1396).

THERE WOULD BE 'UNIQUENESS' ONLY IF THE PROBANS WERE MEANT TO PROVE 'MOON-NESS'; AS, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY WELL-KNOWN FACT REGARDING IT, IT WOULD BE BASED ENTIRELY UPON THE NATURE OF THE THING ITSELF.—(1396)

COMMENTARY.

'*It would be based entirely, etc.*';—i.e. it is in regard to the Probans in the shape of the existence or non-existence of things, that 'Uniqueness' has been asserted,—not in regard to a Probans in the form of a well-known fact; because in the case of the latter, as it is dependent upon the wish of the speaker, the necessary concomitance would always be there. The Inference, without a Corroborative Instance, has been spoken of only in the case where the other party holds a different opinion and denies all experience, and consequently cannot be convinced of the thing being the *Moon* on the basis of any well-known fact,—nor is there any Inferential Indicative (Probans) based upon the capacity of things by which the *Moon-ness* could be proved in reference to the *Hare-holder,*—because the name 'Moon' is based upon the mere whim of the speaker and is not an inherent property of the thing concerned. That this is so is clear from the following statement—'One who does not wish to attribute Moon-ness to the *Hare-holder,*—what sort of well-known cognition could he want? It is for this reason that the Inference addressed to him has to be without a Corroborative Instance, and hence *unique,* too specific.'

In place of '*chandratvasādhane*', 'To prove *Moon-ness*', some texts read '*achandrasādhane*', 'to prove that it is not-Moon'; and with this reading, the explanation would be as follows:—Where the other party has asserted that 'The *Hare-holder* is *not the Moon,* because it exists',—when the Probans, 'because it exists', has been cited by that party for proving the 'Non-moon-character',—then, the person who proceeds to answer him by proving the 'Moon-character', has a reason why he cannot put forward an Inference of 'uniqueness'; and it is this reason that the Teacher has indicated by asserting that 'where, on account of uniqueness, there is no Inference, etc. etc.', which refers to the absence of an Inferential Indicative in the shape of the character of the thing concerned, as apart from any well-known fact (which could be cited).—(1396)

The following *Text* points out the defect in the third argument (put forward by *Pātrasvāmin,* in *Text* 1373, regarding the 'falling insect'):—

TEXT (1397).

THERE IS NO DISTINCTION PERCEIVED BETWEEN 'BEING BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE FALLING INSECT' AND 'HAVING ITS APPEARANCE FELT ON THE TOUCH OF THE FALLING INSECT'.—(1397)

COMMENTARY.

'*There is no distinction perceived*',—between the Probans (Premiss) and the Proposition (Conclusion); that is, the Probans is a part of the Proposition itself. In the case in question, what is meant to be proved is the fact of the Pain being due to a particular insect,—and the same fact is asserted, in different words, in the Probans (Premiss). Hence there is no difference between the Premiss and the Conclusion.—(1397)

The following might be urged:—"If the epithet *falling* is not introduced, and the Probans (Premiss) is stated in the general form 'because its appearance is felt',—then the Premiss cannot be a part of the Conclusion."

Answer:—

TEXT (1398).

'FALLING' MUST BE MADE A QUALIFICATION IN THE PROBANS; OTHERWISE 'INCONCLUSIVENESS' (FALSITY) WOULD BE INEVITABLE.—(1398)

COMMENTARY.

The qualification must be there; otherwise the Premiss would be falsified by reference to the Pain caused by other insects.—(1398)

TEXT (1399).

IF WHAT IS MEANT TO BE PROVED (ASSERTED IN THE CONCLUSION) IS THAT BETWEEN THE TWO (THE PAIN AND THE INSECT) THERE IS THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT,—WHICH HAS BEEN FORGOTTEN,—THEN THE PROBANS WOULD BE 'THREE-FEATURED', AS THERE WOULD BE A CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE PROVIDED BY PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE.—(1399)

COMMENTARY.

It might be urged that "what is meant to be proved is the relation of Cause and Effect—for the benefit of one who has forgotten it,—then, in

that case, the Probans would become 'three-featured', as the Corroborative Instance would be provided by such well-known cases as that of *Smoke and Fire.*—(1399)

The following *Text* supplies the answer to the argument stated (by *Pātrasvāmin,* in Text 1374) regarding "the Eyes having the peculiar potency for bringing about the effect in the shape of Colour-perception".

TEXT (1400).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE VERY *existence* OF THE EYE,—WHICH IS THE SUBJECT—IS STILL UNCERTAIN; AND THE PROVING OF THIS (EXISTENCE) CANNOT BE RIGHT,—AS IT WOULD BE OPEN TO THE DEFECTS OF 'INADMISSIBILITY' AND THE REST.—(1400)

COMMENTARY.

There is a stop after '*na*' (in the second line).

'*Inadmissibility and the rest*'.—The term 'and the rest' includes 'falsity' and 'contradiction'.

What is meant is that if *Existence* is to be proved, then the Probans put forward is open to all the three defects of the Probans. For instance, if the character cited as the Probans is something *positive,* then it is 'inadmissible';—if it is both (positive and negative), then it is 'Inconclusive';—if it is *negative,* then it is 'contradictory'.—This has been thus declared—'The positive property is not admitted; both positive and negative would be Inconclusive; and the negative one would be contradictory; how then can *Existence* be proved?'

If what is sought to be proved is *the potency in the Eye, the Subject, to bring about visual perception,*—even so, inasmuch as 'potency', 'existence', etc. are synonymous, the proving of *Potency* would involve the proving of *Existence.*—On the negative aspect also, inasmuch as the Potency, being beyond the reach of the senses, would not be well-known, the Probans would become fallacious, as having no *well-known* substratum.

Similarly, the Probans, in the form 'because of the perception of Colour', would be something not present in the Subject, and hence it should be understood to be *Inadmissible.*—(1400)

Question :—"How then can you also prove the existence of the Eyes and the other sense-organs?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1401).

BUT SOMETIMES, EVEN THOUGH COLOUR AND OTHER THINGS ARE THERE, VISUAL PERCEPTION DOES NOT TAKE PLACE; HENCE IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THAT (PERCEPTION) ALONE CANNOT BE A REASON (FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE EYE).—(1401)

COMMENTARY.

'*Sometimes*',—when, for instance, the Eyes are closed.

We never seek to prove the existence of the Eye—directly as 'this is the Eye'; what happens (according to us) is that it is found that the Perception appears only when certain things, in the form of Colour, etc. are there, —and it is so found that it is present when these things are there, and it is absent when they are absent;—and what we seek to prove is that the Perception could not have those things alone as its cause,—that it must have some other cause; so that the *Subject* (of our Inference) is the said Perception, which cannot be said to be 'unknown'.—What this other cause is comes to be spoken of as the 'Eye'.

The basis of our conclusion is the practical notion of diversity.—(1401)

The following might be urged:—"It may be that, in the manner shown, the Perception may be the *Subject*; even so, the Probans remains only 'two-featured'".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1402).

THE SPROUT IS ACTUALLY FOUND TO EXIST AS HAVING ITS BIRTH INSEPARABLY CONNECTED WITH ITS CAUSE; AND THIS IS ALWAYS AVAILABLE AS THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE; THE INSTANCE PER DISSIMILARITY IS TOO CLEAR (TO BE STATED).—(1402)

COMMENTARY.

'*Inseparably connected with its Cause*'—invariably concomitant with its Cause—is the *birth*—appearance, coming into existence—of the Sprout. Things like the Sprout, having their birth dependent upon their Cause and hence coming into existence only occasionally, are possible as the Corroborative Instance (in the proving of the Visual Perception as being due to the Eye);—the argument being formulated thus:—Those things that appear on the presence of something else, only occasionally, cannot be regarded as produced from that alone, they must be regarded as dependent upon other causes,—for instance, even when the soil and other things are there, the Sprout is found to appear or not to appear according as the seed is there or not there;

—even when Colour, etc. are there, the Visual Perception appears only at certain times, according as the Eyes are closed or not closed; hence in the case of the denial of the Eye, the argument would point out that the said denial would be contrary to a wider proposition; while in the case of the asserting of the existence of the Eye, it would contain a natural reason.—(1402)

The *Text* now takes up the argument put forward (by *Pātrasvāmin*) under *Text* 1375, to the effect that "the Soul and the Jar are somehow non-existent, etc. etc".

TEXT (1403).

IN PROVING THAT THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS ARE "SOMEHOW NON-EXISTENT",—THE PROBANS IS FOUND AS, IN A PREVIOUS CASE, TO BE 'FUTILE' AND ALSO 'INADMISSIBLE'.—(1403)

COMMENTARY.

Here also, there would be proving what is already admitted; as the fact of the Jar, etc. being 'somehow non-existent' is already admitted.

In case it is not admitted, then the Probans also, in the form 'because it is not apprehended', cannot be admitted; so that the Probans becomes 'Inadmissible'.

In this way, the defect in the Probans may be pointed out,—just as it was in connection with the argument seeking to prove that the things in question are *existent*.—(1403)

It has been argued that—"there being nothing *where the Probandum is known to be absent*, there can be no Corroborative Instance *per dissimilarity*".—The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXTS (1404-1405).

HERE ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE *per dissimilarity*; THAT SAME FORM OF THE THINGS BECOMES *the thing where the Probandum is known to be absent*.—IN THE PROVING OF THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING SOMEHOW EXISTENT' IN REGARD TO NON-ENTITIES,—THERE WOULD BE 'PROVING OF WHAT IS ALREADY ADMITTED'; ALSO 'INADMISSIBILITY', AND THE CONCOMITANCE OF THE CONTRARY CHARACTER IN THAT WAY.—(1404-1405)

COMMENTARY.

That form in which the Jar, etc. are apprehended,—if their existence in that form is accepted by them, then, in that case, that same character would

also serve as the *Instance per dissimilarity* ; because in that character, the Probans—' being unapprehended '—will have ceased to exist.

Similarly in the case of the argument regarding things being ' somehow existent ', the defect of ' futility ' would be present.

' *Nirātmasu* '—i.e. in non-entities.

' *Concomitance of the contrary character* ' ;—i.e. the ' contrary character ', —in the shape of the *cessation of the Probandum*—would be pervaded by (concomitant with) the *absence of the Probans.*

' *In that way* '—i.e. by the possibility of the Instance *per dissimilarity.*—(1404-1405)

The following *Texts* point out the defects in the argument propounded (by *Pātrasvāmin*), in *Text* 1377, regarding " Your father being present in the house, etc. etc." :—

TEXTS (1406-1407).

When the presence of the Father in the house is sought to be proved by the hearing of the Father's Voice,—the Probans in this case is clearly ' three-featured '. As, surely, at some time previously the concomitance of the Voice has been perceived ; if it has never been so perceived, then the ' inadmissibility ' of the Probans would be irresistible.—(1406-1407)

COMMENTARY.

' *Tasya* ' :—the voice as belonging to the Father must certainly have been heard before. If it had not, then the Probans would be *inadmissible.*—(1406-1407)

The said *three-featured* character of the Probans is shown in the following :—

TEXTS (1408-1415).

In that house wherein the Father had been found before,—and also in that wherein he had not been found before,—there is the concomitance, positive and negative, clearly perceived.—As regards the Word, it does not make known any external object at all; because in this case, the character of 'being otherwise impossible' is not present; the Word can only be the indicator of the 'speaker's wish' (to speak of a certain thing). If this (Speaker's wish) were meant to be what is expressed by the word, then its difference is quite clear. Because when the 'Speaker's wish' is not there, the word cannot be used.—As regards the Lamp, it does not make the *Blue* and other things known by becoming the Indicative (inferential); all that it does is to make things capable of being cognised; and it is only in this sense that it is called a 'means of cognition'. Only in case the Word were an Inferential Indicative, would it be necessary to consider if it fulfils the conditions of being *present in the Subject* (Minor Term) and so forth. Otherwise, why cannot the same be urged in connection with the Eye and other organs (as Means of Cognition)?—Even through the character of 'being otherwise impossible', *Visibility* cannot prove anything, unless it is present in the subject (Minor Term).—Thus 'one-featured' Probans are all impotent.—In those that have been cited as 'one-featured' Probans, the presence of *two* features becomes clearly indicated; and in those that have been cited as 'two-featured', the presence of *three* features becomes clearly indicated; because every Probans must reside in the *Subject* (which therefore is an additional condition that must be fulfilled).—If it be argued that "this feature is implied by the character of *being otherwise impossible*",—that cannot be so; because in the case of Sound, though *Visibility* may be otherwise desired, it is not present in sound (which is the subject).—(1408–1415)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of Words, the *character of being otherwise impossible* cannot be admissible,—in reference to *external things*; because it cannot serve as an Inferential Indicative of these latter,—being, as it is, dependent entirely upon the Speaker's wish.—If the said character is asserted in the case of words, in reference to the object that figures in the cognition (brought about by the words),—then, there are all the *three* features present, as in the case of *Smoke* (indicating the Fire). Because, if the Speaker's wish is not there, words cannot be used, the use must be regarded as the effect of that wish;

and as such it is *indicative* of the thing spoken of, just as the Smoke is of Fire ; and this is accepted by us ; but not as being *expressive* of the thing.

As regards the *Lamp*, it is not admitted to be even the *Indicator* like Smoke ; all that is admitted is that it has come to be popularly regarded as the Indicator (making things known) by reason of its making the Jar, etc. (objects cognised) capable of bringing about the cognition ; but the words are not inferential Indicatives ; hence any discussion as to the Indicative subsisting in the Subject cannot arise in this case. If it did arise in this case, then why could not the same discussion arise in the case of the Eye and the rest (which are the means of Sense-perception, not *Inferential* Indicatives) ?

'*Otherwise, etc. etc.*' ;—this sums up the subject-matter under consideration. The sense is that, even though *Visibility* is invariably concomitant with *non-eternality*, it does not prove this *non-eternality* in *Sound*.

Thus then, inasmuch as in all cases, the condition of *subsisting in the Subject* must be present,—by admitting this as a necessary condition, those Probans that have been cited as 'one-featured', must, necessarily, become 'two-featured',—and those cited as 'two-featured' must become 'three-featured'. Thus, on account of the necessity of *subsistence in the Subject*, it is the *one-featured* Probans that are really impotent.

It cannot be right to argue that—"such characters as *subsisting in the Subject* are all implied by that of 'being otherwise impossible', and hence they cannot form so many different independent characteristics of the Probans"—because the other party has himself asserted that there is the character of 'being otherwise impossible', even when *subsistence in the Subject* is not there, in the following passage—"Through the character of *being otherwise impossible* the Lamp and other things are actually indicative of things, *even though they do not reside in the subject* (*Text* 1378, above)".

In the case of *Visibility*,—even though 'non-eternality' is 'otherwise impossible',—visibility does not subsist in the Subject. So that in every way what has been asserted is entirely doubtful.—(1408–1415)

It has been argued above,—under *Text* 1370—that "in the case of the Reasoning 'He is dark because he is the son of so and so', even though the Probans has all the *three* features, yet it is not conducive to certainty of cognition".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (1416).

IN THE CASE OF SUCH PROBANS AS 'BECAUSE HE IS THE SON OF SO AND SO', THE CONTRARY BEING OPEN TO DOUBT, THE *three* CONDITIONS ARE NOT PRESENT ; BECAUSE WHAT IS CITED IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONTRARY. —(1416)

COMMENTARY.

It may be possible that the child may be the son of the man and yet be *not dark* ;—there being no incompatibility in this, *the absence of the Probans*

where the Probandum is known to be absent is open to doubt [and this is one of the three features]; so that the Probans is not 'three featured'; hence the example cited (by *Pātrasvāmin*) is not relevant.—(1416)

The following might be urged—"Certainly there is *incompatibility*; even when there is no difference in the cause, if there were difference in the effect,—then the effect would be causeless".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1417-1418).

EVEN WHEN THE CHILD IS BORN OF A CERTAIN PERSON, THERE IS ALWAYS A LIKELIHOOD OF DIVERSITY IN ITS FEATURES, BY REASON OF THE PECULIARITIES OF SUCH CAUSES AS THE 'DESTINY' (OF THE CHILD) AND FOOD (OF THE PARENTS) AND SO FORTH.—FURTHER, (*a*) WHAT IS CITED AS THE PROBANS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE *nature* (OF THE PROBANDUM); (*b*) NOR IS THAT ITS *Effect*; (*c*) NOR IS IT OF THE NATURE OF 'THE NON-PERCEPTION OF THE PERCEPTIBLE';—AND APART FROM THESE (THREE) THERE IS NOTHING THAT CAN MAKE THE PROBANS 'INFALLIBLE' (TRUE).—(1417-1418)

COMMENTARY.

Through such causes as *the peculiarity of past good deeds* (Destiny) and eating of hot food' and other diverse circumstances, diversity in the features of the child—such as *fairness* and the like—are possible; wherefore then can there be any incompatibility where a diversity in the causes is well known?

Then again, the Premiss—'Because he is the son of so and so'—is not a 'natural' Reason,— as 'being a product' is (in the proving of *non-eternality*); in the latter case, 'being a product' can have no other character save that of *non-eternality*; while in the case in question it is not that there is no other character for 'being his son'; because the appellation of 'his son' is applied,—not on the ground of the son being *dark*, but—on the basis of the aggregate of five ingredients (of which the body of the child consists).—Nor is the *Probans* one based on 'effect'; as there is no causal relation known to subsist (between *Being his son* and *Darkness*).—Nor (lastly), is it of the nature of the '*non-perception* of the perceptible', as what is cited is in the positive form; also because there being no incongruity between the two, the Probans cannot prove the *negation of complexions other than the Dark*.

Apart from these three there can be no Inferential Indicative,—because of the absence of 'Invariable Concomitance' (in all other cases); without Invariable Concomitance, there can be no proper 'indicative' character; for, if there were, it would lead to absurdities.

Thus then, what has been cited is neither a 'Probans', nor is it 'three-featured'. How then could there be 'Infallibility' in it?

'*Non-perception of the perceptible*'—is the non-apprehension of something which fulfils all the conditions of apprehensibility.—(1417-1418)

In the following *Texts*, the author sets forth certain objections against the 'infallibility' put forward as constituting the character of the true Inferential Indicative:—

TEXTS (1419–1421).

"THE SAID 'INFALLIBILITY' IS SEEN IN OTHER CASES ALSO: FOR INSTANCE, (1) THE BLOOMING OF THE LILY AND THE RISE IN THE SEA HAVE THE RISE OF THE MOON FOR THEIR 'INDICATIVE'. (2) FROM THE PRESENCE OF SUN-LIGHT, THE PRESENCE OF SHADE ON THE OTHER SIDE IS INFERRED.—(3) WHEN THE HALF-BURNT WOOD-PIECE IS SEEN IN THE DARK FROM A DISTANCE, IT BRINGS UP THE IDEA OF SMOKE.—(4) FROM THE RISE OF THE *Kṛttikā* (ASTERISM) IS INFERRED THE PROXIMITY OF THE *Rohiṇī* (ASTERISM)."—(1419–1421)

COMMENTARY.

(1) From the Rise of the Moon—follows the inference of the Blooming of the Lily and the Rise in the Sea.

The term '*ādi*' is meant to include such cases as the Blooming of the Lotus inferred from the Rise of the Sun.

(2) From the presence of sun-light, there follows the inference of the shadow on the other side.

(3) When from a distance one sees in the darkness a half burnt piece of wood, he infers the presence of smoke.

(4) From the rise of the asterism *Kṛttikā*, one infers the proximity of the asterism *Rohiṇī*; since it is well known that the asterisms rise in the same order in which they are enumerated in the list beginning with *Ashvinī*.

All these are not included among the three kinds of Probans (mentioned in Texts 1417-1418). Why then should it be asserted that there can be no '*Infallibility*' in any Probans other than those of the said three kinds?—(1419–1421)

The answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXTS (1422-1423).

THE BLOOMING AND THE REST, WHEN PRODUCED, ARE PRODUCED AT THE SAME TIME AS, AND FROM THE SAME PARTICULAR CAUSES AS, THE SAID (MOON-RISE, ETC.). SO THAT HERE WE DO HAVE THE INFERENCE OF THE CAUSE FROM THE EFFECT. IF THERE WERE NO SUCH STRICT RELATIONSHIP, THEN EVERYTHING COULD BE INFERRED FROM EVERYTHING. —(1422-1423)

COMMENTARY.

When the said *Blooming and the rest*—Blooming of the Lily, Rise of the Sea and the Blooming of the Lotus and the Shadow and Smoke—are produced,—in what way ?—*at the same time as* the said Moon-rise, Sun-light and the Half-burnt Wood-piece,—which are known to be the effects of the same Causes ;—that is to say, that which is the cause of the Moon-rise, etc., which appear at the same time as the Blooming of the Lily and other phenomena, becomes also the auxiliary cause in the bringing about of the Blooming of the Lily, etc. ;—the said Moon-rise, etc., while leading to the inference of their own causes, lead to the inference also of the effects appearing at the same time, in the form of the Blooming of the Lily, etc. ; and they do not do this directly. In this way, the Probans in the case in question is one based upon the character of the 'Effect'.

That this is so has to be admitted ; because if the Probans were to lead to the inference of things without some such relationship, then they might lead to the inference of anything and everything ; because the *absence of relationship* would be equally present in all things. Hence in the cases in question also, some sort of relationship has to be pointed out ; and this relationship can only be one of Cause and Effect as just explained.—(1422-1423)

Question :—"What sort of relationship is there between the *Proximity of the Rohiṇī-asterism* and the *Rise of the Kṛittikā-asterism* ?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (1424-1425).

A PECULIAR ATMOSPHERIC CURRENT IS THE CAUSE OF THE *Rise of the Kṛttikā-asterism* ; THAT SAME, IN CONTINUATION, ALSO BECOMES THE CAUSE OF THE *Proximity of the Rohiṇī-Asterism.* HENCE ITS COGNITION IS HELD TO BE DUE TO THE COGNITION OF THAT ; AND THERE IS NO OTHER COGNITION OF IT WHICH IS INDEPENDENT.—(1424-1425)

COMMENTARY.

'*Prabhañjana*'—is Air-current.

Here also there is Inference from a particular Probans which is dependent upon the same auxiliary circumstances. This has been thus declared—

'Being dependent upon one and the same set of auxiliary circumstances is what leads to the inference of a particular cause of a particular thing,—as is found in the case of *Smoke* which is a product of half-burnt fuel'.—(1424-1425)

Objection :—" In the case where the Reflection leads to the Inference of the object reflected,—the Probans cannot be included under any of the three kinds of Probans,—because the Reflected Image is a non-entity (and has no real existence) ; hence the definition provided by you is too narrow ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1426).

The Inference of the Reflected object proceeds on the basis of the Inferential Indicative in the shape of the Reflection ; this is only right ; and the Indicative from which it proceeds is not different from that which rests on the nature of the 'Effect'.—(1426)

COMMENTARY.

In the following Text the author sets forth the objection from the Opponent's standpoint :—

TEXT (1427).

" The Reflection cannot be an entity, because two things cannot exist together at the same place ; then how can it be regarded as an *Effect*, which must be something real ",—if this is urged [then the answer is as in the following *Text*].—(1427)

COMMENTARY.

For the idea that the Reflection cannot be an entity, the Reason is—*two things cannot exist together* ; the Reflection is perceived as occupying the same place as the reflecting surface of the Mirror, and it is not possible for the forms of two things to be seen at the same place ; as there would always be an obstacle ; hence it cannot be possible for any two things to exist at the same place. Hence the idea must be regarded as illusory.

Or [there may be another explanation of the Text]—*Two things cannot exist together at the same place* ;—which *two things* ?—The surface of the reflecting mirror and the Reflection of the Moon ; the surface of the Mirror occupies one point in space, and the Reflection of the Moon occupies a different point in space, inside the Mirror ; like the water at the bottom of the well. When a thing is produced in one place, how can it be perceived in another place ? Hence it follows that there is no such Entity as the Reflection ; and

the perception is due to the force of the attendant circumstances :—unthinkable indeed are the diverse forces of things !—(1427)

The above objection is answered as follows :—

TEXTS (1428-1429).

EVEN THOUGH THE CHARACTER OF THE 'ENTITY' DOES NOT BELONG TO THE REFLECTION AS A CORPOREAL OBJECT, YET HOW CAN THE COGNITION ENVISAGING THE RELECTION BE REGARDED AS *Objectless* ? AND IT IS THIS LATTER (COGNITION), THAT IS REGARDED HERE AS THE 'EFFECT' AND THE '*Inferential* INDICATIVE' ; AND THOUGH ITSELF WITHOUT A MATERIAL BASIS, THE COGNITION APPEARS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE REFLECTED OBJECT WHICH IS THEREFORE REGARDED AS ITS *Cause*. —(1428-1429)

COMMENTARY.

It is only the Cognition of the form of the Reflection that is regarded as the *effect*, and hence the Inferential Indicative, and not any *external* object in the shape of the 'Reflection'.—(1428-1429)

Objection :—" It has been asserted under *Text* 1363 that—'*Inference for the sake of others* consists in the statement of the three-featured Probans'.—Why has this been so asserted, when other people have described *the Inference for the sake of others* as consisting of the statement of the 'Proposition', 'Final Conclusion' and 'Re-affirmation' also ? "

This is what is anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXT (1430).

THE *Inference for the sake of others* HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY OTHERS AS 'THE STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSITION AND THE REST'.—BUT, NOT BEING AN INTEGRAL PART OF PROOF ('PROVING'), THE PROPOSITION IS OF NO USE.—(1430)

COMMENTARY.

The author rejects the said view of other people, in the words—'*But, not, etc. etc.*'.—'*Sādhana*', '*Proof*', (here) stands for the *proving* ; i.e. the cognition of the object to be cognised ;—the Proposition is not an '*integral part*'—i.e. the cause—of the *proving* ; this is what is meant by the compound '*asādhanāṅgabhūtam*'.

Not being an integral part of the proving, the Proposition is of no use, and hence need not be stated.

'*Of no use*' may be explained as *not a cause*; in which case, the phrase would form part of the conclusion set forth here (which would be that the Proposition is *not a cause* of the proving).—(1430)

Question:—"How is the Proposition not an integral part of the *Proving*?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1431–1433).

FOR WANT OF RELATIONSHIP, THE PROPOSITION CANNOT BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS PROVING THE THING *directly*; NOR CAN IT BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS DOING IT *indirectly*, BECAUSE IT DOES NOT INDICATE WHAT IS POSSIBLE.—IF IT BE REGARDED AS PART OF THE *proving*, ON ACCOUNT OF ITS PRESENTING THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PROBANS AND THE PROBANDUM,—LIKE THE STATEMENT OF THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE,—THEN IT WOULD BE LIKE WORDS CONVEYING AN ORDER, AND IN VIEW OF THIS THE REASON GIVEN WOULD BE FALLIBLE. AND AS MERELY THE OBJECTIVE WILL BE INDICATED, THE SAID STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSITION WOULD BE USELESS ALSO.—(1431–1433)

COMMENTARY.

'*It does not indicate what is probable*',—because it only states what is meant to be proved.

What is meant is as follows:—As words have no connection with things the statement of the *Proposition* cannot serve any directly useful purpose;—nor indirectly, like the *statement of the Probans,* because it does not indicate what is possible;—as declared in the following passage—'They made the assertion of the Minor Term, for the purpose of intimating their intention,—which shows where the doubt lay; hence it does not serve any directly useful purpose in the actual proving; and as it states only what is meant to be proved, it cannot help indirectly either'.

Some people hold the following opinion—"The Proposition has to be stated,—in the same way as the Corroborative Instance is stated,—because, even though it does not form a part of the Inference, yet it presents the objective of the Probans and the Probandum; as declared in the words—'Since the two forms that remain are shown in the Corroborative Instance'; that is, the statement of the Corroborative Instance, even though it does not form a separate factor of the Inference, is yet stated for the purpose of showing the two features of the Probans—other than the feature of *subsisting in the Minor Term*".

The answer to these people is provided in the words '*Like the Corroborative Instance, etc. etc.*'.—'*Words conveying an order*',—such as 'Do this,—Prove the Sound to be non-eternal'.—The term '*ādi*' includes words conveying a *request* and so forth. [Under the opinion put forward] it would be necessary

to put forth such expressions also; on the ground that in the absence of these also, it is not possible to propound an Inference all on a sudden.

'*Useless*';—because the Probandum would become cognised even without it. For instance, if the inference is stated simply as 'whatever is *produced* is non-eternal,—and Sound is *produced*', the cognition comes about that 'Sound is non-eternal', even without the statement of the Proposition.—(1431–1433)

Question:—"How then can there be any distinction made regarding the '*Sapakṣa*' ('That in which the Probandum is known to be present') and so forth?"

[This is the question stated in the following]—

TEXT (1434).

"How then can there be any distinction made regarding the '*Sapakṣa*' ('That wherein the Probandum is known to exist') and so forth, when the subject (Minor Term) is not actually stated? The 'three-features' also cannot be there; as that too is dependent upon that"—If this is urged [then the answer is as given in the following *Text*].

COMMENTARY.

"That is to say, '*Sapakṣa*' is the name given to that object which is *similar* to the Minor Term, in the sense that what is sought to be proved (the Probandum) is present in it; and that where there is no such similarity is called the '*asapakṣa*' (or '*Vipakṣa*'). If the Proposition were not stated, then the 'three features' (of the Probans), which is dependent upon that,—i.e. upon that which is the substratum of the '*Sapakṣa*',—would not be there, and the entire fabric (of Inference) would become shattered to pieces."—(1434)

The *answer* to the above is as follows:—

TEXT (1435).

In the mere statement of the Proof (Inferential), there is no distinction made regarding the '*Sapakṣa*' and the rest. It is only in a scientific treatise, that they are distinguished and divided for the purpose of (explaining) the usage.—(1435)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, even a barbarian who knows nothing of the distinction of '*Sapakṣa*' etc., when it is stated to him that 'where there is smoke, there is

Fire,—and there is smoke at this place',—he grasps the positive and negative concomitance between *Smoke* and *Fire,* and hence comes to recognise that 'Fire is there',—without knowing anything about the '*Sapakṣa*' and other details.—Hence it follows that at the time of the actual proving, there need be no distinction as regards the '*Sapakṣa*' and the rest.

Question :—" Where then is this distinction made ? "

Answer—In a Scientific Treatise.—(1435)

Or, even at the time of the statement of the proof, if the said distinction were made,—there would be nothing in it that would be incompatible with our view. This is what is explained in the following—

TEXT (1436).

EVEN WHEN IT IS BASED UPON THE SUBJECT-MATTER IN QUESTION, IT IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE ; THE DISPUTANT DOES NOT STATE THE PROOF EVEN FOR THE OTHER PARTY, ALL OF A SUDDEN.—(1436)

COMMENTARY.

Though the statement of the Proposition is not made at the time that one actually propounds the Premiss, yet if the said distinction is made in regard to the matter under dispute,—i.e. the Subject—there is nothing incongruous in it.—Nor can it be urged that " at the time of the propounding of the Premiss (Reason, Probans), there is no *matter under dispute* ";—because, even *for the other party,*—i.e. for one who makes the statement of the Proposition,—the disputant does not put forward his Premiss, *all of a sudden,*—without reference to some subject under consideration.—(1436)

The question arises still—" The object whose particular character one wishes to ascertain may be the subject under consideration ; even so how can the said distinction be made in reference to that subject under consideration ? "

The answer is provided in the following—

TEXT (1437).

THE *character of residing in the Minor Term* (*Subject*) FOLLOWS ITS PRESENCE IN THE SUBJECT WHOSE CHARACTER IS MEANT TO BE ASCERTAINED ; AND THE '*Sapakṣa*' IS THAT WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THAT SUBJECT ; AND THE '*Vipakṣa*' IS THAT WHERE THE SAID CHARACTER IS ABSENT.—(1437)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(1437)

The '*Upanaya*', 'Reaffirmation' (as one of the five Members of the Syllogism) has been defined as 'that which, on the strength of the Corrobora-

tive Instance, reasserts the Subject as being so, or as being *not so*'—(*Nyāya-sūtra* 1. 1. 38).—'This Re-affirmation is not the *means of proving* the conclusion, as it only serves to make clear the sense of the Probans adduced, being, as it is, like a second affirmation of the Probans'—such is the authoritative statement of *Diṅnāga* in regard to this Re-affirmation.—But *Bhāvivikta* and others have argued as follows, in order to show that (without this Reaffirmation) the function of the Probans itself would remain unfulfilled :—"The fact of the Probans subsisting in the thing where the Probandum is known to be present is not made clear by the *statement of the Probans,* which comes just after the statement of the Proposition ; because the former only mentions the Reason—'Sound is non-eternal, *because it is a product*' ;—and whether this character of 'being a product' subsists, or does not subsist, in Sound, this is learnt only from the *Reaffirmation.*—Or the *Reaffirmation* may be regarded as serving the purpose of providing *Re-presentment* ; when the Probans is stated at first, it points out the presence of the Probans—e.g. 'being a product'—in a general, unqualified, form ;—then the Corroborative Instance is cited, where it is shown that the said Probans is invariably concomitant with the Probandum ;—so that when, after these, the *Reaffirmation* is stated, it brings about the *Representment* of the Probans with the qualification that it is *invariably concomitant with the Probandum,*—'So is Sound a product'. Thus inasmuch as it indicates a particular feature, it is not a mere repetition".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1438-1439).

IF THERE IS NO STATEMENT OF THE *Proposition*, THERE CAN BE NO STATEMENT OF THE *Reason* (PROBANS) ; AND CONSEQUENTLY, THERE NEED BE NO STATEMENT OF THE *Reaffirmation*, FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTIMATING THE EXISTENCE (OF THE PROBANS IN THE MINOR TERM, SUBJECT).—MERE PRESENCE (OF THE PROBANS IN THE SUBJECT) HAVING BEEN STATED AT FIRST, AND THEN, IF ITS INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE (WITH THE PROBANDUM) IS SUBSEQUENTLY POINTED OUT,—BY THIS ALL THAT IS INTENDED BECOMES ACCOMPLISHED ; SO THAT THE *Representment* WOULD BE ENTIRELY USELESS.—(1438-1439)

COMMENTARY.

'*For the purpose of intimating the existence*'—of the Probans, in the Subject, Minor Term.

What is meant is as follows :—The necessity of the statement of the Proposition having been negatived in the manner shown above,—if the

statement of the Reason is to come *after that,* then it cannot come in at all; and as a consequence of this, there should be no statement of the *Re-affirmation,* as this has to be preceded by the statement of the Reason.—If the *Reaffirmation* is made for the purpose of showing that the Probans resides in the Subject, then some other purpose will have to be asserted as following from the Statement of the Reason.

It might be urged that—" The purpose served by it is the intimating of the fact of its being the Reason."

That however cannot be accepted; because what would be the use of this intimation of that fact, when the proving of the Probandum is actually accomplished in another way—as explained previously? Consequently, barring the intimation of the fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject, no other purpose can be pointed out, for the Statement of the Reason. Thus then this fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject having been already indicated by the Statement of the Reason,—if the Reaffirmation is again made for that same purpose, it is clearly proved that it is a needless repetition; how too could the Probans be 'inadmissible'. without such Reaffirmation?

As for the *Representment,* that also is useless; because the mere fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject having been previously asserted by the Statement of the Reason,—and the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum also having been already asserted,—what is wanted would be already accomplished; so that the affirmation of the same thing over again would clearly bear the imprint of a needless repetition. Where then would there be 'inadmissibility' of our Reason in this case also?—(1438-1439)

'*Nigamana*', 'Final Conclusion' (the fifth member of the five-membered syllogism) has been defined as 'the Re-statement of the Proposition on the basis of the Statement of the Probans' (*Nyāyasūtra* 1.1. 39). What is meant is that when it is re-asserted that "Therefore Sound is non-eternal',—the word 'therefore' implies the potency of the Probans as shown in the Corroborative Instance, and then on the basis thereof, there is reassertion of what had been stated in the *Proposition*;—this re-assertion is called the 'Final Conclusion', '*Nigamana*',—the exact connotation of the term '*nigamana*' being *that whereby the Proposition, the Premiss (statement of the Probans), the Corroborative Instance and the Re-affirmation* are connected, strung together, as serving the same purpose (*Nyāya-bhāṣya*).

As a matter of fact however, when (as shown before) the statement of the *Proposition* itself is not there, how can there be any statement of the *Final Conclusion,* which is only a reiteration of the *Proposition*? Hence the Final Conclusion cannot form part of the Reasoning to prove the conclusion.—On this subject, the Revered Diṅnāga has made the declaration that 'Inasmuch as the Final Conclusion is a mere repetition, it cannot be the means of proving anything'.—Against this, *Uddyotakara* and others, under the above *Sūtra,* have argued thus:—" There is no repetition here, because the Proposition states the Probandum as *to be proved,* while the Final Conclusion states it as *proved*; and without the Final Conclusion there can be no *proving*; because until that is stated, the suspicion regarding the truth of

the other Factors of the Reasoning does not entirely cease as to whether or not Sound is really non-eternal (for instance); hence for the removal of this suspicion, the Final Conclusion has to be stated separately ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1440).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE PROVING IS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE FORCE OF THE STATEMENT OF THE THREE-FEATURED PROBANS ; CONSEQUENTLY, THERE CAN BE NO SUSPICION REGARDING THE CONTRARY CONCLUSION ; HENCE THE STATEMENT OF THE FINAL CONCLUSION IS USELESS.—(1440)

COMMENTARY.

When it has been definitely ascertained that in *Sound* there is present the character of ' being a product ', which has been shown to be invariably concomitant with ' non-eternality ',—how can there be any suspicion of its contrary, ' Eternality ' ? When the fact of a certain substance being surrounded by flaming fire has been duly ascertained, no sane man can ever suspect the presence of *coolness* in that substance. [Even if there were any such suspicion] it could not be set aside merely by the statement of the Final Conclusion, without any reasons.—(1440)

Aviddhakarṇa has argued as follows :—" A single idea cannot be expressed by diverse isolated assertions; hence for bringing about the connection between these assertions it is necessary to state the Final Conclusion ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1441).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT IS ONLY BY CONNECTED ASSERTIONS THAT AN IDEA IS EXPRESSED ; HENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING ABOUT THIS CONNECTION, IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO STATE THE FINAL CONCLUSION SEPARATELY. —(1441)

COMMENTARY.

When the fact of the Probans being connected with the Probandum by the relation of *sameness* or by that of *Cause and Effect* has been established,—then the statement of its presence in the Subject and its invariable concomitance (with the Probandum) as connected together, bring about, by implication, the single Idea, in the shape of the desired Conclusion. Even though the statements are isolated, yet they are connected, and as such together lead to

the desired end. Consequently it is not necessary to state the Final Conclusion for the purpose of bringing about the said connection.—(1441)

TEXT (1442).

SOME PEOPLE HOLD THAT INFERENCE IS OF TWO KINDS AS FOLLOWS—(A) *That based upon perceived particulars* AND (B) *that based upon generalised relationship*.—(1442)

COMMENTARY.

'*Some people*'—*Kumārila* and others.

They describe Inference as of two kinds—(1) that based upon perceived particulars, and (2) that based upon generalised relationship.—(1442)

Question :—Which is the Inference based upon the Perceived Particulars ?
Answer :—[Given by *Kumārila*] :—

TEXTS (1443–1445).

(A) "*That based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars is* AS FOLLOWS :—IT SO HAPPENS THAT, IN THE CASE OF TWO PARTICULAR THINGS,—SUCH AS THE *Fire* PRODUCED BY BURNING DRIED COW-DUNG, AND THE *Smoke* PROCEEDING FROM THAT FIRE,—THE OBSERVER HAS THE COGNITION OF THE THINGS,—AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY, ON GOING TO ANOTHER PLACE, THE OBSERVER HAPPENS AGAIN AND AGAIN TO RECOGNISE IN OTHER PLACES THE PRESENCE OF THE SAME FIRE THROUGH THE INDICATION OF THE SAME SMOKE SEEN BEFORE ; AND DUE VALIDITY ATTACHES TO SUCH COGNITION (BY REASON OF ITS BEING BASED UPON THE PREVIOUS PERCEPTIONAL COGNITION), AND IT BECOMES RECOGNISED AS A MEANS OF COGNITION DISTINCT FROM PERCEPTION ; BECAUSE IT BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION OF A THING (FIRE) THE EXISTENCE OF WHICH HAD BEEN IN *doubt*. IT IS THIS THAT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY *Vindhyavāsin* AS INFERENCE *based upon the perceived relationship* OF PARTICULARS ".—[*Shloka-vārtika*—INFERENCE, 141–143].—(1443–1445)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows :—First of all, the man has noticed through Sense-perception in a certain place a *particular* Fire and a *particular* Smoke,—at a later time, he goes to another place and again and again sees the same *particular* Smoke, and then infers the same *particular* Fire ;—this is *Inference based upon the perception* (of the relationship) *of Particulars* ; it is so called because it has for its objective the previously-perceived Particular. This

cannot be regarded as invalid on the ground of apprehending what has been already apprehended; because there is an additional factor present here, in the shape of the removal of the doubt as to whether or not the Fire is still there.—This is the sum total of what Kumarila means.

We now proceed to explain the words in detail—

'*That based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars*'.—*Question*—'What relationship'?—The answer is as follows:—*Shabarasvāmin* has stated the definition of Inference as follows:—'When the perception of one factor of a well-recognised relationship leads to the cognition of the other factor of that relationship,—which latter is not in contact with the man's sense-organs—this second cognition is what is called *Inference* (Inferential Cognition). This Inferential Cognition is of two kinds: (1) that based upon directly perceived relationship, and (2) that based upon a generalised relationship. As an example of the former, we have the inferential cognition of Fire following from the cognition of Smoke [which is based upon the relation of invariable concomitance between a particular Smoke and a particular Fire perceived in the kitchen); and as an example of the second kind of Inference, we have the case where, finding that the Sun changes its position, we infer that it moves,—on the ground of our experience that in the case of Devadatta it is only by moving that he changes his position (which experience has led to the generalised relationship between *moving* and *change of position* in general).' (*Shabara-Bhāṣya*, on 1. 1. 5, *Translation*, page 15).

In connection with this, *Kumārila*, with a view to explaining the nature of the *Inference based upon the perceived relationship of Particulars* has used the words—'*Pratyakṣadṛṣṭasambandham, etc.*'. (*Text* 1443.)—This is to be construed as '*The Inference based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars*—they explain as follows';—The words 'they explain' having gone before in the preceding text (in the *Shlokavārtika*).

In connection with the two *particular things*—Fire and Smoke—the observer has formed the idea of the new factor in the shape of *dry cowdung*,—the idea being that 'these two things Fire and Smoke are the effect of the burning of dry cowdung';—and then he has also formed the idea of the particular spot in the shape of the Hill,—the idea being that 'these two things, Fire and Smoke, exist on the Hill'.—The compound '*gomayēndhana*' means 'that of which dry cowdung is the fuel', and the compound '*taddēsha*' means 'that of which that is the place';—and these two compounds qualify the '*vishēṣa*' the 'two particular things' (Fire and Smoke);—the '*ādi*' stands for other particular fuels in the shape of the woods of the various trees, *Sarja*, *Sarala*, *Sallakī* and the rest,—and also other Fires;—there arises the cognition, in regard to these;—the Locative being construed by 'splitting up' the words;—such perceptional cognition becomes apprehended by the observer;—that same observer, through the indicative in the shape of the same *Smoke* as seen in another place and at another time, cognises the same *Fire*; and this happens *again and again*;—this cognition thus becomes one that is distinct from the previous Perceptional Cognition.—Or the construction may be 'he cognises Fire on the basis of the previous cognition'.—The compound '*Sandihyamāna, etc.*' is to be interpreted as 'the cogni-

tion of that thing whose presence was in doubt—as to whether it is there or not '.—This Inference based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars, as described above, has been spoken of by *Vindhyavāsin* as '*Vishēṣatodṛṣṭa*', 'Inference in relation to Particulars'.—(1443–1445)

The other kind of Inference, the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, that based upon generalised Relationship,* is next described—

TEXT (1446).

"THOUGH THE INFERENCE BASED UPON GENERALISED RELATIONSHIP COULD BE EXEMPLIFIED ON THE BASIS OF *another Fire* AND *another Smoke,*—YET THE INFERENCE CITED IS THAT OF THE 'SUN MOVING', AS THIS IS BASED *absolutely* UPON GENERALISED RELATIONSHIP" [*Shloka-vā.*—INFERENCE, 145].—(1446)

COMMENTARY.

The author of the *Bhāṣya* (Shabara) has cited the Inference of the *moving of the Sun* from its *change of position* as an example of *Inference based upon generalised Relationship.* In regard to this, the following objection might be raised—'In reference to another Fire and another Smoke (other than those actually perceived), there can be Inference on the basis of *common character*; and this Inference of Fire and Smoke would be *based upon generalised Relationship*; while these Smoke and Fire were present in his mind already, why did he give this up and cite the case of the *Sun moving* as an example of Inference based upon generalised Relationship?'

Anticipating this, *Kumārila* offers the explanation—'*Though the Inference, etc. etc.*'. That is to say, when the Inference based upon Generalised Relationship could be cited, on the basis of other *Smoke and Fire* as corroborative Instances,—the author of the *Bhāṣya* has cited the case of the *Sun*, in consideration of the fact that the *moving of the Sun* is imperceptible at all times, and hence for cognising it, the only means available is *the Inference based upon generalised Relationship,* and not that *based upon Perceived Particulars*; hence he wished to cite a case like that of the Sun which was purely and unalloyedly one of Inference based on Generalised Relationship; and he did not cite the case of *Smoke and Fire,* as in this case the Inference need not *always* be one based upon Generalised Relationship.—(1446)

The objection to the above-mentioned classification of Inference is as follows:—

TEXTS (1447-1448).

INASMUCH AS IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT 'PERPETUAL FLUX' IS ALL-EMBRACING, THERE CAN BE NO INFERENCE OF WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE,—BY ITSELF.—IF IT BE ARGUED THAT "THE SAMENESS IS ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF THE SAMENESS OF THE CHAIN"—THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) NO SUCH SAMENESS CAN HAVE ANY REAL EXISTENCE; AND WHAT IS MERELY ASSUMED CANNOT BE AN ENTITY.—(1447-1448)

COMMENTARY.

'*All-embracing*',—i.e. embracing all such things as Fire, Smoke and the rest.

It might be argued that—"Even though the individual things are momentary, there would be sameness (unity) of the *chain* or *series*."

The answer to that is—'*No such sameness, etc.*'—That is, this *sameness* would be something *assumed*, not *real*; so that in *reality*, there would be no continuity of existence for anything; under the circumstances, it cannot be right to say 'by the observer remaining at that place', or 'by that same means' and so forth.—What too is merely *assumed* cannot be an *entity or thing*; hence there would be no sense in the words '*because it is a cognition of a thing whose existence was doubted*' (as used in *Text* 1445, by *Kumārila*).—(1447-1448)

The following might be urged—"When the Inference was described as *based upon Perceived Particulars*, it was on the basis of the *assumed*, not *real*, sameness."

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (1449).

A COGNITION *devoid of objects* IS NOT ADMITTED BY YOU; AND IF THE INFERENCE HAD AN *assumed* OBJECT, IT WOULD CLEARLY BE *devoid of an object*.—(1449)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged:—"Though the Individual is fleeting (momentary), yet the Universal is something not fleeting; and on this basis, the *sameness* or unity would be *real*, and the Inference would not be *devoid of an object*".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1450–1455).

IF WHAT IS MEANT IS THAT—" EVEN ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL, THE UNIVERSAL PERSISTS ",—THEN, THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE EVEN IF THE UNIVERSAL EXISTED, THAT ALSO WOULD CERTAINLY BE COVERED BY THE 'PERPETUAL FLUX'.—FURTHER, ON WHAT GROUNDS HAVE YOU ASSERTED THE RESTRICTION THAT " THESE SAME TWO PARTICULARS WHOSE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN COGNISED BY SENSE-PERCEPTION, ETC. ETC." (TEXT 1443) ?—THEN AGAIN, HAVING ONCE COGNISED A THING BY MEANS OF INFERENCE, IF THE SAME THING IS COGNISED AGAIN BY MEANS OF INFERENCE,—WHY IS NOT THIS LATTER REGARDED AS VALID ? WHAT IS THE PECULIARITY IN THE PREVIOUS ONE (WHEREBY IT IS REGARDED AS VALID, AND NOT THE LATER ONE) ?—IF IT BE URGED THAT—" THE LATER ONE IS NOT REGARDED AS *valid* BECAUSE LIKE REMEMBRANCE, IT APPREHENDS WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY APPREHENDED ",—THEN WHY IS NOT THE PREVIOUS INFERENCE ALSO REGARDED AS THE SAME ?—IF IT BE ARGUED THAT—" IN THE FORMER INFERENCE THERE IS THIS ADDITIONAL PECULIARITY THAT IT SETS ASIDE THE DOUBT THAT HAS SET IN DURING THE INTERVAL,"—WHY IS NOT THE SAME IN THE LATTER ALSO ? HENCE IT IS THIS LATTER ITSELF THAT SETS ASIDE THE DOUBT AS TO SOMETHING BEING *present or not present*; AND HENCE THE GENERALISED PERCEPTION IS REALLY WHAT IS INDEPENDENT.—(1450–1455)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ākṛti*'—The Universal.

'*Even if*'—i.e. granting that such a thing as the *Universal* exists.

The other party regards the Individual and the Universal as identical; how then can the Universal continue to exist when the Individual is destroyed ? If it did, then, having different fates, they would have to be regarded as distinct from one another.

'*If it exists*'—This also is only by way of *being granted*; as in reality, the Universal having been once for all rejected, how could it exist ?—' If it exists'—i.e. even if it existed;—it would be in 'perpetual flux'; as the 'perpetual flux' has been proved to be all-embracing.

Further, when a thing has been once cognised by means of an Inference,—and later on, the same thing (Fire) is cognised by another Inference drawn from the same Inferential Indicative Probans), (Smoke),—why has not this latter Inference also been cited as one *based upon Perceived Particulars*,—when the qualification of having been 'cognised by Perception' is considered desirable ?

It might be argued that—" It has not been so regarded as it apprehends what has been already apprehended ".

That cannot be right ; as the same applies also to what is based on Perceived Particulars.

"In the case of that based upon Perceived Particulars, there is this additional peculiarity that it has set at rest the doubt that has appeared during the interval."

That cannot be right ; as this same peculiarity is also present in what is based upon the *Inferred Particulars.*

Thus from all this it follows that when all things are in a 'perpetual flux', the only Inference possible is *that based upon generalised Relationship*, not any *based upon Perceived Particulars.*—(1450–1455)

TEXT (1456).

SOME SHORT-SIGHTED PEOPLE HAVE ASSERTED THAT "INFERENCE IS NOT A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION", THOUGH, BY THESE VERY WORDS, THEY OFFER UP THEIR OWN 'DESIRE TO SPEAK' (INTENTION, IDEA IN THE MIND, AS SOMETHING TO BE INFERRED FROM THOSE WORDS).—(1456)

COMMENTARY.

'*Some people*'—the followers of *Bṛhaspati* and others.

'*Through these same words*',—i.e. by the words 'Inference is not a means of Right Cognition'.

This shows that the assertion of these people involves self-contradiction. For instance, when a man makes a statement to another person, it is on the basis of the understanding that 'the idea present in one's mind is understood from the words he uses, which are *indicative* of that idea'; so that when the people denying Inference make the statement,—by this statement itself—they admit the fact of Inference being a Means of Right Cognition ;—and yet this same he denies by the statement that 'Inference is *not a* Means of Right Cognition' ;—and this is self-contradiction.

This objection is going to be further explained later on.—(1456)

The *Chārvākas* urge the following arguments (against Inference, as a Means of Right Cognition) :—

TEXTS (1457–1459).

"*Inference for one's own sake* CANNOT BE RIGHT,—BECAUSE IT IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE THREE-FEATURED INDICATIVE, WHICH IS SUBVERSIVE OF WHAT IS DESIRABLE,—LIKE WRONG COGNITION.—NOR CAN THE PRESENCE OF THE 'THREE FEATURES' IN THE INDICATIVE BE REGARDED AS THE MEANS OF INFERENCE; AS THEY ARE PRESENT ALSO WHERE THERE IS NO INFERENCE,—JUST LIKE THE 'TWO FEATURES'.—FURTHER, THE CONTRADICTION OF INFERENCE IS POSSIBLE IN EVERY REASONING; SO ALSO THERE IS POSSIBILITY IN EVERY CASE OF THE INFERRING OF MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY CONCLUSIONS; AND THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF FINDING A REASON WHICH IS CONCOMITANT (NOT-SEPARABLE) WITH THE CONTRARY OF THE DESIRED CONCLUSION (DEDUCED FROM AN INFERENCE)."—(1457–1459)

COMMENTARY.

Inference for one's own sake cannot be right,—because it is brought about by the three-featured Indicative,—like the Wrong Cognition. [Here is a Wrong Cognition based upon a three-featured Indicative]—'The eye and other organs are for the purpose of other persons, because they are composite things; like the Couch, the Seat and such things'; this is a wrong cognition, being subversive of a desirable idea, but brought about by a three-featured Indicative; and like this the Inference in question also is brought about by a three-featured Indicative, and hence it must be wrong.

Nor can the presence of the Three Features in the Indicative be the means of Inference; because, like the *Two Features*, they are present also where there is no Inference.

Further, in every reasoning, *contradiction of Inference* would be possible; for example, it would always be possible to put forward the Inference that 'The intended Probandum cannot reside in the Subject (Minor Term), because it is a part of the aggregate of all these several factors, like the form of the Minor Term itself';—and this would put an end to all Inferences.

Then again, in all cases, when an Inference has been put forward, there is always a possibility of several undesirable contingencies being put forward; for instance, when the Inference has been put forward that 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like the Jar',—some one might set up the argument to the contrary, that 'just as the reason asserted proves the *non-eternality* of Sound, so does it also prove the fact of its not being the quality of *Ākāsha*', and so forth.

Lastly, in every case, it is possible *to find a Reason that is concomitant with the contrary of the desired Conclusion*; for instance, the inference having been put forward, that 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like the Jar', some one may put forward the following reasoning which is concomitant with (and proves) the contrary of this conclusion—'Sound is

eternal, because it is perceptible by the Ear, like the universal *Sound*'. Several such examples may be found in the *Tattvaṭīkā*.—(1457–1459)

Bhartṛhari argues (against Inference) as follows :—

TEXTS (1460–1462).

"CONDITION, PLACE AND TIME BEING DIFFERENT IN REGARD TO DIFFERENT POTENCIES, THE COGNITION OF THINGS BY MEANS OF INFERENCE IS NOT ATTAINABLE.—EVEN IN THE CASE OF A THING WHOSE POTENCY IS WELL-KNOWN, THAT POTENCY BECOMES RESTRICTED IN REGARD TO PARTICULAR EFFECTIVE ACTIONS, BY BECOMING RELATED TO PARTICULAR THINGS.—EVEN WHEN A CERTAIN CONCLUSION HAS BEEN DEDUCED WITH GREAT CARE, FROM AN INFERENCE,—IT MAY BE PROVED TO BE OTHERWISE BY OTHER MORE INTELLIGENT AND CLEVER PERSONS WELL-VERSED IN THE ART OF REASONING"—(*Vākyapadīya*, p. 16].—(1460–1462)

COMMENTARY.

The potency of things varies with their Condition, Time and Place; hence no definite conclusion can be got at regarding them by means of Inference; for instance, it is not possible to be convinced that 'Devadatta is unable to bear the burden, because he is Devadatta, like Devadatta in the state of childhood'; here there is a possibility of the man's potency having changed, hence the reasoning becomes 'indecisive'.—Similarly, difference in the *place* makes a difference in the taste, strength and ripening of the *Āmalakī*, the *Kharjūra* and other fruits; hence it cannot be argued that—'all *Āmalakī* fruits are astringent, like the *Āmalakī* I am tasting now.'—Similarly difference of *time* leads to variations in the coolness and other properties of the water of the well, and hence it cannot be right to argue that 'all water is cool', and so on.

'*Avasthādēshākālānām*';—the Genitive ending goes with '*bhēdāt*'; and the Genitive in '*Bhāvānām*' goes with '*prasiddhi*'.

Then again, the Fire's *capacity to burn, which is manifested in the case of grass,* is set aside as against the mass of clouds; and there can be no such reasoning as—'The mass of Clouds is burnt by Fire, because it is earthy (?), like the grass'.

Further, when one man has proved a certain fact, another man, more clever, proves quite the contrary of it; this cannot be desirable.—(1460–1462)

Another writer argues as follows :—

TEXTS (1463–1467).

"*Inference for the benefit of another* CANNOT BE A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION, BECAUSE IT IS ONLY A REITERATION SO FAR AS THE SPEAKER HIMSELF IS CONCERNED; AS THE MAN PUTTING FORWARD THE INFERENCE DOES NOT HIMSELF DERIVE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE THING FROM THAT INFERENCE.—FOR THE OTHER PERSON, TO WHOM THE INFERENCE IS ADDRESSED, THE COGNITION SO DERIVED COMES TO BE *for his own sake*; BECAUSE WHAT DIFFERENCE IS THERE BETWEEN THE COGNITION DERIVED THROUGH THE EAR AND THAT OBTAINED THROUGH THE EYES ?—SO FAR AS THE OTHER PERSON IS CONCERNED, THE STATEMENT (OF THE INFERENCE) CANNOT BE REGARDED AS *Inference for the sake of another*; BECAUSE IT FALLS WITHIN THE CHAIN OF COGNITIONS PRODUCED BY THE EAR, AND BECAUSE IT IS A MEANS OF COGNITION,—LIKE THE SENSE-ORGAN.—NOR IS THERE ANY DIRECT INDICATION OF THE OBJECT INFERRED; HENCE, LIKE THE IDEA OF THE RELATION OF INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE, IT CANNOT BE A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION.—IF IT BE EXPLAINED THAT—"IT IS CALLED *for the sake of another*, BECAUSE IT LEADS TO THE ACTIVITY OF THE OTHER PERSON",—THAT ALSO CANNOT BE RIGHT; BECAUSE (IN THIS WAY), THE *Inference for one's own benefit* ALSO MIGHT BE REGARDED AS 'FOR THE SAKE OF ANOTHER' [AS THAT ALSO MIGHT LEAD TO THE ACTIVITY OF OTHER PERSONS]."—(1463–1467)

COMMENTARY.

Inference for the sake of others cannot be a means of right cognition, because it is only a reiteration, so far as the speaker himself is concerned.

As regards the other person to whom the Inference is addressed,—for him, the cognition so derived turns out to be *for his own benefit*; what difference is there between the cognition of a thing derived through the Ear and that derived through the Eyes ? Just as, when one's Visual Organ is operative, the resultant cognition is not spoken of as being 'for the benefit of others',—so also it cannot be spoken of as such if the cognition is derived through the operation of the Auditory Organ.—The term '*darshana*' stands for the *Visual Organ,*—the term being derived as '*dṛshyatē anēna*', 'that whereby a thing is seen'.—'*Samvit*'—stands for *cognition.*

Similarly, so far as the other person is concerned, to whom the Inference is addressed, the statement of the Inference cannot be said to be *for the sake of others*;—because it falls within the chain of cognitions produced by the Ear,—or because it is a means of cognition,—like the Sense-organ.—The compound '*Shrotṛsantānādi*' contains the statement of two reasons; and '*yatha indṛiyasya*' cites the corroborative Instance.

There is another argument also:—So far as the other person is concerned, the statement of the Inference in question cannot be said to be 'for the sake of another',—because it does not directly indicate the object

inferred,—like the cognition of the relation of Invariable concomitance.—'*Tasmāt*'—i.e. because it does not directly indicate the object inferred. What is meant is that because it is not directly indicative of the inferred object, therefore the statement cannot be regarded as a means of Right Cognition,—it being like the Cognition of the relation of Invariable Concomitance,—i.e. the '*Invariable Concomitance*' between the Probans and the Probandum ; and the cognition of an Indicative which is so related to the Probandum (is not by itself the Means of Right Cognition).

If it be explained that "it is said to be *for the benefit of another*,—because it leads to the activity of the other person",—even so it cannot be right ; because in that sense the Inference *for one's own benefit* may also be *for the benefit of others* ; because 'another' is a relative term ; just like the term 'other side'.—(1463-1467)

The above arguments are answered in the following—

TEXT (1468).

WHEN THE INFERENCE IS SPOKEN OF AS 'BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE THREE-FEATURED INDICATIVE', WHAT IS MEANT TO BE INDICATED IS THAT IT IS COMPATIBLE (WITH THE REAL STATE OF THINGS) ; AND THIS SAME (*compatibility*) IS WHAT CHARACTERISES THE *Valid Cognition* ; WHY THEN IS IT DENIED ?—(1468)

COMMENTARY.

First of all, the author points out the 'contradictory' character of the Probans in the first argument propounded in *Text* 1457—viz. : 'Because it is brought about by the three-featured Indicative".—'*What is meant is that it is compatible, etc. etc.*' ;—that is, what is meant to be indicated is that it is compatible ; the sense being that, because the cognition that proceeds from the Three-featured Indicative is indirectly appurtenant to the thing concerned, it is *not incompatible*, just like Sense-perception, as has been asserted in the following statement—'Inasmuch as the Probans and the Probandum are indirectly appurtenant to the Thing, and are entirely free from any wrong notions regarding it, there can be nothing deceitful about it.'

'*This same*' ;—i.e. *compatibility* ; as has been thus declared—'The cognition that is *not incompatible* is right (or valid)'. In the case of Sense-perception also,—even for one who admits its validity—there is nothing that can be pointed out as determining its *validity*,—except this *absence of incompatibility* ; and this same condition is present in the case of the cognition proceeding from the *three-featured Indicative* ; why then is the validity of the cognition brought about by the Three-featured Indicative sought to be denied, on the ground of its being brought about by the Three-featured Indicative ?

What is indicated by this is the incongruity between the Probandum and the Probans (as put forward by the Opponent (in 1457). For instance, where there is the character of *being brought about by the three-featured Indica-*

tive, there is *absence of incompatibility* ;—and where there is *absence of incompatibility*, there is *validity* ; and *validity* and *invalidity* are mutually exclusive, —the incompatibility consisting in the fact that where the one is present the other cannot be present and where the one is absent, the other is present ; so that by implication the Probans put forward by the Opponent is '*Contradictory*'.—(1468)

The following *Texts* proceed to show that the Corroborative Instance (cited by the Opponent in 1457, that of 'Wrong Cognition') is 'devoid of the Probandum' :—

TEXTS (1469–1471).

WHEN THE 'WRONG COGNITION', AS 'SUBVERSIVE OF WHAT IS DESIRABLE', IS SPOKEN OF AS BEING 'SIMILAR', THE 'SIMILARITY' MEANT MUST BE ONLY THAT OF THE VIEW OF THE FIRST PARTY,—AND NOT *real* SIMILARITY ; BECAUSE AS REGARDS THE REAL STATE OF THINGS, THE COGNITION IN QUESTION HAS BEEN DEFINITELY FOUND TO BE *not incompatible* ; IN FACT, IT IS IN VIEW OF THIS FACT THAT IT IS A VALID ARGUMENT AGAINST WHAT IS 'DESIRED' BY THE DISPUTANT.—THUS THE REASON ADDUCED IS FOUND TO BE 'CONTRADICTORY' ;—AND THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE ALSO IS FOUND TO BE DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM.—IN THE SAME WAY, IN THE SECOND ARGUMENT, THE PROBANS IS 'INADMISSIBLE'.—(1469–1471)

COMMENTARY.

As proving the contrary of what is desired by the disputant, the cognition in question must be *valid* ; otherwise, if it were meant that all cognitions are invalid and at all times,—in regard to another Probandum,—then, such invalidity might affect Sense-perception also. In fact, it has been spoken of as 'wrong Cognition', only in reference to the view of the First Party.—The term '*pūrvapakṣa*' here stands for the '*pakṣa*', *view*—of the '*pūrva*', the First Party. One who holds the view that the Eye and the rest appertain only to an object which is essentially incapable of any additional features imposed upon it,—it is only in reference to the view of such a party that the Cognition could be spoken of as 'wrong' ; because (under that view) the Eye, etc. have been proved to be the Cause of many fleeting cognitions.

'*Contradictory*' ; because the character of 'being brought about by the Three-featured Indicative' is never present in any invalid Cognition ;—and when the cognition so brought about is valid, then the said character is present in that same Cognition which is 'subversive of what is desired' (by the Disputant).

Says the Opponent :—"When an argument to the contrary is urged against the Materialist, then the Corroborative Instance cannot be one that is admitted (by both parties). The opponent does not admit the validity of the Cognition of what is subversive of what is desired ; and what is not admitted by either of the two parties cannot serve as a Corroborative Instance.

In fact, the law is that what is equally admitted by both parties—that alone can be cited against the argument of either party."

The answer to this is as follows :—Though the other party has not actually admitted the validity of the cognition, in so many words,—yet, the *absence of incompatibility* has to be accepted, as that cannot be denied ; and those who accept that, have tacitly accepted the *validity* also, in so far as the real state of things is concerned ; consequently, the 'contradiction' that we have urged is in regard to the *real state of things,* not in regard to the theory of the other party.

Or, the Opponent's Reason may be regarded as 'contradictory' on the ground of being indicative of a contradictory Reason. For instance, the 'contradictory' Reason would be in the form—'What is *not incompatible* is valid,—e.g. Sense-perception,—the cognition brought about by the three-featured Indicative is *compatible*; [hence it must be valid]' ;—this would be Reason based on the nature of the thing itself. The Reason here put forward cannot be 'Inadmissible', for, if it were not admitted, then the Subject would become featureless and there could be no Reason at all (indicative of *validity*). Nor can it be 'Inconclusive' (Doubtful),—as that would make Sense-perception also *invalid.*

'*Asādhyatā* ;—i.e. the Instance would be devoid of the Probandum.

'*In the second argument*' ;—i.e. in the argument "nor can the presence of three features, etc. etc. ' (urged under *Text* 1458).

'*The Probans is inadmissible*' ;—because it is not present anywhere where the (valid) Inference is absent.

'In the same way'—i.e. by the reasoning based upon the presence of Three-features, etc. etc.—(1469–1471)

The following *Text* provides the answer to the argument urged (under 1459) :—

TEXTS (1472–1474).

EXPONENTS OF THE TRUE REASONING HAVE ALL DECLARED THAT THAT REASON ALONE IS CAPABLE OF PROVING THE CONCLUSION WHOSE RELATIONSHIP (WITH THE PROBANDUM) IS KNOWN WITH CERTAINTY, —SUCH RELATIONSHIP BEING EITHER IN THE NATURE OF *sameness of essence* OR OF *being an effect* ;—AND AGAINST SUCH A PROBANS, THERE CAN BE NO SUCH DEFECT AS THAT OF 'BEING CONTRARY TO INFERENCE' AND SO FORTH. BECAUSE NO SUCH INFERENCE COULD BE POSSIBLE EXCEPT THROUGH *essential sameness* OR *being the cause.* MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES CANNOT BELONG TO THE SAME THING. CONSEQUENTLY THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBILITY OF ANY PROBANS WHICH MIGHT BE CONCOMITANT WITH THE CONTRARY OF THE DESIRED CONCLUSION.—(1472–1474)

COMMENTARY.

'*Against such a Probans*'—i.e. in a Probans that is related through *essential sameness* and through *being an effect.*

'*Except through essential sameness, or being the cause*';—i.e. except through *being the same*, or *being the Cause*,—there can be no *Probans* (Inferential Indicative); if there were, it would be featureless and not a Probans at all.

It has been argued that—" What is meant to be the Probandum is not present in the Subject (Minor Term)".

The answer to that is that, if the Probandum is not present in the Minor Term, then the aggregate (of the 'Three features') as a whole is not present in the Probans; hence on account of the absence of a part of the aggregate, such a Probans would be clearly 'inadmissible'.

It has been argued that—" in the case of all Inferences, there is possibility of particular Inferences to the contrary".

This is not right. Because that alone is called 'Contradictory' which is found to prove the contrary of the desired Probandum; and no particular case is meant to be the Probandum (in the argument under dispute, which is in reference to the definition of *Inference*). As a matter of fact, in the case of an Inference based on the nature of things, there is no possibility of there being any (valid) Probans proving the contrary; because in the same thing, two mutually contradictory properties cannot coexist.—(1472–1474)

It has been argued (under 1470) that—" on account of the diversity *of Condition, Place and Time, etc. etc.*"

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXTS (1475–1477).

As a matter of fact, Inference proceeds only on the basis of things whose 'Indicative character' has been properly ascertained by repeated experience; all else is regarded as 'not Inference'. So that even though the Potencies of things vary according to the variations of Condition, Time and Place, yet the cognition of things by means of Inference is *not unattainable*.—And when a certain conclusion has been deduced, with great care from an Inference,—it cannot be proved to be otherwise, even by cleverer persons.—(1475–1477)

COMMENTARY.

It is only the well-ascertained Probans that is held to be truly indicative,—not one that is doubtful; e.g. when the presence of *Smoke* is only *suspected*, in regard to Vapour, it does not lead to a certain Cognition of the presence of Fire.

Question:—" How does the certainty of the Probans come about?"

Answer—*By repeated experience*:—as is found in persons well-versed in the science of gems,—in regard to gems. That is to say, persons who are conversant with the nature of the things concerned, do discern the *real Smoke* from *Vapour*: and when they proceed to act after discernment, they

do actually find Fire.—Thus then, inasmuch as the well-discerned Probans is never found to fail,—the cognition of things is not unattainable through such Probans,—even though the things vary with variations of Condition, Place and Time.—And when a thing has been well-ascertained by means of well-discerned Probans,—it can never be made otherwise; e.g. when the presence of Fire has been well-ascertained by means of the presence of Smoke, the Fire cannot be proved to be otherwise (i.e. absent); as one and the same thing cannot have two contradictory characters.

It has been argued (in commentary on 1460, etc.) that—"Devadatta is not capable of bearing a burden in his childhood, etc. etc.,—and the Fire burning the *Abhrapaṭala*, etc. etc".

But in all these cases, there is no proper *Probans* at all; as the 'three features' are not present. The mere fact of *not being perceived* cannot lead to the idea of the Probans being excluded from that where the Probandum is known to be absent; as has been thus declared—'Exclusion from that where the Probandum is known to be absent cannot follow from mere non-perception.' In fact, the reality of Invariable Concomitance follows only from the presence of the relationship either of *essential sameness* or of *being the effect*; as has been thus declared—'Either from the relationship of Cause and Effect, or on the restrictive nature of the thing concerned, there is definite Invariable Concomitance,—and this follows from Perception, not from *Non-perception*'; and in the case of the arguments cited, neither of the two relationships—of *essential sameness*, or of *being the effect*—is present.—(1475–1477)

The following might be urged—"How is it known that the well-ascertained Probans never fails? There is no reason why this should be so."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1478).

(*a*) THERE CAN BE NO NATURE (OR CHARACTER) WITHOUT A NATURE (OR CHARACTER); (*b*) NOR CAN THERE BE EFFECT WITHOUT A CAUSE. BECAUSE (OTHERWISE) THERE WOULD BE THE INCONGRUITIES OF (*a*) 'DEVIATION FROM NATURE', AND (*b*) 'CAUSELESSNESS'. AND WITHOUT THESE TWO (RELATIONSHIPS) THERE CAN BE NO INFERENCE.—(1478)

COMMENTARY.

There are only two kinds of *Probans*—(1) Nature of the thing and (2) Being an Effect; 'non-apprehension' being included under 'Nature'. And these two kinds of Probans are not possible except where there is a Probandum, called 'Nature' and 'Cause',—by reason of which there could be 'fallibility' (falsity) in the Probans.

"Why is it not possible?"

'*Because otherwise, etc. etc.*'.—There is copulative compounding between '*bhēda*' and '*animittatā*'; the sense is that the Probans which forms the *Nature* of the thing would cease to be its 'nature'; and the Probans which is an *effect* would come to be *without cause*; and yet no Probans is admitted which forms neither the 'nature' nor the 'effect' (of the Probandum),—except when there is no connection and when there is no Invariable Concomitance.

'*Without these two*',—i.e. as 'nature' and as 'effect'. The word has the Dual Ending.—(1478)

It has been argued (under *Text* 1463) that—"the *Inference for another's benefit* cannot be valid, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1479–1481).

THE STATEMENT OF THE THREE-FEATURED PROBANS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS 'INFERENCE FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANOTHER', ON THE GROUND OF ITS BEING INDICATIVE OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE,—WITH REFERENCE TO THE OTHER PERSON ADDRESSED. BUT THIS 'INFERENTIAL CHARACTER' CAN ONLY BE 'SECONDARY' (FIGURATIVE) AND CONVENTIONAL. HENCE THE FACT OF ITS BEING 'INDICATIVE OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE' CANNOT LEAD TO ANY INCONGRUITY.—IF INFERENCE IS NOT A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION, THEN YOUR ASSERTION IS USELESS. INDEED NO DISPUTANT EVER COMPREHENDS WHAT YOU WISH TO SPEAK OF.—(1479–1481)

COMMENTARY.

The *statement* (of the Inference) has been spoken of as 'for another's benefit', in reference to the other person; hence it cannot be open to the objection urged against its being in reference to the speaker himself.

Even in reference to the *listener*, the other person, as there is the setting forth of the three-featured Probans,—and on that account, it leads to the Inference,—or on account of Convention,—it has been spoken of as 'Inference'; this name 'Inference' being applicable only to what is indicative of what is possible. Consequently, there can be no such incongruity as that of the *Sense-organ*, or the cognition of the relation of Invariable Concomitance, being regarded as 'Inference for another's benefit'; as in those cases, there is no 'indication of what is possible'. It is for this same reason that this Inference differs from the cognition based upon actual Perception. For instance, the cognition of the Indicative, Smoke, is directly brought about by Visual Perception, not by Auditory Perception; as what is directly apprehended by the latter is the Word (uttered by the Man) only; and the Word is not the indicative of the external thing (Fire), in the way that Smoke is; because the Word is related to the speaker's *wish to speak* (which is subjective), and hence it can have no relation (of invariable concomitance) with

anything external (objective); all that the word does is to indicate the presence of Smoke; and it is through Convention that it brings about the conceptual Cognition (associated with words), and hence, in reference to the external thing, it comes to be described as being 'for the benefit of others'. And when what is meant to be understood is only the *Speaker's wish to speak*, then it turns out to be 'for the Speaker's own benefit'. Because it is held to be indicative of the Speaker's wish to speak of what contains the Smoke, which is the effect of the statement in question; it is '*indicative*', not *expressive*, of it; because no other cognition is comprehended from it.

'*Your assertion is useless*';—i.e. the assertion that "Inference is not the means of right cognition".—Because as a matter of fact, from the said statement, no person to whom it is addressed, comprehends what you wish to speak of.—This shows that your assertion involves 'self-contradiction'.—This has been explained previously.—(1479–1481)

Purandara has argued as follows:—"What is known as *Inference*, in the ordinary world, is admitted by the *Chārvākas* also; what they deny is that form of Inference which people have set up, beyond that known in common experience".

This is anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXTS (1482-1483).

IF IT BE URGED THAT—"WHAT IS ORDINARILY KNOWN AS THE INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE IS ACCEPTED BY US, BUT *not* WHAT HAS BEEN SET UP BY OTHERS",—THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) EVEN THE ORDINARY MAN UNDERSTANDS WHAT IS THE 'CAUSE', ETC. OF THE *Effect, etc.*; AND IN REALITY, THIS IS ALL THAT THE MASTERS OF THE SCIENCE OF REASONING ALSO HAVE DECLARED. SO THAT WHEN THE ORDINARY (POPULAR) IDEA IS ACCEPTED, WHAT IS IT THAT BECOMES EXCLUDED?—(1482-1483)

COMMENTARY.

The construction is—'the ordinary man understands, etc. etc.'.

'*Effect, etc.*';—'Etc.' is meant to include the 'nature' of the thing.—Similarly in '*Cause, etc.*', the 'nature' is meant to be included. In both cases the Plural number has been used in view of individual things.

Thus then, the Inferential Indicative which is understood by ordinary men to be related through the relationship of 'Nature' and 'Effect',—is just what has been spoken of by us as the 'Probans';—and when you accept this, what is it that you discard, for which you are denying the character of 'Inference'?—(1482-1483)

It might be argued that—" No Inference is admitted by us at all ;—but the other party have accepted it as a Means of Right Cognition ; and in view of this latter, our assertion is not useless ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1484).

IF THIS (INFERENCE) IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE, THEN WHAT DOES THE OTHER PARTY UNDERSTAND BY IT ?—OF WHAT SORT TOO WOULD THAT COGNITION BE WHICH HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY WHAT IS NOT A MEANS OF COGNITION ? —(1484)

COMMENTARY.

How have you come to the conclusion that your opponent has accepted Inference as a Means of Knowledge ? The idea of another man cannot be known by Sense-perception ; and for you there is no other Means of Right Knowledge whereby you could derive a definite Cognition ?

Even if there be such a definite Cognition ; even so, if what the other party accepts is not a means of Cognition, then how does his opponent know what it means ? The accepting of a Means of Knowledge cannot be a mere whim.

It might be argued that—" Just as a man wrests the sword from the hands of his enemy and by that same sword fells the enemy,—in the same way the Atheist takes up what the other regards as a Means of Right Cognition and then by that same attacks his opponent ".

The answer to this is—' *Of what sort, etc. etc.* ' ;—what is meant is as follows :—If, through delusion, the other party has accepted as *Means of Right Knowledge*, what is really *not* a Means of Knowledge, then, how can it be possible for one to bring about the right Cognition in the mind of that party, by means of what is *not* a Means of Right Cognition, as right Cognition is the only resultant of the Means of Knowledge ? Certainly, if a man has taken up, as *sword*, what is *not-sword*,—another man cannot take up that and strike the other with it. The example cited therefore is not analogous.—(1484)

Aviddhakarṇa has argued thus in the *Tattvaṭīkā* :—" It may be asked—' By means of this Means of Knowledge (Inference), what is the idea that is conveyed to the other person ? It is only what is admitted by both parties (the Speaker and the person addressed) that can convey any idea '.—But this is not right. Because Inference is in the form of a verbal statement ; and it is not a Means of Right Cognition for the person making the statement ; and yet that person conveys the idea (expressed) to the other person ; as his sole effort is towards the conveying of the idea to that other person ; hence the Means need not be admitted by both parties ".

This is the view put forward in the following—

TEXT (1485).

" INFERENCE, CONSISTING OF A VERBAL STATEMENT, IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE FOR THE SPEAKER ; HE ONLY CONVEYS THE IDEA TO THE OTHER PARTY BY MEANS OF THE STATEMENT."
—(1485)

COMMENTARY.

'*He*'—i.e. the Speaker.

'*Tēna*'—by means of the Inference consisting of the verbal statement.

The above view is controverted in the following—

TEXT (1486).

A CERTAIN MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE IS HELD TO BE *not* A *Means of Knowledge* ONLY WHEN IT *does not* BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF WHAT IS NOT ALREADY KNOWN ; AS FOR INSTANCE, THE INFERENCE THAT YOU HAVE PUT FORWARD, WHICH CONVEYS NO IDEA TO THE SPEAKER.—(1486)

COMMENTARY.

When a statement is said to be 'not a Means of Knowledge', it is *not* because, it conveys the idea to the Speaker,—but because it does not convey any information that is not already known. As regards conveying the idea to the Speaker, it is of course there. In the case of your Inference (argument) on the other hand, it conveys no idea to the Speaker. Hence the two cases are not analogous.—Otherwise, what is urged would be something admitted by both parties.

From all this it follows that that Means of Knowledge which is not devoid of reason must be accepted by all parties as a Means of Right Cognition,—just like Sense-perception.—(1486)

End of Chapter (18) *on Inference.*

End of Volume I.

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THE TATTVASAṄGRAHA
OF SHĀNTARAKṢITA

THE TATTVASAṄGRAHA OF SHĀNTARAKṢITA

With the Commentary of
KAMALASHĪLA

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY
GANGANATHA JHA

Volume II

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
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INTRODUCTION

Much need not be said here in regard to the personal history of the two authors—regarding their (*a*) date, (*b*) residence, (*c*) contact and relation with other writers; as all this has been dealt with in great detail in the excellent Foreword attached to Vol. I of the Sanskrit Text. From this we learn that our Authors—who were Master and Pupil—(*a*) lived between 705 and 764 A.D.,—(*b*) they were residents of *Magadha* in North India, from where they went over to Thibet.

There are some points in connection with the third point (*c*). Among the *other writers* referred to in the work, we have the name '*Sahantabhadra*' occurring twice in the Text (pages 506 and 508); while the name given in the Foreword is '*Saṅghabhadra*', and the pages referred to therein are also the same—506 and 508. Which of the two is the correct form of the name? '*Saṅghabhadra*' would appear to be so,—because we know what '*Saṅgha*' is; while we do not know what '*Sahanta*' is. In the body of the Translation, however, we have retained the form '*Sahantabhadra*', because it was felt that the same misprint, if it is a misprint, could not appear twice, and in such close proximity too. It is interesting to note that '*Samantabhadra*' is one of the names of the Buddha Himself mentioned in the *Amarakoṣa*.

Another interesting point regarding this third point (*c*) is that while the authors deal with, name and make large quotations from, the works of *Shabara* and *Kumārila*, they do not seem even to know *Prabhākara*; and yet *Prabhākara* flourished about the same time as *Kumārila*, if not earlier; and his views are really deserving of notice. The reason for this perhaps lay in the fact that *Prabhākara* does not materially deviate from *Shabara*, while *Kumārila* does deviate from him, and in his attempt to revive the 'Āstika-patha', he renders himself open to direct attack from the other quarter.

The list of authors provided in the Foreword does not contain the name of 'Vātsīputra', and yet the Author devotes Texts 336–349 to the demolishing of the Pudgala-philosophy of this writer, who is described as **सौगतम्मन्य**. Apparently he represents a distinct sect among Buddhists known as '*Vātsīputrīya*'. 'Pudgala' appears to figure very largely in the presentation of this philosophy.

The Foreword to the Text also provides us with an account of the 'philosophy' of our Authors (*vide* pp. XXXVIII–LIII); wherein we have a connected account of most of the important topics.

For all this the reader is referred to the said volume.

Here we are going to put together what details we have gleaned from the Text, in course of the translating.

Though the above-mentioned Foreword has supplied us with an exhaustive list of Authors referred to and named in the *Tattva-sangraha* and its commentary, one fails to find there the name of *Tāyin* who is named, and quoted from, in the Commentary on p. 12 of the Text,—and again in Shāntarakṣita's text itself in Verse 1788. One wonders if 'Tāyin' is a title of one of the writers already mentioned in the Foreword. From Text 3320, it would seem as if 'Tāyin' were only another name for *Buddha* Himself; as *Tāyin* is here spoken of as '*Sarvavit*', 'omniscient', which epithet can apply to the *Buddha* only;—this same identification is indicated also in Texts 3368, 3498, 3501 (which again speaks of *Tāyin* as 'omniscient') where the commentary definitely says—'*Tāyino buddhasya*', 'of *Tāyin* the *Buddha*'.

Under Text 1565, we have a simple explanation of the generally accepted principle that a गृहीतग्राहि ज्ञान, the Cognition apprehending what has been already apprehended by another Cognition, is *not Pramāṇa*,—not a valid Cognition. The reason provided is that such Cognition cannot be the साधकतम—the most efficient instrument of the Apprehension, which has already been brought about by another Instrument, in the shape of the previous Cognition; hence the later Cognition cannot be regarded as प्रमाकरण, प्रमाण, which name can be applied only to what is the करण—the साधकतम—of the *Pramā*, Apprehension.

I have often felt,—as Vijñānabhikṣu also felt—that there was deep kinship between 'Vedānta' and 'Buddhist Idealism',—the only difference of importance being that while the Buddhist Idealist regarded *Jñāna*, like everything else, to be momentary, though *real*—more real, at any rate, than the External World,—the Vedānta regarded *Jñāna*,—at least, the Highest Jñāna, 'Consciousness', which is the same as 'Soul', the highest Self, to be the only Reality—and *permanent*. We have been inclined to regard this as an achievement of the Great Shankarāchārya, who succeeded thus in reconciling Hinduism and Buddhism and thus helping the fusion of the two.—It seems however that this feature of the 'Vedānta', this stressing of the eternality of '*Jñāna*', at any rate, was older than Shankarāchārya,—if we admit the date usually assigned to this great writer. For Shāntarakṣita in Text No. 328 *et seq.*, in dealing with the philosophers whom he calls अद्वैतदर्शनावलम्बिनः औपनिषदाः, declares (in Texts 330-331) that the defect in the philosophy of these is *slight*, consisting only in their regarding all *Jñāna* as 'one and eternal'. तेषामल्पापराधं तु दर्शनं नित्यतोक्तितः। So, if Shankarāchārya came after the seventh century, he can be credited only with having *emphasised* this idea and thereby led to the fusion of the two Philosophies or Religions.

This belief is further strengthened by a reference to the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Mishra,—which is believed to be anterior to Shaṅkarāchārya.

Under Text 348 we note another parallelism between the Buddhist and Vedānta ways of dealing with the 'Soul'. We know that, in the last resort, the Vedāntin has recourse to the idea of अनिर्वचनीयता, the 'Soul' being one of the अनिर्वचनीय, *Inexplicable*, things. We find the same idea expressed by *Shāntarakṣita* and his commentator under Text 348. The question having been put—"If no such thing as the *Pudgala* exists, then how was it that when asked if the *Jīva* was different from, or the same as, the *Body*, the Blessed Lord only vouchsafed the answer that 'this matter has not been explained'; why did not He say straight away that 'there was no such thing as the *Jīva*, Soul, apart from the Body'?"—The only answer given by *Shāntarakṣita* is that the intention of the Compassionate One was the denial of *Nāstikya* (i.e. the view that denies the other world and other Regions); and to this end he adopted various methods'.—So that according to this also the Soul is something that has 'not been explained', is 'inexplicable', अनिर्वचनीय.

On p. 16, line 7, we find mentioned a *Kāvya* of the name of *Sītāharaṇa*; the poet's name is not given.

Under Texts 2671–2673 we have a comparison drawn between the Mīmāmsaka's and the Buddhist's idea of *Pralaya*, Dissolution. According to the former, Dissolution consists in the destruction of particular countries and of particular families or peoples; and there is no such thing as *Universal* Dissolution; there is no evidence for any such Dissolution: while according to the Buddhist, there is an 'undeniable Destruction affecting even Brahmā and others, which affects the Veda also; so that *Dissolution* consists in "the withdrawal of the energy of Fire, Water and Air, extending horizontally over the *Trisāhasra-Mahāsāhasra* (?), downwards to the lowest limits of the atmospheric air, and upwards to the highest stages of *Dhyāna*; which affects *Brahmā* and other beings also".

Text 2447 speaks of the *Pārasīkas* as perceiving nothing wrong in the marriage of their mother. Does this mean 'Widow-marriage'?—or something worse?—Text 2807 speaks of these *Pārasīkas* as blindly adhering to their custom.

In Text 2520 the view is expressed that 'attraction by the Magnet is due to the contact of the invisible rays of light emanating from the Magnet and penetrating the piece of Iron'. Does this indicate the knowledge of the fact that all phenomena relating to Light, Electricity and Magnetism are due to the action of the same 'Force' or 'Fluid'?

The commentary on Texts 2653–2655, distinguishes between the verbal usage of the '*Ārya*' from that of the '*Draviḍa*'.

The two important technical terms of Buddhist philosophy '*Pratisañkhyānirodha*' and '*Apratisaṅkhyānirodha*' have been variously understood. The commonly-accepted view is that these terms stand for 'Conscious' and 'Unconscious Destruction'. Texts 2748-2749 bring out the other explanation. They say—"The two *Nirodhas* are not regarded as being of the nature of *Destruction*; because '*Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* is regarded as 'Dissociation, one after the other, from Impurities—brought about by Wisdom'; while *Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* is that which serves as an absolute bar to the appearance of Impurities"; and this latter, adds the commentary, is due not to *Wisdom*, but to the inefficiency of the causes productive of the Impurities.

Text 2945 speaks of *Mīmāmsakas* as '*Prāchya*' (or *Prochya*); does this stand for 'Easterner'? And does that indicate that *Mīmāmsā* had its origin in the country to the East of *Nālanda*, where *Shāntarakṣita* is believed to have taught? This would fit in with common belief that a thousand years ago, the small land of Mithilā was able to bring together *nine-hundred* Mīmāṃsakas at any ordinary gathering of Pandits.

The commentary on Text 3018 tells us of the juice of the *Droṇa* flower as curing jaundice, when dropped into the eyes.

Text 3486 has accepted the definition of *Dharma* as यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयस-सिद्धिः.

Texts 3511-3512 tell us of a *Shākhā* (Rescensional Text) of the Veda,—known as '*Nimitta*' which speaks of '*Bhagavān-Munisattamaḥ*',—the 'Blessed Lord, the Best of Sages'—explained by the commentary as *Shākya Muni*,—as being '*sarvajña*', 'omniscient'.

When I was asked to undertake the translation of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and its commentary, I agreed to do it, with some trepidation; because I have had no direct knowledge of the tenets of Buddhist philosophy, and I am fully conscious of the need of गुरुमुखविद्या, 'direct teaching from the Teacher's mouth', in all important matters.—A careful study of the Sanskrit Introduction attached to the Text, however, gave me valuable information and as I proceeded with the work, the way became gradually smoothened, and I was enabled to complete the work.

The work is rather disappointing; it is purely and almost entirely polemical; its avowed aim being the demolition of all views contrary to the tenets of orthodox Buddhism,—the doctrinaire part of which is neatly—though not at all clearly—set forth in the six opening verses of the Text.

I cannot conclude this without thanking Dr. Benoytosh Bhattachārya, the talented Director of the Oriental Institute, for help rendered of

various kinds,—and also the Baptist Mission Press who have carried through the printing with their usual efficiency.

'Mithilā', GANGANATHA JHA.

Allahabad,

July 16, 1938.

Vol. II.

CHAPTER XIX.

Other Forms and Means of Knowledge.

(A)

Verbal Cognition.

COMMENTARY.

The Author now proceeds to show that there are *only two* Means or Forms of Knowledge, by refuting the various theories regarding their number.—

The Opponent (of the Buddhist) urges the following objection :—

TEXT (1487).

" INASMUCH AS THERE ARE OTHER MEANS OR FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE, IN THE SHAPE OF VERBAL COGNITION AND OTHERS,—WHY HAS THE DEFINITION OF ONLY TWO SUCH MEANS BEEN PROVIDED ? "

COMMENTARY.

What the Opponent means to do by this is (1) to point out that the definition provided is ' too narrow ', and (2) to indicate that what has been assorted (under *Text* 3) regarding Truth ' being ascertained by the two Means or Forms of Knowledge ' is futile.

The answer to this is provided in the following—

TEXT (1488).

THE REPLY TO THIS IS AS FOLLOWS :—IN FACT, THERE CANNOT BE ANY FORM OF COGNITION EXCEPT THE TWO (ALREADY DESCRIBED) ; BECAUSE ALL THE OTHERS THAT HAVE BEEN POSTULATED EITHER DO NOT POSSESS THE CHARACTER OF THE ' FORM OF RIGHT COGNITION ', OR ARE INCLUDED IN THESE TWO.—(1488)

COMMENTARY.

'*Included in these*',—i.e. in the two Forms of Cognition already described.

What is meant is as follows :—The characteristic of *Valid Knowledge* is that it should be in conformity with the real state of things ; and this is not present at all in any of the others that have been postulated ; every case where this characteristic is present, is included in the said two, and hence the others have not been described separately.—(1488)

The Author now proceeds to show how the other so-called 'Means or Forms of Knowledge' are *not* real Means or Forms of Knowledge—or how, if they are real Means or Forms of Cognition, they are included under the two postulated by the Buddhist.

The additional Means or Forms of Knowledge posited by others are the following :—(1) Verbal Cognition, (2) Analogical Cognition, (3) Presumption, (4) Negation, (5) Ratiocinative Cognition, (6) Non-apprehension, (7) Probability, (8) Tradition and (9) Intuition.

As regards Verbal Cognition, the Author says as follows :—

TEXTS (1489–1491).

OTHER PEOPLE HAVE DECLARED 'VERBAL COGNITION' TO BE "THAT KNOWLEDGE OF IMPERCEPTIBLE THINGS WHICH IS DERIVED FROM WORDS" ;—AND [THEY PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF IT], —"THAT COGNITION IS DERIVED FROM (*a*) THE ETERNAL SENTENCE AND FROM (*b*) THE SENTENCE UTTERED BY A TRUSTWORTHY PERSON.—THIS CANNOT BE 'SENSE-PERCEPTION', BECAUSE THE OBJECT APPREHENDED BY IT IS BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES ;—NOR CAN IT BE 'INFERENCE', BECAUSE IT IS DEVOID OF THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF INFERENCE ;—UNTIL THE SUBJECT (MINOR TERM) IS DEFINITELY KNOWN TO BE POSSESSED OF THE PROBANDUM AND ALSO OF THE PROBANS, IT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A CASE OF 'INFERENCE' OF THAT SUBJECT.—(1489–1491)

COMMENTARY.

Shabara-svāmin (in his *Mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya* on 1. 1. 5) has provided the following definition of *Verbal Cognition* :—"That cognition of things not within reach of the senses which proceeds from the cognition of words is called *Verbal*" ; which means that the Specific Individuality of the word having been apprehended, the cognition that follows after that, in regard to things beyond the reach of the Senses, is called *Verbal Cognition,* because it is derived from words.

"This *Verbal Cognition* is of two kinds—(1) Proceeding from words not emanating from human beings, and (2) Proceeding from the words of trustworthy persons.—This cognition is different from Sense-perception, because the object apprehended by it is beyond the reach of the senses.—Nor is it Inference ; as it is devoid of the 'three features'. For instance, the *object of Inferential Cognition* is the *Subject* (Minor Term) which is qualified by *the character that is sought to be proved* (i.e. the Probandum),—not merely

he Subject by itself, nor the character by itself; and until the Probans is lefinitely known as having the same character and as appertaining to the ame Subject,—the Inference cannot proceed. That is to say, until the resence of the Probans in the Subject is definitely cognised with certainty, here can be no Inference".—(1489–1491)

Question—Why cannot this condition of the definite cognition of the robans in the Subject be fulfilled in the case in question?

Answer:—

TEXT (1492).

In the case in question (i.e. in Verbal Cognition) that which would be regarded as the *Subject* forms the *object cognised* itself; and unless this is cognised, there can be no idea of any character (Probans) belonging to it."—(1492)

COMMENTARY.

"In the case of Verbal Cognition, anything, in the shape of the *Tree* and :h things,—that may be assumed to be the *Subject*,—forms the *object cognised* elf; as that is what is expressed by the word. That is to say, in this ie, the *Subject* itself—and not the *Subject as qualified by the Probandum*,— ;he *object cognised*; and so long as the said *Subject* has not been definitely gnised, how can there be any definite cognition of any character as belong- to it?"—(1492)

TEXT (1493).

ND IF THE SUBJECT HAS ALREADY BEEN COGNISED, PRIOR TO THE RECOGNITION OF THE PROBANS IN THE SUBJECT (I.E. THE MINOR PREMISS)—THEN WHAT IS THE USE OF KNOWING THAT THE PROBANS SUBSISTS IN IT AND SO FORTH, BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THE COGNITION COULD BE REGARDED AS *Inference*?"—(1493)

COMMENTARY.

"Then again, if the Subject has been cognised before the recognition of Minor Premiss, then all attempt to obtain the recognition of this latter ld be futile; because the purpose of the whole attempt is to secure the ition of the Subject; hence, if that has been cognised, what would be the n trying to know of the presence of the Probans in the Subject?"

What has been stated is on the basis of taking it for granted that what the opponent has asserted is true. As a matter of fact, the Word is not a property of any such Subject as the *Tree* ; as it is always found in the place where the Speaker is.—(1493)

It has been shown that (in the case of Verbal Cognition), there can be no *subsistence in the Subject* (i.e. the Minor Premiss) ; the following Text shows that there is no possibility of *concomitance* (between the Probans and the Probandum, as expressed in the Major Premiss) :—

TEXT (1494).

"NOR CAN THE CONCOMITANCE OF THE WORD WITH THE *object Inferred* (PROBANDUM) BE ASCERTAINED ; THE CONCOMITANCE OF ALL THINGS IS RECOGNISED ONLY BY THEIR FUNCTIONING."—(1494)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ascertained*'—recognised with certainty.

'*By their functioning*',—i.e. by *existence*, by being present.

What is meant is that it is only what *exists* that can be *concomitant*, not what does not exist.—(1494)

The same idea is further elucidated :—

TEXT (1495).

"IT IS ONLY WHEN THE FIRE *exists* WHENEVER THERE IS SMOKE THAT ITS CONCOMITANCE IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED. IN THE CASE IN QUESTION HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SUCH CERTAIN IDEA AS THAT 'THE THING SPOKEN OF *exists* WHEREVER THE *Word* EXISTS'."—(1495)

COMMENTARY.

"It is because of the well-recognised fact that 'wherever there is smoke there must be Fire' that Fire is said to be *concomitant* with smoke ; there is however no such concomitance between the *Word* and the *Thing* (spoken of)."—(1495)

Question :—Why is there no such *concomitance* ?

Answer :—

TEXTS (1496-1497).

"IT DOES NOT EXIST AT THE PLACE (WHERE THE WORD IS); NOR AT THE TIME.—IF IT BE URGED THAT THE REQUIRED CONCOMITANCE WOULD BE THERE IN VIEW OF THE ETERNALITY AND THE ALL-PERVASIVE CHARACTER (OF THE WORD)",—THEN [THE ANSWER IS THAT] THAT WOULD BE SO WITH ALL WORDS; AND FOR THAT SAME REASON THE CONCOMITANCE BEING PERCEIVED IN ALL CASES, THERE WOULD BE NO IDEA OF THE *negative concomitance* AT ALL; AND IT WOULD THUS BE POSSIBLE FOR ALL WORDS TO PROVIDE THE COGNITION OF ALL THINGS."—(1496-1497)

COMMENTARY.

"The *Thing* (spoken of) does not exist at the place that is occupied by the *Word*; for instance, the word 'Dates' is heard in one place—the city of *Pāṭaliputra* for instance,—and yet the thing,—the dates themselves—do not exist there. Nor again is the *Thing* necessarily present at the time that the word is present; for instance, the word '*Dilīpa*' is present (uttered) now, while the person of that name lived long ago; and while the word '*Mahā-sammata*' is present now, what it denotes is to come in future.—Under the circumstances, how can there be *concomitance* between words and the things denoted by them?

"The following might be urged—'Words are eternal and as such exist at all times; so that things denoted by them cannot exist at a *time* other than that of the Word; nor can they exist at a *place* other than that occupied by the words, as being all-pervading in character, words are present at all places. Thus, by reason of their *eternality* and *all-pervasive character*, there would be concomitance between the Words and the Things denoted by them'.

"If that be so, then, such *eternality* and *all-pervasiveness* belong to all words equally; and hence it should not be the case that particular words should denote particular things only; in fact, any single word should denote all things, as all things would be present at the place and at the time at which the Word is present.

'*The negative concomitance*'—i.e. *the absence of the Probans* wherever there is *absence of the Probandum.*

'*There would be no idea*'—no apprehension; for the same reason that words are *eternal* and *all-pervading.*—(1496-1497)

Recapitulating the arguments, the Opponent formulates his case as follows:—

TEXT (1498).

"THUS THE VERBAL COGNITION IS *not-Inference*—BECAUSE IT IS DEVOID OF THE THREE *Features* ;—LIKE SENSE-PERCEPTION ;—AS IS SHOWN BY THE ABSENCE *of an object like that.*" —(1498)

COMMENTARY.

"The Proposition of his Reasoning is—'The Verbal Cognition is *not-Inference* ;'—'because it is devoid of the three features' is the *statement of the Probans* (Mincr Premiss) ;—'*like Sense-perception*' is the Corroborative Instance.—And 'as is shown by the absence of an object like that' is said in support of the Minor Premiss ; what is meant by this is that the object of the Inference brought about by the Inferential Indicative like *Smoke* is the *Subject* as endowed with the particular property (Probandum),—and any such object is absent in the case of Verbal Cognition."—(1498)

Says the Opponent—'Not having the Three-features, Verbal Cognition may not be *Inference* ; but how can it be regarded as Valid or Right Cognition'?

The answer is as follows :—

TEXT (1499).

"INASMUCH AS THE WORDS SPEAKING OF THE *Agnihotra* AND OTHER THINGS BRING ABOUT UNSHAKEABLE COGNITIONS,—THE CHARACTER OF BEING *Right Cognition* CANNOT BE DENIED TO THEM."—(1499)

COMMENTARY.

The cognition is 'unshakeable' by reason of its being free from doubt and error ; that is, it is *Right Cognition* because there is no Right Cognition sublating it ; just in the same way as Sense-perception is Right Cognition.

Says *Shabara-svāmin* (in his *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 1. 1. 5)—"The cognition derived from the statement 'Desiring Heaven one should offer the *Agnihotra*' is not a doubtful one,—it leaves us in no doubt as to whether Heaven is to be attained or not ;—and when this is cognised with certainty, it cannot be *wrong* ; it is only when the cognition, after having come about, becomes sublated by the subsequent idea that 'it is not so', that it can be called *wrong cognition* ;—the cognition in question however is never, at any time or at any place, found to be otherwise ;—hence it must be *true*. As regards the assertion of the common people,—if it comes from a trusted person, or if it pertains to what is actually perceived by the Senses, then it is certainly true ; if, on the other hand, it emanates from an untrustworthy person, or it relates to something beyond the reach of the Senses,—then having its source

ι a human being, it cannot be regarded as *right*; because such a thing cannot ə rightly known by human beings by themselves ".—(1499)

In the following *Text*, the author proceeds to show that the definition : Verbal Cognition propounded in Text 1489, as 'that Cognition which is ɔrived from the eternal sentence',—is open to the charge of being 'im-ɔssible':—

TEXT (1500).

Ꞩ REGARDS THE 'ETERNAL SENTENCE', ITS POSSIBILITY AND EXPRESSIVENESS (USEFULNESS) ARE BOTH IMPROBABLE; HENCE THE FIRST DEFINITION OF 'VERBAL COGNITION' IS AN 'IMPOSSIBLE' ONE.—(1500)

COMMENTARY.

There is no *possibility* of there being an 'eternal sentence', because it ɜ been established that all things are in *perpetual flux*; also because of the ιsons that are going to be adduced.

Even if such 'eternal Sentence' were possible, it could not convey a mean-; (and serve any useful purpose).

Hence the statement that—" Through the eternal Sentence imperceptible ngs become known "—is impossible; hence the proposed definition is an ıpossible' one.—(1500)

Question:—" Why can there be no *eternal Sentence*?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1501).

E SENTENCE MAY BE 'CAPABLE' OR 'INCAPABLE'; IN EITHER CASE, AS THE CHARACTER WOULD BE ALWAYS THERE, THE COGNITION RESULTING THEREFROM WOULD COME ABOUT (ALWAYS); OR IT WOULD NOT COME ABOUT AT ALL.—(1501)

COMMENTARY.

The 'eternal Sentence' may be 'capable'—of bringing about the ıition,—or 'incapable' at times; these two alternatives are possible. :he former case, as the said 'capability' would be always there, the ıition resulting from it would be always there. This argument may be ıulated as follows:—When a thing has its capacity to produce something ɔstructed, it must always produce that thing,—as for example, the final al conditions,—the eternal Sentence has its capacity to produce verbal :ition unobstructed at all times,—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing. Or it may be formulated as follows:—That effect ɜe cause is present in its perfect condition must come about,—e.g. ;prout, whose cause (in the shape of the seed, the soil and the requisite

moisture) is present in its perfect condition ;—the Cognition resulting from the eternal Sentence has its cause always present in its perfect condition ;—hence this is a Reason based upon the very nature of the thing.

Under the other alternative—that the eternal Sentence is *incapable* (of bringing about cognition),—as the said 'incapability' would be there always, any cognition resulting from it would never come about at all,—just like the sprout whose cause is imperfect.—(1501)

Question :—" Why cannot the eternal Sentence convey a meaning (and serve a useful purpose) ? "

Answer :—

TEXTS (1502-1503).

JUST AS HATRED, DELUSION, ETC. ARE KNOWN TO BE SOURCES OF ERROR, SO ARE COMPASSION, WISDOM, ETC. KNOWN TO BE SOURCES OF TRUTHFULNESS. WHERE, THEN, THERE IS NO PERSON AS THE SOURCE, THESE TWO ALSO CANNOT BE THERE. CONSEQUENTLY THE SENTENCE THAT DOES NOT EMANATE FROM A PERSON MUST BE INEXPRESSIVE (USELESS).—(1502-1503)

COMMENTARY.

A verbal cognition can serve a useful purpose in two ways : either by representing things as they are, or by representing things as they are not ;—no third way is possible ;—the use of both these kinds of Cognition have their source in good and bad qualities, as ascertained by positive and negative concomitance. For instance, the man who is beset with Love, Hatred and other bad qualities is found to say things that are not true, while one who is endowed with Compassion and other good qualities is found to say what is true ;—the receptacle of both these qualities—good and bad—which are the sources of truth and falsehood,—is always a Person ;—hence where there is no Person, there can be no good or bad qualities ;—and when the good and bad qualities are not there, there can be no Truth or Falsehood ;—and as there is no third alternative possible, the statement that does not emanate from a Person can serve no purpose at all ; as the cause is not there ; and when the cause is not there, there can be no effect ; if it were, it would be causeless ; and in that case there could be no restriction of Place, Time, etc. in regard to such effects ".

This argument is to be taken as a *Reductio ad absurdum* ; otherwise, if it were meant to be really true, then it would be contrary to perceptible facts ; because such sentences as 'One desiring Heaven should offer the *Agnihotra*' are actually found to convey a definite meaning ; and what is actually perceived cannot be denied.

Further, the fact that the sentence is *eternal* is not admitted by both parties ; hence the Reason is 'Inadmissible'.

Stated in the form of a *Reductio ad Absurdum*, both the arguments are flawless. For instance, if the Veda is held to be 'without a Personal Author', then it must be meaningless (and useless); as the basis of *expressiveness*, in the shape of the Reason, is not there; and yet, it is not meaningless;—hence it must have a Personal Author;—this is the contingency that is shown by the *Reductio ad Absurdum*.'—(1502-1503)

In order to further support this *Reductio ad Absurdum*, and to refute the charge of being contrary to a perceived fact,—the author anticipates and answers an objection:—

TEXTS (1504–1507).

IF IT BE URGED THAT—"A CERTAIN MEANING IS ACTUALLY COMPREHENDED FROM WORDS, HENCE THEY CANNOT BE INEXPRESSIVE OR USELESS",—THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) SUCH COMPREHENSION CAN ONLY BE DERIVED FROM EXPLANATIONS PROVIDED; AND IN THE MATTER OF EXPLANATIONS, IT IS FOUND THAT THE EXPOUNDER IS FREE TO EXPLAIN THINGS AS HE LIKES.—IT MIGHT BE ARGUED THAT—"THE WORD, BY ITS VERY NATURE, HAS THE POTENCY TO DENOTE WELL-ESTABLISHED THINGS".—IN THAT CASE, ITS MEANING WOULD BE COMPREHENDED ALSO BY ONE WHO HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONVENTION (BEARING UPON THE WORD AND ITS DENOTATION). FURTHER, THE LAMP, WHICH IS ILLUMINATIVE BY ITS VERY NATURE, DOES NOT NEED A CONVENTION (IN ILLUMINING THINGS). LASTLY, AS THERE IS ANOTHER CONVENTION ALSO (BEARING UPON THE SAME WORD), THERE COULD BE NO COMPREHENSION OF THAT OTHER THING FROM THAT SAME WORD. EVEN THOUGH THERE BE A CONVENTION, THE LAMP CANNOT MANIFEST ODOUR, TASTE, ETC.—NOR CAN ANY SUCH POTENCY (OF WORDS) BE RECOGNISED.—(1504–1507)

COMMENTARY.

'*No chēt*'—i.e. If it be urged that—"words cannot be inexpressive; and hence the conclusion of the Buddhist is contrary to a perceived fact".

The answer to this is that our conclusion would really be contrary to perceived facts if things were comprehended from the *Veda* itself, without the help of any instructions; as a matter of fact however, the comprehension of the meaning comes only through the help of the expounder relying upon Conventions (the conventional denotation of words); and it never comes from the Veda itself independently of Convention. For instance, the *Mīmāmsaka* and others have been found to expound the meaning of the Veda in accordance with their own whim; and it cannot be right for the natural denotation of words to be dependent upon the whim of man.

The following might be urged—"The man does not expound a new meaning through his whim ; he explains that same natural meaning of words which has been there all along. So that your conclusion is clearly contrary to this perceived fact."

If that is so, and if the potency to express well-established things is already there in the Veda by its very nature,—then it should be possible for that meaning of the Veda to be comprehended by that man also who is ignorant of the Conventions.

Says the Opponent—"The Veda becomes a means of expressing things only through the help of the Conventions,—not independently by itself".

That cannot be right. The Lamp and such things which are by their nature endowed with the potency to illumine things, do not need any Conventions. If this were not so, then, through positive and negative concomitance, the potency to express things would have to be attributed to those Conventions, not to any natural relationship (between the word and its meaning).

Then again, the comprehension of the meaning may follow from the Veda as helped by Conventions ; even so, the view of the opponent would be defective. This is what is shown by the words—'*As there is another Convention, etc. etc.*'—The Conventions set up by the author of the *Nirukta* are different from those set up by the *Mīmāmsaka* ; and as there is this *other Convention*,—this latter could not bring about the comprehension of any meaning other than that indicated by itself ; for the Lamp never illumines what cannot be illuminated by it—such, for instance, as Odour, Taste and so forth,—with the help of Conventions.

Even granting that, on the ground of the other Convention, the Word may be applicable to (and lead to the comprehension of) another thing,—no validity could attach to the cognition thus brought about.—This is what is meant by the words—'*Nor can any such potency be recognised*'.—If, through the speaker's whim, a word be actually applied to another thing (in another sense),—then, there would be confusion, and it would not be possible to ascertain the exact expressive Potency of the word ; how then could it be possible to derive from it the cognition of the intended meaning ?

Or, the words of the text may be explained in another way :—The natural expressiveness of the word may be either restricted to one thing, or applied to several things ;—only these two alternative views are possible. If it is restricted to one thing, then the objection (to the Opponent's view) is that—'*As there is another Convention, etc. etc.*'.—If the second alternative is accepted then—'*no such potency can be recognised*',—i.e. on account of confusion.

This has been thus declared—'If words are restricted to one thing, then there could be no comprehension of any other thing (from it) ; if they are related to several things, then there is possibility of the contradictory things being expressed'.—(1504–1507)

Having thus proved that the first definition (provided under 1489) of *Verbal Cognition* is impossible,—the Author proceeds to sum up his argument

nd show the 'inadmissibility' of the Probans put up by the Opponent under 1499) to the effect that 'it brings about unshakeable cognitions':—

TEXTS (1508-1509).

HUS, INASMUCH AS THERE CAN BE NO COGNITION OF THE MEANING (OF THE VEDA),—HOW CAN THERE BE ANY 'UNSHAKEABILITY' IN THAT COGNITION? IT COULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF CONVENTIONS; AND IN THIS, IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFERENT FROM THE WORDS OF HUMAN BEINGS. IN FACT, PERSONS WELL-VERSED IN THE SCIENCE OF REASONING DO NOT RECOGNISE ANY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO.—IT CAN BE 'UNSHAKEABLE' ONLY FOR THE *Shrotriyas* WHO ARE IGNORANT OF THE WAYS OF REASONING.—(1508-1509)

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COMMENTARY.

If the Veda is not the work of a human author, then, as shown above, re can be no comprehension of its meaning; how then could the cognition ught about by it be 'unshakeable'? The meaning that is actually found be comprehended from the words of the Vêda must be one based upon iventions, as has been shown above, under *Text* 1504. Hence it can only through Conventions. Specially because the words of the Veda do not er from the words of human beings; that is, they do not differ from human ertions.

Why this is so is explained in the words—'*In fact, persons well-versed, etc.*'

'*Between these two*',—i.e. between words in the Veda and words nating from men.—In every way the words can be brought about by , and hence the Vedic words cannot differ from the words of men.

'*It can be, etc. etc.*'.—In this the Author ridicules the *Shrotriyas* *nāmsakas*).—(1508-1509)

The second form of Verbal Cognition put forward by the other party in 1489, is that brought about 'by words uttered by a Trustworthy on'. In this definition, the Author detects the defect of 'Im- ibility':—

TEXT (1510).

BECAUSE THE 'TRUSTWORTHY PERSON' IS NOT ADMITTED, THEREFORE THE SECOND DEFINITION ALSO OF *Verbal Cognition* IS NOT PROPER.—EVEN IF SUCH A PERSON WERE REGARDED AS POSSIBLE, THAT A CERTAIN PERSON IS SUCH A ONE CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED. —(1510)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the *Mimāmsakas* do not admit of a Person 'free from defects'; hence no 'Trustworthy Person' can be admitted by them; how then could the word of such a person be *valid* (Right, Reliable)?

'*Na kṣamam*'—is not proper; i.e. it is 'Impossible'.

Even if the 'Trustworthy Person' be admitted, it could never be exactly pointed out that 'this person' is *trustworthy*; hence he would be as good as non-existent. Then again, because there is no valid means of ascertaining whether or not there are certain bad or good qualities in a certain person,—because such qualities are beyond the reach of the senses,—specially because as for the bodily and verbal behaviour of men, they are sometimes purposely misrepresented,—therefore how could any reliance be placed upon the word of such men? Because people with limited vision cannot properly discriminate among men.

TEXTS (1511-1512).

IF IT BE URGED THAT—"THAT PERSON IS REGARDED AS TRUSTWORTHY IN REGARD TO IMPERCEPTIBLE THINGS, WHOSE ASSERTIONS ARE FOUND TO BE TRUE IN MOST CASES",—THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) THE MERE FACT OF ONE'S ASSERTION BEING *not true* IN SOME INDIVIDUAL CASE, CANNOT PROVE THAT HIS ASSERTIONS ARE NEVER TRUE; NOR CAN THE FACT OF ITS BEING *true* IN ONE CASE PROVE THAT ALL HIS ASSERTIONS ARE *true*.—(1511-1512)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"Even though a man may not be entirely free from defects, yet if it has been found that in most cases his assertions are true, then such a person is regarded by us as 'trustworthy',—and not any person 'free from defects';—and it is the assertion of such a 'trustworthy' person that is meant in the definition of *Verbal Cognition* (provided by us). Hence the definition is not open to the charge of being 'Impossible'."

This cannot be right; because one assertion of the man has been found to be not incompatible with the real state of things, it does not necessarily

ollow that *all* his assertions are true ; because it is always possible that some ıssertion may be untrue. If it were not so, then the definition would be alse.—(1511-1512)

Having thus proved that both definitions of Verbal Cognition are efective, the Author points out objections to Verbal Cognition in general :—

TEXTS (1513-1514).

VHAT IS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN WORDS AND EXTERNAL OBJECTS, BY EXPRESSING WHICH LATTER THE WORDS WOULD BE 'TRUE' (VALID) ?—THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM CANNOT BE OF THE NATURE OF *being the same in essence*,—BECAUSE THEY ARE APPREHENDED BY DIFFERENT SENSE-ORGANS, AND FOR OTHER REASONS. NOR CAN THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM BE THAT OF *one being produced from the other* ; BECAUSE THIS IS NOT TRUE. NOR IS THERE ANY OTHER CONNECTION POSSIBLE WHICH COULD BE TRUE.—(1513-1514)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, between Words and External Things, there is no h relation as that of *sameness* or of *being produced*,—by virtue of which ation, the words expressing such things would be regarded as true. For tance, the relation of *sameness* is not possible between them,—because of h reasons as their being apprehended by different sense-organs ; i.e. words apprehended by a sense-organ which is different from that by which the ıgs are apprehended ; for instance, word is apprehended by the Auditory an, while things are apprehended by the Visual and other organs.—By ıer *reasons*' are included differences of Time, Place, Appearance, Causes. *Kumārila* has argued as follows :—" The argument that, 'one thing is erent from another because they are apprehended by different sense-ıns', is not Conclusive ; because in a case where the same colour is seen several persons, the Colour will have to be regarded as different, *because apprehended by different sense-organs.* It might be argued that 'all sense-organs apprehending the Colour belong to the same universal 'Eye', hat the Colour is really perceived by a single sense-organ'. But, in that , though 'Being' is perceived by several sense-organs, yet the Universal ıse-organ' being one, it would be perceived by the same sense-organ, hence have to be regarded as one. For these reasons things have to be rded as *same* or *different*, according as their cognitions are same or

different,—and not according to the sameness or diversity of the sense-organs concerned ".

The actual words of *Kumārila* are as follows :—" That which is cognised by more sense-organs than one does not (on that account) become diverse ; for, if it were so, then any and every object would have to be regarded as diverse on the ground of its being cognised by the sense-organs located in the bodies of different persons.—If it be urged that ' in this case the sense-organs of all persons would be of the same category or *class*, and as such, in a way, identical ',—then we could have the same in the other case also, the *class* ' sense-organ ' being one and the same. The class ' Being ' also is not regarded as diverse, even though it is perceived by diverse sense-organs,—because it is always recognised as the same ". (*Shlokavārtika*—Sense-perception, 156-157.)

This however is not right. Even when the difference is based upon the difference of cognitions, what has been urged remains equally applicable to what is meant to be proved (by the Opponent). For instance, in regard to the case in question also, the following might be said :—That the difference among things is due to the difference in cognitions is not true (conclusive) ; for instance, when several persons perceive Colour, there *is* diversity of cognitions,—and yet the Colour is not diverse ; if one-ness (sameness of the Sense-organs) is assumed on the basis of the eyes of all persons belonging to the same class ' Eye ', then the same sameness may be attributed to Colour, Taste and other things also, because even though these Cognitions are diverse, yet they all belong to the one *class* ' Cognition ' ; and this would be a direct contradiction of the assertion that ' Colour, etc. cannot be regarded as *one*, —because their cognitions are different ' (found in *Shlokavārtika*—Sense-perception, 158).

Thus the answer provided (by Kumārila) is of the nature of a ' Futile Rejoinder '.

If it be urged that—" Just as, even when there is difference in the Specific Individualities, there are certain characteristics upon the difference or non-difference of which people regard things as different or non-different, and treat them as the basis of conceiving of things as one or diverse ; this is what we mean by the difference and non-difference of cognitions ",—all this would be equally applicable to the case of Sense-organs also. So enough of this.

' *Nor can the connection, etc. etc.* ' ;—that is, the relation between Words and Things expressed by them cannot be that of *being produced by them* ; as this would be *not true* ; because even when the Thing is not there, the Word may be there, through the mere wish of the speaker.

Nor is there any other kind of *inseparability* between the two, except that of Cause and Effect ; if any such were postulated, it would lead to absurdity.

From all this we conclude that the Word cannot serve as a valid means of cognition of the thing spoken of by it.—(1513-1514)

Says the Opponent—" If that is so, then how is it that it has been declared (by a Buddhist writer) that—' Verbal Cognition is not a distinct form of Cognition, because it proceeds from Inference ; just as the Inference,

based upon the character of being a product, is drawn by one for his own benefit, so the word also denotes things only through the *negation of others*'?"

Anticipating this objection, the Author proceeds to show in what way *Verbal Cognition* is meant to be included under *Inference* :—

TEXT (1515).

FROM ALL VERBAL STATEMENTS THERE FOLLOWS INFERENCE OF THE 'DESIRE TO SPEAK' (I.E. *Intention*, ON THE PART OF THE SPEAKER); THIS (INTENTION) IS DEFINITELY KNOWN TO BE THE CAUSE (SOURCE) OF THE WORDS, THROUGH DIRECT PERCEPTION AND NON-APPREHENSION.—(1515)

COMMENTARY.

'*All words*'—i.e. all those that are regarded as emanating from human beings.

This 'Desire to Speak' or 'Intention' is inferred from the Verbal statements, because they are the *effects* of that Desire,—and not because it is *expressed* (or denoted) by it. That the said Desire is the cause of the Verbal Statement is ascertained from the fact that there is positive and negative concomitance (between them).

When it was said (by the Buddhist writer) that 'the word also denotes things only as the *negation of others*',—what was meant by 'denoting' was only *indicating, making known*; that is, the explanation provided of that passage is as follows :—Just like the Probans 'Because it is a product', it *manifests* (indicates) a thing by means of the negation or exclusion of other things. This has to be so understood; otherwise, the instance 'like the Probans *Because it is a product*' would be one devoid of the Probandum; because there can be no *denoting* of 'being a product'; as the *denoting* is a property or function of words; so that, if actual *denoting* were meant, then the statement of the Reason in the form 'because it denotes things through the negation of others' would be 'Too Specific' (hence Inconclusive).—(1515)

Says the Opponent :—"Even in regard to the *Intention* (*Desire to Speak*), the word should not be regarded as the *Means of Cognition*; because it could not be the means of bringing about the cognition of any *particular* 'Desire to Speak' (Intention); for, if it were so regarded, it would be not true; as in the case of a man labouring under a mistake, a statement is not always understood in the sense in which it was intended by the speaker. Nor could it be the means of bringing about the cognition of the 'Desire to Speak' (or 'Intention') *in general*; because such a cognition would be useless. The cognition of mere *Intention* (Desire to Speak) does not serve any useful purpose in actual practice; because no definite cognition of its meaning can be obtained."

Anticipating this objection in the following *Text* (1516), the Author asserts (in *Text* 1517) the fact of the Verbal Expression being an efficient Means of bringing about the cognition of the *particular* 'Desire to Speak'—

TEXTS (1516-1517).

"IN THE CASE OF THE MAN UNDER AN ILLUSION, A VERBAL STATEMENT IS FOUND WHICH IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THE MAN 'DESIRED TO SAY'; SO ALSO IN THE CASE OF THE 'DESIRE TO SPEAK' *in general*; HENCE THE VERBAL STATEMENT CANNOT FUNCTION (TOWARDS BRINGING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF ANY DESIRE TO SPEAK)"; —IF THIS IS URGED,—(THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT) THERE IS CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORDS USED BY THE MAN UNDER AN ILLUSION AND THOSE USED BY ONE WHO IS NOT UNDER AN ILLUSION. CLEVER MEN ARE QUITE ABLE TO DISCERN THIS DIFFERENCE THROUGH THE CONTEXT AND SUCH OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES.—(1516-1517)

COMMENTARY.

It must be admitted that there is difference between words used by the deluded person and those used by the person not so deluded; otherwise, a difference in the causes would make no difference in their effects. This difference clever men are quite able to discern, through the Context and other circumstances.

'*Prakṛta*' stands for the Context in which the words are used.

'*And other circumstances*';—this includes the *freedom from confusion*, *happy facial expression* and so forth.—(1516-1517)

Question:—"Why should there be a distinction among the words at all?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1518-1519).

DIFFERENCE AMONG WORDS IS DUE TO DIFFERENCE AMONG THEIR CAUSES. —IF THERE ARE PEOPLE WHO DO NOT NOTICE THIS DIFFERENCE, THE FAULT IS THEIRS, NOT OF THE INDICATIVE.—OTHERWISE, THE FACT OF MERE *suspected* SMOKE NOT HAVING FOR ONCE BROUGHT ABOUT THE TRUE NOTION OF FIRE,— MIGHT LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT EVEN WHEN COGNISED WITH *certainty*, *Smoke* CANNOT BE A TRUE INDICATIVE OF FIRE.—(1518-1519)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the difference is due to the difference in the Causes.

Consequently, when the effect has been duly pondered over, it is never found to be non-concomitant with its Cause; so that the Word does become the means of knowing the particular 'Intention of the Speaker'.

If some people however are unable to perceive any difference in the words that appear as indicatives (of the meaning),—the fault lies with these people themselves,—not with the Indicative (word). Because the Indication does not indicate the meaning by its mere presence,—it does so only when it is duly ascertained. Hence the fault lies with the person addressed.

If it were not so, then, if in a case where the presence of *Smoke* has been merely suspected in what was really only *vapour*,—and hence later on it is found that the Fire indicated by it is not there, and it has failed to indicate the true Fire,—it may lead one to the conclusion that even in cases where the Smoke has been duly cognised with certainty, it would not be indicative of the True *Fire*.

Further, when the entire fabric of verbal usage is regarded as illusory, being dependent solely upon mere semblances,—like the idea of 'Two Moons' that the man of defective vision has,—how could the charge of being invalid be brought, on the basis of falsity only, against the notion of the particular 'Intention of the Speaker'? Specially when *real* validity is not attributed to the idea of that particular 'Intention'. This has been thus declared—'When Verbal Cognition was declared to be Inferential, it was with a view to its indicativeness being dependent upon Convention, and not with a view to the real truth'.—(1518-1519)

The following *Text* shows that words can be the Means of Cognising 'the Speaker's Intention' *in general* also :—

TEXT (1520).

IN THE CASE OF THOSE WORDS ALSO, THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN THE INFERENCE OF THE SIMPLE 'DESIRE TO SPEAK'; BECAUSE IT IS ALWAYS THERE ;—FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING THE FACT OF ITS BEING PRODUCED BY THE SPEAKER'S BREATH AND SO FORTH.
—1520

COMMENTARY.

In the case of all words, uttered by deluded as well as undeluded persons, there is no incongruity in the Inference of *a general* 'Intention to Speak';—*because it is always there*,—i.e. there is no failure in the general premiss.

It might be argued that—"The assertion that—'through the mere presence of such a Person,—as through that of the *Chintāmaṇi* gem,—instructions issue forth at will, even out of the walls',—would appear to indicate that (as there is no speaker, there can be no 'desire to speak'), there may be falsity (in such assertions)."

But that is not so; because in this case also the initial cause lies in the 'desire to speak'; as even here the word issues forth only under the influence of the faculty produced by previous meditations. For instance, when a person has thoroughly got up a certain Text, it so happens that even when

his thoughts are turned towards other things, he can go on repeating (automatically) words and portions of verses of that text. And it cannot be said that the initial cause of such utterances does not lie in some previous efforts put forth by the man,—because, if it were not so, then, even on perceiving (misconceiving) smoke, in the vapour issuing from the cowherd's pot (and finding it as not truly indicating the Fire), one might regard the real Smoke also to be fallible as an indicative of real Fire.

From all this it follows that in all cases, there is no fallibility in the Indicative at all,—when due consideration is given to the Effect, the Indicative, the Time, the Place and other details,—and hence it is always present.

Nor can the Inference (of the 'desire to speak') be regarded as useless ; as it serves to prove the fact of the utterance being due to the breath of the Speaker and so forth.

The phrase 'and so forth' includes such conditions as the presence of defects (which can exist only in the Speaker, whose *desire* is inferred from the verbal statement).—(1520)

Says the Opponent—"We grant that words can serve as the means of cognising the 'Desire to Speak'; but what is the *Minor Term*, what the *Probandum*,—what too the well-known relation between them,—by virtue of which the Verbal Statement can be regarded as a full-fledged *Three-featured* Inference,—and not a distinct Means of Cognition by itself ?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (1521-1522).

WHEN THE 'DESIRE TO SPEAK' IS THE THING TO BE *inferred*, THE PRESENCE OF THE THREE FEATURES IS QUITE CLEAR ;—THE MAN IS THE *Minor Term*, WHEREIN THE PRESENCE OF THE DESIRE IS THE *Probandum*, WHICH IS PROVED BY ITS EFFECT IN THE SHAPE OF THE VERBAL STATEMENT (PROBANS). FOR EXAMPLE (THE FORM OF THE INFERENCE WOULD BE)—*this Man* IS COGNISED AS HAVING HAD THE *Desire to Speak* OF THE TREE, —BECAUSE HE HAS UTTERED THE WORD 'TREE',—JUST AS I HAD DONE UNDER PREVIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES.—(1521-1522)

COMMENTARY.

The Man is the Minor Term,—where he is actually seen ;—the *desire to speak* is the Probandum ;—the relation consists of occurring in the same 'chain', as shown before.—Where, however, the speaker is not visible, the *Place* would be the Minor Term,—and *the man with the said desire* would be the Probandum,—because the place also is one of the causes of the Word ;

as is clear from the fact that the Word that is heard in places like the mountain-cave is different from that heard elsewhere.—(1521-1522)

TEXTS (1523–1525).

THUS THEN, IN CASES WHERE THE OTHER PARTY HAVE DENIED THE PRESENCE OF THE THREE FEATURES,—WE DO NOT REGARD THE VERBAL STATEMENT TO BE A MEANS OF COGNITION.—IN CASES, HOWEVER, WHERE THE PRESENCE OF THE THREE FEATURES IS ADMITTED BY THEM, THE FACT OF ITS BEING 'THREE-FEATURED' IS QUITE CLEAR.—WHERE THE 'DESIRE TO SPEAK' IS TO BE PROVED, IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT THE THREE FEATURES ARE PRESENT.—SUCH BEING THE CASE, THE *Word* IS AS GOOD A MEANS OF INFERENCE AS THE *Smoke*,—BECAUSE IT IS EQUIPPED WITH THE THREE FEATURES, AND BECAUSE ITS OBJECTIVE IS OF THAT SAME KIND.—(1523–1525)

COMMENTARY.

'*Thus then, in cases, etc. etc.*'—This means that, when the other party puts forward the reason 'because it is devoid of the Three Features' as against the idea of Verbal Cognition being inferential, in the sense of being something external,—his argument is superfluous; (as we also do not admit that).

'*In cases however, etc. etc.*'—This shows that the reason put forward by the other party *is inadmissible*, if it is urged against the inference of the *Desire to Speak*; because in regard to that, it has been shown that all the *three* features are clearly present.—(1523–1525)

End of Chapter XIX (A).

CHAPTER XIX.

Section (B).

Analogical Cognition.

COMMENTARY.

With regard to Analogical Cognition, the Author declares as follows :—

TEXTS (1526-1527).

' WHAT SORT OF AN ANIMAL IS THE *Gavaya* ? '—ON BEING THUS QUESTIONED BY PEOPLE LIVING IN THE CITY, THE FORESTER MAKES THE STATEMENT ' AS THE COW SO IS THE *Gavaya* ' ; IT IS THIS THAT IS KNOWN AS *Upamāna* (ANALOGY).—ACCORDING TO SHABARA'S VIEW HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF ' WORD ' (VERBAL STATEMENT), HENCE IT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED IN ANOTHER WAY. [*Shlo.-Vā.—Upamāna*, 1-2.]—(1526-1527)

COMMENTARY.

On being asked—' What sort of an animal is the *Gavaya* ? '—The man makes the statement—' the *Gavaya* is like the Cow ' ; it is this Verbal Statement that is known as ' *Upamāna* ', ' Analogy ', among the older *Naiyāyikas* [e.g. *Vātsyāyana*, in his *Nyāyabhāṣya* on Sū. 1. 1. 6].

According to *Shabara's* view, as stated in his Bhāṣya (on Mī. Sū. 1. 1. 5), the cognition brought about by the said statement would be included under ' Verbal Cognition ', and hence the Means of such a Cognition could not be regarded as a distinct Means of Cognition (apart from the *Word*) ; with this in view Analogy has been described by him in a different manner ; he says—' *Upamāna*—that is, Similitude,—also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses ; for instance, the sight of the *Gavaya* brings about the remembrance of the Cow '.*—(1526-1527)

This (Shabara's) view the author proceeds to expound in the following—

* On the exact meaning of this passage in the *Shabarabhāṣya*, there is a difference of opinion among the *Mīmāmsakas* themselves. According to the *Ṛjuvimalā*, the meaning of the words of the Bhāṣya is that ' the sight of the *Gavaya* brings about the Analogical Cognition, that the animal seen is called ' *Gavaya* ', to the man who, on seeing the *Gavaya*, has remembered the Cow.—This is the same as the view of Vātsyāyana, which has been controverted in the *Shlokavārtika*, the meaning according to which has been adopted in the translation above.

TEXTS (1528–1530).

"HAVING SEEN THE COW, WHEN THE MAN GOES TO THE FOREST AND SEES THE *Gavaya*, BEARING A MANIFOLD COMMONALTY (SIMILITUDE, TO THE COW) IN SEVERAL PARTS OF THE BODY, BUT WITH ROUNDED NECK (NOT WITH THE DEWLAP);—THE FIRST COGNITION THAT HE HAS OF THE *Gavaya* IS ONE THAT APPREHENDS ONLY ITS SHAPE; AND THIS COGNITION IS PURELY *perceptional*. THE COGNITION THAT FOLLOWS IS IN THE MORE DETERMINATE FORM—'THE SHAPE OF THIS ANIMAL IS SIMILAR TO THE COW'S'; AND THIS ALSO COMES ABOUT ONLY WHEN THE OPERATION OF THE SENSES IS THERE; SO THAT THIS ALSO IS REGARDED TO BE *perceptional*."
—(1528–1530)

COMMENTARY.

Having seen the Cow previously, the man, later on, goes to the forest and sees the *Gavaya*,—of what sort?—*bearing a manifold commonalty in several parts of the body*,—i.e. he thinks that many parts of its body are similar,—*but with a rounded neck*,—i.e. without the *dewlap* (which is the distinctive feature of the Cow),—then the first cognition that appears is of the non-conceptual (non-determinate) kind, which apprehends only the general shape of the *Gavaya*; and this Cognition is pure Perception.—That cognition also which appears later on,—in the form 'this animal is similar to the Cow'—which is more specifically conceptual,—is also pure Perception; as it is brought about by the operation of the senses.—(1528–1530)

The following might be urged against the above—'The cognition that appears is through Remembrance, as envisaging the *similarity*,—and not through the operation of the senses'.—

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1531).

"THOUGH THE SAID COGNITION APPEARS ON THE *remembrance* OF THE COW,—YET, ON ACCOUNT OF SUBSISTING IN THE *Gavaya*, THERE IS PROXIMITY (OF THE *similarity*, TO THE SENSES), AND HENCE IT WOULD BE WITHIN REACH OF THE SENSES."—(1531)

COMMENTARY.

Though it is true that the said cognition apprehending the *similarity* follows after the Remembrance (of the Cow), yet, because as residing in the

Gavaya, it would be in proximity (to the senses), the similarity would be within reach of the senses.

'*Sannidhi*' stands for *the character of being in proximity*.

'*Gavayasthatvāt*'—is the reason for its being regarded as *in proximity*; the sense being that—*because* the similarity resides in the *Gavaya*, therefore it is in proximity to the senses.—(1531)

Objection :—'*Similarity* resides in two things; how then can it be perceived in the *Gavaya* alone (the other thing, the Cow, not being before the eyes)?'

Answer :—

TEXT (1532).

"LIKE THE *Universal*, SIMILARITY RESIDES IN ITS ENTIRETY IN EACH MEMBER; BECAUSE EVEN WHEN THE CO-RELATIVE IS NOT PERCEIVED, THE SIMILARITY IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED."—(1532)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*sāmānyavat*', means that it is *like the Universal*.

Even though *similarity* lies between two members, yet, like the Universal, it resides in its entirety in each member; it is for this reason that even when the co-relative, in the shape of the *Cow* (in the case in question) is not perceived, the *similarity* is actually perceived in the other member (*Gavaya*) which is before the eyes.—(1532)

The following might be urged—'If *similarity* were an entity by itself, then it could be perceived; as a matter of fact, however, it is not admitted that it is an entity by itself'.

Answer :—

TEXT (1533).

"THE FACT OF *Similarity* BEING AN ENTITY CANNOT BE DENIED; BECAUSE IT ACTUALLY EXISTS IN THE FORM OF THE PRESENCE IN A THING OF ONE KIND OF SEVERAL PARTS SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THAT OF ANOTHER KIND." [*Shlokavārtika—Upamāna*, 18.]—(1533)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, *Similarity* is a relationship in the shape of the Inherence, in a particular individual, of many parts—in the shape of the Horns and others, as existing in the Cow,—in the particular Individual, the *Gavaya*;—and a Relationship is not something entirely different from the Relatives; for, if it were, then there might be the possibility of there being no cognition of the Relationship at all.

The qualifying term is 'in a thing of another kind', because the presence of all common features in things of the same kind is not regarded as *similarity*.—(1533)

The following *Text* shows the real form of Analogical Cognition (according to *Shabara*)—

TEXT (1534).

"UNDER THE SAID CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COGNITION THAT APPEARS IN THE FORM, 'THE COW IS SIMILAR TO *this animal*', IS WHAT IS CALLED *Analogical Cognition*."—(1534)

COMMENTARY.

'The Cow is similar to this animal that is now seen by me',—this cognition appears in regard to the *Cow* which is not before the observer (not within reach of his senses);—and this cognition is what is called 'Analogical Cognition', which thus is a Means or Form of Cognition.

The following *Text* shows the object that is apprehended by the said *Analogical Cognition* :—

TEXT (1535).

"THUS THAT WHICH IS *remembered*, AND WHICH IS QUALIFIED BY THE (PERCEIVED) SIMILARITY, IS THE OBJECT THAT IS APPREHENDED BY *Analogical Cognition*. OR, THE OBJECT OF THE SAID COGNITION MAY CONSIST OF THE *Similarity* ITSELF AS SUBSISTING IN THAT (REMEMBERED) THING."—[*Shlo. Vā.—Upamāna*, 37.]—(1535)

COMMENTARY.

Because Analogical Cognition is as described above, therefore the Cow that is *remembered* and which is qualified by the similarity of the *Gavaya* (seen) is the object apprehended by that Cognition.—Or it may be the *Similarity* itself as subsisting in the Cow.—(1535)

Objection :—'*Similarity* is cognised by Sense-perception,—the Cow also becomes the object of Remembrance ;—what then is left to be known,—apprehending which, Analogy would become the Means of Cognition'?

Answer :—

TEXT (1536).

"SIMILARITY HAVING BEEN APPREHENDED BY SENSE-PERCEPTION,—AND THE COW HAVING BEEN REMEMBERED,—THE TWO TOGETHER (I.E. THE COW QUALIFIED BY SIMILARITY) ARE NOT COGNISABLE BY ANY OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION; HENCE HEREIN LIES THE FUNCTIONING OF ANALOGY AS A MEANS OF COGNITION."—(1536)

COMMENTARY.

Though the similarity has become cognised by Sense-perception, and the Cow also has been *remembered*, yet, the cognition of *the Cow as qualified by the Similarity* has not been cognised by any other Sense-perception or Remembrance. Hence in the bringing about of this Cognition lies the operation of Analogy as a *Means of Cognition*.—(1536)

An example is cited, to illustrate this :—

TEXT (1537).

"[FOR INSTANCE, IN THE CASE OF THE WELL-KNOWN INFERENCE OF FIRE FROM SMOKE] THOUGH THE PLACE IS PERCEIVED BY SENSE-PERCEPTION, AND THE FIRE (IN THE KITCHEN) IS *remembered*,—YET THE COGNITION OF THE TWO TOGETHER (I.E. THE FIRE AND THE PLACE IN THE HILL), DOES NOT CEASE TO BE *Inferential*."—(1537)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, when the Place,—the Minor Term—is directly *perceived*,—and the Fire is cognised by *Remembrance*,- -yet, when the resultant Inference of the place as *qualified by Fire* appears,—it does not lose its character of the *Means of Cognition*; in fact it remains a Means of Right Cognition. The same should be the case with Analogical Cognition also.—(1537)

It might be asked—Even if Analogy be a Means of Cognition,—in what way is it distinct from Sense-perception and the rest ?

The Answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1538–1540).

"(a) ANALOGICAL COGNITION CANNOT BE REGARDED AS *Sense-perception*, —BECAUSE IT IS ENTIRELY DEVOID OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SENSES. (b) NOR CAN IT BE REGARDED AS *Inference*, BECAUSE THE 'THREE-FEATURES' ARE NOT THERE; FOR INSTANCE, THERE IS NO PROBANS HERE (WHICH SUBSISTS IN THE SUBJECT); AND THE *similarity* OF THE COW (TO THE *Gavaya*) HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY COGNISED AS SUBSISTING IN THE SUBJECT; AND THE *similarity* THAT IS PERCEIVED IN THE *Gavaya* CANNOT BRING ABOUT THE INFERENCE OF THE COW."—(1538–1540)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be right to regard the cognition in question as *Perception*, because it is not brought about by the contact of the senses.

Nor can it be regarded as *Inference*; as the 'Three Features' are absent. For instance, what would be the 'property of the Subject', i.e. the Probans ?—the *similarity* ?—or the *Gavaya* that is seen ? If the *similarity* were taken to be the Probans, would it be the *similarity* in the *Cow* ?—or that in the *Gavaya* ? These are the only two alternatives possible.—Now the *similarity* residing in such cognisable things as the *Cow* and the like cannot serve as the Probans, because, prior to the perception of the *Gavaya*, that *similarity* has not been apprehended; and what has not been apprehended cannot serve as the Probans; if it did, it would lead to absurdities.—'Then it is the *Similarity* residing in the *Gavaya* that could serve as the Probans, because this similarity is apprehended when the *Gavaya* is seen'.—The answer to that is that *what is perceived in the Gavaya cannot bring about the Inference of the Cow*; as there is no co-ordination between them; just as there is none between the *Cow* and the *blackness* (perceived elsewhere).—(1539-1540)

Says the *Opponent* :—After the *Gavaya* has been perceived, the similarity residing in the Cow becomes apprehended, and then that *similarity* will serve as the required Probans.

The Answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (1541).

"THE SIMILARITY RESIDING IN THE *Cow* CANNOT SERVE AS THE PROBANS, AS IT FORMS A PART OF THE PROPOSITION ITSELF. THE *Gavaya* ALSO CANNOT SERVE AS THE PROBANS INDICATIVE OF THE *Cow*, AS IT HAS NO CONNECTION WITH THE COW."—(1541)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as Similarity is the object Inferred, it cannot serve as the Probans.

"In that case, the *Gavaya* would be the Probans".

Here also, the *Gavaya* cannot serve as the Probans, for want of co-ordination.—(1541)

Says the Opponent—Then Analogical Cognition may not be a valid form of cognition at all.

Answer :—

TEXT (1542).

"THE COGNITION IN QUESTION CANNOT BE REGARDED AS *not* A FORM OF RIGHT COGNITION ; BECAUSE IT MAKES KNOWN WHAT IS NOT ALREADY KNOWN ; FOR INSTANCE, BEFORE THE PERCEPTION OF THE *Gavaya*, ITS SIMILARITY (IN THE COW) HAS NOT BEEN APPREHENDED AT ALL."—(1542)

COMMENTARY.

That is, before the perception of the *Gavaya*, there has been no apprehension of the Cow *as qualified by similarity to the Gavaya* ; consequently, as Analogical Cognition brings about the cognition of the *Cow as qualified by similarity to the Gavaya*,—which has not been known previously.—it is only right that it should be regarded as a valid Means of Cognition.—(1542)

The above (*Mīmāmsaka*) view of *Analogical Cognition* is refuted in the following *Texts* :—

TEXTS (1543–1545).

As there is no object that could be cognised by this Means, it cannot be regarded as a *Means of Cognition*.—It might be urged that—"there is the connection of the manifold commonalty of *component parts*, which is what is *cognised*".—But *commonalty* itself having been rejected, how could there be any *manifoldness* in regard to it? How too could there be any 'connection' with such manifold 'commonalty'? [Says the Opponent]—"There *is* a Means of Cognition which brings about the Cognition of such *commonalty*, in the form of the Inference that—Commonalty is an entity and is apprehended by Sense-perception, because it is cognisable as something other than Negation,—like the *Unique* entity".—[The answer to this follows in the following *Text* 1545.]—(1543–1545)

COMMENTARY.

Analogy cannot be a Means of Cognition, because there is nothing that is *cognised* by means of it,—and hence it is like any Means other than the *six* (that are accepted by the *Mīmāṁsaka*).

"But there is *similarity*, consisting in the presence of the manifold commonalty of component parts, which is *cognised* by its means; hence the Reason adduced (by the Buddhist) is 'inadmissible'."

It is not so; in course of our examination of *Commonalty* (Universal), all commonalties have been rejected; how then can there be any 'manifoldness of Commonalties'? Nor is connection of Commonalties possible. Hence our Reason cannot be said to be 'Inadmissible'.

The following might be urged:—"There *is* a Means of Cognition which establishes the existence of the Commonalty. Hence your Reason remains inadmissible. The said Means of Cognition is as follows—'The Commonalty is an entity',—and 'it is apprehensible by Sense-perception',—these are the two *Propositions*; the Reason (Premiss) is, 'because it is something cognisable, other than Negation'; that is to say, it is cognisable as something which has a character other than 'non-existence';—'the unique entity' is the Corroborative Instance; the *specific Individuality of things* is the 'unique entity'."—(1543–1545)

The answer to the above argument is provided in the following—

TEXT (1546).

THE REASON (PREMISS) HERE PUT FORWARD IS 'NOT ADMISSIBLE' FOR THOSE WHO DECLARE THAT ANYTHING COGNISABLE IN THE FORM OF 'COMMONALTY' (OR UNIVERSAL) FALLS UNDER THE CATEGORY OF THE 'NON-EXISTENT'. AND IN THE CASE OF THE FORMER OF THE TWO PROBANDA (PUT FORTH), THE PREMISS BECOMES PART OF THE PROPOSITION ITSELF.—(1546)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*artha*' in the compound '*Sāmānyārtha*', stands for 'what is cognisable'.

As regards both the Propositions put forward,—the Buddhists hold that any such thing as 'Commonalty' (Universal) can have no character (existence); hence they cannot admit the statement that Commonalty is anything other than purely *non-existent*; so that to that extent, the Probans cited is 'inadmissible'.

As regards the first Proposition,—that 'Commonalty is an entity',—in that connection, the Reason cited forms part of the Proposition itself; for instance, it is only an *entity* that can be 'other than *non-existent*'; because the *entity* is only the 'negation of the non-existent'; and it is this same that has been put forward, in other words, in the Premiss (Reason); and that same is the Probandum also; thus the Premiss forms part of the Proposition.—(1516)

Further, because it is of the nature of Remembrance, therefore, being like any other Remembrance, *Analogical Cognition* cannot be a valid form of Cognition. The following *Texts* explain how Analogical Cognition is of the nature of Remembrance :—

TEXTS (1547–1549).

WHAT HAPPENS IN THIS CASE IS THAT THERE ARE SOME PARTS IN THE *Gavaya's* BODY WHICH BRING ABOUT COGNITIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE PARTS OF THE *Cow's* BODY ;—HENCE WHEN THE *Gavaya* IS SEEN, THERE FOLLOWS THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE PARTS OF THE COW'S BODY THAT HAVE BEEN SEEN BEFORE REPEATEDLY. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT, THERE DOES NOT ARISE ANY IDEA OF THE HORSE AND OTHER ANIMALS, THROUGH THAT SIMILARITY,—BUT IT DOES ARISE WHEN THE *Gavaya* IS SEEN. OTHERWISE, IF THERE WERE NO SUCH REMEMBRANCE, WHAT WOULD BE THE DIFFERENCE (BETWEEN THE CASE OF THE *Cow* AND THAT OF THE *Horse*) ?—(1547–1549)

COMMENTARY.

In its essence, there is no such thing as *Similarity*; all that is there is that there are some parts in the *Gavaya's* body which bring about the same

conceptual notions as certain parts of the *cow's* body; and *similarity* is not any distinct entity, apart from the said parts which give rise to the same conceptions; that this is so is clear from the fact that nothing apart from these figures in the conception at all. Hence what happens is that on the perception of the *Gavaya*, there arises a cognition in regard to the parts of the *Cow's* body, on account of the repeated perception of these latter in the past; and this cognition that arises is of the nature of *Remembrance*,—and it is not a distinct cognition apprehending a distinct entity in the shape of *Similarity*.—If it were not so, then, in regard to the Horse and other animals also,—as the presence of the manifold commonalty of component parts is there,—why should not the idea of these other animals appear on the seeing of the *Gavaya*, in the way as it does in regard to the *Cow*? There is no difference between the two cases, some degree of *similarity* being present in both cases.

'*Otherwise*',—i.e. if the parts of the *cow's body* had not been seen repeatedly.

In the case of the resultant cognition being of the nature of *Remembrance*, this difficulty does not arise; as the Remembrance appears in regard to that same thing which has been repeatedly seen before; as the causes that bring about Remembrance are restricted in their scope.—(1547–1549)

The following might be urged—"Analogical Cognition may be of the nature of Remembrance; but why should Remembrance itself not be regarded as a valid form of Cognition?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1550).

REMEMBRANCE CANNOT BE A FORM OF VALID COGNITION, BECAUSE IT ENVISAGES WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN. HOW THEN COULD IT BE REGARDED AS A DISTINCT FORM OF VALID COGNITION?—(1550)

COMMENTARY.

'*Iyam*'—stands for Remembrance.—(1550)

Taking for granted that *Similarity* is an entity, the Author proceeds to show that, even according to the view of the *Mīmāṃsaka*, Analogical Cognition cannot be valid:—

TEXTS (1551–1553).

OR, *Similarity* MAY BE AN ENTITY, RESIDING IN THE COW, LIKE THE COMMONALTY (OR UNIVERSAL) ; EVEN SO, IT WILL HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED IN THE COW STANDING BEFORE THE PERSON BEFORE HE SEES THE CO-RELATIVE (*Gavaya*) ; AND AS SUCH THE COGNITION OF THE SAID SIMILARITY FOLLOWING UPON THE SEEING OF THE *Gavaya* CANNOT ESCAPE FROM BEING OF THE NATURE OF REMEMBRANCE.—[SAYS THE OTHER PARTY]—" WHAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY SEEN IN THE COW IS SIMILARITY MERELY EXISTING THERE, AND IT HAS NOT BEEN DEFINITELY ASCERTAINED THAT IT IS SIMILARITY *to the Gavaya* ; WHILE THIS LATTER IS WHAT IS APPREHENDED BY ANALOGICAL COGNITION, WHICH, THUS, IS DIFFERENT FROM REMEMBRANCE."—(1551–1553)

COMMENTARY.

There may be a real entity in the shape of *Similarity* ; and it may be residing in everything in its entirety.—But even so, when, before seeing the *Gavaya*, the man sees the Cow standing before him, he naturally sees the Similarity which is inseparable from the Cow ; otherwise the inseparability of the two could not be there.—And thus, as the subsequent Analogical Cognition would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended, it would not be a form of valid Cognition.

The following argument might be urged :—" The Similarity seen previously was merely as *existing*, it was not seen in the form that ' this is the similarity between this *Gavaya* and the Cow ' ; while this is the form in which the Similarity is apprehended by Analogical Cognition ; so that it cannot be regarded as being of the nature of Remembrance ".—(1551–1553)

The answer to this last argument is provided in the following :—

TEXT (1554).

EVEN IF THE SIMILARITY HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY APPREHENDED UNDER THAT NAME, IT WAS APPREHENDED ALL THE SAME, IN ITS OWN FORM, WHICH IS CALLED ITS VERY SELF.—(1554)

COMMENTARY.

Even though the Similarity has not been previously apprehended *under that* name,—i.e. as ' Similarity *to the Gavaya* ',—i.e. the *animal Cow as similar to the Gavaya* may not have been apprehended prior to the seeing of the *Gavaya* ;—yet *in its own form*, it has been already apprehended ; that is, that which forms its *very self*—its essence, nature,—has been previously apprehended.

Question—"What is that *own form* in which it has been apprehended?"

Answer:—'*Which is called its very self*';—i.e. that which is called the *very self* of the *Cow*,—in that form, which constitutes its nature,—it has been already apprehended.—(1554)

Question:—"What if it has been already apprehended?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1555).

MERE NAME DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE 'ESSENCE' OF THINGS; BY VIRTUE OF WHICH, WHEN IT (THE NAME) HAS NOT BEEN APPREHENDED, THE THINGS COULD BE REGARDED AS 'NOT KNOWN', BY PEOPLE WHO KNOW THE TRUE NATURE OF THE SELF.—(1555)

COMMENTARY.

The *Name* does not form the 'essence' of things; so that, even if the Name has not been previously known,—if the thing happens to become known,—it cannot be said to be 'not known'. Specially for the philosopher who holds the view that Sense-perception is of the nature of definitely certain Cognition,—it cannot be right to say that the thing, thus known, is not known.—(1555)

TEXT (1556).

IF ON THE STRENGTH OF THE SLIGHT ELEMENT OF VALID COGNITION (FOUND IN ANALOGICAL COGNITION),—IT WERE TO BE REGARDED AS AN INDEPENDENT FORM OF COGNITION,—THEN THERE COULD BE NO LIMIT TO THE NUMBER OF SUCH INDEPENDENT FORMS OF COGNITION; SPECIALLY AS THERE ARE OTHER WAYS IN WHICH SUCH SLIGHT ELEMENTS OF COGNITION COULD BE FOUND.—(1556)

COMMENTARY.

Further, if the mere idea of 'being *similar to this*',—this slight element, found in Analogical Cognition,—were to be accepted as the basis for regarding it as a distinct Form of Cognition,—then there would be absurdities; and there could be no limit to the number of forms of Valid Cognition, such as is found in the declaration—'Sense-perception, Inference, Verbal Cognition, Analogical Cognition, Presumption and Negation are the six means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished.'—(1556)

The Author proceeds to show the Incongruities that the above would lead to—

TEXTS (1557-1558).

WHEN A LINE OF TREES AND SUCH THINGS ARE SEEN, WHAT IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED IS ONLY *one* TREE, AND YET SOME IDEA OF THE *second* TREE BEING THERE, THERE FOLLOWS THE DEFINITE COGNITION (IN REGARD TO THE FORMER TREE) THAT 'THIS IS THE *first*';—AND THIS WILL HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS A DISTINCT FORM OF COGNITION; AS IT DOES NOT DEPEND UPON ANY ELEMENT OF 'SIMILARITY' OR OTHER CONDITIONS (ATTENDANT UPON THE WELL-KNOWN FORMS OF COGNITION).—IF IT IS DENIED IN THIS CASE, ON THE GROUND THAT IT APPREHENDS ONLY WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY APPREHENDED,—THEN THE SAME MIGHT BE SAID IN REGARD TO ANALOGICAL COGNITIONS ALSO.—(1557-1558)

COMMENTARY.

'*And such things*'—is meant to include the line of Ants and so on.

As a matter of fact, when one sees a line of trees,—so long as one sees one of the *trees* only, there is no such definite cognition as that 'this is the *first* tree'; when however, he notices the *second* tree, there does come about, in reference to the former tree, the idea that 'this is the *first* tree';—and this would have to be regarded as a distinct form of Cognition (even if the contention of the *Mīmāmsaka* in regard to Analogical cognition were accepted). —Why?—Because it is a form of cognition not dependent upon any element of *Similarity* or such other conditions. So that, because it does not depend upon Similarity, therefore it cannot be *analogical cognition*;—because it does not depend upon the operation of the Senses, therefore it cannot be *Sense-perception*;—because it does not depend upon an Inferential Indicative, therefore it cannot be *Inference*;—because it does not depend upon Words, it cannot be *Verbal Cognition*;—because it does not depend upon any seen or heard of fact which would be otherwise inexplicable, therefore it cannot be *Presumption*;—and because it does not depend upon the cessation of Means and Objects of Cognition, therefore it cannot be *Negation*.—Thus there is room for the absurdity urged in the following declaration—'*This is prior to that,—This is posterior to that—This is larger than that—This is shorter than that*—all these cognitions would have to be regarded as so many distinct Forms of Cognition,—which is highly undesirable'.

It might be urged that—"as the cognition in question apprehends what has been already apprehended, it cannot be regarded as *Valid* Cognition",—this condition, of apprehending what has been already apprehended, is present in Analogical Cognitions also.

The plural number in '*Analogical Cognitions*' is in view of the fact that there are many such Cognitions.—(1557-1558)

TEXTS (1559-1560).

WHEN ONE SEES THE *Gavaya*, THERE APPEARS THE NOTION OF ITS 'DISSIMILARITY' TO THE HORSE AND OTHER ANIMALS; WHY CANNOT THIS BE A DISTINCT FORM OF COGNITION?—IF IT BE URGED THAT "IT CANNOT BE SO REGARDED BECAUSE IT IS INCLUDED UNDER *Negation*",—THEN, THE SAME MIGHT BE SAID IN REGARD TO THE NOTIONS OF 'SIMILARITY' WHICH ALSO ARE INCLUDED UNDER 'MUTUAL *Negation*'.—(1559-1560)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, on seeing the *Gavaya*, there appears the idea of its similarity in the Cow,—and this is regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition; in the same way, when on seeing the *Gavaya*, there follows the notion of its *dissimilarity* in the *Horse*,—why cannot this also be regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition?

"It cannot be regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition, as it is included under *Negation*."

That cannot be right.

"Why?"

Because it envisages a positive entity; while *Negation* envisages a non-entity.

"*Dissimilarity* is only *negation of similarity*; and hence the notion of dissimilarity is really included under Negation."

'*The same might be said, etc. etc.*'—That is to say, if the *negative* character of a certain object is sought to be based upon its being subject to Mutual Negation,—then the same sort of object is found in the case of the notions of *Similarity* also,—which are regarded as 'Analogical Cognition'.—(1559-1560)

Question:—"How so?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1561).

JUST AS DISTINCTION FROM 'SIMILARITY' IS COGNISED IN THAT CASE, SO ALSO IS DISTINCTION FROM 'ALL COMMON PARTS' COGNISED IN THE OTHER CASE ALSO.—(1561)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the idea of 'dissimilarity', there is perception of difference from (i.e. negation of) 'Similarity'; in the same way, in the case of the idea of 'Similarity' also, there is perception of difference from (i.e. negation of) the *presence of all Common Parts*; so that this also can be included under *Negation*, just like the notion of *Dissimilarity*.—(1561)

In support of the same, an argument is put forward:—

TEXT (1562).

BECAUSE THAT COGNITION WHICH APPREHENDS ‘THE PRESENCE OF *several* SIMILAR PARTS’ WOULD ALSO FALL UNDER ‘MUTUAL NEGATION’; (OTHERWISE) IF IT WERE THE ‘PRESENCE OF *all* SIMILAR PARTS’ THAT IS COGNISED, THEN THERE WOULD BE *identity*.—(1562)

COMMENTARY.

‘*Yēna*’—indicates the reason for what has been asserted above. What is meant is that—because, in the case of the Cognition of *Similarity*, what is cognised is the ‘presence of *several* similar parts’,—and not the ‘presence of *all* similar parts’,—therefore this is a case of ‘Mutual Negation’.—Otherwise, if *all parts* were similar, then there would be *identity*,—i.e. the *Gavaya* would be the *same* as the *Cow*.—(1562)

TEXT (1563).

SOME PEOPLE HAVE HELD THE VIEW THAT—“AFTER HAVING HEARD THE ANALOGICAL STATEMENT, WHEN ONE SEES THE SIMILAR OBJECT, HE HAS THE COGNITION OF CONNECTION WITH THE NAME,—AND IT IS THIS THAT IS CALLED *Analogical Cognition*.”—(1563)

COMMENTARY.

‘*Some people*’—i.e. the *Naiyāyikas*.

They have provided the following definition of Analogy—“*Analogy is that which accomplishes its purpose through similarity to a known object*.—(Nyāyasūtra 1. 1. 6)—The term ‘*prasiddhasādharmya*’ may mean either ‘through similarity to a known object’, or ‘through well-known similarity’;—the ‘object’ of which this ‘similarity’ is known is the *Gavaya*;—‘*through this*—i.e. on the basis of this,—there is ‘accomplishment’—fulfilment—of the ‘purpose’—i.e. of the relation of *Name and Named*; and this is *Analogical Cognition*.”

Other people have expressed the same idea in other words, as follows:—“Certain impressions having been left on the mind by a previous Verbal Cognition,—those impressions bring about a Remembrance,—this Remembrance leads to the Cognition of *Similarity*,—from which there follows the cognition of the relation to a Name,—this last cognition is Analogical Cognition.—The ‘Verbal Cognition’ meant here is that derived from the analogical statement—e.g. ‘the *Gavaya* is like the *Cow*’,—this produces an Impression, a faculty in the Mind,—this Impression brings about the remembrance of the said analogical statement, on the occasion of seeing the *Gavaya* in the present;—on the basis of this Remembrance, there follows a notion of Similarity.—‘*Samākhyā*’ is *Name*, i.e. the word;—this Name is related to the object;—and the cognition of this Relation is what constitutes *Analogical Cognition*.”

This is exactly the same idea (that has been set forth in the *Nyāya-sūtra* quoted above).—(1563)

The above view of Analogical Cognition is refuted in the following—

TEXTS (1564-1565).

If the perfect idea of the *relation to the Name* is there at the time of the hearing of the analogical statement,—then the resultant Analogical Cognition apprehends what has been already apprehended; and as such, it cannot have the character of a *Means of Valid Cognition*; because, like Remembrance, this Analogy also is devoid of the true character of the "Instrument' (and *Pramāṇa* is an Instrument, a Means, of Cognition).—(1564-1565)

COMMENTARY.

At the time that the statement of analogy is heard, the idea of the relation of *Name and Named* is already there;—if the same idea appears again subsequently, it apprehends what has been already apprehended before, and hence—like Remembrance—cannot be a *valid cognition.*

It might be urged that—"It may apprehend what is already apprehended, and yet it may be a Means of valid cognition; what would be the incongruity in that?"

The answer to this is—'*It is devoid of, etc. etc.*'—That is, the 'true character of Instrument' consists in being the *most effective cause,*—and a cause is *most effective* only when it tends to bring about what has not been already brought about.—(1564-1565)

The following might be urged—"There has been no previous idea of the relation of the *Name* at all; hence the Reason 'because it apprehends what is already apprehended' is *not admissible*".

Answer:—

TEXT (1566).

If the idea has not been there, then, how is it that the man has the notion that 'this is the object *whose Name* I had heard before'?—(1566)

COMMENTARY.

If the cognition of the relation of the Name had not been there, then there could have been no such cognition, later on, as that 'this is the *Gavaya* whose *name* I had heard before'.—(1566)

A further argument to the same effect is stated:—

TEXT (1567).

IF A MAN HAS NEVER HEARD OF THE NAME CONCERNED, THEN, ON SEEING THE *Gavaya*, HE WOULD NEVER BE ABLE TO HAVE THE IDEA THAT 'I HAD HEARD THE NAME OF THIS ANIMAL'.—(1567)

COMMENTARY.

Aviddhakarṇa has asserted as follows :—" Of the Name, the Man has a general (vague) notion through Verbal Cognition,—and it is the definite idea of it that is brought about by Analogy ".

This view is set forth in the following—

TEXT (1568).

" WHEN ONE HAS HEARD THE ANALOGICAL STATEMENT, AND PERCEIVES THE SIMILARITY, HE COGNISES THE RELATION (OF THE *Name*) IN CONNECTION WITH THE PARTICULAR OBJECT."—(1568)

COMMENTARY.

The word '*upayuktopa, etc. etc.*'—is one who has heard the statement of analogy.—(1568)

The same idea is further expounded :—

TEXT (1569).

" THROUGH VERBAL ASSERTION, THE MAN COGNISES THE RELATION IN A GENERAL WAY ; AND THROUGH ANALOGY HE COGNISES IT AS PERTAINING TO A PARTICULAR OBJECT."—(1569)

COMMENTARY.

'*Particular object*'—i.e. the *Gavaya*.

The answer to the above is provided by the following—

TEXT (1570).

WHEN THE RELATION OF THE NAME HAS BEEN COGNISED IN CONNECTION WITH ONE THING, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO RECOGNISE IT IN CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER THING; AS IT WOULD LEAD TO INCONGRUITIES.—(1570)

COMMENTARY.

'*Na*' has to be construed with '*Yujyatē*'.

When the relation of the name has been cognised in regard to one thing, it cannot be right to cognise the same name as applied to another thing; for, if it did, then there would be incongruities.—(1570)

The possible incongruity is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1571–1573).

WHEN A MAN HAS RECOGNISED A CERTAIN NAME AS APPLYING TO THE *man with the wonderful armlet*, HE DOES NOT, AT ANOTHER TIME, RECOGNISE IT AS APPLYING TO THE MAN WITH THE BEAUTIFUL DIADEM. —FOR THESE REASONS, WHEN A MAN HAS COME TO KNOW OF A NAME AS APPLYING TO A CERTAIN CONCEPTUAL IMAGE RECOGNISED AS SOMETHING EXTERNAL, AND CALLED THE 'UNIVERSAL',—THEN, EVEN IF HE COMES TO PERCEIVE THE *Gavaya*, HE MUST RECOGNISE IT AS APPLYING TO THE *Gavaya* ITSELF; AND IT IS ONLY ONE WHO IS IGNORANT OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE 'PERCEPTIBLE' AND THE 'CONCEPTUAL' THAT REGARDS IT AS 'EXTERNAL'.—(1571–1573)

COMMENTARY.

'*Aṅgada*' is an ornament called '*Kaṭaka*', Armlet.

'*Chitrāṅgada*'—is the man who is wearing a '*chitra*'—wonderful—'*aṅgada*'—armlet.

When the man with the wonderful armlet has been once spoken of as 'Devadatta' (by name)—in the statement '*The man with the wonderful armlet* is Devadatta',—and one, on hearing this, has cognised the name as belonging to that person,—he does not, at any future time, recognise that *expression* 'man with the wonderful bracelet' as applying to *Yajñadatta*, who is a 'man with the beautiful *diadem*'.

'*Kirīṭa*' is *diadem*;—'*Chārukirīta*' is the man with the beautiful diadem.

For the above reasons, in order to avoid the likelihood of the incongruity, when a Name has been recognised by a determinate cognition envisaging an external object, as applicable to a conceptually imposed object,—then, if he comes to perceive the *Gavaya*, he recognises that name as applied to that same conceptually imposed object,—and not to the external Specific Individuality of the name of '*Gavaya*'; and the same conceptual Image is

what is spoken of as the 'Universal'.—And this is purely imaginary, as it has been discarded above.

Question :—"How then is there the idea of the external Specific Individuality?"

Answer :—'*It is only one, etc. etc.*'—(1571–1573)

Question :—"What would be the incongruity if the Word (Name) were applied to the Specific Individuality?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1574).

It has to be understood that the idea of Conceptual Contents and Words envisaging Specific Individualities has been rejected in detail.—(1574)

COMMENTARY.

In course of our examination of the Denotation of Words, the idea that Words and Conceptual Contents envisage Specific Individualities, has been rejected in detail. Hence what is expressed by the name must be the conceptually imposed thing.—(1574)

TEXTS (1575-1576).

Even if they were envisaged by Words and Conceptual Contents,—the resultant cognition would only be *Inference*. That it proceeds from the 'three-featured Indicative' is thus deduced—'This animal, which is similar to the Cow, is one to which the name *Gavaya* is applicable,—just like the *Gavaya* which was present in the mind at the time when the relevant Convention became known'.—(1575-1576)

COMMENTARY.

We grant—for the sake of argument—that Words and Conceptual Contents envisage Specific Individualities. Even so, the Cognition in question becomes included under *Inference*; and Analogical Cognition cannot be a distinct form of Cognition.

Question :—"How can it be included under Inference when it is not brought about by the three-featured Indicative?"

Answer—'*That it proceeds, etc. etc.*' :—'Similarity to the Cow' is the Probans; 'being one to which the name *Gavaya* is applicable' is the Pro-

bandum ; and 'the *Gavaya* present in the Mind, in the shape of the Reflected Conceptual Content, at the time that the Convention became known' is the Corroborative Instance ;—and the *Gavaya* perceived at the time is the Subject, the Minor Term.—(1575-1576)

The following might be urged :—"At the time that the relevant Convention,—in the form 'The Gavaya is like the Cow',—was made, the *Gavaya* was not present in the Mind at all; hence the Instance cited is inadmissible".

The Answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1577).

IF AT THE TIME OF THE CONVENTION, THE *Gavaya* WAS NOT PRESENT EVEN IN THE MIND,—THEN WITH REFERENCE TO WHAT IS THE CONVENTION MADE THAT 'IT IS SIMILAR TO THE COW'?—(1577)

COMMENTARY.

'*Even* in the mind'—the term 'even' means—'it is not only *not seen,* (but also not present in the mind)'.

If there is nothing that appears in the Mind as qualified by *similarity to the Cow,*—then, at the time that the Convention is made in the form '*it* is similar to the Cow',—on what thing is this Convention based ? And yet, such a Convention is actually made ;—hence it has to be admitted that at the time of the making of the Convention, there is something present in the Mind which is qualified by similarity to the Cow.—(1577)

So far, it has been taken for granted (for the sake of argument) that the 'relation between the Name and the thing Named' forms the object of Analogical Cognition,—and then it has been shown that this Analogical Cognition cannot be regarded as a distinct form of valid Cognition,—(1) because it apprehends what is already apprehended (which fact makes it invalid), and (2) because it is included under 'Inference'.—Now what the Author proceeds to show is as follows :—the *Relation* can have no existence apart from the *Relatives* ;—and the two Relatives in question (the Name and the Named) have both been apprehended by other Means of Cognition ; for instance, at the time of the communication of the Convention, the *Name* was apprehended by Auditory Perception, and later on the *Gavaya* standing before the man is apprehended by Visual Perception ; under the circumstances, what else is there to be known, for knowing which Analogy would serve as the Means of Cognition ?—

TEXTS (1578–1580).

IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT THE RELATION HAS NO EXISTENCE APART FROM THE RELATIVES ;—ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION, AT THE TIME OF THE CONVENTION, THE NAME WAS PERCEIVED BY AUDITORY PERCEPTION ;—AND LATER ON THE ANIMAL STANDING BEFORE THE MAN IS SEEN WITH THE EYE ;—APART FROM THESE TWO ALREADY THUS COGNISED, ANY MINGLING UP OF THE TWO COULD NOT BE VALID COGNITION. BECAUSE ANY OTHER COGNITION COULD ONLY RECAPITULATE WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY COGNISED ; AS IN THE CASE OF THE NOTIONS OF 'FRAGRANT' AND 'SWEET'.—THUS THE NOTION OF THE CONNECTION OF THE NAME CANNOT ESCAPE FROM BEING OF THE NATURE OF REMEMBRANCE.—(1578–1580)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is that the Cognition in question cannot be valid, as it apprehends what has been already apprehended.

'*It has been proved*'—in course of our examination of the Category of *Quality*.

The following might be urged :—" The two Relatives may have been cognised by auditory and other perceptions ; it is the commingling of the two that is done by Analogical Cognition ; and it is in this commingling that lies the validity of Analogical Cognition ".

The answer to this is—'*Apart from these two, etc. etc.*'

'*As in the case of the notions, etc. etc.*'—The affix '*vati*' has the force of the Locative. The sense is that there are such notions as—'This thing that I have perceived is fragrant and sweet', where there is a commingling of things already apprehended,—which are not regarded as valid ; so would the Cognition in Question also be.

'*Tat*'—Thus, therefore.

'*Nāmayoga, etc.*'—the cognition of the connection of the Name.

'*Can escape, etc. etc.*'—as already explained.—(1578–1580)

The following might be urged :—" The connection of the Name is nowhere created through similarity ; what happens is that when the thing named is perceived, it is pointed out that 'this is the Cow', which is the form given to the Convention ; nothing like this happens when the thing concerned is not perceived at all ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1581).

NOTIONS OF CONNECTION WITH NAMES ARE PRODUCED BY ENDLESS MEANS, EVEN APART FROM SIMILARITY; AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF SUCH NAMES AS '*Narapa*' (KING) AND THE LIKE.—(1581)

COMMENTARY.

'*Notions, etc. etc.*'—i.e. notions of the relation of Names.
'*As in the case, etc. etc.*'—i.e. of 'King' and such names.—(1581)

An example is cited of the manner in which notions of Names are brought about by endless means :—

TEXTS (1582-1583).

'THAT PERSON IS THE *King* WHO IS PROTECTED FROM THE RAYS OF THE SUN BY THE WHITE UMBRELLA',—HAVING BEEN TOLD THUS, THE MAN, LATER ON, SEES SUCH A PERSON,—AND THROUGH THE SAID ADVICE, COMES TO HAVE THE NOTION THAT 'THIS IS THE PERSON BEARING THE NAME *King*'.—NOW THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS A DISTINCT FORM OF VALID COGNITION, AS IT HAS NOT BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY SIMILARITY OR ANY SUCH CONDITIONS (AS BRING ABOUT OTHER FORMS OF COGNITION).—(1582-1583)

COMMENTARY.

Someone says to another man—'Brother, please go for this business, and see the King passing along with many persons riding elephants and horses'.—The other man says—'Which one among them is the *King*?' The first man replies—'Among them, that person is the *King* who is protected from the Sun's rays by the white Umbrella'.—Bearing this instruction in his mind, the man goes forward, and when he sees such a person as described to him, there appears in his mind the idea that 'this is the person named *King*'.—Now, according to you (*Naīyāyika*)—this also would have to be regarded as a distinct form of valid Cognition—why?—*Because it has not been brought about by similarity or any such conditions.* This shows that the said notion is not included under the six well-known forms of Valid Cognition.—(1582-1583)

Aviddhakarṇa notices the view that "there are only two *Means* (*or Forms*) *of Cognition*; and there is no *object of Cognition* apart from Specific Individuality and Commonalty (or the Universal)";—and in refutation of this view, he puts forward the following arguments :—"(*a*) Perception has its companion

in the shape of a form of Cognition in addition to Inference,—because it is a form of Cognition,—like Inference.—Or (*b*) Inference has its companion in the shape of a form of Cognition in addition to Perception,—because it is a form of Cognition,—like Perception. Similarly (*c*) Specific Individuality has for its companion a cognisable object in addition to the Universal,—because it is cognisable,—like the Universal.—Or (*d*) The Universal has for its companion, a cognisable object in addition to the Specific Individuality,—because it is cognisable,—like the Specific Individuality."

This (view of *Aviddhakarṇa*) is what is set forth in the following—

TEXTS (1584–1586).

" ANOTHER PARTY SEEKS TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF ANOTHER FORM OF COGNITION, ON THE STRENGTH OF INFERENCE, THUS :—PERCEPTION IS CONNECTED WITH A FORM OF COGNITION DIFFERENT FROM INFERENCE, BECAUSE IT IS A FORM OF COGNITION, LIKE INFERENCE. SIMILARLY INFERENCE ALSO."—

THIS IS NOT RIGHT ; AS THE PROBANS CITED IS NOT INVARIABLY CONCOMITANT (WITH THE PROBANDUM) ; AND SPECIALLY BECAUSE NOTHING IS PUT FORWARD WHICH WOULD NEGATIVE THE CONTRARY OF THE DESIRED CONCLUSION.—FURTHER, IN THIS WAY, YOU WOULD BE RUNNING COUNTER TO THE DOCTRINE OF '*Four* FORMS OF COGNITION '. THE ANSWER THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO THAT WOULD ALSO SERVE HERE.—(1584–1586)

COMMENTARY.

'*Saṅgatam* '—connected, related.

This is only by way of illustration ; it should be understood to apply to the proving of the existence of other *cognisable things* also.

Nothing has been mentioned by way of negativing the Probans in the contrary of the Probandum ; hence there can be no Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum. Consequently all that has been cited as the Probans is Inconclusive ; because their presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion.

Then again, what is asserted goes against the doctrine that restricts the number of the Forms of Cognition to *four* ; as in the way shown, the existence of other forms of cognition also might be proved. For instance, it can be said that—' Perception has for its companion a Form of Cognition other than Inference, Analogical Cognition and Verbal Cognition,—because it is a Form of Cognition,—like Inference '.

Further *Cognisable Things* have been held to fall under *three* classes—viz. : *Universal, Particular* and Particular-Universal. This also would be contravened ; as in the same way the existence of other *Cognisable Things* also may be proved.

Whatever answer you may have to these criticisms will serve my purpose also ; so enough of this.—(1584–1586)

CHAPTER XIX.

Section (C)

On Presumption.

COMMENTARY.

The following has been urged in regard to 'Presumption' (which has been regarded as an independent Means or Form of Cognition, by *Mīmāmsakas*) :—

TEXT (1587).

"IF A CERTAIN FACT, COGNISED THROUGH THE SIX MEANS OF COGNITION, IS FOUND TO BE OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE, AND THENCE LEADS TO THE ASSUMPTION OF SOME OTHER FACT,—THIS IS CALLED '*Arthāpatti*' 'PRESUMPTION' ".—(1587)
[KUMĀRILA : *Shlokavārtika*—ARTHĀPATTI, 1.]

COMMENTARY.

In regard to Time, Place, etc., when a certain fact has been duly cognised through the six Means of Cognition,—in the shape of Perception, Inference, Analogy, Word, Presumption and Negation,—and it *is found to be otherwise inexplicable,*—if a certain other fact were not there,—then the assumption of this other fact is made pertaining to what is not perceptible ;—this assumption is the Means of Cognition called 'Presumption'.

'*Called*'—i.e. by *Shabarasvāmin* ; who says (under Sū. 1. 1. 5)—'*Presumption* consists in the presuming of something not seen, on the ground that a fact already perceived or heard of would not be possible without that presumption ; for instance, it is found that *Devadatta,* who is alive, is not in the house,—and this *non-existence in the house* (which is seen) leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house'.

In this passage, the term '*seen*' stands for 'cognised through the five means of Cognitions other than *Word*' ; and '*heard of*' stands for 'cognised by means of the Word'.—(1587)

In the following *Texts*, examples are set forth, in order, of Presumption based upon the six Means of Cognition :—

TEXTS (1588-1589).

"FOR EXAMPLE—(1) THE ASSUMPTION OF THE BURNING POWER OF FIRE, BASED UPON THE *perceived* FACT OF ITS HAVING BURNT A CERTAIN THING ;—(2) THE ASSUMPTION OF THE *mobility* OF THE SUN BASED UPON THE *inferred* FACT OF ITS GOING FROM PLACE TO PLACE.—[*Shloka-vārtika*—PRESUMPTION, 3] ;—(3) THE POTENCIES OF ALL THINGS ARE PRESUMED ON THE BASIS OF THE INEXPLICABILITY OF THE EFFECTS PRODUCED BY THEM ; [*Shlokavārtika*—SHŪNYA, 254] ; AND ALL SUCH POTENCIES THAT BECOME COGNISED ARE SUCH AS HAVE NOT BEEN KNOWN ALREADY,—AND THESE ARE COGNISED WITHOUT ANY IDEA OF THE RELATION (OF CONCOMITANCE)."—(1588-1589)

COMMENTARY.

(1) An example of Presumption based upon *Perception* is the following—Having *perceived* the fact of *burning* by Fire, there is Presumption of the presence of Burning Power of Fire.

(2) An example of Presumption based upon *Inference* is the following—When the fact of the Sun's moving from place to place has been *inferred*, this leads to the Presumption of the presence of *mobility* in the Sun.

(3) The potencies of all things are always *presumed* on the basis of the inexplicability otherwise of the effects produced by them. This Presumption (of Potencies) itself is based sometimes on Perception ; e.g. when one *perceives* the effect and thence *presumes* the potency in the Cause ;—when however the effect is known through Inference or some other means of Cognition, and thence the Potency of the Cause is *presumed*, then the Presumption is based upon Inference or some other Means of Cognition.

The compound '*Kāryārthāpatti, etc.*' is to be expounded as 'those whose cognition is brought about by the *otherwise inexplicability of the effect* ;—(i.e. the fact that the effect cannot be explained except on the basis of the Potencies)'.

It cannot be said that the Potency of the Cause is already known ; because the said Potencies that are cognised are always such as are not already known ; so that the cognition does not apprehend what has been already apprehended ; and hence this must be regarded as a Form of Valid Cognition.

It might be argued that—' Potencies are always *inferred* from the effects,—they are not *presumed* '.

The answer to this is that the cognitions in question *are brought about without any idea of the relation* (of Concomitance, necessary in all Inference) ; hence they cannot be regarded as *Inference*.—(1588-1589)

The following text proceeds to show the said absence of any idea of the *Relation* :—

TEXT (1590).

"THE RELATION OF THESE POTENCIES HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY COGNISED;—NOR IS IT COGNISED NOW; AND IT IS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF SUCH COGNITIONS THAT THERE COULD BE THE TWO PREMISSES."—(1590)

COMMENTARY.

Prior to the time of Inference, the relation of the Potencies to the effects has not been cognised,—in the way in which the relation of Fire and Smoke is previously recognised in the kitchen; because the Potencies are *not perceptible.* This shows that there can be no Major Premiss (asserting the Invariable Concomitance).

'*Nor is it cognised now*'—at the time of Inference; for the same reason that they are *not perceptible.* This shows that there can be no Minor Premiss.

The *effect* cannot be regarded as a property of the Potencies residing in the Cause, as there can be no ground for this idea.—(1590)

TEXT (1591).

"IN THE CASE OF PROVING THE POTENCY OF THE EAR, ETC., WHATEVER PROBANS MIGHT BE PUT FORWARD, WOULD ALL BE FOUND TO BE 'OF UNKNOWN SUBSTRATUM'; AS THE SUBSTRATUM WOULD CONSIST OF THE POTENCIES THEMSELVES, AND THESE ARE STILL UNKNOWN."—(1591)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, in a case where the Potencies of the Ear, etc. are made the Subject of the Inference, whatever Probans (Reason) might be put forward, for the proving of the said Potencies, would all be 'of unknown substratum'; because the Potencies would be their substratum, and these are *not known* (as yet).

From all this it follows that all Potencies are cognisable through *Presumption,* not through *Inference.*—(1591)

TEXT (1592).

"(4) 'HE IS CORPULENT AND DOES NOT EAT DURING THE DAY'—ON HEARING SUCH WORDS, ONE CONCLUDES THAT THE MAN EATS AT NIGHT; AND THIS IS *Presumption based upon what is heard.*"—[*Shlo-Vā.*—PRESUMPTION, 51]—(1592)

COMMENTARY.

(4) Presumption based upon *Verbal Cognition* is there when, on hearing the words that 'Devadatta is corpulent without medication, and does not

eat during the day', one concludes that the man eats beforehand at night. Such an assumption is *Presumption*.—(1592)

The following might be urged :—'The idea that the Man eats at night is derived from the said words—*He is corpulent and eats not during the day*—themselves [so that it is only a case of *Verbal Cognition*].'

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1593–1598).

"As a matter of fact, the idea of the Night (and the Man eating at night) cannot be derived from the sentence speaking of the *Day* (and the man not eating); because what is expressed by the words of the latter has no *connection* with *eating at night*. Nor is there any contradistinction whereby the latter could indicate the *eating at night*.—Nor can a second (and totally different) meaning be attributed to the words (speaking of the *Day*); because these are already taken up in expressing another idea.—From all this it follows that the idea in question (of *eating at night*) is derived from a totally different sentence present only in the mind of the person.—Thus then, this sentence (in the mind), though it is not actually verbally expressed, is yet duly cognised,—and it has to be pointed out which one among the Means of Cognition, Perception and the rest, it is which brings about the cognition of the said (unspoken) sentence.—As the Sentence is not actually spoken, it could not be *Perception*; nor could it be *Inference*, because the Sentence has never been found to be concomitant with the other factor; and if, even when this relation (of concomitance) has never been perceived, the factor concerned were regarded as an Inferential Indicative,—then the utterance of any one sentence might bring about the cognition of all Sentences; because on the point of *being unrelated*, there would be no distinction between one sentence and another."—(1593–1598)—[*Shloka-vārtika—Arthāpatti*, 56–61.]

COMMENTARY.

There are two kinds of meaning possible in a sentence—in the form of (*a*) Connection and (*b*) Contradistinction; of these 'Connection' consists in the

unification or commingling of things expressed by the words like *Milk and Water,* and 'Contradistinction' consists in these things expressed standing in the relation of *excluder* and *excluded*;—or 'Connection' consists in the well-known relation of *cause and affect,*—and 'Contradistinction' in the *exclusion of the unlike.*—In neither of these two forms could the (unspoken) sentence 'He eats at night' be the meaning of the (spoken) sentence 'He eats not in the day'. For instance, the words of the sentence 'He eats not in the day' denote the *Day* and so forth; and these have no 'Connection' with *eating at night*; as the two are entirely different. Nor is there 'Contradistinction' between them; because the word 'day' is never used in the sense of the *negation of non-night.*

It might be argued that—"*That he eats at night* is another meaning of the same sentence 'He eats not in the day'."

The answer to this is—'*Nor can a second meaning, etc. etc.*'—There can be no assumption of another meaning for the same sentence,—as it is entirely taken up in expressing the idea of the *man not eating in the day,* and hence cannot express the other idea that *he eats at night.* Consequently the idea of *the man eating at night* must be expressed by another sentence.

'*Present in the mind*'—This shows that the cognition is not *Verbal.*

'*Though it is not verbally expressed*',—i.e. even though it is not *Verbal,* due to words; as in the manner shown above, it cannot be *verbal cognition.*

For the cognition, then, of the sentence—'He eats at night'—which is understood (in the Mind), some 'Means' will have to be pointed out; which could only be one out of Perception and the rest.—And yet it cannot be any of these. Hence it must be an entirely distinct Means of Cognition.—This is what is meant.

The idea of the required Means being one from among Perception and the rest is next refuted—'*As the sentence, etc. etc.*'—The sentence expressing the idea of the man *eating at night,* not being actually spoken, cannot be of the nature of Perception, because it is not *heard.* Nor can it be of the nature of Inference, because there is no relation (of concomitance). For instance, the sentence expressing the fact of *eating at night* has never been perceived in association with the sentence speaking of *not-eating in the day,*—which fact alone could constitute the relation of concomitance between the two. Nor is there any other Inferential Indicative available.

It might be argued that, "even without the perception of any relation, it could be regarded as an Inferential Indicative",

The answer to that is—'*And if, even when. etc. etc.*'—That is to say, if it could be an Inferential Indicative even when it is not known to be related, then from the utterance of the sentence speaking of the man *not-eating in the day,* there should follow the cognition of *all* sentences,—not only of the sentence speaking of *eating at night.*—Why?—Because, as regards *being devoid of relation,* the sentence speaking of *eating at night* does not differ from any other sentence; that is, in the point of being *not-related,* all sentences stand on the same footing.—(1593–1598)

The following *Text* describes the Presumption based upon Analogical Cognition:—

TEXT (1599).

"(5) THE COW IS LIKENED TO THE *Gavaya*,—A COGNITION IS PRODUCED BY THIS LIKENESS,—THE POTENCY IN THE OBJECT WHEREBY IT BECOMES APPREHENDED BY THAT COGNITION,—IS DERIVED ON THE STRENGTH OF THE SAID ANALOGICAL COGNITION."—(1599)

COMMENTARY.

(5) When the object, Cow, is likened to the Gavaya, there is in the Cow the capacity to be apprehended by the Analogical Cognition ; and this capacity is derived from the *strength*—Presumption—based upon that Analogical Cognition.—(1599)

The following *Texts* describe the Presumption based upon Presumption—

TEXTS (1600-1601).

"(6) INASMUCH AS THE DENOTATION OF A WORD CANNOT BE OTHERWISE DEFINED, WE ASSUME THE EXPRESSIVE POTENCY OF WORDS ; AND AS THIS POTENCY WOULD NOT BE OTHERWISE POSSIBLE, WE DEDUCE, THROUGH ANOTHER PRESUMPTION, THE ETERNALITY OF WORDS ; [*Shlokavārtika—Arthāpatti*, 6-7] ;—BECAUSE WHAT IS NON-ETERNAL CANNOT BE RELATED TO ANY CONVENTION."—(1600-1601)

COMMENTARY.

'*Abhidhā*'—Denotation ; i.e. expressing of meaning.—This could not be done by words, could not be defined,—except through *Expressive Potency* ;—having thus '*presumed*' the expressive potency of Word, it is found that this potency would not be otherwise possible,—i.e. there is no other way of explaining such a Potency,—without recognising the *eternality* of words ; so that this cognition of the eternality of words is also obtained by means of another Presumption.

Question :—"Why cannot there be Expressive Potency without *eternality* ?"

Answer :—'*Because what is non-eternal, etc. etc.*'.—That is to say, if what was perceived at the time of the making of the Convention does not continue to exist till the time of being used, then, the making of the Convention would be entirely futile ; as Convention is set up only for purposes of usage ; and the Word that is present at the time of usage is not one with which the connection of the meaning had been set up at the time of the Convention.

Or, the text may be explained in another way :—' *Tadananyagatēḥ* '—since, of the word existing at the time of usage, there is no difference from the word perceived at the time of the making of the Convention.—How is it known that there is no difference ?—*Answer*—*Because what is non-eternal, etc. etc.* '—(1600-1601)

The following *Texts* describe the Presumption based upon Negation :—

TEXTS (1602–1606).

" (7) THE ABSENCE OF *Chaitra* FROM THE HOUSE HAVING BEEN COGNISED THROUGH NEGATION, THE COGNITION OF THE PRESENCE OF *Chaitra* OUTSIDE THE HOUSE WHICH IS MARKED BY HIS ABSENCE, HAS BEEN CITED ; THIS IS TO BE REGARDED AS ANOTHER KIND OF PRESUMPTION, *based upon Negation.* [*Shlokavārtika*—*Arthāpatti*, 8-9].—THIS (PRESUMPTION) IS DIFFERENT FROM INFERENCE, BECAUSE THE MINOR PREMISS (*Probans as residing in the Minor Term*) AND THE OTHER FACTORS DO NOT FORM PART OF IT. WHEN THE *object cognised*, IS EITHER THE MAN CONNECTED WITH THE EXTERIOR (OF THE HOUSE), OR THE EXTERIOR CONNECTED WITH THE MAN,—IN EITHER CASE, HOW COULD ' ABSENCE IN THE HOUSE ' SERVE AS THE PROBANS (RESIDING IN THAT SUBJECT) ?—[*Ibid.*, 10–12].—WHAT IS REGARDED AS THE PROBANS IN THIS CASE IS THE ' ABSENCE OF THE LIVING MAN IN THE HOUSE ' ; AND THERE CAN BE NO COGNITION OF THIS ABSENCE WITHOUT KNOWING HIS PRESENCE *outside the House.* [*Ibid.*, 19].—AS FOR PURE ' ABSENCE IN THE HOUSE ',—APART FROM THE IDEA OF HIS BEING *alive*—SUCH ABSENCE IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF DEAD PERSONS ALSO, AND HENCE CANNOT BE A PROOF OF HIS *presence outside* ".—[*Ibid.*, 21].—(1602–1606)

COMMENTARY.

The *absence of Chaitra* has been cognised by the *Negation*—absence,—of Perception and other Means of Cognition ;—the House is qualified by this ascertained *absence* ;—i.e. the idea that ' *Chaitra* is not in the House ' ;—and the presence of *Chaitra*,—if he is alive—is cognised as being outside of the said House ;—this cognition, in the form ' *Chaitra* is outside the house ',—*has been cited*—in the *Bhāṣya*, by *Shabarasvāmin* ; that is, only as an indication of the other kinds of Presumption ; e.g. when *Dēvadatta* is alive, if he is not in the house, there is Presumption of him as being out of the house.

This is an example of Presumption *based upon Negation.*

Almost all *Naiyāyikās* have included Presumption under ' Inference '. In refutation of this view, *Kumarila* adds—' *This is different from Inference, etc. etc.* '—Inasmuch as the Probans, etc. do not enter into it as factors—as its causes—this must be different from Inference ; just like Perception. Because the object of cognition in this case is either *Chaitra qualified by the*

place outside the house, or the *place outside the house qualified by Chaitra*; in either case, how could the *absence of Chaitra*, which resides elsewhere (inside the House) serve as the Probans? That is to say, it could never serve as the Probans.

Then again, if *absence in the House* were assumed as the Probans,—it could be so assumed only in one or the other of two ways—i.e. either as *the absence of the living Devadatta, in the House*, or *absence in the House in general*. In the former case, there would be this objection—that '*the absence of the living man, etc. etc.*'—'*there can be no cognition of this absence, etc. etc.*'—That is, the cognition of the *living Devadatta*—the certainty regarding it—would not be possible until his presence outside is definitely known.

What is meant by this is that the Probans in this case would be one that is 'inadmissible', and that if it is admissible, it is futile.

If the second alternative is accepted [i.e. *absence in the House in general* is the Probans], the Probans would be Inconclusive; as even when Devadatta is dead, people recognise his absence in the House. This is what is shown in the words '*as for pure absence in the House, etc., etc.*'.—'*Vidyamānatva*' is *being alive*.—(1602–1606)

With the following *Texts* begin the refutation of the above view (regarding *Presumption* as a distinct Means of Cognition).

In the first place, the definition that has been provided is not a proper one. For instance, the definition provided is that 'Presumption consists in the presuming of an imperceptible fact without which a perceived or heard of fact would not be possible'. In connection with this, the following points have to be considered:—Has the relation of that *imperceptible fact* with the *perceived and heard of facts* been perceived anywhere, or not? If it has been perceived, then the cognition in question becomes an *Inference*, as brought about by the perception of the said Relation.—If the Relation has *not* been perceived, then, in that case, the *non-burning power* of Fire might also be *presumed*, in the same way as its *burning power* is; because so far as being *not related* is concerned, both stand upon the same footing.—It might be argued that—"inasmuch as Fire has never been actually found to be associated with *non-burning power*, there can be no *presumption* of this latter".—But in that case, there should be no *presumption* of the *burning power* also; because Fire has never been seen to be associated with that power. Thus it is only when the relation between two things is well known that, on seeing one of the two invariably concomitant members of that relation, there can be a presumption of the other relative;—and when this has been presumed,—it is only through the said Relation; and hence this presumption becomes included under 'Inference'.

The examples also that have been cited are not right. These examples have been cited to show that through four *Presumptions* one cognises the *Potency* of something known through Perception and the other Means of Cognition.

The author points out the defect that is common to all these:—

TEXT (1607).

APART FROM THE *Potent* OBJECT, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS 'POTENCY', WHICH COULD BE COGNISED BY MEANS OF PRESUMPTION; AND AS FOR THE POTENT OBJECT, IT IS COGNISED THROUGH PERCEPTION ITSELF.—(1607)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as Potency is nothing apart from the Potent object,—and the Potent object is cognisable by Perception,—Presumption would be apprehending what is already apprehended; and on that ground alone, it could not be regarded as a Means of Valid Cognition.

The mention of 'Perception' in this connection is only by way of illustration.—(1607)

The following *Texts* point out the objections that are applicable specially to that example of Presumption which has been cited as *based upon Perception*:—

TEXTS (1608–1610).

IN THE CASE OF SUCH PHENOMENA AS *Burning* AND THE REST, THEIR CAUSE IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED IN THE FORM OF THE *Fire* AND THE REST, AND THERE IS NOTHING WRONG OR UNCERTAIN IN THIS PERCEPTION; WHAT THEN COULD 'POTENCY' BE, APART FROM THOSE CAUSES?—IF THE 'POTENCY' IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT (FROM THE SAID CAUSES), THEN AS THAT 'POTENCY' WOULD BE WHAT BRINGS ABOUT THE EFFECT, THE *object* (CAUSE) ITSELF WOULD NOT BE AN ACTIVE AGENT AT ALL (IN THE BRINGING ABOUT OF THAT EFFECT); IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE OBJECT DOES BRING ABOUT THE EFFECT, THEN THE POTENCY WOULD NOT BE ANYTHING DIFFERENT;—BECAUSE THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF THE 'OBJECT' IS THAT IT SHOULD BE *capable of effective action*; AND THAT THE OBJECT IS SO CAPABLE IS LEARNT FROM PERCEPTION ITSELF.—(1608–1610)

COMMENTARY.

'*There is nothing wrong, etc.*'—This compound is to be taken as an adverb (modifying the verb 'perceived').

If the Potency is regarded to be something different from the object, then,—in the bringing about of the effect (in the shape of the phenomenon cited), the Potency being the effective agent, the object itself would cease to be an active agent; which would mean that the object is a *non-entity*; as the characteristic of the *Entity* is that it should be *capable of effective action.*

If, in order to guard against the object becoming a non-entity, it be admitted that the object does have some action in the bringing about of the

effect concerned,—then the '*Potency*' *could not be anything different*—from the object.—Why ?—Because 'Potency' can be only that form—or nature, —which is capable of effective action ;—it cannot be anything else.

As regards the verbal expression 'the Potency of the object'—which implies some sort of a difference between the two,—that is meant to discard the notion of any other kind of difference, and is used in this form only with a view to the enquiry as to what 'Potency' is,—and the answer is that *it is the object itself*.—(1608–1610)

The following might be urged—"*Capacity for effective action* is not the characteristic of *Potency* ; it is something else".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (1611).

THERE IS NO MEANS OF KNOWING ANY OTHER CHARACTERISTIC OF *Potency*. EVEN IF SUCH ANOTHER CHARACTERISTIC WERE KNOWN, THERE WOULD BE NO USE FOR IT ; AS THE EFFECT WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE MERE PRESENCE OF THE OBJECT.—(1611)

COMMENTARY.

There is no means of knowing any other characteristic of 'Potency',—which Means could distinguish *Potency* from 'Negation'—in the form of *the absence of all capacity*.—Even if such a characteristic were known, it would serve no useful purpose for men who would be seeking for *effective action* ; because the needed effective action will have been accomplished *by the presence*—i.e. by the very nature—of the Object itself ;—as has been declared in the following words : 'To persons seeking for effective action, what would be the use of cogitating over what is not fit for effective action ? Certainly, the young woman has no need to consider whether the impotent man is ugly or handsome'.—(1611)

TEXT (1612).

IF THE OTHER CHARACTERISTIC OF 'POTENCY' WERE HELD TO BE COGNISABLE THROUGH PRESUMPTION BASED UPON THE FACT OF THE EFFECT BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE,—THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT, AS THE EFFECT IS ACTUALLY PRODUCED OTHERWISE,—AS IT PROCEEDS FROM THE OBJECT ITSELF.—(1612)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"There is another characteristic of *Potency*—that is, *Potency* which is always cognisable through the fact of

the effect not being otherwise possible ; so that—'being inferred from the effect' would be the characteristic of *Potency*".

This definition of *Potency* cannot be right.—"Why ?"—Because *the effect is actually produced otherwise*,—that is, the effect is produced even without such a distinct thing as 'Potency'.—"How so ?"—*It proceeds from the Object itself*.—Because this effect proceeds from the Object—the Thing—therefore the existence of the effect is possible even without the Potency ; so that what is the use of assuming the Potency as something apart from the Thing itself ?—(1612)

TEXT (1613).

FIRE, AS APART FROM WATER AND OTHER THINGS, IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED AS CAPABLE OF *burning* ; WHAT THEN IS THE USE OF THE SAID 'POTENCY' ?—(1613)

COMMENTARY.

The same idea is further clarified—

TEXT (1614).

IF IT BE URGED THAT—"THE POTENCY IS NOT SOMETHING ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT (FROM THE THING),—IT IS OF A DUAL CHARACTER, BEING BOTH (DIFFERENT AND NON-DIFFERENT)",—THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) IT CANNOT BE SO, BECAUSE OF SELF-CONTRADICTION. AND FURTHER, ITS *non-difference* (FROM THE THING) WOULD BE COGNISED BY PERCEPTION.—(1614)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged :—"The objection urged would apply if we held that the Potency is something absolutely different from the Thing ; as a matter of fact, however, we regard it to be of a dual character, being both different and non-different".

This cannot be right.—"Why ?"—*Because of self-contradiction* ;—if it is *different*, how could it be *non-different* at the same time ? If it is *non-different*, how could it be *different* ? There is clear self-contradiction if two mutually exclusive properties—the presence of one of which must mean the absence of the other and *vice versa*,—are attributed to the same thing.—In fact, *being another* consists in *not being the same*, as is found in the case of 'another self'.

Granting that the Potency has the dual character,—even so, that Potency of the dual character is cognisable by Perception itself ; because the *non-difference* of the Potency from the Thing is also cognised by Perception,—and not *absolute difference* only ; whereby it would not be perceptible. Under the circumstances, the statement that 'Potency is always cognisable from the effect' would become set aside.—(1614)

TEXT (1615).

THE *perceptibility* (OF POTENCY) BEING THUS ESTABLISHED,—ALL THAT HAS BEEN SAID (BY THE OTHER PARTY) REGARDING ITS NOT BEING COGNISABLE BY INFERENCE, DOES NOT AFFECT US. BECAUSE IN THIS CASE WE DO NOT REGARD THE COGNITION TO BE OF THE NATURE OF *Inference*.—(1615)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, it has been declared (by *Kumārila,* see above under *Text* 1589) that "Potencies of all Things become cognised through Presumption" and so forth; where it has been shown that Potencies cannot be *inferred.* That does not affect our position at all.—"Why?"—Because *in this case*—of Potency being *perceptible,*—*we do not regard the cognition to be of the nature of Inference*; for the simple reason that Inference consists of the cognition of only such things as are not cognisable by Perception.

This shows that the arguments adduced are superfluous.—(1615)

It has been argued above under *Text* 1591, that "whatever Reasons are adduced in regard to the Potency of the Ear, etc. would all be such as have their substratum *unknown*".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1616).

AS REGARDS SUCH THINGS AS THE AUDITORY ORGAN AND THE LIKE WHICH ARE NOT AMENABLE TO PERCEPTION,—THEIR VERY EXISTENCE, IN THE SHAPE OF POTENCY, IS COGNISED BY INFERENCE.—(1616)

COMMENTARY.

Objection:—"It has been said previously that *their existence is proved*; why then is it said now that *their existence is indicated*?"

Reply:—

TEXT (1617).

WHAT WAS ASSERTED ON THE PREVIOUS OCCASION WAS ONLY THE FACT OF THE APPREHENSION OF SOUND BEING DEPENDENT ON OTHER CAUSES,—ON THE GROUND THAT EVEN WHEN ITS CAUSE WAS THERE, IT DID NOT COME ABOUT, BECAUSE SOMETHING ELSE WAS ABSENT;—AS IN THE CASE OF THE SPROUT AND SUCH THINGS.—(1617)

COMMENTARY.

Existence is not proved directly; what is proved is the fact of Auditory and other Perceptions, as the Subject, being dependent upon other causes,—

on the ground that when the other cause, of its Auditory Perception,—in the shape of attention of the mind—is not there the Perception does not come about. This argument is formulated as follows :—When even on the presence of something, another thing appears only occasionally (not always), then this latter must be dependent upon other causes ; e.g. even when the soil is there, the Sprout appears only occasionally ;—even when the attention of the Mind is there, the Auditory Perception comes about only occasionally ; this thus is a Reason based upon the nature of things. When this fact of *being dependent upon other causes* has been established, then it is deduced that that other cause must be the well-known Auditory Organ ; that is why it is said that *existence is cognised*, in this way—and not directly.—Hence there is nothing wrong in this.—(1617)

It has been argued (under Text 1588) that—" From the *inferred* mobility of the Sun, the Potency is cognised by Presumption ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1618-1619).

WHEN THE SUN REACHES ANOTHER PLACE, WHAT HAPPENS ALWAYS IS THAT IT IS BORN (AGAIN) IN A PLACE DIFFERENT FROM ITS ORIGINAL PLACE ; THIS IS AS IT IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE FIRE-FLAME ; A THING THAT REMAINS PERMANENT IS OF A TOTALLY DIFFERENT KIND ; OTHERWISE SUCH REACHING OF ANOTHER PLACE WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE.—AS REGARDS POTENCY, IT HAS ALREADY BEEN SHOWN THAT IT IS NOTHING APART FROM THE THING.
—(1618-1619)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that Presumption is included under Inference.

For instance, whenever anything is found to reach another place, it is a case of the thing being born in a place other than its original one ;—as is found to be the case when the fire-flame moves from one place to the other ; —the Sun is found to be reaching another place ; hence this is an Inferential Reason based upon the nature of things.

This Reason cannot be regarded as 'Inconclusive' ; because *a thing that remains permanent*—i.e. an object that always remains in one and the same form—cannot reach another place ; as it can never renounce its original position ; if it does renounce it, it must be in a new form born again. This is the Reasoning sublating any conclusions to the contrary.

It might be argued that—" This Presumption has been cited as proving the existence of the *Potency*, not the *birth* of the thing ; how then is it that the Presumption is said to be included under this Inference ? "

The answer to this is—'*As regards Potency, etc. etc.*'—(1618-1619)

The Author next points out the objections against the example of the 'Fat Devadatta not eating in the day', as illustrating Presumption *from what has been heard* :—

TEXT (1620).

NO CERTAIN COGNITION CAN RESULT FROM THE ASSERTION THAT 'THE FAT MAN EATS NOT DURING THE DAY',—AS THE SPEAKER MIGHT BE ASSERTING THIS THROUGH ENMITY OR DELUSION AND SUCH OTHER CAUSES.—(1620)

COMMENTARY.

What this shows is that there can be no Presumption based upon Verbal Cognition.—(1620)

The following might be urged :—"It is not that the other assertion is indicated by the first sentence, on the basis of what is expressed by it ;—it is indicated by the assertion itself ; and the assertion itself is directly perceived (heard)."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1621).

IF ANOTHER EXPRESSIVE STATEMENT IS INDICATED (IN PRESUMPTION) BY THE FIRST STATEMENT, INDEPENDENTLY OF WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY ITSELF,—THEN THAT OTHER STATEMENT ALSO WOULD INDICATE ANOTHER STATEMENT.—(1621)

COMMENTARY.

The sentence is said to be 'independent of what is expressed by it' when it functions by itself, not through its meaning ; when the mere sentence by itself indicates (through Presumption) the other sentence which is expressive of a definite meaning,—then *that other statement also would indicate another statement* ; that is, it would be possible for the sentence asserting *eating at night* to indicate another sentence ; as the condition of being *devoid of relation* would be equally present in the case of all.—If then it be said that the indication is through what is expressed by the first sentence, then the objection urged before remains in force.—(1621)

In the following *Text*, the Author anticipates and answers the intention of the Opponent :—

TEXT (1622).

IF, THE IDEA OF WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY THE SENTENCE IS ADMITTED AS EMANATING FROM THE OTHER PERSON, OR AS BROUGHT ABOUT BY ANOTHER MEANS OF COGNITION,—THEN THE COGNITION OF *what is expressed* BY THE LATER SENTENCE MAY BE REGARDED AS FOLLOWING FROM THAT.—(1622)

COMMENTARY.

In order to avoid the incongruity urged above, it might be said that the ependence of what is expressed by the first sentence is also admitted,— s emanating from the other person (who has asserted that 'the fat Devadatta oes not eat during the day') who is known to be reliable;—or as brought bout by another Means of Cognition—Perception, etc.—whereby it is known ıat the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day.

The answer to this is—'*Then the cognition, etc. etc.*'—That is, the cogni- on of the fact itself (expressed by the second sentence) might follow from ıat fact (expressed by the first sentence)—i.e. from *fatness along with not ting in the day*; and there need be no indication of the *sentence* in the mind. nd in that case, the cognition would become included under *Inference*, ıd hence Presumption need not be a separate means of Cognition.—(1622)

The following *Text* shows how the said cognition becomes included under nference':—

TEXT (1623).

ΉAT IS COGNISED IS THE MAN SPOKEN OF AS RELATED TO *eating at night*;—ON THE GROUND OF HIS *being fat while going without food during the day*,—LIKE ANOTHER PERSON. —(1623)

COMMENTARY.

'*Iṣṭaḥ*'—spoken of,—i.e. the Man as related to *eating at night*. The bans is—'because while going without food during the day, he is fat *e another person*' is the Corroborative Instance.

This is a Probans in the form of 'effect'.—(1623)

Question:—"How is the relation of Cause and Effect known in this ?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1624).

THAT THERE IS *fatness* WHEN THERE IS *eating* IS KNOWN WITH CERTAINTY THROUGH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE ; AND HENCE THE COGNITION OF ONE THING FOLLOWS FROM THE OTHER WHICH IS THUS RELATED TO IT.—(1624)

COMMENTARY.

The relation of *Cause* and *Effect* between *Fatness* and *Eating*—as between *Fire* and *Smoke*,—is known with certainty ; whereby it is right that there should be cognition of one thing—i.e. *the Eating*—(which is the Cause) from another thing—i.e. the Fatness, which is related to the former as its effect. But it cannot be right that the cognition of one sentence should proceed from another sentence which is not so related to it ; as if there were such cognition, then there would be incongruities.—(1624)

The following *Text* shows what the incongruity would be :—

TEXT (1625).

HOW CAN A SENTENCE BE COGNISED, WHICH IS DEVOID OF ALL RELATIONSHIP ? OTHERWISE ALL THINGS WOULD BE COGNISED THROUGH A SINGLE THING.—(1625)

COMMENTARY.

How can a sentence be cognised, which is devoid of relationship—such as that of *sameness* and *origination* ? It can never be cognised. *Otherwise*—if a sentence devoid of all relationship were cognised,—from any single thing —in the shape of the Jar for instance,—*all* jars would become cognised. This however does not happen. Hence the cognition must be held to follow from a definite relationship (of concomitance).—(1625)

The following text further elucidates the incongruities involved :—

TEXT (1626).

WHEN THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP—OR WHEN, EVEN THOUGH EXISTENT, THE RELATIONSHIP IS NOT DEFINITELY KNOWN,—IF THE OTHER SENTENCE WERE INDICATED, IT WOULD BE UNRELIABLE (INVALID).—(1626)

COMMENTARY.

The idea really is that there *is* a relationship between the two sentences.—But if, at any time, there is no relationship between one sentence and another, —or if existent, it is not definitely known, and hence is as good as non-

existent,—if, when the relationship is not definitely known, if the second sentence were indicated,—such indication would be invalid ; that is, it would be a baseless cognition ; and if baseless cognitions were admitted, then the incongruity of everything being indicated by everything would be inevitable. —(1626)

The following *Text* anticipates an argument from the Opponent's standpoint :—

TEXT (1627).

" THERE IS NO SUCH ROYAL EDICT AS THAT ' THAT ALONE IS VALID WHICH IS RELATED '. HOW DOES VALIDITY ATTACH TO PERCEPTION, IN WHICH THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP ? "—(1627)

COMMENTARY.

The Opponent says :—" That validity can attach to only what is related can, at best, be only a Royal Edict ; there can be no reason for such an idea. For instance, if it were not a Royal Edict that ' validity can attach to only what is related ',—how could there be any validity in Perception, in which there is no Relationship ? This has to be explained ".—(1627)

The answer to the above is provided in the following—

TEXTS (1628-1629).

IF SOMETHING UNRELATED COULD BE COGNISED,—THEN WHY SHOULD NOT THERE BE COGNITION OF OTHER THINGS ALSO ? BECAUSE IN THE MATTER OF *being unrelated,* NO DISTINCTION AMONG THINGS CAN BE PERCEIVED. IN THE CASE OF PERCEPTION ALSO, VALIDITY RESTS UPON RELATIONSHIP ONLY. THE VALIDITY OF A COGNITION CONSISTS IN ITS BEING *in conformity* (WITH THE REAL STATE OF THINGS), AND THIS CONFORMITY DEPENDS UPON THE PERCEPTION OWING ITS EXISTENCE TO THE THING PERCEIVED.—(1628-1629)

COMMENTARY.

If an unrelated thing could be cognised, then there would be an incongruity,—because there could, in that case, be no distinction between one thing and another,—the absence of relationship being equally present in all things. You have not given any answer to this contention of ours.

As for the question—How is there validity in Perception, in which there is no Relationship ?—it is irrelevant ; because no one regards Perception to be valid, in the absence of a Relationship. In fact, even in Perception, validity rests upon Relationship only.

The reason for this is pointed out—'*The validity of a cognition, etc. etc.*'—'Validity' consists in *conformity*, which is the capacity to get at the real thing; and how could this *conformity* be unreservedly admitted in the case of Perception, if it did not derive its own existence from the thing perceived?—(1628-1629)

The following *Text* explains what would be wrong if it were otherwise:—

TEXT (1630).

NO SUCH 'CONFORMITY' WITH THE REAL STATE OF THINGS CONCERNED CAN BE CERTAIN, IN A COGNITION OF WHICH THE PARTICULAR OBJECT IS NOT THE BASIS, OR IN ONE WHICH HAS NO (OBJECTIVE) BASIS AT ALL. OR ELSE, THERE WOULD BE CONFORMITY WITH ALL (THINGS).—(1630)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*ataddhētuḥ*' is to be expounded as '*na-taddhētuḥ*'; '*taddhētuḥ*' being expounded as that of which the particular object is the (objective) basis; that is, *that which is based upon something else*;—in such a cognition,—and also in a cognition which has no objective basis,—i.e. which is devoid of all objective background,—there can be no 'conformity with the real state of the thing concerned', in all cases. "What then?"—There would be conformity with all things. So that the incongruity is present in this case also.—(1630)

Or, what the affirmative sentence 'Devadatta is fat and he eats not during the day' does is to bring about the inference of its own cause, in the shape of the speaker's particular 'desire to speak',—this inference being based upon the Indicative in the shape of the effect of the said desire; and then it brings about the idea of the contrary sentence 'He eats at night',—but by implication, not directly,—through the inference of the character of the Cause,—just as in the case of smoke, there is implication of its being due to defect in the fuel.

This view is what is expounded in the following—

TEXT (1631).

OR, IT MAY BE THAT WHAT IS INFERRED IS THE SPEAKER'S 'DESIRE TO SPEAK' RELATING TO THE SECOND STATEMENT; BY THIS THERE IS COGNITION OF NEGATION FOLLOWING FROM THE AFFIRMATIVE ASSERTION.—(1631)

COMMENTARY.

'*By this*'—i.e. by the Inference of the character of the cause,—not directly; because it is from the affirmative sentence that the said 'desire

to speak' is apprehended,—in which 'desire', the negative sentence also figures. Otherwise, if the *eating at night* did not figure in the said 'desire to speak', and mere *denial of eating* were meant, then the statement would have been in the form 'Devadatta does not eat' and the terms 'fat' and 'during the day' would not be there.

'*Vyatirekagatiḥ*'—the cognition of the contrary sentence.—(1631)

It has been asserted (under *Text* 1599) that—"the presence, in the cow, which is likened to the *Gavaya*', of the *capacity* to be apprehended by that cognition is cognised by Analogical Cognition"

This is refuted in the following—

TEXT (1632).

THE VALIDITY OF ANALOGICAL COGNITION HAVING BEEN REFUTED IN DETAIL, THE VALIDITY OF PRESUMPTION ARISING OUT OF IT BECOMES REFUTED AS A MATTER OF COURSE.—(1632)

COMMENTARY.

Even granting the validity of Analogical Cognition, the Presumption based upon that cognition cannot be regarded as being a distinct Means or Form of Cognition, as it apprehends what is already apprehended; and also because there is no separate cognisable thing, in the shape of Potency, which could be cognised through it.

This is what is explained in the following—

TEXTS (1633-1634).

THE *Cow* HAS BEEN HELD TO BE THE OBJECTIVE BASIS OF ANALOGICAL COGNITION; AND IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT THE *objective basis* BRINGS ABOUT ITS OWN COGNITION, BY ITS MERE PRESENCE. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF THE 'POTENCY', FOR THE APPREHENSION WHEREOF PRESUMPTION BASED UPON ANALOGICAL COGNITION IS REQUIRED AS A DISTINCT MEANS OF COGNITION?—(1633-1634)

COMMENTARY.

'*For the apprehension whereof*'—i.e. for the cognition of *Potency*.

The rest is easily understood.—(1633-1634)

It has been argued (under *Text* 1600) that—"Inasmuch as the Denotation of a word cannot be otherwise defined, we assume the expressive Potency of Words, etc. etc.";—where an example has been cited of a Presumption based upon another Presumption.

The following *Text* points out that the argument is 'Inconclusive'—

TEXT (1635).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF *sameness*, THERE IS NOTHING INCOMPATIBLE IN THE EXPRESSION OF THINGS BY WORDS: JUST AS THERE IS EXPRESSION BY SUCH MEANS AS THE SHAKING OF THE HAND AND SO FORTH.—(1635)

COMMENTARY.

There is no incompatibility in the expression of things by such *non-eternal* means as the *shaking of the hand, winking of the eye* and so forth; similarly, even in the absence of the sameness of the Word (at the time of Convention and at the time of Usage), there should be no incompatibility in the expression of things by the Word. So that the Instance that has been cited is Inconclusive.

'*Sameness*' here stands for *eternality*; 'being different' constitutes *evanescence*; hence 'being non-different or *same*' constitutes *eternality*.—(1635)

Says the Opponent:—"It has been pointed out that if the Word were not eternal, then it could not continue during all the time between the Convention and the Usage."

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (1636).

WHAT SERVES AS THE CAUSE OF THE EXPRESSIVENESS OF WORDS IS THE SAMENESS OF THE CONCEPTION, LIKE *shaking*; AND THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY IN THIS.—(1636)

COMMENTARY.

Though the Specific Individualities being all momentary, there can be concomitance or continuity of them, yet there are some Specific Individualities which are so constituted that, either directly or indirectly, they become the cause of an illusory conception of *sameness*; and hence becoming conceived as the *same*, they become *expressive*, through Convention;—'*Like Shaking*'—i.e. just as *Shaking* 'is expressive'.—(1636)

The Opponent urges the objection that "the instance of 'shaking' that has been cited is *devoid of the Probandum*":—

TEXT (1637).

"THOSE ACTIONS THAT ARE SEEN SUBSISTING IN PERCEPTIBLE THINGS ARE ALL HELD TO BE ETERNAL, LIKE THE LETTERS IN THE WORD,—ON THE GROUND OF RECOGNITION."—(1637)

COMMENTARY.

"We hold the letters to be eternal, on the ground of Recognition; in the same way, the gestures made by the Hand also are eternal; hence the 'Shaking' (of the Hand) that has been cited is 'devoid of the Probandum',—[i.e. it is *not* non-eternal]; hence that does not falsify our Premiss".—(1637)

Question:—If this is so, and the Gestures of the Hand, etc. are eternal, how is it that these are not cognised always?

Answer (from the Opponent):—

TEXT (1638).

"THAT THESE ARE NOT APPREHENDED ALWAYS IS DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE INDICATOR. WHAT WOULD BE THE 'PRODUCER' UNDER YOUR THEORY IS REGARDED BY US AS THE 'INDICATOR'."—(1638)

COMMENTARY.

'*These*'—i.e. the Gestures,—'are not apprehended always';—just as, under your theory, the Gestures are not perceived always, because of the absence of the *producer*,—so, under our view also, it is because of the absence of the *indicator*; so that the same explanation is available for both of us.'—This is what the Opponent means.—(1638)

The above argument is answered as follows:—

TEXTS (1639-1640).

IT CANNOT BE SO; SO LONG AS THE CAPACITY IS NOT OBSTRUCTED, ITS COGNITION SHOULD BE THERE ALWAYS; IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SAID CAPACITY, IT SHOULD NEVER BE THERE AT ALL. THUS NO 'INDICATORS' ARE POSSIBLE FOR THE GESTURES. AS REGARDS 'RECOGNITION' INDICATING *eternality*, THAT HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED. —(1639-1640)

COMMENTARY.

There are only two alternatives possible regarding the capacity of the Gestures which are held to be 'indicated' by certain indicators:—By their

nature (*a*) they have the capacity of bringing about cognitions—or (*b*) they do not have this capacity.

If they have the said capacity, then the Cognition producible by these should be there always—at all times; because their nature, being eternal, could not be obstructed by anything; because a thing to which (on account of its Eternality) no peculiarities can be added, can never, for that reason, be obstructed.

If, on the other hand, they do not have the capacity, then, in the absence of the capacity, the cognition producible by them could never be there. So where would be the use of the Indicator ?

For these reasons, it is not possible for the Gestures, which are held to be eternal, to have any 'indicators'. If they are non-eternal, however, it is possible for a new character to be produced by the Indicators, and hence in this case, the presence of Indicatives would be logical.

It has been asserted that—"They are held to be eternal, like Letters, on the ground of Recognition".—The answer to that is—'*As regards Recognition, etc. etc.*';—for the proving of *eternality* (the Probandum), Recognition has been put forward as the *Probans*; and this Recognition has been already rejected under the examination of the Permanence of Things (*Chapter* VIII).—(1639-1640)

It has been argued (under *Text* 1602 *et seq.*) that—"The absence of *Chaitra* having been cognised through Negation, etc. etc.".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXTS (1341-1343).

IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO DEDUCE THE FACT OF CHAITRA BEING OUTSIDE THE HOUSE FROM THE FACT OF HIS ABSENCE IN THE HOUSE, BECAUSE, THERE BEING A CHANCE OF HIS HAVING DIED, THE LATTER FACT IS CAPABLE OF ANOTHER EXPLANATION ALSO.—IF IT IS THE ABSENCE OF THE *living* MAN IN THE HOUSE THAT IS MEANT TO BE THE BASIS OF THE PRESUMPTION BRINGING ABOUT THE IDEA OF HIS BEING OUTSIDE,—THIS ALSO CANNOT BE RIGHT ; AS THE ELEMENT OF CERTAINTY WOULD BE LACKING. WHEN A MAN WITH ORDINARY POWERS OF VISION DOES NOT SEE *Chaitra* IN THE HOUSE, HE CAN HAVE NO CERTAIN COGNITION REGARDING HIS BEING *alive*.—(1641-1643)

COMMENTARY.

'*Another explanation*';—it is possible for *Chaitrā* to be absent in the House, without being outside.

This shows the 'Inconclusive' character of the Reason put forward.

It might be argued that—"what is put forward as the basis of this particular instance of Presumption is the absence of the *living* Devadatta in the House,—not mere absence."

This cannot be right.—"Why?"—Because the fact of *Devadatta* being *alive* would still be doubtful. So that the Probans would be open to the defect of being 'Doubtful—hence—Inadmissible'.

The ground of uncertainty is stated—'*When a man, etc. etc.*';—as there are no Means of Ascertaining the fact of *Chaitra* being alive, the ordinary man with ordinary powers of vision would always be uncertain about it.—(1641–1643)

The following might be urged—"Even though the man with ordinary powers of vision could not have any means of perceiving the fact of *Chaitra* being alive, yet Inference and the other means of cognition would be always available for him".—This is what is urged in the following—

TEXT (1644).

"THE CERTAINTY REGARDING HIS BEING ALIVE BEING OBTAINED THROUGH THE *Word* OR OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION,—CERTAINTY REGARDING HIS ABSENCE IN THE HOUSE BEING OBTAINED THROUGH *Negation*,—DUE VALIDITY WOULD BELONG TO THE PRESUMPTION BASED UPON THE NEGATION."—(1644)

COMMENTARY.

'*Through the Word*'—i.e. when a word uttered by him is heard, or when an ascetic engaged in austerities behind the wall says that '*Chaitra* is alive'.

'*Through Negation*'—as a Means of Cognition,—in the shape of the absence of Perception and the other Means of Cognition,—the certainty of Chaitra's absence in the house being obtained,—it becomes known that the absence in the house is of the *living* Chaitra;—then due validity would belong to this Presumption as based upon Negation.—(1644)

The answer to all this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1645–1647).

EVEN THEN, THE ABSENCE IN THE HOUSE IS COGNISED FROM THE FACT OF HIS NOT BEING SEEN THROUGH THE EYES;—WHICH SHOWS THAT THE SAID ABSENCE IN THE HOUSE IS COGNISED THROUGH AN INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE.—ONE WHO IS NOT *in the house* IS ALWAYS *outside of it,*—AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE MAN STANDING IN THE COURTYARD SEEN BY MEN AT THE GATE; THE *Man inside the house* PROVIDES THE TERM WHERE THE PROBANDUM IS KNOWN TO BE ABSENT.—FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THIS *Presumption* DOES NOT DIFFER FROM *Inference.* —(1645–1647)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that Presumption is included under Inference.

For instance, *Chaitra* is the Subject, the Minor Term;—his *being outside* is the Probandum;—'Being alive and yet not being in the house' is the Probans, of the nature of an 'effect';—'the man standing in the courtyard' is the Corroborative Instance *per* similarity;—'the man in the house' is the Corroborative Instance *per* dissimilarity.—

'*Sadana*' is House.

The Invariable Concomitance (the Major Premiss) is indicated by the two Instances.

The Probans cannot be said to be 'inadmissible'. Because *absence in the House* has been cognised by 'the non-perception of what should have been perceived, if there'; as for the man *being alive,* this is said to be ascertained in accordance with the doctrines of the other party. In reality, the Probans is *doubtful,* as there is no Means for obtaining a certain cognition of his *being alive.*

"But it has been said that there are such means as the Word, etc."

In that case, if his *being alive* has been duly ascertained by means of Word, etc., then that is enough to prove his *existence outside*;—what then is there left to be done by Presumption?

Thus, it is on the basis of the doctrines of the Opponent that we regard the Probans put forward by us as 'admissible', and through the Probans it has been proved that Presumption is included under Inference.—(1645–1647)

End of Presumption.

CHAPTER XIX.

Section (D).

On 'Negation'.

COMMENTARY.

In regard to 'Negation'—*Abhāva*—the Author sets forth the following views :—

TEXT (1648).

"IN THE CASE OF AN OBJECT WHERE THE FIVE MEANS OF COGNITION DO NOT FUNCTION FOR THE COMPREHENSION OF THE EXISTENCE OF THAT OBJECT,—NEGATION IS THE ONLY MEANS OF COGNITION." KUMĀRILA : *Shlokavārtika*—NEGATION, 1].—(1648)

COMMENTARY.

According to *Mīmāmsakas,* entities are of two kinds—Positive and Negative,—the former being characterised by *existence* and the latter by *non-existence* ;—and they hold that every object has two aspects—the *existent* and the *non-existent* ; thus it being acknowledged that the Object has these two aspects,—the *existent* and the *non-existent,*—in the case of *an object*—i.e. the non-existent aspect of the object,—*the five Means of Cognition,* ending with 'Presumption', *do not function,*—for what ?—*for the comprehension of the existence of that object,*—i.e. for apprehending the *existent* aspect of the object,—in the case of such cognisable object, in the shape of its *non-existent* aspect,—'Negation' is the only Means of Cognition.

This shows only the *object* cognisable by this Means of Cognition, not the *form* of the Cognition itself.—(1648)

Question :—What then is the *form* of this Cognition ?
Answer :—

TEXT (1649).

"WHAT IS REGARDED TO BE 'NEGATION, A MEANS OF COGNITION', IS THE NON-FUNCTIONING OF PERCEPTION AND THE OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION ; THIS MAY CONSIST EITHER IN 'THE NON-MODIFICATION OF THE SOUL', OR IN THE COGNITION OF ANOTHER OBJECT."—[*Shlokavārtika*—NEGATION, 11].—(1649)

COMMENTARY.

What is regarded to be 'Negation, a Means of Cognition' is the non-functioning of Perception and the other Means of Cognition.

The term '*pramāṇābhāva*' may be taken either as the Genitive—*Tatpuruṣa* Compound, or as the *Kārmadhāraya.*

In some places the reading is '*pramāṇē-abhavaḥ*', in which the meaning of the Locative ending would be 'among Pramāṇas',—the singular number in '*pramāṇē*' being due to all *Pramāṇas* being referred to as a *class.*

Thus has *Shabara-svāmin* declared (under Sū. 1. 1. 5)—'Negation consists in the absence of the Means of Cognition and it gives rise to the notion of a certain unseen object *not existing*'.

Question—"What is this non-functioning (of the Means of Cognition)?"

Answer :—'*This may consist, etc. etc.*'—*This*—i.e. the non-functioning of Perception and the rest,—may be said to consist in the Soul in a state of rest, not becoming modified into the form of the cognition of the Jar or any such thing which may be meant to be denied;—or it may consist in the cognition of the spot on the ground as devoid of the said Jar, etc. —(1649)

Objection :—It is the *absence* of things that is called '*Abhāva*', 'Negation'; how then can it be an entity? Certainly the *absence* cannot be an *entity.*

Anticipating this objection, the *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds to prove that Negation is an entity :—

TEXT (1650).

"THE NEGATION (ABSENCE) OF THINGS IS APPREHENDED WHEN THERE IS NO APPREHENSION OF THE THINGS THEMSELVES; AND IT IS DIVIDED UNDER FOUR HEADS—'THE PREVIOUS NEGATION' AND THE REST."—(1650)

COMMENTARY.

If the 'Negation of the Means of Cognition' were not an entity, then, as a non-entity, it would have no capacity at all; so that there could be no cognition or idea of it;—nor would there be any division of Negation into the four kinds of 'Previous Negation' and so forth. And yet this is not so. Hence inasmuch as the Idea of Negation cannot be otherwise explained,—and as the well-known fourfold division also of it cannot be otherwise accounted for,—Negation must be regarded as an entity.

Some people hold that these two 'Presumptions' afford the proof for Negation being an entity.

Others however explain that the sentence (in the Text) to the effect '*It is divided under four heads*' embodies an Inference; and they formulate it as follows :—Negation is an entity,—because it is divided,—like the Jar and other things.—(1650)

The following *Texts* proceed to show how 'it is divided under four heads' :—

TEXTS (1651–1654).

"(1) 'THAT THE CURD IS NOT IN THE MILK' IS A CASE OF 'PREVIOUS NEGATION';—(2) 'THAT THE MILK IS NOT IN THE CURD' IS A CASE OF 'DESTRUCTION';—(3) 'THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE HORSE IN THE COW' IS A CASE OF 'MUTUAL NEGATION'".—[*Shlokavārtika*—NEGATION, 2-3].—IN THIS LAST CASE, THE COW DOES NOT HAVE THE FORM OF THE OTHER, AND HENCE THIS NEGATIVE CHARACTER BELONGS TO IT BY ITSELF.*—(4) THE FLAT PORTION OF THE HARE'S HEAD, BEING DEVOID OF HARDNESS AND HEIGHT, AND HENCE THERE BEING NO HORNS IN THE HARE,—THIS IS A CASE OF ABSOLUTE NEGATION [*Shlokavārtika*—NEGATION, 4].—IF THERE WERE NO SUCH ENTITY AS 'NEGATION' CLASSED UNDER THESE SEVERAL HEADS OF 'PREVIOUS NEGATION' AND THE REST,—THEN THERE COULD BE NO USAGE BASED UPON THE DIFFERENTIATION OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS".—[*Shlokavārtika*—NEGATION, 7].—(1651–1654)

COMMENTARY.

When in reference to the cause—such as Clay or Milk,—people have the idea of the effect—the Jar or the Curd—*not being there,*—this is called 'Previous Negation'. If this 'Previous Negation' were not an entity, the product, Curd, would always be there in the Milk.

In the same way, when in reference to the Curd, there is the idea of the Milk *being no longer there,*—it is called 'Destruction'. If this Negation were not an entity then the Milk would still be there in the Curd.

In reference to the *Cow,* there is the idea of its *not being the Horse*; this is called 'Mutual Negation'. Because the Cow does not have the form of the other,—the Horse—therefore this is called 'Mutual Negation'. If this Mutual Negation were not an entity, then the Horse would be there in the Cow.

When the flat parts of the Hare's head are found to be devoid of growth and hardness,—and entirely non-existent in the form of Horns,—it is called 'Absolute Negation'.—Even though here also, in so far as the nature of the things is concerned, we have a case of 'Mutual Negation'. [The flat Head not being the Horn], yet, it has been cited as an example of 'Absolute Negation', in accordance with the popular notion of it. In common parlance whenever 'Mutual Negation' is spoken of, the two things are mentioned in the co-ordinated form—'This is a *Cow,* not a *horse*'; in the case of the negation of the Hare's Horn, however, they do not say—'This is the Hare, not the Horn'. If 'absolute Negation' were not an entity, then the Hare's Horn would be there. As says *Kumārila* [in *Shlokavārtika*—Negation, 2–4]—'If Negation were not a Means of valid Cognition, then there would be Curd in the Milk,—Milk in the Curd,—the Cloth in the Jar,—the Horn

* This sentence is not a quotation from the *Shlokavārtika.*

in the Hare,—sentience in the Earth and other substances,—Corporeality in the Soul,—Odour in Water,—Taste in Fire,—and both Odour and Taste along with Colour, in Air,—Touch and the other qualities' in *Ākāsha*.—Here 'sentience' stands for the *soul*; 'Corporeality' for *solidity*;—'those two'—Odour and Taste—along with Colour, would be there in Air;—and Colour, Taste and Odour, along with Touch would be there in *Ākāsha*.

Further, there could be no differentiation into Causes and Effects in the transactions of the ordinary world,—if Negation did not exist in its various forms of 'Previous Negation' and the rest. For instance, one who wants *Curd*, obtains Milk,—but one who wants Milk does not seek to obtain Curd; similarly one who wants the Cow does not secure the Horse; nor does the man who wants the Horse secure the Cow. It is in this way that business is carried on in the world.—(1651–1654)

The following might be urged—'Even if there is this fourfold division, how does that make Negation an *entity*?'

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1655).

"THESE SEVERAL KINDS (OF NEGATION) COULD NOT APPERTAIN TO A NON-ENTITY; HENCE NEGATION MUST BE REGARDED AS AN *Entity*; FOR INSTANCE, THE 'NEGATION' OF THE *Effect* CONSISTS IN THE 'PRESENCE' OF THE *Cause*."—[*Shlokavārtika*—NEGATION, 8].—(1655)

COMMENTARY.

There can be no division of a *Non-entity*; as division always rests in entities.—Hence *Negation* must be an *entity*.

"What sort of an *entity* can it be?"

Answer:—'*The Negation of the Effect, etc. etc.*'—The *Presence* of the Cause—Milk, for instance—is what constitutes the *Negation* of the Effect—Curd; and the Presence of the Effect—Curd—is what constitutes the Negation of the Cause—Milk. It is in this way that Negation is an *entity*.—(1655)

The following *Text* seeks to prove, by means of Inference, that Negation is an entity:—

TEXT (1656).

"OR AGAIN, NEGATION MAY BE REGARDED AS AN *entity*,—LIKE THE COW, ETC.,—BECAUSE IT IS APPREHENDED BY EXCLUSIVE AND INCLUSIVE NOTIONS,—AND ALSO BECAUSE IT IS *cognisable*."—[*Shlokavārtika*—NEGATION, 9].—(1656)

COMMENTARY.

'Negation is an entity',—this the statement of the Proposition; in support of this there are two Reasons: (1) '*because it is apprehended by*

exclusive and inclusive notions', and (2) '*because it is cognisable*';—'*like the Cow, etc.*' is the Corroborative Instance.

Of these, the 'inclusive Notion' is the idea, in regard to all the four kinds of Negation, that 'it is Negation';—the 'exclusive notion' is in the form of the differentiating idea as '*Previous Negation* is not *Destruction*'. —(1656)

Kumārila has described three kinds of Negation:—(1) the 'Non-modification of the Soul';—(2) 'the Cognition of some other particular object',—as declared under *Text* 1649 (which is a quotation from the *Shlokavārtika*—Negation, 11),—and (3) 'mere cessation (non-functioning) of all Means of Cognition', as described by him in this passage—'That Cognition is regarded (by the Buddhist) as *Inference* which is brought about by the three-featured Probans; but that Means of Cognition which consists in *not being brought about* (i.e. Negation) cannot stand in need of a *Cause*'—(*Shlokavārtika*—Negation, 44).

In regard to this third kind of Negation, the following Text anticipates and answers an objection:—

TEXT (1657).

"IF IT BE ASKED—'HOW CAN NEGATION BE A *Means* (*or Form*) *of Cognition*?'—OUR ANSWER IS—WHAT SORT OF OBJECT IS IT THAT IS *cognised* BY IT? JUST AS THE COGNISABLE OBJECT IS *negative*, SO SHOULD THE MEANS (OR FORM) OF COGNITION ALSO BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE."—[*Shlokavārtika*—NEGATION, 45].—(1657)

COMMENTARY.

The following point may be raised—How can 'Negation', which consists in *non-appearance of Perception*, be a Means of Cognition?

The answer to this is—*What sort of Object is it that is cognised by it?*

The rejoinder may be—"What is cognised is *negative* in character."

In that case (our answer would be that), the Means of Cognition also should be understood to be of the same nature as the Object *cognised*; why then should it be asked—how Negation can be a Means of Cognition?—Certainly it cannot be denied that the *Means* can be of the same nature as the *Object*.—(1657)

Question:—*Negation* may be a Means of Cognition; but why should it be different from Perception and the rest?

Answer:—

TEXTS (1658-1659).

"THE *negation of the Means of Cognition* MUST BE DIFFERENT FROM PERCEPTION AND THE REST,—BECAUSE IT IS SPOKEN OF BY THE NAME 'NEGATION',—LIKE THE *negation of cognisable things.*— OR THE NEGATION (OF THINGS) MUST BE COGNISED THROUGH A MEANS WHICH IS OF THE SAME NATURE AS ITSELF,—BECAUSE IT IS SOMETHING COGNISABLE,— JUST LIKE THE POSITIVE ENTITY. FOR THESE REASONS, THIS MEANS OF COGNITION MUST BE OF A NATURE DIFFERENT FROM THE *positive.*"— [*Shlokavārtika*—NEGATION, 54-55].—(1658-1659)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Negation of Perception and the other Means of Cognition' must be regarded as a *Means of Cognition* different from Perception and the rest,—because it is spoken of by the name 'Negation',—just like the *negation of cognisable things.*

Or, the cognisable object named 'Negation' may be the subject (Minor Term),—the Probandum regarding it being that 'it is cognisable through a *Means of Cognition* of the same nature as itself';—'because it is a cognisable object' is the Probans;—the cognisable object called 'positive' is the Corroborative Instance. From this it follows that the *Means of Cognition* which is of the same nature as the cognisable 'negation' must be distinct from Perception and the rest which are *positive* in character.—(1658-1659)

The above arguments (of *Kumārila,* in support of 'Negation' as a distinct *Means of Cognition*) are answered in the following—

TEXT (1660).

AS REGARDS THESE ARGUMENTS—THE 'MODIFICATION' OF THE ETERNAL ENTITY (SOUL) HAS BEEN REJECTED ALREADY; THE EXISTENCE OF THE CONTRARY OF SUCH A 'MODIFICATION' CANNOT BE OCCASIONAL.—(1660)

COMMENTARY.

This shows the 'impossibility' of the first definition of *Negation* as 'the non-modification of the Soul' (see Text 1649). What is meant is as

follows :—By the process of Preclusion, 'non-modification' is something 'contrary to modification'; it is this, as appearing at certain times, that is meant to be the characteristic feature of 'Negation'. If it were not this *occasional* 'non-modification' that is meant by the process of Preclusion, then the thing defined would be there at all times.—Such 'non-modification' is not possible in the case of the Soul; as the possibility of any *modification* of an eternal entity has been already rejected. Under the circumstances, how could there be any basis for what is only the contrary of that Modification by the process of Preclusion ?

The '*sattva*', 'entity', meant here is the *Soul*, which is qualified by the adjective '*nitya*', 'eternal'.—Or, the compound '*nityasattva*' may be expounded as 'that of which, the *sattva*, existence, is *nitya* eternal'; that is, *eternal*.

'*The existence of the contrary of such modification*';—'*the contrary of modification*' is *non-modification*;—this cannot be *occasional*; it must be eternal; as being always of one and the same form, the Soul is one only.—(1660)

The following might be urged—"*Non-modification* is not of the nature of 'something contrary to *modification*', it is only of the nature of the 'absence of modification'; so that the definition cannot be *impossible*".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1661).

IF WHAT IS MEANT BY 'NON-MODIFICATION' IS ONLY THE *absence of modification*,—THEN, AS THE ENTITY CONCERNED IS ETERNAL, THIS SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE THERE AT ALL TIMES, AS IT NEVER CEASES.—(1661)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tatpratikṣēpamātrātmā*'—'*Tat*' is *modification*;—'*Pratikṣepa*' is denial, absence;—'*mātra*' is *only*;—that which has this absence of modification for its essence.

'*This*'—i.e. the 'non-modification' in the form of 'absence of modifications'—should be always of one and the same form; as there can be no modification of the Soul.—(1661)

In the following *Texts*, the possibility of 'non-modification' is taken for granted, and then it is shown that the definition is too wide :—

TEXTS (1662–1664).

OR, THERE MAY BE 'NON-MODIFICATION' OF THE SOUL. EVEN SO, THE DEFINITION IS WRONG. BECAUSE IN THE STATE OF SLEEP, SWOON AND THE LIKE, EVEN THOUGH THIS (NON-MODIFICATION OF SOUL) IS THERE, THE OBJECTS (OF COGNITION) ARE THERE.—IF THEN, THE 'NON-MODIFICATION OF THE SOUL' BE HELD TO BE IN REFERENCE TO THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS, ON THE GROUND THAT WHEN THERE ARE OTHER COGNITIONS, THE PLACE CONCERNED IS SEEN TO BE DEVOID OF THOSE THINGS,—THEN, EVEN BY THIS EXPLANATION, WHAT MORE HAS BEEN SAID IN ADDITION TO WHAT IS SAID IN THE SECOND DEFINITION (OF NEGATION) THAT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED,—IN VIEW WHEREOF THE TWO DEFINITIONS HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD AS ALTERNATIVES ?—(1662–1664)

COMMENTARY.

'*Wrong*'—Too wide.

'*Swoon and the like*'.—'And the like' is meant to include those conditions where there is interception, or the thing is behind one's back.

'*Even though this is there*'—i.e. even though the Soul is there, not-modified into the form of the Cognition of the Jar and other things.

[Says the Opponent]—"Even though cognition other than those based on real objects are there, this is cognition of the place as devoid of the Jar and such real substances,—and it is this that is meant by 'non-modification'; as the Soul (under the states) is not modified into the form of the cognition of the Jar, etc. [and thus this precludes the cases of sleep, swoon and the like].—'*Tasya*' stands for the *Soul*.—'*Asau*' stands for *non-modification*".

If this is what is meant (by the first definition), then there would be nothing said (in the first definition) which differentiated this definition from the second definition (put forward in *Text* 1649) to the effect that 'Negation is the cognition of some other object'; so that the putting forward of two alternative views would be useless.—(1662–1664)

The following *Text* points out the defect in the second definition of *Negation* (put forward under *Text* 1649) :—

TEXT (1665).

IF THE SECOND KIND OF 'NEGATION' WERE ADMITTED, THEN, WHEN THE 'COGNITION OF SOME OTHER THING' WOULD COME ABOUT, THERE WOULD BE 'NEGATION' OF EVERYTHING ELSE,—EVEN THAT WHICH IS NOT PERCEPTIBLE.—(1665)

COMMENTARY.

'*Even that, etc. etc.*'—i.e. things removed in time, place and nature.

'*Second kind of Negation*'—i.e. that in the form of 'the cognition of something else'.—(1665)

TEXT (1666).

"WHAT IS COGNISED THROUGH THE SAID COGNITION OF SOME OTHER THING, IN THE SHAPE OF THE PLACE DEVOID OF THE THING IN QUESTION, IS THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ONLY THAT WHICH IS AS CAPABLE OF BEING COGNISED AS THE OTHER THING COGNISED,—WHEN OTHER CAUSES ARE PRESENT",—IF THIS IS WHAT IS MEANT [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING *Text*].—(1666)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"What we mean to prove is not the non-existence of all that is not perceived; it is the non-existence of only that which is as capable of being cognised as the *place devoid of the Jar and other things*,—i.e. that only which would be perceptible if it were there.

'*Through the cognition of some other thing*',—i.e. on the cognition of *the place devoid of the Jar and other things.*"—(1666)

The answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXTS (1667-1670).

[UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES] THE 'NON-EXISTENCE' SHOULD BE SAID TO BE OF ONLY THAT PERCEPTION WHICH ENVISAGES THE PERCEPTIBLE OBJECT,—NOT OF OTHERS; AS THAT WOULD BE FALSE.—HOW TOO IS IT KNOWN THAT *the cognition of the other thing* HAS COME ABOUT, WHEN COGNITIONS THEMSELVES ARE NOT PERCEPTIBLE? IF IT IS KNOWN THROUGH PRESUMPTION, THAT TOO IS OF THE NATURE OF COGNITION,—HOW THEN IS IT ITSELF COGNISED? IF ANOTHER PRESUMPTION IS SUGGESTED, THEN THERE IS AN INFINITE REGRESS.—IF THE 'NEGATION OF COGNITION' IS AN ENTITY, THE 'NEGATION OF THE COGNISED OBJECT' ALSO SHOULD BE THE SAME. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHY DO YOU NOT INCLUDE 'NEGATION' UNDER 'PERCEPTION' ITSELF?—(1667-1670)

COMMENTARY.

'*Shakyadarshana*' is that thing the Perception of which is possible, i.e. what is *perceptible*. '*Ābhā*' is form, figure;—hence what is meant is that Perception which envisages the perceptible thing.

'*Not of others*'—i.e. of Inference and the rest; because what is cognised through these is *imperceptible*; and the absence of these is not followed by the absence or negation of things removed in time, place and nature; so that the absence or negation of these would be false (if brought forward as bringing about the *Negation* of these things). Hence there would be no sense in

adding the term 'and the rest' in the phrase 'negation of Perception *and the rest*'.

Further, if 'the cognition of a thing other than that' were definite and certain,—then it must be admitted that it proves the absence of the counter-entity. Otherwise, if the Negation were proved as merely *existing*, then it would mean that the negation in question has become cognised by all men, through the said 'cognition of the other thing' appearing in any one person only. In that case, how could the *Mīmāmsaka*, who regards Cognition as imperceptible, become cognisant of that 'Cognition of another thing'?—He would never be able to cognise it.

'*If through Presumption*';—'if it is cognised'—this has to be construed here, from the Context;—as has been asserted in the statement—'As there can be no idea of the object that is not cognised, the cognition of the thing is inferred from the inferential indicative in the shape of the Idea of the thing';—here the term 'inferential indicative' stands for *Presumption*;—and '*cognition of the thing*' means that cognition which can be explained otherwise than on the basis of the said Presumption;—'*inferred*' stands for *definitely cognised.*

In that case, as this Presumption also would be a Cognition,—it has to be explained how it is itself cognised.

If the answer be that "it is cognised through another Presumption",—then, there would be an infinite regress.

Then again, if the idea of Negation being an *entity* is admitted, then, just as the 'negation of the Means of Cognition' is an entity, the 'negation of the object cognised' also should be an entity; and in that case, being an *entity*, why cannot Negation be regarded as cognised through Perception itself? In that case there would be no need for postulating a distinct Means of Cognition for the Cognition of Negation.—(1667–1670)

The following *Text* supports the same idea of Negation being included under Perception:—

TEXT (1671).

THE 'NEGATION OF THE EFFECT' CONSISTS IN THE PRESENCE OF THE CAUSE; AND THIS LATTER IS OF A NATURE DISTINCT FROM THE OTHER, AND IS APPREHENDED BY PERCEPTION ITSELF.—(1671)

COMMENTARY.

It has been declared (by *Kumārila* himself, see *Text* 1655 above) that 'The Negation of the effect consists in the presence of the Cause'; and this 'presence of the Cause' is of a nature—character—distinct from the Effect; and it is apprehended by Perception itself; so that what other aspect of 'Negation' is left to be cognised, for the sake of which Negation would be a distinct Means of Cognition?

This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one Means of Cognition has no cognisable object other than that of another Means of Cognition, then it cannot be a distinct Means of Cognition; —e.g. a *seventh* Means of Cognition,—'Negation' has no cognisable object apart from what is cognised by Perception; hence the assumption of such a distinct Means of Cognition would be failing in the fulfilment of the wider condition.—(1671)

The Opponent urges the 'inadmissibility' of the Reason adduced in this argument—

TEXTS (1672-1673).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, IN THE CASE OF EVERYTHING WHICH IS ALWAYS *existent* IN ITS OWN FORM, AND *non-existent* IN THE FORM OF OTHER THINGS,—IT IS ONLY A CERTAIN ASPECT THAT IS COGNISED THROUGH CERTAIN MEANS AT CERTAIN TIMES; AND IT IS ONLY WHEN THE *existent* (POSITIVE) ASPECT IS TO BE COGNISED THAT PERCEPTION AND THE REST COME IN; AND WHEN THE *non-existent* (NEGATIVE) ASPECT IS TO BE APPREHENDED, THE OPERATION OF THE 'NON-APPEARANCE OF PERCEPTION AND THE REST' (I.E. 'NEGATION') COMES IN."—(1672-1673)

COMMENTARY.

"There would have been no object left to be cognised by *Negation* if objects had only one aspect; as a matter of fact, however, objects have two aspects—they are *existent* (positive) in their own form, and *non-existent* (negative) in the form of other things; there thus being two aspects of every object, there is only a certain aspect of it that is cognised through a certain Means,—all aspects are not cognised by all Means of Cognition.

"This same idea is further explained—'*It is only when the Positive aspect, etc. etc.*'—When the Positive aspect of the Object is apprehended, then there is the operation of the five Means of Cognition, Perception and the rest,—and not of Negation; when however it is the Negative aspect that is meant to be apprehended, then there is operation of the 'non-appearance of Perception, etc.',—i.e. of 'Negation'."—(1672-1673)

Our Reason would have been 'inadmissible' if one and the same thing had both (positive and negative) characters; as a matter of fact however the presence of two characters in the same object is incongruous.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1674).

IT IS THE *form* (*aspect*) *of the Thing itself* THAT IS HELD TO BE 'DIFFERENTIATED'; IT IS IN THAT SAME FORM THAT IT EXISTS, AND IT IS IN THIS FORM THAT IT IS PERCEIVED.—(1674)

COMMENTARY.

When the thing is 'differentiated' from another thing, it is not in any other form; in fact it is differentiated *in its own form*; hence it is the *form of the thing itself* which is apprehended as differentiated from the other thing; as it remains in its own form. That form in which it is differentiated,—in that form, the Thing is always *existent*, never *non-existent*. This thing is perceived in the form in which it is differentiated from other things; so that there is no apprehension of any second form or aspect of that thing.—(1674)

It has thus been shown that the postulating of the two forms (aspects) of things is incompatible with Perception; the following Texts show that it is incompatible with Inference :—

TEXTS (1675–1677).

WHAT IS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE ACTION IS SAID TO BE 'EXISTENT',—OTHER THAN THAT IS SAID TO BE 'NON-EXISTENT'; THE TWO CANNOT EXIST TOGETHER IN THE SAME SUBSTRATUM, AS THEY ARE CONTRADICTORY.—"BUT THE SAME THING MAY BE *capable* OF THAT EFFECTIVE ACTION WHICH IT CAN ITSELF ACCOMPLISH, BUT INCAPABLE OF ANOTHER (EFFECTIVE ACTION)".—IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE DUAL CHARACTER CAN NEVER SUBSIST IN ANY SINGLE THING. IF IT IS SOMETHING ELSE THAT IS REGARDED AS 'INCAPABLE' OF THE OTHER ACTION,—THEN THERE ARE TWO THINGS; AND THE DUAL CHARACTER DOES NOT BELONG TO ONE AND THE SAME THING.—(1675–1677)

COMMENTARY.

(A) That which is capable of effective action is 'existent',—for example that aspect of the thing which is regarded as 'existent';—and what is held to be 'non-existent' is not capable of effective action;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

(B) Things that are mutually contradictory can never coexist in the same thing,—e.g. Light and Shade, or Heat and Cold,—the *existent* and *non-existent* aspects are mutually contradictory;—so the idea that they coexist is contrary to a universal proposition.

The Opponent urges the objection that the Reason adduced is 'inadmissible'—"*The same thing, etc. etc.*—That is to say, one and the same thing is *capable* of the effective action which can be accomplished by itself,

and also *incapable* of that effective action which can be accomplished by others; hence the Probans based upon the *capability for effective action* cannot be admissible; because the thing is not admitted as *capable of efficient action*, in regard to such action as can be accomplished by others. Nor is there any contradiction between 'existence' and 'non-existence', as the two are in reference to distinct aspects of the thing; for instance, the thing is called 'existent' in reference to such effective action as can be accomplished by itself, and that same thing—not another—is called 'non-existent', in reference to such action as can be accomplished by others; there would have been 'contradiction' if it had been called 'non-existent' also in reference to the action accomplished by itself."

The answer to this is as follows—'*As a matter of fact, etc. etc.*';—That same thing which is 'capable' of the action that can be accomplished by itself, is 'incapable' of that which can be accomplished by others;—and it is not any other thing. Things do not differ through difference in their relatives or through difference in words;—because the thing is impartite.

'*Tat*' stands for '*tasmāt*', 'for these reasons'.—*For these reasons, the dual character* can never belong to the same thing.

If it be held that—"the aspect that is incapable of such action as can be accomplished by others is different from that which is capable of effective action". This is what is introduced by the words '*If it is something else, etc. etc.*'.

The answer to this is that *there are two things*;—that which is *capable* of effective action is one thing, and that which is *incapable* is the second thing; so that in saying what you have said, you have asserted the existence of *two things*, and not the dual aspect of one and the same thing.—(1675–1677)

The following *text* points out defects in the third definition of 'Negation' put forward—that it consists merely in the *absence of Means of Cognition.*

TEXT (1678).

THE IDEA OF 'NEGATION' BEING AN ENTITY HAVING BEEN PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED, WHY IS IT DESCRIBED TO BE *featureless*?—(1678)

COMMENTARY.

'*Previously accepted*'—in the assertion that 'Negation consists in the non-modification of the Soul or in the cognition of something else' (*Text* 1649).

'*Featureless*'.—It has been asserted (by *Kumārila*, see under Text 1657) that—"Just as the cognisable Object is negative, so should the Means of cognition also be understood to be"; from which it is clear that the Means or Form of Cognition consists in the apprehension of the Object; hence it cannot be right to attribute the character of 'Means or Form of Cognition'

to what is entirely featureless; this is what is meant; and this same idea is going to be put forward again (in the following *Text*).—(1678)

This same idea is further explained—

TEXT (1679).

THE OBJECT THAT IS FEATURELESS BEING DEVOID OF THE FORM OF COGNITION, CANNOT BE A *Means or Form of Cognition*; AS THIS IS ALWAYS OF THE NATURE OF *Cognition*.—(1679)

COMMENTARY.

'*This*'—i.e. Means or Form of Cognition.

That which is not of the nature of the cognition of things cannot be a 'Means or Form of Cognition',—e.g. the Jar and such things;—and Negation is devoid of the nature of the cognition of things;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character (which must mean the absence of the less wide character).—(1679)

The following might be urged:—"The Eye and the other organs are not of the nature of the cognition of things,—and yet, as they serve as causes bringing about the cognition of things, they are called 'Means of Cognition'; the same would be the case with 'Negation' also; so that the Reason adduced is *not true* (Inconclusive)".

This is the argument anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXT (1680).

IF IT IS URGED THAT—"NEGATION IS A *Means of Cognition* BECAUSE—LIKE THE EYE, ETC.—IT SERVES AS THE CAUSE OF COGNITION",—THEN (OUR ANSWER IS THAT) WHAT IS ENTIRELY FEATURELESS CAN NEVER SERVE AS THE CAUSE OF ANYTHING.—(1680)

COMMENTARY.

It is not right to make assumptions on the basis of the figurative idea of being the 'cause of cognition'; because what is entirely featureless and hence devoid of all capacity, cannot be rightly regarded as a *Cause*. If it were so regarded, it would cease to be *featureless*; and further, as what is featureless cannot be specially related to any particular time or place, if a cognition were brought about by it, it would never cease at all.—(1680)

TEXTS (1681–1683).

THEN AGAIN, BEING DEVOID OF THE FORM OF COGNITION, HOW WOULD THE 'NEGATION' BE APPREHENDED ?—IF IT WERE HELD TO BE APPREHENDED BY THE ABSENCE—I.E. NEGATION—OF THE COGNITION RELATING TO IT,—THEN THERE WOULD BE NO END (TO THE ASSUMPTION OF SUCH NEGATIONS).—IF, THEN, THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE *Cognition* WERE APPREHENDED THROUGH THE ABSENCE OF THE *cognised thing*,—AND THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE *cognised thing* WERE APPREHENDED THROUGH THE *absence of Cognition*,—THERE WOULD BE MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE.—HENCE THE FACT IS THAT WHAT IS THE *Perception* OF ONE THING IS CALLED THE *Non-perception* OF ANOTHER ;—AND THE SAID *Perception* COMES ABOUT BY ITSELF, BECAUSE BY ITS VERY NATURE IT IS *not-dark* (SELF-LUMINOUS).—(1681–1683)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, what is itself *not known* cannot bring about the Cognition of anything else ;—if it did, it would lead to absurdities ; this has been already explained ; so it has to be explained in what way 'Negation' itself is known. It cannot be cognised by itself ; as if it were so, then the *negation*, or absence, of the object also would be cognised by itself, and there would be no need for postulating a Means of Cognition in the shape of 'Negation' ; as this is meant only for the purpose of bringing about the cognition of the *negation of the object*,—and this negation of the object will have been cognised by itself, like the *negation of the Means of Cognition*.—Nor can it be regarded as cognised by its own Cognition, because, *ex hypothesi*, it is 'devoid of the form of Cognition' ;—how then could it be cognised by its own Cognition ? It is only what is of the nature of *Cognition* that can be so cognised.

It might be argued that it could be known from another *negation* of the Means of Cognition bearing upon itself.—But then there arises the question —how is this latter Negation known ?—If it were held to be due to yet another Negation,—then there would be an infinite regress. This has been thus declared :— 'Otherwise the non-existence of the Object is known through Non-apprehension, and the non-existence of the Apprehension is known by another Non-apprehension ; so there is an infinite regress'.

In order to avoid this Infinite Regress, it may be held that the Cognition of *Negation* is due to the absence (Negation) of the Object.—But in that case there is mutual interdependence. For instance, the Negation of the *Means of Cognition* is cognised through the cognition of the Negation of the *Object*, and the negation of the *Object* is cognised through the Cognition of the negation of the *Means of Cognition* ; thus the defect of mutual interdependence is quite clear.—Thus you are reduced to that condition where the thrust of the Javelin throws out the Eye-ball !

From all this it follows that the *Non-apprehension* of one thing consists only in the *apprehension* of another thing,—and 'Negation' need not be a Means of Cognition different from *Perception*.

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The following might be urged:—"How is that *apprehension of one thing* known? What has been urged against the Cognition of *Negation* would apply to that also".

The answer to this is that—'*the said Perception, etc. etc.*'—That is, the Perception of the one thing becomes cognised *by itself*,—not through anything else; hence in this case there is no Infinite Regress.—"Why?"—Because, *by its very nature*,—in its own form,—*it is not-dark*,—i.e. it is of the nature of *Light* (which is self-luminous).—Nor would cognition through mere *presence* lead to incongruities, as nothing else (except Cognition) is of the nature of Light (i.e. self-luminous).—(1681–1683)

Question:—"Why should there be this hostility towards the apprehension of Cognition through something else?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1684–1686).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE APPREHENSION OF COGNITION THROUGH SOMETHING ELSE IS NOT POSSIBLE IN ANYWAY,—EITHER (*a*) THROUGH THE INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE,—OR (*b*) THROUGH ANOTHER COGNITION (PERCEPTION),—OR (*c*) THROUGH PRESUMPTION.—THERE BEING A POSSIBILITY OF OBJECTIONS BEING RAISED AGAINST ALL THESE THREE, THERE WOULD BE SEVERAL INFINITE REGRESSES CREEPING IN FOR YOU.—[IT MUST BE ADMITTED THEREFORE THAT] AS AMONG THINGS EQUALLY CAPABLE OF BEING APPREHENDED, THE APPREHENSION OF ONE LEADS TO THE DEFINITE COGNITION THAT THE OTHERS ARE *non-existent*.—(1684–1686)

COMMENTARY.

(1) Some people hold that Cognition is cognisable through the Inferential Indicative;—this Inferential Indicative being either in the form of the idea of a thing, or in that of an Action, or in that of a thing perceptible by the senses, or some manifest object, and so forth.

(2) Others hold that Cognition is *perceived* through another Cognition,—and not self-cognised,—because the operation of anything upon itself involves an incongruity.

(3) Others again hold that it is cognised through Presumption based upon the inexplicability (otherwise) of what is duly known; i.e. the idea of a thing being *known* would be inexplicable if the Cognition of the thing were not there, the Cognition itself being by its nature *dull* (non-intelligent, dark).

Thus these three theories have been put forward.

Now there being a possibility of objections being brought up against each of these three theories—relating to the Inferential Indicative and the rest,—such as—'How is the Inferential Indicative itself known?', and so forth,—*there will be several Infinite Regresses creeping in*:—For instance, the Inferential Indicative and the rest could not be cognised until Cognition

is cognised; hence its cognition should be sought for from somewhere else;—and for that also, it would be necessary to have *recourse* to another Inferential Indicative and so forth. This same process being urged against each of the three theories,—there would be an endless Infinite Regress.

From all this, the right conclusion would be that the apprehension of one thing brings about the Cognition of the non-existence of other things.—When one has to deny the time and place of things, the negation (denial) is made of the perceptible *things* themselves, as it is these latter that stand on the same footing as the *thing* that has been apprehended; it being impossible to deny anything else. If *sameness* were denied, then all would be denied,—as has been seen before; because all things become included under 'what is not—that thing—which is apprehended',—according to the principle that 'what is not the same as one thing is another thing'.—(1684–1686)

Question:—

TEXT (1687).

"What is that *one* thing on the cognition whereof the sky is cognised as *moon-less*? How too is the *absence* of all Sound cognised anywhere?"—(1687)

COMMENTARY.

[Says the Opponent]—"When a man notices the absence of the Moon in the *Ākāsha*, there is no apprehension of any *one* thing, by virtue of which it could be said that from the apprehension of that one thing follows the apprehension of *the non-existence of other things*; specially as there is no such real thing as *Ākāsha* which could be apprehended as devoid of the Moon. Even that *Ākāsha* which others have postulated as something *real* is beyond the reach of the senses.—Then again, when at a certain place the *absence of sound* is noticed,—from the apprehension of what *one* thing does that follow?—It cannot be urged that it follows from the apprehension of the spot on the ground concerned; because the ground is not equal to the Sound as regards its perceptibility,—because the ground is visible, while the Sound is *audible*; and what are meant to be mutually related in the present context are things that stand on the same footing regarding their perceptibility.—This is clear from the assertion that 'one thing is *other* than the other when both are related to the same cognition and yet are not dependent upon one another'.—Nor can the cognition in question be said to proceed from the apprehension of *Time*; because there is no such category as 'Time' apart from the other categories, whose apprehension could be there. The *Time* that is accepted by the other party is also something beyond the senses".—(1687)

The answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXTS (1688-1689).

AS A MATTER OF FACT (ALL THAT IS PERCEIVED IS) THE *Mass of Light and Shade*, WHICH THE OBSERVER REGARDS AS '*Akāsha*'; ANYTHING APART FROM THAT HAS NO EXISTENCE; NOR IS IT PERCEIVED.—IN THE CASE OF *the absence of all Sounds* ALSO, ITS COGNITION IS DUE TO THE NON-PERCEPTION OF ITS EFFECT; AND THIS NON-PERCEPTION IS COGNISED ULTIMATELY THROUGH THE SELF-COGNITION OF OTHER COGNITIONS.—(1688-1689)

COMMENTARY.

'*Of the mass of Light and Shade*';—add—'on the perception of';—this same—mass of Light and Shade—is regarded by the observer as '*Ākāsha*', nothing apart from that. For instance, during the day or night, the man perceives the '*Ākāsha*' to be 'like sapphire' or 'like the Cloud'; and for the other party, the *Ākāsha* has neither colour nor shape.

'*Anything apart from that*';—that is, anything like the *Ākāsha* postulated by the other party has no existence apart from the said *Mass of Light and Shade*; and if it does exist, it is not perceptible by the senses.

As regards the absence of all sounds also, it is cognised through the non-apprehension of its effect in the shape of *Auditory Cognition*; and this *non-apprehension* is cognised through the apprehension of the *Visual* and other Cognitions; so that here also there is the *apprehension of one thing*, in the shape of the apprehension of these other Cognitions.

Says the Opponent:—"All cases of the existence of the *Causes* are not covered by the existence of the Effect, by virtue of which the existence of the Effect, on its cessation, would preclude the existence of the Cause also. That this cannot be the case is due to the fact that Causes are not always effective (even though present)."

[*Answer*]—We do not say that *all* cases of the existence of the Cause are covered by the existence of the Effect; what we say is that *particular* cases of the existence of the Cause,—whose effectiveness is never obstructed,—are those that are meant to be excluded by the non-existence of the *effect* (auditory Perception),—not the existence of all causes. For instance, even in a case where the apprehension of the bare *place* brings about the cognition of the *absence of the Jar*, what brings about this latter cognition is the non-apprehension of the *effect* in the shape of the *apprehension of the Jar*; because the *absence* that is cognised is only that of the Jar which would have been *perceptible* (if it were there),—and not of *all* Jars. And what would be that which is *perceptible*? That alone whose capacity has not been obstructed. Because *Perceptibility* has been described as a particular *character*,—and what is the *character* of a thing must be perceptible. Otherwise, here also, all cases of the *Existence of the Jar* would not be covered by the *Apprehension of the Jar*; and hence the absence of the *non-pervading* factor could not lead to the absence of the *un-pervaded* factor; and there would be no cognition

of the *absence of the Jar*. It is for this reason that in all cases, the non-apprehension of the character of the thing leads to the thing being regarded as *non-existent*. In reality however what has to be perceived is the *non-apprehension of the effect* (which leads to the cognition of the non-existence of the *Cause*).—(1688-1689)

The following *Text* proceeds to show the 'Inconclusive' character of the Reason—'because it is spoken of by the name *Negation* [therefore Negation should be regarded as different from Perception and the rest'; see *Text* 1658]:—

TEXT (1690).

THUS, IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT NEGATION IS ESSENTIALLY A POSITIVE ENTITY, THE FACT OF ITS *being spoken of by the name Negation* IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH ITS BEING INCLUDED (UNDER OTHER MEANS OR FORMS OF COGNITION).—(1690)

COMMENTARY.

'*Thus*',—i.e. under the principle that 'the perception of one thing is what is called the non-perception of other things' and so forth.

'*The fact, etc. etc.*'—Even when 'Negation' is included under 'Perception', the fact of its being spoken of by the name 'Negation' does not become incompatible.

This shows that the Probans put forward by the Opponent is not absent where the contrary of the Probandum is present.—(1690)

TEXT (1691).

AS REGARDS THE CONTENTION (UNDER *Text* 1659) THAT "NEGATION MUST BE COGNISED BY A MEANS WHICH IS OF THE SAME NATURE AS ITSELF",—THIS IS ENTIRELY SUPERFLUOUS; AS EVEN IN WHAT WE ASSERT THERE IS THAT *sameness of nature*.—(1691)

COMMENTARY.

'*There is that sameness of nature*',—the 'non-apprehension', in the shape of the apprehension of something else, being *negative* in character.

In this connection, some people urge the following objection:—"The cognition that envisages merely the absence of things cannot be included under Perception and the rest,—because it envisages only the *absence* (negation) of things, while Perception and the rest envisage positive things;—nor can it be regarded as invalid,—as it is in conformity with the real state of things. When you (Buddhists) postulate the absolute destruction of things, you cannot deny the *absence of things*."

What has been explained above disposes of this objection also. In the case in question, what the particular Conceptual Thought envisages is *not pure* negation devoid of all specifications of time, place, etc.,—it envisages the qualified Negation in the form that at a certain place 'the Jar is not'; and that it is so is due to the fact that the Place, etc. have the capacity of being perceived. Thus it is that Negation is not regarded as a distinct Means or Form of Cognition; because what is conceived is only such empty place as has been apprehended by Perception.—Even if there were apprehension of *pure*, unqualified, Negation, the cognition apprehending it could not be regarded as valid, because it would be envisaging a *non-entity*; and all consideration of the validity of cognitions, by men seeking for effective action, relates to *entities* only.—What has been urged therefore is beneath notice.—(1691)

End of Negation.

CHAPTER XIX.

Section (E).

On 'Yukti' (Ratiocination) and *'Anupalabdhi' (Non-Apprehension).*

The author argues as follows, in connection with 'Ratiocination' and 'Non-apprehension' (as distinct Means of Cognition):—

TEXTS (1692–1695).

(A) "THAT THING COMES ABOUT WHEN THIS THING IS THERE, AND IT DOES NOT COME ABOUT, WHEN IT IS NOT THERE,—THEREFORE IT PROCEEDS FROM THAT",—THIS IS CALLED 'RATIOCINATION'. THE SAGE *Charaka* HAS DECLARED THAT IT IS A DISTINCT MEANS OF COGNITION; BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE INFERENCE, AS NO CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE IS AVAILABLE".—

(B) "WHEN A CERTAIN THING IS COGNISABLE BY AN APPREHENSION,—THEN, FROM THE ABSENCE OF THAT APPREHENSION, ONE DEDUCES THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THAT THING;— THIS IS REGARDED AS 'NON-APPREHENSION'.—THIS ALSO IS A DISTINCT MEANS OF COGNITION, AS IT DOES NOT NEED A CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE AND OTHER FACTORS. IN FACT, IN THE INSTANCE ALSO, NON-EXISTENCE WOULD BE COGNISED BY MEANS OF THIS SAME 'NON-APPREHENSION'."—(1692–1695)

COMMENTARY.

When a thing is cognised as being the effect of a certain thing, on the ground of its being produced only when the latter is present,—it is regarded as a case of 'Ratiocination'.—As it is *conceptual,* it cannot be *Perception*; nor can it be *Inference,* as there is no Corroborative Instance; and if there were an Instance, then also the notion of *being an effect* would be due to *being produced only when the other is present*; and in support of that, another instance would have to be sought for; and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress.—Hence this is a distinct Means of Cognition; so says the sage *Charaka,* the medical doctor.

Similarly, when there is cognition of the non-existence of a thing derived from the *absence of its apprehension,* it is a case of 'Non-apprehension'; and the reasons for regarding this also as a distinct Means of Cognition are to be found as in the case of 'Ratiocination'.—(1692–1695)

The above is refuted in the following—

TEXT (1696).

THERE IS NO RESTRICTION REGARDING THE COGNITION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, AND THE COGNITION OF NON-EXISTENCE; AND IN THE CASES CITED THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PROBANS AND THE PROBANDUM.—(1696)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*Kāryakāraṇatā, etc.*' is to be expounded as the '*pratipatti*', cognition, of '*Kāryakāraṇatā*', the relation of Cause and Effect, and of '*abhāva*', 'non-existence'; the cognition of the relation of Cause and Effect is said to be by means of 'Ratiocination', and the cognition of 'non-existence by means of Non-apprehension'.

'*Asyām*'—in the two cases cited—of 'Ratiocination' and 'Non-apprehension',—there is no difference between the Probans and the Probandum. —(1696)

How there is no difference is shown in the following—

TEXT (1697).

THE RELATION OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT' IS NOTHING OTHER THAN THAT ONE THING IS PRODUCED ONLY WHEN THE OTHER IS THERE; NOR IS *non-existence* KNOWN TO BE ANY THING OTHER THAN THE 'NON-PERCEPTION' OF WHAT IS PERCEPTIBLE.—(1697)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of 'Ratiocination', there is no difference between the *Probans and the Probandum*; because the *reason* (Probans) is the *fact of one thing being produced only when the other is there*,—the *relation of Cause and Effect* is the Probandum; and we find no difference between these two; the two are synonymous, like the terms '*taru*' and '*pādapa*' (both meaning *Tree*).

In the case of 'Non-apprehension' also, there is no difference between the Cause and the Effect. For instance, if mere *absence of apprehension* is meant (by 'Non-apprehension'), then as nothing like it is known, it would be open to the Infinite Regress and other objections urged above. If, on the other hand, the 'Non-apprehension' of a thing is only the 'apprehension of something else', then it becomes included under 'the Non-apprehension of what should have been apprehended'; and this does not prove the *non-existence*, which is cognised by Perception itself. It is for this reason that the text has declared—'*Nor is non-existence, etc. etc.*'—(1697)

It might be argued that—"what are meant to be proved are not the *Relation of Cause and Effect* and *Non-existence* themselves, but the ordinary usage regarding these."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1698).

FOR THE PROVING OF THE CAPABILITY OF BEING USED (SPOKEN OF, REGARDED) AS SUCH,—THERE IS THE EXAMPLE OF THE THING COGNISED AT THE TIME OF THE CONVENTION.—(1698)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tadbhāvavyavahāra*'—is the '*vyavahāra*', usage,—of the '*bhāva*', character, of 'cause and effect' and 'non-existence'.—That is, what is meant to be proved is the capacity of being spoken of as expressed by a certain name.—[And in this way, the two Means of Cognition become included under Inference]—The arguments being formulated as follows :—

(A) Things that, by their nature, are perceived after the operation of a certain thing, are capable of being spoken of as the 'effect' of that thing,—e.g. the things perceived at the time of Convention: the *Jar* is found to be perceived only after the Operation of the Potter; so also Words are found to be perceived only after the Operation of the Palate and other portions of the Mouth;—this being a Probans based upon the nature of things.

(B) Similarly in the case of 'Non-apprehension', if *usage* is what is meant to be proved, then the Inferential Reasoning may be formulated as follows :—When certain things capable of being apprehended are not apprehended in certain places, they are to be spoken of as *non-existent* in those places;—e.g. the Head of the Hare is one that can be spoken of as a place where the Horn is *non-existent*;—and as regards the doctrine of 'Universals', it is found that the 'Universal' and other categories postulated by others, which are held to be perceptible, are not perceived at all in *individuals*—like the spotted Cow for instance,—which are supposed to be the substratum of the said 'Universal'; so that here 'Non-apprehension' is in the very nature of these things. As regards the Individuals,—the *spotted* and other cows—these are duly perceived, hence these are not rejected as *non-existent.*

Nor can the Probans be said to be 'Inconclusive'; because the idea that there is only *manifestation* (by the Cause, of what already exists) is going to be rejected.

It is only on the basis of these facts that things are spoken of as 'non-existent'.

Nor can the Probans be said to be 'Contradictory', as it is actually present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.—(1698)

CHAPTER XIX.

Section (F).

On 'Sambhava', 'Probability'.

COMMENTARY.

"'*Sambhava*', (Probability) serves to bring about the cognition of the *components of the Aggregate* after the Aggregate itself has become cognised. For instance, the idea of 'a hundred' follows after the existence of 'a thousand' has been cognised. This cannot be Inference, as there is no Corroborative Instance available."

The objection against this is set forth in the following—

TEXT (1699).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE MEMBERS OF THE AGGREGATE ARE THE CAUSES OF THE IDEA OF THE AGGREGATE; HENCE THE COGNITION OF THE PROBABILITY OF 'A HUNDRED' PROCEEDING FROM THAT OF 'A THOUSAND' IS ONLY PRODUCED BY THE INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE.—(1699)

COMMENTARY.

Because the Aggregate is not something apart from the *components of the Aggregate*,—and these components are the cause (basis) of the very notion of the 'Aggregate',—therefore the cognition of 'a hundred' that proceeds from 'a thousand' is only a case of cognition produced by the Inferential Indicative, in the shape of *Effect*.—(1699)

End of Section (F).

CHAPTER XIX.

Section (G).

On 'Aitihya', 'Tradition' and 'Pratibhā', 'Intuition'.

COMMENTARY.

There are others who regard 'Tradition', etc. also as distinct Means of Cognition.—Of these 'Tradition' is that Means or Form of Cognition whose original promulgator cannot be discerned, but has come down through a long-continued assertion;—e.g. 'A *yakṣa* resides in this Banyan-tree'.

'Intuition' is that cognition indicative of the existence or non-existence of things, which appears suddenly without any restrictions of Time or Place; e.g. when the virgin has the notion 'my brother will come to-day'; and this does come about; hence it is valid cognition.

The objection to the above is set forth in the following—

TEXT (1700).

'TRADITION', 'INTUITION' AND THE REST ARE FOUND TO BE FALSE IN MANY CASES; HENCE THESE CANNOT BE REGARDED AS 'MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION'; AS SUCH ASSUMPTION WOULD LEAD TO INCONGRUITIES.—(1700)

COMMENTARY.

The phrase '*and the rest*' includes 'Recognition' and others; these also are regarded by some others as 'Means of Right Cognition'.

'*Would lead to incongruities*';—e.g. *Dream-Cognition* might be found to be true in a certain case and thereby come to be regarded as a valid Means or form of Cognition.—(1700)

End of Section (G).

CHAPTER XIX.

Section (H).

Summing up.

COMMENTARY.

Having thus rejected all other Means or Forms of Cognition, in detail, the author briefly proceeds to discard them (and thus sums up the question):—

TEXT (1701).

OR, ALL THIS EFFORT IS OUT OF PLACE; SINCE THINGS EXIST IN TWO FORMS ONLY—VIZ.: PERCEPTIBLE AND IMPERCEPTIBLE.—(1701)

COMMENTARY.

Things are of only two kinds—Perceptible and Imperceptible.—(1701)

Objection:—"There is also another kind—which is both *Perceptible and Imperceptible*, and which is neither *Perceptible* nor *Imperceptible*."

Answer:—

TEXTS (1702–1708).

ANY OTHER KIND IS NOT POSSIBLE,—IN THE SHAPE OF *Both Perceptible—and Imperceptible*, OR *neither Perceptible—nor—Imperceptible*. BECAUSE IN ANY SINGLE THING, BOTH *action* AND *inaction* WOULD BE SELF-CONTRADICTORY. THAT THING IS CALLED 'PERCEPTIBLE' WHICH PRODUCES ITS COGNITION DIRECTLY (IMMEDIATELY); THE CONTRARY OF THIS IS REGARDED BY THE WISE, AS 'IMPERCEPTIBLE'.—NOW VERBAL COGNITION, ANALOGICAL COGNITION AND THE REST CANNOT ENVISAGE THE FORMER (PERCEPTIBLE) THING; AS IN THAT CASE THEY WOULD BECOME INCLUDED UNDER 'PERCEPTION', OR BE FUTILE, LIKE REMEMBRANCE.—EVEN IF THEY ENVISAGE *Imperceptible* THINGS, IN WHAT WAY COULD ANYTHING BE ENVISAGED BY ALL? IF DIRECTLY (IMMEDIATELY), THEN THE THING WOULD NOT BE 'IMPERCEPTIBLE', BEING EXACTLY LIKE THE PERCEPTIBLE THING. IF THE COGNITIONS ARE DEPENDENT UPON SOMETHING ELSE (I.E. *indirect, mediate*), WOULD THE COGNITION BE RELATED TO IT OR NOT RELATED? WOULD IT ENVISAGE *distinction* OR NOT?—IF IT AROSE OUT OF WHAT IS *not related*, THEN THERE COULD BE NO RESTRICTION; AND IF IT

ENVISAGES *distinction*, THEN THERE COULD BE NO INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE. IF, LASTLY, THE COGNITION ENVISAGES AN *imperceptible* THING,—IS BASED UPON A RELATED OBJECT—AND DOES NOT ENVISAGE DISTINCTION FROM IT,—THEN IT IS CLEARLY 'INFERENCE'.—(1702–1708)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be right for any one thing to contain within itself a mixture of mutually contradictory properties;—if it did contain such, it would cease to be *one* thing. For instance, that thing is called 'Perceptible' which brings about the cognition of the thing as it exists, *directly*,—i.e. without the intervention of the Inferential Indicative or such other means of cognition. On this principle, such cognitions as 'Sound is momentary' would be one envisaging an *imperceptible* Thing. One and the same thing cannot be regarded as both active and inactive as regards anything; by virtue of which anything could be *both—Perceptible—and—Imperceptible*—as producing and not-producing a certain cognition.

Nor can a thing be *neither—Perceptible—nor—Imperceptible*; because in regard to anything, the *negation* of one character always implies the *affirmation* of the contrary character. If there are more things than one, then there is no incongruity in there being both *action* and *inaction* in any given case; e.g. the action and inaction of *Colour and Taste* (both) in regard to Visual Perception. Nor is there any incongruity in both *action* and *inaction* of even *one* thing, if it is in reference to more things than one; e.g. that of Colour with reference to both Visual and Auditory Perceptions.—It is in view of this that the *Text* says—'*In any single thing, both action and inaction would be self-contradictory*'.

For all these reasons, things are of only *two* kinds—(Perceptible and Imperceptible).

Now, if the Word and other Means of cognition were distinct *Means of Cognition*,—there could be only two alternatives regarding them—they envisage either (*a*) the Perceptible Thing, or (*b*) the Imperceptible Thing.

They cannot envisage the Perceptible Thing.—"Why?"—Because in that case they would be liable to become included under 'Perception'; as the Verbal and other Cognitions, in that case, would envisage those same things that are envisaged by Perception.—It might be urged that—"the other Means of Cognition bring about the Cognition of the thing concerned after it has been envisaged by Perception";—the answer to that is that '*it would be futile*'; that is, apprehending what is already apprehended, the Cognitions would be *invalid*,—like Remembrance.

Under the second alternative also (that Verbal and other cognitions envisage *Imperceptible* Things)—when the Imperceptible thing is cognised—would it be cognised *directly*, or *indirectly*, through the intervention of something else?—It cannot be cognised *directly*; as, in that case it would be like any *perceptible* thing and would cease to be *imperceptible*. Because it is called 'Imperceptible' only because it does not produce cognitions *directly*; if then, it were to produce cognitions *directly*, how could it be called 'Imperceptible'?

If the cognition of the Imperceptible thing were produced through the intervention of something else,—(1) would it be produced through the intervention of something *related* to it ? (2) of something *not related* to it ? (3) would it envisage distinction ? or (4) envisage non-distinction ?—These four alternatives are possible.—As an example of cognition envisaging *distinction*, there is the cognition of a particular Fire—produced by Leaves or Grass, produced through *smoke in general*. An example of cognition envisaging *non-distinction*, there is the cognition of *mere Fire* as excluded from other unlike things, produced by *Smoke*.—Now if this latter cognition were brought about by the intervention of a thing (Smoke) *not related* to the thing concerned (Fire),—there would be no restriction at all ; anything might bring about the cognition of anything.—If the cognition envisage *distinction*, then there would be no Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum ; as there would be no concomitance regarding the qualifying factor ; and to that extent, the Probans would be Inconclusive. —If then the cognition envisaged *non-distinction*, then it would be included under 'Inference'.

All this is what is urged in the *Text*—'*If, lastly, the Cognition, etc. etc. ; —and does not envisage distinction, etc. etc.*'.—That is, devoid of all tinge of distinction, envisaging the mere object as excluded from all unlike things ; e.g. the cognition of mere Fire, from Smoke.—If the cognition in question is of this kind, then it is clearly *Inference*, as brought about by the perception of Relation,—as the cognition of Fire, from Smoke.—(1702–1708)

End of Chapter XIX.

CHAPTER XX.

Examination of 'Syādvāda' (Jaina Doctrine)

COMMENTARY.

It has been declared in the Introductory bases (*Text,* 3) that the 'True Doctrine' is 'not mixed up with any foreign element, to the smallest detail'.—In support of this idea, the Author proceeds with the next chapter; and starts off with an objection (from the standpoint of the other Party):—

TEXT (1709).

"As a matter of fact, every entity has more than one aspect,—like the gem sapphire; why then should there be any incompatibility among 'existence', 'non-existence' and the rest?"—(1709)

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted (under *Text* 1675, above) that 'What is capable of effective action is said to be *existent,*—other than that is said to be *non-existent,*—the two cannot exist together in the same substratum, as they are contradictory'.

Against this, *Āhrīka* (a Jaina writer) and others urge the following objections:—

"*Every entity has more than one aspect,*—the *General* and the *Particular*; just like the lustrous gem which appears to be of variegated colour; why then should there be any contradiction (incompatibility) between *existence* and *non-existence,*—in view of which it is said that 'the two cannot co-exist in the same substratum'?—The term '*ādi*' in '*sadādi*' is meant to include 'activity and inactivity', 'unity' and so forth".

Though this objection has been already refuted under *Text* 1676, by the sentence '*Nanu tadētaddhi, etc.*', yet it has been introduced here for the purpose of expounding the matter in detail, or for setting forth a fresh theory.—(1709)

For proving the *General* and *Particular* character of things, *Āhrīka* has formulated the following arguments in due order:—

TEXT (1710).

"IF AN ENTITY WERE *not-equal to* (ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM) OTHER ENTITIES, THEN IT WOULD NOT DIFFER FROM THE 'SKY-FLOWER.' ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT WERE ENTIRELY DEVOID OF *non-equality* (DIFFERENCE), THEN IT COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS ANYTHING DIFFERENT FROM THOSE THINGS".—(1710)

COMMENTARY.

"If a certain thing spoken of—the Jar, for instance,—were *not-equal to* (i.e. different from) all other things,—such as the Cloth and the like,—i.e. if it were always excluded (differentiated) from these,—then there would be no difference between the Jar and the 'Sky-flower'; as it would be always differentiated from all other things; and a thing that is always differentiated from all other things can have no other state save that of the 'sky-flower'. Consequently, one who is not willing to admit the equality of that thing to the 'sky-flower', must admit that it is equal (similar) to other entities, in *being an entity*; hence this general character (commonalty), in the shape of the universal 'entity', has to be admitted.

It may be asked—"In what way then is there the *Particular*?"

The answer is—'*If it were entirely devoid of non-equality, then it could not be regarded as different from those things.*—If that same entity, Jar, were devoid of non-equality to other things like the Cloth,—i.e. if it were not *non-equal* to them,—then the Jar could not be regarded as anything different from the Cloth, etc., in the form—'This is *Jar*, that is Cloth'; just like the specific individuality of things;—and yet, as a matter of fact, it does differ from other things; hence it becomes established that it has the *Particular* character also.—(1710)

TEXTS (1711–1713).

"IF THE INTENDED ENTITY IS ENTIRELY *not-equal* TO OTHER THINGS, THEN IT CEASES TO BE AN *entity*; FOR THAT WHICH IS EXCLUDED FROM 'ENTITY', WHERE COULD THERE BE ANY OTHER POSITION, EXCEPT *non-existence*,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'SKY-FLOWER'? THUS THEN, ONE WHO WISHES THE ENTITY TO BE NOT-EQUAL TO THE 'SKY-FLOWER', MUST ACCEPT THE UNIVERSAL 'ENTITY' AS THE CHARACTER COMMON TO ALL *entities*."—(1711–1713)

COMMENTARY.

The following *Texts* set forth another argument in favour of the view that every entity has a *commonalty*, a general character:—

TEXTS (1714–1716).

"IF IT WERE NOT AS ASSERTED, THEN, TO WHAT WOULD THIS FACT BE DUE—THAT THE COMMON NOTION OF 'ENTITY' DOES NOT APPEAR IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'CROW'S TEETH', WHILE IT ALWAYS APPEARS AS RESTRICTED TO *Entities* ALONE?—IF IT BE URGED THAT—'THE SAID RESTRICTION IS DUE TO *similarity*',—THEN OUR ANSWER IS THAT, THAT SAME (SIMILARITY) IS WHAT WE CALL 'COMMONALTY'.—THIS SAME REMARK APPLIES ALSO TO THE VIEW THAT 'THE SAID RESTRICTION IS DUE TO A CERTAIN CAPACITY IN THE NATURE OF THINGS'.—*Absolute difference* (FROM OTHER ENTITIES) THEREFORE IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ANY ENTITY; BECAUSE ENTITIES DO NOT DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER, ON THE POINT OF BEING 'ENTITIES'."—(1714–1716)

COMMENTARY.

'*If it were not, etc. etc.*'—If an entity were 'not-equal' to—different from—every other entity,—then how is it that the common idea of 'being an *entity*' is found to appear only in connection with the Jar and such things, and not in connection with the 'crow's teeth' (and other non-entities)? The basis for this has to be explained.

It might be urged that—'the basis for this lies in the *similarity* (among entities)'.

Then it becomes established that that same *Similarity* is the 'Commonalty', the Common character; 'similarity' being synonymous with '*Commonalty*' (Common character).

It might be explained that—'the said comprehensive potency subsists in the Jar and other *entities* only, and not in the Crow's Teeth and such *non-entities*; hence 'the capacity of the nature of things' is what forms the basis of the notion in question'.

This view also is dispensed with by what has been just explained; i.e. the answer to this is the same as that to the view regarding 'Similarity'; because the said *capacity* may be regarded as the required 'Commonalty'.

From all this it follows that, *in the form of* '*entities*', all things—the Jar and the rest—are *not-different* from one another.—(1714–1716)

The following *Texts* provide reasons for accepting the 'difference' (*particular* character) of things from one another:—

TEXTS (1717–1719).

"IF THE SAID ENTITY WERE ENTIRELY DEVOID OF DISSIMILARITY FROM THE OTHER STANDARD ENTITIES,—THEN THAT ENTITY WOULD NOT BE DIFFERENT FROM THESE; THERE WOULD BE COMPLETE NON-DIFFERENCE,—AS FROM THEIR OWN SELVES. WHAT IS CALLED 'DISSIMILARITY' IS ONLY A FORM DIFFERENT FROM THOSE; HENCE

THE IDEA THAT 'THERE IS *no dissimilarity*, AND YET THE THING IS *different*' WOULD INVOLVE A SELF-CONTRADICTION. CONSEQUENTLY, WHEN ONE HAS TO ACCEPT SOME SORT OF *difference* AMONG THINGS, HE HAS TO ACCEPT 'DISSIMILARITY' ALSO, AND THENCE ALSO THE 'PARTICULAR' CHARACTER OF THINGS."—(1717–1719)

COMMENTARY.

'*Standard entities*'—the Cloth and the rest (to which the Jar is being compared).—If the Jar were entirely devoid of dissimilarity to these other things—Cloth, etc.—then, there being no difference between them, the Jar could not be any thing different from those things; as it would be non-different from it, like the form of its own self. For instance, what is called 'dissimilarity' is only that form of the Jar which is different from the Cloth,—nothing apart from that form; hence to say that 'there is *dissimilarity* in the *Cloth*, etc., and yet there is no *difference* from the *Jar*', would involve self-contradiction;—as 'difference' and 'dissimilarity' are synonymous terms.—(1717–1719)

Having thus established the fact that every entity has the two-fold character—the *General* and the *Particular*, the Jaina proceeds to show that these two aspects serve as the basis of usage free from all confusion :—

TEXTS (1720-1721).

"THE ENTITY ITSELF IS ONLY *one* IN ESSENCE, BUT IS REGARDED AS HAVING SEVERAL ASPECTS; AND THESE ASPECTS ARE THERE IN THE FORM OF BEING APPREHENDED BY *inclusive* AND *exclusive* COGNITIONS; THE FORMER ONES, BEING *inclusive*, ARE SPOKEN OF AS 'COMMON' (UNIVERSAL, GENERAL), WHILE THE LATTER, BEING *exclusive*, ARE CALLED 'PARTICULAR'.—(1720-1721)

COMMENTARY.

"The real truth of the matter is as follows :—Like the gleaming Sapphire, every entity, while being one, has several aspects; of these aspects, some are apprehended by *inclusive* notions, and others by *exclusive* notions. Those that are apprehended by *inclusive* notions are *inclusive* and hence spoken of as 'Common', while others, which are apprehended by *inclusive* notions, are *exclusive* and hence said to be 'Particular'. The *inclusive notion* appears in the one *non-distinctive* form of 'Entity'; while the *exclusive notion* appears in the *distinctive* form 'this is *jar, not Cloth*'."—(1720-1721)

The following *Texts* proceed to refute the above *Jaina* view :—

TEXTS (1722-1723).

IF THE 'GENERAL' AND THE 'PARTICULAR' WERE OF THE NATURE OF EACH OTHER, COMMINGLING AND CONFUSION WOULD BE INEVITABLE; HENCE IT CANNOT BE POSSIBLE THAT EVERY ENTITY HAS TWO ASPECTS.—IF THEY ARE NOT OF THE NATURE OF EACH OTHER, THEN THEY ARE DIVERSE (TWO DISTINCT THINGS), AND HENCE IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THERE ARE 'TWO ASPECTS' (OF A SINGLE ENTITY). —(1722-1723)

COMMENTARY.

There are two alternatives possible: (1) The 'General' is the same as the 'Particular' and (2) The 'General' is something different from the 'Particular'.

In the former case, the Particular and the General being of the nature of one another, there would be commingling and confusion; the result of which would be that it could not be discerned that 'this is General and that is Particular'; which means that there cannot be two aspects of the same entity.

If, in order to avoid the confusion, the latter alternative is accepted, even so, the two being regarded as not of the nature of each other,—there would be 'diversity'—difference of nature between the General and the Particular; thus there would be no confusion between the two, only if the two were entirely different; but even so,—even when the two are different,—there are *two things*, and not *two aspects* of one thing.

The following might be urged—"Even when there has come about a difference in the nature of the General and the Particular, the entity that exists in the form of the General and the Particular is one and the same".

This however will be a contradiction in terms. For instance, if the General and the Particular are regarded as *non-different* from one and the same thing, how could there be any difference in the nature of those two themselves? Being non-different from one and the same thing, they must be non-different from one another,—like the nature of any single entity. When however the difference between the nature of the General and that of the Particular is accepted, there could not be any single thing that would be non-different from those two; because being non-different from the two, what is meant to be *one* would have to be regarded as *two*,—like the form of the General and the form of the Particular.

From all this it follows that the assertion that "every entity has two aspects" involves self-contradiction.—(1722-1723)

The following *Texts* put forward the view of *Sumati* (a Jaina writer of the *Digambara* School):—

TEXTS (1724-1725).

"THOUGH THE ENTITY MAY BE OF ONE NATURE ONLY, YET IT CAN HAVE DIFFERENT PROPERTIES; THERE COULD BE NO INCONGRUITY IN THE PRESENCE OF DIFFERENT STATES (OF THE SAME THING); WHICH IS FOUND, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF THE POTENCIES OF THE ACTIVE AGENCIES;—NOR CAN THERE BE ANY INCONGRUITY IN WHAT IS ACTUALLY SEEN; AND IT IS ACTUALLY SEEN THAT EVEN THOUGH THE GENERAL AND THE PARTICULAR ARE ASPECTS OF ONE AND THE SAME THING, YET IN ACTUAL PRACTICAL LIFE THERE IS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM."—(1724-1725)

COMMENTARY.

Sumati has offered the following explanation in connection with the objection urged against the Jaina doctrine:—"It has been urged that if the General and the Particular were not regarded as different, there would be confusion.—But this does not affect the case at all. Though, by reason of their being of the same nature there may be confusion,—there can be difference in their properties,—as is found to be the case with the potencies of Active Agencies. For instance, there are such expressions as '*Balāhako vidyotatē*', 'The Cloud flashes' (where the *Cloud* appears as the active Agent), and '*Balāhakādvidyotate*', 'flashes from the Clouds' (where the Cloud appears as the *Source*, the Ablative); in such cases we find the potencies of the active agencies varying through the diversity of their effects; even though they being all of the nature of 'substance' there is a certain amount of confusion. If this is not admitted, that would be quite contrary to common experience as well as scientific (Grammatical) principles.

Then again, there can be no incongruity urged against what is actually seen. For instance, in the case of the General and the Particular, though they are aspects of one and the same thing, and are quite distinct and never confounded, yet, all practical business is actually found to be carried on on the basis of their difference.—The compound '*bhedalokayātrā*' is to be expounded as 'Practical business on the basis of difference'; and this is carried on, though the entity is one only embracing both the aspects.—The argument may be formulated as follows:—When any one thing is treated as diverse, it is on the basis of the diversity of its properties,—as in the case of the Potencies of active agencies;—the idea of the General and Particular being aspects of one and the same thing involves treatment of the thing as diverse;—this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(1724-1725)

The above argument is answered in the following—

TEXT (1726).

IN FACT, IF THE THING HAS ONLY ONE FORM, IT CANNOT HAVE DIVERSE PROPERTIES; A DIVERSITY THAT IS NOT A CREATION OF FANCY IS WHAT IS CALLED 'PLURALITY'.—(1726)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that the Reason adduced by the *Jaina* is 'contradictory'; inasmuch as it proves the contrary of what is intended to be proved. For instance, what the other party intends to prove is *real* diversity of properties; but no such 'diversity of properties',—which is not a creation of fancy—is proved by the Reason adduced; as 'one-ness' of the thing itself is admitted; and what is *one entity* cannot be compatible with *Diversity*; as *Diversity* is what is called 'Plurality'; and how can a thing that is *Plural* be *one*?—(1726)

The Corroborative Instance that has been cited (by the *Jaina* writer) is 'devoid of the Probandum', and the Probans also is one that is concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1727).

AS REGARDS THE POTENCIES, THEIR DIVERSITY IS MERELY A CREATION OF THE SPEAKER'S 'DESIRE TO SPEAK'; HERE ALSO NO DIVERSITY CAN BE REASONABLE IN WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY ONE.—(1727)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged (by the other party):—"Even though *Diversity* is what is called 'Plurality',—why should such real Plurality of a single entity be incompatible,—by virtue of which the Reason is said to be 'contradictory', as proving the contrary of the desired conclusion?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1728-1729).

THINGS ARE SAID TO BE 'ONE' WHEN IT IS SAID 'THIS IS THAT'; WHEREAS THEY ARE SAID TO BE 'DIVERSE' WHEN IT IS SAID 'THIS IS NOT THAT'. *Being that* AND *Not being that* THUS BEING MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY, CANNOT, IN ANY WAY, BE ATTRIBUTED TO ANY *one* ENTITY.—(1728-1729)

COMMENTARY.

When it is stated categorically that 'this is that', then the things are said to be 'one'; as in the case of Consciousness and Spirit. On the

other hand, when the identity between things is denied, they are said to be 'diverse, different'; as in the case of Matter and Consciousness. As it is impossible for both affirmation and denial to pertain to any one thing, there is clear contradiction between 'Unity' and 'Plurality', which are based respectively upon the said identity and difference. Hence any diversity of properties of a single entity can be only a creation of fancy.—(1728-1729)

Question:—"Why should there be contradiction between Identity and Difference (Affirmation and Denial)?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1730).

AFFIRMATION AND DENIAL ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY; AND THEY CANNOT BE MADE BY ANY SANE-MINDED PERSON, IN REGARD TO ONE AND THE SAME THING.—(1730)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"What is the basis of the assumption of the *diversity of properties*? There must be a distinct basis for it; otherwise there would be confusion among things. Hence it follows that that which would be that distinct basis would be the real 'diversity of properties' for us."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1731-1732).

WHEN AN ENTITY, EXCLUDED FROM SEVERAL LIKE AND UNLIKE THINGS, IS DIFFERENTIATED FROM *this* AND *that*,—THAT IS CALLED 'THE DIVERSITY OF PROPERTIES'. IN THIS WAY EVEN A SINGLE THING MAY BE *assumed* TO HAVE NUMBERLESS DIVERSE FORMS; BUT IN *reality*, NO SINGLE THING CAN REASONABLY HAVE TWO FORMS.—(1731-1732)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*sajātiya, etc. etc.*' is to be expounded as—there is first a *karmadhāraya* compound between '*like and unlike*' and '*several*';—and from these the entity is '*excluded*'.—When such a single entity is differentiated from *this* and *that*,—like and unlike thing—this is what forms the basis of the idea of the 'diversity of properties'. Thus, inasmuch as there can be an assumed 'Plurality',—there can be no reason for postulating a real *duality of form* for any single thing.

The particle '*api*' implies that there would be 'superfluity' in the Jaina writer's argument if what were meant to be proved were the mere fact of the thing having in a general way, a diversity of properties.—(1731-1732)

The following might be urged:—"The argument urged (by the Buddhist) is Inconclusive, in view of entities like *Narasimha* and others; though these

beings are of a single nature, yet the real presence of the dual character (Half Man, Half Lion) is not found to be incompatible".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1733–1735).

SUCH ENTITIES AS *Narasimha* AND OTHERS WHICH HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS HAVING DUAL CHARACTERS,—IN THEIR CASE ALSO THE DUAL CHARACTER IS NOT REAL. AS A MATTER OF FACT, *Narasiṃha* IS OF THE NATURE OF AN AGGREGATE OF MANY ATOMS, AND IS NOT ENDOWED WITH ANY ONE UNIFORM FORM; WHAT IS *variegated* (VARIOUS) CANNOT BE *one*,—AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE COLLECTION OF SEVERAL KINDS OF GEMS.—IF THERE WERE ONE FORM, THERE COULD NOT BE A DUAL CHARACTER AND THE CONSEQUENT APPEARANCE OF SEVERAL SHAPES; AND EVEN IF THE SMALLEST PART OF THE BODY THAT COULD BE COVERED BY THE LEG OF A FLY WERE HIDDEN, THE BODY COULD NOT BE SAID TO BE NOT-HIDDEN.—(1733–1735)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*ādi*' includes the gleaming Sapphire.

'*Sa*' stands for *Narasimha.*

'*Sandoha*'—is *aggregate.*

'*Naikarūpavān*'—not having a *single* form. This shows that the Instance cited by the Jaina writer is not one 'admitted' by the opposite party; as for the *Bauddha, Narasimha* is not one *composite* whole, he being only an aggregate of many atoms.

The author cites the reason for denying the said *oneness*—*What is variegated cannot be one*; e.g. a collection of several kinds of gems;—and *Narasimha* has a variegated form.—So that the Jaina reasoning involves an idea contrary to the nature of things.

The fact that 'if it were one, it could not have a dual character and consequently there would not be appearance of several forms', provides an argument against the said 'unity';—this argument being based on the fact the idea of 'diversity' is based entirely upon the appearance of diverse forms.

'If any one part of the body were hidden, the whole might become hidden' (under the *Jaina's* idea);—this provides another argument against the conclusion of the *Jaina* writer: because it cannot be right that one and the same thing should have the contradictory characters of *being hidden* and *being not hidden* at the same time.—(1733–1735)

Question :—"If *Narasimha* is only *an aggregate of many atoms,*—then how is it that there is an idea regarding him as being a single entity with a dual character?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (1736-1737).

By their very nature, the said atoms are the basis of the Recognition that envisages the salient features of the *Man* and the *Lion*;—as is clear from the fact of its arising from a particular Idea. In this same way are the variegated gems and other cases disposed of.—The variegated character, based upon the presence of several forms, is certainly incompatible with *unity*.—(1736-1737)

COMMENTARY.

The Recognition that envisages the features of the body of the Man and the Lion (in the body of *Narasiṃha*),—of that the only cause or basis consists of the atoms (composing those features); what then, would be the use of assuming the *composite* whole (Body)?

If it be asked—Whence this 'nature' of the Atoms?—The answer is—'*As is clear from the fact of its arising out of a particular Idea*'; i.e. because it proceeds from a particular cause; the 'particular idea' in this case is in the shape of the past deed leading up to the particular state of existence, and also the factors and other parts of the body peculiar to the particular animal-species.

What has been said regarding the case of *Narasimha* also serves to dispose of the case of the glittering gems, etc.;—and it is not necessary to criticise them separately.—(1736-1737)

It has been argued (by the *Jaina* writer, under *Text* 1716) that—"in the form of entities all things are not-different from one another."—This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (1738–1744).

'Being an Entity' is said to consist in 'capacity for effective action'; if this were all-pervasive, then every thing would be capable of doing every thing. Generally, one thing is held to be productive of another, only by reason of the presence, in it, of the capacity for that action; if then, that capacity is equally present in another thing, why should not this be productive of the same?—If the 'Blue' and other objects themselves are held to constitute the all-embracing character of 'Entity', then the *white* and *yellow* things also would do what is done by the *Blue* one; and in that case, the whole universe would become a single 'Entity', devoid of a second; and thus it would

NOT BE TRUE THAT A SINGLE THING HAS SEVERAL ASPECTS.—IF THE *Blue, etc.* THEMSELVES DO NOT CONSTITUTE 'ENTITY',—AND THIS IS LIKE THE 'BEING' (*Sattva*) POSITED BY '*Kaṇāda*',—THEN IT CANNOT BE AS YOU HOLD, THAT ONE THING CANNOT HAVE SEVERAL ASPECTS; AS THERE WOULD BE CLEAR DIFFERENCE.—FURTHER, WHAT CONSTITUTES 'DIFFERENCE' AMONG THINGS IS THE PRESENCE OF CONTRARY PROPERTIES, AND NO OTHER KIND OF 'DIFFERENCE' IS HELD TO LIE BETWEEN 'BLUE' AND 'YELLOW'. THIS SAME CONDITION IS PRESENT BETWEEN THE 'GENERAL' AND THE 'PARTICULAR'; BECAUSE WHILE THE FORMER IS 'INCLUSIVE', THE LATTER IS OTHERWISE. WHY THEN SHOULD NOT 'DIFFERENCE' BE ADMITTED AS CLEARLY LYING BETWEEN THEM ?—(1738–1744)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Entity' is said to be that which is capable of effective action,—nothing else.—If this capacity is present in all things, then every thing would be capable of doing every thing. It is only in this sense that things are held to be *productive.* This *capacity* then being equally present in all cases, anything might be produced out of anything.

Further, is the 'Entity' the same as the *Blue*, the *Yellow* and other things ? Or is it something different ?—If it is the same, then, as it would be all-pervasive, even the *white* and *yellow* could bring about the colouring in the cloth that is brought about by the *Blue.*—Then again, there being no other character or nature possible, the entire Universe would become a single conglomeration of things ; and this would upset the proposition that a single entity has several aspects.—If on the other hand, the 'entity' is something different from the *Blue*, etc.,—like the 'Being' posited by *Kaṇāda*,—i.e. just as *Kaṇāda* has postulated the 'Entity', called 'Being',—as something different (from the particular things),—then it becomes all the more unreasonable to attribute 'Plurality' to any single thing ; as in this case there would be clear absolute difference.

Then again, any two things are 'different' only when they have contrary poperties,—e.g. *Hot* and *Cold* ;—the General and the Particular are found to have contrary properties ; *because while the former is 'inclusive', the latter is otherwise* ; '*otherwise*'—i.e. *not-inclusive,* 'exclusive'.—If, even on the presence of contrary properties, difference were not admitted, then there would be no difference even between the *Blue* and the *Yellow,* which is admitted in some way, by the other party ;—*Kumārila* himself having declared (in *Shlokavārtika*—Sense Perception, 158) that—"as their cognitions are different, Colour, etc. cannot be one and the same" ;—where it has been declared that there is difference among the *Blue* and other things.—(1738–1744)

The author puts forward—from Kumārila's point of view—the objection against the Buddhist argument, the objection that the Reason put forward is 'Inconclusive' :—

TEXTS (1745-1746).

"AS IN THE CASE OF THE *Variegated Colour*, ONE MAY EMPHASISE ANY ONE COLOUR AS HE CHOOSES,—BECAUSE THE COLOUR IS VARIEGATED,—IN THE SAME WAY 'DIFFERENCE' OR 'NON-DIFFERENCE' OF AN ENTITY MIGHT BE EMPHASISED.—(*Shlokavārtika—Ākṛti*, 57-58).—WHEN A THING OF A MIXED CHARACTER IS COGNISED SIMULTANEOUSLY, THEN ALL DISTINCTIONS LIKE 'DIFFERENCE', 'SAMENESS' AND SO FORTH, DISAPPEAR—(*Ibid.*, 62-63)."
—(1745-1746)

COMMENTARY.

'*Kalmāṣa-varṇa*'—is the *variegated colour*.—In this case one can fix upon, as he wishes, upon any of the several colours present—regarding the thing either as *Blue*, or *Yellow* or *Red* ;—in the same manner, in the case of the Entity which has a *variegated* or *mixed* character,—being *existent* in its own form, and also *non-existent* in the form of other things,—and also having the two-fold character of the General and the Particular,—one can fix upon *Unity* or *Diversity*, as he likes. When a man wishes to emphasise the diversity-aspect, then he fixes upon *diversity* ; and when he all at once cognises a thing as being both General and Particular,—then all that has been urged regarding its *difference* or *non-difference*, etc. disappears ; i.e. it does not apply at all ; because what is clearly cognised through Perception is the thing of the mixed character. The objection that has been urged regarding the thing being *different* or *non-different*, etc. etc. is as follows :—(*a*) The *General* thing being *non-different* from the Particular things in the shape of the Horse, etc. should also have a diversity of forms like these particular things ;—(*b*) the Particular things, being *non-different* from the General, all Particular things should become the same, like the General thing ;—(*c*) how could *difference* and *non-difference*, which are mutually contradictory, reside in the General and the Particular ? The other objections are such as—*Unity* and *Plurality* being mutually contradictory, how can one and the same thing be *General* as well as *Particular* ?—(1745-1746)

It might be argued against the above (argument of *Kumārila's*) that—'If so, then in all cases, there would be cognition of the *Mixed Character*, and it would not be successive and simultaneous'.

TEXT (1747).

WHEN A THING HAS SEVERAL FORMS, ONE MAY EMPHASISE ANY ONE ACCORDING TO HIS OWN WHIM, EITHER SUCCESSIVELY OR SIMULTANEOUSLY: THERE CAN BE NO OTHER WAY WITH VERBAL EXPRESSIONS.—(1747)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, in the case of everything whether its 'General' and 'Particular' aspects are emphasised, one after the other or simultaneously, depends upon the wish of the Speaker; so that when one wishes to speak of the 'existence' and the 'non-existence' aspects of a thing,—or the 'General' and 'Particular' aspects of it,—simultaneously, he emphasises its form in that way. If he wishes to speak successively, one after the other, of the 'existence' and 'non-existence' aspects, or the 'General' and 'Particular' aspects—then he emphasises that form. In fact, all its forms are emphasised successively and simultaneously (as one wishes),—just like the Emerald and other gems in a Mass of jewels.

It may be asked—'Why cannot it be indicated in a way other than successively or simultaneously?'

The answer to that is—'*There can be no other way, etc. etc.*'—i.e. no way other than 'successively or simultaneously'.

'*Vidhi*'—is *way, method.*—(1747)

The following *Text* answers the above arguments (of *Kumārila*):—

TEXTS (1748-1749).

IT CANNOT BE AS EXPLAINED ABOVE. THAT WHAT IS 'VARIEGATED' CANNOT BE 'ONE' HAS JUST BEEN POINTED OUT. 'VARIEGATION' CONSISTS IN 'SEVERAL FORMS', AND IT CAN NEVER BE CONCOMITANT WITH 'UNITY'.—ALL THE REAL FORMS THAT THERE MAY BE OF A CERTAIN THING WOULD BE SO MANY (DIFFERENT) THINGS; AND THE THING IN QUESTION ITSELF REMAINS ONLY ONE.—(1748-1749)

COMMENTARY.

The idea that 'a single entity is variegated' involves a contradiction in terms, as already explained under *Text* 1734 above; and the reason for this is that the term 'variegated' itself connotes Plurality; and between 'Unity' and 'Plurality' there is 'contradiction' consisting in the fact of the presence of one implying the absence of the other. Consequently one thing cannot have several *real* forms. Even if it had,—this fact would not prove the *plurality* of the single thing; as all that it would mean would be that there are so many things come about; but that also only if these forms could be proved

to be *real.* But in no case can *Plurality* belong to what is *one*, as the two are mutually contradictory.—(1748-1749)

It has been argued (under *Text* 1712, above)—" For that which has been excluded from ' Entity ', where could there be any other position ? "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (1750).

IF A CERTAIN THING WERE EXCLUDED FROM ONE ' ENTITY ', IT WOULD BE DEVOID OF SAMENESS ONLY WITH THAT ENTITY ; IT WOULD NOT BECOME LIKE THE ' SKY-FLOWER ' ;—AS IT WOULD STILL BE CAPABLE OF EFFICIENT ACTION. —(1750)

COMMENTARY.

If what is cited as the Reason is ' exclusion of *all* entities ',—and similarity to the ' sky-flower ' is meant to be proved by it,—then the Reason is ' inadmissible ' ; because the exclusion of the Jar from *all entities,* cannot be admitted ; all that can be admitted is that it is excluded or differentiated from things other than itself.

If, on the other hand, the Reason meant to be adduced is exclusion from *some things,* then it is ' Inconclusive '.

For instance, the *Jar,* excluded or differentiated from the *Cloth* and other things, could be recognised only as devoid of sameness with the Cloth, and it could not be recognised as absolutely devoid of essence (existence), as even as thus excluded, it would be *capable of efficient action.*—(1750)

The following *Texts* show the ' Inconclusive ' character of the Opponent's Reason :—

TEXTS (1751-1752).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE *capable* (POTENT) FORM OF ONE ENTITY DOES NOT RESIDE IN OTHER ENTITIES,—BECAUSE THE EFFECT PRODUCED AND THE FORM OF THE APPREHENSION ARE FOUND TO BE DIFFERENT AND SO FORTH ; THIS HAS BEEN EXPLAINED BEFORE.—' THAT ' A CERTAIN ENTITY IS NOT THE SAME AS THE OTHER ',—THIS ALONE CAN FOLLOW FROM THE EXCLUSION (OR DIFFERENTIATION) THEREFROM ;—AND NOT THE FACT OF ITS BEING A NON-ENTITY DEVOID OF ALL PROPERTIES.—(1751-1752)

COMMENTARY.

If the character of ' Entity ', consisting of *capacity for effective action,* were something embracing all ' entities ' collectively, then alone could the

thing differentiated from others be said to be featureless (non-existent),—the 'entity' being something that is characterised by capacity for effective action. As a matter of fact however, the 'capable (or potent) form of one entity—the *Blue* for instance—cannot subsist in other things,—like the *white* and the rest; as has been explained under *Text* 1740.

Question :—"Why cannot it subsist in other things?"

Answer :—Because the effect produced is different, and the form of Apprehension (Idea) is different. The term '*Upalambha*' here stands for *Apprehension*, i.e. Cognition; and '*nirbhāsa*' for the form of that Cognition (i.e. the Idea).

The phrase 'and so forth' stands for diversities of birth, of existence, of destruction, etc.

For these reasons all that 'non-contact'—differentiation—from another entity can prove is only that 'the entity in question is *not the same* as this latter'; it cannot prove it to be devoid of properties, a mere *non-entity*.

"Why?"

Because the *capacity for effective action*, which constitutes the essence of 'Entity', is present in it.—(1751–1752)

Objection :—"If there is absolute difference among entities,—how can there be such all-embracing notions as 'this is entity', 'this is entity' (in regard to all things)?—how too can there be any difference between the Entity and the 'sky-flower', etc.—if there were no similarity?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (1753-1754).

THE CONCEPTION BEING THERE THAT 'THAT ALSO IS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE ACTION',—THERE WOULD BE THIS IDEA THAT 'IT IS AN *entity*';—THUS THERE WOULD BE SUBJECTIVE SIMILARITY CONSISTING IN 'DIFFERENTIATION FROM WHAT IS INCAPABLE'. THUS, EVEN THOUGH THERE IS ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE, THERE IS A SUBJECTIVE *similarity*; AND THUS AN 'ENTITY' BEING 'EQUAL' TO OTHER ENTITIES, BECOMES DISTINGUISHED FROM THE 'SKY-FLOWER'.—(1753-1754)

COMMENTARY.

'*Differentiation from the Incapable*';—'the incapables' meant are such non-entities as 'the son of the Barren Woman',—there is 'differentiation' from these,—i.e. the entity is not the *same* as these.

Because the subjective *Similarity* is there, therefore it cannot be admitted that "If an entity were not equal to other entities, it would not differ from the sky-flower"—(as asserted by the Opponent under *Text* (1710).

In the following Texts, the Author sets forth the objections urged by *Sumati* (against the Buddhist point of view):—

TEXTS (1755–1757).

"IF THE FORM IN WHICH A CERTAIN THING IS DIFFERENTIATED FROM OTHER THINGS,—HOMOGENEOUS AND HETEROGENEOUS—WERE THE SAME IN WHICH IT IS *similar* TO THE HOMOGENEOUS THINGS,—THEN IT SHOULD BE RECOGNISED AS SIMILAR TO THE HETEROGENEOUS THINGS ALSO; AS THE FORM WOULD BE THE SAME IN BOTH CASES.—AND YET IT IS NOT SO RECOGNISED.—HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT THE FORM IN WHICH THE THING IS *not similar* TO THE HOMOGENEOUS THINGS, AND THE FORM IN WHICH IT IS *similar* TO THESE,—MUST BE DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER."—(1755–1757)

COMMENTARY.

Sumati argues as follows:—

"That form in which a certain thing is differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous things,—if, in that same form, it were *similar* to the homogeneous things,—then it should be recognised as similar to the heterogeneous things also; as the form would be the same in both cases.—And yet as a matter of fact, it is not so recognised.—Hence it follows that that form in which it is *dissimilar* to the homogeneous things,—and that form in which it is *similar* to these things,—between these two forms, there must be difference.—It might be asked—'when it is homogeneous to them, how can it be *dissimilar*? And if it is dissimilar to them, how can it be homogeneous to them? The two are contradictory'.—This however does not affect our position. Because the other party regards everything as having two aspects, the General and the Particular; hence in the 'General' aspect, all things are said to be 'homogeneous' to that thing, while in its 'Particular' aspect, it is held to be 'heterogeneous'; and in this latter sense, it is said to be *dissimilar*; so that the objection urged does not affect the position.

The compounds '*Samānāparavastu*' stands for the '*Samāna*', the *Homogeneous*, and the '*apara*', Contrary,—i.e. the *Heterogeneous*.—The rest is easily intelligible, hence it is not explained in detail.—(1755–1757)

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (1758).

IT IS IN THAT SAME FORM THAT IT IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE *similar*, BECAUSE THE CAUSE OF SUCH UNDERSTANDING IS PRESENT, IN THE SHAPE OF BEING THE CAUSE OF ONE AND THE SAME CONCEPTION, AS DIFFERENTIATING THESE FROM OTHER THINGS.—(1758)

COMMENTARY.

It is in the same form that it is said to be 'similar',—because they form the basis of the same conception. What is meant is that those that do not

form the basis of the same conception are treated as 'dissimilar', while those that do serve as that basis are regarded as 'similar'.—(1758)

Question :—"Why do not all things become the basis of the same conception,—the difference being equally present in all ?"

Answer :—

TEXT (1759).

IT IS ONLY CERTAIN THINGS THAT CAN SERVE AS THE BASIS OF ONE AND THE SAME CONCEPTION,—THE RESTRICTION BEING DUE TO THE CAPACITY OF THE FORM OF THINGS, EVEN WHEN THERE IS DIFFERENCE,—AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE *Sense-organs* AND THE *Amṛtā* AND THE LIKE.—(1759)

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COMMENTARY.

No question can be raised regarding the nature of things—such as—why should *Fire*, and not *Water*, burn or be hot ? All that can be reasonably asked is—to what is this nature due ? For, if the nature of things were not due to any cause, there could be no restriction, which would lead to incongruities. Hence it should be said that it is due to its own cause ; but then the question would be—to what is that due ? And so on and on it would go on to a beginningless series (of causes).

'*Akṣa*' is sense-organ.—'*Amṛtā*' is the herb *Guḍūchī*,—'*and the like*' goes with each of the two.

What is meant is that it is only the *Guḍūchī* and other herbs that have the capacity to allay fever and other diseases,—not other things. And it is the Sense-Organ, the object, the Light and Attention that have the capacity to produce particular cognitions.

In the same way, it is only certain things to which belongs the capacity to bring about a single conception.

Or, the term '*akṣa*' may stand for the. *Vibhītaka* fruit ; and the term 'and the like' goes with the whole compound.—(1759)

In the following *Texts*, the objection is raised that "the Corroborating Instance cited cannot be admitted" :—

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TEXTS (1760–1762).

"HOW CAN THE EYE BE PRODUCTIVE OF THE COGNITION OF THE *Blue* AND OTHER THINGS,—IF IT IS HELD TO HAVE THAT FORM ALONE WHICH IS DIFFERENTIATED FROM THE *Blue* AND OTHERS? IN FACT, JUST AS THE EAR IS NOT REGARDED AS PRODUCTIVE OF THE COGNITION OF *Blue*, ETC., ON ACCOUNT OF ITS BEING DIFFERENT FROM THE *Blue, etc.* WHICH ARE PRODUCTIVE OF THE COGNITION OF *Blue*, ETC.,—SO ALSO THE EYE SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS THE CAUSE OF THAT COGNITION.—HOW COULD ANY OTHER THING, WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM THE PRODUCTIVE CAUSE, BE PRODUCTIVE OF IT? —FROM ALL THIS FOLLOWS THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE MUST BE INCLUSIVENESS ALSO AMONG THINGS."—(1760–1762)

COMMENTARY.

"If the Eye be held to be that which has a form *exclusive* of the *Blue*, etc.,—and *not any that is inclusive*; this is what is meant by the particle 'eva', '*alone*';—in that case the Eye cannot be the cause of the perception of the Blue, etc.; because it has been differentiated (excluded) from what is productive of that perception;—when a thing has been excluded from the Cause of a certain thing, it cannot be the Cause of that thing; e.g. the Ear which, being differentiated from the *Blue, etc.*, which are the cause of the perception of the Blue, etc., is not the cause of the perception of the Blue, etc.;—the Eye also is (*ex hypothesi*) differentiated from the Blue, etc., which are the cause of the perception of Blue, etc.;—hence there is the possibility of an apprehension contrary to a universal truth.

As a matter of fact however, it is not so [i.e. the Eye is not non-productive of the perception of Blue, etc.].—Hence the truth should be otherwise than this; that is, when one thing is productive of another, it cannot be excluded from the nature of being so productive,—e.g. the Blue, which is productive of the perception of *Blue*, cannot be excluded from its own nature;—and the Eye is actually productive of the perception of the *Blue*, etc. So this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

In the same way *Blue, etc.* may be made the Minor Term in the Reasoning.

From all this it follows that there is *inclusiveness* among things.

Thus through the contrary of the *Reductio ad absurdum*, it has been shown that the example cited is not admissible.—(1760–1762)

The following might be urged—"The thing could be excluded from the other things and yet be productive of the Cognition; so that the *Reductio ad Absurdum* is Inconclusive".

This is what is answered in the following—

TEXT (1763).

"IF IT WERE NOT AS ABOVE, THEN, 'DIFFERENTIATION' BEING THE SAME IN BOTH CASES, WHY IS NOT THE EAR ALSO REGARDED AS PRODUCTIVE OF THE COGNITION OF BLUE, ETC.,—JUST LIKE THE EYE, WHICH ALSO IS DIFFERENT FROM THE COLOURS ?"—(1763)

COMMENTARY.

"The possibility of the Ear also being regarded as the cause of the cognition of *Blue, etc.* is a proof of the contrary of the conclusion (arrived at by the Buddhist); but the difference is the same in both cases. The difference that there is between the *Eye* and the *Blue* is the same as the difference between the *Ear* and the *Blue*; i.e. the Ear is as different from the Blue, etc. as the Eye is".—(1763)

The answer to the above arguments of the Opponent is as follows :—

TEXTS (1764–1775).

THE 'EXCLUSION' (DIFFERENTIATION) OF THE *Eye*, ETC. FROM THE *Cause* (OF THE COGNITION OF BLUE) IS NOT ADMITTED, WITHOUT QUALIFICATION. BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THE EYE, ETC. IS ALSO REGARDED AS THE *Cause*; AND IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ANYTHING TO BE 'EXCLUDED' FROM ITS OWN NATURE; IF THERE WERE 'EXCLUSION' OF A THING FROM ITS OWN NATURE, THE THING WOULD BECOME DEVOID OF ALL CHARACTER. WHEN 'EXCLUSION' IS SPOKEN OF, IT IS EXCLUSION FROM ANOTHER CAUSE THAT IS MEANT; WHAT IS MEANT BEING THAT THE EYE IS *not of the form of that other* CAUSE ;—AND THIS IS QUITE ACCEPTABLE TO US.—IT IS NOT THAT WHAT IS PRODUCTIVE OF THE COGNITION IS DESCRIBED PRECISELY AS IT EXISTS. IN FACT, ALL COGNITIONS PROCEED FROM THEIR OWN SPECIFIC CAUSES. IF, ON THE GROUND OF THEIR BEING OF THE SAME NATURE, THEY WERE REGARDED AS A SINGLE PRODUCTIVE CAUSE,—THEN, AS THE SAID NATURE ITSELF IS THERE (AS THE CAUSE), WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF OTHER AUXILIARIES ?—IF IT BE HELD THAT—'ON ACCOUNT OF DEFECTS IN OTHER PARTICULARS, THE ONE (NATURE) IS NOT PRODUCTIVE (OF THE COGNITION)',—THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) THOSE CAUSES ARE *incapable* (OF BRINGING ABOUT THE COGNITION IN QUESTION), BY REASON OF DIFFERENCE. IF THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCE, HOW COULD THEY BE DEFECTIVE ?—JUST AS, EVEN WHEN THERE IS DIFFERENCE—AS AMONG PARTICULAR THINGS,—EVERYTHING IS NOT THE CAUSE OF EVERY OTHER THING,—IN THE SAME

WAY, EVEN THOUGH THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFERENCE IN 'PLURALITY', YET THERE WOULD BE RESTRICTION (OF ONLY SOME CAUSES BRINGING ABOUT SOME EFFECTS). EVEN WHEN THERE IS DIFFERENCE, IT IS ONLY A CERTAIN THING THAT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE OF THE PARTICULAR EFFECT BY REASON OF ITS NATURE. IN THE CASE OF 'INCLUSIVENESS', HOW COULD THE ONE THING BE PRODUCTIVE AND NON-PRODUCTIVE OF THE SAME ONE THING?—IF THERE IS DIFFERENCE IN THIS CASE ALSO,—THE DIFFERENCE MAY BE THERE; BUT IS THAT DIFFERENCE FROM THAT THING ONLY? THERE CAN BE NO DIFFERENCE APART FROM THE 'INCLUSIVE' (PRODUCTIVE CAUSE); AND THIS IS NON-PRODUCTIVE. IN FACT, THAT ALONE IS A REAL ENTITY WHICH IS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE ACTION; AND THIS ENTITY IS *non-inclusive*; AND FROM WHAT IS *inclusive*, THE EFFECT IS NOT PRODUCED. IN FACT DIFFERENCE AND NON-DIFFERENCE CAN BE NOT-IMAGINARY (REAL) ONLY IN RELATION TO THAT FORM OR NATURE IN REFERENCE TO WHICH THE MAN HAS RECOURSE TO ACTIVITY. OTHERWISE THE DIFFERENCE IS THERE BY ITS VERY 'NATURE', AND THE 'GENERAL' CHARACTER ALSO IS THERE BEING DUE TO 'EXCLUSION'. THE THING ITSELF IS NOT 'INCLUSIVE' (COMPREHENSIVE); AS IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD BE MOST INCONGRUOUS ACTIVITIES.—(1764–1775)

COMMENTARY.

If mere 'differentiation from the character of the productive' is put forward without any qualification, as the Probans, then it cannot be 'admitted'. Because as a matter of fact it is not admitted that there is unqualified 'differentiation' of the *Eye, etc.* from the character of being productive; for the nature of the Eye, etc. also is regarded as productive; why should then there be any such restriction as that the effect must always be produced by *this* Cause, not by another? This Cause may produce it, and the other may also produce it; we see no incongruity in this. Under the circumstances, if the 'differentiation of the Eye, etc.' meant were without reservation of any kind, then there would be their differentiation from their own nature, which would mean that they are 'devoid of nature or character' (featureless). It is for this reason that there can be no differentiation of things from their own nature.

If then, 'the differentiation of the Eye, etc.' meant to be the Probans be that from other productive causes (of Cognition)—than their own nature,—then the Probans is 'inconclusive'; as in that case what is differentiated from the other nature may not be of that nature, but it need not cease to be productive (of the cognition); because everything is productive, in its own form, not in the form of something else; and from that *nature of itself* in which it is held to be productive, it has not been differentiated;—why then should it cease to be productive? So that the Probans put up is found to be 'Inconclusive'.

If then, what is meant by 'not having the nature or character of a certain thing' is exclusion by way of 'contradistinction',—then the argument is superfluous; because 'differentiation of character' among things mutually is what is admitted by both parties.

The compound '*atajjanakarūpatvam*' is to be thus explained :—'*That other cause*' is the *Colour*,—there is the nature or form of this,—which is '*atajjanakarūpa*',—and *that which does not possess this form or character of the other Cause* (Colour, etc.) ;—that is, it has not the same character or form as Colour, etc.—Or, it may be taken as a *Karmadhāraya* first and then compounded with the negative term as *Bahuvrīhi*.—Or again, it may be taken as a three-membered *Bahuvrīhi*.—[The sense remains the same under all these explanations].

There arises the following question :—"In the bringing about of a certain effect,—why should the independent (unmixed) productive character be attributed to the Eye, etc. themselves, by virtue of which these alone could be restricted to that effect ?"

The answer to this is that '*In fact, all cognitions proceed, etc. etc.*'—This serves also to answer the objection urged to the effect that—"the difference of the Ear from the cognition being the same as that of the Eye, why should not the Ear be regarded as productive of it ?".—Thus then the 'nature' of things being restricted, even when there is difference, it is only one thing that is productive, not the other. There is nothing incongruous in this.

If then the Eye, etc. were regarded as productive, on the ground of their having a common character, though different,—then that one nature of them would be productive and hence the only Cause ; which would mean that the effect proceeds from that alone ; and in that case, the other contributary causes would have to be regarded as useless.

If it be urged that "the one Cause cannot produce the effect, on account of defects in other particulars",—then those particulars that are regarded as 'defective' would be *incapable, impotent*,—why ?—*by reason of difference* ; i.e.—because they are different from that comprehensive 'nature' which has been regarded as *capable* (of producing the effect in question) ; and if what is *incapable* happen to be defective, then that cannot hamper the production of the effect ; as in that case anything might cease to be produced at all.

It might be urged that—"we do not regard the General and Particular aspects of things to be absolutely distinct, and hence the Reason put forward 'by reason of difference' becomes *inadmissible*".

The answer to this is as follows :—If there were no difference, how could they be *defective* ? That is, if the *Particulars* are non-different from the *General*, then it should not be said that 'The one thing is not productive by reason of the defective character of particulars'. Hence, when the *General* is there in its perfect form, those Particulars that are non-different from that *General* cannot be *defective*. When between two things, one does not always share the fate of the other, they cannot be of the same 'nature'.

Further, the incongruity urged is there in your case also: 'Presence' or 'Inclusion' being the same in all things, why does not everything produce everything? Just as, in your case, though the Presence or Inclusion is there in all cases, everything does not produce everything, so it would be in our case also. So there is no force in this.

Then again, even when the difference is equally present in several things, it is only one thing, not others, that produces a certain effect; and this might be due to the restriction on the productiveness of things,—on the principle that the 'nature' of one thing is not the 'nature' of the other; and there can be no incongruity in this.

When however, the productiveness belongs to one comprehensive entity,—then one and the same entity would be productive as well as non-productive,—how could these two mutually contradictory affirmation and denial subsist in the same entity? There could be no incongruity if they subsisted in different entities. This is what is meant by the words of the text—'*Ēkasya, etc.*', '*How could the one thing be both productive and non-productive, etc. etc.*'.

The following might be urged—"We do not regard anything to be absolutely *comprehensive* (inclusive), on account of which there would be the incongruity of the same thing being both productive and non-productive of an effect;—what we hold is that there is difference also; so that *non-productiveness* would not be incongruous".

There may be *difference*; but it has to be explained whether this difference from the 'productive' nature is meant to belong to the same comprehensive 'productive nature', or to another. It cannot belong to that same; because there can be no exclusion (difference) of a thing from its own nature; as in that case it would become *nature-less* (devoid of its character). Nor can it belong to another; if it is different, then, as it would be of the productive nature, and *not imperfect*, it could not be regarded as *non-productive*; if it were, that would lead to an absurdity.

We grant that that same thing may be different from its own nature; even so, the incongruity of one and the same thing being both *productive* and *non-productive* remains unanswered. For instance, even when the difference is there, it could not be effective in bringing about the one effect in question.

'*There can be no difference apart from its inclusion* (or comprehensiveness); in fact, it would be that same *inclusion*; so that the incongruity of the same thing being both *productive* and *non-productive* would still be there.—The term '*anvaya*' (Inclusion) here stands for *that which is comprehensive or inclusive*,—i.e. the *productive nature*.—The particle '*nanu*' is meant only to emphasise what is said.

Then again, it is found from positive and negative concomitance that the Effect is produced from Particulars only,—hence these Particulars themselves should be regarded as associated with Specific Individualities, which latter therefore do not necessarily indicate the 'Universal' or General aspect of things; because the character of the 'Entity' consists in *capacity for effective action*. Under the circumstances, whether the *General* is different from the Specific Individuality—or non-different from it—does not con-

cern the man who seeks only for effective action and who is not concerned with the said *difference* or *non-difference*; as a matter of fact, when the Man seeks for effective action, he has recourse to that which he considers fit for that action; and he ponders over the difference or non-difference of only that thing; and he does not ponder over them simply because he likes to do it.

'*Otherwise*;—i.e. if *Difference* (Exclusiveness) and *Non-difference* (Inconclusiveness) are not regarded as *real*,—then, of *the thing capable of effective action*, there would be real *difference* or exclusiveness, in its own form,—and the *General* or inclusive character would be there, through the 'exclusion' (of all other things), which would be determined by the Conceptual Content. So that there would be no dispute on this point.

It is only to this extent that the man seeking for activity has recourse to the consideration of *Difference* in general; and where would there be any need for his considering any such *General* entity as is not capable of effective action?

It might be argued that—"The thing itself may be the *General*,—(the comprehensive factor),—why assume *exclusion* at all?"

The answer to that is—'*The Thing itself, etc. etc.*'—That is, if the form of the *Cloth* were present in the *Jar*, then the man seeking to carry Honey or Water might take up the Cloth; and there would be other such incongruous activities. The other likely incongruities meant are all things being produced and destroyed at the same time and so forth.—(1764–1775)

It may be that other people also, like the Buddhists, accept the view that 'the various Generalities (Universals, Commonalties) are assumed on the basis of things from which a certain thing is not not-excluded, and these Generalities embrace the Particulars (Individuals)'.—

In view of this, the following remark is made:—

TEXT (1776).

IN CASE THE 'VARIEGATED CHARACTER' OF THINGS SPOKEN OF REFERS ONLY TO CONCEPTUAL CREATION (FANCY),—THEN WHAT WOULD BE THE DIFFERENCE IN THE ASSERTIONS MADE BY '*Vipras*', '*Nirgranthas*' AND '*Kāpilas*'?

COMMENTARY.

'*Variegated character*'—Difference, Diversity.—(1776)

The following Texts set forth Kumārila's view on the subject:

TEXTS (1777-1778).

"WHEN THE POT IS BROKEN UP AND A DISH IS MADE (OF THE SAME GOLD), THE MAN WANTING THE FORMER BECOMES SORRY, WHILE THE MAN WANTING THE LATTER BECOMES GLAD, WHILE ONE WANTING ONLY THE GOLD REMAINS NEUTRAL. THUS THE THING HAS THREE ASPECTS; AND THE SAID THREE IDEAS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF THERE WERE NO PRODUCTION, CONTINUANCE AND DESTRUCTION OF THINGS." [*Shlokavārtika—Vanavāda*, 21-22].—(1777-1778)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila argues as follows:—"Inasmuch as all things are capable of being born, continuing to exist and being destroyed,—they have three aspects. That this is so is shown by the fact that a single thing can bring about three effects: For instance, when the Pot is broken up and made into a Dish, sorrow is produced in the man who wanted the former, while pleasure is produced in one who wanted the latter, while there is indifference in the man who wanted only gold. If the thing had only one aspect, then the idea produced by it would be of only one kind, not of three kinds.

'*Vardhamānaka*' and '*Ruchaka*' are particular kinds of utensils.—(1778)

The following might be urged (against *Kumārila*)—If it is admitted that the Entity has three aspects,—even so, how does it follow that the three aspects consist of Destruction (Continuance and Production)?

Answer (from *Kumārila*):—

TEXT (1779).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO *Sorrow* WITHOUT *destruction*, AND THERE CAN BE NO *Happiness* WITHOUT *production*; AND THERE CAN BE NO *Neutrality* WITHOUT *continuance*. IT IS IN THIS WAY THAT THE UNIVERSAL (COMMONALTY) IS ETERNAL."—[*Shlokavārtika—Vanavāda*, 23].—(1779)

COMMENTARY.

'*It is in this way, etc. etc.*';—Because there can be no *indifference* without Continuance, therefore—i.e. on account of the invariable concomitance between Neutrality and Continuance,—the Universal—'Gold' is understood to be eternal.—(1779)

The answer to the above arguments of *Kumārila* is as follows:—

TEXTS (1780–1783).

THIS IS NOT RIGHT; BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF A COMMON SUBSTRATUM; PRODUCTION, CONTINUANCE AND DESTRUCTION CANNOT HAVE THE SAME SUBSTRATUM; FOR IF THEY HAD, IT WOULD INVOLVE THE PRESENCE AT THE SAME TIME OF ALL THESE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES. ALL THIS WOULD BE FREE FROM DIFFICULTIES UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 'PERPETUAL FLUX'; FOR WHY SHOULD ANY MAN BE SORRY AT THE ABSOLUTE DESTRUCTION OF GOLD IN THE FORM OF THE POT? WHY TOO SHOULD THERE BE ANY JOY AT THE PRODUCTION OF THE GOLD IN THE NEW FORM OF THE DISH? AS FOR *continuance*, THERE IS NONE, OF ANYTHING AT ALL.—(1780–1783).

COMMENTARY.

The principal sentence is '*because of the absence of a common substratum*'; this is explained in what follows—'*Production, Continuance, etc. etc.*—If a single entity had the three aspects of *Production* and the rest,—then it would mean that all these three—Production, Continuance and Destruction—are there in the thing at one and the same time; and yet it cannot be possible for these mutually contradictory properties to be present in anything at one and the same time; as otherwise, they would not be contradictories at all.

Question—"How then can there be the three notions described?"

In *answer* to this the *Text* shows how this is possible—'*All this, etc. etc.*'

When the *Gold in the shape of the Pot* is destroyed by itself—why should any man so wanting it be sorry for it? Why too, on the production of a new thing in the shape of the *Dish* out of the Gold, should one be happy? As for *continuance*, there can be no such thing for anything of the nature of Gold; as both Production and Destruction are absolute without any connection with anything (past or future).—(1780–1783)

Question:—"If that be so, then how is there the feeling of *Indifference*?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (1784-1785).

WHEN THE DULL-WITTED MAN PERCEIVES THE TWO THINGS MADE OF GOLD, HE LOOKS UPON IT AS A CASE OF THE APPEARANCE OF SIMILAR PRODUCTS AND THEREBY COMES TO THINK OF IT AS SOMETHING LASTING.—IF THE GOLD ITSELF HAD A LASTING FORM, THEN THAT FORM, IN THE SHAPE OF THE *Dish*, COULD BE PERCEIVED IN ITS PRECEDING AND SUCCEEDING STATES ALSO; OR ELSE, THERE WOULD BE DIVERSITY.—(1784-1785)

COMMENTARY.

When the dull-witted man perceives the two things—the Pot and the Dish—made of gold,—though perceiving it, he is not able to distinguish

between the characters of the two things, being deceived by the appearance of another similar thing,—and then he has the idea *of being similar products*, which is the cause of his illusion, he concludes that the Gold has continued to remain all the time.

'*Samānāparabhāvēna*' ;—though the common character of being *negation of not-gold*, the two articles are regarded as the same or similar ; and the man regards it as a case of the birth of two things with a common character.

Question :—" How do you know that the man regards the gold as something lasting, on account of being deceived by the appearance of common products ;—and not on account of the gold being really lasting ? "

Answer :—'*If the gold, etc. etc.*'—If eternality did belong to the gold, then the *Dish* also would be perceived in the *Pot*, which is perceptible. '*Otherwise*'—if the Dish is not perceived when the gold is in the state of the *Pot*, which should be perceptible,—or if the *Pot* is not perceived when the gold is in the state of the Dish, which should be perceptible,—then there is clear difference between the two (Dish and Pot) ; and as the gold is not-different from them, like its own nature—the gold also becomes diverse. It is in view of all this that the Text says—'*Or else, there would be diversity*'.

Under *Text* 1717—"*If the said entity*, etc. etc. "—a Reason has been put forward in proof of the Diverse character of things.

The only objection we have to urge against that is that it is superfluous [proving what is already admitted].—(1784-1785)

End of Chapter XX.

CHAPTER XXI.

Examination of the doctrine of 'Traikālya'—'Things continuing to exist during three points of Time.'

COMMENTARY.

Under Text 4, the True Doctrine has been called 'Immobile'; the Author proceeds to support that idea.

TEXT (1786).

ON THE GROUND OF THE GOLD CONTINUING TO BE THE SAME, WHEN IT COMES TO BE REGARDED AS SOMETHING PERMANENT,—SOME BUDDHISTS ALSO HOLD (ON THE BASIS OF THIS) THAT THE THING (BY ITSELF PERMANENT) PASSES THROUGH DIVERSE STATES.—(1786)

COMMENTARY.

The Buddhist Doctrine is that 'there is nothing that has continued existence'; against this, the following objection is urged:—"How can it be said that 'there is nothing that has continued existence'—when as a matter of fact, some Buddhists (of the Vaibhāṣika-Realistic-School) also,—like *Dharmatrāta* and others—have accepted the view that an object continues to exist at three points of time, through its diverse states;—this view is held on the analogy of the *Gold* (discussed above) continuing to exist (in the state of the Pot and that of the Dish)?"

This same idea is further expounded in the following *texts*:—

TEXTS (1787–1790).

"JUST AS GOLD DOES NOT ABANDON ITS COLOUR, EVEN WHEN THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN ITS STATE,—SIMILARLY UNDER ALL ITS STATES, THE ENTITY DOES NOT ABANDON ITS CHARACTER OF 'SUBSTANCE'.—IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN THE COGNITION OF PAST AND FUTURE THINGS WOULD BE OBJECT-LESS.—HOW AGAIN, IS IT THAT IT HAS BEEN ASSERTED BY *Tāyin* THAT COGNITION RESTS UPON THESE TWO?—HOW AGAIN IS ACTION, WHICH IS PAST AND HAS NO FURTHER EXISTENCE, HELD TO BE PRODUCTIVE OF RESULTS? HOW TOO COULD MYSTICS HAVE THE DISTINCT COGNITION OF PAST AND FUTURE

THINGS?—FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT PAST AND FUTURE THINGS ARE NOT THE OBJECTS OF MERE 'NEGATION OF SUBSTANCE',—BECAUSE THEY ARE INCLUDED UNDER THE CHARACTER OF THE 'STATES', ETC.,—JUST LIKE THE PRESENT THING."—(1787–1790)

COMMENTARY.

Among the Buddhist writers (referred to under Text 1786) are the following:—

(1) *Bhadanta-Dharmatrāta*—the upholder of the view that while the thing undergoes changes, it remains substantially the same. He argues as follows:—When a certain thing has entered into its course of existence, there is change only in its *mode* of existence, not in the *substance*; for instance, the substance Gold undergoes several changes through which it comes to be called the 'armlet', 'necklet', 'ear-ring' and so forth,—but there is no change in the Gold itself. In the same way, the object is something different from the Future, and other 'modes'. For instance, when a certain object abandons its 'future' Mode and reaches the 'present' Mode;—and when it renounces its 'present' Mode, it reaches the 'past' Mode,—and yet the Object itself does not change; as throughout the three Modes, the same character of the 'substance' continues. If it were not so, the 'future', 'present' and 'past' objects would be entirely different from one another.—What is it that is meant by the term '*bhāva*', 'Mode', here?—It is a particular quality on which the notions of 'Past,' etc. are based."

(2) *Bhadanta-Ghoṣaka*—holds that the changes undergone by the Object are in its *character*. He argues as follows:—"When the Object has entered into its course of existence, it is said to be 'past', when it has the character of the 'past', but is not entirely deprived of the character of the 'future' and the 'present': for example, a man may be attached to one woman, but he need not be disgusted with other women. Similarly when the Object is 'future' or 'present' [it has these characters, but is not entirely devoid of the other two characters]."—The difference between this view and the previous one is that under this view things are spoken of as 'past' on account of the actual presence of a particular character.

(3) *Bhadanta-Vasumitra*—holds the view that the changes undergone by things is in their *aspects* or states. He argues as follows:—"When a thing has entered the course of existence, it is spoken of variously, according to its varying *aspects* (or conditions); and these variations relate to the *aspect*, not to the *substance*; as the Substance remains the same at all three points of time. For example, when the clay counting-piece is placed in the place of *Units*, it is denominated 'one', when placed in the place of *Hundreds*, it is denominated 'hundred', and in place of *Thousands*, it is denominated a 'thousand'. Similarly when the thing is in the state of activity, it is called 'present'; and when it has ceased from activity, it is 'past', and while it has not become active at all, it is 'future'. So that things are spoken of in accordance with their *states*, as in the case of the clay counting-piece, where there is no change in the nature of the Substance;

only different denominations are assigned to it in accordance with its varying position, which makes it indicative of varying numbers ".

(4) *Buddha-deva* (a writer of the second century A.D.)—holds the view that the changes are due to changes in 'Relativity'.—He argues as follows :—" When an object has entered its course of existence, it is called one or the other in relation to what has gone before and what is to come. For instance, the same woman is called 'mother' as well as 'daughter'; and the usage in question is also dependent upon the *past* and the *future*; when a thing has something before it, but nothing after it, it is called 'future'; when it has something before it and also something after it, it is called 'present'; and when it has something after it, but nothing before it, it is called 'past'."

All these four Buddhists are *Asti-vādins*, Realists (upholding the view that things have real and permanent existence),—called respectively: (1) 'Mode-changers', *Bhāva-vādin*, (2) *Lakṣaṇavādin*, 'Character-changers', (3) *Avasthāvādin*, 'Aspect-changers' and (4) *Anyathānyathika*, 'Relative changers'.

(1) Of these, the first (Dharmatrāta—the *Mode-changer*) does not differ from the *Sāṅkhya*, who holds the 'Modification' theory. So that the refutation that has been put forward against the *Sāṅkhya* is applicable to this Buddhist Realist. For instance, would the 'modification' come about without the abandoning of the previous mode or after its abandonment? If the former, then there would be comingling and confusion of the Modes. If the latter, then that would be incompatible with the permanent existence of things.

(2) As regards the second view (that of *Ghoṣaka*),—here also there would be the same comingling and confusion; as all things may have all characters. As regards the *man* (falling in love with one woman, which has been cited as an example), he is spoken of as 'attached' (or 'in love') on account of the appearance of *Attachment*, which is a totally different thing; and he is said to be 'not disgusted', when there is mere association (meeting together); in the case of the ordinary thing however, there is no *appearance* of the 'character', nor the mere association of 'character',—which would constitute the 'attainment' of it by the thing; as, if it were, then like 'attainment', the 'character' also would become something different from the thing. Thus there is no analogy between the two cases—the case in question and that of the example cited.

(3) As regards the third view (of *Vasumitra*),—that the changes in things are due to variations in their *aspects or states of activity*,—its refutation is going to be set forth in detail below.

(4) As regards the fourth view (that of *Buddhadēva*), it involves the incongruity of three *states* occurring under the same *state*. For instance, under the 'Past' state, the preceding and the succeeding moments would be 'past' and 'future' and the 'middle' moment would be the 'present'. This criticism against this is quite clear.

The Examination of the 'Idea of things continuing to exist during the Three Points of Time' proceeds in the Text, only with reference to the

third among the above views—[i.e. the view of *Vasumitra,* that the changes in things are due to the variations in their *states of* activity].—What has been stated in connection with the example of Gold (under *Texts* 1786-1787) is only an indication of the thesis of all these writers,—and it is not in strict reference to the view of *Dharmatrāta* only (the first of the views described). This is clear from what is going to be said (under *Text* 1791)—'As regards the distinction among things due to their states of activity, etc. etc.' ;—and under the view of *Dharmatrāta* the distinction is not based upon states of *activity* ; it is only under *Vasumitra's* view that it is so.

This view (*Vasumitra's*) is as follows :—

" If the ' Past ' and the ' Future ' were not there, then such notions as ' There lived *Mahāsammata* ', ' *Shaṅkha* is going to be an all-world sovereign ' and so forth,—which involve the idea of what is *past* and what is *going to be*—would be entirely baseless ; in fact, the Object not being there, the Idea also could not be there ; because in regard to the case of everything, the Idea is in the form in which the Object is cognised ; so that if the cognised Object is not there, there is nothing that could be apprehended by the Cognition ; hence there would be no Cognition (or Idea) at all.

"Further, the Blessed One has declared that 'Every cognition is produced on the basis of two things.—Which *two things* ?—The Eye and the Colours and the Mental Function '. If then the Past and the Future are not there, the cognition based upon these would not be *on the basis of two things* ; so that there would be incompatibility with the scriptures.

" Further, a past act could not bring about its fruit, if it were devoid of essence and devoid of existence, at the time of the appearance of the fruit, as the cause of that fruit would not be there ; what is non-existent cannot have the capacity to produce an effect ; as ' non-existence ' consists in the *absence of all capacity.*

" Then again, such ideas as 'Māndhāna Devadatta lived', ' the world-sovereign Shaṅkha shall be Maitreya Tathāgata ',—which appear distinctly and severally in the minds of Mystics, in regard to the Past and the Future, could not be possible ; as there can be no distinction among things that are *non-existent.*

" From all this it follows that *past* and *future* entities, like *Shrīharṣa* and others, cannot be regarded as mere ' negations of substance ',—because they have been declared as ' *to be included under the states* '.—The Blessed Lord has declared as follows :—' O *Bhikṣus,* if the Past form had not existed, then the noble *Shrāvaka* would not have heard and been entirely indifferent regarding past forms ; hence, because there is a Past form of things, therefore the noble *Shrāvaka* has heard and has thus become indifferent to the Past. All this severally would be much too detailed ; hence thus whatever form has been *past* or is in *future,*—all this is spoken of briefly as *Colour-phase* '."

In the compound (in the text)—' *Adhvasaṅgraha, etc. etc.*',—the term ' *adhvasaṅgraha* ' stands for Colour, etc., in the sense that they are ' included under the *states* '.

The second '*ādi*' implies the further reason that all these have been taught as consisting of suffering, transitory as a whole, devoid of the Soul, and so forth.—(1787–1790)

The following might be urged:—'Like *Ākāsha*, all things are always existent; hence there can be no idea of the *Past*, etc.'

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1791–1793).

"In this connection, there should be no such cogitation as to how this diversity in the *states* comes about. Because this distinction among the states is conceived on the basis of *activity*. That which is engaged in activity is called 'Present'; that which has ceased from activity is called 'Past'; and that which has not yet attained activity is called 'Future'.—The 'activity' of things serves only to 'project' the Result, not to produce it. As there can be no such 'projecting' in the case of Past things, there is no possibility of activity in them."—(1791–1793)

COMMENTARY.

The various states are determined through activity; that which is engaged in activity is 'Present'; that of which the activity has ceased is 'Past' and that which has not yet attained Activity is 'future'.

Objection:—"What is it that is meant by '*Kāritra*', '*Activity*', in this connection?—If it is *operation*, in the shape of *seeing* and the rest,—e.g. *seeing* and the rest are the 'activity' of the Eye and other organs,—since the Eye *sees*, the Ear *hears*, the Nose *smells*, the Tongue *tastes*,—and Cognition also is the Cogniser, as it is that which cognises things; and thus Colour, etc. become perceptible by the Senses;—if this is what is meant by 'activity', then, even when the Man has been born, if the Eye, which shares the fate of the body, has no activity, the man (or the Eye)—could not be regarded as 'present'.—Secondly, *activity* may be held to consist in the giving (producing) and receiving of the fruit,—for instance, the *caste* and other properties of man, which are born along with the Eye, are the result (fruit) of human effort; the Visual organ (Eye) or the supervising Deity, or Vibration brings about human effort; and it is by reason of bringing about this result that the Eye becomes a cause, and hence comes to be spoken of as 'present'.—Under this definition of 'activity', even Past things, being held to be productive of all-embracing results sharing the same fate, would have to be regarded as 'Present'.—Thirdly, it may be held that the 'Activity' meant here is that which gives and takes all sorts of results.—In that case, the Past, being the cause of some part of such results, would have to be regarded as 'Half-present'."

In view of this objection, *Āchārya Sahantabhadra* has offered the following explanation :—What is called the 'activity' of things is the potency of *projecting* the Result,—not of *producing* it ; the Past and other things, which are only partial causes, do not *project* the result ; it is only in the 'present' state that the Result is *projected* (thrown out) by its cause. Nor can there be 'projection' of what has been already projected, as that would lead to an infinite regress. Thus there being no 'activity' possible in what is 'past', there can be no confusion in the character of these (Past, Future and Present). —(1791–1793)

The following *Texts* answer the above arguments (of the Realist Buddhist) :—

TEXTS (1794–1796).

THESE PEOPLE WILL HAVE TO ADMIT THAT THIS 'ACTIVITY' IS EITHER DIFFERENT FROM, OR THE SAME AS, THE OBJECT CONCERNED ; AS THERE CAN BE NO OTHER WAY IN WHICH IT CAN REALLY EXIST.—IF IT IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE OBJECT, THEN THE PAST AND FUTURE STATES OF 'PRESENT' THINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS FORMLESS,—BECAUSE THEY ARE 'CAUSES' AND ARE 'EMBELLISHED', AND SO FORTH,—LIKE THE ACTIVITY. OTHERWISE, THE THINGS WOULD BE EVERLASTING ; AS THE 'FORM' WOULD BE THERE ALL THE TIME ; AND APART FROM THIS, THERE IS NO OTHER CHARACTERISTIC OF THE 'EVERLASTING'.—(1794–1796)

COMMENTARY.

The said Activity will have to be regarded by these people either as different from, or the same as, the Entity ; as there can be nothing apart from both 'difference' and 'non-difference', as these are mutually exclusive ; the affirmation of one being invariably concomitant with the denial of the other ; and there is no other way in which the thing can exist.

If then the Activity is something *different* from the Entity, then the Past and Future states of Present things would have to be regarded as 'formless',—because of their being *causes* and being *embellished*,—like the Activity.—The term '*and so forth*' is meant to include 'being an entity' and so forth.—*Otherwise*—that is, if, they were not formless in the Past and in the Future,—then, all 'embellished' things would have to be regarded as eternal ; as the 'form' (or Nature) would be always there ; and the 'eternality' of a thing is nothing more than *being always there* ; as declared in the following words—'The learned men regard that Form as *eternal* which is never destroyed'.—(1794–1796)

The following might be urged :—"If *eternality* is a potency,—then how can the two Reasons—'being cause' and 'being embellished'—escape from being not incompatible with the contrary of the Probandum ?"

This is answered in the following—

TEXTS (1797-1798).

THE IDEA OF THE ETERNAL THING *being a cause* HAS ALREADY BEEN REJECTED BEFORE—ON THE GROUND OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ITS EFFECTS APPEARING EITHER SUCCESSIVELY OR SIMULTANEOUSLY. AS FOR *being embellished,* THIS IS CLEARLY IMPOSSIBLE IN AN ETERNAL THING.—WHEN 'ACTIVITY' IS DESCRIBED AS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE 'PHASES' AND OTHER THINGS (POSTULATED BY BUDDHISTS), THERE IS THE IRRESISTIBLE CONTRADICTION OF YOUR OWN DOCTRINES.—(1797-1798)

COMMENTARY.

'*Before*'—i.e. under the chapter on the 'Permanence of Things'.

All that is 'embellished' has been held to be non-eternal, hence the character of *being embellished* cannot belong to an eternal entity;—this is clearly understood.

Further, when the 'Activity' is described as something different from the 'Phases' (*Skandhas*) and the 'Inner Receptacles' (*Āyatanaṣ*),—there is clear contradiction of your own (Buddhist) doctrine; as the Blessed Lord has declared as follows—"All things, O Brāhmaṇa, are included in the Five 'Phases' and the Twelve 'Receptacles' and the Eighteen 'Substances'."—(1797-1798)

TEXTS (1799-1800).

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE 'ACTIVITY' IS *not different* FROM THE ENTITY, THEN, BEING INSEPARABLE FROM THE ENTITY, IT WOULD BE THERE AT ALL TIMES, JUST LIKE THE NATURE OF THE ENTITY; AND IN THAT CASE, THE DIVISION AMONG THE STATES COULD NOT BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF THIS ACTIVITY; AS THERE COULD BE NO SUCH DISTINCTION AS THAT BETWEEN *cessation,* AND *non-attainment,* OF THE SAID ACTIVITY.—(1799-1800)

COMMENTARY.

If the Activity is held to be non-different from the Entity, then like the nature of things, it would be inseparable from the Entity; the Activity also would be something existing at all times; and in that case there could be no such distinction among states as that—that which has ceased from activity is 'Past', that which is still active is 'Present', and that which has not yet attained Activity is 'Future'. Because if the Activity were distinguishable into 'attained' and 'not attained',—then alone could the said distinction be

possible ; the said distinguishing however is not possible ; because there can be no such distinction in the case of what is always present in the same form —(1799-1800)

TEXT (1801).

OR (CONVERSELY), BECAUSE IT WOULD BE NON-DIFFERENT FROM THE ACTIVITY—THE ENTITY, LIKE THE ACTIVITY, WOULD BE DEVOID OF THE 'PREVIOUS' AND 'LATER' CONDITIONS, AND WOULD HAVE ITS SOLE EXISTENCE IN THE *middle* (PRESENT).—(1801)

COMMENTARY.

Further, being non-different from Activity, the Entity also would have only such existence as is devoid of the previous and later ends,—like Activity itself.

The compound '*Pūrvāpara, etc.*' is to be explained as 'that which has its all—sole existence—in the middle,—being devoid of the two ends of the 'previous' and the 'later'.—(1801)

In the following *Texts* the Author laughs at the other party for expounding mutually contradictory doctrines :—

TEXTS (1802-1803).

ACTIVITY IS NOT THERE ALWAYS,—AND THE ENTITY IS DESCRIBED AS BEING THERE AT ALL TIMES,—AND YET THE ACTIVITY IS SAID TO BE NON-DIFFERENT FROM THE ENTITY ;—CERTAINLY THIS IS CONDUCT WORTHY OF A DIVINE BEING !—EVEN IF IT BE HELD THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATES (IN THE ACTIVITY ITSELF) IS DEPENDENT UPON OTHER ACTIVITIES,—THE SAME QUESTION WOULD BE EQUALLY WELL RAISED AGAINST THAT VIEW ALSO.—(1802-1803)

COMMENTARY.

Under the circumstances, it comes to this that the Entities, Colour and the rest, do not exist at all times, as they are non-different from Activity. This is shown in the Text—'*The Entity, etc. etc.*'

For the following reason also the Activity must be something different from the Entity—'*And the Activity is non-different, etc. etc.*'.

'Divine Beings'—God and the like ; who act and live independently, not minding what is proper and what is improper ; and just as their behaviour is unreasonable, so also is the conduct of the philosopher under review.

Then again, if the Activity itself is regarded as 'future', without another Activity, then it should not be said that the states are determined by Activity; as that would not be true; inasmuch as in the case of Activity itself its 'future' and other states are determined on the basis of its own existence; and in the same manner the 'future' and other states of Entities also could be determined on the basis of their own existence.

In order to avoid this objection it might be held that, in the case of Activity also, there would be another Activity, which would be the determining factor.—But in that case also the same question—as to its being different or non-different from the former Activity,—would arise. And this would be open to the further defect that it would involve an infinite regress.—(1802-1803)

It has been pointed out that if the Activity is non-different from the Entity, it must be there at all times,—like the form or nature of the Entity itself.—*Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra* has offered an answer to that, which is anticipated and answered in the following—

TEXTS (1804-1805)

"PROPERTIES DISTINCT FROM THE ENTITY HAVE ALSO BEEN FOUND TO QUALIFY IT; FOR INSTANCE, THE QUALITY OF 'RESISTANCE'",—IF THIS IS URGED, THIS CANNOT HELP THE MATTER UNDER DISCUSSION; SUCH CHARACTERS AS THAT OF RESISTANCE AND THE LIKE ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE ENTITY AT ALL TIMES; THEY HAVE BEEN REGARDED AS OCCASIONAL; BECAUSE THE ENTITY ITSELF IS PRODUCED IN THAT WAY. —(1804-1805)

COMMENTARY.

"As a matter of fact, Properties distinct from the Entity and yet qualifying it have been found; for example, the character of *Resistance* and the like found in Earth and other things. These things—Earth, etc.—as *Categories*,—are all the same; and yet these are found to be 'resistant' and 'non-resistant', 'similar' and 'dissimilar',—thus being qualified by properties which are distinct from the form of the things themselves. In the same manner, the Entity could be qualified by Activity, which may be different from the Entity itself."

This explanation will not help the present topic. The topic under consideration is this—If the Activity is regarded as non-different from the Thing,—then there can be no distinction in the Activity which, being of the same nature as the Entity, could not serve to determine the distinction among the states (as 'Past', etc.).—As regards Earth and the other things (that have been cited by *Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra*),—they are distinct from

one another by reason of their being associated with mutually divergent characters,—and hence it is that while some are 'resistant', others are 'non-resistant'; as is found in the case of 'Sensation', etc.; but it is not that those same are 'non-resistant' which are 'resistant'; and this for the same reason that there is no comprehensive entity in the form of 'Category', by virtue of which the qualities of 'Resistance', etc. could be occasional. In fact, what happens is that the Entity itself, which is impartite, and is 'excluded from like and unlike things',—*is produced in that way.* For these reasons it is not right that any property, other than the form of the Entity itself, should distinguish any single Entity.—(1804-1805)

Question:—"How then is it that there is such an expression as '*Rūpasya sapratighatvam*', 'Resistance of the Form', where the two appear as different from one another,—if a property non-different from a thing cannot serve to distinguish it?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1806).

IT IS THE ENTITY ITSELF, WHEN IT DOES NOT INDICATE 'DIFFERENCE FROM OTHER THINGS', THAT IS SPOKEN OF BY THE WORDS 'IT IS OF THE FORM'; JUST AS 'DISPOSITION' IS SPOKEN OF AS 'OF THE MIND'.—(1806)

COMMENTARY.

'*When it does not, etc. etc.*';—that is, when it ignores the difference from other things.

'*Spoken of as, etc.*'—i.e. as if it were something different.

'*It is of the form, etc.*'—'It' stands for 'Resistance'.

'*By the words*',—i.e. by the expression 'Resistance *of* the Form'.

An example is cited—'*As Disposition, etc. etc.*'.

The term '*api cha*' should be understood in the cumulative sense.—(1806)

The same writer (*Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra*) has argued as follows:—"Activity is not something different from the Entity,—as it is not found to have any nature apart from that.—Nor is it the *Entity* only; because even though it forms its very nature, yet it is non-existent at times.—Nor is it a particular (form of it), as the Activity has had no previous existence. In fact, the 'Activity' is like the 'Chain' (Series): the consecutive birth of the Entity is called the 'Chain' (or Series),—and yet it is not something different from the Entity, as it is always apprehended as not-separate from it; nor is it the Entity only, as in that case even a single 'Moment' would have to be regarded as the 'Chain';—and yet with all this, it cannot be said that the Chain does not exist; because its effects are found to exist.—[Similar is the case with 'Activity'].—All this has been thus asserted—'It is admitted

that there are effects of the Chain,—and yet the *Chain*, as such, is nowhere existent (by itself, apart from the Entity); similar should be understood to be the case with '*Activity* as bringing about the *states*'."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1807–1809).

IF THE 'ACTIVITY' IS DESCRIBED AS 'NEITHER SAME NOR DIFFERENT', LIKE THE 'CHAIN', ETC.,—THEN IT BECOMES PURELY 'ILLUSORY'; AND THUS BEING PURELY IMAGINARY, LIKE THE 'CHAIN', IT COULD SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE IN REGARD TO ANY EFFECT; AS IT IS ONLY A REAL ENTITY THAT IS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE ACTION. THUS THEN, AS THE PRESENCE OF THE 'ACTIVITY' WOULD NOT BE REAL, ANY DETERMINING OF THE STATES BASED UPON THAT 'ACTIVITY' COULD NOT BE *real*.— (1807–1809)

COMMENTARY.

'*Like the Chain, etc.*'—the 'etc.' is meant to include the 'Aggregate' and such things.—

The 'Chain' is incapable of being spoken of as either different or non-different from the links of the chain; hence, like the 'Pudgala' (Body) it is featureless, devoid of form;—in the same way the 'Activity' in question also would be featureless;—when there is some feature (or form), it is necessary that it should be either different or non-different. Thus then, the Activity in question being purely imaginary, it could not serve any useful purpose in the bringing about of any effect; just like the 'Chain'. The 'Chain', which is purely a creature of fancy, does not serve any useful purpose towards any effect, because it is featureless; and the appearance of an effect is inseparably connected with some feature (or character). Hence it is only an *entity*, which has the form of a 'link in the chain' that is capable of effective action, —not the imaginary 'Chain'. From this it follows that the 'Activity' in question having a purely imaginary existence,—there can be no real presence of it, either before or after anything, and consequently any notions of the distinct 'states' determined upon the basis of such Activity must also be *imaginary*, not *real*.—(1807–1809)

Says the other party—"It may be that the Activity has a purely *imaginary* existence; and hence the distinction of the *states* based thereupon may also be only *imaginary*;—what is the harm in that?"—This is the view taken up in the following—

TEXTS (1810–1815).

Firstly, THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION CONSISTS IN 'THE CAPACITY TO THROW OUT RESULTS' AND IS CAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF; HOW CAN IT BE SAID TO HAVE AN IMAGINARY EXISTENCE, WHEN THE CAPACITY OF THINGS IS AN ENTITY ?—*Secondly*, THE FORM THAT IS ADMITTED TO BE BRINGING ABOUT SUCH EFFECTS AS *burning*, *cooking* AND THE LIKE,—IS THIS SAME FORM HELD TO BE IN THE 'PAST', 'PRESENT' AND 'FUTURE' STATES ?—IF IT IS THE SAME, HOW CAN *activity*, *inactivity* AND *cessation of activity* BELONG TO THE ENTITY THAT HAS A SINGLE FORM ?—HOW CAN THESE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY MODES BE PRESENT IN WHAT IS ONLY *one and undifferentiated* ?—IF IT IS ARGUED THAT—"BECAUSE IT ABANDONS ONE 'STATE' AND THEN TAKES UP ANOTHER, THAT ENTITY CANNOT BE UNDIFFERENTIATED, WHICH PASSES THROUGH THE STATES",—THEN THE QUESTION ARISES—ARE THESE 'STATES' DIFFERENT FROM THE ENTITY ?—[THE OTHER PARTY ANSWERS)—"NO; AS IN THAT CASE, THE ENTITY WOULD NOT BE AN ACTIVE AGENT. BECAUSE IT IS ONLY THROUGH THE EXISTENCE OF THE 'STATES' THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE EFFECTS IS APPREHENDED."—(1810–1815)

COMMENTARY.

You (Sahantabhadra) have explained that the capacity of entities to throw up their effects is what is meant by 'Activity';—now, how can *this capacity to throw up effects* have a merely imaginary existence ? That is, it can never be so. Consequently the distinction of the 'states' based thereupon should also be accepted as *real.*

Further, the Form of Fire is found to be one that is capable of such efficient actions as those of Burning, Cooking, etc.;—is this the same that continues in the 'Past' and other states ? Or is it different ? If it remains the same,—then how can such contradictory properties as 'activity', 'inactivity' and 'cessation from activity' belong to the said form which is one and the same, totally undifferentiated ?—And it is only through the presence of these properties that the Entity could have such states as the 'Future', 'Present' and 'Past' respectively. If, even in the presence of contradictory properties, the entity remained the same, then all ideas of Difference would become uprooted, and the entire universe would have to be regarded as *one* only. And such *one-ness* would mean that all things should be produced together at one and the same time.

It might be argued that—"By virtue of the variations undergone in the process of abandoning one state and taking up another,—the Entity in the three states is *not* entirely *undifferentiated* ".

But even so, are these states different or non-different (from the Entity) ? This has got to be explained.

Says the other Party—"They are not different;—i.e. they do not differ from the Entities.—'Why ?'—Because, in that case the Entity could not be

an active agent; i.e. it would be inactive; as through positive and negative concomitance, it has been ascertained that efficient activity (causal efficiency) to produce effects belongs to the *states* only. [Hence by being different from the States, the Entity could not be an active agent]".—(1810–1815)

The objections against this last view [that "the States are *not different* from the Entity"] are pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (1816–1820).

HOW DO THESE PEOPLE ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THERE IS NON-DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ENTITY AND THE STATES?—THEY (THE STATES), NOT HAVING BEEN IN EXISTENCE, COME INTO EXISTENCE AND THEN BECOME DESTROYED;—HOW THEN COULD THEY BE THE SAME AS THE ENTITY?—IN THE MIDDLE 'STATE', THE ENTITY IS 'ACTIVE' IN ITS OWN FORM,—THEN, AS THE SAME FORM PERSISTS IN OTHER TWO STATES ALSO, HOW COULD 'ACTIVITY' AND 'CESSATION OF ACTIVITY' BE THERE IN THESE TWO STATES?—IF IT IS 'ACTIVE', IN THE FORM OF SOMETHING ELSE, THEN IT CEASES TO BE ACTIVE AGAIN.—IF, LASTLY, IT BE HELD THAT THE FIRE AND OTHER THINGS, IN THE PAST AND FUTURE STATES, ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE SAME IN THE PRESENT STATE,—THEN IT IS TRUE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ROOM FOR THE OBJECTION THAT COMINGLING AND CONFUSION WOULD BE INVOLVED; BUT EVEN SO, AS THE ENTITY IN THE MIDDLE (PRESENT) STATE BECOMES CAPABLE OF FRUITFUL ACTION ONLY WHEN IT COMES INTO EXISTENCE AFTER THE TIME DURING WHICH IT WAS NOT IN EXISTENCE, AND AFTER HAVING COME INTO EXISTENCE, IT DOES NOT CONTINUE TO EXIST,—THERE WOULD BE NO CONTINUITY OF EXISTENCE FOR THE ENTITY.—(1816–1820)

COMMENTARY.

How can any one accept the view that the states are non-different from the Entity?—No one can accept it.—Because the States come into existence after having been non-existent, and after having come into existence, they become destroyed;—while nothing like this happens to the Entity; because it has been held to be existent at all times. Under the circumstances, having been non-existent, then coming into existence and then ceasing to exist,—how could the States be the same in essence as the Entity?—They can never be so; because, they stand upon entirely different footings.—Otherwise, being the same as the Entity, the States also would have to be regarded as existing at all times,—just like the nature of the Entity; because they are non-different from the Entity; or (conversely) the Entity itself would have to be regarded as subject to *non-existence before existence* and so forth,—like the form of the States.

Even granting the assumption that the States are non-different from the Entity,—the objection based upon the attributing to them of mutually contradictory properties still remains unanswered. For instance, when the Entity is in the 'middle' (Present) state,—is it active in its own form? Or in the form of something else?

If it is active in its own form, then, as that same form would be there in the Past and Future states also,—how could this form of the active entity become active and inactive?

If it is active in the form of something else, then it ceases to be active; and hence becomes a non-entity.

Thus it is clear that it is not right to say that the same form is there in the Past and Future states also.

If then there is some other form (of the Entity) in these States,—then, under this view, there would be no room for the objection that it involves the confusion and comingling in the same thing of mutually contradictory properties of Activity and Inactivity,—because the Entity would not be the same. But (the other difficulty will remain, that) if the Entity, Fire, which is capable of such action as *Burning* and *Cooking*, comes into existence after having been *non-existent*, and having come into existence, it disappears,—this is incompatible with the doctrine of the permanent existence of the Entity; because there is no continuity of existence.—(1816–1820)

The following might be urged—"It is true that the Entity, not being capable of action before it becomes capable of action, and having become capable of action, it ceases to be so; but even so, in these Past and Future states also the Entity is there all the same, though not capable of action; so that our theory is not incompatible with the idea of the Entity being there at all times.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1821).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THAT ENTITY ALONE IS REAL WHICH IS *capable of action*; HENCE FROM THAT WHICH IS NOT SO IN THE TWO STATES,—NO EFFECT CAN PROCEED.—(1821)

COMMENTARY.

'*That alone*'—which is capable of action.

'*In the two states*'—in the Past and Future states.

'*That which is not so*'—i.e. not capable of action.—(1821)

The following might be urged:—"In the case of such 'Past' entities as the 'Partial (or divided) cause', *capacity for action* is actually held to be there; hence the conclusion that 'no effect can be produced' cannot be admitted".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1822–1828).

SUCH A PAST ENTITY WOULD BE ONE THAT HAS COME INTO EXISTENCE, NOT HAVING BEEN THERE BEFORE, AND AS SUCH IT WOULD CLEARLY BE 'PRESENT', —JUST LIKE ANY OTHER 'PRESENT' ENTITY; ALSO BECAUSE IT WOULD BE OCCASIONAL.—IF AN ENTITY HAS NO CAUSE, IT CAN BE EITHER ETERNALLY EXISTENT OR NON-EXISTENT, BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT BE DEPENDENT UPON ANYTHING ELSE. THAT HOWEVER, WHICH HAS ITS EXISTENCE DEPENDENT UPON A CAUSE MUST BE CALLED 'PRESENT'.—THEN AGAIN, OTHER PEOPLE HAVE POSTULATED THAT 'MODIFICATION' OF FORM, ETC. IS DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER FROM 'PRATIŚAṄKHYĀNIRODHA' (DISSOCIATION FROM IMPURITIES BROUGHT ABOUT BY TRANSCENDENTAL KNOWLEDGE), AND OTHER 'ETERNAL VERITIES'; AND THIS 'MODIFICATION' OR EMBELLISHMENT OF FORM AND OTHER THINGS, COMES ABOUT THROUGH BIRTH, EXISTENCE, ETC.; NOW WHAT IS THAT PECULIARITY BY PRODUCING WHICH, BIRTH IS SAID TO BE 'PRODUCTIVE' OF THE THING? IS IT SOMETHING *non-different* FROM THE 'UNBORN' FORM? OR *different* FROM IT? IF THE PECULIARITY IS *non-different* FROM THE FORM, THEN THERE CAN BE NO 'PRODUCTION' OF IT; AS IT WOULD, IN THAT CASE, BE THERE EVEN BEFORE THE 'BIRTH', JUST AS AFTER IT. AS FOR A *different* PECULIARITY, THERE CAN BE NO SUCH,—BECAUSE BY REASON OF THIS DIFFERENCE, THERE CAN BE NO RELATION BETWEEN THEM. FURTHER, AS IT WOULD NOT BE EXISTENT BEFORE, IT WOULD INVOLVE THE NOTION THAT THE EFFECT WAS NOT EXISTENT (WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE OPPONENT'S DOCTRINES).—SIMILARLY IF THERE WERE 'REVERSAL OF CHARACTER', 'CONTINUANCE' AND 'DESTRUCTION' (BROUGHT ABOUT RESPECTIVELY BY THE EMBELLISHMENTS OF 'DECAY', 'STABILITY' AND 'NON-ETERNALITY'),—THE OBJECTIONS BASED UPON THEIR BEING 'DIFFERENT OR NON-DIFFERENT', 'DECAY' AND THE REST, WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO THESE ALSO.—(1822–1828)

COMMENTARY.

'*Just like any other present Entity*'—i.e. any other Entity whose 'present' character is not disputed.

'*Also because it would be occasional*';—this also goes with 'it would be *Present*'.

The Reason here put forward cannot be regarded as Irrelevant. Because as a matter of fact that thing is called 'Present' which has been produced by the Causal Link (or Factor); and what is *occasional* must owe its birth to a Causal Factor; because for that which has no cause, there are only two conditions possible—perpetual existence or non-existence; for the simple reason that its existence is not dependent upon anything else; hence what is

and thus it becomes established that, that which has its existence brought about by a Causal Factor must be 'Present'; that is to say, 'Being Present' is invariably concomitant with 'being occasional'.

Further, if the Entity is really objectively 'Past' and 'Future', then all 'Embellishments' (or Modifications) would be everlasting; and in that case, there would be no difference between Form, etc. and the 'Dissociation from Impurities by transcendental knowledge' and other 'eternal verities'.

It might be argued that it is only the Form and such things as are actually found to be embellished (or modified) that can be regarded as 'modified'—not *Ākāsha* and the other Eternal Verities; so that there would be clear difference between Form, etc. and the said 'Eternal Verities'.

This is the view that has been held by other people.

This however cannot be right. Because there are four marks of *modification*—(1) Birth, (2) Decay, (3) Existence, and (4) Non-eternality. Among these, *Birth* produces things, *Existence* leads to their continuance, *Decay* leads to their decadence, and *Non-eternality* destroys them; hence among these, the functions of Producing and the rest have been held to be present.

Now the question arises—What is that Peculiarity which *Birth* produces by virtue of which it comes to be spoken of as 'productive' of the Form, etc.?—Is this Peculiarity something different from the Form, etc.? Or non-different from them? These are the only two possible alternatives.

It cannot be *non-different* from Form, etc.; because the Peculiarity in question would, in that case, be an accomplished thing even before the functioning of 'Birth', and as such it would be incapable of being brought about,—just as after its accomplishment; what is already an accomplished entity cannot be brought about again; if it were, then there would be an infinite regress.

Nor can a Peculiarity be brought about which is different from the Form, etc.; because as it would be different from them, there could be nothing to determine that 'this Peculiarity belongs to that Form'. For instance, the relation between them cannot be that of Identity,—as they are held to be different; if they are not held to be different, then the above objections come in. Nor can the relation between them be that of one being produced by the other; as the production of the thing is due to Birth itself. No other kind of relation is possible;—those of *container and contained* being included under that of *being produced.* If then the relation of *being produced* from it is held to subsist between the said Peculiarity and Form, etc.—then, as the Peculiarity would be capable of being produced by the Form itself alone, it would be produced at all times from that alone; and under the circumstances, what would 'Birth' do to it?—It might be argued that "the Form produces the Peculiarity, *through Birth*".—The answer to that is that it cannot be right that there should be any dependence upon the *Birth* which can render no help at all. Otherwise it would lead to an absurdity. If the Birth be held to actually render some help, then in regard to this Help, the question would arise as to its being different or non-different and so forth,—just as it arises in the case of the Peculiarity; and this would lead to an infinite regress.

From all this it follows that if there is difference, then there can be no relationship.

Further, if it be held that the said 'Peculiarity' did not exist before,—then it would mean the acceptance of the view that the effect has been non-existent (which is inconsistent with the opponent's doctrines).

Similarly, if Decay brings about a *reversal of character*,—and if Existence brings about *stability*,—and if Non-eternality brings about *destruction*,—then the question regarding these—'Reversal', etc.—being different or non-different, will arise, as it arose in connection with Birth; and all the objections then urged would be applicable in the case of these also.—(1822–1828)

TEXTS (1829-1830)

THESE, 'BIRTH' AND THE REST, ARE PRODUCTIVE OF THEIR EFFECTS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LIMITATIONS OF THEIR NATURE; AND THIS CAPACITY OF THEIRS IS THERE BEFORE AS WELL AS AFTER; THIS POTENT FORM THUS BEING THERE AT ALL TIMES, WHY SHOULD THEY NOT PROCEED WITH THE ACTIVITY IN KEEPING WITH THEIR NATURE? AT THE STARTING OF SUCH ACTIVITY THERE CAN BE NO LIMITATION ON THE 'STATES'.—(1829-1830)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, the capacity of 'Birth' and the rest to produce their effects is limited to their respective capacity; and this capacity of theirs is there at all times; hence they should produce their effects at all times. It cannot be urged that there is absence of the 'Causal Factor' (which prevents the production). Because the Causal Factor also is there at all times. Thus then, as Birth and the rest would be producing their effects in the 'past' and 'future' states also,—one and the same 'state' should include all the States, of which thus there need be no division.—(1829-1830)

TEXTS (1831-1832).

FURTHER, WOULD THE 'PAST' AND OTHER ENTITIES BE MOMENTARY, OR NOT?—IF THE FORMER, THEN THERE IS THE SAME ABSENCE OF RESTRICTION.—THE 'MOMENT' THAT IS BORN BECOMES THE 'PRESENT',—THAT WHICH, ON BEING BORN, BECOMES DESTROYED, BECOMES THE 'PAST',—AND THAT WHICH IS YET TO BE BORN BECOMES THE 'FUTURE'.—(1831-1832)

COMMENTARY.

Again, are the Past, Present and Future things momentary or not? These are the two alternatives.—If the former,—if they are momentary.—

then there is the same absence of restriction.—The next sentence—'*The Moment, etc. etc.*' shows this same absence of restriction.—(1831-1832)

TEXT (1833).

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SAID THINGS ARE *not momentary*,—THEN THAT GOES AGAINST YOUR DOCTRINE ; UNDER YOUR DOCTRINE IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT ALL MODIFICATIONS ARE MOMENTARY.—(1833)

COMMENTARY.

If the other alternative is accepted—that the Past and the rest are not momentary—then it goes against your doctrine.—The term '*Kṛtānta*' stands for *Siddhānta*, accepted doctrine.—The doctrine referred to is that 'all modifications are momentary'.—(1833)

TEXT (1834).

THE VIEW IN QUESTION IS OPPOSED TO REASON ALSO : IF THE THINGS ARE EXISTENT, THEY MUST BE MOMENTARY, LIKE PRESENT THINGS. THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE BETWEEN THESE TWO TERMS HAS BEEN ALREADY ESTABLISHED BEFORE.—(1834)

COMMENTARY.

Further, the view in question does not go against your own doctrine only, it is opposed to Reason also. For instance, whatever is existent must be momentary,—like the Present thing,—the Past and the Future are existent —hence they must be momentary. Previously—under the treatment of the Momentary Character of things (under Chapter VIII) the Invariable Concomitance of this Probans (*Being existent*, with the Probandum, *Being momentary*) has been established. Hence it cannot be said to be 'Inconclusive' (Doubtful). Further, 'existence' is characterised by *capacity for effective action* ;— what is not-*momentary* is not compatible with effective action, either successive or simultaneous ;—and when there is no *effective action*, there must be cessation of *existence* also, which is characterised by *effective action.* Thus *Existence* becomes excluded from where the Probandum (momentariness) is absent.—(1834)

TEXTS (1835–1840).

ARE THESE 'PAST' AND 'FUTURE' THINGS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE ACTION? OR NOT?—IF THEY HAVE THAT CAPACITY, THEN THEY MUST BE REGARDED AS 'PRESENT', LIKE OTHER 'PRESENT' THINGS.—IF THE 'PAST' AND THE 'FUTURE' ARE NOT REGARDED AS 'PRESENT', THEN THEY MUST BE DEVOID OF ALL CAPACITIES,—JUST LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS'.—THE *Ākāsha* AND OTHER 'NON-PRODUCED' (ETERNAL) THINGS ARE OPEN TO THE SAME OBJECTION; HENCE THESE CANNOT SERVE TO MAKE OUR REASON 'INCONCLUSIVE'.—IN THE CASE OF ALL ENTITIES, THEIR RESTRICTED CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION, MUST BE DUE TO SOME CAUSE; IF IT WERE WITHOUT A CAUSE, EVERYTHING WOULD BE USED FOR EVERYTHING. IN FACT, THE RESTRICTED CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION MUST BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY A CAUSE; AND THERE IS NO OTHER CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF THE 'PRESENT' THING. IN THE CASE OF THE 'PAST' AND 'FUTURE' ALSO, THE SAID CAPACITY IS THERE FULLY COMPLETE, ACCORDING TO YOUR VIEW; WHEREFORE THEN SHOULD NOT THE CHARACTER OF THE 'PRESENT' BE ATTRIBUTED TO THEM?—(1835–1840)

COMMENTARY.

Further, there are the two alternatives—these Past and Future things are capable of effective action—or not capable.—If they are capable, then, the capacity being there, the things must be regarded as 'Present',—like those things whose 'present' character is not disputed. The argument may be thus formulated—Things that are capable of effective action must be regarded as Present,—as those things whose 'present' character is not disputed,—and the Past and Future things are capable of effective action; hence there is this Reason based upon the nature of things, which provides the *Reductio ad absurdum*.—The Probans cannot be said to be 'Inconclusive'; because the absence of the 'Present' character in the Past and Future things would imply the absence of all capacities,—just as in the 'sky-lotus'.—The argument may be thus formulated:—Things that are not-'Present' are also *not-efficient* for any action,—e.g. the 'sky-lotus',—and the Past and Future things are not 'Present'; hence there is perceived in them the absence of the wider character.

Nor can this argument be said to be 'Inconclusive', in view of the three 'eternal verities'—*Ākāsha*, *Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* and *Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*,—which do not undergo modifications;—because these also are included under the Minor Term (Subject of the Syllogism).

Thus there is no ground for the Reason being regarded as 'Inconclusive' (or Doubtful).

Then again, the restricted capacity for effective action that there is in entities, must be admitted to be due to some cause; otherwise, if it were

without cause, then there could be nothing to restrict it; and the capacity of things would, in that case, not be restricted (or limited); with the result that each and every thing would be utilised in bringing about each and every effect. Thus it cannot be right to restrict the efficiency of the eternal verities, *Ākāsha* and the rest. Consequently they do not supply the ground for regarding the Reason as 'Inconclusive'.

Nor can it be urged that the former Reason is one whose presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion; because the efficiency that pertains to a particular efficient activity,—the birth of which is due to causal factors,—is what characterises the 'Present'; and this characteristic of the 'Present' is present intact in the Past and Future things also; hence, there being no other basis for this, why should these be not regarded as 'Present'?—(1835-1840)

TEXT (1841).

AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS, ALL ATTEMPT TO ATTAIN HEAVEN AND FINAL BEATITUDE WOULD BE FUTILE; AS NO FRUIT IS FOUND THAT COULD BE ATTAINED BY EFFORT.—(1841)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, for the man for whom the Past and Future are actually present,—the fruit of acts also would be there at all times; hence any effort to attain Heaven or Final Beatitude would be futile; as there would be no fruit that could be attained by effort,—what would be the efficiency of the Austerities and Penances that constitute 'effort'?—It might be said that "they would have the efficiency to produce the desired results".—That would mean that the said 'Production' of Results is something that was not there before and has come about now.—But even so, what is it that would be efficient? And wherein would it be efficient?—"The efficiency would lie in making the results 'present'".—What do you mean by 'making them *present*'?—If it means 'bringing them to another place', then the thing becomes eternal, as it would remain for all time.—How too could there be any such 'bringing' in the case of Sensations, etc., which are immobile? Even so, this 'bringing' would be something that did not exist before, but has now come into existence.

'*Heaven*' stands for the place on the summits of mount *Mēru*.—'*Apavarga*', 'Final Beatitude', stands for Deliverance;—the '*Samsarga*' of these is their *attainment*.—The '*effort*' for this consists in Observances and Austerities.—(1841)

TEXT (1842).

IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PAST AND FUTURE THINGS ARE HELD TO BE WITHOUT THE *capacity for effective action*,—THEN, ON THAT GROUND ALONE, THEY WOULD BE *non-existent*,—LIKE THE 'SKY-FLOWER'.—(1842)

COMMENTARY.

If then the second alternative view (proposed under *Text* 1835) is accepted —that the Past and Future things are devoid of capacity for effective action, —then, in that case, for that very reason,—of being devoid of *capacity for effective activity*,—they would have to be regarded as 'non-existent', like 'sky-flowers'; as the only characteristic of 'non-existence' consists in the *absence of all capacity*.—(1842)

Having thus adduced arguments in favour of the view that the 'Past' and the 'Future' do not exist, the author proceeds to refute the arguments that have been put forward in support of the view that they do exist :—

TEXT (1843).

AS REGARDS THE REASONS THAT HAVE BEEN ADDUCED, THEY MUST RESIDE IN THINGS; AND UNTIL THESE THINGS ARE ESTABLISHED, THE REASONS CANNOT BE ADMITTED.—OR ELSE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE 'PRESENT' CHARACTER BEING ESTABLISHED, THE SAID REASONS ARE 'CONTRADICTORY', —AS GOING AGAINST THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT.—(1843)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Reasons' meant here are those adduced by the other party, under the *Text* 1790; these are 'Inadmissible in regard to their substratum'; because the things in which they are said to reside are the Past and Future things, and it has been shown that these do not exist; as has been said— 'if the thing is not there, its property cannot be there'.

Even if the said things existed, as they have been proved to have the 'Present' character, the Reasons in question would be proving something contrary to the very nature of the *Subject*; and as such, they would be 'Contradictory'.—(1843)

Question :—"If that is so, then how is it that Buddhist writers have declared the Past and Future Forms, etc. to be included among the 'states'? The Past and Future character of non-entities like the Hare's Horns is never tried to be determined".

Answer :—

TEXTS (1844-1845).

THAT FORM WHICH, HAVING COME INTO EXISTENCE, HAS CEASED TO EXIST, HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS 'PAST'; AND THAT WHICH IS TO COME WHEN THE CAUSAL FACTORS ARE COMPLETE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS 'FUTURE'.—IF THE 'EXISTENCE' OF THIS WERE INSISTED UPON, THEN THEY MUST BE REGARDED AS 'PRESENT'; THIS IS WHAT HAS BEEN JUST PROVED; AS THE ONLY CHARACTERISTIC OF THE 'PRESENT' IS THAT IT SHOULD BE *existent.* —(1844-1845)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(1844-1845)

Question :—" How is it that the presence of Form, Sensation and the rest has been attributed to these ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (1846).

WHEN FORM, ETC. ARE ATTRIBUTED TO THE PAST AND FUTURE THINGS, IT IS THROUGH *imposing* UPON THEM THEIR PAST AND FUTURE CONDITIONS; AND NOT IN REALITY.—(1846)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tām dashām*'—that condition.—(1846)

Question :—" How is it then that Cognition has been declared to rest in two substrates ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (1847).

WHEN THE SEER OF TRUTH DECLARED THAT COGNITION PROCEEDS FROM TWO CAUSES,—THIS TEACHING WAS IN VIEW OF THE COGNITION WITH AN OBJECT.—(1847)

COMMENTARY.

Cognition is of two kinds—with object (objective) and without object (purely subjective). It is in reference to the *Cognition with Object* that Cognition has been taught by the Blessed Lord, as being based upon two substrates.—(1847)

Question :—" How is it known that there is Cognition *without Object* also ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (1848).

IN THE CASE OF THE COGNITIONS OF 'ETERNAL THINGS', 'GOD' AND SO FORTH,—THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE BACKGROUND; AS WORDS AND NAMES ARE DEVOID OF THE FORMS OF THOSE.—(1848)

COMMENTARY.

'*And so forth*', includes such other assumed things as Primordial Matter, Time, etc.

No such idea should be entertained as that these cognitions have their objective background in the words; this is what is meant by the words—'*As Words and Names, etc. etc.*' —What is meant is that the 'form' of God—such as Eternality, Being the Cause of all things and so forth,—that is envisaged in the said cognitions,—of that form, the Word or the Name is entirely devoid,—which Word or Name does not undergo any modification.

The term '*ādi*' in '*shabdanāmādi*', is meant to include the contingent cause (of Cognition), postulated by other people, in the shape of the Reflected Image of things.—(1848)

Question:—"If then there is Cognition *without object* also, then how is it called 'Cognition'? Because 'Cognition' stands for *that which apprehends things*; and when there is nothing *to be apprehended*, how could the *cognition* be there?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1849).

IT IS CALLED 'COGNITION' ONLY BY VIRTUE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE NATURE OF 'CONSCIOUSNESS'; AND THIS 'CONSCIOUSNESS' ALSO CONSISTS IN THE COGNITION BEING *not-dark* WHICH IS DEDUCED FROM ITS *being luminous*.—(1849)

COMMENTARY.

"The presence of the nature of Consciousness also is not possible without cognition";—in answer to this it is added—'*And this Consciousness, etc. etc.*'—'*Sā*' stands for the presence of the nature of Consciousness;—'*asya*'—i.e. of the Cognition.—"What is it?"—It consists in the Cognition being *not-dark*; only, on account of there being nothing else to be illumined by it, and also of the absence of any other source of illumination, the Cognition is of the nature of Light itself,—like the Light diffused in the atmosphere; and it is by virtue of this *luminosity* that it is called 'Cognition'.—(1849)

Question:—"How does the *past act* bring about its fruit"?

Answer:—

TEXT (1850).

WHAT BRINGS ABOUT THE FRUIT IS THE CAUSE OF FRUITION,—NOT ANYTHING 'PAST'. IN FACT, THE FRUIT IS HELD TO PROCEED FROM THE 'CHAIN' OF COGNITIONS IMPRESSED BY THE ENTITY (WHEN PRESENT).—(1850)

COMMENTARY.

'*Impressed*'—i.e. rendered capable of producing the fruit, through the long series of 'causal factors'.—(1850)

Question:—"If that is so, then how is it that the Blessed Lord has declared that—'There is *Karma*, which decays, is obstructed and becomes modified'?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1851)

IN VIEW OF THE SAID IMPRESSION BEING ATTRIBUTED TO THE 'SERIES OF COGNITIONS', THE LORD HAS SAID THAT 'THERE IS *Karma*', WHICH ASSERTION IS FIGURATIVE; AS THE PRINCIPAL (OF THE DEBT) IS SAID TO BE 'NOT DESTROYED (LOST)'.—(1851)

COMMENTARY.

'*Bhaktyā*'—Figuratively.

When in the case of a Debt, when the accrued interest has become equal to the Principal, the Principal actually disappears; yet it is said to bé 'not lost'. In the same way the *Karma*, Act, also, though past and gone, is spoken of as 'not gone and destroyed'.—(1851)

Question:—"What was the purpose for which the Teaching was given in figurative language?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1852).

THE MATTER HAS BEEN EXPLAINED IN THIS WAY BY THE TEACHER, FOR THE PURPOSE OF REMOVING THE NOTION OF THE UTTER ANNIHILATION (OF PAST ACTS). OTHERWISE, HOW COULD HE EXPLAIN THE TEACHING IMPARTED IN THE APHORISM DECLARING THE 'VOID'?—(1852)

COMMENTARY.

If it were declared that 'the Past act does not exist', it might be understood that there is non-existence of that *potency to produce the fruit* which had been set going by the past act; and the disciples would come to take

up the view of the utter annihilation of the Past and its Effects ; it is in view of this possibility that the Lord has said that 'the Act persists'.

'*Otherwise*'—if the Past really persisted,—then how could we explain the teaching in the aphorism where we are taught that '*in reality* all is *void*'?

As a matter of fact, when the Eye is produced, it does not come from anywhere ; similarly when it is destroyed, it does not go away to any other place ; what happens is that after having been not in existence, it comes into existence, and having come into existence, it again becomes non-existent.—It might be urged that—"in the Present state, it comes into existence, after having not been in existence"—That is not so ; because the 'State' is not anything different from the entity (Eye) ; as is clear from the assertion that these same (things) are the 'States' and they exist as such.—If it be meant that—"not having been itself, it becomes itself" ;—then it would be established that there can be no 'future' Eye.—Further, if the Modifications are always there, the Cause and Effect would not be there ; which would mean that there is no fixed Truth ; and this would imply the absence of the two paths of 'Repression' (Purification) also ; and thus the *four Truths* being non-existent, there would be no possibility of True Knowledge, Renunciation, Direct Intuition and Meditation. These being not there, there would be non-existence also of the *Pudgalas* (Bodies) which are near about the regions where the Fruit of Acts come about. This would put an end to all Teaching. —From all this it follows that the assumption of 'Past' and 'Future' things is not wholesome.—(1852)

It has been asked by the Opponent (under *Text* 1789)—"How have Mystics distinct cognitions of the Past and Future?"

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1853–1856).

THE MYSTICS COGNISE THAT FORM OF THE 'PRESENT' THING WHICH, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, HAS BECOME EITHER AN EFFECT, OR A CAUSE ; SUBSEQUENTLY, THEY FOLLOW IT UP WITH *conceptual cognitions*, WHICH ARE PURELY COMMON (SECULAR) IN CHARACTER, AND WHICH ARE REALLY WITHOUT OBJECTS (WITHOUT A REAL OBJECTIVE BACK-GROUND).—THUS IT IS THAT, ON THE BASIS OF THE SAID PAST AND FUTURE SERIES OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS, PROCEED ALL TEACHINGS REGARDING THE PAST AND THE FUTURE.—AS FOR THE *Tathāgata* HIMSELF, HIS TEACHINGS PROCEED WITHOUT CIRCUMLOCUTION ; BECAUSE THE SERIES OF HIS COGNITIONS ARE ENTIRELY DEVOID OF THE WEBS OF CONCEPTUAL CONTENT.—(1853–1856)

COMMENTARY.

It has become the 'Effect' in relation to the 'Past',—and 'Cause' in relation to the 'Future'.

'*Vikalpānugatātmabhiḥ*'—i.e. with Conceptual (Determinate) Cognitions.

'*Really without objects*';—because the Specific Individuality of things cannot be envisaged by Cognitions associated with verbal expressions.

'*Tat*'—Thus, Therefore.

On the basis of the Past and Future series of Causes and Effects,—proceed all teachings regarding the Past and the Future,—from such Mystics as have not yet reached the Purest (Highest) stage.

As regards the Blessed Lord Himself, He does not even have the purely secular cognition,—because He is always calm and collected on account of the destruction of all Illusion and Ignorance ; and all that is *Conceptual* is the product of Ignorance and Illusion. This has been thus declared—'Conceptual Content itself having assumed the form of Ignorance proceeds to impose its own form in the shape of the External world'.—So that, under the influence of the whole mass of His previous Meditations, Piety and Knowledge, His nature has become like that of the *Chintāmaṇi-gem* ; hence His teachings proceed without circumlocution of any kind.—(1853–1856)

End of Chapter XXI.

CHAPTER XXII.

Lokāyata—Materialism

COMMENTARY.

[In the Introductory Text, 4] the *Truth* has been spoken of as 'without beginning, without end'.—The Author proceeds to set forth arguments in support of this view, starting with the criticism that has been urged against it:—

TEXT (1857).

"IF THERE IS NO ENTITY THAT HAS CONTINUITY OF EXISTENCE, THEN THERE CAN BE NO 'OTHER WORLD', BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING THAT COULD BELONG TO THE 'OTHER WORLD'."—(1857)

COMMENTARY.

'*No entity*'—like the Soul, etc.—The 'Soul' has been already rejected; hence it cannot be 'continuous', simply because it does not exist at all; as for the Cognition and other entities, they are all momentary, and it has been proved in the Chapter on 'The Three Points of Time' that there can be no continuity of these.—(1857)

'The Body, etc. might appertain to the other world.' The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXTS (1858-1859).

"THE BODY, THE COGNITION, THE SENSE-ORGANS AND THE REST BEING DESTROYED EVERY MOMENT,—THEY COULD NOT PERTAIN TO THE OTHER WORLD; AND THERE IS NOTHING ELSE THAT IS ADMITTED (BY YOU, BUDDHISTS). HENCE CONSCIOUSNESS MUST BE REGARDED AS PRODUCED FROM, OR MANIFESTED BY, CERTAIN MATERIAL SUBSTANCES,—JUST LIKE FERMENTED ACIDS, LIQUORS AND SUCH THINGS."—(1858-1859)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*and the rest*' includes *Feeling* (Vedanā) *Name-conception* (*Sanjñā*) and *Mental Faculties* (*Samskāra*).

'*There is nothing else that is admitted*'—in the shape of the 'Soul'.

Thus this turns out to be the assertion of the view of the *Lokāyata* (Materialist). His aphorisms read as follows :—" There being nothing that could belong to the *other world*, there can be no other world ;—there are four material substances, Earth, Water, Fire and Air ; and from these proceeds Consciousness ".

Some commentators upon these aphorisms offer the explanation that Consciousness is *produced* out of the material substances ; others explain that it becomes manifested by them. Hence the author has mentioned both these views—'*produced* or *manifested*'.

'*Shukta*'—is fermented acid.

'*Surā*'—is intoxicating liquor.

'*And such things*'—is meant to include things having the effect of making people unconscious and so forth.—(1858-1859)

An objection is raised—' As a matter of fact, Consciousness (or Cognition) is always produced on the basis of such causes as the Eye and other Sense-organs, and Objects, in the shape of Colour (Forms) ;—this fact is too well known. How then is it said that Cognition proceeds from those material substances ? '

The (Materialist's) answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (1860).

"THE NAMES 'BODY', 'SENSE-ORGAN' AND SO ON ARE APPLIED TO PARTICULAR COMBINATIONS OF EARTH AND OTHER MATERIAL SUBSTANCES ; THERE IS NO OTHER REALITY THAN THESE."—(1860)

COMMENTARY.

Says the *Lokāyata-Sūtra*—" It is to the combination of these that the names 'Object' and 'Sense-organ' are applied ;—the Sense-organ, etc. have no existence apart from the Great Material Substances ;—the idea of those appear only in regard to the combinations of these ; —and 'combination' has no existence apart from the combining elements ;—these four Material Substances are well known by direct Perception.—Apart from these, there is no other Reality, equally well known by direct Perception ;—and apart from Perception, there is no other Means of Cognition, which could prove the existence of the 'other world' and such things ".—(1860)

TEXTS (1861-1862).

"THERE CAN BE NO RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT BETWEEN THE TWO MINDS (CONSCIOUSNESSES) UNDER DISPUTE,—BECAUSE THEY SUBSIST IN DIFFERENT BODIES,—JUST LIKE THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE COW AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE HORSE.—COGNITIONS (CONSCIOUSNESS) CANNOT BE THE EFFECTS OF THE COGNITION (CONSCIOUSNESS) IN QUESTION,—BECAUSE THEY ARE CONSCIOUSNESS,—LIKE CONSCIOUSNESS CONNECTED WITH ANOTHER 'SERIES'."—(1861-1862)

COMMENTARY.

"Further, if the Mind that existed in the past body were the cause of the Mind (Consciousness) in the body now born,—and the Mind in the dying body were the cause of the Mind in the future body,—then, inasmuch as there would be no cessation in the continuity of the Mind, the existence of the 'other world' might be postulated. As a matter of fact, however, thère can be no relation of Cause and Effect between the said two Minds in dispute,—because they reside in different bodies,—just like the Cognition of the Cow and the Cognition of the Horse.

"Or, the produced Cognitions maybe made the 'Subject',—in regard to which there is denial of the idea of their being produced by the last cognition in the past (dead) body;—the 'Probans' being the same as before, 'because they are cognitions';—the 'Cognitions appearing in other Series' supply the Corroborative Instance.

"The argument may be formulated as follows:—The (present) Cognition cannot be produced by the last Cognition in the Past body,—because it is Cognition,—like the Cognition appearing in another Series;—the Cognitions appearing in the Body in question are all *Cognitions*;—hence there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the contrary; inasmuch as 'being cognition' is concomitant with the contrary of 'being produced by the Cognition in the last Body in question".—(1861-1862)

The idea of the 'previous birth' has thus been denied by the Materialist; he proceeds to deny the 'future birth':—

TEXT (1863).

"THE DYING CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE MAN BESET WITH AFFECTIONS CANNOT BRING ABOUT THE CONTIGUITY OF ANOTHER MIND (OR CONSCIOUSNESS),—BECAUSE IT IS DYING CONSCIOUSNESS,—JUST LIKE THE DYING CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE PERSON FREE FROM THE 'AFFLICTIONS' (PASSIONS AND IMPURITIES)".—(1863)

COMMENTARY.

"The Dying Consciousness cannot bring about another Consciousness,—because it is Dying Consciousness—like the dying Consciousness of the '*Arhat*', (the Person free from the Afflictions (of Passions, etc.)".—(1863)

Question:—How then does the Consciousness (Mind) come about?
Answer:—

TEXT (1864).

"FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE RIGHT VIEW IS THAT CONSCIOUSNESS PROCEEDS FROM THE BODY ITSELF WHICH IS EQUIPPED WITH THE FIVE LIFE-BREATHS—*Prāṇa*, *Apāna* AND THE REST;—AS HAS BEEN DECLARED BY *Kambalāshvatara*."—(1864)

COMMENTARY.

The *Sūtra* is—"It is from the Body itself, etc."—which has been pronounced by *Kambalāshvatara*.—(1864)

An objection is raised—Even before the Body has been completely formed, and while it still exists only in the form of the fœtus, etc.,—Consciousness is already there, though in latent condition; and this Consciousness is known as being produced by the Consciousness in the *past* body; then how can it be asserted that it proceeds from the *Body itself* only?

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1865–1868).

"To assert that Consciousness resides in the Fœtus, etc. is sheer audacity; nothing can be cognised at that stage, as the sense-organs are not there; and Consciousness can have no form other than the cognition of things; it is for this same reason that there is no Consciousness in the state of swoon. Nor can Consciousness exist there in the form of a latent potency; because no Potencies can exist without a substratum; and as there is no Soul that could be that substratum of Consciousness, the Body is the only substratum possible for it. So that at the end, when the Body has ceased to exist, wherein could the Consciousness subsist?"—(1865–1868)

COMMENTARY.

"The Sense-organ and the Object are the cause of the birth of Consciousness;—because Consciousness consists only in the apprehension of things; at the fœtus-stage of the Body, neither the Sense-organs nor the Objects are there; how then could there appear the effect of these, in the form of Consciousness? Thus it is proved that on account of the absence of the Cause, there can be no Consciousness, even in a swoon.—Such is the upshot of the whole.

"It cannot be right to assert that at that stage the Consciousness is there in the state of latent Potency. Because at that stage, there is no substratum for such a Potency, either in the shape of the 'Soul' postulated by the *Naiyāyika,* or in that of the 'Chain of Cognitions' (postulated by the Buddhist); and Potency cannot be there without a substratum. Hence it follows that on the ground of sheer capacity, the Body alone can be the substratum of Consciousness. For the simple reason that there is nothing else that could be the required substratum,—either in the shape of the 'Chain of Cognitions' or the 'Soul'. Consequently, at the end, when the Body dies, the substratum in the shape of the Body having ceased to exist, how could the Consciousness exist without a substratum?

"Thus it is proved that there can be no *Future Birth.*"—(1865–1868)

TEXTS (1869–1871).

" WHEN THE OTHER BODY HAS NOT BEEN SEEN, HOW CAN IT BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE REQUIRED SUBSTRATUM IS THE BODY THAT IS BORN SUBSEQUENTLY ? HOW TOO COULD THE CONSCIOUSNESS, RESIDING IN DIFFERENT BODIES, BE RELATED TO THE SAME 'CHAIN OF COGNITIONS',—BEING LIKE THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE ELEPHANT, THE HORSE AND OTHER ANIMALS ?—FOR THESE REASONS, AS THE SUBSTRATUM OF CONSCIOUSNESS, YOU HAVE EITHER TO SEEK FOR A BEGINNINGLESS AND ENDLESS TRANSMIGRATING PERSONALITY,—OR ACCEPT PURE MATERIALISM."—
(1869–1871)

COMMENTARY.

" It might be argued that—the Consciousness would be subsisting in that intermediate body which would be produced immediately after death ".—But that cannot be right; because no such intermediate body has ever been seen appearing immediately after death; and there can be no certainty regarding the existence of what has never been seen; as such a thing is always regarded as *non-existent*.

Nor can it be right for the Consciousness of one 'chain' to subsist in another body;—as in that case the character of being related to the same 'chain' would be lost;—just as in the case of the Consciousness of the different animals, Elephant, Horse and so forth.

" The argument may be formulated thus :—Consciousness appearing in different bodies cannot belong to the same 'chain',—like the Cognition of the Elephant and that of the Horse,—the Consciousness subsisting in the dead body and that subsisting in the succeeding Intermediate Body subsist in different bodies; hence there would be the possibility of the apprehension of what is contrary to the wider conception;—but as a matter of fact, there is no such apprehension;—hence the contrary must be true. That is, what are related to the same 'Chain' cannot subsist in different bodies,—e.g. the Consciousness of the Elephant does not subsist in the body of the Horse;—the Consciousness of every person is related to the same 'Chain';—hence there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the contrary; because 'being related to the same Chain' is invariably concomitant with 'subsisting in the same body', which is contrary to 'subsisting in different bodies'.

The words—'*For these reasons, etc. etc.*'—recapitulates the Materialist's view.

'*Ādi*'—is birth, beginning;—'*nidhana*' is destruction, end;—that which has neither beginning nor end is '*beginningless and endless*'.

*Or; accept pure Materialism** ;—this indicates the *Lokāyata*-Sūtra—'There is no one related to the *other world* ; hence there can be no *other world*'.—(1869–1871)

The following *Texts* answer the above arguments (of the Materialist) :—

TEXTS (1872–1877).

AS REGARDS THE 'OTHER WORLD', THERE IS NO SUCH 'OTHER WORLD', APART FROM THE 'CHAIN OF *Causes and Effects*, IN THE FORM OF *Cognition* AND THE REST'. WHAT IS SPOKEN OF AS 'THE OTHER WORLD' OR 'THIS WORLD', THAT IS ONLY BY WAY OF A CERTAIN LIMIT PLACED UPON THE SAID 'CHAIN' WHICH IS BEGINNINGLESS AND ENDLESS.—WE REGARD IT TO BE THUS, IN THE SAME WAY AS PEOPLE ADDICTED TO THE PLEASURES OF THE PERCEPTIBLE ONLY ASSUME THE 'OTHER WORLD' TO CONSIST IN SOME OTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY.—IF WHAT YOU ARE DENYING IS THE 'OTHER WORLD' DIFFERENT FROM THOSE JUST MENTIONED,—THEN THE ATTEMPT TO PROVE THAT DENIAL IS FUTILE ; AS THERE IS NO DISPUTE (BETWEEN US) REGARDING THE NON-EXISTENCE OF SUCH 'OTHER WORLD'.—*Objection*—"THE *Chain* BEING A NON-ENTITY, IT CANNOT HAVE DIFFERENT STATES ; HOW THEN CAN THE 'OTHER WORLD' CONSISTING OF THESE, BE ANYTHING *real* ?"—*Answer*—THERE IS NOTHING IN THIS ; WHAT ARE DENOTED BY THE TERM 'CHAIN' ARE THE *members of the chain*, SPOKEN OF COLLECTIVELY BY THAT TERM FOR THE SAKE OF BREVITY ;—JUST LIKE SUCH TERMS AS 'FOREST' AND THE LIKE.—(1872–1877)

COMMENTARY.

What is the 'other world' which you are denying ? Is it something different from the Chain of causes and effects, consisting of Cognition and the other four 'Phases' (*Skandhas*) ? Or is it this same Chain ?

The former cannot be right ; as no such 'other world' has been admitted. In fact, there is nothing apart from the Chain of Causes and Effects, in the shape of Cognition and the rest,—which could be accepted. What is actually regarded as the 'other world', or 'this world', or the 'previous world',—is only by way of a certain limit,—in the form of a hundred years or so—placed upon the said Chain of Cognition, etc., which is without beginning and without end. This is exactly as you (Materialists), who are addicted to merely perceptible pleasures, apply the name 'other world'

* [This use of '*nāstikatā*' is to be noted ; as it affords another indication of the truth that '*nāstika*' is not the same as 'Atheist' ; '*nāstikatā*', as we find here, is the view that denies the *other world*. This is in agreement with the View of *Vātsyāyana*, who also sums up the '*Nāstika*' view in the words '*Nāsti ātmā nāsti paralokaḥ*', 'There is no *Soul*, there is no *other world*.']

to some other part of this same visible world ; as is declared in such assertions as ‘ The Man is only so much as is perceptible of the senses ’ ; and again, ‘ The *other world* consists in *another place*, or *another time* or *another state* ’.

If, on the other hand, the ‘ other world ’ that is denied is something different from the said *Chain of causes and effects in the shape of Cognition, etc.*,—then, as such a conclusion is already admitted (by both parties), any proving of it would be futile ; as no such ‘ other world ’ is postulated by us.

An objection is raised—“ The *Chain* being a non-entity, any State that is attributed to it must also be a non-entity ; under the circumstances, the ‘ other world ’ based upon such limitation could not be *real* ”.

Answer—This does not affect our position. What the term ‘ Chain ’ denotes are *the members of the chain*, which are entities ;—these being spoken of, for the sake of brevity, and expressed collectively and simultaneously, by the one name ‘ Chain ’ ; just in the same way as the *Dhava* and other trees (which are real) are spoken of collectively as ‘ Forest ’ (though the Forest as such is not a real entity).—(1872–1877)

Question :—“ If it is so, then how was it that the Chain was spoken of as a *non-entity* under *Text* 1807, where the Chain or Series has been declared to be ‘ illusory ’ (unreal) ? ”

Answer :—

TEXTS (1878–1885).

IT IS BECAUSE IT IS CONCEIVED AS ‘ ONE ’ (COMPOSITE), AND IS FEATURELESS AND INCAPABLE OF BEING INDICATED EITHER AS THE *same*, OR AS *different* (FROM THE COMPONENT MEMBERS OF THE CHAIN).—THAT THE CHAIN HAS BEEN REGARDED AS A ‘ NON-ENTITY ’ ;—JUST LIKE THE ‘ LINE OF SKY-LOTUSES ’.—AS IT IS, WHY CANNOT THE CHAIN BE ACCEPTED AS BEING WITHOUT BEGINNING AND WITHOUT END ?—IF [IT HAD A BEGINNING AND] THE FIRST MEMBER OF THE ‘ CHAIN ’ CONSISTED OF THE FIRST *cognition*,—THIS COULD BE HELD TO BE EITHER (1) ‘ WITHOUT CAUSE ’,—OR (2) AS PRODUCED BY AN ETERNAL CAUSE,—OR (3) AS ETERNAL BY ITSELF,—OR (4) AS PRODUCED FROM ANY SUBSTANCE,—OR (5) AS PRODUCED BY ANY OTHER COGNITION.—(1) THE FIRST COGNITION WOULD APPEAR AT THE VERY INCEPTION OF THE FŒTUS, AND IT COULD NOT COME ABOUT WITHOUT CAUSE ; BECAUSE OTHERWISE, ITS EXISTENCE, WHICH IS ONLY OCCASIONAL, WOULD BE QUITE THE REVERSE (EVERLASTING).—(2) NOR COULD IT BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY SUCH ETERNAL CAUSES AS MIND, TIME, SPACE, GOD, SOUL AND SO FORTH ; BECAUSE ON THAT VERY ACCOUNT IT SHOULD BE ETERNAL.—(3) ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF THE SAID ‘ ETERNAL EXISTENCE ’ IT WOULD BE SHEER AUDACITY TO ASSERT THAT THE COGNITION IS ONE AND ETERNAL; AS DIFFERENCE IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED AMONG THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND AND OTHER THINGS.—(4-5) NOR COULD IT BE PRODUCED FROM, OR

MANIFESTED BY, THE MATERIAL SUBSTANCES—EARTH, FIRE, WATER AND AIR; AS, IN THAT CASE, ALL COGNITIONS WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS; AS THE OTHER PARTY REGARD THESE SUBSTANCES AS OF PERMANENT FORM; AND THE IDEA OF A PERMANENT THING REQUIRING THE HELP OF AUXILIARIES HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED. —(1878–1885)

COMMENTARY.

That 'Chain' which has been postulated as *one* has been found to be incapable of being indicated as the *same* as, or *different* from, the members of the Chain, and on that ground, it has been regarded as a 'non-entity';—just like the 'Series of sky-lotuses'; and we do not base our notion of the 'other world' upon the states of any such one 'Chain'.—If it is this 'Chain of Cognitions, etc.', called the 'other world', which you are denying,—then, it cannot be right to deny this 'other world' on the basis of the denial of the very form or existence of the said 'Chain'; because what is actually perceived cannot be denied. All the denial that could be made of it would be with regard to its qualities of *beginninglessness* and *endlessness*.—But why cannot these—*endlessness* and *beginninglessness*,—be accepted?

If *beginninglessness* is denied, and the first cognition at birth is held to be the *first* cognition (the beginning),—then this initial cognition would be either (1) *without cause*,—or (2) produced by an eternal cause, like an eternal Cognition or God and so forth,—or (3) it would itself be eternal,—or (4) it would be produced from any Substance,—or (5) produced by a Cognition appearing in another 'chain'.—These are the five alternatives possible.

If each cognition in the chain were the effect of another previous cognition in the same Chain,—then alone could the Chain be *beginningless*, not otherwise. That is why the Author has set forth these alternatives that are possible (under the idea of the Chain being *not* beginningless,—and then to show the untenability of every one of these alternatives).

(1) The first alternative cannot be accepted; as under that view the Cognition would have permanent existence. Things are *occasional* only when they are dependent upon other things, and what is without cause is not dependent upon anything,—why then should it cease to exist?

(2) Nor is the second alternative tenable; as for that same reason it would be eternal. Effects become non-existent only by reason of the absence of their cause; when the cause is present in its perfect form, you have to explain why the effect should not come about.

(3) Nor can the third alternative be accepted.—"Why?"—*Because of the absence*—of permanent existence.—The same absence is further emphasised by the words—'*It would be sheer audacity, etc. etc.*'.—This points out the fact of the Opponent's Proposition being contrary to perceived facts.

(4) The sentence '*Nor could, etc. etc.*' rejects the fourth alternative.—'*Kṣoṇī*' is Earth.—This alternative is open to the same objections as the second one—that it proceeds from the Eternal God, etc.; because the four Major Elemental Substances are held by the other party to be eternal.—It will not be right to urge that—"the production of the Cognition from an

Eternal Cause would be possible as it would be dependent upon auxiliary causes";—because it has been thoroughly established that an eternal cause cannot depend upon an auxiliary, as it can render no help to it.—(1878-1885)

[The refutation of the *fifth* alternatives follows under Text 1893.]

TEXT (1886).

IF THE OTHER PARTY ASSERT THAT "THESE ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCES ARE *momentary* (NOT *eternal*)",—THEN, IN THAT CASE, WHY CANNOT THEIR OWN DOCTRINE BE REGARDED AS REJECTED BY THIS ?—(1886)

COMMENTARY.

If the four Major Elemental Substances are described by the other party as *momentary*,—with a view to escape from the objections urged above,—then also, there are objections against him.—This is what is meant.

[These objections—against the view that Cognition proceeds from the elemental substances, Earth, etc.—are now set forth in detail.]

For instance, there is nothing to prove that between Cognition and the Body (made up of the material substances), there subsists the relation of Cause and Effect,—on the basis whereof the usage of the other party could be justified. This argument may be thus formulated:—When there is no evidence in support of a certain thing having a particular character, no sane man should treat that thing as being of that character;—for instance, one should not treat Fire as *cold*;—there is no evidence in support of the presence of a causal relation between the Body and Cognition,—hence the wider proposition is not available —Nor can the Reason be held to be 'inadmissible'. Because the causal relation is always based upon Perception and Non-apprehension; and as such, it can be ascertained through particular positive or negative concomitance (Premiss),—not by mere perception or non-perception. When the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a particular cause is going to be ascertained through positive concomitance, what is to be found out is if the thing in question is one which is perceptible and which, being not seen before, is seen when the other thing (the Cause) is seen;—otherwise, if it were not found out *if the thing is perceptible and was not seen before*,—then it might be thought that the thing (Effect) might have been there even before the Cause appeared, or it might have gone to some other place. So that there would be nothing in the idea of the Tree and such other things, which have been existing before the cause in question, being the cause of the effect concerned. This possibility becomes averted by noting that the effect is one that could be perceived and is yet not perceived; as this condition is not fulfilled in the case of false causality. In this way the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a certain cause becomes ascertained through positive concomitance.—In the ascertainment of the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a certain cause through negative concomitance, it has to be found

out what is that thing during the absence of which the effect in question does not appear, even though other efficient causes are there; otherwise, if all that were accertained were that it does not appear when the other is absent, it would be doubtful if that particular cause is really efficient enough to bring about that effect; as other causes efficient for that purpose are also absent; so that it might be conceivable that—"these latter are the real causes of the effect; and it is the absence of these to which the absence is due; and as for its absence also during the absence of this other thing (which is intended to be the cause),—that may be a mere accident; just as in the case of the *absence of date-palm*, which grows in a place where the '*Mātṛvivāha*' (?) generally grows, during the absence of this latter. Hence the qualification, 'other efficient causes being present', has to be added.—It is in this way that it is fully ascertained that the thing in question *only* can be the cause of the effect concerned; its absence being duly followed (by the absence of the effect). There is no such following of the absence of anything which renders no help in the bringing about of the effect; if it did, it would lead to absurdity.—Thus it is only through positive and negative concomitance that the relation of Cause and Effect can be ascertained, not in any other way.

There is no such positive or negative concomitance between the Body and the Cognition. For instance, there can be no certainty regarding the positive concomitance between one's own Body and Cognition; because in the Fœtus, before the appearance of the Cognition, the Body alone is not perceived; nor is it perceived apart from the Cognition. As regards the Body of another person also, the Cognition is *not* one that could be perceptible; and hence there is no perception of any order of sequence. Hence there can be no certain idea of positive concomitance.—Nor can there be any certainty regarding negative concomitance; it is possible to know that when one's own body is absent, his own cognition also is absent,—because the man himself is absent; but it can by no means be ascertained that in the absence of another man's body, his cognition also is absent. Because that man's cognition not being perceptible, even on the absence of his body, there may be doubts regarding the absence of his cognition. It is for this reason that, even in the case of Trees, though the Body is not there, it is not certain that the Cognition is not there; as in this case also there will be the suspicion that its presence is not amenable to perception. It cannot be right to be certain of *absence* on the basis of the absence of vibration, etc., as it is not necessary that causes *must* necessarily produce their effects. It would be always a matter of doubt whether the absence of Cognition in the Tree is due to the absence of the *Body* or to the absence of its Cause in the shape of the absence of Desire which would be the cause of its having a particular body.

Thus the Reason adduced by us is not 'inadmissible'.

Nor is it 'contradictory'; as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.

Nor again can it be 'Inconclusive'; as that would lead to incongruities; and also it would mark the objector as being devoid of intelligence.

Question :—" What is there to prove that the contrary of the Proposition 'The Body cannot be the cause of the Cognition' is not true ?"

Answer :—This has no force ; as the proof is there ; for instance, that 'the Body cannot be the cause of the purely subjective Cognition' is going to be proved under Text 1930—'Mental Consciousness is independent, self-sufficient, etc. etc.' ; specially as it is this subjective Consciousness itself which serves as the dominant cause in bringing about the contact of other bodies ; which shows that it is not dependent upon the present body ; and thus it is that the existence of the 'other world' becomes established.

Then again, the Body may be the Cause of the subjective Consciousness. But would it be so in the form of the single composite whole,—or in diverse forms, in the form of an aggregate of atoms ?—Would it be the cause along with the sense-organs ? Or without the sense-organs ? Would it be the material (constituent) cause ? Or the contributory cause ?—These are the alternatives possible.

Now, the Body, as a single composite whole, cannot be the Cause of Cognition ;—as the very idea of the 'composite whole' has been already rejected. And also because such an idea would militate against the notion that the cause consists of the Four Major Elemental Substances ; as a *single* thing could not have *four* forms ; as, if it did, then there would be an end of all notions of 'plurality'.

Nor can the Body in the form of the aggregate of atoms be accepted (as the Cause of Cognition). Will the Cause consist of the Atoms severally or collectively ? It cannot be *severally* ; as in that case the Cognition would arise from each one of the atoms, just as the sprout arises from every one of the seeds. Nor could it be *collectively* ; as in that case, the defect in any-one of the limbs—like the Nose for instance,—would lead to the contingency of no Cognition being produced at all ; just as the defect in even one of the various ingredients of the Cause of the sprout,—in the shape of the soil, for instance,—makes it impossible for the sprout to appear. In fact, whenever an effect is dependent upon a concatenation of cause-conditions, it does not come about, when even one of those conditions is absent ; if it did, it would not be dependent upon them.—It might be held that " all the atoms are the cause of Cognition, according as they happen to be in proximity ".—But in that case, there should be some difference between the effect as produced by a perfect cause and that produced by a defective cause ; as the two causes would be different ; otherwise the distinction in the cause would be pointless. As a matter of fact, when a cause that has been perfect in all its parts happens subsequently to be defective in certain parts, there is not found any difference in the subjective Cognition at all ; and this is due to the fact that the impressions of past auditory and other cognitions continue intact.—It is only in the case of Animals, like the Elephant for instance, that there are changes in the subjective Consciousness, not in the case of human beings ; the animals in the infantile stage of the body are dull, while those that have acquired a larger body are cleverer ; the improvement and deterioration of the Cause, in this case, are found to bring about improvement and deterioration in the Effect ; hence when, between two things,

the changes in one do not lead to changes in the other, one cannot be the Effect of the other ; otherwise there would be absurdity ; and the changes in the Effect would be without cause.

Nor can the other alternative view be accepted, that the *Body along with the Sense-organs* is the cause of subjective Consciousness.—For, here also, would the subjective Consciousness proceed from each of the sense-organs severally ? or from all of them collectively ?—It could not proceed from each severally ; because it is found that even after the disappearance of the Sense-organs one by one, the subjective Consciousness comes in all right. For instance, even when the motor-organs have become disabled by Paralysis and other diseases, the subjective Consciousness remains intact and enjoys a perfect state of existence. And when between two things, the changes in one do not bring about changes in the other, one cannot be the Effect of the other ; otherwise there would be incongruities. Further, under the view under consideration, subjective Consciousness would have to be regarded as (*a*) apprehending only particular things, (*b*) as being free from conceptual content (indeterminate), (*c*) as being dependent upon the presence of the object,—just like the Visual and other sense-cognitions ; because it would have the same cause as these latter ; and also because there would be the possibility of several conceptions appearing at the same time.

Nor can the other alternative view be accepted,—that "Subjective Consciousness proceeds from all the sense-organs *collectively*" ; as in that case, there could be no Subjective Consciousness, even when one of the Sense-organs would be absent (disabled) ; just like the absence of the Sprout on the absence of even one of its contributory causes.

Nor can the other alternative view be accepted—that "Subjective Consciousness proceeds from the Body without the Sense-organs". As under that view, it would be possible for the said Consciousness to proceed from the Hand and such other parts of the body even when severed from the Body. If it were held that a qualified Body is the cause,—then it would come to this that the cause consists of the Body *as along with the Sense-organs* ; as no *qualified Body* can be shown other than the *Body with the Sense-organs*.

Nor again can the view be accepted—that "the Body is the material (constituent) cause of Subjective Consciousness".—Because that particular cause is accepted as the 'Material Cause' of a certain Effect which is found to fulfil the two conditions—viz. : (1) that it helps, by its presence, the entire nature of the Effect embracing all its peculiar features, and (2) that the Effect undergoes no change except upon changes in the said Cause ; as is found in the case where the Clay is held to be the 'material cause' of the Jar as it passes successively through all the modifications proceeding from the clod of clay to the finished product called 'Jar'. It is for this reason that when one desires to modify a certain thing he modifies it by modifying its material cause,—not in any other way. When an antecedent Material Cause is there without having its potency impeded in any way,—no one can impede the appearance of the subsequent Effect going to be produced. For instance, in the case of the Jar, no modification can be made in the effect to be

produced, without having brought about a 'moment' in the Clay incapable of further efficiency. In fact, in the bringing about of all modifications, the process is the same—that of producing of a 'moment' (entity) incapable of producing another 'moment'; if it were not so, nothing could be directly contrary to anything. If such direct modification were possible, then, as the Cause, so the effect also could be modified directly by itself,—not through the bringing about of a like modification in its material cause.—It is true that in the case of the Lamp,—there is a modification brought about in its outspreading light by putting up an intervening screen without modifying the Light at all; but in this case the Lamp is not the direct Material Cause of the Light; each Light-moment is the cause of the Light-moment that follows it; so that what happens is that the screen brings about a modification in the shape of a 'moment' devoid of further causal efficiency, and thereby practically destroys the Light at that point.—In a case where a thing is modified without modifying an entity, it is not a case of Material Cause; when, for instance, the Cow is modified without modifying the *Gavaya*.—In the case in question, however, it is found that, without modifying the Body, the Subjective Consciousness is subjected, by wrong-doing, to modifications, such as evil intentions and the like. So that here there would be apprehension of something contrary to the wider premiss (that there can be no modification in the effect without modifications in the Cause;—if the Body were regarded as the Material Cause of Subjective Consciousness).

Objection:—"When there is modification in the Body, in the shape of being well-nourished and strong,—which is brought about by good food,—there *is* actually perceived a modification in the Subjective Consciousness, in the shape of Love and Hatred, etc."

What does it matter if such modification is seen? This alone does not make our Reason inadmissible. For example, all that is meant by us is that, when between two things, the modification of one is possible without modification of the other, then the one cannot be the Material Cause of the other. It is quite possible that under certain circumstances, without any modification in the Body, there is modification in the Subjective Consciousness by wrong-doing. Consequently why should our Reason be 'inadmissible'? But on the basis of occasional stray instances of modification (of the Subjective Consciousness due to modification in the Body) it cannot be right to regard the one as the Material Cause of the other. As, in this way, the *object* also might become the Material Cause (of Cognition). For instance, when one sees such disgusting things as the blood of the tiger, etc., there appears a modification in the mind of a cowardly person, in the shape of *swoon* and so forth; and yet this does not make the said Subjective Consciousness a material effect of that blood. Again, when the Mind is beset with vascillations due to love or grief and such causes, there come about certain modifications in the Body; and on the basis of this the Body might come to be regarded as having the Mind for its Material Cause. What is a fact is that when the modification of one thing always follows the modification of another, then alone can the one be rightly regarded as the Material Cause of the other. Modifications of the Mind in the shape of Love, Hate, etc.

do not *always* follow from the strength and vigour of the Body; as it is not found to follow in the case of the vigorous man who has attained wisdom. Conversely, even a man or an animal with a weak body and poor development, who happens to have no opportunities for sexual and other indulgences, has his mind beset with much Love and Hate, etc. And when one thing comes about in the absence of another thing, one cannot be rightly regarded as the Cause of the other. If it were so regarded, there would be incongruities. Love and Hate, etc. do not proceed directly from the Body;—the absence of opportunities for sexual and other indulgences being the necessary intervening conditions. For instance, when the Body is quite vigorous, there is a pleasure felt in the contemplation of pleasurable sensations; in such cases, the man, who has a body and a soul and has his mind beset with the notion of impermanence attaching to Pleasures and their Means,—sometimes feels that what obstructs his pleasure does him good as well as harm; and thence follows the idea of the two alternatives of loving (the benefactor) and hating (the obstructor); thence follow (respectively) good-will and ill-will; from all this proceed the notions of Pleasure and other things.—All this is well-known through positive and negative concomitance. In fact, it is only when the Mind is happy and at peace that Love is found to appear; and it is often found not to appear when the Body is vigorous. From all this it follows that vigorousness, etc. of the Body cannot be the cause of Subjective Consciousness.

From all this it also follows that, on account of its affording no direct help, the Body cannot be the Contributory Cause of Subjective Consciousness; because in the case of the Sprout, it has been found that the Contributory causes are only those that have a direct bearing upon it,—e.g. the Soil, Moisture, etc. If it were not so, there would be incongruities. Love and other feelings therefore must be regarded as proceeding from the awakening of an antecedent homogeneous seed. As for vigorousness of the Body, youth and so forth, these are found to give rise to Love, etc. by enlivening the impressions of the past, in men who have had no practice at meditation and are hence without the requisite wisdom.

Even granting that sometimes the Body has a direct bearing upon Subjective Consciousness, when this latter proceeds from its own material cause;—even so, it does not follow that it ceases upon the cessation of the Body. For instance, even on the cessation of Fire, the Jar does not cease to exist, because it has proceeded from its own material causes; so this does not affect our view adversely.—Nor is the Reason 'Inconclusive'; for, if it were, then there would be incongruities.—Nor again is the Reason 'Contradictory', as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.

Thus it is proved that the Body cannot be the Material Cause of Subjective Consciousness;—nor can it be the Contributory Cause;—from all which it follows that Subjective Consciousness proceeds from preceding cognitions one after the other occurring in the same 'Chain'.

The following argument might be urged:—"When any two things are found to be invariably concomitant with one another (always found to exist

together), they must be regarded as Material Cause and Effect ; as in the case of the Lamp and the Light ; there *is* such invariable concomitance between the Body and the Subjective Consciousness ;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things ".

The Reason adduced here is 'inadmissible' for one or the other party. Because in certain cases, where the Mind-essence is devoid of material form, Subjective Consciousness is present even though there is no body.—Nor does the argument put forward quite prove what is meant to be proved ; as on the same grounds Subjective Consciousness might be regarded as the Material Cause of the Body.

The Reason adduced is 'Inconclusive' also ; as the said concomitance is possible even when the cause is different ; as between Fire and fluidity of (melted) Copper. For instance, it is only with Fire as the contributory cause, that Copper produces Fluidity,—not otherwise ; similarly, in the case in question, the Fœtus, which is the material cause of the Body, produces the next body, which is the contributory cause of Subjective Consciousness ; so that the concomitance between the Body and the Subjective Consciousness is not due to the one being the material cause of the other ;—to this extent, the Reason adduced is 'Inconclusive', 'Doubtful'.

The following might be urged :—" Even though the Subjective Consciousness appearing subsequently proceeds from each proceeding Consciousness (cognition),—yet that which appears for the *first* time must have proceeded from the Body ; hence it cannot be regarded as *beginningless* ".

This is not right. There is no proof in support of such an assumption,—as has been explained already.—It cannot be said that " there is no proof to the contrary either " ;—because there certainly is proof to the contrary. For instance, if the Mental Cognition (Subjective Consciousness) were once at the outset produced out of the Body and then subsequently came to be produced out of each preceding homogeneous Cognition,—then for ever afterwards it would be produced out of preceding homogeneous cognitions,—and never out of heterogeneous cognitions produced through the Eye and other organs ; when once the Smoke has been produced by Fire, it is never, later on, produced from anything not homogeneous to itself. As a matter of fact, Mental Cognition is not always found to be produced by Mental Cognitions only ; it is found to be produced by any Cognition that happens to go immediately before it ;—when one thing has been found to appear immediately after another thing, the former cannot be held to proceed from anything other than the latter ; as in that case, it would have to be regarded as being without cause. As regards Mental Cognition, it is found to appear immediately after the visual and other cognitions ; hence it becomes established that it can follow from any Cognition without restriction.

Further, if it is only at the earlier stage that the Body is the material cause of the Mental Cognition,—and not at the later stages,—then why should it not proceed entirely independently of the Body ? It is not right that it should depend upon the Body which does not help it in any way.—It might be urged—" In your case also, where one cognition is preceded and brought about by another cognition, why should not the Cognition proceed by itself

alone ? "—There can be no force in this, as it does so proceed; as in the case where the Mind-element is without material embodiment; when a Cognition wants another Cognition, it is dependent upon that; this is only natural and should not be objected to.—If it is held that "at the later stages also the Body does help the mental Cognition",—then there would be the incongruity of several chains of Cognition proceeding at once; as the Body which is the Material Cause of the other Cognition would be present there in its efficient form and would be productive of the same. Because whichever Cognition is produced from the Body sets going its own 'chain of cognitions' which is different from the other Chains; in this way therefore for a single person there would be issuing forth, at every moment, innumerable 'Chains of Cognition'. But such is never found to be the case.

It might be argued that—"when the Body helps the Cognition at the later stages, it does not help as its Material Cause; it is only as a Contributory Cause that it helps the Mental Cognition that has been produced out of itself as the Material Cause, in bringing about each of its succeeding effects; so that the Body helps as a contributory cause, and the Cognition does not function entirely independently of the Body at any stage."

This also cannot be true. When one thing is known to be productive of another thing in a certain way, it cannot produce it in any other way; as there is no difference in the conditions. For instance, the Light, having served as productive of visual Cognition as its basis, does not produce it in another way; as has been thus declared—'Apart from *apprehensibility*, there is no other characteristic of the *apprehensible thing*; Colour and other things cannot otherwise be helpful to the Cognition'.—If it were not so, there could be no certainty regarding the difference and non-difference of the *Effect* from the character brought about by its Cause; as it would not be following in the wake of the help rendered by it; and this would mean that the Effect is without a Cause.

Then again, at the first stage,—apart from the Body being directly productive of the Cognition,—you have not noticed in it any other character of the Material Cause. What you have apprehended is merely the fact of its being a directly contributory cause. And as this is present at the later stages also,—why should it not be the Material Cause at those stages also ? Otherwise, as at the later stages, so at the first stage also, it may not be the Material Cause at all; as the conditions are the same.

It will not be right to argue that—"At the later stages also, it is the Body itself which, along with the preceding Cognition, would be the Material Cause of each succeeding Cognition".—Because the possibility of its being such a Material Cause has been already rejected in detail; and also because in that case, the first initial Cognition also would have to be regarded as preceded and produced by another Cognition.

It is for these reasons that even under the view that material substances are impermanent, the following objection urged by the Teacher, remains applicable—'If the Cognition, once produced from the Body, becomes restricted to its own kind, through something else, then why should there be

From all this it follows that Mental Cognition (Subjective Consciousness) is *without beginning.* Or it may be understood that all Cognition, without exception, is without beginning. Because if the Cognition had a beginning,—then, when the Cognition would appear first of all, would it be *Sensuous* Cognition or *Mental* Cognition ?—It could not be *Sensuous* Cognition ; because in the case of men asleep, or in a swoon, or with mind elsewhere,—even though the Sense-organs are there, the *Sensuous* Cognition does not appear, on account of the absence of the mental functions. Hence it is understood that the Sense-organs alone cannot be the cause of Sensuous Cognition ; they can be so only through the help of a particular functioning of the Mind ; and it should be so understood because the causal relation between things is always determined by positive and negative concomitance. —When too one thing has been ascertained to be produced, at first, from a certain other thing,—it cannot obtain appearance before that from any third thing ; as such appearance would be without a cause ; as for example, if *Smoke* were held to proceed from non-fire. When the Sensuous Cognition has come about first of all, it does so only through a favourable mental operation ; hence it becomes established that the Sense-organ alone can never be its cause ; otherwise it would be without a cause ; this is an argument that annuls the said view.

Nor can the first Cognition be a *Mental Cognition* (the second alternative put forth on bottom of p. 530 of the Sanskrit Text). As a matter of fact, it never appears independently by itself in reference to anything not apprehended by the senses ; if it did, there would be no deaf or blind persons.—Even if it did appear so,—it should be explained if it would be *conceptual* (determinate) or *non-conceptual* (indeterminate) ?—It could not be *conceptual* ; whenever Conceptual Thought operates it operates always as associated with verbal expression, expressive of the concept ; because it is always found to appear in the form of an internal (unexpressed) verbal presentation ; and this expressive verbal form of the Conceptual Thought could proceed either (*a*) from the comprehension of Convention,—or (*b*) from the fact of Word in the expressive form being a property of the Cognition itself, like the form of consciousness,—or (*c*) from the comprehension of the meaning of the Word. These are the only alternatives possible.

(*a*) It cannot be true that it proceeds from the comprehension of Convention ; because the Convention has not yet been comprehended.

(*b*) Nor can the second alternative be accepted ; because the essence—form—of the Word is twofold—'Specific Individuality' and 'Universal'. Of these the 'Specific Individuality' of the Word is always apprehended in an inexpressive form ; hence on that basis, the Cognition could (not) be conceptual (determinate). Nor is it a property of the Cognition itself, as it always appears as something external, like the Blue and other objects. If then, it were the property of the Cognition itself, then the Blue and other things also might be the property of the Cognition itself ; as there would be nothing to distinguish between the two cases. In that case the entire universe would be mere *Cognition,* and not a modification of Material Substances.

Objection :—"According to the view that Cognition has forms, the Blue and other things are of the very essence of the Cognition, and it is these that appear as *external*; what then is it that is meant by the assertion that 'because they appear in the external form they cannot be properties of the Cognition'?"

True; but the very fact of Cognition appearing in a form tainted by the external object leads us to conclude that it forms the essence,—not of the *Cognition*,—but of the external object; as therein lies its own essence. In the Cognition it appears only on account of certain circumstances and is purely adventitious.

From all this it follows that the Word in the form of 'Specific Individuality' cannot be expressive; nor can it be the property of the Cognition itself.

As regards Word in the form of the 'Universal',—though that is expressive, yet it cannot be a property of the Cognition itself; because it is tacked on, not to the Cognition itself but, to that which is comprehended on the hearing of the Specific Individuality of the Word appertaining to the external thing. The 'Universal' of one thing cannot be tacked on to another thing; if it were, then there would be incongruities in the Cognition; as in that case the Universal 'Cow' could be tacked on to the *Horse*. And until the thing, in the shape of the Specific Individuality has been apprehended, it is not possible to tack on to it that property which is expressive; for the simple reason that Properties are always dependent upon the Objects to which they belong, and as such cannot be apprehended by themselves. And the thing in the form of 'Specific Individuality' cannot be apprehended by conceptual thought; as this latter always envisages the 'Universal'. Hence it becomes established that all Conceptual Thoughts have their source in the awakening of the Tendencies created by the beginningless apprehension of 'Specific Individualities'.

(*c*) Nor, lastly, could the fact of the conceptual thought having the form of the expressive Word be due to the comprehension of what is expressed by the Word. Because words do not subsist in the *object*; nor are they of the nature of objects; for if they were so, they could be understood by the unlearned also; and it would, in that case, be impossible to apply words to things according to one's own choice.

Further, though all objects are similar in so far as they are impermanent, yet Conceptual Thought cannot envisage them all at one and the same time; as each Conceptual Thought appears only in respect of certain well-defined objects with special forms, as differentiated from other forms. Hence the Cause that is pointed out should be through a conceptual thought that appertains to a single form. Such a cause cannot be indicated to be any other except Repeated Practice; as is found in the case of the Conceptual Thoughts appertaining to dead bodies (?). Thus then as the Conceptual Thought proceeds through previous repeated practice, it becomes proved that the Conceptual Cognition *is without beginning*.

Nor can it be right to accept the alternative (set forth on p. 53, line 7 of the original) that 'the first Mental Cognition (or Subjective Consciousness)

is *non-conceptual*'.—Because under that view there would never be any *Conceptual Cognition* at all.—It might be argued that—"in the manner explained before, it could appear later on on the basis of Conception".—But that cannot be; so long as the man rests upon *non-conceptual* cognition, he cannot set up any Convention. Because no Convention can be set up until the *Universal* Word or the *Universal* Thing figures in the Cognition; what does figure in the Cognition however is the *Specific Individuality*, and no Convention can be made either in relation to it or upon its basis; because it is meant for the purposes of Usage, while the Specific Individuality that is seen at the time of the Convention can never be present at the time of usage; consequently it has to be admitted that there is Conceptual Thought *before* the Convention is made relating to the *Specific Individuality*. And this is not possible without repeated experience; so that there also it becomes established that the Cognition in question is *without beginning*.

Then again, if it is not admitted that 'the first Cognition at birth is due to the continuity of the impressions left by the repeated experiences of previous lives',—then, how would you account for the idea in the new-born babe,—even among animals—of a certain thing being a source of pleasure and another a source of pain? It is by virtue of such ideas that it seeks for the mother's breasts which it regards as a source of pleasure, and it cries out when it does not find it, or having found it suddenly stops crying and proceeds to feed itself. Certainly during its present life, the baby has never experienced the fact of the breasts being the means of allaying the pangs of hunger. Nor has it had any experience of falling from a precipice being a source of hurt and pain; and yet even the newborn young of the monkey becomes afraid of death and the suffering caused by falling from a height, and, on account of that fear, clings more strongly to the mother's arms; and also avoid the place where there is a precipice. Until people have had some actual experience of things bringing pleasure or pain, they never invariably seek to obtain the one and avoid the other. If they did, there would be an absurdity.—The example of the Iron being drawn to the Magnet cannot be properly cited in this connection; because that attraction is not without cause; if it were without cause, then it would always be there. If then it has a cause, it is the Magnet that is pointed out to be the cause on the basis of positive and negative concomitance; and some similar cause will have to be found for the action of the child in securing and avoiding certain things. No such cause can be indicated, apart from repeated experience. Hence it becomes established that the action of children in seeking to obtain and avoiding certain things is due to repeated past experience; and that, on this account, the Cognition must be *without beiginning*.

It is for these reasons that the author is going to indicate other objections applicable in common (to all the views of the Materialists)—under *Texts* 1930 and 1940 below.—Hence we desist from further details.

Further, if the *Chārvākas* admit the momentary character of things, then their own doctrine,—that Material substances are everlasting—becomes upset.—(1886)

TEXTS (1887-1888).

[THE MATERIALIST MIGHT SAY]—" LET THE DOCTRINE BE UPSET ; WE ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT ALL THINGS ARE DECIDEDLY MOMENTARY, BECAUSE IT IS A REASONABLE VIEW SUPPORTED BY ALL KINDS OF REASON ".—IF YOUR LOVE FOR REASON IS SO GREAT THAT YOU HAVE NO REGARD FOR YOUR OWN DOCTRINE,—THEN YOU SHOULD ACCEPT ALSO THE MORE REASONABLE VIEW THAT ' PRIMARY ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCES DO NOT EXIST AT ALL '.—(1887-1888)

COMMENTARY.

If you accept the momentary character of things, because it is in accordance with Reason, then you should accept the doctrine that ' Ideas alone exist ', which is still more reasonable ; because *reasonableness,* which is your criterion for acceptance, is present in this case also.—(1887-1888)

Question :—" How so ? "
Answer :—

TEXT (1889).

THE PRIMARY ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCES CANNOT EXIST IN THE FORM OF *composite wholes,* NOR IN THE FORM OF *Atoms* ; BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO CONJUNCTION OF ATOMS,—AS IS GOING TO BE EXPLAINED.—(1889)

COMMENTARY.

' *Tēṣām* '—of the Primary Elemental Substances.

' *Going to be explained* ',—under the next chapter on the Examination of the ' External World '.—(1889)

Question :—" If the said elements do not exist, then how is it that they figure in Cognitions ? "
Answer :—

TEXT (1890).

NOT HAVING ANY REAL EXTERNAL FORM, THEY FIGURE IN COGNITIONS ONLY THROUGH THE FRUITION OF DISPOSITIONS ; JUST AS DURING DREAMS ; THEY DO NOT APPEAR ANYWHERE ELSE.—(1890)

COMMENTARY.

'*Anywhere else*',—i.e. apart from Cognition.—(1890)

Question :—"How then is it that people and the scriptures speak of the Earth and other Elemental Substances ?"
Answer :—

TEXT (1891).

ALL THESE FOUR PRIMARY ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCES ARE ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF WHAT APPEARS IN COGNITION,—JUST LIKE DREAMS AND ILLUSIONS. AND THEY HAVE NO REAL EXISTENCE.—(1891)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—"If the elemental substances do not exist, then what is the basis of the Cognition (of these) ?"
Answer :—

TEXT (1892).

IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT WHAT IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE COGNITION SHOULD FIGURE IN IT ; IT IS ONLY A PREVIOUS COGNITION ENVISAGING THE SUBSTANCES THAT COULD PRODUCE ANOTHER SUCH COGNITION.—(1892)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tadanyasya*'—something different from the Cognition, in the shape of the four elemental substances.—(1892)

It has thus been proved that the first Cognition after birth cannot proceed from any material substance. The author now proceeds to demolish the view that it is produced only by another Cognition (occurring in a different Chain ;—the fifth alternative put forward under *Text* 1880) :—

TEXTS (1893–1896).

IF THE COGNITION IN SOME OTHER 'CHAIN' BE HELD TO BE THE CAUSE (OF THE FIRST COGNITION),—THEN (THE QUESTION IS)—IS THAT THE 'MATERIAL CAUSE' OF IT, OR THE 'CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE'?—IF IT IS MEANT TO BE THE MATERIAL CAUSE, THEN THE LEARNING AND CULTURE OF THE PARENTS SHOULD CONTINUE IN THE CHILD'S 'CHAIN OF COGNITIONS';—THAT SUCH IS THE NATURE OF THE MATERIAL CAUSE AND ITS EFFECT HAS BEEN ASCERTAINED, THROUGH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE, IN CONNECTION WITH ONE'S OWN 'CHAIN'.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE COGNITION OF THE OTHER 'CHAIN' BE ASSUMED TO BE THE 'CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE' OF THE FIRST COGNITION, ON THE BASIS OF ITS OWN MATERIAL CAUSE,—THEN THERE WOULD BE NOTHING WRONG IN IT.—(1893–1896)

COMMENTARY.

Would this 'Cognition' occurring in 'another Chain',—i.e. the 'Chain of Cognitions' of the Parents,—be the Material Cause or the Contributory Cause (of the First Cognition under consideration)?—It cannot be the Material Cause; as, in that case, it would be possible for the peculiar learning and culture of the Parents to continue in the Son; just as the Parents' Cognition continues in their own subsequent cognitions. It has been found in the case of all Material Causes and their Products that the embellishments of the preceding 'moment' continue in the succeeding 'Moments'; this having been found, by positive and negative concomitance, to be the case is one's own 'Chain'.

The following might be the opinion suggested—"When one lamp is lighted from another Lamp the second lamp is not produced as equipped with the size and other embellishments of the first one,—it is produced merely as a lamp without any embellishments; it acquires its own embellishments from other sources in the shape of its own wick and oil, etc.;—and the same may be the case with the Cognition in question also".

That cannot be so; because the embellishment of the Lamp sets up a 'chain' in its own substratum also; because it is itself evanescent; that is the reason why on the exhaustion of the 'fuel' (in the shape of the oil and wick), the Lamp ceases to exist. The embellishment of Learning and Culture however is not evanescent; as it continues for a long time. Hence it is not possible for mere Cognition without embellishments to be produced in the manner of the Lamp.

Further, in the case of the Lamp and other things, the presence or absence of peculiarities is determined on the basis of their being aggregates of larger and less number of atoms; of the single thing, as a mere *entity*, there cannot be either presence or absence of peculiarities. In the case in question however, the single entity, the Cognition in the mother, would have the peculiarities of the cultural and other embellishments, while when appearing in the son, it would be without those peculiarities; who can impart such a teaching?

Then again, the *reductio ad absurdum* that has been urged is in regard to the view that one Cognition is the Material Cause of the other ; but one Lamp is not the Material Cause of the other Lamp ; because it belongs to an entirely different 'Chain'. Hence what has been urged is nothing at all.

Further, in the case of Beings who have no mother—e.g. the sweat-born insects,—how could the first Cognition be due to a Cognition in another series ?—We resist from further argumentation on this subject.

If, on the other hand, it be held that the Cognition of the other Chain is a *contributory* Cause of the First Cognition,—then the argument proves what is already admitted (by all parties) and hence is superfluous.—(1893–1896)

The following *Text* formulates the argument in support of the beginninglessness (of Cognition) :—

TEXT (1897).

THUS THEN THE FIRST COGNITION MUST BE REGARDED AS ARISING OUT OF ITS OWN MATERIAL CAUSE,—BECAUSE IT IS *Cognition* AND SO FORTH,—LIKE THE COGNITION OF THE PRESENT MOMENT.—(1897)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows :—That entity which partakes of the nature of the Four Phases of Cognition, Feeling, Name-Conception, and Mental Faculty, must be regarded as proceeding from its own Material Cause ;—because it is *Cognition, Feeling,* etc. etc.—just like the same Four Phases during youth and old age ;—the First Cognition is of the nature of Cognition :—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing.

In the term 'First Cognition', the mention of *Cognition* is only by way of illustration ; what is asserted should be understood to be true of Feeling and the other Phases also.—(1897)

The following *Text* puts forward an argument against the contrary of the above conclusion :—

TEXT (1898).

AS OTHER CAUSES HAVE BEEN REJECTED, IF THE COGNITION WERE ENTIRELY WITHOUT CAUSE,—THEN, IT COULD NOT HAVE ANY PARTICULAR CHARACTER AT ALL.—(1898)

COMMENTARY.

All other causes, in the shape of the eternal things—Mind, Time, Space, God and so forth,—have been rejected before ; and the view that the Cognition arises out of itself is not accepted ; the only alternative left is that it should be *without cause* ; but in that case it could not have any such particular (distinguishing) character as *Being Cognition* and the like. Because a character

or property that is purely accidental cannot serve as a determinant, and hence there could be no determination on the basis of that.

Thus the *causelessness* of Cognition would be open to rejection by the incongruity of there being no possibility of the appearance of such distinguishing characters as that of *Being Cognition* and the like ;—and there would be the further objection that if it were causeless, it would not be possible for the Cognition to appear only occasionally.—(1898)

Having thus established the fact of there being a 'previous' birth, the author proceeds to establish the 'future' birth also :—

TEXT (1899).

THE COGNITION AT THE MOMENT OF DEATH IS CAPABLE OF BRINGING ABOUT ITS PRODUCT,—BECAUSE IT IS BESET WITH AFFECTIONS, NOT HAVING SHAKEN OFF ALL ATTACHMENT,—LIKE THE PREVIOUS COGNITION.—(1899)

COMMENTARY.

The Cognition or Consciousness that is beset with affections is capable of producing its effect in the shape of another Cognition,—because it is beset with affections,—like the Consciousness during the previous state ;—and the Consciousness at the moment of death is beset with affections ; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

This Reason cannot be said to be 'inadmissible'; because as a matter of fact, the Consciousness that is dissociated from the idea of 'Void', which is opposed to all experience, is always beset with affections ; because it is dissociated from its opposite,—just like the Consciousness during intercourse.

Nor is the Reason 'Inconclusive' (Doubtful) ; because the appearance of another Cognition is always due to this much only. Hence the reason against the contrary of the conclusion would consist in the impossibility of there being a fully efficient cause.—(1899)

The same point is further elucidated :—

TEXT (1900).

IN THE FORM IN WHICH THE COGNITION PRODUCED A DEFINITE COGNITION IN THE PAST,—WHY CANNOT IT, IN THE SAME UNALLOYED FORM, BE PRODUCTIVE OF IT IN FUTURE ALSO ?—(1900)

COMMENTARY.

'*In the same form*'—i.e. bearing the same form or character.—(1900)

In the following Text, the Opponent urges the objection against both the above arguments,—that "the Corroborative Instances cited are devoid of the Probandum" :—

TEXT (1901).

"ACCORDING TO THE OTHER VIEW, THE IDEA IS THAT CONSCIOUSNESS PROCEEDS FROM THE BODY ITSELF; HOW THEN CAN THE TWO CORROBORATIVE INSTANCES BE ADMITTED TO BE EQUIPPED WITH THE PROBANDUM?"—(1901)

COMMENTARY.

"The Probandum, that is desired to be proved, is that *the Cognition proceeds from its own Material Cause and produces its own product*; according to the other Party, however, Cognition is always produced from the Body itself; so that for him there can be no Instance which fulfils the conditions of the Probandum; why then has the Buddhist put forward the two instances of 'the present Cognition' and 'the previous Cognition'?"

[The answer to this is as follows]—

TEXTS (1902–1905).

THE IDEA OF THE BODY BEING THE CAUSE (OF COGNITION) HAS BEEN ALREADY DISCARDED, ON THE GROUND OF ITS INVOLVING THE POSSIBILITY OF ALL COGNITIONS APPEARING SIMULTANEOUSLY, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING NO OTHER (CONTRIBUTORY) CAUSES.—AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT IS FOUND THAT COGNITION IN THE FORM OF REMEMBRANCE, AFFECTION AND SO FORTH (WHICH ARE *Cognitions*) ACTUALLY PROCEEDS FROM PLEASURABLE EXPERIENCES AND PLEASANT REMINISCENCES OF THE SAME [WHICH ALSO ARE *Cognitions*];—AND THIS CANNOT BE DENIED.—THEN AGAIN, IT IS ALSO SEEN THAT DETERIORATION AND IMPROVEMENT IN ONE'S LATER COGNITIONS ARE BROUGHT ABOUT BY DETERIORATION AND IMPROVEMENT IN THE PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING AND ARTS.—IT IS ALSO SEEN THAT WHEN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE MIND IS DEFECTIVE, THERE IS NO APPREHENSION OF OTHER THINGS.—ON ACCOUNT OF ALL THESE FACTS, THE IDEA OF COGNITION PROCEEDING FROM COGNITION CANNOT BE OBJECTED TO.—(1902–1905)

COMMENTARY.

There is no force in the above objection. It has been already shown that the Body cannot be the cause of Cognition, on the ground that that would involve the simultaneity of Cognitions; because there is no other contributory cause which would be needed; and if the Body is eternal, it cannot require anything else; if on the other hand, it is *not eternal*, then the previous and the present, both objections, would be applicable. As a matter of fact, what is proved by proper means of Cognition cannot be set aside by mere assertion; as otherwise there would be incongruities; so that nothing could be the

cause of anything at all. This is what has been described in the words 'mere disagreeableness cannot render things objectionable'.

Further, it is found that after a pleasurable experience, when there is remembrance of it in a definite form, there proceeds, from this pleasurable Cognition, a feeling of love and attachment—'How beautiful she is! So youthful and slim-waisted, with a handsome face!' and so forth; when one goes on contemplating upon it there appears in the mind of the man inclined to be passionate, the passion of Love. Similarly when some one causes one an injury, one goes on thinking of it—'He has done me this injury,—he has done it in the past—he is going to do it again' and so forth; thereupon there appears Hatred.—How can all this be denied;—specially by one who takes his stand upon Sense-perception (as the only Right means of Cognition)?

Similarly, when there is deterioration and improvement in the previous practice of Learning and Arts, it is found that there are corresponding deterioration and improvement in the subsequent Cognitions. And it is found that, when the Mind is attracted elsewhere and the functioning of the Mind is defective, there is no perception of other things.

From all this it is clear that the idea that Cognition is the Cause of Cognition, is in accordance with reason and should not be objected to; also because it has been actually proved that Cognition is the Cause of Cognitions.—(1902–1905)

TEXT (1906).

The Reason—'because they subsist in different bodies'—cannot be admissible. Because how can there be any *subsistence* of the Cognition, which is incorporeal and hence not liable to fall down, in the Bodies?—(1906)

COMMENTARY.

Under *Text* 1861, it has been argued (by the Materialist) that—"there cannot be any relation of Cause and Effect between the two Cognitions under dispute, *because they subsist in different bodies*";—this Reason there put forward is not admissible. Because, if the 'subsistence' meant is that of the nature of 'container and contained', then such subsistence in the *Bodies* is entirely impossible for Cognition, which is *not liable to fall*; because even though the causal relation may be there, the Cognition, which is *incorporeal*, could never be liable to fall; and for what is not liable to fall, no *container* is needed, as it could serve no useful purpose.—(1906)

Question:—"What then would the *Container* (or Receptacle) do in the case of Water and such things?"

Answer:—

TEXT (1907).

IN THE CASE OF WATER AND OTHER THINGS, THE RECEPTACLE (CONTAINER) WOULD BE THERE AS SERVING TO PREVENT THEIR FALLING DOWN. IN THE CASE OF COGNITIONS HOWEVER, WHICH ARE DEVOID OF MOVEMENT (AND HENCE OF FALLING). WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF RECEPTACLES (OR CONTAINERS) ?—(1907)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of Earth, etc. which are corporeal, things are produced on the spot where the material cause exists, and never in a place where that cause does not exist ; hence that which serves as preventive of their moving away from that place is regarded as the Receptacle (Substratum, Container). No such thing is possible in the case of what is incorporeal.—(1907)

TEXT (1908).

IF THEN, THE 'SUBSISTENCE' (OF THE COGNITIONS IN THE BODIES) BE ASSUMED TO BE OF THE NATURE OF 'IDENTIFICATION' (SAMENESS), —THAT ALSO CANNOT BE RIGHT. BECAUSE FOR YOU, COGNITION CANNOT BE OF THE NATURE OF THE BODY.—(1908)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant by 'Subsistence' is 'being of the same nature',—that also cannot be admitted. For you, who insist upon the External Things only, it cannot be right to assert that 'Cognition is of the nature of the Body' ; though it is all right for me who posit the Cognition only ; and for whom the Body also is of the nature of the *Ālayavijñāna* (a series or chain of Cognitions).—(1908)

Question :—" Why cannot it be right (to assert that Cognition is of the nature of the Body) ? "

TEXTS (1909-1910).

IF THE COGNITION IS OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE BODY,—THEN WHY IS NOT THE CONSCIOUSNESS (COGNITION) OF LOVE, HATRED, ETC. NOT PERCEIVED BY OTHERS AS CLEARLY AS THE BODY IS ?—IN FACT, COGNITION IS COGNISED BY THE COGNISER HIMSELF ALONE, WHILE THE BODY IS COGNISED BY HIMSELF AS WELL AS BY OTHERS. THINGS THAT ARE SO COGNISED ARE ALWAYS DISTINCT, E.G. COLIC PAIN AND THE DRAMATIC ACTOR.—(1909-1910)

COMMENTARY.

When the Body of a man is perceived by another man, it should be possible for the latter to perceive the Love, Hatred, etc. also of the former ; as the two are not different.—Nor can the premiss be falsified on the basis of occult powers (whereby the feelings of others are perceived) ; because at the time concerned no such powers are noticeable.—Nor can Consciousness be regarded as *incognisable* ; as in that case, it could not be cognised by the Cogniser himself.

Further, whenever between two things, one is cognised by one while the other is cognised by both,—they are different from one another ; for instance, Colic Pain and the Dramatic Actor ;—of the two Cognitions in the two bodies in question, while one is cognised by one, the other is cognised by both ; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—'*Svēnaiva*'—By the Cogniser himself.—(1909-1910)

Says the Opponent—" If this is so, then nothing can prevent the doctrine of Pure Idealism—(that there is Cognition or Consciousness alone)—also being rejected on these same grounds ".

The Answer to that is as follows :—

TEXTS (1911-1912).

THIS REASON IS NOT ADMISSIBLE AGAINST THE DOCTRINE THAT 'COGNITION (CONSCIOUSNESS) ALONE EXISTS'; AS (UNDER THAT VIEW) WHAT IS COGNISED (BY THE COGNITION) IS THE APPEARANCE OF ITSELF ; AS IN THE CASE OF THE MAN WITH DEFECTIVE VISION.—FURTHER, COGNITION IS ALWAYS FOUND TO BE DESTROYED IMMEDIATELY AFTER APPEARANCE ; IF THEN, THE BODY WITH THE COGNITION IS OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE COGNITION, —WHY IS IT NOT REGARDED AS *momentary* ?—(1911-1912)

COMMENTARY.

'*This Reason is not admissible*' ;—i.e. the Reason, if so applied, becomes subject to the objection of being 'inadmissible'. For instance, the fact

of 'being cognised by both' cannot be admitted by the Idealist; as for him what is cognised by the Cognition is always its own appearance; as in the case of the man of defective vision seeing *two moons*.

Then again, when a particular object is cognised, the Cognition is clearly found to disappear immediately after its appearance; hence, if the Body were held to be of the same nature as the Cognition, it should have to be regarded as *momentary* (like the Cognition).—(1911-1912)

Thus then it has been proved that the 'Subsistence' of Cognitions in the Body cannot be admitted to be of the nature of 'identity' (or 'Sameness'). If 'the subsistence' of the Cognition in the Body be held to consist in its *being produced from it*,—then the question is—is it 'produced from it' in the sense that the Mental Cognition has the Body for its *Receptacle* (or Substratum),—in the way that Visual Perception is produced by the Eye which serves as its receptacle ?—or, is it 'produced from it' in the sense that it is inseparable from it;—as the Smoke is inseparable from Fire ?—Both these forms of 'Subsistence' are inadmissible. Because Mental Cognition does not rest in the Body, like Sense-Cognition; as it does not always follow the changes in the Body. Nor is it invariably concomitant with—inseparable from—it; because in the case of 'formless negations', it is held that there are cognitions without the Body.

Though the facts are so, yet, for the sake of argument, the Author admits that the Reason is 'admissible', but proceeds to show that even so, it is 'Inconclusive' (Doubtful) :—

TEXTS (1913–1915).

IF THE SAID 'SUBSISTENCE' BE HELD TO BE DUE EITHER TO THE COGNITION BEING PRODUCED IN THE BODY AS ITS SUBSTRATUM,—OR TO ITS INSEPARABILITY FROM THE BODY,—THE REASON PUT FORWARD IS WRONG (INCONCLUSIVE, DOUBTFUL). THE BODY UNDERGOING DESTRUCTION EVERY MOMENT, THE PREVIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS BRINGS ABOUT AN UNBROKEN CONTINUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN SUCH SUCCEEDING BODIES. IF, BY REASON OF THEIR OCCURRING IN THE SAME CHAIN, THE TWO BODIES BE HELD TO BE NOT DIFFERENT FROM ANOTHER,—THEN IN THE OTHER CASE ALSO, THERE COULD BE NO DIFFERENCE, ON THE SAME GROUND OF OCCURRENCE IN THE SAME CHAIN.—(1913–1915)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, there is no incompatibility between the contiguity of other Consciousnesses and the presence of the Consciousness in the Body; for instance, the Consciousness at the moment preceding death brings about contiguity with the Consciousness in the living body coming into existence

at the next moment,—even though this latter Consciousness appears in a body other than that of the former ; because the Body has only a momentary existence ; hence the Reason put forward by the other party is 'Inconclusive'.

If, on the ground of their occurring in the same Chain, the two Bodies be regarded as one and the same, and on that ground the fact of the Consciousness appearing in the 'same' body be assumed,—then, the same might be said in the other case also—of the Bodies appearing during the stage intervening between the two physical bodies. Because the Body appearing in the other regions (at which the intervening bodies appear) is only one other state of the Chain of the same Body consisting of the *five* 'Receptacles' (*Āyatanas*),—just like the states of Childhood and old age.

In the second argument (of the Opponent) also, the Probans or Reason adduced is 'because it is *Cognition* (or Consciousness)' ; and no evidence has been adduced to prove that the said Reason is not present where the contrary of the Probandum is known to be present ; so that the Reason is clearly 'Inconclusive', Doubtful. This fact was quite clear ; hence the Author did not mention it.—(1913–1915)

The third argument adduced by the other party is that—"the dying Consciousness of the man beset with affections can bring about another Consciousness,—because it is Dying Consciousness,—like the Consciousness of the man free from affections".—This is now taken up :—

TEXT (1916).

WHY HAS IT BEEN HELD THAT THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE PERSON FREE FROM THE IMPURITIES OF THE AFFECTIONS IS NON-CONTIGUOUS ? —IF THIS VIEW IS HELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCTRINE OF OTHERS,—THAT CANNOT BE RIGHT ; BECAUSE THE AUTHORITY (AND VALIDITY) OF THESE DOCTRINES IS NOT ACCEPTED (BY THE MATERIALIST).—(1916)

COMMENTARY.

'*Non-contiguous*',—i.e. that which has no contiguity with another Consciousness.

What is meant to be shown by this is that the Corroborative Instance cited is 'not admitted' by either one or the other of the two parties concerned. For instance, how does the Materialist know that in the case of the *Arhats*, the dying Consciousness does not bring about the contiguity of another Consciousness ?

It may be that under the Buddhist Philosophy, the following assertion is found—'My life is at an end, I have led the life of the Student, I have done my duty, I know of no more birth',—and it is in accordance with this faith of the Buddhist that the Materialist has based his assertion that 'there is no contiguity of the dying Consciousness'.

This however cannot be right. As a matter of fact, the Materialist does not admit the authority or validity of the doctrines of other people; how then could he come to have a conviction on the basis of what he does not accept as valid? Specially, in this same way he may come to the decision that the 'other world' exists.

If it is from any other valid source of knowledge that the Materialist derives the said conviction,—then, why has not that same source been cited as the proof? Where was the use of putting up a Reason which does not lead to the desired conclusion and which only indicates sheer stupidity? Certainly that other proof could not be unfit for proving the other conclusion (of the Materialist)—for which reason it has not been adduced.—(1916)

Even though the statement may be made on the basis of the Buddhist doctrine, yet there are some Buddhists who cannot admit the Corroborative Instance (of the *Arhats*) to be endowed with the Probandum (*not bringing about further consciousness*).—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1917-1918).

AS REGARDS THIS MATTER, THERE ARE SOME WISE PERSONS WHO DESCRIBE *the Jinas* (BUDDHAS) AS 'BEINGS' WHOSE 'NIRVĀṆA' IS NOT 'ABSOLUTE AND FINAL',—AND THE TWO PATHS AS AIMING AT THAT SAME PATH.—FOR THESE PEOPLE THE INSTANCE CITED CANNOT BE ADMITTED TO BE ENDOWED WITH THE PROBANDUM;—EVEN THOUGH IT HAS BEEN CITED (BY THE MATERIALIST) ON THE BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE OTHER DISPUTANT.—(1917-1918)

COMMENTARY.

'*This matter*',—the doctrine of the Buddhists.

'*Some wise persons*',—the *Mahāyānist-Mādhyamikas*.

These people have declared that the '*Nirvāṇa*' of the *Buddhas* consists in *the absence of absolute finality*; on the ground that both 'Birth-Cycle' and 'cessation of conscious existence' are neither final nor absolute for them.—As regards the *Neo-phyte* and the Prospective *Buddha*, these also have the same 'path of the *Buddha*' as their goal; as is clear from such statements as—'There is only one Path, that of the *Mahāyāna*'.—(1917-1918)

Having pointed out the defect in the Corroborative Instance, the Author proceeds to show that the Probans also is open to the charge of being 'Inconclusive':—

TEXT (1919).

INASMUCH AS NO ARGUMENT HAS BEEN ADDUCED AS NEGATIVING THE CONTRARY,—THERE IS AN UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE (OF THE PROBANS WITH THE PROBANDUM); SO THAT, THERE BEING A SUSPICION REGARDING THE PRESENCE (OF THE PROBANS) IN THE *contrary of the Pobandum*,—THE PROBANS REMAINS 'INCONCLUSIVE'.—(1919)

COMMENTARY.

'*Inasmuch as, etc. etc.*';—this is the reason for the uncertainty regarding the Negative Concomitance [i.e. there is no certainty as to the Probans being *absent* whenever the Probandum is *absent*].

'*There being a suspicion, etc. etc.*'.—This is the reason for 'Inconclusive' ness'.

'*Vijātīyasadbhāva*'—is *presence in the contrary*.—"Whose presence?" — of the Probans.

The compound '*Shaṅkyamāna, etc. etc.*' is to be expounded as 'whose presence in the contrary is suspected'.

Nor could the contingency of the idea (of Death-Cognition producing another Cognition) being taken to imply the *absence of death* be taken as serving the purpose of the argument negativing the contrary. Because in reality there is no 'death' of anything in the shape of the 'Soul' and other things; what really happens is that a dissimilar Chain becomes set up, which brings about the cessation of the condition which gave the name to the particular body; and it is this that is spoken of as 'Death' in common parlance and also in scientific treatises.—(1919)

It has been argued above (under *Text* 1865) that—"it is sheer audacity to assert that there is Consciousness in the Fœtus, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1920–1922).

THERE IS NO AUDACITY IN ASSERTING THAT 'THERE IS CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE FŒTUS'; EVEN THOUGH THE SENSE-ORGANS HAVE NOT APPEARED IN IT, WHY CANNOT COGNITION BE THERE?—IN FACT THE ASSERTION THAT DOES INVOLVE AUDACITY IS THAT 'ALL COGNITION PROCEEDS FROM SENSE-ORGANS AND OBJECTS'; BECAUSE THE CONTRARY IS FOUND TO BE THE CASE DURING DREAMS.—IN REALITY, COGNITION IS APPREHENDED ALSO IN A FORM WHICH IS DISTINCT FROM THAT OF THE OBJECT, AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF SWOON. FROM THIS IT IS CLEAR THAT CONSCIOUSNESS CAN BE THERE IN THE FŒTUS.—(1920–1922)

COMMENTARY.

If all Cognition were apprehended only through the Sense-organs and the Objects,—then our assertion would have been an audacious one; as a matter

of fact, however, in Dreams and other states there appears Subjective Consciousness envisaging the *Blue* and other objects, which Subjective Consciousness is apprehended even when there is no Sense-organ nor any Object in the shape of Colour, etc.—Nor can it be said that at that time the substratum of the Consciousness consists of the Sense-organ in the body; because what figures in the Consciousness is the *Blue* Object (which is not present in the body) ; and every bodily Cognition apprehends only tangible objects. Hence it is not right to say that 'all Cognition is in the form of the apprehension of things'. It is thus that there is nothing incongruous in asserting the presence of Cognition in the state of swoon and similar conditions.—(1920–1922)

The following might be urged—"There is nothing incongruous in the idea of Consciousness existing there in the form of a latent potency, but the idea that it is actually there in its potent form is certainly incongruous".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1923–1927).

CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT PRESENT IN THE FŒTUS MERELY IN THE FORM OF A POTENCY ; THE VIEW HELD IS THAT CONSCIOUSNESSES ARE PRESENT THERE IN THEIR ACTUAL FORM.—WHENCE DO YOU DERIVE THE IDEA THAT THERE IS NO CONSCIOUSNESS DURING SLEEP AND SWOON AND SUCH OTHER CONDITIONS ?—IF IT BE ARGUED THAT—"THE IDEA IS OBTAINED FROM THE ABSENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS",—THEN, THE QUESTION IS—HOW HAS THIS ABSENCE BEEN COGNISED ? IN CASE YOUR IDEA PROCEEDS THUS—"WE DO NOT COGNISE ANY CONSCIOUSNESS AT THE TIME",—THEN THAT ITSELF PROVES THE PRESENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT THE TIME.—IT MIGHT BE ARGUED THAT—"IF CONSCIOUSNESS IS PRESENT DURING THE SAID STATES, THEN WHY IS THERE NO REMEMBRANCE OF IT ON AWAKENING, ETC. ?"—THIS FACT (OF NON-REMEMBRANCE) IS NOT EFFECTIVE (IN REFUTING OUR VIEW) ; THE ABSENCE OF REMEMBRANCE IS DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF VIVIDNESS AND OTHER CONDITIONS (IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS)—AS IN THE CASE OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE NEWBORN INFANT.—(1923–1927)

COMMENTARY.

There would certainly be an incongruity if there were some means of knowing with certainty that there is no Consciousness at all during the states of sleep, swoon and the like.

"Th e is this means of knowledge available in the fact that there is no consciousness or cognition of the Consciousness itself."

That cannot be right ; how has this *absence of the Consciousness of itself* been cognised ? As *ex hypothesi* there can be no definite cognition of the absence of Cognition.

If also your definite Cognition proceeds in the form that—"in sleep, swoon and other states, I am not cognisant of any Consciousness",—then this definite cognition itself proves the existence of Cognition (or Consciousness).

It might be argued that—"if there were Consciousness during sleep and other conditions, then why should not there be remembrance of it on awakening, etc. ?'—The '*etcetera* ?' is meant to include the state when the swoon and the intoxication have passed off".

But this *non-remembrance* is not effective in proving that what has been cognised did not exist there. It would be so if the mere *cognition* of a thing meant that there must be *remembrance* of it. As a matter of fact, however, in many cases, even when there is Cognition, there is no Remembrance,—on account of the absence of *vividness, repetition* and *interest* in the Cognition; just as is found to be the case of the new-born infant, where, even though there is Cognition, there is no Remembrance.—(1923–1927)

Question:—"What proof or authority have *you* for asserting that Consciousness is present,—where there is doubt regarding the appearance of Remembrance ?"

This is the objection urged by the Opponent in the following—

TEXT (1928).

"If it is so, then how do you postulate the presence of this (Consciousness) in these (states) ?"—(1928/1)

COMMENTARY.

'*Of this*'—of the Consciousness.
'*In these*',—in the states of sleep, etc.—(1928)

Our reason is as follows, as has been explained already:—

TEXTS (1928–1930).

We conclude this from reasons already explained before.—If the presence of Consciousness is not admitted during the states of sleep, swoon and the like,—then there should be Death; while if another Consciousness is produced, then there would be no Death at all.—Thus Mental (subjective) Consciousness must be regarded as independent, as it is not dependent upon the Eye, etc. and it is present on the strength of its own cause, just as during Dreams, etc.—(1928-1930)

COMMENTARY.

The Reason as already explained before is as follows:—On awakening, the first Consciousness that the man has must be regarded as arising from

its own Cause,—because it is Consciousness,—like the Reminiscent Cognition following after experience. The Probans adduced here is not 'Inconclusive'; because on the previous occasion it has been shown by the rejection of the possibility of other causes, that the necessary invariable concomitance is there.

Then again, if there were no Consciousness during sleep, etc., then there would be Death.

If, on the other hand, it be held that—"after the Body has become entirely deprived of all Consciousness, another Consciousness is produced (on awakening)",—then, such appearance of Consciousness would mean that there can be no Death at all; because, as in the case of the man awakening from sleep, so in the case of the dead man also, there would be reappearance of Consciousness. Specially as it is only Mental (subjective) Consciousness that has the capacity to link up the next birth; as has been thus declared—'Linking up, Dispassion and the rest are admissible only when the subjective Consciousness is there'.

From all this it follows that Subjective Consciousness rests entirely upon the previous Consciousness; this is the idea expressed in the words—'*Subjective Consciousness must be regarded as independent*'.—The reason for this 'independence' consists in the fact of its not requiring anything else. In all cases, this Subjective Consciousness proceeds entirely from its own Cause,—because it does not stand in need of any causes other than its own, in the shape of the Eye, etc.;—as is found to be the case during sleep.—(1928–1930)

The following *Text* disposes of the charge of 'inadmissibility' against the Reason just stated:—

TEXT (1931).

FOR INSTANCE, CONCEPTUAL COGNITIONS ARE NOT DEPENDENT UPON SENSE-ORGANS AND OBJECTS,—BECAUSE THEY COME ABOUT EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THESE LATTER,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'SKY-LOTUS' AND SUCH THINGS.—(1931)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tadavyāpāra, etc. etc.*'—Even when there is no functioning of the Sense-organ and the Object. When one thing comes about without the functioning of the other, this latter cannot be the cause of the former. If it were, it would lead to absurdity.—(1931)

The following might be urged:—"The Conceptual Cognition of the *Sky-lotus* and such things may be independent of the Sense-organ and the Object,—because it comes about even in the absence of these latter; how could the Conceptual Cognition however, which appears when the Eye is fixed upon the Blue object before one, be independent of the Sense-organ

and Object,—which could save the Probans from being 'inadmissible' in regard to a part of the 'Subject' (Minor Term) ?"

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (1932-1933).

EVEN ON THE PRESENCE OF THE SENSE-ORGAN AND THE OBJECT, THE CONCEPTUAL COGNITION THAT APPEARS IN RELATION TO THE PAST, ETC. SHOULD BE REGARDED AS ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THE CONCEPTION THAT ENVISAGES A NON-ENTITY. IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED IN DETAIL THAT THE FORM OF AN ENTITY CANNOT FIGURE IN CONCEPTUAL COGNITIONS, BECAUSE THEY INVOLVE VERBAL EXPRESSIONS.—(1932-1933)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tayoḥ*'—of the Sense-organ and the Object.

'*Asadarthoparāgēṇa*'—is 'that which envisages what does not exist', —i.e. the conception of things like the *Sky-lotus*.—On the same footing as this would be the conception relating to the Past (if Cognitions were dependent upon the actual presence of the Object cognised).

"How so ?"

All Conceptual Cognitions appear as associated with verbal expressions, and hence they envisage verbal expressions also ; and that which envisages the verbal expression cannot envisage an entity ; because verbal expressions do not bear upon the form of things ; as words are not fixed by Convention in relation to the actual form of things.—All this has been explained in detail under the Chapter on 'Word and its Denotation' (Chapter XVI).

The Reason is present in everything where the Probandum is known to be present ; hence it cannot be regarded as 'Contradictory'.—Nor is it 'Inconclusive' ; because if the Cognition were not produced from its own cause, it would have to be regarded as *without cause*.—(1932-1933)

It might be argued that—"as the Cognition would subsist in the Body, it could not be regarded as *without cause*".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (1934).

IN THE STATES OF PARALYSIS, ETC.,—EVEN THOUGH THERE IS CHANGE IN THE BODY, THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS ; HENCE THIS LATTER CANNOT BE REGARDED AS SUBSISTING IN THE BODY.—(1934)

COMMENTARY.

When the body is struck with diseases like Paralysis, there is modification in it ; but that does not make any change in the Subjective Consciousness ;

hence this Subjective Consciousness cannot be regarded as subsisting in the Body ; when one thing does not become directly modified upon the modification of another thing, it cannot be regarded as subsisting in this latter ;——e.g. the Horse, which is not modified by the modification of the Cow (does not subsist in the Cow) ;—on the modification of the Body, Subjective Consciousness does not always and directly become modified, in the state of Paralysis, etc. ;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character (which implies the absence of the less wide).—(1934)

The following *text* proceeds to show that the *character of subsisting in something* is invariably concomitant with the *character of becoming directly modified* on the modification of the latter thing :—

TEXTS (1935-1936).

IN CASES OF AFFECTIONS OF THE EYE, WHENEVER THERE IS THE SLIGHTEST DEFECT IN THE EYE, THE COGNITION BASED UPON THE EYE APPEARS IN A DEFECTIVE FORM.—THUS, EVEN WHEN THE BODY HAS PERISHED, THE SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS, WHICH DOES NOT SUBSIST IN IT, CONTINUES TO EXIST THROUGH THE FORCE OF ITS OWN CAUSE ;—THERE CAN BE NO INCONGRUITY IN THIS.—(1935-1936)

COMMENTARY.

As the wider character is absent, it is proved that the Subjective Consciousness does not subsist in the Body.

'*Thus*'—therefore—even on the cessation of the Body,—the Subjective Consciousness shall not cease. There is no incongruity in this.—When one thing does not subsist in another, it does not necessarily cease upon the cessation of the latter ; e.g. the cessation of the *Cow* does not lead to the cessation of the *Gavaya* ;—and the Body is not the substratum of Subjective Consciousness ; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character.—(1935-1936)

It has been argued above (under *Text* 1869) that—" when the other body has not been seen, how can it be understood that the required substratum is the Body that is born subsequently ? "

TEXTS (1937-1938).

WHEN THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS BY ITSELF, WE ARE NOT EAGER TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF ANOTHER BODY.—BUT, EVEN THOUGH NOT SEEN, SUCH A BODY CANNOT BE DENIED; BECAUSE THE NON-PERCEPTION MAY BE DUE ONLY TO UNCERTAINTY IN THE MAN WITH DEFECTIVE EYESIGHT,—AS IN THE CASE OF SCANTY SMOKE.—(1937-1938)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows :—What is meant to be proved is the existence of the 'other world'; and how can it be proved ?—It can be proved if it is shown that Consciousness is without beginning and without end; as it is only an aspect of Consciousness that figures in the Idea of the 'other world'; this Idea cannot subsist in the Body, which is a material object with a shape; as the 'other world' is held to be there even when the Body is not there. If the 'Chain of Cognitions' is proved to be without beginning and without end, then the existence of our 'other World' also becomes proved. Hence we do not put forth any effort towards proving the existence of the other Body; as it would be useless.

Simply because the other body is not seen, it cannot be denied; as this *not-seeing* may be due to the absence of necessary attention, as happens in the case of the man with defective eyesight,—even though the body may be there all right; as it happens when there is a scanty line of smoke; so that mere non-perception does not prove non-existence. In fact a subsequent body is described as actually perceived by persons of pure birth and super-normal vision.

For these same reasons, there can be no denial of the 'migratory body' (*Liṅgasharīra*) postulated by the *Sāṅkhya*.

In the case of the previously-born body also, it is just possible that there may be non-perception due to the remoteness of place;—due either to its being produced at a remote place, or to the difference in its character, as in the case of Ghosts and Goblins. Even when the bodies are not remote, people with normal vision can never cognise with certainty that it is such and such a being who has become born as a bird; just as there is no recognition in cases where the body is changed by means of the use of medicines with unthinkable potency.—(1937-1938)

Question :—"How is it then that Cognitions appearing in different substrata are spoken of as belonging to the same Chain ?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (1939–1941).

EVEN THOUGH THE TWO COGNITIONS SUBSIST IN TWO DIFFERENT BODIES, YET, BY REASON OF THE LATER COGNITION APPEARING IN THE SAME PARTICULAR CHARACTER AS THE PRECEDING ONE, THE LATER COGNITION IS CONNECTED WITH THE SAME 'CHAIN' WITH WHICH THE PREVIOUS COGNITION IS CONNECTED.—FURTHER, EVEN IN THE CASE OF NEWLY-BORN INFANTS, THERE IS ACTIVITY TOWARDS SUCKING THE BREAST, AS ALSO DISPLEASURE AT BEING BAULKED ; ALL WHICH IS INFERRED FROM SUCH ACTS AS CRYING, SUCKING THE BREAST AND SO FORTH.—ALL THIS IS OF THE NATURE OF CONCEPTUAL COGNITION, AND CONCEPTUAL COGNITION IS ASSOCIATED WITH NAMES (VERBAL EXPRESSION).—(1939–1941)

COMMENTARY.

'*By reason of the later Cognition, etc. etc.*'—That is, the Cognitions of the present life appear with the same peculiarities as the Cognitions of the previous life. This has been thus declared—' Through repeated practice, good and evil deeds appear in the nature of men ; and these same appear in future lives, without any instruction,—like a dream '.

The Materialist has argued as follows :—" The Body in this world and the Body in the 'other world' being entirely different, the *Chain* of the Cognitions in those two bodies cannot be one and the same ; so that the first Cognition that appears in the Fœtus cannot belong to the same Chain as the Cognition under dispute,—because they belong to different bodies,—like the Cognitions of the Buffalo, the Boar and other animals ".

This also becomes refuted by what has been said above.

Then again, for the following reason also the existence of the 'other world' should be admitted :—Every Conceptual Cognition is preceded by the repeated Cognition of words,—because it is Conceptual,—like the Conceptual Thoughts occurring in youth and old age ;—the Conceptual Cognition involved in the desire for sucking the breast and so forth appearing in new-born infants is *Conceptual* :—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The Reason cannot be said to be one which has an unadmitted substratum ; because the existence of the Minor Term in the shape of the *desire for sucking the breast, etc.*, is proved by such effects in newborn infants as crying and actual breast-sucking ; such *crying* and *breast-sucking* cannot be possible in one who has no conception of *liking and disliking.*

Nor is the Reason 'inadmissible by itself' ;—this is shown by the words '*all this is of the nature of Conceptual, etc. etc.*'.—'*All this*'—i.e. the desire for breast-sucking, etc.—is of the nature of Conceptual Thought ; because it is apprehended as something sought after.

That the Reason is not 'Inconclusive' is shown by the words—'*is associated with names*'. '*Saḥ*' stands for Conceptual Cognition. Inasmuch as Conceptual Cognition is associated with verbal expression, it is said to be 'associated with names'. This 'association with names',—

of the Conceptual Cognition—is not possible without repeated Convention; as has been explained by us already in detail.—(1939–1941)

The following might be urged:—"There may be *association with names* due to repeated practice; but that does not prove what is wanted; in fact, it only proves the contrary, i.e. the fact of being preceded (and produced) by repeated practice during the present life."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (1942).

IN THE CASE IN QUESTION THERE CAN BE NO 'NAME-FORM' TO WHICH ONE HAS BEEN HABITUATED, DURING THE PRESENT BIRTH.—AS IN THE CASE OF THESE PERSONS, IF THERE HAS BEEN NO PREVIOUS BIRTH, THERE SHOULD BE ENTIRE ABSENCE OF THE SAID DESIRE, ETC.—(1942)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—The practice or habitual use during the present life in this world is negatived by all evidence,—in the case of newborn infants. The Reason adduced in support of a conclusion that is so annulled cannot be said to be 'contradictory', because the Probans has been said to be 'contradictory' only when the Probandum is one that is not already annulled.

'*Name-form*',—i.e. the form of the Name, i.e. its expressiveness; even though this really functions in the mind, it is imposed upon (attributed to) the verbal forms.

'*These persons*'—i.e. the newborn infants.

'*Absence of, etc. etc.*'—i.e. absence of the said Desire for breast-sucking and so forth.—(1942)

The following *Text* sums up the purport of the above arguments:—

TEXT (1943).

FOR THESE REASONS, THE SAID DESIRE, ETC. MUST BE REGARDED AS PROCEEDING FROM THE IMPRESSIONS LEFT BY THE HABITUAL USE OF THE NAME; AND AS THESE ARE OF THE NATURE OF CONCEPTUAL COGNITION, THE SAID DESIRE ALSO SHOULD BE ADMITTED TO BE CONCEPTUAL.—(1943)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tat*'—stands for '*tasmāt*', 'For these reasons'.—(1943)

The following *text* describes the upshot of the above arguments:—

TEXT (1944).

BECAUSE THE CONCEPTUAL COGNITION OF THE SAID PERSONS IS BORN OF THE FRUITION OF THE IMPRESSIONS LEFT BY THE REPEATED COGNITION OF THE NAME DURING THAT SAME BIRTH, —THEREFORE 'ANOTHER BIRTH' BECOMES ESTABLISHED.—(1944)

COMMENTARY.

'*Name*'—verbal expression.—'*Cognition*'—apprehension, knowledge;—'*abhyāsa*', repeated appearance.

The compound '*yannāma, etc. etc.*' is to be expounded as 'that birth during which there has been repeated cognition of the Name',—this compound being in accordance with a particular rule (of Pāṇini's)—'*Saptamī*, etc.';—the impressions are left by this repeated Cognition;—these Impressions have this 'fruition', development, attainment of their full character, by producing their effects;—and it is from this 'fruition' that the said Conceptual Cognition is born.

'*Of the said persons*'—i.e. of new-born infants.—(1944)

The following *Text* sets forth the opponent's *Reductio ad absurdum* argument against the above view:—

TEXT (1945).

"IF THE SAID CONCEPTUAL COGNITION OF THE NEWBORN INFANTS PROCEED FROM THE REPEATED COGNITION OF NAMES,—HOW IS IT THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE THE MEMORY OR THE CLEAR SPEECH OF ELOQUENT SPEAKERS?"—(1945)

COMMENTARY.

"If the Conceptual Cognition proceeds from the repeated Cognition of the Convention during previous lives,—then the newborn child should have remembrance of the past Convention; because the continuity of a habit could not be possible without remembrance; also the child should have clear speech like eloquent speakers;—and in that case, there would be no need for the setting up of any Conventions during the present life.—And yet none of these things happens.—Hence it follows that, as there is no Remembrance, and there is no clear speech,—the idea that the Conceptual Cognition is preceded and produced by repeated Cognition is incompatible with facts".

By means of this *Reductio ad absurdum*, which rejects the very nature of the Major Term, the Opponent shows that the final Conclusion (of the Buddhist) is defective.—(1945)

In the following *Text*, the author points out that the Reason put forward in this *Reductio ad absurdum* is 'Inconclusive' (Doubtful):—

TEXT (1946).

THAT SPEECH IS NOT THERE IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE DEVELOPMENT (OF THE IMPRESSIONS) BECOMES HAMPERED BY POWERFUL IMPEDIMENTS,—JUST AS IN THE STATE OF HIGHLY COMPLICATED FEVER.—(1946)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Repeated Cognition is not invariably concomitant with Remembrance, etc. ;—by virtue of which concomitance it should always produce the said Remembrance ; or should cease on the cessation of the same. Because it is quite possible that, there may be continuance of the previous habit, and yet there may be no Remembrance.

The mention of the 'high complicated fever' is only by way of illustration.

'*Powerful impediments*'—due to existence in the mother's womb.

'*The development becomes hampered*'—That is the full development of the Impressions becomes hampered ; i.e. it does not proceed in exact accordance with the peculiarities of the particular place, time and character of things as previously cognised.

This answers the following argument of the Materialist :—" Remembrance of previous birth cannot be admitted ; because there is Remembrance of all men coming from the same village ".—The fact of the matter is that even those coming from the same village do not have the Remembrance ; as among them there are some who are dull-witted who lose their memory.

'*Tāsām*'—stands for the words, speech.—(1946)

The following *Text* shows that the Reason adduced in the *Reductio ad absurdum* is 'inadmissible' regarding its substratum :—

TEXT (1947).

IN THE CASE OF THOSE HIGH-SOULED MEN, WHERE THERE IS NOT THE SLIGHTEST IMPEDIMENT,—CLEAR SPEECH IS ACTUALLY HEARD AND THEY DO HAVE CLEAR REMEMBRANCE OF THEM ALSO.—(1947)

COMMENTARY.

'*High-souled men*'—Men of exceptionally pure life.—(1947)

The following texts set forth another argument in proof of the idea of the 'other world' :—

TEXTS (1948–1953).

As a matter of fact, all these feelings of Love, Hatred and the rest become strong through habit and repetition,—as has been ascertained by positive and negative concomitance.—These feelings, appearing for the first time (in the child), are entirely devoid of any habit and repetition during the present life; what then is the cause of their appearance,—if there is no other life?—Their appearance cannot be due to the presence of their (external) excitants; because even when these excitants are present, the feelings in question do not appear, if there is Disgust; and when this Disgust ceases, they are found to be strong, even in connection with past and future things, when the counterfeelings appear in intensified form.—The feelings of Love, Hatred and the rest are found to proceed in regard to Women and other things, when the man attributes to them Goodness, devotedness and constancy and so forth; even though these qualities may not be actually there.—For these reasons, these feelings appearing in this life must be regarded as appearing, without the excitants being actually present,—through the force of the habitual appearance of similar feelings in the past,—because they are feelings of Love, etc.,—like these same feelings appearing subsequently.—(1948–1953)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be thus formulated :—The strength of the feelings of Love, Hatred, Jealousy, Haughtiness and Pride, etc.,—as also Wisdom, Compassion, Sympathy and so forth—is due to habitual practice; just as during the present life, it is found in men possessed of the varying degrees of these feelings;—during the present life, there is in the Body, etc. of a man, a degree of strength of the feelings, which is not due to any such practice during the present life;—so this is a Reason based upon the relation of cause and effect. As all such relations of cause and effect are determined by positive and negative concomitance, the Reason cannot be said to be 'inadmissible'.—This is what is meant by the words—'*Ascertained by positive, etc. etc.*'.

It cannot be urged that—"the Reason is 'contradictory', as cited in proof of the fact of the feelings due to habitual repetition during other lives".

What is meant is that these feelings as appearing for the first time during the present life have not been habitually repeated during this life ;—this may not be a Reason directly proving the fact of these feelings being due to habitual practice during previous lives ; but what is stated as the Reason being admitted to be a fact, it could not be without some cause ; if it were without cause, it would be there at all times ;—hence if another life were not there, what could be the cause of the strength of the said feelings of Love, Hatred, etc. ? Hence the conclusion is that the habitual repetition during past lives is the cause of the said strength of the feelings ;—and thus the 'other world' becomes established.

The external objective excitant cannot be the cause of the feelings in question ; because in many cases, even when these excitants are there, the feelings of Love, etc. do not appear at all,—if there happen to be present a feeling of Disgust against the evil character of the things.—The term '*pratisaṅkhyāna*', 'disgust' stands for that counter-feeling against Love, etc., which is based upon the idea of evil.—Sometimes, even when the excitant is not there, the said feelings of Love, etc. actually appear. Hence the presence of the feelings cannot be due to the presence of the excitants.

Then again, even in regard to past and future things, the feelings are found to be strong in the man in whom the feeling of Disgust has ceased, and feelings due to the absence of pleasure have become intensified through strong desire. And when there is no change in the presence or absence of a certain thing, or the presence or absence of another thing,—the one cannot be the cause of the other ; otherwise these would be incongruities.

For the following reason also, the feelings of Love, etc. cannot be due to the presence of the excitants :—Because, if the feelings appeared exactly in accordance with the excitants, they would proceed from the excitant exactly in the same manner as the Cognition of Blue and other things (which always proceeds in accordance with these things) ;—the feelings however do not proceed in this way ; on the contrary, the said feelings appear in regard to the Woman and other things, in men who attribute to the woman the form of their own lasting pleasure, etc. which have not been experienced at all ; and yet the objects (woman, etc.) are not actually possessed of the said form of goodness, etc. ;—and when a thing is devoid of a certain form, it cannot be the excitant or basis of the Cognition of that form ; otherwise it would lead to absurdity.

'*Tat*'—i.e. for these reasons, the feelings of Love, etc. as pertaining to imposed things must be regarded as devoid of an objective basis (or excitant) ; and from this it follows that the said feelings of Love, etc., when they appear for the first time during present life, proceed from the repeated experience of similar feelings in the past.—(1948–1953)

Question :—" If Objects are not the excitants of the feelings, then how is it that feelings of Love, etc. appear only when the Objects are present ? "

Answer :—

TEXTS (1954–1956).

WHEN THE OBJECTS ARE PRESENT, THERE APPEAR PLEASURE, ETC.; FROM THIS PLEASURE, ETC. PROCEED THE 'AFFLICTIONS' OF LOVE, HATE AND THE REST,—BEING THE OUTCOME OF THE FRUITION OF THE IMPRESSIONS LEFT BY SIMILAR PAST FEELINGS,—IN MEN WHO ARE DEVOID OF WISDOM AND ARE SUBJECT TO EVIL PROPENSITIES (?),—IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POTENCY OF THINGS. DIRECTLY, THE OBJECTS ARE NOT THE CAUSE OF THE FEELINGS; IF THEY WERE, A SINGLE AFFLICTION WOULD BE THE CAUSE OF THEM ALL,—IN REGARD TO THE OBJECT,—LIKE THE COGNITION OF THINGS.—(1954–1956)

COMMENTARY.

The process is as follows :—When the Object is present, there appears pleasure born of the sense-organ concerned ;—from this Pleasure, proceed the 'Afflictions' of Love, etc.,—in men devoid of wisdom (and dispassion) and subject to evil propensities and tendencies,—out of the fruition of the Impressions left by the previously experienced feelings of Love, etc. ; so that the Objects are not the direct cause of the feelings.

The following might be urged :—"You are only expounding your own doctrine ; you state no reasons".

The answer to this is—'*A single Affliction, etc. etc.*'.—'Single'—i.e. of a single kind.—'*Tatra*'—in regard to the object.—'*Tasya*'—of the object.—'*Like the Cognition of things*' ;—i.e. like the Cognition apprehending the form of the *Blue* and other things.—As a matter of fact however, a single 'Affliction' is not what actually appears ; for instance, in regard to the single object in the shape of the body of the Woman,—while in one man the feeling aroused is that of *Love*, in another it is *Hate*, while in yet another, mere *jealousy* ; so that there are several kinds of 'Afflictions' (Feelings) that appear.—(1954–1956)

The following might be urged :—"The feelings of Love, etc. that appear during the present life cannot be the effect of repeated experience in the past ; they arise either from the seeing of the actual act done by others, or from the advice of other persons".

This is answered in the following—

TEXT (1957).

THE APPEARANCE OF THE FEELINGS CANNOT BE DUE EITHER TO THE PERCEPTION OF THE DOINGS OF OTHERS, OR TO HEARING OF THINGS FROM OTHER PERSONS ;—BECAUSE SUCH IS NOT FOUND TO BE THE CASE ALWAYS.—(1957)

COMMENTARY.

'*Vṛtti*' stands for *doings*.—(1957)

The following *text* shows how that is not found to be the case always :—

TEXT (1958).

BOARS, BUCKS AND OTHER ANIMALS,—WHO HAVE NEVER SEEN OR HEARD OF THE DOINGS,—BECOME PERTURBED AT THE TOUCH OF FEMALES OF THEIR OWN KIND.—(1958)

COMMENTARY.

'*Doings*'—Intercourse and the like.

'*Sabhāgagati, etc. etc.*'—females of the same kind,—i.e. the sow and the doe.

When there is *contact*—proximity—of these, there is '*perturbation*'—disturbance,—i.e. desire for intercourse.—(1958)

TEXT (1959).

SUCH QUALITIES AS WISDOM, GENTLENESS, COMPASSION AND THE LIKE,—WHICH ARE NOT HABITUALLY PRACTISED IN THE WORLD,—DO NOT PROCEED BY THEMSELVES, LIKE PRIDE, ETC.—(1959)

COMMENTARY.

It must be admitted that the feelings of Love, etc. appear by themselves, as the effect of habitual experience in the past ;—because such qualities as wisdom, gentleness and the rest,—which are not habitually practised in the world,—are *not* found to appear by themselves ;—like *Pride, etc.* ;—this is an instance of dissimilarity. 'Pride' is *haughtiness*.—Otherwise, like Pride, etc., Wisdom and the rest also would appear by themselves.—(1959)

Some people have held the following view :—" Love proceeds from *Phlegm* (in the physical constitution of the Body),—Hatred from *Bile*,—and Delusion from *Wind* ".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXTS (1960-1961).

THE ORIGINATION OF THE FEELINGS CANNOT BE DUE TO PHLEGM AND THE REST. BECAUSE, AS IN THE PREVIOUS CASE, THE ENTIRE FALSITY OF THIS IDEA IS PERCEIVED IN EXPERIENCE.—FOR THESE REASONS, THAT TIME REPEATED PRACTICE DURING WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF THE FEELINGS APPEARING FOR THE FIRST TIME, MUST BE THE 'OTHER BIRTH', WHICH THUS BECOMES ESTABLISHED ; AND THE DOCTRINE OF 'NON EST' BECOMES DAMNED.—(1960-1961)

COMMENTARY.

'*Balāsa*' is *Phlegm*.

'*As in the previous case*',—in the case of objects, as shown under *Text* 1950 above.

Then again, as a matter of fact, there is no increase and decrease in the feelings of Love, etc. upon increase and decrease of Phlegm. And when the change in one thing does not bring about a change in the other, the former cannot be the cause of the latter.—Similarly, fierce *Hatred*, and not fierce *Love*, has been seen to appear in one with preponderance of Phlegm; while one with preponderance of Bile is found to have fierce *Love*, not fierce *Hatred*; this sort of comingling is often met with; and when one thing appears without the other, this latter cannot be the cause of the former. Further, the man with *Love* is often found to be in the same condition as the man with *Hatred*.—From these non-concomitances, it follows that the feelings of Love, etc. are not the effects of Phlegm, etc.

'*Tasmāt*'—*Thus*; this sums up the chapter.

'*Yadabhyāsa, etc. etc.*'—The compound is to be expounded as—'Repeated experience during which is the cause of the feelings in question'.—(1960-1961)

The following *texts* set forth the objections of the other party:—

TEXTS (1962-1963).

"(*a*) IF WHAT IS MEANT TO BE PROVED IS THE FACT OF THE FEELINGS BEING PRODUCED BY REPEATED EXPERIENCE DURING THE PRESENT LIFE,—THEN SUCH AN IDEA IS ANNULLED BY WELL-PERCEIVED FACTS, AND IS ALSO CONTRARY TO WHAT IS DESIRED (BY THE BUDDHIST).—(*b*) IF WHAT IS MEANT TO BE PROVED IS THE FACT OF THEIR BEING PRODUCED BY THE REPEATED EXPERIENCE OF OTHER LIVES,—THEN THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE IS DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM.—(*c*) IF WHAT IS MEANT TO BE PROVED IS THE MERE UNQUALIFIED FACT OF THE FEELINGS BEING PRODUCED BY 'REPEATED EXPERIENCE',—THE REASON PUT FORWARD IS 'CONTRADICTORY',—BECAUSE IT PROVES THE CONTRARY OF THE FACT OF THE FEELINGS BEING DUE TO THE REPEATED EXPERIENCE OF ANOTHER LIFE."—(1962-1963)

COMMENTARY.

The sense of the objection is as follows:—

"In reference to the feelings of Love, etc. appearing for the first time, what is it that is desired to be proved—(1) Is it that they proceed from repeated experience during present life?—Or (2) that they proceed from the repeated experience during other lives?—Or (3) that they proceed only from mere 'repeated experience' without any qualifications?—As, if this is proved, then by implication, it becomes proved that they are due to experiences of the 'other world';—these are the only alternative views possible.

"(1) If it is the first,—then there is '*bādhana*' of it—incompatibility with facts of perception; because in fact, the Love, etc. in question are never

found to appear from experience during the present life;—and there is '*bādhana*'—*denial*—also of what is desired by the upholder of the 'other world'.

"(2) Under the second view, the Corroborative Instance cited becomes devoid of the Probandum; because for the Materialist, there can be no instance where the feelings proceed from experiences of past lives.

"(3) Under the third view, the Reason becomes 'contradictory';—as, like the Corroborative Instance, it proves only the negation of the desired idea of the feelings being due to experiences during other lives."—(1962-1963)

The above objection is answered in the following—

TEXT (1964).

WHAT IS MEANT TO BE PROVED IS THE GENERAL FACT. NOR WOULD THE REASON BE 'CONTRADICTORY'; THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THESE AND THE REASON, BY REASON OF WHICH INCOMPATIBILITY, IT COULD NEGATIVE IT.—(1964)

COMMENTARY.

It is the third of the above alternative views that is meant by us.

Nor is the Reason 'Contradictory'.

"Why?"

Because there is no incompatibility between '*being produced from past experience*' and 'Love and other feelings',—by virtue of which incompatibility, the idea of 'being due to past experience' could be set aside.

Further, such notions as 'this world' and 'the other world' are based on differences in the state or condition of things,—and the differences of childhood, youth and so forth.

In this way, the beginninglessness (of things) becomes established. Hence this should not be emphasised—as it amounts to the view-point of other disputants (Naiyāyika, Mīmāmsaka, etc.).—(1964)

End of Chapter on Materialism.

CHAPTER XXIII.

'*External World.*'

COMMENTARY.

Under the Introductory *Texts*, '*Pratītya-samutpāda*', 'Intervolved Chain of Causation', has been described as '*pratibimbādi-sannibham*', 'resembling the Reflection of things'. In support of this assertion the Idealist sets forth as follows :—This entire universe comprising the threefold phenomena (Subjective or Immaterial, Objective or Material, and Imaginary or Fictitious) is mere 'Ideation'; and this *Ideation* or *Idea*, through the diversity of 'chains' varying with each individual 'Being', is endless, and *impure*—for persons who have not realised the Truth,—but *pure*,—for those whose 'Karma' has been wiped off; it is in perpetual flux (being destroyed every moment), and affects all living beings; it is not *one* and *unmodifiable*, as held by the 'followers of the Upaniṣads' (Vedāntins).

Such is the view of the Idealist Buddhists.

The idea of the entire universe being mere *Idea* is got at by the following two methods :—(1) Anything external, in the form of Earth, etc., which could be *apprehended*, being non-existent, there can be no *apprehender* ;—or (2) even though existent, in another 'Chain', the two factors would be devoid of the character of the 'apprehender' and 'apprehended'.—The argument, may be formulated as follows :—Every Cognition is devoid of both 'apprehended' and 'apprehender' because it is Cognition,—like the Cognition of the Reflected Image ;—and the Visual and other Perceptions of the Healthy man are *Cognition* ;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The Reason cannot be regarded as 'not concomitant' (with the Probandum); because, for the Cognition, there does not exist any such *apprehended* object as the 'external world', in the shape of the Earth, etc.; because such a world would be devoid of one as well as of several forms. This argument may be formulated as follows :—That which is not of one or several forms cannot be regarded by an intelligent man as 'existent',—e.g. the 'sky-lotus' ;—and the Earth, etc. postulated by other people are devoid of one and several forms; hence there is non-apprehension in them of the wider character ;—as, no third alternative possible, *existence* is invariably concomitant with the presence of one or several forms ;—and the impossibility of the relation of 'pervaded and pervader' (that which is concomitant, and that with which it is concomitant) would be the reason that would reject any idea to the contrary; hence the Reason adduced cannot be regarded as 'Inconclusive'.—Nor can it be regarded as 'Contradictory'; because it is present everywhere where the Probandum is known to be present.

In bringing forward against this Reason, the charge of being 'inad-missible', the Opponent has argued thus :—'You may accept the principle

that the material substances do not exist at all'; and while proceeding to show that such a Proposition would be contrary to perceptible facts, the Opponent explains that the first Reason is *not concomitant* (with the Probandum),--in the following:—

TEXTS (1965-1966).

"IF THE FOUR *material substances* DO NOT EXIST APART FROM THE COGNITION (CONSCIOUSNESS, IDEA), THEN, HOW IS IT THAT THEY ARE DISTINCTLY AND CLEARLY PERCEIVED ?—EVEN WHEN SO PERCEIVED, IF THEY ARE HELD TO BE NON-EXISTENT, THEN FOR YOU, WHAT WOULD BE THE PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE *Cognition* ALSO ?"—(1965-1966)

COMMENTARY.

'*Distinctly*'.—This indicates the fact of the four substances being something distinct from Cognition;—and '*clearly*' indicates that it is clearly perceived.

This same idea is further strengthened by a *Reductio ad Absurdum*—'*Even when so, etc. etc.*'.—(1965-1966)

The *Answer* to the above is as follows:—

TEXTS (1967–1969).

WHEN THE EXTERNAL OBJECT IS PERCEIVED,—IN WHAT FORM IS IT PERCEIVED ? IS IT IN THE FORM OF THE ATOM ? OR IN THAT OF A COMPOSITE THING ?—AS FOR THE FORMER, THE FORM OF THE ATOM IS NOT WHAT IS ACTUALLY COGNISED; BECAUSE IN THE COGNITION, THERE IS NO RECOGNITION OF SEVERAL IMPARTITE CORPOREAL THINGS; WHILE, IF THE ATOMS HAD APPEARED IN THE COGNITION, THEY SHOULD HAVE APPEARED AS DEVOID OF ALL DISTINCTIONS OF COMPONENT PARTS; OTHERWISE THEY WOULD NOT BE 'PERCEPTIBLE', FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THEY WOULD NOT BE IMPRESSING THE COGNITION WITH THEIR OWN FORM.—(1967–1969)

COMMENTARY.

If the external object were cognised by Perception, it could be so either (1) as *one* and not-different from the Atoms,—or (2) as one, but in the form of a composite whole composed of the Atoms;—or (3) as a single gross object (by itself) not composed of parts.—These are the likely alternatives.

It cannot be the *first* of these; that is, it cannot be held to be cognised as *one and not-different from the Atoms*; because there is no recognition in the Cognition (of the object) of several impartite corporeal atoms; in fact, what is

actually recognised in Consciousness is the idea of something gross.—If the reading is '*pratyayē apratīvedanāt*', there is to be no compounding.——The argument may be formulated as follows :—That which does not appear in its own form in the Cognition which is held to be Perception, should not be regarded as 'perceived',—for instance, the 'sky-lotus';—the Atom, many and corporeal, does not appear in this form in the Cognition which is held to be Perception, which always apprehends the *gross* form;—thus there is no apprehension of the wider character (which would imply *perceptibility*); because 'Perceptibility' is invariably concomitant with 'appearance of its own form'.—This same invariable concomitance is shown by the words—'*If the Atoms, etc. etc.*'—(1967-1969)

The following might be urged—"In as much as we hold the doctrine that the Atoms are always produced, and also perish, in the aggregated form,—there can be no appearance of the Atoms singly; as has been asserted by *Bhadanta-Shubhagupta*—'Atoms cannot come about one by one, each independently by itself; that also is the reason why they do not appear singly in consciousness'."

The following *Text* shows that this is no answer to the argument urged above (under 1967 *et seq.*).

TEXTS (1970-1971)

EVEN IF THEY COME INTO EXISTENCE IN THE AGGREGATED FORM, THE ATOMS SHOULD APPEAR IN THEIR OWN FORM (IN THE COGNITION); BECAUSE EVEN UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS THEY DO NOT ABANDON THEIR *impartite* FORM.—IF IT BE SAID THAT—"THEIR FORM IS ONE THAT HAS REACHED THE LOWEST LIMIT OF DIMUNITION (SMALLNESS)",—THEN, WHY SHOULD NOT THEY BE REGARDED AS *incorporeal*, LIKE SENSATION, ETC.?—(1970-1971)

COMMENTARY.

'*Under those conditions*'—in the aggregated form.

Further, if the Atoms are impartite (indivisible), then they should not be regarded as *corporeal*; so that the present assertion of the Opponent involves a self-contradiction.—This is what is shown by the words "*If it be said, etc. etc.*'—'*Labdhāpa, etc.*' means 'that form or character which has reached the lowest limit of dimunition'. That is to say, if the Atoms are not liable to dimunition through the diminishing contacts of component parts,—i.e. if they are indivisible, without parts,—they must be regarded as 'incorporeal', like Sensations and Feelings,—as there would be no distinction between them.—(1970-1971)

The following *Text* anticipates the answer that may be given by *Bhadanta-Shubhagupta* :—

TEXT (1972)

"JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE COMING INTO EXISTENCE OF SIMILAR 'MOMENTS', THERE IS AN ILLUSION OF *permanence*,—SO WHEN THERE IS AN UNBROKEN SERIES OF COGNITIONS OF SIMILAR ATOMS, THERE IS AN ILLUSION OF *Grossness*."—(1972)

COMMENTARY.

He has offered the following answer :—" In the case of sound and other things what are perceived are several similar ' Moments ' coming into existence one after the other ; and yet there is an illusion of there being a permanent entity ;—in the same manner, in the case of Atoms, what are perceived simultaneously are so many homogeneous Atoms present in an unbroken chain, which gives rise to the mental delusion that what is perceived is a *gross* object.—Thus the Reason adduced above in *Text* 1968 is ' inadmissible '. "—(1972)

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (1973–1979)

IF THE PERCEPTION, ENTIRELY BY ITS OWN FUNCTION, DID NOT BRING ABOUT THE RECOGNITION (OF THE IMPARTITE ATOMS),—THEN, HOW COULD THESE BE REGARDED AS 'AMENABLE TO PERCEPTION'?—THAT THINGS ARE MOMENTARY IS ASCERTAINED BY MEANS OF PROOFS ; BUT HOW ARE THE ATOMS COGNISED AS 'WHITE', 'YELLOW' AND THE REST ?—IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT—"THE FIRST VISIBLE THING MUST BE AN AGGREGATE OF MINUTE (INVISIBLE) THINGS,—BECAUSE IT IS *gross*,—LIKE THE HILL AND SUCH THINGS ;—THERE IS THIS INFERENCE (WHICH PROVES OUR ASSERTION) ".—THE ANSWER TO THIS IS THAT *grossness* IS NOT ADMITTED TO BE PRESENT IN THE TWO THINGS ; THE COMPOSITE IS NOT GROSS, NOR ARE THE ATOMS SO.—IF WHAT HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF AS SUCH (GROSS) IS THE WELL-KNOWN FORM THAT IS FOUND EXTENDED IN SPACE,—EVEN SO, AS SUCH FORM APPEARS IN ILLUSORY COGNITION ALSO, THERE WOULD ALWAYS BE DOUBT.—IF THE ANSWER BE THAT—"ILLUSORY COGNITION IS WRONG, HENCE WHAT IS COGNISED IS NOT ADMITTED TO BE SO",—THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT, UNLESS A DISTINCTION IS ESTABLISHED, WHAT WOULD BE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS AND THAT ?—IF IT IS *compatibility with effective action*,—AND THIS IS SAID TO CONSIST IN COMPATIBILITY WITH THE COGNITION ENVISAGING THAT EFFECTIVE ACTION,—THEN SUCH COMPATIBILITY IS POSSIBLE OTHERWISE ALSO ; ON ACCOUNT OF THE CAPACITY FOR ACTION BEING RESTRICTED.—(1973–1979)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by the emphasising particle '*ēva*', 'entirely', is the fact of there being no dependence upon the Inferential Indicative or the

Reliable Word. What is meant is that, even though Perception comes about, it does so, in an unspecified (indeterminate) form; and yet that factor alone is regarded as 'Perceived' for practical purposes in regard to which it produces a *Re-cognition* of the form actually apprehended; while that factor with regard to which it does not produce this *Re-cognition* is as good as not-apprehended, even though it might be apprehended. Hence our Reason cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible'. Specially because what is meant by the clause '*Pratyayāprativedanāt*' (in *Text* 1968) is that 'it does not figure in that cognition which is meant to be Perception, and which is put forward as the Reason in the Minor Premiss.'

It has been argued (in *Text* 1972) that—"the idea of *grossness* is a mental illusion".—That is not right; because if the Atom had been established by suitable proof, then alone could the idea of *grossness* be regarded as *wrong* or illusory;—as it is only when the momentary character of things has been established by suitable proof, that the idea of *permanence* is regarded as *wrong*. As a matter of fact however, the Atoms have not yet been established; as they form the subject of the present investigation.

Further, this 'illusion of grossness' cannot be said to be 'mental',—as it appears quite clearly; while what is confined to mere Conceptual Thought can never be clear; because the generic form is always *indistinct*; and without the generic form, there can be no Conceptual Thought.

The following might be urged:—"Like the *non-eternality* of things, Atoms also are actually established by suitable proofs. For instance, whatever is *gross* is only of the nature of the aggregate of minute things,—as for example, the Hill and other things;—and the first visually perceived object is *gross*;—hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things. The qualification 'visually' has been added for the purpose of excluding the 'Atomic Diad' (which is not *visually* perceived)."

The answer to this is as follows:—In the premiss 'because it is gross',—if it is *real* 'grossness', as a property of the thing, that is put forward as the Probans (Reason),—then such 'grossness' is *not admitted* by your disputant (the Buddhist) either in the *Probandum* or in the Corroborative Instance; and in that case the Probans is 'inadmissible' and the Corroborative Instance is 'devoid of the Probandum'.

If, on the other hand, the 'grossness' meant is that which appears as extended in space, which cannot stand the test of investigation, and which is well-known to all common people, down to the veriest cowherd,—then, even in the case of illusory cognition like Dream, such 'gross form' actually figures in Consciousness, even though there is no 'aggregate of Atoms' at the time; and hence your Probans becomes 'Inconclusive'.

If, in order to avoid this difficulty, you add the qualification 'there being no illusion',—then, so far as the Idealist is concerned, so long as the difference, between the visual cognition produced under normal conditions on the one hand and the cognition produced duiing dreams on the other, is not established,—there is no Cognition that can be accepted as being 'free from illusion'; hence the qualification also becomes 'inadmissible'.

The following might be urged:—"Between the normal healthy visual

cognition and the Dream-cognition, the difference is quite clear—in that while the former is compatible with effective action, the latter is not".

The answer to this is—What is this 'compatibility with effective action?'—If it is *the reaching of the external object*,—then, that is not yet established; in fact, it is for the establishing of the *external object* that the Reason has been put forward.—If, on the other hand, 'compatibility with effective action' be held to consist in *the Cognition envisaging the desired effective action*,—then, *otherwise also*,—i.e. even without the *external object*,—such compatibility would be possible; so that the Reason adduced is clearly 'Inconclusive'.

Question:—"How would it be possible *otherwise*?"

Answer:—'*On account of the capacity for action being restricted*';—i.e. because the capacity of the cause, consisting in the immediately preceding Cognition, is restricted; that is, a certain preceding Cognition is capable of bringing about only a particular Cognition; all are not able to produce all; for example, your own 'External Object'; which also proves that there is restriction in the capacity of things.—(1973–1979)

The following *texts* urge the defect of 'inadmissibility' in the Probans adduced by the Buddhist,—'because it is not recognised in consciousness',—from the view-point of *Sumati*, the *Digambara* (Jaina):—

TEXTS (1980–1983)

"ATOMS HAVING TWO FORMS, *similar* (COMMON) AND *dissimilar* (UNCOMMON),—WHEN THE *common form* IS THE THING APPREHENDED, THEN THE UNCOMMON FORM IS NOT APPREHENDED; SUCH BEING THE CASE, WHAT IS IT THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE?—IN FACT, ALL THINGS EXIST IN TWO FORMS, THE 'UNIVERSAL' AND THE 'PARTICULAR'; HENCE ATOMS ARE DECLARED TO HAVE TWO FORMS—THE *common* AND THE *uncommon*. OF THESE, IT IS THE *common* FORM THAT IS AMENABLE TO SENSE-COGNITION. HENCE IT IS ONLY IN REFERENCE TO ATOMS THAT THERE CAN BE COGNITION OF ONLY ONE FORM. THAT FORM OF THE ATOMS WHICH IS *uncommon* IS HELD TO BE AMENABLE TO MYSTIC PERCEPTION".—SUCH ARE THE CONFOUNDED ASSUMPTIONS OF SOME DULL-WITTED PERSONS.—(1980–1983)

COMMENTARY.

Sumati has argued as follows:—All things have two aspects—the Universal and the Particular; consequently Atoms exist in two forms—the *common* and the *uncommon*; of these, it is the Common form that is apprehended by the Senses, not the uncommon form. In this way there is nothing incongruous in there being one uniform Cognition apprehending all Atoms; and thus it is by Perception that Atoms become established.

'*Confounded*'—indefinite; in as much as it implies no one definite form.—(1980–1983)

Says the Opponent—"The assertion that 'things have two forms' is quite definite".

True,—that assertion is there; but the assertion is not right.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (1984-1985)

HOW CAN IT BE RIGHT TO SAY THAT A *single* THING HAS *two* FORMS? IN FACT, THERE WOULD BE TWO THINGS, EACH DIFFERING FROM THE OTHER IN FORM.—IF THEY WERE OF THE SAME FORM AS ONE ANOTHER, THE DUALITY OF FORMS WOULD BE ANNULLED; AND IT WOULD BE THE *uncommon* FORM THAT WOULD BE APPREHENDED BY THE EYE AND OTHER SENSE-ORGANS.—(1984-1985)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, if there are two forms of a thing, different from one another, then there are two things; as the two forms, being different from one another, would be two different things; and it would not be right to say that a single thing has two forms.

Then again, the two forms, being not-different from the Thing itself, would be identical, both being like the form of a single thing; how then could it be a single thing having two forms?

Further, as the Particular form of a thing is not entirely different from the Universal form, there would be a possibility of the former being apprehended by the senses; and in that case there could not be the clear cut distinction that 'the Common form is amenable to *Sense-cognition* and the Uncommon form is amenable to *mystic cognition*'.—(1984-1985)

Further, the assertion that 'one thing has two forms' involves, not only a self-contradiction, but it also implies what is more damaging, that the one thing has two mutually contradictory forms.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (1986—*First Line*).

HOW COULD ONE AND THE SAME THING HAVE TWO MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY FORMS (AND CHARACTERS)?—(1986)

COMMENTARY.

The two forms—*Common* and *Uncommon*—are such that the absence of one implies the presence of the other and *vice versa*; how then can any single thing have these two forms?—(1986)

The following *Text* sets forth the view of *Kumārila*:—

TEXTS (1986-1987).

"AS IS ACTUALLY FOUND TO BE THE CASE, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ONE AND THE SAME THING TO HAVE CONTRADICTORY CHARACTERS. THAT 'ONE THING SHOULD HAVE ONE AND ONLY ONE FORM' IS NOT A ROYAL EDICT—IN FACT EVERYTHING HAS TO BE ACCEPTED AS IT IS PERCEIVED."—[SHLO VĀ.—*Shūnyavāda*, 219]—(1986-1987)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila argues thus :—" It is not true that mutually contradictory forms cannot belong to any one thing ;—why ?—because it is actually found to be the case.—Further, there is no such Edict of Kings that 'one thing must have only one form' ;—in fact, everything should be accepted to be exactly as it is found ; as all notions of things are based upon our Cognition of the same. As a matter of fact, the Cognition that is found to appear in connection with things is in one form,—as in the form of 'Being'—and also in many forms ; hence the nature of each thing has to be determined on the basis of the way in which it is actually cognised."—(1986-1987)

The answer to the above is as follows :—

TEXT (1988).

THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT ; BECAUSE THERE IS COGNITION OF THE NON-ENTITY ALSO ;—E.G. THAT OF THE YELLOWNESS OF THE CONCH-SHELL. OF 'DIFFERENCE' TOO THERE IS NO OTHER CHARACTERISTIC EXCEPT THE PRESENCE OF CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES.—(1988)

COMMENTARY.

If it be as asserted, then no Cognition could be wrong ; and there would be an end to all notions of 'difference'.

It might be possible to characterise that Cognition as 'wrong' which is subsequently sublated. But even so, when the idea of 'many' in reference to what is *one* is sublated, how could it be *not-wrong* ?

Thus it is found that the existence of Atoms cannot be proved either by Perception or by Inference ; consequently the proposition denying the external world does not involve the contradiction of any fact of perception. Nor is the Reason adduced by us 'inadmissible'.—(1988)

In the following *text*, the Opponent raises the objection that the Reason propounded in the form—'Because the Earth and other things are not of

the nature of one or several [therefore they must be non-existent]'—is doubtful and hence 'inadmissible':—

TEXT (1989).

"THE EXISTENCE OF ATOMS MAY NOT BE PROVED. THERE MAY BE DOUBT REGARDING THEM. BUT HOW COULD INTELLIGENT PERSONS HAVE THE CERTAINTY THAT ATOMS DO NOT EXIST AT ALL?"—(1989)

COMMENTARY.

The following *texts* supply the answer to this—

TEXTS (1990–1992).

IN EVERY OBJECT, IF THE FORM OF THE ATOM AT THE CENTRE,—WHICH IS IN CONJUNCTION WITH, OR DISTINCT FROM, OR LYING CONTIGUOUSLY WITH, THE FRONT PART OF ANOTHER ATOM,—IS REGARDED AS ALSO FACING A THIRD ATOM,—THEN, IN THAT CASE, THERE WOULD BE NO *aggregation* IN THE FORM OF THE HILL AND OTHER THINGS.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE IDEA IS THAT WHAT IS IN FRONT OF THE OTHER ATOM IS ANOTHER FORM OF THE FIRST ATOM,—THEN, IN THAT CASE, HOW COULD SUCH AN ATOM BE *one*?—(1990–1992)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—That which is devoid of the form of *one* or *many* is fit for being regarded as *non-existent*,—as the 'sky-lotus';—the Atoms postulated by the other party are devoid of the form of *one* or *many*;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

It cannot be said that the Reason here adduced is 'inadmissible'; because that the Atom is one cannot be admitted; because in the Hill and other things which are aggregates of Atoms, there is diversity of facings towards various directions.

This 'diversity of facings in various directions' must be present in the Atoms also, otherwise it could not be possible in the aggregates of Atoms, like the Hill and other things;—this is what is set forth in the words—'*If the assumption is, etc. etc.*'.

Some people hold that in every Object, the Atoms are in close conjunction with one another;—others hold that they remain there separate from each other, always, without touching one another;—others again hold that there is

no intervening space between atoms, hence they are said to be *in contact.*—Under all these three views, when the Atom in the middle is surrounded by many other Atoms, if there were no diversity in its facings towards various directions, then,—as in the case of the Mind and Mental entities,—no aggregation would be possible, as Atoms have no parts. For instance, that form in which the central Atom would be facing one Atom,—if in that same form, it also faced other Atoms,—then, it would imply that all the surrounding Atoms occupy the same point in space, and no aggregation of them would be possible.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—Whatever faces the Atom of one form must occupy the same point in space,—as for example, the Atom lying in space behind the said Atom,—or the House that stands facing another House;—and all the Atoms surrounding the central Atom stand facing that central Atom which has only one form;—hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things. As a consequence of this, there could be no *aggregation* (of Atoms).

If, on the other hand, the central Atom faces the other Atom in another form, then as the diverse facings would be there, the Atom could not be one,—being just like the Jar and other things.

Bhadanta-Shubhagupta has offered the following explanation:—"In the case of an entity, as differentiated from the 'non-existent' and the 'non-entity', several Universals are assumed, but not in reality; similarly in the case in question, as Atoms exist in several things, they are assumed to be *many*, but not in reality. Because there is no distinct Category in the shape of Space (or Direction) as posited by *Kaṇāda* and others; because if this Space were one only, then the diverse notions of 'East', 'West' and the rest, would not be possible. It is only the Atoms that lie there one after the other which come to be spoken of as 'Space' or 'Direction'; hence when it is said 'because there is diversity of facings in Space', all that is meant is that one Atom is surrounded of several Atoms,—and not that the Atom has parts".

This is not right. Because, if the Atom has no parts, it is like the Mind; and hence there cannot be any such diversity as its 'upper' or 'lower' parts; and in that case there could be no 'surrounding' of the one by the many; just as there is none in the case of the Mind and Mind-products. Thus the 'surrounding' being, in reality, non-existent,—how could there be any existence (of the Atom) in the middle of surrounding Atoms;—by virtue of which diversity due to facings could be assumed?

If, even in the absence of 'upper' and 'lower' parts, there were 'surroundings' by other Atoms,—then there could be such surrounding of Mind and Mental effects also; and in that case, like the Atoms, these latter also would subsist in Space. If not, then the Atoms also could not subsist in Space. Hence it follows that there could be no *aggregation of Atoms*; this is absolutely certain.

The following might be urged—"In the case of the *Present* 'Mind-moment' there is immediate sequence, *in time*, to the Past and Future 'Mind-moments',—and yet the Present Moment has no parts like the

various divisions of Time—Seconds, Minutes and so forth;—in the same manner, in the case of Atoms, even though there is surrounding of one Atom by many Atoms, there would be no parts in the Atom, due to the facings in Space."

This is not right. As a matter of fact, there is no real immediate sequence between the Present Moment and the Past and Future Moments; because at that moment, these latter are non-existent; and there can be no real sequence to what is non-existent. All that is possible is that, because there can be no relation of Cause and Effect between things existing at the same moment, therefore through that relation the existence of the Past and Future Moments is implied and assumed;—just as there is assumption of *Prior* and *Posterior* Non-existence. In the case of Atoms however, there cannot be any such assumption of sequence *in space*; as in that case, no aggregation would be possible.

Then again, it cannot be right to regard things as *without cause*; for if they were so, they would be always there.

Even the person who admits the 'illusory' character of things, must regard all things as *with cause*. And when they are *with cause*, it is not right that the Cause and Effect should exist at the same moment; nor can the Cause be non-existent before the Effect, as, in that case, it could not have the requisite potency; *after* the appearance of the Effect, there would be no use for the Cause. Hence it must be admitted that all Causes exist *before* the Effect. This idea has been thus expressed—'Previous to the Effect if the Cause is non-existent, it can have no potency; after the Effect, there is no use for it; hence all causes must have existence prior to the Effect; hence no Object can exist along with its cognition'.

Thus, even when all things are without parts, the existence of some sort of sequence *in time* stands to reason; but how could there be any sequence *in space*, if there were no parts? This is the point that is urged.

If, even in the absence of parts, there were sequence *in space*, then there could be such sequence in the case of Mind and Mental effects also; as there would be no difference between the two cases, as already pointed out above.

"There *is* difference due to *corporeality*."

Not so; as in the absence of parts, there cannot be *corporeality* also. So this explanation means nothing more than the assertion of the presence of parts. There is no other point of difference. So there is nothing in this.

Thus then, in the case of all things, it is only sequence *in time* that has some basis in reason; anything more than that,—in the shape of sequence *in space*,—is not possible except when there are parts. Hence it is a perfectly correct statement that—'where there is diversity of facings in Space, the thing cannot be *one*'.—We desist from further labouring of this point.—(1990–1992)

On this subject, some people argue as follows:—"Under the circumstances, Atoms may be regarded as being minuter points of Space itself; and if parts of these would have to be assumed, those parts again would consist in the still minuter points of Space; even though this may involve an infinite

regress. But in no case does it seem to be justifiable to regard Atoms as mere *ideal* (subjective) entities, for fear of having to regard them as with parts.—Even if they are mere subjective entities, it is necessary to postulate a cause for that Idea; and that which is the cause of that Idea would itself be the *Atom.*—If what you are seeking to prove is that Atoms do not exist at all,—even so, the Reason adduced—' Because there is diversity of facings' —is 'inadmissible'. Because mere non-entities—like the 'Horns of the Ass'—do not have the diverse facings towards the East and other directions. —Nor can your argument be treated as a *Reductio ad Absurdum*; because 'the diversity of facings' is not admitted by us ".

The answer to this is given in the following—

TEXTS (1993–1997).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHAT WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING IS THE ATOM WHICH HAS BEEN REGARDED BY OTHER PEOPLE AS DEVOID OF DIVISION INTO PARTS; AND IT IS NOT IMPROBABLE THAT THIS MAY LEAD TO SOMETHING UNDESIRABLE.—WHEN THESE PEOPLE ACCEPT THE FACT OF THE PARTS THEMSELVES BEING 'ATOMS',—THEN THIS CERTAINLY INVOLVES A DEVIATION FROM THEIR OWN DOCTRINE.—THE ARGUMENT THAT HAS BEEN SET FORTH (BY US) IS ONLY IN THE FORM OF A *Reductio ad Absurdum*; THIS IS NOT OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF 'INADMISSIBILITY' REGARDING ITS SUBSTRATUM.—THE UNITY OF THE ATOM ALSO BECOMES DISCARDED BY THE CONJUNCTION, ETC. THAT THE OTHER PARTY ADMITS.—THUS UNDER ALL VIEWS, THE ATOM CANNOT BE REGARDED AS BEING ESSENTIALLY *one*. AND WHEN IT CANNOT BE *one*, IT CANNOT BE *many* EITHER.—THUS, FOR ALL WISE PEOPLE, THE ATOM IS ONLY CAPABLE OF FORMING THE OBJECT OF THE DEFINITE IDEA THAT IT IS NON-EXISTENT,—BECAUSE IT HAS THE NATURE OF NEITHER *one* NOR *many*,—LIKE THE *Sky-lotus*.—(1993–1997)

COMMENTARY.

The man who postulates the 'Atom' must hold that it is a certain entity with a well-defined form. Otherwise, if there were an indefinite Infinite Regress, the form of the 'Atom' could not be determined; and in that case our Opponent would himself have established the fact that it is something 'indescribable', 'indefinite', 'indeterminate'; and thus he would have established what is desired by his Opponent. For these reasons, that same well-defined entity which you would prove to be the 'Atom', without having recourse to an Infinite Regress,—if with regard to that same entity an investigation is carried on, why should there be an Infinite Regress? Specially so when the Infinite Regress would lead to the subversion of your doctrine. But that would not bring about a situation undesirable for your Opponent. —And as this would be enough to prove what is desired by your Opponent,

the argument that we have put forward is only by way of a *Reductio ad Absurdum*.

Our Reason cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible'. Because the other party has accepted the view that Atoms are in conjunction with one another,—that there is no intervening space between them,—and that each Atom is surrounded by Atoms distinct from one another; if it were not so, how could there be any Cognition of it? Thus though it has not been admitted in so many words that there is 'diversity of facings' in Atoms,—yet it follows from the acceptance of their being *in conjunction* and so forth. Unless there is diversity of 'upper' and 'lower' parts, there cannot be any *Conjunction, etc.*,—as there is none in the case of the Mind and Mental Effects;—this has been explained before.

It has been argued that—"It is necessary to admit a Cause for the Idea of the Atom, and that which is the Cause of that Idea is the *Atom*".—The answer to that is that there is already a cause for the illusory idea of 'Atom',—in the shape of the notion of the dust-particles coming in through the hole,—this notion resulting from the fruition of the Impressions left by the contemplation of wrong teachings. It cannot be right to regard the Atom itself as the cause of its own Idea; as in that case, the Atom would not have a purely subjective existence. If it were not so, then the cause of the Idea of the Soul would consist of the *Soul* itself,—and not of the 'Thought-phases' (*Skandhas*) In this way, as of the Atom, so of the Soul also, there could be no denial.

Thus it is established that Atoms cannot be *one*; and as there can no longer be any doubt on this point, our Reason cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible' for proving the fact of Atoms being *non-existent*.—(1993-1997)

Having thus proved that the 'External Object' is devoid of the nature of 'many', the *Text* proceeds to show that it cannot have the nature of 'one':—

TEXT (1998).

BECAUSE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-CONJUNCTION OF THE ATOM, THE COMPOSITE CANNOT EXIST,—THEREFORE OTHER PEOPLE REGARD THE COMPOSITE AS COMPOSED OF ATOMS.—(1998)

COMMENTARY.

Those people who admit of the Gross Object, even though not composed of Atoms,—for them, like the Atom, the Gross Object also could not be regarded as *one*, because of 'the diversity of its facings'; because if it were *one* entity, then the shaking of the hand or the limbs would lead to the shaking of the whole body.—As this is quite clear, and was threshed out on several occasions, the Author has not pointed out here any objections to this view.

Thus the Reason—'*that which is devoid of the nature of one and many*, etc. etc.'—which has been put forward by us, for proving that there can be no activity in regard to 'external objects',—is one that cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible'. And when that is 'admissible', the Earth and other

external things apprehended should be treated as *non-existent*. And when the Earth, etc. cannot be 'apprehended', the fact of the Cognition being the '*apprehender*', assumed on the basis of the apprehension of those things, also, becomes proved to be inadmissible. Thus it becomes established that all this is mere 'Idea' (has a purely subjective existence).—(1998)

Having thus proved that Idea alone exists, on the ground of there being no 'object', the Author now proceeds to prove the same, on the ground of the absence of the characters of the 'apprehended' and the 'apprehender':—

TEXT (1999)

EITHER 'NOT ENVISAGING A FORM', OR 'ENVISAGING A FORM', OR 'ENVISAGING SOMETHING ELSE',—THE COGNITION CANNOT APPREHEND ANY 'EXTERNAL THING'.—(1999)

COMMENTARY.

Neither as 'formless', nor as 'with form', nor 'with the form of something other than the object',—can there be any apprehension of the external Object; and there is no other way possible. Hence Cognition is always self-cognisant, even when there is another 'Chain' which is external to it. Hence it becomes established that Idea or Cognition alone exists.

Some people have regarded the Cognition of one form as apprehending (envisaging) a Cognition in another form; for example, the Cognition in the 'yellow' form apprehends also the 'white' conch-shell. This has been thus asserted by *Kumārila* [*Shlokavārtika—Nirālambanavāda,* 108]—"In every case, there is an external back-ground, appearing under diverse conditions of Place and Time,—be it during this same life or in another life, or at some other time."

It is in view of this view that the Text has introduced the third alternative. —(1999)

Question:—"Why should not the alternatives just set forth—'not envisaging a form, etc.'—apply to the view that the Cognition (or Idea) is self-cognised?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2000).

WHEN THE COGNITION IS PRODUCED, IT IS PRODUCED AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM ALL 'UNCONSCIOUS' FORMS; AND IT IS THIS FACT OF ITS BEING 'NOT-UNCONSCIOUS' THAT CONSTITUTES ITS 'SELF-COGNISABILITY'.—(2000)

COMMENTARY.

When Cognition is said to be 'self-cognisant', it is not meant that it is the *apprehender* or *cogniser* of itself; what is meant is that it shines,—becomes

manifested,—by itself,—by its very nature,—just like the Light diffused in the atmosphere.—(2000)

Question :—" Why is the Cognition not regarded as the *Apprehender* (of itself) ? "

Answer :—

TEXTS (2001-2002).

THERE CAN BE NO 'SELF-COGNITION' OF THE COGNITION, IN THE SENSE THAT IT IS THE *action* AND ALSO THE *active agent*; BECAUSE ONE AND THE SAME ENTITY, WHICH IS IMPARTITE IN FORM, CANNOT HAVE THREE CHARACTERS. HENCE THE ONLY RIGHT VIEW IS THAT THE 'SELF-COGNITION' OF THE COGNITION IS DUE TO ITS BEING OF THE VERY NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOW CAN THERE BE ANY COGNITION OF ANY OTHER THING IN THE SHAPE OF THE 'OBJECT'?—(2001-2002)

COMMENTARY.

'*Three characters*'—of the *Cognised*, the *Cogniser* and the *Cognition*.—(2001-2002)

The following might be urged :—" Just as there is self-cognition of the Cognition itself, so would there be cognition of the External Thing also, without there being an *apprehender* and an *apprehended* ".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (2003).

THE FORM OF ANY OTHER THING IS NOT SUCH THAT UPON ITS COGNITION, SOMETHING ELSE WOULD BECOME COGNISED; BECAUSE, IN REALITY, THINGS ARE DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER.—(2003)

COMMENTARY.

Though it has been assumed that there is the single form of 'Entity'—as differentiated from 'non-entity'—which is common to all things,—yet in reality, they are all different among themselves; hence there is no 'one-ness' among them. This is what is meant by the phrase—'*in reality*'.—(2003)

The following might be urged :—" Even though the External Thing be different from the Cognition, yet it could be 'cognised', 'apprehended'—just as the Cognition itself is ".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (2004).

IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE COGNITION TO BE COGNISED, BECAUSE IT IS PRODUCED IN THE FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS. THE OBJECT, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN PRODUCED, IS NOT IN THE FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS; HOW THEN COULD IT BE COGNISED?'—(2004)

COMMENTARY.

Having thus proved the 'self-cognition' of Cognitions, the Author proceeds to show that there can be no apprehension of the Object by Cognition which is formless (and envisages no form):—

TEXTS (2005-2006).

UNDER THE VIEW THAT 'COGNITION ENVISAGES A FORM', THOUGH, IN REALITY, THERE IS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO (THE COGNITION AND THE FORM ENVISAGED BY IT), YET, ON ACCOUNT OF THE REFLECTION HAVING THE SAME FORM AS WHAT IS REFLECTED, THERE MIGHT BE 'COGNITION' (OF ONE BY THE OTHER) IN THE INDIRECT SENSE.—BUT FOR ONE WHO DOES NOT REGARD THE COGNITION AS BEARING THE IMPRINT OF THE OBJECT, —THERE CAN BE NO 'COGNITION' OF THE EXTERNAL OBJECT, EVEN IN THE SAID 'INDIRECT' SENSE.—(2005-2006)

COMMENTARY.

'*Reflection*'—i.e. of the form of the Cognition.

'*Tādrūpyāt*'—on account of its having the same form.

'*Indirect*'—not primary; secondary.

'*Even this*'—cognition in the secondary sense, assumed on the ground of similarity.—(2005-2006)

The following might be urged:—"The sword strikes the Elephant, the Fire burns the inflammable thing; and yet the Sword and the Fire are not of the form of the Elephant and the inflammable thing;—in the same way the Cognition, though not assuming the form of the Object, would apprehend that object".

This is the view set forth in the following—

TEXT (2007).

THE FOLLOWING IDEA MAY BE ENTERTAINED—"THE SWORD AND THE FIRE, THOUGH NOT OF THE FORM OF THE ELEPHANT AND THE INFLAMMABLE OBJECT, DO THE CUTTING AND THE BURNING OF THOSE OBJECTS; IN THE SAME WAY WOULD THIS (COGNITION) ALSO DO (THE APPREHENDING OF THE OBJECT, WITHOUT ASSUMING ITS FORM)."—(2007)

COMMENTARY.

The genitive ending in '*dantidāhyādeḥ*' is in connection with '*chhedadāhādi*'.

'This'—i.e. the Cognition.

The term '*ādi*' includes such other cases as the *Lamp* illuminating the *Blue* and other things.—(2007)

The following *Text* provides the answer to the above:—

TEXT (2008).

THERE IS NO ANALOGY (BETWEEN THE TWO CASES); BECAUSE THE THINGS CITED ARE PRODUCTIVE OF THE OTHER OBJECT IN THAT FORM, AND HENCE ARE KNOWN AS SUCH; WHILE COGNITION IS NOT PRODUCTIVE IN THE SAME WAY.—(2008)

COMMENTARY.

The Sword is 'productive' of the Elephant, and is, on that account, known as the 'Cutter'; what happens is that when the Elephant is struck by the Sword, there is produced an Elephant with sundered limbs; similarly when the Fuel is touched by Fire, it becomes produced as the Live-coal; in the same manner, the Jar and other external things also become capable of producing cognitions, through Light. But even so, the Cognition does not confer any benefit upon the Object; on the contrary it is the Object that produces the Cognition in a clear form. When, thus, the Cognition does not confer any benefit upon the Object,—how could it be its 'Cogniser'?—The mere fact of the Cognition being the product of the Object cannot justify the idea that it is 'Cognisant' of that Object; as otherwise, the Cognition might be regarded as 'Cognisant' of the Eye and other means of Cognition also.—(2008)

Bhadanta-Shubhagupta has argued as follows:—

"Even though not assuming the form of the Object, the Cognition does apprehend it, because it is of the nature of the apprehension of that Object; hence no question should be raised as to how it apprehends it and like what it apprehends it. This has been thus asserted—'If the Cognition does apprehend the Object, then it is of the nature of the apprehension of

that Object, and no question should be raised as to how, and like what, it apprehends it ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2009-2010).

THE FACT OF THE COGNITION BEING OF THE NATURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF THE OBJECT WOULD BE POSSIBLE, IF THE APPREHENSION OF THE COGNISED OBJECT WERE OF THE FORM OF COGNITION. OTHERWISE IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY STATED THAT COGNITION IS OF THE NATURE OF APPREHENSION ; IT HAS NOT BEEN POINTED OUT THAT 'THE APPREHENSION *of the object* IS IN THIS FORM'.—(2009-2010)

COMMENTARY.

All this would be true if it were proved that Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of something other than itself ; as a matter of fact, this has not yet been proved.—Because the Cognition does not apprehend the Object by its mere existence ; if it did so, it would apprehend all things.—Nor does it apprehend the Object, as its product ; for, if it did, there would be apprehension of the Eye and other organs also.—Nor is Cognition held to be *with form*, by virtue of which, being similar to the Object, it could not be distinguished from it and thus regarded as 'cognisant' of it.—Thus then, if the apprehension of the cognised object were of the nature of Cognition, then the Cognition could be said to be of the nature of the apprehension *of the object*. Otherwise, how can it be unequivocally stated that " Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension *of the object* " ?

In fact, Cognition being something different from the apprehension *of the object*, it must be of the nature of *Cognition* itself ; and hence it becomes established that Idea or Cognition alone is what exists.

The following might be urged :—" There must be some peculiarity in the Cognition, whereby it apprehends the Object only ; and what this peculiarity is cannot be exactly indicated ".

The answer to this is given in the words—'*It has not been pointed out, etc. etc.*'—'*Bhavati*' has to be supplied. Though every specific entity cannot be indicated, yet by some feat of imagination it is always spoken of somehow. If it were not so, then no peculiarity could be asserted in regard to Colour and other things also. The mere vague assertion, that 'Cognition is the *apprehension of the object*' does not state anything clearly and unequivocally and with certainty.

From this it follows that if the existence of objects were established in this vague indefinite form, the objects would indeed become really well-established !—(2009-2010)

It might be asked :—" If there were no Object to be *apprehended*, whose apprehension would be there ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (2011).

THERE CAN BE NO SUCH COMPLAINT AS—" WHOSE APPREHENSION WOULD IT BE ? "—IN FACT, APPREHENSION IS THE VERY NATURE OF THE COGNITION ; JUST AS ' SATISFACTION ' IS OF *Pleasure*.—(2011)

COMMENTARY.

It is the nature or essence of the Cognition itself that is called 'apprehension',—by reason of its being of the nature of Light ;—just as—' Satisfaction ' is of Pleasure ; when one speaks of ' the *satisfaction* of Pleasure ', the mere fact of the two being mentioned separately does not make the *Satisfaction* something different from *Pleasure*.—Similarly, though there are such expressions as ' apprehension of Blue ', ' apprehension of Yellow ', and so forth,—where the two appear to be different,—yet, it is the very nature of the Cognition that it appears in the form of *Blue*, etc., and hence it is spoken of in the said manner ; and the reason for this lies in the fact that Cognition is by its nature *self-cognisant*.—(2011)

Question :—" What is this ' Self-cognition ' that is spoken of ? "
Answer :—

TEXT (2012).

IT MEANS THAT FOR THE COGNITION OF ITS OWN FORM, THE COGNITION DOES NOT NEED ANY OTHER THING ; AND YET IT IS NOT UNCOGNISED ;—THIS IS WHAT IS MEANT BY ' SELF-COGNITION '.—(2012)

COMMENTARY.

The following *Text* raises an objection to the statement just made—from the view-point of *Kumārila* :—

TEXT (2013).

" WHILE FUNCTIONING TOWARDS THE APPREHENDING OF THE OBJECT, THE COGNITION DOES NOT TOUCH ITSELF ; HENCE, EVEN THOUGH IT IS ILLUMINATIVE, IT NEEDS SOMETHING ELSE FOR ITS OWN APPREHENSION."—[*Shlokavārtika—Shūnyavāda*, 184].—(2013)

COMMENTARY.

This is how *Kumārila* argues—" Though Cognition is of the nature of Light, yet for its own manifestation, it needs something else ; and it does not

touch—apprehend—itself; as it is wholly taken up in the manifesting (apprehending) of the object; and when it is engaged in one thing, it cannot operate over another thing, without abandoning the former."—(2013)

Anticipating an objection on the basis of the *Lamp* (which is self-illumined), *Kumārila* states as follows:—

TEXT (2014).

"OR, THE ILLUMINATIVE CHARACTER OF THE COGNITION MAY BE REGARDED AS CONSISTING IN ITS BEING THE APPREHENSION OF THE OBJECT. AND AS THERE IS NO APPREHENSION OF ITSELF, COGNITION CANNOT BE REGARDED AS ILLUMINATING ITSELF."—[*Shlokavārtika—Shūnyavāda*, 185].—(2014)

COMMENTARY.

The question arising—'If the Cognition is not illuminative of itself, how can it be regarded as illuminative of the external object?'—*Kumārila* offers the following answer:—

TEXT (2015).

"AS IN THE CASE OF THE EYE, IT IS FOUND THAT, EVEN THOUGH IT IS ILLUMINATIVE, YET IT HAS ITS ILLUMINATIVENESS RESTRICTED TO COLOUR,—SO IT WOULD BE IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO."—[*Shlokavārtika—Shūnyavāda*, 186].—(2015)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the Eye and other organs, it is found that their illuminativeness is restricted to certain definite things, like Colour and the rest,—even though the Eye, etc. are not illuminative of themselves; the same would be the case with Cognition also.—(2015)

The following might be urged (against *Kumārila*):—'How is it that, abandoning its own self, which is more intimate to itself, the Cognition illumines only the external Object?'

The answer to this by *Kumārila* is as follows:—

TEXT (2016).

"THE ILLUMINATIVENESS OF THE COGNITION OPERATES UPON THE EXTERNAL OBJECT, AND NOT UPON ITSELF, FOR WANT OF THE NECESSARY POTENCY (CAPACITY). [*Shlokavārtika—Shūnyavadā*, 187].—AND THE POTENCY OF THINGS CANNOT BE COMPLAINED OF."—(2016)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—'Why should the Cognition not have the potency to illuminate itself?'

Answer:—*The potency of things cannot be complained of*'; as has been thus declared—'It is fire alone that burns, not *Ākāsha*,—who is to be complained against for this?'—(2016)

The answer to the above arguments of *Kumārila* is as follows:—

TEXT (2017).

IT IS THE 'APPREHENDING OF THE OBJECT' THAT IS CALLED 'COGNITION'. WHEN THEN, IT FORMS ITS OWN ESSENCE, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY OTHER FUNCTION OVER IT?—(2017)

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted (under *Text* 2013) that—"while functioning over the apprehending of the Object, the Cognition does not touch itself".—This is irrelevant. Because the 'apprehending of the object' is not something different from the *Cognition*. For instance, it is Cognition itself which is spoken of by such synonyms as '*vitti*' (apprehension), '*upalabdhi*' (comprehension), '*arthapratīti*' (objective consciousness), and '*vijñapti*' (ideation). When, then, this 'apprehending of the object' forms the very soul of the Cognition, what other 'functioning',—in the shape of the 'apprehending of the object'—could the Cognition have, apart from itself,—by virtue of which it could be said that 'the Cognition is functioning over the apprehending of the Object'? Certainly it is not right that anything should operate upon itself.—(2017)

The following question might be raised—"How is it known that the 'apprehending of the object' is of the nature of *Cognition*,—on account of which 'Cognition' and 'apprehending of the object' are regarded as synonymous?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2018-2019).

'APPREHENSION' FORMS THE VERY NATURE OF THE OBJECT. IF THAT APPREHENSION WERE OF THE NATURE OF 'COGNITION', THEN IT MIGHT BE CORRECT TO REGARD THE 'COGNITION' AS BEING OF THE NATURE OF THE 'APPREHENSION OF THE OBJECT'.—BUT IT CANNOT BE SO (UNDER YOUR VIEW), AS THAT WOULD INVOLVE THE ABANDONING OF YOUR DOCTRINE: EVEN SO, THOUGH THE COGNITION WOULD COME TO BE OF THE NATURE OF 'APPREHENSION', THERE WOULD BE NO APPREHENDING *of objects.*—

(2018-2019)

COMMENTARY.

'Apprehension' must be regarded as of the *nature*—form—of the Object; otherwise, how could the Cognition operate over it? There can be no operation of anything upon what does not exist—e.g. the 'Hares' Horn'. Consequently if the said 'nature' of the Object in the form of *Apprehension* were not-different from *Cognition*, then alone could it be correct to regard the *Cognition* as being of the nature of the *Apprehension of Objects*,—as has been declared (by the Opponent) in the sentence—"the *illuminativeness* of the Cognition consists in its being of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects" (*Text* 2014).

On being pressed hard, the Opponent might admit the non-difference of *Cognition* from the *Apprehension of Objects*; hence it is added—'*But it cannot be so under your view*';—'it' stands for the idea of the *Apprehension* being non-different from *Cognition*.

'*Your opinion*',—viz.: that "Cognition is devoid of the apprehension of itself";—this would be abandoned if the said non-difference were admitted. That is, if it be admitted that the *Cognition is not different* from the *Apprehension of Objects*, it would mean that *Cognition* is *self-cognised.*

The following might be urged:—"When we speak of Cognition as 'illuminative', we do not mean that it is so *because it is of the nature of the Apprehension of Objects*; but only that *it is of the nature of Apprehension*, pure and simple".

The answer to this is—'*Even when, etc. etc.*'—'*Tasya*' stands for the *Cognition.*—Even though Cognition has now come to be of the nature of mere *Apprehension*, not of the nature of the Apprehension *of Objects*,—even so there could be no distinct *Apprehension of Objects*,—such as 'this is the apprehension *of Blue*, not of *Yellow*'.—(2018-2019)

Question:—"Why should not there be such apprehension?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2020).

FOR THE OTHER PARTY, 'PROXIMITY' COULD NOT BE THE BASIS FOR SUCH APPREHENSION,—AS THERE IS UNDER THE VIEW THAT COGNITION HAS A FORM, IN THE SHAPE OF THE 'REFLECTED IMAGE'.—(2020)

COMMENTARY.

'*For the other party*',—one who holds the view that Cognition is formless; whose opinion is that "it is the external Object that has form, the Cognition is formless".—(2020)

It has been asserted (under *Text* 2014) that—"the *illuminativeness* of Cognition consists in its being of the nature of Apprehension".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2021).

IF, BY ITS NATURE, COGNITION IS *unconscious* AND AS SUCH, CAN HAVE NO APPREHENSION OF ITSELF,—THEN, THERE WOULD BE NO CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE COGNITION; WHICH WOULD MEAN THAT THE SAME IS THE CASE WITH THE APPREHENSION OF THE OTHER ALSO. —(2021)

COMMENTARY.

If Cognition, being unconscious, does not apprehend itself,—then the Cognition itself being imperceptible, the apprehension of the Object also would have to be regarded as *imperceptible*.—(2021)

The following might be urged—"If the Cognition is not perceptible, why should the apprehension of the Object also cease to be perceptible? Certainly the imperceptibility of Colour does not make Sound also imperceptible".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2022)

THE *Apprehension of the Object* IS CALLED 'COGNITION' ITSELF; IF THEN, THERE IS NO PERCEPTION OF THE COGNITION, HOW CAN THERE BE PERCEPTION OF THE OTHER?—(2022)

COMMENTARY.

We cannot find any other form (or character) of the Cognition, apart from Apprehension. And so long as we cannot find any such, if we were to carry on any business, we would be deceiving ourselves and also others.

If the *Cognition* is uncognised, what other cognition could there be of the *apprehension of the object*? None whatsoever.—(2022)

It might be held that there would be apprehension of it by another Cognition.

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2023-2024).

IF THE APPREHENSION OF THE OBJECT WERE APPREHENDED BY ANOTHER COGNITION,—THEN IT WOULD MEAN THAT AT THE TIME THAT THE OBJECT IS APPREHENDED, IT IS NOT COGNISED; BECAUSE ITS COGNITION HAS NOT YET COME ABOUT: AND IF THAT IS SO, THEN WHEN AGAIN WOULD IT BECOME COGNISED?—IF IT BE HELD THAT—"IT WOULD BECOME COGNISED WHEN ITS COGNITION BECOMES COGNISED",—THEN IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE OBJECT WHICH IS NOT COGNISED AT THE TIME OF ITS OWN APPREHENSION, BECOMES COGNISED ON THE APPREHENSION OF SOMETHING ELSE.—THIS INDEED WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY WISE ASSERTION!—(2023-2024)

COMMENTARY.

'*Siddhyasamsiddhēḥ*'—on account of its cognition not having come about.—It cannot be right that the thing whose appearance has not become cognised should be regarded as *apparent*. That is to say, even at the time that the Object is apprehended, there is no cognition of it; because the apprehension consisting of the manifestation of the Object has not yet been cognised; under the circumstances, it behoves you to explain at what time it would become cognised.

If it be held that—'*it would become cognised, etc. etc.*';—i.e. it would become cognised at the time of the appearance of the Cognition of its cognition,—this indeed would be a very clever assertion! How can a thing which is not cognised at the time of its own apprehension become cognised at the time of the cognition of something else?—(2023-2024)

It might be granted that it does become cognised,—only if there were no infinite regress; as it is however, the idea involves an unavoidable infinite regress.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (2025).

IF THE SAID COGNITION OF THE APPREHENSION IS NOT COGNISED, THEN THE PRECEDING ONE REMAINS UNCOGNISED. IF OF THAT ALSO, YET ANOTHER COGNITION WERE POSTULATED, THEN THERE WOULD BE AN INFINITE REGRESS.—(2025)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tasya*'—stands for the second cognition of the apprehension of the Object.

'*Preceding one*'—i.e. the apprehension of the Object.

'*Remains uncognised*'—i.e. remains as something of which there has been no cognition.—(2025)

Then again, if it is held that the Apprehension is apprehended by another Cognition,—then in connection with this latter cognition also, there would certainly appear the Remembrance in the form 'I have had the Cognition of the Cognition'; so that for this Cognition also there will have to be postulated another apprehension;—as without previous apprehension there can be no Remembrance; under the circumstances, it has to be explained what that is which, having nothing else to do, goes on producing this string of Cognitions and Apprehensions.—It cannot be the *Object* that brings about this string. Because it forms the object of the initial Cognition itself.—Nor can it be the Sense-organ and Light; as these could be effective only in the case of Visual Perception.—Nor can the said string of Cognitions be regarded as *without cause*. As, in that case, there would be the possibility of its being there at all times.

It might be said that "it is the first Cognition itself which goes on producing Cognitions, one after the other".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2026–2028).

[IF IT WERE AS SUGGESTED], THEN THERE WOULD BE NO ROOM FOR THE COGNITION OF ANY OTHER OBJECT. AND YET SUCH COGNITION IS ACTUALLY FOUND TO APPEAR. AND IF THERE IS COGNITION OF ANOTHER OBJECT, THE LAST OF THE SERIES OF COGNITIONS COULD NOT BE COGNISED BY ANY OTHER COGNITION; SO THAT THAT WOULD REMAIN UNCOGNISED; AND IF THAT IS NOT COGNISED, ALL THE REST OF THE SERIES MUST REMAIN UNCOGNISED; SO THAT THE ENTIRE WORLD BECOMES BLIND (UNCONSCIOUS).—IF THEN, THE FIRST COGNITION BE REGARDED AS SELF-COGNISED, THEN THE SAME MAY SURELY BE SAID OF THE OTHERS ALSO;—BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL *Cognition*; OTHERWISE, THEY WOULD NOT BE *Cognition* AT ALL,—LIKE THE JAR AND SUCH THINGS.—(2026–2028)

COMMENTARY.

In the way suggested, there is no possibility of the entering of any other Object (into the fold of Consciousness). Because, each succeeding Cognition would be the Object of the preceding Cognition, and would be there in close proximity to its cause; and so long as it had such an intimately connected objective, why should the Cognition take up any other less intimate Objective? In fact, even though such an external Object were present, it could not—simply because it is external,—prevent the Cognition from envisaging the preceding Cognition. If, even though external, the Object could prevent the Cognition

of the Cognition, then no one could never apprehend any Cognition at all. Because there is no point of time when an external Object is not present. —Remembrance also would become rooted out; because there would be no Apprehension that could bring about Remembrance.—Further, for the appearance of the conceptions of 'Past' and the rest, which appear when the Object concerned is not there,—there would be no cause; so that the series of conceptions would continue there as long as the world lasts; and no one would have any anxiety for anything at all.

Granting the presence of other objects,—even though it is not possible, —even so, it behoves you to explain by what the other (second) Cognition is cognised.

It might be said that—"that same succeeding Cognition, while apprehending another Object, would apprehend both, this Object as well as the preceding Cognition".

But this cannot be right. Because, when after the Cognition of Sound, there follows the Cognition of Colour,—the Cognition of Sound would figure in the later Cognition of Colour, and hence there should be Cognition of Sound also which would be figuring in its own Cognition.—Even for one who regards Cognition as formless, unless there is apprehension of Sound, there can be no apprehension of what apprehends the Sound; e.g. unless there is apprehension of the *stick*, there can be no apprehension of the Holder of the Stick. Thus Sound also would figure in the Visual Cognition of Colour. Similarly on the said principle, in the Cognition of Cogitation also in regard to such objects as the letter 'A' and the like,—there would always be two verbal expressions one after the other. For instance, when after the Cogitation over the letter 'Ī', one Cogitates over the letter 'A',—then, the Cogitation of the letter 'A' should apprehend the apprehender of the letter 'Ī' also; consequently the verbal expression relating to the letter 'Ī' as figuring in its own Cognition, should appear in the Cognition of the letter 'A'.

Further, under this view, everything would appear in Consciousness twice over; because it must so appear at the time of its own Cognition also. But as a matter of fact, there is no such double appearance of Objects.

For these reasons, it is not right to say that the succeeding Cognition apprehends both (the preceding Cognition and also the Object).

It might be urged—"The one final Cognition might remain unapprehended and unremembered; where would be the harm?"

The answer to this is—'*If there is Cognition of another Object, etc. etc.*' —Self-Cognition being not accepted by the other party, the last Cognition cannot be regarded as 'self-cognised'; nor can it be cognised by anything else; as in that case there would be an infinite regress. Thus the final Cognition being uncognised, the Cognition preceding it must remain uncognised, as it would apprehend something that is not perceptible; and so on and on backwards, the Object also will remain uncognised; so that no Object would ever be cognised at all; which means that the entire world becomes blind.

If, in order to avoid the said difficulty, it be admitted that the final Cognition of the series is cognised by itself,—then the entire lot of Cognitions might be self-cognised; as all are equally 'Cognition'.

This argument may be formulated as follows :—Every Cognition, for own Cognition, does not depend upon the operation of anything else,—use it is *Cognition*,—like the final Cognition of the series,—the Cognition er dispute is a *Cognition* ; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature hings.

If it were not so, then what is itself not cognised would be unconscious, the Jar and other things ; and hence it would lose the character of gnition '. This is an argument annulling a conclusion to the contrary.—6–2028)

It has been argued above—under *Text* 2015, that—" Even though it be inative, the illuminativeness would be restricted ".—The answer to this follows :—

TEXT (2029).

EYE IS REGARDED AS 'ILLUMINATIVE' OF COLOUR, BECAUSE IT BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION OF COLOUR,—NOT BECAUSE IT IS ITS APPREHENSION ; WHAT SIMILARITY THEN CAN THE EYE HAVE TO COGNITION ?—(2029)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the Eye is spoken of as 'illuminative' of Colour, use it brings about the Cognition of Colour :—As regards Cognition, it not do anything to the Colour; as what it does bring about is entirely *urless* (formless) ; and what does not do anything to a certain Object ot be regarded as 'illuminative' of it ; otherwise there would be incon-ies.

'*Tat*'—Therefore.

'*Upamā*'—Similarity.—(2029)

The following *texts* proceed to address certain arguments to the philo-er who holds Cognition to be *formless*,—for the purpose of proving that e is non-difference between the *Blue* and other forms and the Cognition ese forms :—

TEXTS (2030-2031).

EN THERE IS COGNITION OF A CERTAIN THING, AND ALSO THAT THING WHICH THAT ALONE IS THE COGNITION,—THIS THING IS *not-different* FROM THAT COGNITION ; OR THIS DOES NOT DIFFER FROM THAT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE *Cognition of the Blue*, OR THE SECOND MOON ;—AND THIS IS THE COGNITION OF *Blue*, BECAUSE IT APPREHENDS THE BLUE FORM.—(2030-2031)

COMMENTARY.

When there is Cognition of a certain thing,—and also the thing of which alone—none other—is the Cognition,—then the latter is absolutely *different* from the former.

Or, the 'non-difference' may be stated conversely—the former is : different from the latter.

What is meant is as follows :—When a certain Object has no Cogn: other than a certain Cognition, that Object is non-different from Cognition ;—e.g. the Cognition of the Blue from itself,—or the Second M which figures in the Cognition of the man with defective eye-sight.— Cognition in question is the Cognition of the *Cognition of the Blue* ; reiterates the presence of the Probans; the 'Subject' or 'Minor Term' con of the *Blue Form* and its Cognition ; and the 'non-difference' of these is the Probandum. The said 'constancy of their being found toget is the Probans. This is the meaning of the Probans that appears in the of the Great Teacher which says—'There must be non-difference betweer Blue and its Cognition, *because they are always found together*'.

Bhadanta-Shubhagupta however has argued as follows :—" This Prol is 'contradictory'; because in common parlance, the term 'together never used except with *another* thing; hence the Reason that ' are cognised *together*' is *contradictory* ".

This is not right; that Probans is 'contradictory' which resides where the Probandum is known to be absent; the Probans in question not reside *only* where the Probandam is known to be absent; as it resides where the Probandum is known to be present. For instance, among pe there is the idea that the 'two moons' (seen by the man with defe vision) are perceived *together* ; and yet there is no real difference between th and people are found to use the term 'together' in such assertions as ' moons are seen together'. Similarly in the case in question, the term gether' has been used on the basis of a difference assumed on the basis o idea that the form (Blue) appearing as 'external' is the 'second', the 'oth —though it is really non-different from the Cognition. In fact, all ve usage is not in exact accordance with the real state of things ; whereby mere use of the term 'together' would make the Inferential Indica which is really concomitant with a certain thing, something different.

The same *Bhadanta-Shubhagupta* says again :—" If the term 'toget means *one*, then the Reason is 'inadmissible'; because the Blue and o things are *not* apprehended *as one*, in such shows as those of dancers, wrest etc.—Nor are the *Blue* and the *Cognition of Blue* both apprehended *by* (person) ; because even when the *Blue* is apprehended, the Cognitions of same Blue, *appearing in other 'series' or 'chains'*, are not apprehen When again, the existence of all living beings and all 'Cognition-mome are apprehended by the Omniscient Being,—how can it be admitted there is apprehension *by one* only ?—Then again, it is only when the ap hension of 'others' is negatived, that there can be certainty regarding apprehension *of one* ;—but the negation of the apprehension of others is possible; because of what is diverse in nature, both affirmation and de cannot be possible.—If the term 'together' is meant to convey the ide *being present at the same time*, then the Reason becomes 'Inconclusive view of the Cognition cognised by the *Buddha*, and also of the Mind Mind-effects. For instance, the Cognition in other 'chains' which

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If it were not so, then what is itself not cognised would be unconscious, like the Jar and other things ; and hence it would lose the character of 'Cognition'. This is an argument annulling a conclusion to the contrary.—(2026–2028)

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COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the Eye is spoken of as 'illuminative' of Colour, because it brings about the Cognition of Colour :—As regards Cognition, it does not do anything to the Colour; as what it does bring about is entirely *Colourless* (formless) ; and what does not do anything to a certain Object cannot be regarded as 'illuminative' of it ; otherwise there would be incongruities.

'*Tat*'—Therefore.

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The following *texts* proceed to address certain arguments to the philosopher who holds Cognition to be *formless*,—for the purpose of proving that there is non-difference between the *Blue* and other forms and the Cognition of these forms :—

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When there is Cognition of a certain thing,—and also the thing of which that alone—none other—is the Cognition,—then the latter is absolutely *not-different* from the former.

Or, the 'non-difference' may be stated conversely—the former is non-different from the latter.

What is meant is as follows :—When a certain Object has no Cognition other than a certain Cognition, that Object is non-different from that Cognition ;—e.g. the Cognition of the Blue from itself,—or the Second Moon, which figures in the Cognition of the man with defective eye-sight.—The Cognition in question is the Cognition of the *Cognition of the Blue* ; this reiterates the presence of the Probans; the 'Subject' or 'Minor Term' consists of the *Blue Form* and its Cognition ; and the 'non-difference' of these two is the Probandum. The said 'constancy of their being found together' is the Probans. This is the meaning of the Probans that appears in the text of the Great Teacher which says—'There must be non-difference between the Blue and its Cognition, *because they are always found together*'.

Bhadanta-Shubhagupta however has argued as follows :—"This Probans is 'contradictory'; because in common parlance, the term 'together' is never used except with *another* thing; hence the Reason that 'they are cognised *together*' is *contradictory*".

This is not right; that Probans is 'contradictory' which resides *only* where the Probandum is known to be absent; the Probans in question does not reside *only* where the Probandam is known to be absent; as it resides also where the Probandum is known to be present. For instance, among people, there is the idea that the 'two moons' (seen by the man with defective vision) are perceived *together* ; and yet there is nc real difference between them ; and people are found to use the term 'together' in such assertions as 'two moons are seen together'. Similarly in the case in question, the term 'together' has been used on the basis of a difference assumed on the basis of the idea that the form (Blue) appearing as 'external' is the 'second', the 'other', —though it is really non-different from the Cognition. In fact, all verbal usage is not in exact accordance with the real state of things ; whereby the mere use of the term 'together' would make the Inferential Indicative, which is really concomitant with a certain thing, something different.

The same *Bhadanta-Shubhagupta* says again :—"If the term 'together' means *one*, then the Reason is 'inadmissible'; because the Blue and other things are *not* apprehended *as one*, in such shows as those of dancers, wrestlers, etc.—Nor are the *Blue* and the *Cognition of Blue* both apprehended *by one* (person); because even when the *Blue* is apprehended, the Cognitions of the same Blue, *appearing in other 'series' or 'chains'*, are not apprehended. When again, the existence of all living beings and all 'Cognition-moments' are apprehended by the Omniscient Being,—how can it be admitted that there is apprehension *by one* only ?—Then again, it is only when the apprehension of 'others' is negatived, that there can be certainty regarding the apprehension *of one* ;—but the negation of the apprehension of others is not possible; because of what is diverse in nature, both affirmation and denial cannot be possible.—If the term 'together' is meant to convey the idea of *being present at the same time*, then the Reason becomes 'Inconclusive', in view of the Cognition cognised by the *Buddha*, and also of the Mind and Mind-effects. For instance, the Cognition in other 'chains' which are

cognised by the Blessed Lord *Buddha*,—that *Cognition* and Buddha's Cognition of that Cognition are found to appear together,—i.e. at the same time,—and yet they are *different*. Similarly in the case of Mind and Mental Effects, even though they are apprehended 'together', yet they are not one and the same. Thus the Reason is 'Inconclusive'".

All this is not right. What is meant is, not 'apprehension *by one*', nor 'apprehension *of one*';—what is meant is that there is a single—not separate—apprehension of the Cognition and the Cognised; that is, the apprehension of the Cognised is the same as the apprehension of the Cognition, and the apprehension of the Cognition is the same as the apprehension of the Cognised. In the case of such shows as those of the Dancer, the Wrestler and the like, there is no Cognition of the Cognition which does not apprehend the Cognised also;—nor is there any Cognition of the Cognised which does not apprehend the Cognition also. How then can the Reason be regarded as 'inadmissible'?—Nor can the Reason be regarded as 'of doubtful admissibility'; because the self-cognition of the Cognition is the Cognition of the Object also; as has been admitted also by our opponent, the upholder of the Reality of the External World.—This also serves to refute the 'inadmissibility' urged on the basis of the alternatives—whether what is meant is 'the apprehension *of one*', etc. etc.—Then again, it is not a fact that the 'Cognition-moments' figuring in another 'chain' are cognised by the *Buddha*. Because the Blessed Lord, who is free from all obscuring influences, is entirely free from defects as those of the 'apprehender' and the 'apprehended'. This has been thus declared—'For Him, there is no *Apprehended*, nor *Apprehension*, nor *Apprehensibility* by other Cognitions; it is pure Void'.—As regards the declaration of 'being untrammelled' (made in regard to Buddha's Cognition),—that is only in view of His being the Lord of all things; as has been declared in the following words—'He is held to be *omniscient*, because His knowledge serves the purpose of all and is fully equipped with the Faculties resulting from previous meditations,—as is going to be described later on'. Hence the Reason cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible'.

Says the Opponent:—"*Āchārya Dharmakīrti*, in setting forth the *Pūrvapakṣa* (the Opponent's view), says—'At first, there is appearance of the Object as the cause of Cognition and hence this is what is apprehended first, and the apprehension of the Cognition comes later'; and here he has shown that what the term 'together' means is *simultaneity*, not *sameness*; it is only when *simultaneity* is meant, that the assertion of the Opponent showing that the two appear at different points of time can be relevant".

There is no force in this argument. Because *difference in time* is included under *real material difference*; hence the assertion of the difference in time as indicating actual difference is quite relevant; because the 'less wide' term should not be inconcomitant with the 'wider' term.

Nor again can the Reason be regarded as 'Inconclusive', in view of the Cognition cognised by the *Buddhas*; because in that case there is no limitation of the Cognition being *one*; because one by one all the Buddhas cognise the Cognition. For this same reason, in their case also, there is

consideration regarding the wrongness of Cognitions ; because each Cognition is cognised by itself.

Or, there may be Cognition of the Cognition of others by the *Buddha* ; even so, the Reason is not 'Inconclusive' ; because there is always differentiation. Even when there is diversity in the apprehension of two things, there is always differentiation ; in the case of Cognitions however, when appearing in the same 'Chain', there is no diversity in their specific Individualities. Hence what is meant is that there is apprehension of the Cognition *only* when there is apprehension of the Object. The apprehension of the Cognition of the Blessed Lord however is not always the same as the apprehension of the Cognitions occurring in other 'Chains',—there is another Cognition also ; because the separateness (difference) of His own Cognition is also distinctly apprehended. For this same reason, the Reason does not become wrong, in view of Colour and Light ; because Light is perceived also alone by itself ; and Colour also is perceived by certain animals (e.g. Cats), even when there is no Light.—Thus then, the Reason, not being present where the Probandum is known to be absent, cannot be regarded as 'Inconclusive'.—(2030-2031)

The following might be urged :—"Even though the presence of your Probans where the Probandum is known to be absent is not known with certainty,—yet it is suspected all the same ; and even so the Probans becomes 'Inconclusive' ; as its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum is doubtful. Because, inasmuch as the relation of 'Subject' and 'Object' (between the Cognition and the Cognised) is definite, the fact of their 'being apprehended together' (Concomitance) is open to an explanation other than their *non-difference* ; because the Cognition is always of the nature of the *apprehender*, as it has the character of apprehending things ; and the Object is always the *apprehended* ; and the fact of these two being always together is due to their being dependent upon the same set of circumstances.—In the case of the Eye and other sense-organs, it is found that, even though they are equally produced together,—they cannot be the *cognised object* ; simply because they do not have that character. Because, as a matter of fact, what the causal circumstances bring about is the Cognition only in the form of the apprehension of the Blue and other *objects*,—not in that of the apprehension of such objects as the Eye, etc. ; the, *Blue*, etc. also are produced in the form in which they are apprehended by that Cognition ; not so the Eye, etc.—All this has been declared as follows :—'There is no *apprehender* other than Cognition, nor without the visible and other *objects* ; it is on this ground that the fact of the Blue Object and its Cognition *being apprehended together* rests, not upon their non-difference ;—the antecedent circumstances would bring about the Cognition of the *object-moment*, in the same way as Light does that of Colour ; and in this way they would be apprehended together".

The *answer* to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2032).

THE 'NATURE OF COGNITION' NOT BEING THE 'NATURE OF THE OTHER THING' [ACCORDING TO THE OTHER PARTY];—HOW COULD THERE BE APPREHENSION OF THE *Blue form*, WHEN THERE IS APPREHENSION OF THE *Cognition of the Blue*,—IF THERE IS NO NON-DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO ?—(2032)

COMMENTARY.

When one thing differs from another, there can be no certainty of their being apprehended together, except through a constant relationship; as otherwise, there would be incongruities. In the case in question, there is no Relationship in the cognition of the different thing. For instance, if there were such Relationship, it could either consist (*a*) in *being of the same nature* or (*b*) in one *being the product of the other*;—(*a*) in the case in question the Opposite party does not admit the *sameness* of the two factors concerned; and in fact, that is exactly what is going to be proved here;—(*b*) nor could the fact of being apprehended together be due to one being the product of the other; because there can be no relationship of Cause and Effect between things that come into existence at the same time; and also because in that case, there should be apprehension of the Eye and the other organs also (which are the cause of *Cognition*).

Nor can their relation of 'Object and Subject' be based upon mere simultaneity due to the antecedent circumstances. Because, in that case, the relationship of 'Object and Subject' would have to be admitted as subsisting between the Mind and Mental Effects on the one hand and the Eye and other Sense-organs on the other.—It cannot be said in answer to this that—"what the Antecedent circumstances bring about is the relationship of *object and subject* in regulated form, and hence there could be no incongruities";—because, in reality, it is this same 'relation of object and subject' that forms the subject of the present discussion, and as such cannot be admitted as established. In fact, it is only when the *constant relationship* has become established, that the 'relation of subject and object' could be there; and it is this same constant relationship as the basis of the *Relation of subject and object*, that is being considered now.

Apart from *sameness* and *being produced*, there can be no other constant relationship, on which the *Relation of object and subject* could be based. And we have just arrived at the conclusion that (in the case in question) no such *relation of subject and object* can be based upon the said *sameness* and *being produced*. Consequently, apart from these there can be no 'joint apprehension'. Why then should the Reason be regarded as having its *exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum* doubtful ?—(2032)

A second argument is now put forward in proof of the fact of the form belonging to Cognition :—

TEXT (2033).

ALL THIS COGNITION DOES NOT ENVISAGE OTHER THINGS; THERE IS COGNITION OF THE *Blue*;—LIKE THE COGNITION OF THE COGNITION ITSELF.—(2033)

COMMENTARY.

Whatever is Cognition does not envisage anything other than the Cognition itself,—the Cognition of the Blue and other forms is *Cognition*;—hence there is apprehension of something embraced by its contrary; inasmuch as the 'Cognition' is embraced within the character of *not envisaging any other thing,* which is contrary to *the character of envisaging some other thing.*—(2033)

The following *Texts* proceed to establish the Premiss just set forth :—

TEXTS (2034-2035).

PRIMARILY, THE COGNITION DOES NOT APPREHEND AN OBJECT AT ALL, AS IT RESTS WITHIN ITS OWN SELF; ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS ABSENCE OF THE IMPRINT OF THE OBJECTIVE FORM; NOR CAN IT BE SAID TO DO SO SECONDARILY (FIGURATIVELY).—THIS REASONING IS ADDRESSED TO THOSE WHO REGARD COGNITION AS IMPRINTED WITH THE FORMS OF THINGS, ITSELF BEING LIKE PURE ROCK-CRYSTAL.—(2034-2035)

COMMENTARY.

In reality, all things are inactive; hence there can be no apprehension of one thing by another;—what happens is only that Cognition, being of the nature of Light, appears in a certain form, and is said to be the 'apprehender' of itself. *Primarily,*—in the direct primary sense,—the Cognition cannot be the *apprehender* of the Object; because all things rest within their own self; and the 'self' of one thing cannot be the 'self' of another.

The following might be urged :—"Primarily the Cognition of the Object is not held to be of the same kind as the self-cognition of the Cognition; the *apprehensibility* of the Object consists only in its producing a Cognition bearing the imprint of that Object. Thus, if it is 'apprehensibility' *in the primary sense* that is adduced as the Reason (in the above Buddhistic arguments), then it is 'inadmissible'. If on the other hand the 'apprehensibility' meant is based upon the similarity of the idea being regarded as 'apprehension' in some sort of a way,—then such a Reason cannot prove what is wanted. Because the similarity of the words '*go*' and '*gavaya*' cannot prove the presence of Horns in the *Gavaya.*—If both kinds of Reason put

forward are with reference to the *Blue* and other forms that figure in the Cognition,—and in favour of the idea of the form belonging to the Cognition,—then, the whole argument is superfluous—proving what is already admitted. This has been thus described—'Under the view of the form belonging to Cognitions, what is cognised is the imprint of that form; and if what is meant to be proved is the non-difference of this with the Cognition, then the Reason would be open to the charge of proving what is already admitted'."

It is in anticipation of—and in answer to—all this objection emanating from *Bhadanta-Shubhagupta,* that the Author has added the words—'*There is absence of the imprint, etc. etc.*'—In the compound '*arthākāroparāga*', '*arthākāra*' qualifies '*uparāga*', the meaning being—'the imprint of (in the shape of) the form of the object'.

'*Idam*'—both the aforesaid arguments in question have been put forward against the person who regards Cognition as formless. Hence they are not 'futile'—proving what is already admitted.

Nor can there be an apprehension of something else (other than the Cognition) in the *secondary* (figurative) sense either; as there is no basis for such figurative expression.—(2034-2035)

It has thus been proved that there can be no apprehension of Objects by a Cognition that does not bear any imprint (objective). The other view—that there can be none even by the Cognition that does bear such an imprint,—is now taken up and expounded:—

TEXT (2036).

[SAYS THE OTHER PARTY]—"THE COGNITION ENDOWED WITH SIMILARITY OF FORM MAY BE THE APPREHENDER OF THE EXTERNAL OBJECT".—THAT ALSO BEING IMPOSSIBLE, IT CANNOT HAVE THE POSITION OF THE APPREHENDER.—(2036)

COMMENTARY.

There can be no real form in the Cognition, on the basis of which the exact nature of things could be determined; and a Cognition with an unreal form could not apprehend the Object; as such form is present in wrong Cognition also.—(2036)

Question:—"Why should Cognitions *with forms* be unreal?"
Answer:—

TEXTS (2037-2038).

AS THE *form* WOULD BE NOT-DIFFERENT FROM THE COGNITION, THERE COULD NOT BE A MULTIPLICITY (VARIETY) OF FORMS;—CONSEQUENTLY, ON THE BASIS OF THAT THERE CAN BE NO APPREHENSION.—OR, THE COGNITION, BEING NOT-DIFFERENT FROM THE FORMS, SHOULD BE MANY (MULTIPLE). IF NOT, THEN HOW CAN THESE TWO BE REGARDED AS ONE AND THE SAME ?—(2037-2038)

COMMENTARY.

When one sees a bedspread of variegated colour, there should not be a multiplicity of forms (colours),—because, like the form of the Cognition itself, they are all not-different from the Cognition, which is one only.—Similarly, as the Cognition is not-different from the forms, it should be more than one.

There are some people who argue thus :—" In the case of the Bedspread of variegated colours, what happens is that there do appear simultaneously several homogeneous Cognitions, as many in number as there are forms (colours); as there is in the case of the Cognition of several diverse sounds. Hence the *Reductio ad Absurdum* that has been urged is futile ".

For these people, just as, in the case of the Bedspread of variegated Colour, there are several forms that are cognised,—so in the case of the white sheet also which has only one form (colour),—as there are several forms in the shape of the nearer, remoter and middle parts of the sheet,—the Cognition would have to be multiple.

It might be said—" Yes; that is certainly our view ".

Well, then, it behoves you to explain which is the Cognition that is *one*.

" It is the Cognition that apprehends the Atom which has no parts."

This is contrary to all experience. In no Cognition is the impartite atomic form ever found to appear.

In the case of incorporeal things, there can be no priority or posteriority due to space,—for the justification of which there would be some ground for assuming a multiplicity of Cognitions. The idea of extension in space being false, how can the forms be real ? And yet there is no Cognition of the *Cognition of Blue, etc.* apart from the appearance of the *Blue, etc.* that have extension in space. Hence the assuming of a multiplicity of Cognitions is entirely futile.—(2037-2038)

Another defect in the Opponent's view is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (2039).

IF THE COGNITION WERE ENTIRELY LIKE THE OBJECT,—THEN IT WOULD HAVE THE CHARACTER OF *Non-Cognition* (IGNORANCE), ETC. IF THERE IS ONLY PARTIAL LIKENESS, THEN EVERY COGNITION SHOULD APPREHEND EVERY OBJECT.—(2039)

COMMENTARY.

'*Character of Non-cognition*'—i.e. being of the nature of the unconscious.

'*Etcetera*'—is meant to include *negation of attachment, negation of hatred* and so forth.—(2039)

The following *Text* proceeds to deal with the third alternative view (suggested in *Text* 1999)—that "Cognition envisages something else":—

TEXT (2040).

HOW CAN THE COGNITION ENVISAGING (HAVING THE FORM OF) ONE OBJECT APPREHEND ANOTHER OBJECT? IF IT DID SO, EVERYTHING WOULD BE APPREHENDED BY EVERY COGNITION; AND THERE WOULD BE NO BASIS FOR RESTRICTION.—(2040)

COMMENTARY.

It might be urged that—"when a Cognition is produced by a certain Object, it apprehends only that Object, and thus every Object could not be apprehended by every Cognition".

The answer to this is—'*There would be no basis for restriction*'; that is, even the Eye, etc. would become 'apprehended'.—(2040)

The following *Text* presents *Bhadanta-Shubhagupta's* answer to the above—

TEXT (2041).

"JUST AS YOUR COGNITION, WHICH IS FORMLESS *in reality*, APPREHENDS FORMS WHICH ARE NON-OBJECTIVE,—IN THE SAME WAY WOULD IT APPREHEND ALL THINGS."—(2041)

COMMENTARY.

Bhadanta Shubhagupta has argued as follows:—"According to you, Idealists, Cognition is really formless,—as is clear from such assertions as 'Cognition is held to be non-elemental, like the purity of Gold and *Ākāsha*';

—and yet it apprehends forms ; in the same manner it would apprehend the external thing also ".—(2041)

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2042–2044).

As a matter of fact, the form of the Mind and Mental Effects is *not-common* (specific) ; hence there can be no apprehension of other forms in the real (primary) sense of the term ; therefore the name 'apprehension' could be applicable to the apprehension of objects only in the secondary (figurative) sense, on the basis of such conditions as 'being dependent upon the same causal circumstances', 'the relation of Cause and Effect' and so forth. An entity however which has no form, cannot be 'dependent upon the same form', nor could the other condition be fulfilled. Hence of such an entity, there can be no 'apprehension', even in the figurative sense."—(2042-2044)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, of what is *non-objective*, there can be no 'Apprehension' in the primary sense of this term. Because of the Mind and Mental Effects,—the only form or nature that figures in 'Happiness, etc.' and which is spoken of as 'I', is specific—not-common—and is of the nature of Light ; and it is this *figuring* that constitutes their 'apprehension' in the primary sense. Hence of 'non-objective' things other than Cognition,—which are not of the nature of *Cognition*,—there can be no such 'apprehension' in the primary sense ; simply because they are *non-objective*.—Nor can the same be there in the *secondary* sense ; because there is no basis for such secondary signification. Because the only possible grounds for secondary signification are—*dependence upon the same causal circumstances*, *the relation of Cause and Effect* and *similarity of form*,—this last being indicated by the term 'and so forth' in the text. And none of these is possible in the case of what is *non-objective*. There can be no other ground for the figurative use of the name 'Apprehension'.—What happens therefore, in such cases, is only that through Nescience (Illusion) a *Wrong Cognition* comes about indicating a non-objective form, which really does not form the objective (of the Cognition at all).—(2042–2044)

The opponent says—" That same false cognition would be the basis of the figurative use of the name to the Apprehension of the unreal form ".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXTS (2045-2046).

OR, IT MAY BE THAT THE COGNITION IS SPOKEN OF AS 'APPREHENDING THE *non-objective* FORM',—THROUGH MISTAKE, BECAUSE IN REALITY IT DOES NOT APPREHEND IT AT ALL, FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT IT HAS NO OBJECT. IF YOU ALSO SPEAK THROUGH ILLUSION OF THE COGNITION APPREHENDING SUCH A THING,—THEN IT BECOMES CLEARLY NON-OBJECTIVE. —(2045-2046)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tat*'—i.e. the Cognition that is spoken of as envisaging the *non-objective* form.

In reality, there is no *non-objective form* at all which could be apprehended; because if it were admitted to be apprehensible in the positive form, then it would have to be regarded as *objective*.—(2045-2046)

The same writer (*Bhadanta-Shubhagupta*) says again:—"With reference to the Buddha's Cognition also, the same questions arise—Is it *with form* or *formless*? Is it produced at the same time or at different times? That is to say, just as the point is discussed that the Cognition *with form* cannot apprehend the Object,—why is not a similar point raised in regard to the apprehension of the Object of the Blessed Lord's Cognition?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2047).

WHETHER *with form* OR *formless*, IT DOES NOT APPREHEND ANYTHING ELSE; HENCE IN REGARD TO THE BUDDHA'S COGNITION, THE QUESTIONS DO NOT ARISE.—(2047)

COMMENTARY.

The Cognition of the Blessed Lord is not regarded as the apprehender of the Object; hence the question is not raised in regard to that. As a matter of fact, in His case, all obscuration having disappeared,—that there should be no question regarding the Apprehender and Apprehended, is exactly what is right.—(2047)

Says the Opponent:—"Even though the External Object does not exist, which could be apprehended,—yet another Cognition is there, in another 'Chain'; why cannot this be apprehended by the Cognition of the Blessed Lord?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2048).

IF HE HAD THE COGNITION OF THE LOVE AND HATE, ETC. IN OTHER PERSONS,—THIS COULD ARISE ONLY FROM SIMILARITY TO SUCH LOVE, ETC.; AND THIS WOULD IMPLY THE PRESENCE OF 'OBSCURATION',—UNDER THE VIEW OF THE 'APPREHENSIONIST'.—(2048)

COMMENTARY.

If there is apprehension of the Love, etc. occurring in other 'Chains',—that could be due only to similarity, not otherwise; as if it were otherwise, there would be incongruities.—As regards this Similarity (between the Lord's Cognition and the Love, etc. in another person), if it is similarity on all points, then the Lord's Cognition should be tainted with the same Love, etc.;—and in that case, the Afflictions and Obscurations would not have ceased in Him; and there could be possibility of Obscuration.

'*Aupalambhika-darshanē*'—under the view—opinion—of those who proceed on the basis of Cognitions alone,—i.e. the Apprehensionists, the Idealists.—Or it may be interpreted as 'under the Apprehensionist or Idealistic, view of the Lord'.

If, on the other hand, the said *similarity* is only *partial*,—even so, as the two forms would not have ceased, the obscuration of the apprehended object would be there; as it would be tainted with the form of what is apprehended. Because a duality of form in any single object cannot be *real*; so that the said Cognition would have to be regarded as *wrong*, mistaken; and thus, as the seed of wrong-cognition, in the shape of Defect, would not have entirely ceased, the Blessed Lord would come to be one whose obscuration has not ceased *entirely*.—(2048)

Question:—"If the Blessed Lord does not apprehend anything, how can He be omniscient?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (2049-2050).

THE GREAT SAGE IS LIKE THE *Kalpa-tree*, UNSHAKEN BY THE WINDS OF DESIRES; AND YET HE BRINGS ABOUT THE WELFARE OF MEN. EVEN THOUGH HE HAS NO COGNITIONS, ALL MEN REGARD THE BLESSED *Jina* (*Buddha*) TO BE OMNISCIENT; BECAUSE BY REASON OF THE ABSENCE OF LIMITATIONS, HE KNOWS ALL THINGS, WITHOUT EXCEPTION,—AS IS CLEAR FROM WHAT HE DOES (FOR THE WELFARE OF PEOPLE).—(2049-2050)

COMMENTARY.

'*Adarshanam*'—He who has no cognition.

By the force of his previous Meditations, the Lord has no limitations; He is like the *Kalpa-tree*, bringing about the welfare of the entire Universe;

that is why people regard Him as 'Omniscient,' —not because He has cognitions ; in fact, no other character can be attributed to Him.—(2049–2050)

Having thus stated the arguments negativing the External World, the Author next refutes the argument adduced by the other party in support of the External World.

TEXT (2051).

IF THE COGNITION IS NOT OF THE 'WHITE' AND OTHER FORMS,—THEN, HOW CAN IT BE THE APPREHENSION OF THE OBJECT ? IF IT IS OF THE FORM OF 'WHITE', ETC., THEN WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE FOR THE EXTERNAL OBJECT ?—(2051)

COMMENTARY.

The external object could be proved either by Perception or by Inference ; any other Means of Knowledge, if any, is included under these two.

It cannot be proved by Perception. Because, is the Perceptional Cognition, which apprehends the Object, *with form* ? Or *without form* ? It cannot be *formless* ; as in that case there would be no basis for the necessary contacts (without which there can be no Perception).—Thus then, *if the Cognition were not of the White and other forms,—how could it be the apprehension of the Object* ? It can never be so, as already explained before.—If, on the other hand, the Cognition apprehending the Object is *with form,* then the only form of the Blue, etc. that would be perceived would be that in the Cognition itself, and the External Object would be only indirectly cognised (by Inference), not *perceived.* Because *two* 'Blues' are never perceived—one in the form of the reflection in the Cognition, and the other in the form of the external object which casts the reflection.

Thus the External Object cannot be proved by Perception.—(2051)

It might be said—"In that case, it could be proved by *Inference*". And in support of this idea, *Bhadanta-Shubhagupta* has formulated the argument as follows :—"The form in which the Cognition appears,—if it is in conformity with the real state of things,—must be produced by some other Object of that same form,—like the apprehending form ;—and the 'form of Cognition' in question envisaging the Blue and other forms, appearing in the man with underanged sense-organs, is compatible with the real state of things ; hence this is a Reason in accordance with the real state of the thing concerned."

This is the argument presented in the following—

TEXT (2052).

"THE FACT OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE BLUE AND OTHER FORMS BEING PRODUCED BY SOMETHING OF THE SAME KIND IS SOUGHT TO BE PROVED BY ITS BEING THE FORM OF THE COGNITION WHICH IS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REALITY,—LIKE THE CONSCIOUSNESS."—(2052)

COMMENTARY.

'*Samvāditvēna* ;—The Instrumental ending indicates the characteristic feature of the Cognition ; the sense being—that *form of the cognition* which is in conformity with reality,—by *that* is proved the fact of the form of the Cognition being produced by some other thing of the same kind ;—like Consciousness ; i.e. like the form of the *Apprehender*.—(2052)

The following texts point out the defects in this argument :—

TEXTS (2053-2054).

(*a*) IF BY 'BEING IN CONFORMITY WITH REALITY' IT IS MEANT, EITHER THAT IT PRESENTS THE EXTERNAL OBJECT, OR THAT IT HAS THE CAPACITY FOR PRESENTING IT,—THEN THIS CANNOT BE 'ADMISSIBLE' BY THE MAN WHO DENIES THE EXTERNAL OBJECT.—(*b*) IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, 'BEING IN CONFORMITY WITH REALITY' CONSISTS IN BEING THE CAUSE OF A COGNITION ENVISAGING EFFECTIVE ACTION,—THEN, THIS IS POSSIBLE ALSO WHEN THE COGNITION IS WITHOUT AN EXTERNAL OBJECTIVE BASIS.—(2053-2054)

COMMENTARY.

(*a*) If 'being in conformity with reality' as the qualification of your Probans, means, either that it represents the external object, or that it has the capacity of representing it,—then, *for the person who denies the external object*—i.e. for one who holds that Idea or Cognition is all that exists,—such conformity can never be 'admissible'; hence the Probans is one tainted with 'inadmissibility' by one of the two parties.

(*b*) If 'conformity' means that it brings about a Cognition which envisages the desired effective action,—then,—so long as a proof setting aside the contrary conclusion has not been adduced, there would always be a suspicion of the Probans being present where the Probandum is absent ; and this would make the Probans 'Inconclusive'. Because such *conformity* would not be incompatible with the view that Cognition has no objective basis.—(2053-2054)

The following *Texts* show how there is no such incompatibility (with the Idealistic position) :—

TEXTS (2055-2056).

JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE EXTERNAL THINGS, WATER AND THE REST, THE PRESENCE OF ACTUAL CAPACITY IS REGARDED AS THE REGULATING FACTOR IN 'CONFORMITY',—THIS SAME 'CONFORMITY' OF COGNITION' IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF OTHER COGNITIONS (INFERENTIAL, ETC.) ALSO. SO THAT, IN VIEW OF WHAT APPEARS IN INFERENCE, THE REASON ADDUCED BY THE OPPONENT IS 'TOO WIDE' (HENCE 'INCONCLUSIVE').—CERTAINLY THE FORM OF FIRE AND OTHER THINGS (INFERRED) WHICH IS QUITE CLEAR AND DISTINCT, IS NOT LIKE THAT OF THE INFERENCE ITSELF.—(2055-2056)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, though the Inferential Cognition is devoid of the objective substratum, yet it is in conformity with reality ; so that the Reason adduced is clearly found where the Probandum is absent, and hence, like 'cognisability', it is clearly 'too wide', hence 'Inconclusive'.

It might be argued that—" we do not admit that Inferential Cognition is devoid of objective substratum ".

The answer to that is—'*Certainly, the form, etc. etc.*'—This argument may be thus formulated :—When a cognition is devoid of the form of something, it cannot be regarded as having that for its objective basis,—e.g. the Cognition of Colour does not have Sound for its objective ; —Inferential Cognition is devoid of the external form ;—hence there is apprehension of something that is contrary to a wider factor.—The Reason adduced here cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible' ; because the form of the Fire is quite clear and distinct ; and as such, it is not like the form of the Inferential Cognition (of that Fire) ; because the Inferential Cognition is always somewhat hazy and indefinite.—If it were not so, then the Fire which, in Perception, is cognised in a well-defined form, as due to the burning of grasses and leaves, would appear in the same definite form in Inference also ; as a matter of fact, what does appear in Inference has abandoned its well-defined form and appears only in a vague general form in accordance with the Indicative on which the Inference is based. Hence so far as the External Object is concerned, it does not appear in Inference at all. Nor can one and the same thing have two forms—the *General* and the *Particular*,—which are mutually contradictory, as already explained before.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as 'Contradictory' ; because it is present where the Probandum is present.—

Nor is it 'Inconclusive'; for, if it were, then there would be incongruities.—(2055-2056)

With the following *Text*, the Author sets forth the arguments propounded by *Uddyotakara* [*Nyāyavārtika* on Sū. 4. 2. 34]:—

TEXT (2057).

"THAT WHICH APPEARS IN VARIOUS PLACES MUST BE REGARDED AS DIFFERENT FROM APPREHENSION WHICH IS INTERNAL (SUBJECTIVE)—BECAUSE IT IS COGNISABLE, ETC.,—LIKE THE COGNITION OCCURRING IN ANOTHER *Chain*",—IF THIS IS URGED [THEN, THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE NEXT *Text*].—(2057)

COMMENTARY.

He has argued thus:—"The Blue etc. which appear in various places must be regarded as different from Apprehension, which is internal,—because they are cognisable, because they are evanescent, because they are products, and because they have causes;—just like the Cognition appearing in another *Chain*".

TEXT (2058).

IN THIS ARGUMENT ALSO THERE IS 'FALSITY' (INCONCLUSIVENESS); AS THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE, IN THESE RESPECTS, BETWEEN THE COLOUR AND THE COGNITION; AND THERE IS 'INCONCLUSIVENESS' ALSO, IN VIEW OF THE 'TWO MOONS' AND OTHER THINGS PERCEIVED BY MEN WITH DISEASED EYES.—(2058)

COMMENTARY.

'*In this argument*'—i.e. in all the Reasons adduced.

'*Falsity*'—Inconclusiveness.—Because the 'inner cognition' also has the character of 'cognisability' and the rest; just as there is 'inconclusiveness' also in view of the 'two moons' that appear in the Cognition of the man with the diseased eye.

In things like the 'two moons', *cognisability* should be understood to be present in the sense that they appear in that form in the Conceptual Cognition; because they are not really cognisable in the sense of forming the object of the cognition itself; because they are not in contact with the Sense-organ; as declared in the saying—'On account of the obstruction of the Hair, etc. the visual perception does not proceed from the Sense-organ'.—(2058)

In the following *Texts*, the Author notices and answers *Kumārila's* view, that what has been just cited as the basis of 'Inconclusiveness' (Falsity) of the Reason cannot be 'admitted':—

TEXTS (2059–2063).

IF IT IS ALLEGED THAT—"IN THE CASES CITED, IT IS REALLY THE EXTERNAL OBJECT THAT IS COGNISED",—[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS FOLLOWS] :—THE FORM THAT ACTUALLY FIGURES IN THE COGNITION CANNOT BE OF THE NATURE OF THE REAL *object* ; AS IT ONLY FIGURES IN THE COGNITION AND HENCE BECOMES COGNISED ; THE ACTUAL FORM OF THE EXTERNAL OBJECT ITSELF DOES NOT FIGURE THERE AT ALL. HOW IS IT POSSIBLE THAT IT SHOULD NOT FIGURE THERE AND YET BE COGNISED ? IT IS CERTAINLY A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS TO SAY THAT 'ONE COGNISES IT' AND 'ONE DOES NOT COGNISE IT'.—IT IS FOR THESE REASONS THAT IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO PROVE THAT COGNITIONS ARE *self-cognised* ; BECAUSE SUCH IS FOUND TO BE THE COGNITION IN EVERYTHING WHICH IS OF THE NATURE OF 'LIGHT'.—FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "THE WRONG COGNITION, WHILE APPREHENDING THE OBJECT, APPREHENDS IT AS OTHERWISE THAN IT REALLY EXISTS, AND THUS ENVISAGES ITSELF (?)".—(2059–2063)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila argues as follows :—"In the cases cited of wrong cognitions (like that of *Two Moons, Yellow conch-shell* and so forth), what is put forward as the basis of wrong cognition is an *external object* itself in the form of the Conch-shell, etc. only it is in the *yellow* form that it supplies the basis for the Cognition. Hence there is no 'falsity' (or 'Inconclusiveness') at all".

The answer to this is—'*The form that actually figures, etc. etc.*'—What is meant is briefly as follows :—The only right view is that that same form can be apprehended by a certain Cognition which actually figures in that Cognition ; otherwise every Cognition would apprehend everything. Thus then, 'being apprehended' is invariably concomitant with 'appearing or figuring'. In the Cognition of the *Yellow* form, the *white* form does not figure at all ; because what is meant to be perceptible is not actually perceived ; so that the wider character of 'appearing or figuring' being absent, there must be absence of the less wide character of 'apprehensibility'.—The argument may be formulated as follows :—When a certain form does not figure in a Cognition, it cannot be regarded as cognisable (by that Cognition), —e.g. Colour in the Cognition of Sound ; —the *white* colour of the Conch-shell does not figure in the cognition of the *yellow* form ;—and thus there is no apprehension of the wider character.

'*One cognises it, etc. etc.*'—This shows that there is self-contradiction.

'*It is for this reason, etc. etc.*'—By this passage the Author tries to establish, by the way, his view that Cognition is self-cognised. And this also serves to set aside what has been asserted by the followers of Jaimini (*Shabara-bhāṣya*) to the effect and that—"Our Cognition is imperceptible and formless".

'*From all this, etc. etc.*'—The sentence is to be construed as—'*Kalpayantī satī arthamēva anyathā santam kalpayati iti na*',—'it is not true that, etc. etc.'—This denies what has been asserted by *Kumārila*.—(2059–2063)

The following *texts* set forth a series of arguments put forward by *Kumārila* :—

TEXTS (2064–2068).

"(*a*) THAT WHICH IS THE *apprehender* OF COLOUR MUST BE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS *apprehended*,—BECAUSE THE COGNITION OF THE ONE DOES NOT APPEAR ON THE COGNITION OF THE OTHER ;—AS IN THE CASE OF THE APPREHENDER OF TASTE, ETC.—(*b*) WHAT IS *apprehended* MUST BE DIFFERENT FROM THE *Apprehender* ; BECAUSE ONE WHO THINKS OF THE ONE DOES NOT NECESSARILY THINK OF THE OTHER ; —AS IN THE CASE OF THE APPREHENDER OF TASTE, ETC.,—(*c*) FOR THE SAME REASON THE TWO MUST, THUS, BE CONCLUDED TO BE DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER, LIKE TASTE, ETC.,—(*d*) THE TWO MUST BE DIFFERENT, BECAUSE THEY ARE NEVER COGNISED AS BEING OF THE SAME FORM,—LIKE THE COGNITION OCCURRING IN ANOTHER 'CHAIN'.—(*e*) THE COGNITION CANNOT APPREHEND ANY PORTION OF ITSELF ; BECAUSE IT PROCEEDS FROM THE COGNITION ;—LIKE ITS OWN POTENCY.—(*f*) THERE SHOULD BE DENIAL ALSO OF 'APPREHENSIBILITY'. (OF THE COGNITION BY ITSELF) ;—BECAUSE THE IMPRESSION IS DEVOID OF THE DUPLICATE CHARACTER.—(*g*) CHAITRA'S COGNITION CANNOT BRING ABOUT THE APPREHENSION OF THE APPREHENSIBLE PART OF THE COGNITION ARISING OUT OF HIS COGNITION ;—BECAUSE IT IS COGNITION ;—JUST AS THE COGNITION APPEARING IN ANOTHER PERSON."—[*Shlokavārtika—Shūnyavāda*, 172–177]—(2064–2068)

COMMENTARY.

"(*a*) The Cognition that apprehends Colour must be different in form from what is *apprehended* ;—because when there is Cognition of the Colour, there is no Cognition of the Cognition ; just as the Apprehender of Taste.—Or (*b*) what is apprehended,—i.e. Colour, etc.,—must be different from its Apprehender ; because when a man thinks of the one, he does not think of the other ;—just as in the case of the apprehender of taste, etc.—Or (*c*) the two—the Colour and its Apprehender—must be different from one another, because there is no thought of the one while the other is thought of, —just like Taste and Colour, etc.—Or (*d*) the two must be regarded as different, because they are never recognised as being of the same form,—like the Cognition appearing in another 'Chain'.—Or (*e*) the Cognition cannot apprehend a portion of itself,—because it is produced from the Cognition itself ; like its own Potency ;—this 'Potency' is what is known as 'Impression'.—(*f*) Similarly, there should be denial of the 'apprehensibility' of Cognition, which is done in this form :—The portion of Cognition cannot be apprehended by the Cognition itself, because it has come out of the Cognition".

Question :—In between these two arguments where is the Corroborative Instance endowed with the character of the Probandum ?

Answer :—" *Because the Impression is devoid of the duplicate character* ;—*i.e.* the character of the *Apprehended* and the character of the *Apprehender*.

(*g*) Or, there is another argument—This Cognition in question cannot bring about the apprehension of the portion of Cognition produced in one's Cognition,—because it is Cognition,—just as the Cognition appearing in other persons—*Maitra* and the rest,—does not apprehend the portion arising out of *Chaitra's* Cognition.—(2064–2068)

The refutation of the above is set forth in the following :—

TEXT (2069).

BECAUSE THE TWO ARE NEVER COGNISED SEPARATELY, AS EXPLAINED BEFORE,—THEREFORE ALL THE REASONS ADDUCED (BY *Kumārila*), DOWN TO THE ' NON-COGNITION OF SAMENESS ', SHOULD BE REJECTED AS ' INADMISSIBLE '.—(2069)

COMMENTARY.

' *Because the two are never cognised separately* ' ;—i.e. because the *Blue* and its *Cognition* are always found together ; because for the man who has no apprehension of Cognition, there can be no perception of the Object ;—all this has been explained before in course of the proof of Cognition being self-cognised ;—where the non-difference between the Blue and its Cognition has been established ;—because of this, all the Reasons adduced above (by *Kumārila*) down to the ' non-cognition of sameness ' cannot be ' admissible '.—(2069)

In the following *Text*, the Opponent urges that the Reasons are well-known and ' admissible ' :—

TEXT (2070).

" THE COGNITION OF THE FORM OF THE *Apprehended* (*object*) IS SPOKEN OF AS ' CONNECTED WITH EXTERNAL SPACE ', AND AS APPEARING WITHOUT THE COGNITION OF THE *Apprehender* (COGNITION)."—(2070)

COMMENTARY.

" As a matter of fact, ' the External Object is directly perceived as having a shape and as connected with external space '—as asserted by *Shabara*, the author of the *Bhāṣya* (on Mīmāmsā-Sūtra 1. 1. 5),—where it has

been explained that there is Cognition of the Apprehended Object, even when there is no Cognition of the Apprehending Cognition. Hence the Reason 'Because it is not apprehended on the apprehension of the other' becomes established and hence 'admissible'."—(2070)

Question :—How are the second and subsequent Reasons (urged under *Texts* 2065 *et. seq.*) proved and *admissible* ?

Answer :—

TEXTS (2071–2073).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, PEOPLE HAVE SUCH NOTIONS AS 'I DO NOT REMEMBER IF ANY OBJECT WAS APPREHENDED BY ME AT THE TIME', WHICH SHOWS THAT THEY REMEMBER THE APPEARANCE OF THE APPREHENDING COGNITION, WITHOUT ANY IDEA OF THE APPREHENDED OBJECT. IF THE TWO WERE NON-DIFFERENT, THERE WOULD BE REMEMBRANCE OF THE APPREHENDED OBJECT ALSO, WHEN THERE IS REMEMBRANCE OF THE APPREHENDING COGNITION ;—AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER, THERE IS IDEA OF THE APPREHENDING COGNITION ONLY. THUS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO BECOMES PROVED BY POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE.—THUS ALL THESE REASONS BECOME ESTABLISHED AS RESIDING IN THE MINOR TERM." —[*Shlokavārtika-Shūnyavāda*, 83–85].—(2071–2073)

COMMENTARY.

The Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition is found to appear even without the remembrance of the Apprehended Object ;—if there were absolute non-difference between the two, then there would be remembrance of the Apprehended Object also,—just as there is, of the Apprehending Cognition ;—hence as they do not share the same fate, the Apprehended Object and the Apprehending Cognition must be different from one another.

It might be urged that—'there *is* remembrance of the Apprehended Object also'.—The answer to that is—'*As a matter of fact, however, etc. etc.*'.

'*Tatra*'—At the time that there is Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition.—'*Ēṣa eva*',—i.e. the Apprehending Cognition alone,—not the Apprehended Object. The particle '*ēva*' is misplaced.

'*By positive and negative concomitance*'—as between the presence and absence of the Remembrances of the Apprehended Object and the Apprehending Cognition ; as there is *absence* of the Remembrance of the Apprehended Object even when there is *presence* of the Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition.—(2071–2073)

The above arguments (of *Kumārila*) are answered in the following :—

16

TEXT (2074).

As a matter of fact, there can be no apprehension of the object for one who has no apprehension of the Cognition ; hence there can be no apprehension of the Apprehended Object without the apprehension of the Cognition.—(2074)

COMMENTARY.

The following *Text* points out the 'Inconclusive' character of the Reason adduced (by *Kumārila,* under *Text* 2070, above) that—'the Object is clearly perceived as connected with outside space' :—

TEXT (2075).

The *yellow* colour is also clearly perceived by people with diseased eyes ; and yet it is not apprehended as something differentiated from the element of the Apprehending Cognition. It should be the same in the other case also.—(2075)

COMMENTARY.

There should be a stop at '*niskṛṣtam*'.

'*Also*' ;—i.e. just as the *real* 'yellow' is clearly perceived as connected with outside space, so also is the 'yellow' clearly perceived by the man with the jaundiced eyes.

Question :—"What if it is so perceived ?"

Answer :—'*And yet it is, etc. etc.*'—There should be a stop after '*saṁvedyam na*' ; and '*niṣkṛṣṭam*' has to be construed here ; and after '*na*', '*bhavati*' is to be understood.—Thus the meaning comes to be this :—The *yellow* that is perceived by the man with the diseased eyes does not become apprehended separately, differentiated from the *apprehending factor* ; and yet it is perceived as 'connected with outside space'. Hence the Reason in question is 'Inconclusive'.

'*It should be the same, etc. etc.*'—i.e. also in the case of the real 'yellow'.—What is meant to be shown by this is that the two cases stand on the same footing only so far as 'being clearly perceived' is concerned.—(2075)

The following *Text* supplies the answer to the argument urged (by *Kumārila,* under 2071, above) that—"People have the notion 'I do not remember, etc. etc.'" :—

TEXTS (2077-2078).

IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN THERE COULD BE NO REMEMBRANCE IN THE FORM '*some* OBJECT HAD BEEN APPREHENDED'; FOR REMEMBRANCE IS NEVER COGNISED AS A PIECE OF PURE ROCK-CRYSTAL.—THE TWO LAST REASONS (CITED BY *Kumārila*) ALSO ARE CLEARLY 'INCONCLUSIVE', IN VIEW OF SUCH COGNITIONS AS THAT OF THE '*Yellow* CONCH-SHELL'.—THIS IS THE WAY TO DEAL WITH THE OTHER REASONS ALSO.—(2077-2078)

COMMENTARY.

If the Remembrance did not envisage the Object even in the vague undifferentiated form, then it could not appear even in the vague general form that 'Some object had been apprehended'. Nor is even a Cognition remembered in the form of the pure Rock-crystal, without the imprint of the form of the Object apprehended (and remembered);—by virtue of which it could be asserted that "They remember the appearance of the Apprehending Cognition devoid of the form of the Apprehended Object" as has been asserted by [*Kumārila*, under *Text* 2071, above].

Thus it cannot be admitted that "there is no Remembrance of the Object when the Cognition is remembered".

As regards the last two Reasons put forward (by *Kumārila* in *Texts* 2067 and in 2068)—"Because it proceeds from Cognition" (2067) and "Because it is Cognition" (2068),—these are 'Falsified' (Inconclusive) by such instances as the following :—The Cognition of the *Yellow Conch-shell*, though 'proceeding from Cognition', does apprehend its own subjective factor in the shape of *yellow* ;—and also while being 'Cognition', it brings about the Cognition of the *yellow* which is part of the Cognition; and so could other Cognitions also do. Hence the two Reasons are 'Inconclusive'.—As regards the Cognition of the 'Yellow Conch-shell', it has been already proved that it is devoid of objective basis; hence what the Cognition of the 'Yellow Conch-shell' apprehends is only that form of *Yellow* which exists in the Cognition alone (as a subjective factor); and to that extent it proves the fact of Cognition being *self-cognised*.

'*This is the way, etc. etc.*'—'*With the other Reasons*',—that is, other Reasons that the other party has adduced in proof of the existence of the External Thing.

It has been asked by the other party—"What sort of *one-ness* (of the two) is sought to be proved? Is it meant to be on the ground that there is no such thing as appears in the form of *Blue*, etc., nor any form of Cognition, such as is met with in experience? How can any such idea be entertained? As if it were so, this would mean a negation of all things".

The answer to this is as follows :—There would not be negation of all things. Because all that is non-existent by its very nature is the apprehensible thing, like Earth, etc., apart from the Cognition itself. As for

'another Chain', that does not exist as something apprehensible, and hen it is devoid of the apprehensible form. And as for the fact of the Cogniti being the Active Agent in relation to it,—on the basis of the idea that t Cognition also *cognises*,—that *active agency* also is not there; and hence th too is devoid of the 'apprehensible form';—not so the 'active agency' relation to the Specific Individuality of the Cognition itself; as everythi cannot be brought about by everything.—This has been thus described 'When the Blue, Yellow and the like appear in Cognition as somethi *external*,—there does not, in reality, exist anything cognisable, outsid hence the idea of the Cognition being the active agent in relation to that not true; hence what appears as Cognition is the only one reality, withc a second'.—Under this understanding, the following text of the *Praj pāramitā* also becomes comprehensible:—'Cognition is devoid of the nat of Cognition, in the sense that it is devoid of any definite characteristics' (2077-2078)

Having set forth the original formal argument above (in the Comment introducing *Text* 1965 on p. 550, *Line* 13) in the words—'Every Cognitio devoid of both, *apprehended* and *apprehender*, because it is Cognition,—l the Cognition of the Reflection';—and having so far established the invaria concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum in this reasoning, Author sums up the whole position in the following:—

TEXT (2079).

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COGNITION UNDER DISPUTE MUST BE *with a second*,—BEING DEVOID OF OBJECTIVE AND THE ACTIVE AGENT,—BECAUSE IT IS COGNITION,—LIKE THE REFLECTION.—(2079)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by the epithet 'under dispute' is that the subject of Reasoning is the Cognition of persons with healthy eyes, etc.,—not *all* Co tions;—while what is put forward as the Probans—'because it is Cognitic —is Cognition *in general*; thus it is that the Probans is not part of the Prop tion. '*Being devoid of Objective and Active Agent*' qualifies '*without a secon* that is, what is meant by its being 'without a second' is that it is 'with Objective and Active Agent'; and not that no 'second' exists at all.

'*Like the Reflection*'—The *Object* being spoken of as the *Cognition*, term 'Reflection' stands for the *Cognition of the Reflection*.—Or the 'V affix, in '*pratibimbavat*' may be taken as coming after the Locative endi then, as the Receptacle (denoted by the Locative), the *Cognition* i becomes indicated.

The Probans cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible'; because wha put forward is that character of the Cognition which consists in the 'exclu of other things',—and not the very nature of 'Cognition'.

Nor is the Probans 'Contradictory'; because it is present wherever the Probandum is known to be present.—(2079)

Another party urges the fact of the Corroborative Instance ('Reflection') being devoid of the Probandum:—

TEXT (2080).

"IN THE CASE OF REFLECTION ALSO, THE COGNITION IS REGARDED AS HAVING AN OBJECTIVE BASIS; AS IT IS FOUND THAT ON THE VISUAL RAYS BEING TURNED BACK, ONE'S OWN FACE IS SEEN AS IT IS IN THE REFLECTION."—(2080)

COMMENTARY.

"The light-rays, issuing from the eyes and falling upon the surface of the Mirror, become turned back and thus become connected with one's own face, and then they bring about the cognition of the face. Thus it is the face itself that is seen as within the Mirror. So that it becomes established that the Cognition of the Reflection is not 'devoid of the *Apprehender* and the *Apprehended*'."—(2080)

The answer to the above is provided in the following:—

TEXT (2081).

IT IS NOT HIS OWN FACE THAT ONE SEES IN THE MIRROR,—BECAUSE IT IS SEEN IN FRONT OF ONE'S SELF, AND BECAUSE WHAT IS SEEN IS DIFFERENT IN SIZE, POSITION, ETC. (FROM ONE'S FACE),—LIKE ANY OTHER OBJECT.—(2081)

COMMENTARY.

It is not his own face that one sees in the mirror,—because the face seen there stands before one's self;—also because what is seen has a position, size, complexion and other details different from the face.—'*Like any other object*';—i.e. like such things as sound and the like.

What is meant is as follows:—If the Cognition were the Apprehender of the face, then it should have apprehended it exactly as the face itself actually stands; because it cannot be right for the Apprehender of one form to apprehend a thing of another form. If this were possible, then there would be incongruities. As a matter of fact, when a man facing the South looks at the mirror, what he perceives in the mirror is the face facing the North; similarly, if the mirror is a small one, the face that he sees in the reflection is smaller than his own face; and it is also perceived as touching the mirror's surface and lying far beneath it. In reality however, the mirror's surface is not of that size, nor is it really in contact with the real face.—Similarly when a man is standing on the bank of a lake of clear water, and looks at

the water-surface, he perceives the reflections of the trees standing on the brink of the water, with their tops pointing downwards; and yet they are not really in that condition.—From all this we conclude that the *Cognition of the Reflection* does not apprehend the man's own face,—because what it envisages is something different from the face,—like the Cognition of sound.—(2081)

Bhadanta-Shubhagupta argues as follows :—"For the proving of the Cognition being the only entity, *the character of being Cognition* has been adduced as the Reason; but it is not incompatible with the contrary; hence all that is said is nugatory".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2082–2084).

'BEING COGNITION' IS 'LUMINOUSNESS'; AND THAT CAN HAVE NO PLACE IN THE 'APPREHENDED OBJECT',—BECAUSE IT HAS NO CONNECTION WITH THE CHARACTERS OF 'NOT ENVISAGING A FORM' AND THE REST;—HENCE ITS INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE HAS BEEN DULY ASCERTAINED.—(2082)

COMMENTARY.

The requisite invariable concomitance has already been establishe under *Text* 1999 above—'Not envisaging a form, or envisaging a form c envisaging something else, the Cognition cannot apprehend any externa thing'. Consequently, the Reason put forward here cannot be regarded a 'Inconclusive'.

The Revered Teacher *Dinnāga*, for the purpose of determining tl 'basic cause', has declared as follows :—'When that which is cognisable onl in the internal (subjective) form appears as if it were *external*, that obje must be regarded as existing in the form of the Cognition, and also as formir its *basic cause*'.—This serves to determine the objective element in th aspect of the Cognition which is apprehended.

The same Teacher has said again—'Or, it may be that by transferrir the potency, the apprehension of the Object, in due course, brings abou for the bringing about of an effect similar to itself, a potency in the Cognitior so there is no incompatibility'.—This establishes the fact that the sa Apprehension (of the Object) transfers to the immediately subseque Cognition, the potency tending to produce an effect similar to itself, a thus becomes the cause.—(2082)

In connection with this, the same *Bhadanta* (*Shubhagupta*) argues follows :—"Though the apprehended element may be the instrument Sense-cognition, yet, inasmuch as that cannot figure in the Cognition itself, could not be the object of the Sense-cognition".

TEXTS (2083-2084).

THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE OBJECT IN THE *Apprehended Aspect* OF THE POTENCY OF THE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING COGNITION IS NOT REGARDED BY US TO BE REAL. THAT IS WHY THE IDEA IS SUPPORTED.—THE FACT OF THE COGNITION BEING THE ONLY ENTITY HAS BEEN CLEARLY ESTABLISHED BY CLEVER WRITERS. WE ALSO HAVE TRODDEN THE SAME PATH FOR THE ASCERTAINMENT OF TRUTH.—
(2083-2084)

COMMENTARY.

'*Shaktau anantarē jñānē*' ;—the two Locative endings are not to be taken in co-ordination.

'*Immediately following Cognition*',—in the form of the '*Ālayavijñāna*' (Recumbent Cognition).

'*Potency*',—of forming the basic cause of the said idea of the object.

'*Is not held to be real*' ;—because it is not possible for anything apart from Atoms, etc. to be the objective basis,—as has been established in detail. This has also been asserted by the Revered Teacher, in the following words : 'The absolute denial of the objective basis may involve incompatibility with a fact of direct experience ; and there may be incompatibility with the doctrine enunciated in the *Sūtra*'—'*There are four kinds of causal factors—basic, dominant, immediate antecedent and causal link*' ;—in order to show that there is no incompatibility, it has been explained what sort of *Basic Cause* is meant in this *Sūtra* and also in ordinary experience. But all this has been done on the plane of 'Illusion', not of *Reality* ; as in *reality* all Cognitions are entirely devoid of objective basis.

End of Chapter on the External World.

CHAPTER XXIV.

"*The Revealed Word.*"

COMMENTARY.

In the Introductory verses the 'Intervolved Wheel of Causation' has been described as 'not dependent upon any self-sufficient Revelation'; the Author sets forth arguments in support of this :—

TEXT (2085).

OTHER PEOPLE, WITH INTELLECT OBSCURED BY IGNORANCE, HAVE ASSERTED AS FOLLOWS :—"IT IS NOT RIGHT THAT ALL THIS IS MERE IDEA (OR COGNITION); BECAUSE THIS IS SET ASIDE BY THE REVEALED WORD".—(2085)

COMMENTARY.

'*Other people*'—the followers of *Jaimini*.

These people argue as follows :—"Injunction alone is the basis for determining *Dharma* (what one should do) and *Adharma* (what one should not do), the only light available for all beings, being like the common 'Eye' of all. It must be accepted as authoritative and reliable by all intelligent men seeking to know their Duty (*Dharma*); not so other words composed by human beings. Because the ordinary human being has his mind beset with Ignorance, Attachment and the rest; hence his word is not capable of affording the right knowledge of supersensuous things; it is for this reason that 'Duty' and such other matters cannot be learnt from the words of such persons.—Nor is Duty amenable to the Sense-perception of people of limited vision; because it is beyond the reach of the Senses and hence absolutely imperceptible.

"For instance *Dharma* (Duty) and *Adharma* (its contrary) are characterised by capacity to bring about what is *good* and what is *evil* (respectively); as has been asserted in *Shabara's Bhāṣya*—'That alone is spoken of as *Dharma* which brings about the good (or welfare) of man;—how do you know that ?—when a man performs a sacrifice, people call him *dhārmika*, firm in the performance of his duty; and it is only when one does something that he is called after it; e.g. the man who does the *cooking* is called the *Cook*, and one who does the *chopping* is called the *Chopper*; in the same way that is spoken of by the name *Dharma* which brings man into contact with the highest good'.

"What thus becomes explained is that *Dharma* is the capacity of Substance, etc. to bring about what is good. For instance, *Substance, Quality*

and *Action* are spoken of as particular means of accomplishing the Good; and it is shown that the name '*Dharma*' is applicable to these. These, Substance and the rest, are perceptible, in their own forms,—but not as the *means of accomplishing the good*; and it is in this latter form that they are held to be '*dharma*', not merely in their own forms. This has been thus asserted—'The *Good* consists in the *happiness* of the man, and this happiness is brought about by Substance, Quality and Action as indicated in the Injunction; hence it is to these that the character of *Dharma* belongs; even though these, by themselves, are within the reach of the Senses, yet it is not in that form that they are *Dharma*. The fact of these being *the means of accomplishing the good* is learnt from the Veda; and it is in this form that these are *Dharma*; hence *Dharma* is not amenable to the Senses'. [Vide *Shlokavārtika*, Sū. 2, 191, and 13-14.]—'*In that form*', as being *the means of bringing about the Good*.—Thus it is established that *Dharma* is a capacity or Potency.

"From this it is also clearly understood, by implication, that *Adharma* also, as contrary to *Dharma*, is a Potency or capacity to bring about what is *not-Good*.

"This capacity or Potency a man with limited powers of vision cannot perceive directly by the Senses; because capacity is always inferred from its effects; as has been declared in the passage—'The Potencies of all things are always proved by Presumption from these effects'.—(*Shlokavārtika*, Sū. 2, 200.)—If it were not so, then the character of 'having limited powers of vision' would disappear.—Nor can the Perception of mystics apprehend supersensuous things,—simply because they are Perception,—like any other Perception.

"Nor can *Inference* be of use in knowing what is *Dharma*; because Inference can envisage only such a thing as has had its relation with something else already known; and *Dharma* is not such a thing.

"Nor can *Analogy* bring about the knowledge of *Dharma*; because *Analogy* consists in similitude and brings about the cognition of a thing not before the Eyes; e.g. the seeing of the *Gavaya* brings about the remembrance of the *Cow*; and there can be nothing which is known to be *similar* to *Dharma*,—which similarity could bring about the cognition of this *Dharma*.

"Nor is *Presumption* capable of bringing about the knowledge of *Dharma* and *Adharma*. Because *Presumption* consists in the assuming of something not perceived, on the ground that something else, which has been perceived or heard of, would not be possible or explicable without the said assumption. *Dharma* is not something without which something else would not be explicable or possible,—whereupon its Presumption could be based.

"*Non-apprehension* also, which consists in the absence of all Means of Cognition, serves to bring about the idea of *this is not*, and not any *positive* idea.

"Thus then, *Dharma and Adharma* would fall within the jaws of this *Non-apprehension* and would be swallowed by it, if the Vedic Injunction were not there to save them. Hence *Dharma* must be regarded as 'that which is indicated by the Injunctive Word as conducive to welfare',—and it cannot be anything that is indicated by the Senses or other Means of Cognition.

disorder ;—the Veda, not being the work of a human being, is free from the contact of Love, Hatred and such other causes of falsity ;—hence this is a Reason (for Reliability) based upon the nature of the thing concerned.

By putting forward a Corroborating Instance *per dissimilarity*, the Arguer indicates the absence of 'Inconclusiveness' in his Reason—'*It is only words, etc. etc.*'—What is shown by this is that the *absence of the Probandum* is invariably concomitant with the *absence of the Probans*. As a matter of fact, Defects (in the source of knowledge) are the cause of *falsity* ; and wherever these Defects are present, there alone they bring about their Effect in the shape of *falsity*,—not anywhere else ; and that is so because when the Cause is not there, the Effect cannot be there ; even if the Effect were there it would have to be regarded as *without cause* ; and what would come about without the cause would not be regarded as the effect of that cause ; as that would lead to absurdity. Thus, the impossibility of the relation of Cause and Effect between Defects and Falsity,—and the contingency of falsity being without cause,—constitute the 'Reason' setting aside any conclusion contrary to the one set forth above. Hence the Reason cannot be regarded as 'Inconclusive'.

The argument may be formulated as follows :—Where the Cause of a thing does not exist, the Effect cannot appear,—e.g. Smoke does not appear in water, where its cause, Fire, is absent ;—in the case of the *Veda*, the Cause of falsity in the shape of the presence of Love, Hate, etc. is not present ; —hence its Effect, Falsity cannot be there.—(2086)

In the following *text*, the *Mīmāṁsaka* shows that his Reason is not open to the charge of being 'Inadmissible' :—

TEXT (2087).

"IN THE CASE OF THE ASSERTION OF HUMAN BEINGS, IT IS ALWAYS OPEN TO DOUBT WHETHER OR NOT THERE ARE DEFECTS (IN THE SPEAKER) ; IN THE CASE OF THE REVEALED WORD, HOWEVER, AS THERE IS NO *speaker*, WE CAN HAVE NO SUSPICION OF THERE BEING ANY DEFECTS."
—(2087)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Defects reside in human beings only,—as they are their property ; how then could they be there where their substratum is absent ? If they could be there, they would be there without a substratum (baseless) ; in fact it is the very nature of the *subsistent* thing that it should follow in the wake of its substratum ;—and Man—the doer, the compiler,

the speaker—is the substratum of Defects; and any such author is not there in the case of the Veda; whence then could there be any suspicion of there being Defects?

This same argument has set aside also the charge of the Reason being 'doubtful—hence inadmissible'.—(2087)

The following might be urged against the *Mīmāṁsaka*—How is it known that there is no 'doer', 'author' (in the case of the Veda), who would be the substratum of Defects?

In view of this, the *Mīmāṁsaka* proceeds to establish the fact of there being no Author of the Veda, by showing that no such Author can be cognised by any of the five Means of Cognition:—

TEXTS (2088–2095).

"(a) AN AUTHOR OF THE VEDA IS NOT *perceived*;—IT COULD ONLY BE ASSUMED THAT SUCH A ONE EXISTED IN THE PAST [BUT SUCH AN ASSUMPTION CAN HAVE NO BASIS].—(b) WHEN ANY RELATIONSHIP (OF CONCOMITANCE) OF SUCH AN AUTHOR HAS NEVER BEEN PERCEIVED BEFORE, ANY INFERENCE THAT COULD BE MADE REGARDING HIM MUST BE BASED ONLY UPON PRESENT IGNORANCE; HENCE IF SUCH AUTHOR IS ASSUMED (BY THE OTHER PARTY) IT CANNOT BE THROUGH INFERENCE.—(c) AS REGARDS VERBAL AUTHORITY (SCRIPTURE), THAT ALSO CANNOT POINT TO AN AUTHOR OF THE VEDA; BECAUSE NO OTHER SCRIPTURE IS WITHOUT AN AUTHOR; AND HENCE ANY OTHER SCRIPTURE WHICH IS THE WORK OF AN AUTHOR, BEING ITSELF UNRELIABLE, COULD NOT PROVIDE A RELIABLE NOTION OF THE AUTHOR OF THE VEDA. AS REGARDS THE WORDS OF MANU AND OTHERS, THEIR RELIABILITY RESTS UPON THE VEDA ITSELF. AS FOR ANY OTHER WRITER WHO HAS NO CONNECTION WITH THE VEDA AND IS HOSTILE TOWARDS IT,—HOW CAN SUCH A ONE BE TRUTHFUL ON THIS POINT? HENCE FOR US, THERE IS NO SCRIPTURE COMPILED EVEN BY OTHERS WHICH CAN DECLARE AN AUTHOR OF THE *Veda*.—(d) IN CASE SOMEONE WERE VISIBLE NOW WHO IS SIMILAR TO THE AUTHOR OF THE *Veda*, THEN ALONE, ON THE BASIS OF THAT ANALOGY, THERE MIGHT BE AN ANALOGICAL COGNITION OF SUCH AN AUTHOR.—(e) IF THERE WERE SOMETHING VOUCHED FOR BY THE MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION WHICH WOULD BE INEXPLICABLE IF THERE WERE NO AUTHOR OF THE *Veda*,—THEN ALONE, SUCH AN AUTHOR OF THE VEDA MIGHT BE ACCEPTED ON THE BASIS OF PRESUMPTION; AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER, THERE IS NOTHING IN THE VEDA WHICH COULD NOT BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT SUCH AN AUTHOR;—ON THE CONTRARY, IF THERE *were* AN AUTHOR, THERE IS MUCH, IN THE SHAPE OF ITS RELIABILITY AND

SO FORTH, WHICH COULD NOT BE DULY COGNISED.—THUS THEN, BEING NOT AMENABLE TO THE SAID FIVE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE, THE AUTHOR IN QUESTION BECOMES AMENABLE ONLY TO THE SIXTH, *Negation* (NON-APPREHENSION) : CONSEQUENTLY, HE IS ONE WHOSE EXISTENCE IS IMPOSSIBLE,—AS IT IS PRECLUDED BY NEGATION, WHICH IS THE ONLY MEANS OF COGNITION (APPLICABLE TO HIM)."—(2088–2095)

COMMENTARY.

" (*a*) The Author of the *Veda* cannot be known by means of *Sense-perception* ; because it can never be pointed out that 'Here is the Author of the Veda', simply because he is not seen at the present moment. It might be assumed that 'there *was* an Author' ; and as no such person has ever been seen, the assumption can only be that 'he existed at some time' ; and this idea would not be reliable,—this is what is meant and has to be added.

" (*b*) Nor can the Author be known by means of *Inference* ; this is what is said by the words—'*Adṛṣṭapūrva, etc. etc.*' ;—the detractors of the Veda premise a relationship, in the shape of cause and effect, between the *Veda* and the Author who has never been seen before ; and such a premiss can be based only on Ignorance, as there can be no valid means of Cognition indicating any such relationship ; no one can ever be able to apprehend a relationship between Smoke and the Fire that has never been seen. Hence, if such an Author is assumed, such an assumption cannot be supported by Inference.—The particle '*api*' implies that it is without the support, not of *Sense-perception only*, but *also* of Inference.

" (*c*) The words '*āgamopi, etc. etc.*' point out that the Author cannot be known by means of Verbal Authority (or Revelation, Scripture). Because, as there is no scripture other than the *Veda* which is itself without an author, the required scripture cannot be one which is without an author ; nor can it be one that has an author ; because such a scripture would itself be unreliable. Because, when the scripture would be the work of an author,—it could be the work of (1) *Manu* and other writers related to the *Veda*, or of (2) the *Sādhyas* and *Munis* not related to the Veda.—As regards the first alternative, —it is said—'*as regards the words of Manu and others, etc. etc.*' :—'*Tatkṛtā*'—due to the Veda ;—this means that these works are not self-sufficient in their authority.—The objection to the second alternative is next stated—'*Asambaddhastu, etc. etc.*'—'*who has no connection*'—with the *Veda* ; because such persons are not entitled to the study of the *Veda*. '*Any other writer*'—i.e. the work of a person who has no connection with the *Veda*.—'*Vēdakārāgamaḥ*',—i.e. speaking of the Author of the *Veda*.

(*d*) *Pramitam*—vouched for by the six Means of Right Cognition.—'*Tēna vinā*'—without an Author.—'*Kiñchit*'—anything vouched for by the Means of Right Cognition.—'*Asmin*'—Author.

In the word '*prāmāṇyādi*', '*reliability and so forth*',—'so forth' is meant to include *Dharma* and such notions.

'*Abhāvēna*' ;—it is only by the sixth Means of Cognition, *Negation*, that it can be known that *a certain thing does not exist* ; as it is that alone

that envisages *negation.*—Or it may mean that such an Author is cognised in the form of negation—i.e. *as non-existent*; because there is no means of knowing him.

'*Pramāṇābhāvabādhanāt*';—'*abhāva*', cessation of the Means of Cognition; i.e. Negation as the Means of Cognition;—by this Negation, the idea of the Author is precluded. Hence it is established that there can be no Author of the *Veda.*—(2088–2095)

The following argument might be urged (against the *Mīmamsaka*):—If you prove the fact of the *Veda* not being the work of an Author, and then, on that basis, prove its authoritative (reliable) character,—then, lo! the authority of the Veda rests upon something other than itself; as the authority of the Veda cannot become recognised until the fact of its not being the work of an author is recognised.

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2096).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE IDEA OF THE VEDA *not* BEING THE WORK OF AN AUTHOR IS EMPHASISED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING THAT THERE CAN BE NO CAUSE FOR *unreliability*; AND AS SUCH AN IDEA (BEING NEGATIVE) IS A NON-ENTITY, IT CANNOT BE PROVED BY MEANS OF PROOFS."—(2096)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this is as follows:—We are not proving the Reliability (Authority) as a positive fact, which is not recognised; all that we are doing is to reject the *unreliability* (of the Veda) which has been urged by our Opponent; and when this charge has been set aside, the original positive proposition remains fully recognised by itself.—As a matter of fact, even the idea of the Veda not being the work of an Author is not being sought to be proved by us; because, if it were proved, the implication would be that the reliability of the Veda rests upon something else. The fact of the matter is that the said idea consists in the mere *negation* of the fact of the Veda being the work of an Author, and as such, it is a *non-entity* (which cannot be proved).—(2096)

Question:—If it is not proved (by you), how does it become proved by itself?

Answer (from the *Mīmāmsaka*):—

TEXT (2097).

"WHEN THE LOGICIAN ASSERTS THE FACT OF THE VEDA BEING THE WORK OF AN AUTHOR, THE REFUTATION OF THAT FACT PROVES THE FACT OF THE VEDA *not* BEING THE WORK OF AN AUTHOR."—(2097)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—Even on the refutation of the Opponent's view, if the upholder of the Veda does not actually prove his own view, how could the latter be accepted and the upholders of the Veda become satisfied ?

This question is further expounded :—

TEXT (2098).

WHEN THERE ARE TWO POSITIVE VIEWS REGARDING A QUESTION—E.G. 'PRIMORDIAL MATTER' AND 'ATOM' AS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD,—IF ONE IS NOT PROVED, THE OTHER DOES NOT BECOME PROVED *by itself*.—(2098)

COMMENTARY.

The following *Text* explains the term '*Primordial Matter and Atom*' :—

TEXT (2099).

EVEN AFTER REFUTING THE FACT OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER BEING THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD, THE IDEA OF THE ATOM BEING THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD HAS GOT TO BE PROVED BY OTHER REASONS.—(2099)

COMMENTARY.

Even though the *Vaisheṣika* has (successfully) refuted the *Sānkhya* view that the World is a product of Primordial Matter,—yet he has got to prove, by means of other Reasons, the fact of the world being the product of Atoms;—similarly in the case in question (it is necessary for the *Mīmāmsaka* to adduce reasons in proof of his view).—(2099)

The answer to the above (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) is as follows :—

TEXTS (2100-2101).

"When a proof is adduced in support of the *affirmative* view if that is refuted, the *negative* view (to the contrary) becomes rightly proved by itself. Thus it is that, when the other party adduce proofs in support of the two ends of the Veda, the Upholders of the Veda have their purpose accomplished by the refutation of those proofs."—(2100-2101)

COMMENTARY.

'*Affirmative view*'—that the Veda is the work of an Author; and denial of that is the '*Negative view*'. These two views are so related that truth of the one involves the falsity of the other and vice versa;—hence *denial* of one is concomitant with the *affirmation* of the other; so that *Negative* view becomes proved by itself. For instance, for the purpose proving the 'two ends'—beginning and end—of the Veda, the Buddh adduce certain proofs,—the mere refutation of these proofs proves contrary view that the Veda has no beginning or end, and as such, is the work of an Author; and when this has become proved, the Upholder the Veda become satisfied on the accomplishment of what is desired them.—(2100–2101)

Objection:—Even when the said proofs have been refuted, it is necess to put forth a further effort to prove the *positive* fact of the *Veda* b eternal; under the circumstances, how can the Upholders of the Veda satisfied, until they have actually proved the *Eternality of the Veda*?

The answer to this (from the *Mīmāṁsaka*) is as follows:—

TEXT (2102).

"As regards the positive fact of the *Eternality of the Veda*, becomes established for us on the rejection of the 'two ends' (of the Veda),—even though we do not adduce proofs in support of the said *Eternality*."—(2102)

COMMENTARY.

'*The two ends*'—i.e. the proof adduced in proof of the idea of the V having a beginning and end.—(2102)

How the rejection of the 'two ends' automatically proves *Etern* is explained in the following:—

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TEXT (2103).

'HE '*first end*' OF THE VEDA CONSISTS IN THE IDEA OF ITS BEING THE WORK OF AN AUTHOR,—AND THE '*other end*' CONSISTS IN ITS BEING DESTROYED; AND THE NEGATION OF THESE (TWO ENDS) MEANS 'ETERNALITY'."—(2103)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, 'Eternality' and 'Having the two ends' are ually exclusive,—one involving the negation of the other; and between mutually exclusive ideas, the absence of one is always concomitant with presence of the other; as has been already pointed out.—(2103)

The other party urges—If the 'negation of the two ends' constitutes *nality,* then it comes to this that *Eternality* is not a positive quality of gs.

The answer to this (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) is as follows:—

TEXTS (2104-2105).

IE *eternality* OF THE VEDA CONSISTS IN THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT RODUCED IN THE BEGINNING AND DOES NOT PERISH IN THE END.—IF IT BE URGED THAT 'EVEN SO, THIS *eternality* IS SOMETHING *cognisable*',—THEN [THE ANSWER IS THAT] *eternality* IS WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TWO CHARACTERS OF 'BEING NOT PRODUCED' AND 'BEING NOT DESTROYED'; AND BOTH THESE BEING OF THE NATURE OF NEGATION DO NOT REQUIRE ANY PROOF FOR THEMSELVES."—(2104–2105)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this is that *eternality* forms part of the very nature ie *Veda,* which is an entity.

'*If it be urged, etc. etc.*'—This anticipates the following objection from)pponent—If it is as stated, then *Eternality* is an entity and as such it is ething that has to be cognised by a Means of Cognition, to be proved.

The answer to this is—'*What is meant, etc. etc.*'

'*Both these*'—i.e. the characters of *not being produced* and *not being oyed.*

'*Proof for themselves*'—i.e. any means of cognising their own forms. t is meant is that there need be nothing incongruous in Negation being *ntity*; so that even though *Eternality* consists in the two characters of being produced' and 'not being destroyed', it need not be a non-y.—(2104-2105)

"Having thus shown that the five Means of Right Cognition are not tive in the matter, it is regarded as proved that there is no Author of the

Veda ; and consequently there can be no 'inadmissibility' in the Reason adduced by the *Mīmānsaka*—'because the Veda is free from the contact of defects that bring about falsity'.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as 'Contradictory'; because it is present wherever the Probandum is present; and being not present where the Probandum is not present, it cannot be regarded as 'Inconclusive. Thus it becomes established that the Veda is authoritative and reliable."

Now the *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds to point out in detail the defects in the two arguments put forward by his Opponent in support of the view that the *Veda* is *not* authoritative and reliable.

These two arguments are as follows :— (A) What is perceptible by the senses, and (B) what is produced by effort, must be *non-eternal*,—e.g. the Jar ;—and Sound is both (perceptible and produced by effort) ; these are Reasons based upon the nature of things, which prove the *non-eternality* of sound in general ; and this being proved, the non-eternality of the *Veda* necessarily follows ; and from this it also follows, by implication, that like the assertions of human beings, the words of the Veda also may be false.—Such is the sense of what is argued by the Buddhists and others.

Against these arguments, the *Mīmāmsaka* sets forth in detail the argument that the proposition of the Opponents is annulled by the Verbal and other Means of Right Cognition.

First of all, the following *Text* shows that the Proposition that the Vedic Words are false is annulled by Verbal Cognition itself :—

TEXT (2106).

" ONE WHO ASSERTS THE FALSITY OF THE VEDIC WORDS ON THE BASIS OF INFERENCE, HAS HIS PROPOSITION ANNULLED BY THE FORCE OF THE COGNITION DERIVED FROM THE VEDA."—(2106)

COMMENTARY.

'*Vaidika*' is *derived from the Veda*; i.e. such cognitions or notions as Heaven follows from the performance of the *Agnihotra*';—by the force of such notions, his Proposition becomes annulled, as it is set aside by it. This has been thus asserted—" As a matter of fact, the notion derived from the Injunction is not of a doubtful character,—in any such form as 'this may or may not be so'; nor at any other time or place, or in any other circumstances, or in any other person, does there appear any notion to the contrary, that 'it is false'. As regards the idea that—'the notion derived from the Vedic Injunction must be false because we have found another statement made in the Veda to be false',—this is only an Inference, and as such, becomes sublated by the aforesaid direct cognition to the contrary." (*Shabara-bhāṣya-Translation*, page 18 .—(2106)

Says the other party :—The two—Verbal Cognition and Inference—being of equal strength (validity), how can one be annulled by the other ? If even

when they are of equal strength, there can be sublation, then why should not the Inference sublate the Verbal Cognition ? "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2107).

" THE KNOWLEDGE DERIVED FROM THE VEDA IS OF THE SAME DEGREE AS PERCEPTION, AND HENCE STRONGER THAN INFERENCE ; CONSEQUENTLY, IT CAN NEVER BE ANNULLED BY INFERENCE."—(2107)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—How then is Inference annulled by the Verbal Cognition (derived from the Veda) ?

Answer :—

TEXT (2108).

" INASMUCH AS THE VEDA HAS BEEN PLACED IN THE SAME POSITION AS PERCEPTION, IT IS STRONGER THAN, AND HENCE SETS ASIDE, INFERENCE."—(2108)

COMMENTARY.

This has been thus declared—" The cognition derived from the words of the Veda is Perception, and Inference contrary to Perception cannot be valid ".—(2108)

Question :—In what way is Verbal Cognition (derived from the Veda) stronger than Inference,—by virtue of which it is regarded as equal to Perception ?

Answer :—

TEXTS (2109-2110).

" THERE IS A DEGREE OF SIMPLICITY IN THE VALIDITY OF VERBAL COGNITION—DUE TO THE FACT OF ITS NOT NEEDING A CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE, AND TO THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS,—WHICH IS NOT FOUND IN *Inference*. CONSEQUENTLY, WHENEVER THERE SHOULD BE ANY DOUBT BETWEEN VERBAL COGNITION AND INFERENCE, IT IS VERBAL COGNITION THAT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS STRONGER, AND THE MATTER DETERMINED ACCORDINGLY."
—(2109-2110).

COMMENTARY.

'*Pramāṇatvē*'—the Locative is to be construed with '*lāghavam*'.

'*Which is not found in Inference*' ;—because it needs a Corroborative Instance and because defects are possible in it ; the defect being that it is

annulled by Cognition derived from the *Veda* which is equal in authority to Perception.—(2109-2110)

The other party raises an objection—As a rule that alone is regarded as a 'Defect' in argument which is admitted by both parties; in the case in question, Revelation is not a means of valid Cognition, for the Buddhist, who posits only two Means of Cognition (Perception and Inference); then how can there be an 'annulment' of Inference by what is not accepted as a Means of Cognition,—so far as the Buddhist is concerned?

The answer to this (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) is as follows:—

TEXTS (2111-2116).

"WHILE THE VEDA IS CLEARLY BRINGING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THINGS, THE ASSERTION THAT 'IT IS NOT A MEANS OF COGNITION FOR ME' SHOULD NOT BE MADE BY A TRUTHFUL PERSON, BY REASON OF SHEER MALICE. IT CANNOT CEASE TO BE A MEANS OF COGNITION, ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS MALICE AGAINST IT OR BECAUSE IT IS NOT POPULAR; NOR CAN ANYTHING BECOME A MEANS OF COGNITION, ON THE GROUND THAT ONE LIKES IT AND IT IS POPULAR. EVEN THOSE WHO ARE HOSTILE TO THE VEDA DO NOT ASSERT ANY REASON WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION;—BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THEY COULD BE REGARDED AS TRUTHFUL PEOPLE. WHEN PEOPLE, WHO HAVE BEEN INTENT UPON THE STUDY, THE RETENTION AND THE EXPOSITION OF THE VEDA AND UPON THE PERFORMANCE OF ACTS ENJOINED THEREIN, HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO DETECT ANY GROUNDS OF FALSITY, HOW CAN THEY BE DETECTED BY PERSONS WHO HAVE KEPT THEMSELVES ALOOF FROM IT? IT IS ONLY PERSONS WHO ARE FULLY CONVERSANT WITH A THING AND WHO HAVE THEIR PURPOSE CENTRED THEREIN THAT CAN DETECT THE GOOD AND BAD POINTS OF THAT THING. THOSE EVIL-MINDED PEOPLE ON THE OTHER HAND, WHO ARE HOSTILE TO BRAHMAN AND HAVE BEEN FAR REMOVED FROM THE VEDA,—HOW CAN THOSE PEOPLE BARE-FACEDLY SPEAK OF THE GOOD AND BAD POINTS IN THE VEDA?"—(2111-2116).

COMMENTARY.

This is how the *Mīmāmsaka* argues—"Things do not become established or otherwise merely according to one's whim; by virtue of which the mere assertion of the opinion would set aside the validity of Verbal Cognition; what is established by reason must be accepted by both parties; it has been explained that the conviction derived from the Vedic declarations regarding *Agnihotra*, etc. is exceptionally strong; how then can it be said that it is *not* a Means of Cognition? It is a mere assertion of yours, wholly devoid of reason".—Such in brief is what is meant by the *Mīmāmsaka*.

'*Because it is not popular*'—People's agreement constitutes its popularity.

'*Aloof from the Veda*'—*Shākya* and others who keep away from the Veda ; because they are excluded from its study, etc.

'*Who have their purpose centred therein* —i.e. whose *purpose*—ends of life, in the shape of sacrifice, etc.—is *centred*—expounded—in the Veda.

'*Hostile to Brahman*'—i.e. Hostile to the Veda. Or 'Brahman' may be taken as standing for the knowledge derived from the Veda.—(2111–2116)

"Or, it may be that the Inference is not annulled by Verbal Cognition ; even so, the Proposition of the Buddhist is defective ; because it is annulled by Perception and other Means of Cognition ".

This is the idea expounded in the following :—

TEXT (2117).

"THEN AGAIN, THE *eternality* AND *all-pervasiveness* OF THE WORD, IS ESTABLISHED BY AUDITORY RECOGNITION ;—WHO, THEN, COULD EVER CONCEIVE OF THE CONTRARY ? "

COMMENTARY.

This shows annulment by Perception.

For instance, at all times, the Word is recognised by Perception as 'the same' ; hence the eternality of the Word is proved by this Recognition which is called 'Perception'.—And being recognised as 'the same', in all places, Word is proved to be all-pervasive also.—Under the circumstances, who could conceive of the contrary—of the said *eternality* and *all-pervasiveness* ?—No one. The 'contrary' of *eternality and all-pervasiveness* would be *non-eternality* and *non-pervasiveness* (respectively).—(2117)

The position is summed up in the following :—

TEXT (2118).

"FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE FACT OF ITS REMAINING THE SAME AT ALL TIMES AND AT ALL PLACES IS PROVED BY PERCEPTIONAL RECOGNITION ; AND THIS ANNULS IT."—(2118)

COMMENTARY.

'*At all times*',—i.e. in the past, present and future.

'*It*'—the 'contrary' (spoken of in the preceding text).—(2118)

The following *Texts* anticipate and answer the objection that Recognition is not infallible (not always true)—

TEXTS (2119-2120).

"IF IT BE URGED THAT—'IN THE CASE OF SUCH THINGS AS THE FLAME, IT IS FOUND THAT THOUGH IT EXISTS FOR ONE MOMENT ONLY, YET THERE IS RECOGNITION',—THE ANSWER IS THAT IT IS NOT SO; WHAT IS *recognised* IN THESE CASES IS THE *universal*, AND THAT IS ETERNAL, FOR US. IN CASES WHERE THERE IS NOTION OF DIFFERENCE IN REGARD TO ANY ASPECT OF THE THING, ON ACCOUNT OF CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANTIAL CONDITIONS,—THERE IS NO RECOGNITION, AS IS CLEAR FROM THE NOTION OF DIFFERENCE."— (2119–2120).

COMMENTARY.

'*Such things*'—this includes the cases of Hair, nails and grass, etc.—which are cut and grow again,—as also that of water-falls; as in these cases also there is Recognition that these are the same Hairs and Nails, the same grasses, the water-fall, the same river-water and so forth.

This is not right. In all these case what is *recognised* is the *Universal*,—the commonalty—such as 'Fire' (in the case of the Lamp) and so forth; and this Universal is held to be eternal; where then is there any *falsity* in our Premiss? The individual form of these things, which is evanescent, that certainly is not *recognised* (as being the *same*); where then is there any falsity in our Premiss?

'*In regard to any aspect*'—as in regard to the greater or less degree.

'*On account of certain circumstantial conditions*'—the lesser degree being due to going upward.

Question:—How do you know that there is no Recognition in such cases?

Answer:—'*As is clear from the notion of difference*',—it is deduced from the presence of the notion of difference that there is in such cases.—(2119-2120)

The *Mīmāṁsaka* next proceeds to show how the Proposition of the Buddhist (regarding *Veda* being non-eternal) is annulled by *Inferences*:—

TEXTS (2121–2130).

"(1) The notions of the individual *cow-word*, though diverse in points place, time, etc., must all envisage the same *cow-word*,—they do not envisage several words,—because they always appear in the form 'Cow',—like the notion of 'Cow' that appears at the present moment.—(2) The notion of the *cow-word* that appeared yesterday envisaged this same *cow-word*,—because it envisaged the *cow-word*,—like the notion appearing to-day.—(3) This notion envisages that *cow-word*,—for the same said reason,—like the previous notion.—(4) Both notions envisage the same *cow-word*,—like the single notion.—(5) All notions of the 'Cow', divergent as regards place, time, etc., are brought about by the same *cow-word*,—because they are notions of the 'Cow',—like the single notion.—(6) The *cow-word* that was uttered yesterday must exist today also,—because it is envisaged by the cognition of the *cow-word*,—like the same word uttered today.—(7) The *cow-word* that is heard today was heard by me yesterday also; for the aforesaid reason,—like the word uttered yesterday.—(8) All such words as are expressive must be regarded as lasting a long time,—because they bring about the Cognition of the cognisable thing through the apprehension of relationships,—everything that does this has been found to be permanent,—like the 'Universal' aspect of *Smoke*.—(9) That which denotes things through the apprehension of relationships cannot be evanescent,—because it must have its relationship continuing till the time of use,—like the light of the Lamp and the Lightning.—Thus the idea of Word-Sound being non-eternal is annulled by all these Inferences which must be admitted to be perfectly sound. Consequently it becomes established that words are eternal."—(2121–2130)

COMMENTARY.

"(1) The notions that appear in connection with the individual *words* '*Cow*',—though divergent through diversities of place, time, quick, middling and prolonged, and so forth,—all envisage the same word,—they do not envisage diverse words,—because they all appear in the same form 'Cow',—like the notion of the *cow-word* appearing at the present time.

"Or, (2) Whenever there is notion of the word 'Cow', it must be taken as referring to the word 'Cow' appearing to-day,—because it envisages the word 'Cow',—like the word appearing to-day;—the notion of the word appearing yesterday envisages the same word.—This is thus a Reason based

"Or, (3) The 'subject' of the Inference may be *the notion of the word appearing to-day*,—'being envisaged by the notion of the word that appeared yesterday' is the Probandum,—'because it envisages the word' is the Probans;—and 'the notion of the word appearing yesterday' is the Corroborative Instance.—This is the argument formulated in the words.—'*This notion envisages, etc. etc.*'—'this notion' stands for the notion appearing *to-day*.—'*That*'—the word 'Cow' apprehended by the Cognition of the word 'Cow' that appeared *yesterday*.—'*For the same said reason*'—i.e. 'because it envisages the word *Cow*'.

"Or, (4) Both—the notions appearing *to-day* and *yesterday*—envisage the same word,—because both envisage the word 'Cow';—like the notion of the single word 'Cow'.—This argument is expressed in the words '*Both, etc. etc.*'. The Reason has not been stated in detail, as it is well-known.

"Or, (5) All notions of the universal 'Cow',—though divergent in regard to diversities of place, time, etc.—are produced by the same word 'Cow',—because they are notions of the Cow,—like the notion of the single Cow.—In the previous argument, the 'Subject' (Minor Term) consisted of 'the notions envisaging the word '*Cow*'.—'envisaging the same object' being the Probandum; while in the present argument, the notions envisaging the universal 'Cow' form the Minor Term,—and 'beng produced by the same word *Cow*' is the Probandum;—this is the difference between the two arguments.

"(6) The compound '*hyastanochchāraṇa*' means 'that which had its utterance yesterday';—this mentions the Minor Term; 'existing to-day' is the Probandum. The rest is easily understood.

"(7) *The word 'Cow' that is heard to-day* is the Minor Term;—'was heard yesterday' is the Probandum.—'*Aforesaid*',—i.e. 'because it is apprehended by the Cognition of the word *Cow*', is the Probans.

"Or, (8) '*all such words as are expressive*' is the Minor Term;—their 'lasting for a long time' is the Probandum;—and 'because they bring about the cognition of the cognisable thing through the apprehension of relationships' is the Probans.—In the compound '*sambandhānubhavā, etc.*' '*sambandhānubhāpēkṣam*' qualifies '*jñeyajñanapravartanam*';—'should be regarded as lasting'; '*for a long time*' qualifies '*lasting*'. The 'lasting character' meant here is in regard to *time*, not in regard to *place*, as in the case of mountains;—this is what is intended to be indicated by the qualifying term 'for a long time'.—'*Like the universal aspect of Smoke*' is the Corroborative Instance; the 'specific individuality' of things cannot have any continuity of existence or concomitance, hence it is the 'universal aspect' alone that can serve as the Corroborative Instance.

"(9) '*Cannot be evanescent*';—this states the same argument negatively.—'*Because it must have, etc. etc.*'.—'*Tādātvika*'—till that time, i.e. till the time of use,—its '*nimitta*',—relationship—should continue."—(2121-2130)

The following objection is raised—In this way, the Jar and such things also may be asserted to be one only. For instance, all notions of the individual Jar, though diverse through divergence of Place, Time, etc. must be regarded

as envisaging one and the same thing, and not as envisaging several things,—because it appears in the form of 'Jar',—like the notion of the Jar appearing at the present moment; and so forth. As a matter of fact, however, such one-ness of the Jar is neither desired nor vouched for by perception. Hence all the Reasonings set forth above must be regarded as *False* (Fallacious).

The answer to this objection (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) is as follows :—

TEXTS (2131-2132).

"IF THE *one-ness of the Jar*, THAT IS URGED AS AN UNDESIRABLE CONTINGENCY, IS IN REFERENCE TO THE 'UNIVERSAL ASPECT',—THEN THE ARGUMENT IS SUPERFLUOUS.—IF HOWEVER, ONE WERE TO URGE THE CONTINGENCY OF THE *individual* JARS BEING *one*, ON THE STRENGTH OF THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS,—THEN IT CAN BE POINTED OUT THAT SUCH AN IDEA WOULD BE CONTRARY TO ALL FORMS OF RIGHT COGNITION; BECAUSE THE MULTIPLICITY OF INDIVIDUALS HAS BEEN DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED BY ALL MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION, SENSE-PERCEPTION AND THE REST."—(2131-2132)

COMMENTARY.

If it is in reference to the 'Universal'—the 'genus', 'Jar'—that *one-ness* is sought to be proved by the above *Reductio ad Absurdum*, then, it is superfluous; as it has been declared—'That aspect of the object which is *Universal*, Common, is eternal, the other aspect is held to be perishable'.

On the other hand, if the *Reductio ad Absurdum* is meant to prove the *one-ness* of the *Individual* Jars,—even so, that does not falsify our premisses. Because such a Proposition is directly annulled by Sense-perception and other Means of Cognition; specially as all the Reasons adduced in this connection have to be regarded as qualified by the condition that 'what they assert is *not annulled*'; how then could there be any falsity in our Reasons ?—Such is the sense of the passage.

'*Would be contrary*, etc. etc.'—That is, the Proposition in question is so contrary.

The rest is easily understood.—(2131-2132)

Again, the *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds to show that the Proposition that 'Words are non-eternal' is annulled by Inference and Presumption.—The Inference that he sets forth is—"When the relation between two things is *not-artificial* (eternal), the two things themselves must be regarded as *not-artificial* (eternal);—e.g. *Ākāsha* and the *Atom*;—and the relation of *Denoter and Denoted* between the *Word* and its denotation in the form of the 'Universal' is not-artificial;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things."

In the following *Texts* the *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds to show that the reason here adduced (that the relation between the Word and its Denotation is *eternal*) is not 'inadmissible':—

TEXTS (2133–2135).

'IF THE RELATIONSHIP IN QUESTION WERE *artificial* (SET UP FOR THE OCCASION), THEN, AS THE PARTICULAR USE WILL HAVE BECOME ACCOMPLISHED AND COME TO AN END,—IT WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO THAT ONE PARTICULAR CASE ONLY, AND WOULD NOT BE UNIVERSAL IN ITS APPLICATION. IN THE *Cow* THERE IS A COMMINGLING OF SEVERAL FACTORS—SUCH AS THE 'EARTH', 'SUBSTANCE', 'BEING', 'TAIL' AND SO FORTH,—THERE COULD BE NO DEFINITE IDEA OF THE 'COW' EXCEPT THROUGH FREQUENT REPEATED USAGE.—FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE WORD IS *not-artificial*; AND IT NEVER PERISHES,—BECAUSE IT HAS AN ETERNAL RELATIONSHIP WITH AN ETERNAL ENTITY—LIKE THE *Ākāsha* AND THE *Ātom.*"—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 359–361].—(2133–2135)

COMMENTARY.

The sense requires the reading '*kṛtrimatve cha sambandhasya*'.

If the Relationship were artificial, then,—inasmuch as the particular use will have been accomplished,—come to an end,—the Word would have come to an end; hence the relationship between the Word and its meaning would not be universal—i.e. applicable to all uses of the Word at all times.—Why?—Because it would be applicable to that one particular case only; i.e. it would apply to one particular Cow only. In support of this a Presumption is put forward—When several Cows are there before one, even though the Universal 'Cow' may be subsisting in a single individual Cow, what is understood is the universal 'Cow' as extracted from the word 'Cow'; and this would not be possible if the Word were not there.—Why it would not be possible is explained in the Words—'*There is a commingling of several factors, etc. etc.*'—This Presumption is based upon the authority of Words.

'*For these reasons Word cannot be artificial*'.—This sums up the Inference.

'*With an eternal entity*'—i.e. the object named 'Universal', 'Community'.—'*Eternal relationship*'—which lasts for all time; just like the relationship of Atoms with *Ākāsha*, which is eternal.—(2133–2135)

The following *texts* reject the 'Inconclusiveness' of the above Presumption :—

TEXTS (2136–2138).

"INASMUCH AS THE WORD, HEARD BUT ONCE, ENVISAGES SEVERAL 'UNIVERSALS' IN AN INDEFINITE FORM, IT CANNOT DEFINITELY POINT TO ITS OWN SPECIFIC DENOTATION, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE OTHER 'UNIVERSALS—(UNTIL IT HAS BEEN USED SEVERAL TIMES).—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE WORD 'COW' WOULD GET AT THE SPECIFIC DENOTATION OF THE PARTICULAR 'UNIVERSAL' 'COW' ONLY AFTER A LONG TIME WHEN IT HAS BEEN HEARD SEVERAL TIMES, AND HAS THEREBY EXCLUDED THE OTHER *Universals*—'LIVING BEINGS', 'THE *quality* OF WHITENESS', THE *action* OF 'MOVING', THE *Universals* 'DEWLAP', 'TAIL', AND ALSO THE *Individuals*, THE 'COW OF VARIEGATED COLOUR', THE 'HORNLESS COW' AND THE LIKE,—WHICH ARE DIVERSE BY REASON OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL PECULIARITIES."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—364–366]—(2136–2138)

COMMENTARY.

This has been thus explained in the *Bhāṣya* (of *Shabara*, on Sū. 1. 1. 19) —"If the word 'Cow' is eternal, it is the same word that is uttered many times and has been previously heard also several times, as applied to other individual Cows ; and thus by a process of positive and negative concomitance the Word comes to be recognised as denoting the particular *Universal* ; for this reason also, the Word must be eternal."

'*Individuals which are diverse, etc. etc.*'—i.e. distinguished by their respective peculiarities ; their diversity is based upon their being cognised as different from one another. Hence the compound '*svasvanibandhanāḥ*' is to be expounded to mean 'which have their diversity based upon the cognition of their respective peculiarities'.

'*Having excluded*' has to be construed with all these.—(2136–2138)

The following might be urged (against the *Mīmāṁsaka*) :—If the Word get at its denotation after a long time,—even so, how does it become proved that the Word exists for all time ?

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2139-2140).

"AND IF THE WORD EXISTED FOR SUCH A LONG TIME, WHO COULD DESTROY IT AFTER THAT?—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—367].—FOR ANOTHER REASON AGAIN IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE WORD TO BE DESTROYED: IN THE CASE OF THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WOULD BECOME DESTROYED EITHER THROUGH DECAY OR THROUGH SOME WEAPON; THERE IS NO SUCH CAUSE BY WHICH THE WORD COULD BE DESTROYED."—(2139-2140)

COMMENTARY.

'*For such a long time*',—i.e. during which time it denotes its own meaning after excluding so many other factors.

Says the Opponent:—In the case of the Jar, etc. it is found that though they continue to exist for a long time, yet they come to be destroyed by the stroke of a stick or some such thing; the same may be the case with *Word* also.

The answer to this is—"*For another reason, etc. etc.*".—'*Bhūyaḥ*' —again.

Things like the Jar undergo destruction either by decay or by the stroke of some weapon; there is no such cause for the destruction of the Word.—Why?—Because the Word is incorporeal, while the Jar and other things are corporeal.—(2139-2140)

It has been declared (under *Text* 2131, above) as follows:—'If the oneness of the Jar, that is urged as an undesirable contingency, is in reference to the Universal aspect, then the argument is superfluous.—If however, one were to urge the contingency of the *Individual* Jars being one, on the strength of the above arguments, then it can be pointed out that such an idea would be contrary to all Forms of Right Cognition'.—What has been said there is equally applicable to the present case: For instance—If the one-ness urged is in regard to the 'Universal' aspect of the 'ga' and other letters (composing the word '*Gavḥ*'), then it is superfluous, and so forth, all the rest of it may be repeated. Because in view of the diversity of Place, Time and Speaker, the Individual Letters—*Ga* and the rest are *many*; and it is in these that the 'Universal' *Cow* subsists; and in the same way, the *Universal* aspect of the letter '*ga*' is held to subsist in the individual letter; so the two cases are exactly similar in all aspects [and on the same grounds that the individual *jars* cannot all be the same the individual word 'Cow', or the individual letter '*ga*', cannot all be the same].

Anticipating this argument, the *Mīmāmsaka* offers the following answer:—

TEXT (2141).

"EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF PLACE, TIME AND USER,—THERE IS NO DIVERSITY IN THE LETTER '*Ga*' AND THE REST; AS THE 'RECOGNITION' IN THEIR CASE IS CLEAR AND DISTINCT."—(2141)

COMMENTARY.

From Perception, in the shape of *Recognition,* it is proved that the Individuals (letters) are one;—Inference can have no validity, as against Perception; Perception being the highest of all Means of Right Cognition. Such is the sense of the text.—(2141)

Objection :—Diversity of the Letters is proved by such diversities in their pronouncing as *fast, middling, slow* and so forth; under the circumstances, how can it be said that their Recognition as being the same is clear and distinct?

The *Answer* to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2142).

"EVEN WHEN THERE IS DIVERSITY IN THE PRONUNCIATION BEING FAST, ETC., THE INDIVIDUAL LETTER '*ga*' IS NOT CLEARLY COGNISED AS AN ESTABLISHED ENTITY, DISTINGUISHED FROM THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL LETTER '*ga*'."—[*Shloka-vārtika—Sphoṭa,* 22].—(2142)

COMMENTARY.

'*Established*'—not merely conceived or fancied.

'*Distinguished*'—distinct, separate, different.

'*Ga-vayakti*'—stands for '*gakāravyakti*', the Individual letter-sound '*ga*'.

What is meant is that Recognition having established the identity among the individuals, there can be no 'other' Individual at all.—(2142)

Says the Opponent—What is *recognised* is only the *Universal aspect* of the Letter '*ga*',—not the individual aspect; how can there be said to be a *recognition* of the Individuals?

The answer (of the *Mīmāmsaka*) to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2143).

"THE INDIVIDUAL LETTER '*Ga*' HAS NO EXISTENCE APART FROM THE SUBSTRATUM OF THE UNIVERSAL '*Ga*',—BECAUSE IT CAN NEVER BE APPREHENDED BY ANY COGNITION OTHER THAN THAT OF '*Ga*',—JUST LIKE THE UNIVERSAL '*Ga*' POSTULATED BY THE OTHER PARTY."—[*Shloka-vārtika—Sphota*, 32]—(2143)

COMMENTARY.

'*Gānyabuddhyanirūpyatvāt*'—Because it is not apprehended—cognised—by any cognition except that of the letter '*Ga*'.

'*Like the Universal, etc. etc.*'—Because the view of the other party is that '*Universals* are without universals'.—(2143)

TEXT (2144).

"THE SAME CONCLUSION COULD BE PROVED ON THE GROUND OF ITS BEING A *Letter*, LIKE THE LETTER '*Kha*'.—AS A MATTER OF FACT THE CONTRARY OF THIS IS NEVER PERCEIVED; HENCE THE SAID CONCLUSION CANNOT BE SAID TO BE ANNULLED BY PERCEPTION."—[*Shloka-vārtika—Sphoṭa*, 34]—(2144)

COMMENTARY.

'*The same conclusion*'—the denial of the individual 'Ga' apart from the Universal.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—The Letter 'Ga' cannot be entirely differentiated from the substratum of the universal 'Ga',—e.g. the letter 'Kha',—and 'Ga' is a letter;—hence here there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the Contrary,—as 'being Letter' is invariably concomitant with the contrary of being the substratum of the Universal 'Ga'.

That the Conclusion of this argument is not sublated by Perception is shown by the words—'*The contrary of this, etc. etc.*'—'contrary' stands for *difference* between the two.—'*Dṛṣṭam*'—Perceived fact.—(2144)

The following might be urged:—The argument adduced is *superfluous*, as addressed to the Buddhist. Because the idea of 'oneness' is held by him to be based upon 'the exclusion of others', and not upon any Universal in the shape of 'Ga' as apart from the Individuals; so that even when the Universal 'Ga' is denied as a distinct entity, the 'one-ness' of the Letter does not become established on the basis of the idea of 'one-ness',—as it is based upon the 'exclusion of others'.

This objection is anticipated and answered (by the *Mīmāṁsaka*) in the following :—

TEXTS (2145-2146).

" THE ENTITY IN THE FORM OF THE ' LETTER ' IS ADMITTED BY BOTH PARTIES ; IT IS ONLY RIGHT THEREFORE THAT ' ETERNALITY ' AND OTHER CHARACTERS,—WHICH ARE ATTRIBUTED TO AN ASSUMED ENTITY,—SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO WHAT IS ADMITTED BY BOTH PARTIES. THUS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE ONE IDEA ARISES OUT OF THE ONE-NESS OF THE LETTER. AS REGARDS THE IDEAS OF PECULIAR FEATURES, THAT WOULD BE DUE TO THE DIVERSITY IN THE CHARACTER OF THE MANIFESTING AGENCY."—[*Shlokavārtika—Sphoṭa*, 18, 23].—(2145-2146)

COMMENTARY.

" Why is it that leaving aside the *Letter* itself,—which is admitted by both parties,—such characters as ' eternality ', ' multiplicity ', ' pervasiveness ' and the rest are attributed to an assumed entity, in the shape of the ' exclusion of others ',—as is clear from such assertions as ' the class and the property thus become determined ' ? The right thing to do would be to attribute all these to what is admitted by both parties ; as otherwise there would be the necessity of assuming much that is never perceived at all. —Hence it follows that the *Recognition* of the Letter as one and the same must be due to the one-ness of the Letter itself."

Question :—If that is so, then how could there be such diverse notions regarding the Letter, as *short*, *medium* and *loud* ?

Answer :—' *As regards, etc. etc.* '—' *Manifesting agency* '—consisting of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air (proceeding from the throat of the speaker).—(2145-2146)

As a matter of fact, Air is never apprehended by the Ear ; conjunctions and disjunctions also of the Air must be inapprehensible by the Ear ; under the circumstances, unless the manifesting agency is apprehended, how can the *manifested* (property) be apprehended ? For example, until the Light is seen, there is no perception of the Jar illumined by it.

With the above idea in his mind, the Opponent of the *Mīmāṁsaka*

TEXT (2147).

ONE FOR WHOM BOTH ARE AMENABLE TO AUDITORY PERCEPTION CO HAVE THE DUAL NOTION ; FOR YOU HOWEVER, THE *pitch* (OF TE LETTER-SOUND) BEING BEYOND THE SENSES, HOW COULD THE SAID PECULIAR FEATURES BE DUE TO THE *pitch* ?— [*Shlokavārtika—Sphoṭa*, 38].—(2147)

COMMENTARY.

'*One for whom*'—i.e. the Grammarian and others, according to w the manifester consists of the letter-Sound in the form of *ghoṣa* (articulat not of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air,—for such men both, *Manifested* (letter-Sound) and the *Manifester* (articulation), are appreher by auditory perception ; for such people, there may be the two notior the notion of all as *one*, and also the notion of the peculiarities of the p etc. But for you, the *Mīmāṁsaka*, how could the Pitch, which is in the f of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air, bring about the notion of peculiarities,—as such Pitches, etc. are not perceptible by the Ear ?—(2

To the above objection, the *Mīmāṁsaka* makes the following answe

TEXT (2148).

" SOME PEOPLE ASSERT THAT WHEN A WORD-SOUND IS COGNISED BY EAR AS AFFECTED BY THE DEGREE OF THE PITCH,—THEN IT IS THAT THERE IS APPREHENSION OF THE PECULIAR DEGREE OF PITCH, BROUGHT ABOUT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS BEING MIXED UP WITH THE WORD-SOUND." —[*Shlokavārtika—Sphoṭa*, 39].—(2148)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tadupashleṣa*'—being mixed with the Word-Sound.
'*Tasya*'—of the Pitch.
'*Bodhaḥ*'—apprehension.

'*Some people assert*'.—What these people mean is that, though pure h by itself is not apprehended by the Ear, yet when it is mixed up with nd, it does become so apprehended ; and hence the dual notion comes ut.—(2148)

The following *Text* justifies the dual notion, even under the view that e is no apprehension of the Pitch :—

TEXT (2149).

R, THERE MAY BE NO APPREHENSION OF THESE (PITCHES) ; IT IS ONLY HE COGNITION OF THE WORD-SOUND THAT IS BROUGHT ABOUT THROUGH THE PITCH. AS FOR THE DEGREES OF THE PITCH,—IN THE SHAPE OF INTENSITY, ETC.—THEY ARE COGNISED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IMPRESSIONS (MADE BY THE SOUND-PITCH)."—[*Shlokavārtika—Sphoṭa*, 40]. —(2149)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tēṣām*'—of the Pitches ; consisting of the conjunctions and disjunctions ir.

Question :—How can there be a cognition of the *Manifested* when the ifester is not cognised ?

Answer :—'*It is only, etc. etc.*'—'*Tadvaṣāt*'—through the Pitch ; i.e. he mere presence of the Pitch.

Question :—There may be apprehension of the mere form of the Word-nd ; how is there the apprehension of the degrees of the Pitch ?

Answer :—'*They are cognised, etc. etc.*' ;—When the more intensive h produces an intensive impression on the Ear, then that intensity is ised in the Sound ; on the other hand, when the impression produced is x, the Sound is perceived as weak. Thus the varying degrees of the h are apprehended in accordance with the impression made upon the —(2149)

Says the Opponent :—The varying degrees of Pitch resides according ou, in the *Manifester*, not in the *Manifested* (Sound) ; these degrees there-would be unapprehended because the *Manifester* itself is not apprehended ; er the circumstances, without apprehending the degrees of Pitch in the *ifester* how could one attribute it to the Word-Sound ? Until the Water been apprehended, it is not attributed to—imposed upon—the Mirage ?

TEXTS (2150–2153).

'THOSE WHO HAVE THEIR MINDS PERVERTED BY THE DISORDERS OF BILE PERCEIVE THE *sweet* AS *bitter*, AND *white* AS *yellow*;—THOSE WHO ARE RUNNING FAST, OR SAILING IN A BOAT, MISTAKE THE HILL AND OTHER OBJECTS TO BE MOVING; THOSE WHO HAVE APPLIED THE FAT OF THE FROG TO THEIR EYES MISTAKE THE PIECE OF BAMBOO TO BE A SERPENT.—IN THE SAME MANNER, THROUGH THE HIGHER AND LOWER INTENSITIES OF THE INDIVIDUALS, PEOPLE HAVE THE IDEA OF THE *Universal* AS BEING THE SUBSTRATUM OF THOSE INTENSITIES. —JUST AS, IN THE CASES CITED, PEOPLE HAVE THE IDEAS (OF *bitterness*, ETC.) WITHOUT HAVING ANY PERCEPTION OF THEIR CAUSES (IN THE SHAPE OF THE DISORDERED BILE, ETC.)—SO, IN THE CASE IN QUESTION, WITHOUT COGNISING THE VARYING DEGREES OF PITCH IN THE MANIFESTER, THERE WOULD BE A MISTAKEN IDEA OF THESE IN CONNECTION WITH THE MANIFESTED."—[*Shlokavārtika—Sphoṭa*, 41–44].—(2150–2153)

COMMENTARY.

Through the disorders of Bile, people apprehend the sweet thing as bitter, without having any idea of the character of the Bile;—similarly while running fast or sailing fast on a boat, people are led to the mistaken notion of the Hill and other objects moving along;—similarly when one applies the fat of the frog to his eyes, he perceives bamboo-pieces as serpents;—similarly, through the varying degrees of intensity in the Individuals, people have the idea of the Universal as being the substratum of those degrees; 'Being' being the largest, highest, Universal, and the 'Cow' and the like being the lesser, smaller, Universals.—If it were not so, then, *being eternal* and *all-pervasive*, all Universals would be equal; and in that case to what could the 'largeness' or 'smallness' of the Universals be due?—Hence the conclusion is that—just as people have the notion of Bitter in connection with the Sweet thing, without having any notion of the Bile to which the misconception is due,—so also, in the case in question, without apprehending the larger or smaller intensity in the *Manifester*, people would have the misconception of these in connection with the *manifested* Sound.

'*Abudhvā*', '*without cognising*';—the sequence of the nominative agent is in reference to the action of 'misconception'; otherwise the Pastparticipial affix '*Ktvā*' would not be possible.—(2150–2153)

Question:—How do you know that the idea of Larger and Smaller intensity that appears in connection with Sound is due to extraneous circumstances, and the Sound itself has no such diversity?

Answer (from the *Mīmāmsaka*):—

TEXTS (2154-2155).

"THE DISTINCTION IN THE LETTER ITSELF INTO *short*, ETC. WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF ETERNALITY (OF WORDS); FOR, HOW CAN THE LETTER, WHICH IS EVER PRESENT, BE SAID TO BE *measured by duration*? CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS THE *articulation* OF THE LETTER THAT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS *measured by duration*, FOR ONE OR TWO MOMENTS; THE LETTER ITSELF CANNOT BE MEASURED BY DURATION."—[*Shlokavārtika—Sphoṭa*, 50-51]. —(2154-2155)

COMMENTARY.

'*Short, long, etc.*'. The '*etcetera*' includes the *Long*, the *ultra-long*, the High Pitch, the Low Pitch, the Middling Pitch, and the '*Ṣaḍja*' and other musical notes.

'*Would be contrary, etc. etc.*'—That is, because the *Eternality* of the Letter has been established by *Recognition*.—(2154-2155)

In the following text, the Opposite view is put forward—that the said 'manifestation' cannot be admitted—

TEXTS (2156-2157).

THE MANIFESTATION OF WORD-SOUND BY ARTICULATION IS NOT POSSIBLE: THAT MANIFESTATION COULD BE DUE TO THE EMBELLISHMENT EITHER OF THE SOUND ITSELF, OR OF THE SENSE-ORGAN CONCERNED, OR OF BOTH. IF IT WERE THE SOUND THAT WAS EMBELLISHED, THEN IT WOULD BE COGNISED BY ALL AS SO EMBELLISHED; AND IT BEING IMPARTITE AND ALL-PERVADING, THERE COULD BE NO EMBELLISHMENT OF IT IN ANY PARTS.—(2156-2157)

COMMENTARY.

If there were *manifestation* of the Word-Sound by the conjunctions and disjunctions of Air, it could be through the embellishment of the Sound itself, or through the embellishment of the Sense-organ, or through the embellishment of both—of the Sound and also of the Sense-organ.—If there were embellishment of the Sound, then when embellished at one place—at *Pāṭaliputra* for instance,—it would become apprehended by people in all places; as it goes everywhere simultaneously.

It might be said that only a part of the Sound becomes embellished.

The answer to that is that *it is impartite*,—not made up of parts, being incorporeal; hence, even though it is all-pervading, it being without parts, how could there be any embellishment *in part*?—(2156-2157)

It might be argued that—as the substratum of the Sound varies, there could be embellishment of it, even though it is without parts,—through that diversity of substratum.

The answer to the above is as follows :—

TEXT (2158).

NOR CAN THERE BE DETERMINATION OF THE EMBELLISHMENT THROUGH THE DIVERSITY OF SUBSTRATUM; BECAUSE SOUND HAS NO SUBSTRATUM AT ALL,—LIKE *Ākāsha* AND *Soul.*—(2158)

COMMENTARY.

Because Sound is all-pervading, like *Ākāsha* and *Soul,*—it is without substratum.—(2158)

Says the other party—As a matter of fact Sound is a quality of *Ākāsha,* and qualities always subsist in the Substance to which they belong ; so that *Ākāsha* would be the substratum (or receptacle) of Sound.

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2159).

IF *Ākāsha* IS THE SUBSTRATUM,—EVEN SO, *Akāsha* ITSELF BEING WITHOUT PARTS, THERE COULD BE NO EMBELLISHMENT *in part*, BECAUSE THE WORD-SOUND IS ALWAYS COGNISED AS A WHOLE.—(2159)

COMMENTARY.

The said *Ākāsha* being without parts, the diversity in the embellishment could not be due to the diversity of the parts of the substratum.

The Opponent argues thus—Though *Ākāsha* is without parts, yet there is diversity among substances coming into contact with *Ākāsha* ; e.g. we have 'the *Ākāsha* in the Jar' and so forth ; so that the *Ākāsha* within the tympanum of one man would be different from that within another man's.

The answer to that is—'*Because the Word-Sound, etc. etc.*'—this is to be construed with the sentence '*there could be no embellishment in part*' ; the sense being that Sound itself is always apprehended as being without parts and such an apprehension would not be possible if the embellishment belonged to only one part of the *Ākāsha.*—(2159)

The following *text* sums up the argument and shows how it is as stated :—

TEXT (2160).

IN AS MUCH AS SOUND EXISTS AS A WHOLE PERVADING OVER THE ENTIRE *Ākāsha*, IT COULD NOT BE COGNISED AS A WHOLE, IF IT WERE EMBELLISHED IN PART.—(2160)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the Word-Sound pervades over the entire *Ākāsha* ; and hence the whole of it could not be cognised if it were embellished only in part.—(2160)

The *Mīmāmsaka's* Opponent now sets forth objections against the view that the embellishment pertains to the Sense-organ [the second alternative view suggested under *Texts* 2156-2157, regarding the variations of Sound being due to embellishments, in the shape of the conjunctions and disjunctions of Sound]—

TEXTS (2161-2162).

UNDER THE VIEW THAT THE AUDITORY ORGAN CONSISTS OF *Ākāsha*, AS THE ORGAN WOULD BE ALL-PERVADING, IT WOULD BE EQUALLY IN CONTACT WITH ALL THINGS ; SO THAT EVEN WHEN THE SOUND IS PRODUCED FAR OFF, IT SHOULD BE HEARD HERE.—IN THIS WAY THE AUDITORY ORGAN ALSO WOULD BE ONE ONLY FOR ALL LIVING BEINGS ; HENCE AT THE TIME THAT ONE PERSON HEARS A SOUND, ALL MEN SHOULD HEAR IT.—(2161-2162)

COMMENTARY.

There are some people who hold that the Auditory Organ consists of *Ākāsha* ; under this view, as *Ākāsha* is one and all-pervading, it would be in equal contact with all Sounds, and hence it should be possible to hear Sounds at a distance also.—The Auditory Organ also would be one and the same for all living beings ; hence when one of them hears a sound, that sound should be heard by all of them ; because the Auditory Organ is one and the same for all. It should be added also that if one man does not hear a Sound, no man should hear it.—(2161-2162)

The following might be urged—The Auditory Organ consists of *Ākāsha* as conditioned by the tympanum embellished by Merit and Demerit ; hence as the Sound heard would be subsisting in the *Ākāsha* as contained in the tympanum,—there would be no room for the two undesirable contingencies just pointed out—viz. : (*a*) that being all-pervading, the Organ would be in equal contact with all Sounds, and (*b*) that there would be one and the same Organ for all living beings.

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2163).

As *Ākāsha* is without parts, the Auditory Organ could not consist of *Ākāsha* as conditioned by Merit and Demerit,—which is essential for the two limitations referred to above.—(2163)

COMMENTARY

For that which is impartite, there can be no *parts*, by virtue of which a certain *part* of *Ākāsha* could constitute the Auditory Organ.

'*The two limitations*'—the limitation that the contact of the Organ with all-Sounds cannot be the same, and that there are several Auditory Organs.—Or the 'two limitations' may be those relating to the *apprehension and non-apprehension* of Sound.—(2163)

TEXTS (2164-2165).

Further, the Auditory Organ, once embellished, should bring about the Cognition of all Sounds; when the Eye is opened for seeing the *Jar*, it does not fail to apprehend the *Cloth*.—This same contingency may be urged also in connection with the Remembrance of the thing (Sound); as the embellishment appertains, without distinction, to the same space in *Ākāsha*.—(2164-2165)

COMMENTARY.

Further, once embellished,—the Auditory Organ should lead to the Cognition of all Sounds,—make them apprehended; as the said Organ would apply in common to all Sounds; and also because the Sounds, being all-pervasive, would be occupying the same perceptible place.

It might be argued that—it is for the purpose of cognition that the Speaker has embellished the auditory organ of the Hearer; consequently the organ would bring about the cognition of that same Sound, not others

The answer to this is—'*When the eye is opened, etc. etc.*'—'It does not fail to apprehend'—i.e. it does apprehend ; that is, on account of the perceptibility of the place being equal.

Question :—Why has the word 'all' been introduced ?

Answer :—'*As the embellishment appertains, etc. etc.*'—All Sounds, being all-pervading in character, occupy the same space in *Ākāsha* ; hence their embellishment also should be without distinction.

In some places, the reading is '*samskāro hyavishēṣataḥ*'. In that case the particle '*hi*' stands for 'because' ;—'*avishēṣataḥ*' stands for '*avishēsēṇa*' ; hence the meaning comes to be—Because the embellishment has been produced in Sounds without distinction,—on account of their occupying the same space,—therefore it should be possible for *all* Sounds to be apprehended (at the same time).—(2164-2165)

The following might be urged—Though the embellishment appertains to all Sounds equally,—yet that Word-Sound alone is actually apprehended which the hearer desires to apprehend,—none other.

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2166).

THE EMBELLISHMENT, WHEN IT COMES, WOULD COME ABOUT BY THE REMOVAL OF THE IMMOBILE AIR-ENVELOPE ; AND IT HAS BEEN FOUND THAT WHEN THE COVERING ENVELOPE IS REMOVED, THE APPREHENSION OF WHAT HAS BEEN THERE FOLLOWS (AS A MATTER OF COURSE).—(2166)

COMMENTARY.

There are two kinds of Air—mobile and immobile ; it is the immobile Air which envelopes Sound, like dense Darkness ;—it is in this Air-envelope that Conjunctions and Disjunctions are produced by the Air proceeding from the Speaker's mouth ;—these Conjunctions and Disjunctions bring about the removal of the said Air-envelope ; removal of the Air-covering is what is meant by the 'embellishment' of Sound,—which cannot mean the strengthening of its characteristic features ; because Sound is eternal and always of one and the same form.

What if it is so ?

'*It has been found, etc. etc.*'—'Found' in scriptures and also in common experience; e.g. when the enveloping darkness is removed, the Jar that is there,—even though its perception may not be desired,—becomes perceived, because it lies in a perceptible spot.—(2166)

[The following might be urged]—It has been asserted (in *Text* 2157) that 'if Sound were embellished, it would be heard by all'; but this incongruity does not arise, because even a single Sound may be embellished for one man, while not-embellished for another; just as the same woman, through difference in relationship, may be *mother* to one and *daughter* to another person.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2167).

THE WORD-SOUND BEING ONE, IT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS BOTH *embellished* AND *not embellished*; SO THAT ONLY ONE CONDITION SHOULD BE ADMITTED,—NO MATTER WHETHER IT BE COGNISED, OR NOT COGNISED, BY ALL.—(2167)

COMMENTARY.

The Sound being one, the two conditions of being 'embellished' and 'not embellished' cannot belong to it, at the same time; because the *condition* cannot differ from the *conditioned*; so that, as the *conditioned* 'Sound' is one only, its *condition* (embellished or otherwise) must be one only.—As regards the case of one and the same woman being both *Mother* and *Daughter*,—there it is the *name* only that differs, not the thing itself; while in the case in question, the difference is not merely in *name*, as the Sound is there as equally perceptible by all men; whence there could not be perception and non-perception at the same time; and mere change in name cannot deprive a thing of its innate capacity for effective action.

It might be said that the nature of Sound is such that it is perceptible by certain restricted persons only,—so that there would be nothing incongruous in its perception and non-perception at the same time, by reason of the capacity of the particular persons concerned.

This cannot be so; if it were so, then if Sound is not perceived by a man at one time, it would never be perceived by him;—but such is not the case.

Hence, in order to preserve the *one-ness* of the Sound, only one *condition* should be accepted—either the *embellished* or the *unembellished*.

Question:—What would be the result of this?

Answer:—'*So that only one condition, etc. etc.*'—(2167)

The following *Text* puts forward the objection against the view that 'there is embellishment of both, Sound and Sense-organ' (the third alternative view set forth under *Text* 2157):—

TEXT (2168).

THE OBJECTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN URGED AGAINST EACH OF THE OTHER TWO VIEWS ARE APPLICABLE TO THE VIEW THAT THERE IS EMBELLISHMENT OF BOTH. THUS IT IS NOT POSSIBLE IN ANY WAY THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANY *manifester* OF THE SOUND.—(2168)

COMMENTARY.

'*To each of the two views*'—that there is embellishment of the Sound and there is embellishment of the Sense-organ. The objections that have been urged against these are applicable to the view that there is embellishment of both.

'*Thus, etc. etc.*'—This sums up the whole criticism (against the *Mīmāṃsaka's* view).

The following texts set forth the *Mīmāṃsaka's* answer to the above criticism (set forth in *Texts* 2156 to 2168) :—

TEXT (2169).

"THE AUTHOR OF THE *Bhāṣya* HAS EXPOUNDED THE ANSWER TO THE ABOVE,—ON THE BASIS OF THE IDEA THAT THE EMBELLISHMENT PERTAINS TO THE AUDITORY ORGAN. THE DIVERSITY IN THE HEARING BY DIFFERENT PERSONS IS ALSO DUE TO THE DIVERSITY OF THE ORGAN."—(2169)

COMMENTARY.

'*The Author of the Bhāṣya*'.—This is what has been said by him (in *Shabara-Bhāṣya* on 1. 1. 13)—'For one who holds that the Conjunctions and Disjunctions *manifest* (not produce) the Word, the said incongruity (of the Word uttered in *Srughna* being heard in *Pāṭaliputra*) does not arise, because the Conjunctions and Disjunctions operating in one place do not affect the Ear-drum at a distance ; so that the Auditory Organ at a distance does not catch the Word-Sound that is manifested'—(*Translation*, pp. 34-35).

'*Due to the diversity*'—in the Ear-drum.

'*Diversity in hearing*'—diversity in the cognition (of Sound).—(2169)

Question :—How can the embellishment of one thing bring about the manifestation of something else ?

TEXT (2170).

"JUST AS THE LAMP IS REGARDED AS THE *manifester* OF THE JAR, THROUGH THE AID THAT IT AFFORDS TO THE EYE,—SO (IN THE CASE OF THE WORD-SOUND) THE ARTICULATION WOULD BE THE MANIFESTER (OF THE SOUND) THROUGH THE IMPRESSION THAT IT MAKES UPON THE AUDITORY ORGAN."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 42].—(2170)

COMMENTARY.

Just as the Lamp becomes the manifester of the Jar, through the help it accords to the Eye, so the Articulation also, would be the manifester of the Sound through the embellishment of—impression upon—the Auditory Organ.—(2170)

Says the Opponent :—It has to be explained in what way the Articulation brings about the embellishment of the Auditory Organ, which is an accomplished entity.

Answer (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) :—

TEXT (2171).

"THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY SUCH QUESTION AS TO THE FORM IN WHICH THE EMBELLISHMENT IS MADE ; AS THAT QUESTION CAN BE SIMILARLY RAISED IN THE CASE OF THE *production* (OF THE WORD, IN THE EAR) ; AS IN THAT CASE ALSO, THE *capacity* (OF THE THINGS CONCERNED) IS BEYOND SENSE-PERCEPTION."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 43].—(2171)

COMMENTARY.

'*That question can be, etc. etc.*'—The said question can be raised, with equal reason, in regard to the view that 'there is production of Sound in the Ear'. Under the view that Sound is *produced* (not *manifested*) by its causes, the said question could be raised,—'in what form does the *Articulation*, which consists in Conjunctions and Disjunctions of Air,—or any other cause—*produce* the Sound ?'—Because in that case also,—i.e. in the case of the *production* of Sounds being brought about,—the capacity of the causes of the Sounds would be beyond the reach of Sense-perception ; and so it is in the case of the view that Sounds are *manifested* (not *produced*). So the question can be raised, with equal reason, in regard to both the views.—(2171)

Question :—If the *Capacity* is beyond the reach of the Sense-organs,—how then can it be admitted ?

Answer (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) :—

TEXT (2172).

"WHY SHOULD ANY QUESTION OR OBJECTION BE RAISED AGAINST THE *Capacity* OF THINGS, WHICH IS ALWAYS INFERABLE FROM ITS EFFECTS ? AND THE ONLY PROOF FOR IT LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE PARTICULAR EFFECT APPEARS ONLY WHEN THE PARTICULAR CAPACITY IS THERE."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 44].—(2172)

COMMENTARY.

Whether it be the *capacity to manifest*, or the *capacity to embellish*,—in all cases, whatever capacity is there can always be inferred from its effects ; hence no question or objection can be raised against it.

Question :—What is that *effect* which leads to the inference of the *Capacity* ?

Answer:—'*And the only proof, etc. etc.*'—'*Tadbhāvē*' —when the Articulation is there,—then alone is '*tadbhāvitā* '—i.e. the appearance of the effect, in the shape of the cognition of the Sound ; this is the only proof for the existence, in the Articulation, of the capacity to manifest the Word-Sound ;—that is, from the effect, in the shape of the cognition of Sound, there is inference of the said *capacity*.

'*Only* '—this is meant to preclude the idea of *production*.—(2172)

The following *Text* sums up the position :—

TEXT (2173).

"THUS THE CONCLUSION IS THAT IT IS BY MEANS OF THE IMPERCEPTIBLE CAPACITY ALONE THAT THESE (ARTICULATIONS) IMPART AN IMPERCEPTIBLE CAPACITY TO THE SENSE-ORGAN CONCERNED, AND THEREBY APPEAR AS CAUSES OF THE *manifestation* (OF THE WORD-SOUND)."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 45].—(2173)

COMMENTARY.

From all this it follows that these articulations, by means of their imperceptible Capacity, produce, in the Auditory Organ, an imperceptible Capacity, and appear as the causes of *manifestation*—i.e. 'of Words and Sounds ', which has to be added.—(2173)

Question :—Why cannot the Articulations be known (inferred) as the causes of *Production* (and not of *manifestation*) ?

Answer (from the *Mīmāṃsaka*) :—

TEXTS (2174-2175).

"THERE ARE SOME PEOPLE, ACCORDING TO WHOM THE WORD-SOUND IS APPREHENDED BY THE AUDITORY ORGAN, WHEN IT IS PRODUCED BUT NOT IN ACTUAL CONTACT WITH THAT ORGAN ;—FOR THEM, THE *absence of contact* BEING EQUALLY PRESENT IN THE CASE OF DISTANT AND NEAR SOUNDS, THE APPREHENSION AND NON-APPREHENSION BY PEOPLE FAR AND NEAR WOULD BE EQUALLY POSSIBLE ; AND THERE COULD BE NO ORDER OF SEQUENCE, NOR THE GREATER AND LESS *intensity* (OF SOUNDS HEARD)."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 119–121].—(2174-2175)

COMMENTARY.

According to the Buddhists, when Sound is apprehended by the Auditory Organ, it has been *produced* and is *not in contact with the organ* ; in the compound '*aprāptajāta*', '*aprāpta*', 'not in contact', qualifies '*jāta*', 'produced'; because according to their doctrines, the Visual and Auditory Organs are operative *without contact*, and Sound is produced by the conjunction and disjunction of the Primary Elementary Substance (Air).—In accordance with the view of these people, the 'non-contact' with the Auditory Organ would be equally present in the cases of remote, obstructed and approximate Sounds, and their apprehension and non-apprehension by people far and near would be equally possible ; that is, the apprehension by the man near the Sound would be exactly like that by the man far off,—there being no difference between the two.

Nor would there be any apprehension of Sound *in succession* ; in the way that the apprehension by the nearer man comes first and then follows the apprehension by the remoter man.

Nor would there be any such difference in the hearing as that of greater or less intensity,—as is found to be the case in actual experience that the Sound heard by the nearer man is more intense than that heard by the remoter man. So also with the difference in grades of intensity also.—(2174-2175)

Says the Opponent :—Even for the *Mīmāmsaka*, according to whom the Sound apprehended by the Auditory Organ is one that is *in contact* with the organ, and is *not-produced*,—why should the said incongruity not arise ?

In view of this question, the *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds to draw a distinction (between the two cases) :—

TEXTS (2176–2180).

'HUS, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE VEDIC SCHOLAR ALSO, LET US EXAMINE THE MATTER : IT IS AN UNDOUBTED FACT THAT (IN SPEAKING) THE AIR WITHIN THE BODY, ON THE IMPACT OF THE MAN'S EFFORT, ISSUES FORTH ; AND IN THUS ISSUING FORTH, IT UNDERGOES CONJUNCTION AND DISJUNCTION WITH THE PALATE AND OTHER SPOTS IN THE MOUTH ; AND INASMUCH AS THE AIR ISSUES FORTH WITH SOME VELOCITY, IT GOES ALONG AS LONG AS THE INITIAL MOMENTUM LASTS ;—IT IS ALSO CERTAIN THAT, IN THUS ISSUING FORTH, THE COMPONENT PARTICLES OF THE AIR COME INTO CONTACT WITH, AND BECOME DISJOINED FROM, THE STILL AIR (THROUGH WHICH IT PASSES) ;—HAVING REACHED THE *Ākāsha* IN THE AUDITORY ORGAN, THIS AIR IMPARTS A CERTAIN CAPACITY TO THAT ORGAN ;—AND IT IS ONLY WHEN THIS IS THERE THAT THERE IS COGNITION (HEARING) OF THE SOUND ; FROM WHENCE IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS A CERTAIN 'EMBELLISHMENT' OF THE ORGAN, AND THIS IS THE ONLY IMPERCEPTIBLE FACTOR (THAT IS POSITED). THIS WOULD BE EXACTLY LIKE 'THE CAPACITY TO *produce*' (WHICH IS POSTULATED BY THE OTHER PARTY).—SIMILARLY PECULIAR FORMS WOULD BE INFERRED FROM PARTICULAR FORMS OF THE COGNITION." [*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 121–126].—(2176–2180)

COMMENTARY.

The mention of the *Mīmāmsaka* by the term '*Shotriya*', 'Vedic Scholar', .eant to show that he is not a 'Logician', and in this way, by contrary ;estion, he indicates the superiority of his own view.

Question :—What is the view of these Vedic Scholars ?

Answer :—'*It is an undoubted fact, etc. etc.*'—*The effort* is the form of operation of the Palate and other centres of speech ;—on the impact his effort, there is urged forward, *the Air within the body,*—which issuing from the navel, spreads itself out in the regions of the heart,—revolves he throat and strikes the brain,—then proceeding through the mouth, sues out.

All this is shown by the words—'*In thus issuing forth, etc. etc.*'. When Air issues out, it undergoes contact and disjunction with the Palate, —When thus issuing out, it does not go on as far as *Ākāsha* extends ; es along *as long as the momentum lasts,*—i.e it moves forward in accord- with the momentum imparted to it ;—why ?—because it issues forth *with velocity* ;—when the Air thus goes out, there come about Conjunctions Disjunctions of the particles of that Air *with the still Air*—the calm, obile Air. Thus when it reaches the Ear-cavity, it surely imparts a potency he Auditory Organ. And *when this is there,*—i.e. when the Conjunc- s and Disjunctions of the Air are there,—there is cognition of Sound ; it is on this ground that it is held that there is embellishment of the itory Organ. You yourself hold that there is *production* of Sound by

other sounds or by articulation, and yet you also posit a potency or capacity; so also is the embellishment held by us.—As declared in the *Bhāṣya* (Shabara—on Sū. 1. 1. 13)—' What happens is that the air-particles disturbed by the sound-provoking stroke, strike against the stagnant air-particles and produce Conjunctions and Disjunctions (i.e. ripples) on all sides, which go on spreading as long as the momentum lasts ; the Conjunctions and Disjunctions (Ripples) are not perceived, because the Air (of which they are ripples) is imperceptible ; and as for the Sound, it is heard only so long and so far as the ripples do not cease,—and after they have ceased, the Sound is not heard '.—(*Translation*, p. 35).

Objection :—If that is so, then there is no difference between the view that Sound is *produced* and the view that it is *embellished.*

Answer :—' *Similarly, etc. etc.*'—' *Peculiar forms* ',—i.e. peculiarities of embellishment are possible through the peculiarities in the cognition of the Sound. Hence the apprehension and non-apprehension by remote and proximate persons cannot be similar ; as the embellishment would vary with each person.—(2176–2180)

Question :—Why is there no cognition of Sound when there are obstructions like the intervening wall ?

Answer (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) :—

TEXTS (2181-2182).

" THE INTERCEPTION CAUSED BY OBSTACLES LIKE THE WALL IS QUITE POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF *Air*. THE STRIKING AGAINST THE TYMPANUM (OF WHICH WE ARE AT TIMES COGNISANT) IS DUE TO THE FORCE OF THE AIR-CURRENT. AND INASMUCH AS THE AIR PROCEEDS IN SUCCESSION AND HAS A WANING INTENSITY AND VELOCITY, IT BECOMES THE CAUSE OF THE SEQUENCE AND VARYING GRADES OF INTENSITY OF THE EMBELLISHMENT PRODUCED BY IT."—(*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 128–130].—(2181-2182)

COMMENTARY.

Though Sound is not subject to interception, yet, inasmuch as the Air and the Wall are both corporeal substances, they are liable to obstruction and interception ; and hence the Air does not reach the Ear (when there is an intervening wall) ; and hence there is no embellishment of the organ ; this is the reason why there is no hearing of the intercepted Sound.—The criticism urged therefore is applicable to those for whom there is perception of Sound without its actually reaching the Ear.

To the question—How then is there the diversity of greater and less intensity ?—the answer is—' *The striking against, etc. etc.*'—The verb ' *yujyatē* ', ' is possible ', has to be construed with all these sentences.

'*Has a waning intensity, etc. etc.*'—The construction is—The *liability to wane* and *velocity* are both possible in Sound.—Or the compound may be expounded to mean that 'the velocity is liable to wane' (*Karmadhāraya*); or 'the Sound has a velocity which is liable to wane' (*Bahuvrīhi*).

The construction is that—'On these grounds the varying grades of intensity become quite explicable'.

The sequence in the embellishment also becomes explicable, because of the sequence in the Air-current; *high intensity* becomes explicable on the ground of the Air having velocity; and *low intensity* becomes explicable, as being due to the *waving* character of the velocity.

The term '*ādi*' is meant to include other variations in the Sound.—(2181-2182)

Says the Opponent—Under the view that the Auditory Organ is *Ākāsha*, if there is embellishment of the organ, there are various objections against this as pointed out above—such as 'Being all-pervasive, there would be equality of contact with all Sounds and all organs' (*Text* 2161);—how then is it that the Author of the *Bhāṣya* (*Shabara*) has provided the Answer on the basis of the 'embellishment of the Auditory Organ'?

The Answer to this (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) is as follows:—

TEXTS (2183-2184).

"WE DO NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT THE IDEA OF THE AUDITORY ORGAN CONSISTING OF *Ākāsha*; NOR CAN *Ākāsha* BE REGARDED AS BEING *without parts*;—BECAUSE SUCH AN IDEA HAS BEEN NEGATIVED BY THE *Jaina* AND THE *Sāṅkhya*.—CONSEQUENTLY THE AUDITORY ORGAN MAY BE A PART OF *Ākāsha*, OR IT MAY BE A DISTINCT ENTITY BY ITSELF;—THUS THERE IS A SEPARATE AUDITORY ORGAN FOR EACH PERSON,—WHICH IDEA IS BASED UPON PRESUMPTION DUE TO THE FACT THAT WELL-KNOWN EFFECTS CANNOT BE EXPLAINED EXCEPT ON THAT BASIS."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 66–68].—(2183-2184)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this is that the objections urged against that theory are not applicable to the *Mīmāmsaka*, who does not accept that theory.

'*Nor can Ākāsha be regarded as being without parts*'—The verb '*abhyupēyatē*' (is accepted) has to be construed here also.

Why?

'*Because such an idea has been negatived by the Jaina and the Sāṅkhya*'.—The *Jainas*—the *Ārhatas*,—as well as the *Sāṅkhyas* have rejected that idea. It is not that the *Mīmāmsakas* do not make use of the conclusions of other people; they accept anything that is found to follow from reason; if they did not do this, they would cease to be '*Mīmāmsakas*' (Rationalists). Consequently, even if they accepted the *Jaina* and *Sāṅkhya* idea of the Auditory Organ consisting of *Ākāsha*, they would be doing nothing objectionable. '*Or it may be a distinct entity by itself*',—called the 'Ear-drum'.

'*Presumption due, etc. etc.*'—i.e. based upon the fact that the phenomenon of the *hearing of Sound* cannot be explained except on the basis of this idea. —(2183-2184)

Or, even the view that the Auditory Organ consists of the *indivisible Ākāsha*, is not open to the said objections.—This is what is explained in the following :—

TEXT (2185).

" EVEN IF THE AUDITORY ORGAN (AS CONSISTING OF THE *indivisible Ākāsha*) WERE ALL-PERVADING AND ONE,—THE EMBELLISHMENT DUE TO ARTICULATION COULD AFFECT ONLY THE MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM OF THAT ORGAN ; HENCE THAT MAN ALONE HEARS THE SOUND THE SUBSTRATUM OF WHOSE ORGAN IS AFFECTED BY THAT EMBELLISHMENT."—(*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 68-69].—(2185)

COMMENTARY.

'*Vyāpi*'—'*Ēkam*'—qualify '*Shrotram*' (understood).

Even so, that man alone, no other, hears the Sound whose 'Ear-drum', as the substratum of the Auditory Organ—is affected by the embellishment due to articulation.

What is meant by this is that the embellishment affects the *substratum*, not the Auditory Organ ;—and as the substratum varies with each person, the objections in question do not apply at all.—(2185)

The following *Text* explains that the said objections do not apply even if the embellishment is regarded as affecting the Auditory Organ itself :—

TEXT (2186).

" EVEN IF THE EMBELLISHMENT AFFECTS THE *organ* ITSELF,—AS IT COULD AFFECT THE ORGAN ONLY THROUGH ITS SUBSTRATUM, THAT ORGAN OF WHICH THE EAR-DRUM HAS NOT BEEN EMBELLISHED WOULD NOT CATCH THE SOUND."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 69-70].—(2186)

COMMENTARY.

'*Substratum*'—the Ear-drum ; it is through this Ear-drum that there is embellishment of the Auditory Organ,—not by itself. It is for this reason that in the case of persons at a distance, or with mind preoccupied, or asleep or in a swoon,—Sound is not heard, because the substratum of the organ has not been embellished.

The compound '*asaṃskṛta, etc. etc.*' is to be explained as 'that organ of which the Ear-drum has not been embellished'.

In the word '*adhiṣṭhānadēshataḥ*', the '*tasi*'-affix at the end has the sense of the *Locative*.—(2186)

Says the Opponent :—If the articulations embellish the substratum, or the organ as subsisting in that substratum,—how is it that the Sounds whose presence is apprehended here and there do not come to embellish the substratum of the organs of all living beings ?

Answer (from the *Mīmāṃsaka*) :—

TEXT (2187).

"THERE IS NO EMBELLISHMENT OF THE AUDITORY ORGAN, IF AND WHEN THE ARTICULATION DOES NOT REACH THE LOCUS OF THE ORGAN ; THUS THE RESTRICTION ON THE EMBELLISHMENT BECOMES DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF THE DIVERSITY IN THE SUBSTRATUM (OR LOCUS) OF THE ORGAN."—[*Shlokavārtika* —ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 70-71].—(2187)

COMMENTARY.

Even if Articulations tend to embellish the substratum, or the organ localised in that substratum,—in either case, it is only when they actually get at the object to be embellished that they produce the embellishment; not when they do not get at it. Hence the embellishment cannot affect the substratum of the organs of all persons.

The mention of the 'Auditory Organ' in the *Text* is only by way of illustration; for the matter of that there is no embellishment of the *substratum* also.

In some places, the reading is '*aprāptakarṇadēshādvā*'. Under that reading, the meaning would be that the answer given before was based upon the idea of the embellishment affecting the Organ through its substratum ; while the answer provided under the clause in question is that—even when there is no embellishment of the Organ through the embellishment of its substratum, there can be no objection to the view put forward; because only those *air-particles* are fit for bringing about the embellishment which have actually reached the base of the Ear-drum,—not those that have not got at it; it is with this other answer in view that the clause has been added.

'*Thus, etc.*'—This sums up the explanation.—(2187)

The following text sets forth an objection raised by the Opponent against [illegible] explanations detailed above :—

TEXT (2188).

" The Opponent may argue as follows—' Having become embellished in one substratum, the Auditory Organ should bring about the cognition of the Word-Sound in all bodies,—according to one who holds the view that the Auditory Organ is one only (for all) '."—
[*Shlokavārtika*—Eternality of Words—
71–73].—(2188)

COMMENTARY.

The Auditory Organ being one only, it cannot have the two mutually contradictory characters of *being embellished* and *being not-embellished*; hence when there would be embellishment in one, the organ being the same in all bodies, it would become embellished in all bodies; hence the Sound should be heard by all, even by the deaf;—for one who holds the view that the Organ is one only, for all. And in that case, there could be no deafness at all.—(2188)

The answer to the above objection (provided by the *Mīmāmsaka*) is as follows:—

TEXT (2189).

" The appearance of the Cognition (of Sound) is held to take place in the bodies of Persons; consequently, by reason of the principal factor (Bodies) occupying different places, the embellishment of the Auditory Organ is inefficient to that extent."—
[*Shlokavārtika*—Eternality of
Words, 72-73].—(2189)

COMMENTARY.

Though ' Persons '—in the shape of Souls—are all-pervading, yet the view of the *Mīmāmsakas* is that Cognitions appear only in the bodies that are adopted by the Souls by virtue of their merit and demerit. Hence as this principal factor in the shape of the bodies would be occupying different

points in space, the embellishment in question, of the Auditory Organ,—even though the Organ is all-pervading—*remains inefficient* (in the bringing about of the Cognition of Sound in all persons); hence there is no room for the objection that has been urged.

In some manuscripts the reading is '*sātra saṁskṛtiḥ*'; in which case, the construction would be—'*sā saṁskṛtiḥ shrotrasya*', 'that embellishment of the Auditory Organ'.—(2189)

Says the Opponent—The Soul being all-pervading, the cognition of the Word-Sound in all places should be irresistible.

The *Mīmāṁsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2190–2192).

"EVEN THOUGH, ACCORDING TO US, THE SOUL IS WITHOUT PARTS AND IS CONSCIOUS OF ALL THINGS EVERYWHERE, YET IT ACTUALLY APPREHENDS THE THING IN THE BODY ONLY; AND THERE CAN BE NOTHING WRONG IN THIS EXPLANATION. [*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 73-74.]—ON THE SAME GROUNDS DOES DEAFNESS ALSO BECOME LIMITED IN SCOPE; IT DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE EXPERIENCE OF ANOTHER SOUL, BECAUSE IT IS INFLUENCED BY MERIT AND DEMERIT (WHICH VARIES WITH DIFFERENT SOULS).—JUST AS WHEN THE VILLAGE-LORD HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THE LORDSHIP, THOUGH CONTINUING TO LIVE IN THE VILLAGE, DOES NOT ENJOY THE PRIVILEGES OF THE LORDSHIP,—SO THE SOUL OF THE DEAF MAN DEPRIVED OF THE AUDITORY ORGAN IN THE BODY, THOUGH CONTINUING TO DWELL IN THE BODY, DOES NOT ENJOY THE EXPERIENCE (OF HEARING SOUNDS), WHICH OTHER MEN ARE HEARING."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 76–78].—(2190–2192)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows :—

Though it is as stated, yet the actual cognition of Sound by the Soul appears only within the limits of the body with which it has been equipped by reason of its Merit and Demerit; hence the objection urged is not applicable.

Question :—The Soul being the same, how can there be such differentiation as cognition and non-cognition and embellishment and non-embellishment of the Auditory Organ ?

Answer :—There is no force in this. Though *Ākāsha* is without parts yet, on account of the diversity of the objects with which it comes into contact, it becomes subject to distinctions as '*ākāsha* in the Jar', '*ākāsha* in the Pot' and so forth; the same would be the case in the matter under consideration also.

It is for this same reason that, though the Auditory Organ (as *Ākāsha*) is all-pervading and without parts, yet there are restrictions in the matter of *Deafness*, etc. on account of the diversity among objects with which the organ comes into contact.—This is what is meant by the words—' *On the same grounds, etc. etc.*;'—the ' grounds ' consist in the diversity among objects with which it comes into contact.

Question :—If the objects with which the Organ comes into contact are diverse,—even so, why is it that only a certain person becomes deaf ?

Answer :—' *It does not form part of the experience, etc. etc.*'—That same defective Auditory Organ does not form part of the experience of another person ;—why ?—because it is influenced by Merit and Demerit.

This same idea is further clarified by means of an example.—' *Just as, when the village-lord, etc. etc.*'—The Lord of a certain village, even though continuing to live in the village,—if he is removed by the King from the Lordship,—does not enjoy the same privileges in the same village ;—in the same manner, the deaf man does not hear the Sound, even though another man hears it.—(2190–2192)

Says the Opponent—All the three factors—the Auditory Organ, the Sound and *Ākāsha* being without parts and 'all-pervading,—no *partial* existence is possible for any of them ; then how do you get at the distinction into ' hearing ' and ' non-hearing ' determined by such partial existence ?

Answer (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) :—

TEXT (2193).

" As a matter of fact, the Auditory Organ, the Sound and its substratum have themselves no parts,—and they do not exist at any one place ; even so, our view is not open to objection."—[*Shlokavārtika*—Eternality of Words, 78-79].—(2193)

COMMENTARY.

The Auditory Organ, the Sound, and the substratum of the Sound—i.e. *Ākāsha*,—these themselves have no parts ; yet such parts are attributed to them figuratively through the diversity among objects with which they come into contact ;—this is what is meant by the qualifying term ' themselves '.

' *Even so, etc. etc.*'—' our view ', regarding the partial existence, and restricted apprehension of sound and so forth.—(2193)

Question :—How so ?

Answer (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) :—

TEXT (2194).

HE (VIBRATING) AIR-PARTICLES, WHICH ARE THE MANIFESTERS OF HE WORD-SOUND, HAVE THEIR DIFFERENT PARTS OCCUPYING DIFFERENT POINTS IN SPACE; AND THERE ARE DIFFERENT *kinds* OF THEM ALSO;—AND IT IS THROUGH THIS THAT THE EMBELLISHMENT BECOMES REGULATED."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 79-80].—(2194)

COMMENTARY.

They have different parts occupying different points in space; and e are different *kinds* of them also,—due to the difference among the ributory causes in the form of such diverse things as the Palate and the —(2194)

Says the Opponent—It has been already pointed out that, 'on being ellished once, the Auditory Organ should bring about the cognition of all nds' (under *Text* 2164).

The answer to this (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) is as follows:—

TEXT (2195).

JST AS THE AIR-VIBRATION PUT FORTH FOR THE PURPOSE OF ONE OES NOT BRING ABOUT ANOTHER,—IN THE SAME MANNER, THE AIR-VIBRATION, CAPABLE OF BRINGING ABOUT THE EMBELLISHMENT FOR THE APPREHENSION OF ONE LETTER WILL NOT BRING ABOUT ANOTHER."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 80-81].—(2195)

COMMENTARY.

'*For the purpose of one*'—for the producing of another Letter.

'*Capable of bringing about, etc. etc.*'—that *embellishment of the Auditory an* which brings about the hearing of the Letter, is what is spoken of e by the term '*anyavarṇa-samskāra*'; and it is not the *embellishment of Letter* itself that is meant; that it is so follows from the fact that it is embellishment *of the Auditory Organ* that forms the subject-matter of present discussion.

'*Will not bring about another*';—i.e. will not embellish another Letter ough the embellishment of the Auditory Organ.—(2195)

Question:—Why should there be the restriction in the case of the *Air-rations* only?

Answer (from the *Mīmāmsaka*):—

TEXT (2196).

" ONE SET OF CONTACTS WITH THE PALATE, ETC. SERVES TO BRING AB ONLY ONE LETTER-SOUND, NOT ANOTHER ; IN THE SAME MANNER THE CONTACTS BRINGING ABOUT ONE ARTICULATION DO NOT SERVE TO BRING ABOUT ANY OTHER ARTICULATION."—*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 81-82].—(2196)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is that there are different articulations,—in the sh of Air-vibrations—which serve to manifest Sounds ; and they vary the variations in the contact of the Palate, etc.

'*Only one letter, not another*'—'*is brought about*' has to be taken understood.

'*Bringing about* of other articulations'—i.e. the *putting forth of* them

'*Serving to bring about one articulation*'—is to be construed with *contacts of the Palate, etc.*'—(2196)

The argument is summed up in the following—

TEXT (2197).

" FOR THESE REASONS—IN THE *production* AND *manifestation* (OF WO SOUNDS), THE DIVERSITY OF CAPACITY IS EQUALLY PRESENT, IN TH *Effort* AND THE *Desire to Speak*,—SUCH DIVERSITY BEING PRESUMED ON THE BASIS OF CERTAIN EFFECTS (FACTS) WHICH CANNOT BE OTHERWISE EXPLAINED."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 82-83].—(2197)

COMMENTARY.

The word '*utpattyabhivyaktyoḥ*' has the Locative ending,—the mean being—'in the production and in the manifestation of the Word-Sound there is equal diversity of capacity in the Effort and the Desire to Spe —why ?—because the fact of certain well-known effects not being otherw explicable indicates such diversity ; that is, in both cases, the Presumpt based upon the said inexplicability of certain facts is equally operative (2197)

So far the *Mīmāmsaka* has taken for granted (for the sake of argume the idea that the Auditory Organ consists of *Ākāsha*, as postulated un other doctrines,—or that it consists of the Ear-drum as conceived by comm people,—and then proceeded to show that there can be nothing objectiona

of the said Auditory Organ.—He now proceeds to take his stand upon the idea of the Auditory Organ consisting of *space* as described in the Veda, and to show that there can be no objection against the idea of Word-Sound being manifested by the diverse embellishments of that organ :—

TEXTS (2198-2199).

"OR, THE IDEA THAT SHOULD BE ENTERTAINED IS THAT THE AUDITORY ORGAN CONSISTS OF *Space*,—WHICH IDEA WOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VEDA [*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 150] ;—NOWHERE IN THE VEDA HAS IT BEEN SAID THAT THE AUDITORY ORGAN CONSISTS IN *Ākāsha*, ETC.—IN CONNECTION WITH DISSOLUTIONS, IT HAS BEEN DECLARED (IN THE VEDA) THAT THE AUDITORY ORGAN BECOMES DISSOLVED INTO SPACE ; HERE WE HAVE THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ORGANS,—LIKE THE EYE AND THE REST,—BECOMING DISSOLVED INTO THEIR ORIGINAL CONSTITUENTS."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 150-151].—(2198-2199)

COMMENTARY.

'*The idea that the Auditory Organ consists in space*' ; i.e. the conclusion should be accepted that 'Space itself is the Auditory Organ.'

Why so ?

'*Because nowhere in the Veda, etc. etc.*'

If that is so, then, nowhere in the Veda is it found declared that 'Space constitutes the Auditory Organ' ; then why should that idea be accepted ?

Answer :—'*In connection with Dissolutions*, etc. etc.'—'Dissolution' consists in becoming dissolved into the original constituent cause. At the time of the death of living beings, their Eye and other organs become dissolved into their respective original constituent causes ; in connection with the animal that is sacrificed, it is said in the Veda—'May its Eye revert to the Sun, and the Ear to Space',—'may revert' is to be construed with the latter sentence also. '*May revert*'—i.e. may it go to that from where it came. Thus though in the Veda it has not been directly declared that 'Space constitutes the Auditory Organ', yet the sentence 'may the Ear revert to Space' clearly implies that idea which is, thus, as good as asserted.

How so ?

Answer :—'*Here we have the description, etc. etc.*' ;—what the sentence 'may the Ear revert to Space' is meant to describe is the fact that the Ear reverts to its original Constituent Cause, the meaning being—'may the Ear revert to Space, which is its original Constituent Cause'.—'Like what ?'—'*Like the Eye, etc.*'—(2198-2199)

The same idea is further explained—

TEXT (2200).

"JUST AS, IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISUAL ORGAN, IT IS ASSERTED 'MAY HIS EYE REVERT TO THE SUN',—WHICH CONVEYS THE IDEA THAT THE VISUAL ORGAN HAS ITS ORIGIN IN *Light*,—SO, IN THE SAME MANNER, THE AUDITORY ORGAN CONSISTS IN SPACE."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 151-152].—(2200)

COMMENTARY.

Just as in the case of the sentence 'May his Eye revert to the Sun' what is asserted is the idea that the Visual Organ has its origin in Light—the term '*chaksuṣah*' has to be supplied;—in the same manner, what the sentence 'may the Ear revert to Space' asserts is the idea of the Auditory Organ having its origin in, and consisting in Space.—The words are to be construed in this way.

'The idea of Light being the origin'—i.e. the idea of the Visual Organ consisting of Light.—(2200)

Question:—What is this 'Space' like?
Answer (from the *Mīmāmsaka*):—

TEXT (2201).

"SPACE IS ONE AND ALL-PERVADING, AND EXTENDS AS FAR AS *Ākāsha*; WHEN IT BECOMES LIMITED WITHIN THE CAVITY OF THE EAR, IT FORMS THE *Auditory Organ*,—IN THE SAME WAY AS *Ākāsha* DOES (FOR THE OTHER PARTY)."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 152-153].—(2201)

COMMENTARY.

The 'all-pervading character' is explained by the phrase '*it extends as far as Ākāsha*'.

Objection:—If this is so, then, there can be no 'deafness', etc.

Answer:—'*When it becomes limited, etc. etc.*'—The entire Space is not the Auditory Organ; it is only that much of Space as is encased within the ear-cavity.—(2201)

Says the Opponent—Space being without parts, how do you secure the division of its parts (which the foregoing explanation implies)?
Answer (from the *Mīmāmsaka*):—

TEXT (2202).

"THE REASONS THAT THE *Vaishēṣika* CAN ADDUCE IN SUPPORT OF THE VIEW THAT THE AUDITORY ORGAN IS A *part of Ākāsha*, WILL APPLY EQUALLY WELL TO THE IDEA OF ITS BEING A *part of Space*; WITH THIS DIFFERENCE THAT THE LATTER IDEA HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE VEDA."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—153-154].—(2202)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of *Ākāsha*, there is an assumption of parts, on the basis of the objects with which it comes into contact; the same would be the case with *Space* also.

Question :—What then is the difference between this view and the other one under which the Auditory Organ consists of *Ākāsha* ?

Answer :—'*With this difference, etc. etc.*'—(2202)

In the following *Text*, the *Mīmāmsaka* sums up his position and explains the possibility of Deafness, etc.—

TEXT (2203).

"THUS THEN, THE AUDITORY ORGAN CONSISTS OF A PART OF THE SUBSTANCE *Space*, WHICH IS INFLUENCED BY MERIT AND DEMERIT AND WHICH COMES TO BE ENCLOSED WITHIN THE CAVITY OF THE EAR. AND IT IS THIS ORGAN THAT IS *embellished* (BY ARTICULATION)."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 154-155].—(2203)

COMMENTARY.

The *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds to explain that the objections urged do not also affect the view that the embellishment pertains to the *object* (the Word-Sound that is heard).—

TEXT (2204).

"EVEN IF THE EMBELLISHMENT PERTAINED TO THE OBJECT,—IT WOULD AFFECT THAT ONE OBJECT ONLY; AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCE IN THE CAPACITIES OF MEN, THE SOUND COULD NOT BE HEARD BY ALL."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—83-84].—(2204)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued above (under *Text* 2157) that 'if the Word-Sound were embellished, it should be heard by all men'.—This criticism is not

applicable at all.—Why ?—Because on account of the difference in the capacities of men ; this difference in the capacity is due to the fact that in the case of some men the air embellishing the Organ is in close proximity to them, while in others, it is not so.—(2204)

Says the Opponent—The Sound being *one* and *all-pervading*, it must be equally related to all men ; how then could there be apprehension (by some) and non-apprehension (by others) of it ?

Answer from the *Mīmāmsaka* :—

TEXTS (2205-2206).

"JUST AS (UNDER THE OPPONENT'S VIEW) THE WORD-SOUND, THOUGH PRODUCED AND APPEARING EQUALLY WITH REGARD TO ALL MEN, IS NOT HEARD BY ALL, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIVERSITIES OF DIRECTION, PLACE AND SO FORTH,—IN THE SAME MANNER, (UNDER OUR VIEW ALSO) THE SOUND IS HEARD ONLY BY ONE WHOSE AUDITORY ORGAN IS EMBELLISHED BY THE ARTICULATIONS MADE NEAR HIM,—AND NOT BY PERSONS AT A DISTANCE."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—84–86].—(2205-2206)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—How is it known that what proceeds from the Air-vibrations is the *embellishment* of the Object (Sound),—and not the *Object* itself ?

Answer (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) :—

TEXT (2207).

"INASMUCH AS THE IDEA OF THE *production* OF THE WORD-SOUND HAS BEEN REJECTED,—AND AS NO OTHER EXPLANATION OF THE PHENOMENON (OF THE HEARING OF WORD-SOUNDS) IS POSSIBLE, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT WHAT IS PRODUCED BY THE ARTICULATIONS IS THE PARTICULAR EMBELLISHMENT."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—126-127].—(2207)

COMMENTARY.

On the ground of *Recognition*, it has been established that Sound is *one* and *all-pervading* ; hence there can be no *production* of Sound [there can be only *manifestation* of it] ; and from this it is deduced, by implication, that what is produced by the articulations is the *embellishment*, not the *Word-Sound*.—(2207)

Says the Opponent :—It is clearly known that Sound is the effect of the articulations,—from the fact that it appears only when these are there,—just as, on similar grounds, the sprout is known to be the Effect of the Seed.

In this latter case, it is found that the Sprout is seen only when the seed has been there, and from this it is concluded that the Sprout is the effect of the Seed,—in the same manner, Sounds are perceived only when the articulations have been there ; why then, should Sound be not regarded as the effect *produced* by the articulations ? Specially because the said fact is the sole basis for anything being regarded as the effect of something else.

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2208).

" ALL THAT THE FACT OF ONE THING APPEARING ONLY WHEN THE OTHER IS THERE INDICATES IS THE PRESENCE (IN THE LATTER) OF A CERTAIN POTENCY (OR CAPACITY),—JUST LIKE THE POTENCY IN THE AUDITORY ORGAN ; AND THERE THE PRESUMPTION HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO REST."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—127-128].—(2208)

COMMENTARY.

There is hearing of Sound when the Auditory Organ is there ; but this fact of the Sound being heard only when the Organ is there does not lead to the inference that the Auditory Organ possesses the potency to *produce* Sound ; all that can be inferred is that it has the potency or capacity of *apprehending* it. Similarly, in the case in question, all that the fact of Sound being heard only when the articulations are there can justify is the inference that these articulations possess a certain *potency* ;—it cannot indicate the presence in them of the *capacity to produce* Sound ; as the said fact is concomitant only with the presence of the capacity in general,—and not with any particular kind of Capacity. Hence in the proving of the particular kind of Capacity, the said fact, if cited as the Probans, cannot but be ' fallible ', ' inconclusive '.—This is what is meant by the *text*.

Question :—How then is there the idea of the particular Capacity in the ' Embellishment ' ?

Answer :—' *There the Presumption has been allowed to rest.*'—That is, Recognition having established the Eternality of the Word-Sound, the Presumption based upon the fact of the well-known phenomenon of Hearing not being otherwise explicable has been made—by the author of the *Bhāṣya* (Shabara)—to rest in the particular *embellishment* ; and the capacity of this embellishment has not been *inferred* merely from the fact of concomitance (of the Embellishment and the Hearing).—(2208)

Against the view that ' there is embellishment of both (Sound and the Auditory Organ) ' [propounded as an alternative in the commentary on *Text* 2157],—it has been argued (under *Text* 2168) that ' the objections urged against each of the two alternative views are all applicable to the view that there is embellishment of both '.

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2209).

"AS REGARDS THE VIEW THAT THERE IS EMBELLISHMENT OF BOTH, THE ASSERTION THAT IT IS OPEN TO BOTH SETS OF OBJECTIONS IS FUTILE. BECAUSE WHEN SOUND IS NOT HEARD BY ALL, IT IS DUE TO THE DEFICIENCY IN EITHER ONE OF THE TWO."—[*Shloka-vārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—86-87].—(2209)

COMMENTARY.

The assertion made previously that both sets of objections are applicable is futile,—useless.

Why ?

Because, to the deficiency in either one of the two—of the embellishment of the Auditory Organ, or of the embellishment of the object, Sound—is due the fact that Sound is not heard. For instance, even when the embellishment of the Sound is there, the deaf man does not hear the Sound, because his organ is deficient ; and even when there is no deafness, if there is no manifestation of the Sound (by articulation), there is no hearing of the Sound.

The reading in some places is '*mṛṣā doṣadvayē vachaḥ*', the meaning of which is clear.—(2209)

Says the Opponent—If the Word-Sound is all-pervading, how is it that it is perceived as several—just like the Jar,—when there is diversity of place ? As a matter of fact, as it is all-pervading, it should be always perceived in an uninterrupted form. Nor should there be any distinctions of *far* and *near* in the case of what is all-pervading ;—nor can it come in from any place, as it is always present everywhere. Further as it is eternal, there can be no such distinctions as *long* and *short*, or of various degrees of loudness and so forth. Nor again is difference of *time* possible.—From all this it follows that—because Sound is actually perceived as affected and diversified in place, time and form, therefore, like the Jar, it must be *diverse* and *evanescent*. How then is it that the assertion has been made above (under *Text* 2207) that—"Inasmuch as the idea of the production of Sound has been rejected, etc. etc." ?

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to the above is as follows :—

TEXT (2210).

"THOUGH THE SUN IS *one*, YET IT IS SEEN (BY ONE AND THE SAME MAN) AS DIVERSE IN WATER AND OTHER SURFACES AT THE SAME TIME ; AND YET IT DOES NOT MAKE IT *many* ; THE SAME SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE CASE WITH SOUND ALSO."—[*Shloka-vārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 178-179, *though the reading there is slightly different*].—(2210)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant to be shown by this is that the fact of being perceived as diverse in different places, as a Reason for diversity, is 'Inconclusive'.—(2210)

Says the Opponent—In the case of the Sun, there are grounds for the illu-n of *multiplicity*, in the shape of the diverse receptacles in the form of Water l the other reflecting surfaces ; in the case in question however, there is ground for such illusion ; while what we have put forward as the Reason ccompanied by the qualification 'there being no grounds for illusion' ; r then can our Reason be regarded as being 'False and Inconclusive' ?

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2211–2214).

OUND IS HEARD IN ONLY A PARTICULAR PLACE, BECAUSE IT IS DEPENDENT (FOR ITS COGNITION) UPON THE ARTICULATION THAT MANIFESTS IT ; AND ARTICULATIONS HAVE NOT THE CAPACITY TO PERVADE THE ENTIRE SPACE ; CONSEQUENTLY, THE WORD-SOUND IS NOT HEARD CONTINUOUSLY ALL OVER THE WORLD ; AND BECAUSE THE ARTICULATIONS APPEAR IN DIFFERENT PLACES, THE HEARING IS RESTRICTED TO THOSE PLACES ; AND AS THE INTERVENING SPACES (BETWEEN THE ARTICULATIONS) ARE NOT FILLED UP (BY THE ARTICULATION), THERE IS THE COGNITION OF A BREAK (IN THE CONTINUITY OF THE SOUND). AND, AS THESE ARTICULATIONS APPEAR ONLY IN LIMITED PLACES, THERE ARISES THE NOTION THAT SOUND IS NOT ALL-PERVADING. FURTHER, AS THESE ARTICULATIONS HAVE MOVEMENT AND A CERTAIN VELOCITY,—FROM WHATEVER PLACE THESE ARTICULATIONS PROCEED, THE HEARER THINKS THAT THE SOUND THAT HE HEARS ALSO COMES FROM THAT SAME PLACE."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—172–176].—(2211–2214)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is that in the case in question also, there is ground for ion, in the shape of the diversity of the manifesting articulations, so the two cases stand on the same footing.

'*Because it is dependent upon the manifesting articulations*' ;—i.e. the *nition of Sound* is so dependent.

'*That place*'—the place where the articulation has appeared.

'*That*'—Sound.

In what way the manifesting articulation becomes the cause of the on of *interception* is explained by the words—'*and articulations do not the capacity, etc. etc.*' ;—'*asau*' stands for the *Sound* ;—'*the hearing*'—e Sound ;—'*tatra*'—in that part of *Ākāsha*.

'*As the intervening spaces are not filled up*' ;—what is meant is that are not filled up by the articulations.

'*Tēṣām*'—stands for the *articulations*.

'*Tē cha āyānti*'—this also stands for the *articulations*.—(2211–2214)

Says the Opponent—It cannot be admitted that the single Sun is perceived as diverse because of the separateness of space (between the reflecting Media); because what are actually apprehended by the Eye are so many diverse reflected images of the Sun; and it is not the Sun that is apprehended. For you, who do not regard the reflected image to be different from the object reflected,—there can be no cause for the apprehension of several reflected images

This argument of the Opponent is what is referred to in the following :—

TEXT (2215).

" THE OPPONENT SAYS—' BY WHAT CAUSE ARE THE REFLECTED IMAGES PERCEIVED SIMULTANEOUSLY AS DISTINCT IN EACH VESSEL (OF WATER) ? ' "—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 179-180].—(2215)

COMMENTARY.

'*Āha*'—' says '—the Opponent.

'*Simultaneously*'—at one and the same time.—(2215)

The answer to the above is as follows :—

TEXTS (2216-2217).

" OUR ANSWER TO THIS IS AS FOLLOWS :—WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS IS THAT BY THE LIGHT FROM THE SUN SCINTILLATING IN THE WATER, THE LIGHT FROM THE EYE (STRIKING THE WATER) IS TURNED BACK IN THE WAKE OF THE REFLECTED SOLAR LIGHT, AND THUS IT PERCEIVES THE SUN IN ITS OWN REGION,—BUT THERE IS AN ILLUSION OF THERE BEING SEVERAL SUNS OF DIVERSE FORMS, BY REASON OF THE DIVERSITY OF THE VESSELS OF WATER. HOW THEN COULD THERE BE MULTIPLICITY OF SUNS ? "—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—180–182].—(2216-2217)

COMMENTARY.

The solar light in the vessel of Water which flows out makes the light of the Eyes turn back—reflected backwards—and hence, it apprehends the Sun in its own place.

'*Yathāpātram*'—as many as the number of vessels that are there.

It is for this reason that the Sun appears to be of diverse forms. How ıen can there be multiplicity of the Sun ?—It cannot be ; because what is verse is the functioning of the Eye.—(2216-2217)

The following *Text* shows that it is by reason of the peculiar function-g of the Eye that the Sun, though really *one*, is perceived as several :—

TEXT (2218).

ᐯHEN THE EYE IS SLIGHTLY PRESSED BY THE FINGER, EVEN A SINGLE ƆBJECT IS PERCEIVED AS DIVERSE,—BECAUSE OF THE DIVERSITY IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EYE. THE SAME THING HAPPENS IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO,—ACCORDING TO US."—[*Shloka-vārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—182-183].—(2218)

COMMENTARY.

'*Īṣat*'—slightly, a little.—When the Eye is so pressed,—even a single ɔct is perceived as diverse—many ;—why ?—because the functioning of Eye has been diversified. In the same manner, for us, the single Word-nd would be heard as diverse (if there are adequate reasons for it).—18)

TEXTS (2219-2220).

ɾHER PEOPLE WHO HOLD THE VIEW THAT THE REFLECTED IMAGE IS ACTUALLY PRODUCED (AS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE REFLECTED OBJECT) URGE THE FOLLOWING OBJECTION :—' IF THE SAME SUN IS SEEN IN THE SEVERAL VESSELS, WHY IS NOT THE SAME SEEN AS BEING OVERHEAD (OVER ONE'S HEAD, LIKE THE REAL SUN) ? HOW TOO COULD IT BE SEEN BELOW, IN WELLS AND SUCH OTHER DEEP WATER-RESERVOIRS, IF THE REFLECTED IMAGE WERE NOT ACTUALLY PRODUCED THERE ? FURTHER, HOW IS IT THAT WHEN A MAN FACING THE EAST LOOKS AT THE MIRROR, HE PERCEIVES HIMSELF AS FACING THE WEST ? ' "—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—183–185]. —(2219-2220)

COMMENTARY.

It was argued (under *Text* 2210) that 'just as in the Water, the single is seen as diverse, etc. etc.' ; and as invalidating this reason, some people ɛ that the Reflected Image is something entirely different from the ɔcted Object ; and they argue as follows :—

If what is seen (in the reflection), is the same Sun, and not the Reflect Image,—then, how is it that it is not perceived as being overhead ? It cou be so seen if the same Sun had been seen in different places (in the reflecti surfaces)—not otherwise ; as otherwise there would be incongruities.

Further, in the case of the Well, how could there be perception of the Su lying so far deep inside, if its Reflected Image were not produced there?- Certainly the Sun does not actually exist there inside the Well.

Then again, when a man facing the East looks at the mirror, how do he come to face the West ? Certainly a face is not seen to have been pr duced at his back.—(2219-2220)

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to the above is as follows :—

TEXTS (2221–2223).

" WHEN A MAN IS LOOKING AT THE SUN AND THE WATER, HIS EYE (RAYS PROCEED IN TWO WAYS,—ONE UPWARDS AND THE OTHER DOWN WARDS ; THE PERCEIVER DOES NOT PERCEIVE THAT SUN WHICH I ILLUMINED BY THE EYE-RAYS PROCEEDING UPWARDS, BECAUSE I IS NOT IN A STRAIGHT LINE WITH THE BODILY SUBSTRATUM OF TH VISUAL ORGAN ; WHILE WHAT IS PERCEIVED BY THE DOWNWARD RAY IS THE SUN SHINING ABOVE PRESENTED MEDIATELY (INDIRECTLY) AND BECAUSE IT IS THE SAME SUN THAT IS SO PRESENTED, THE OB SERVER THINKS THAT WHAT IS SEEN IS ' BELOW '. IT IS THUS THAT I IS THE SUN ITSELF THAT IS SEEN BELOW, THROUGH THE INTERVENIN MEDIUM (OF THE DOWNWARD RAYS)."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALIT OF WORDS, 186–188].—(2221–2223)

COMMENTARY.

The opinion entertained is as follows :—If the organ were to go ou and then render the Sun cognisable,—then it would be necessary that i should be seen *above*, not below ;—what happens however is that the orga brings about the cognition while it is itself still in the body, and does no move upwards, as has been declared in the following words :—' If the organ going out, were to render the object cognisable there, then it might be a urged ; as a matter of fact, however, it brings about the cognition while sti in the body '.—(*Shlokavārtika*—Eternality of Words, 185-186.)

The whole process is as follows :—Those who see, in the vessel, the Wate as well as the Sun, for these *persons looking at the Sun and the Water*, the singl Visual Organ (in the shape of Rays) proceeds in two ways—one upward an the other downward ;—then the Sun that is illumined by the upward ray

is not seen by the observer ;- –why ?—*because it is not in a straight line with the substratum of the organ* ;—the substratum of the Visual Organ in the body does not lie in a straight line with the Sun ;—but '*mediately*'—through an intervening medium—the Sun is presented to the Visual Rays by the rays of the Sun, and hence becomes seen through the downward rays ;—so that what happens is that the Solar Rays present the luminous object to the Visual Rays, the Visual Rays present it to the Visual Organ, and the Visual Organ presents it to the perceiving observer. This is what is meant by the 'mediate presentation' of the luminous Sun. Thus it is that the Sun, shining *above*, is regarded by the observer as if it were *below*.—Who regards it so ? The observing person ;—and it is not that there is *another* Sun shining below.—Why is this so ?—*Because it is the same* ; i.e. the Sun is one, not diverse.—Others explain '*tadēkatvāt*' as 'because the Visual Organ is one'.—Thus it is under the influence of the downward rays of the Visual Organ, as functioning through a medium, that the Sun is seen *below*, in the Well ;—so also in the case of the diverse vessels containing Water ; if it were not so, how could there be cognition of the Sun as one and the same ?—(2221–2223)

It has been argued (by some people, under *Text* 2220)—'How could the man facing the East, come to face the West, when looking at the mirror ?'

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2224).

"SIMILARLY (IN THE CASE OF THE MAN LOOKING AT THE MIRROR), IT IS THROUGH ILLUSION THAT THE MAN COGNISES THE FACE AS FACING THE WEST, THOUGH IN REALITY WHAT HE ACTUALLY PERCEIVES IS THE FACE AS PRESENTED BY THE VISUAL RAYS PROCEEDING EASTWARD TO THE RAYS PROCEEDING WESTWARD."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 189-190].—(2224)

COMMENTARY.

What happens is as follows :—First of all the Visual Rays, taking up the face-image, issue forth till they reach the mirror ; these are spoken of as 'proceeding eastward' ;—on striking the mirror-space, the said rays are turned back and come back to the man's face standing there as before ; this is spoken of as 'proceeding westward' ;—the eastward rays thus present the face-image to the westward rays,—and these latter present it to the Soul (the observer) ; thereupon the Soul, cognising the image as presented by the westward rays, has the illusion that he is facing the West. The sense of all this is that the diversity of the functioning of the Eye is at the root of the illusion in question.—(2224)

Even granting that the Reflected Image is something different, produced in the reflecting medium, the *Mīmāmsaka* offers another explanation :—

TEXT (2225).

"EVEN GRANTING THAT THE REFLECTED IMAGE REALLY EXISTS IN THE DIFFERENT PLACES,—THERE CAN BE NO PLURALITY OF THESE IMAGES, BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL APPREHENDED BY THE SAME COGNITION."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS—190-191].—(2225)

COMMENTARY.

Even if the Reflected Image is something different, these images cannot be several ;—why ?—*because they are apprehended by the same Cognition*—i.e. they all fall within the same idea.

In the same way, the Word-Sound also becomes established as one,—because it is apprehended by a single Idea.—(2225)

Says the Opponent—When the images are actually perceived in diverse places, why should they not be *several* ? That is to say, when the *diversity* of images is admitted on the ground of their being perceived in diverse places,—how can this diversity be set aside by the single Cognition (by which they are all apprehended) ?

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2226).

"THE IDEA OF DIVERSITY DUE TO DIVERSITY OF PLACE IS *inferential* ; WHILE THE IDEA THAT 'IT IS THE SAME' IS *perceptional*,—AND HENCE ANNULS THE FORMER."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 197-198].—(2226)

COMMENTARY.

'*It annuls the former*' ;—because Perception is superior in authority to all means and forms of Cognition.—(2226)

The following *text* points out that the idea that 'it is cognised as appearing at diverse places' is not concomitant with 'diversity', and hence there can be no validity attaching to it :—

TEXT (2227).

"JUST AS THE SINGLE PERSON, *Devadatta*, PASSING FROM PLACE TO PLACE, ONE AFTER THE OTHER, DOES NOT BECOME DIFFERENT,—SO THE WORD-SOUND ALSO DOES NOT DIFFER (SIMPLY BECAUSE IT IS HEARD IN SEVERAL PLACES)."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 198-199].—(2227)

COMMENTARY.

'*So the Word-Sound also does not differ*'—'either in regard to time or to place',—this has to be added.

Thus, the non-concomitance between the two (Diversity of Place of Appearance and Diversity of Sound) has been indicated through *spacial* non-comcomitance; next, the *Mīmāṃsaka* proceeds to point out the non-concomitance of the two cognitions, spacial and chronological,—through chronological non-concomitance :—

TEXT (2228).

"AND AGAIN, THE SAME DEVADATTA, WHOSE ONE-NESS IS WELL KNOWN,—WHEN SEEN AGAIN AND AGAIN,—DOES NOT BECOME DIVERSE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIVERSITY OF TIME; SIMILARLY THE WORD-SOUND DOES NOT BECOME DIVERSE ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIVERSITY OF PLACE."—[*Shlokavārtika*, ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 199-200].—(2228)

COMMENTARY.

'*Jñātaikatvaḥ*'—'whose unity is well known through Recognition'.

'*On account of the diversity in place*';—this is by way of illustration; Sound does not become different on account of diversity of *time* either. By pointing one kind of non-concomitance, the other kinds of non-concomitance also become indicated. [That is why the *Text* has named *place* only.]—(2228)

The following *Text* anticipates and answers the objection that the Corroborative Instance cited (of Devadatta) is not quite relevant :—

TEXT (2229).

"IF IT BE ARGUED THAT—'(IN THE CASE OF *Devadatta*) THE IDEA OF HIS BEING *one* IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE (WITH THE FACT OF HIS BEING SEEN AT SEVERAL TIMES), BECAUSE THERE IS SUCCESSION (IN THE SEVERAL COGNITIONS OF HIS PRESENCE)',—THEN (IN THE CASE OF WORD-SOUND ALSO) PLEASE SEE THAT THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY; ALSO BECAUSE THE SOUND IS ALL-PERVADING. IN FACT, THE PROPERTY THAT EXPLAINS A PERCEPTIBLE FACT MAY BE ACCEPTED AS BELONGING TO ALL THINGS."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 200-201].—(2229)

COMMENTARY.

The argument of the Opponent is as follows :—'The fact that, even though Devadatta is seen in different places and at different times, he is not regarded as several, what makes this not-incompatible is the fact that the repeated seeings of Devadatta occur in succession, one after the other, and not simultaneously; there is no such reason in the case of Sound. Hence there is difference between the case in dispute and the case cited as an example'.

In answer to this, the *Mīmāmsaka* points out that in the case of Sound also there is a reason whereby there can be no incompatibility :—'*Please see, etc. etc.*'—the construction is that 'Please see that there is no incompatibility, because Sound is all-pervading'.

What the particle '*api*', 'also', indicates is the reason mentioned before 'because the articulations do not fill up the intervening space'.

Question :—Why do you accept the all-pervading character of the Word-Sound ?

Answer :—'*In fact, the property, etc. etc.*'—For the purpose of explaining the idea of the same Sound being heard at several places and times,—whatever property is found necessary is admitted through Presumption based upon the fact that a well-known fact cannot be otherwise explained; in the present instance, if the Sound did not possess *all-pervadingness*, its being heard at several places and times would not be possible; hence on the ground of this Presumption, Sound is regarded as *eternal* and *all-pervading*.—(2229)

The *Mīmāmsaka* next proceeds to show that the Reason that '*because Sound is cognised as having diverse characters,* it must be diverse' is also 'Inconclusive', 'not true' :—

TEXTS (2230–2233).

"WHEN A LARGE PIT IS DUG IN THE GROUND, THERE IS A NOTION OF THE *Ākāsha* IN THE PIT BEING 'LARGE', AND WHEN THE PIT IS SMALL, THERE IS THE NOTION OF ITS BEING 'SMALL'; IN THE SAME WAY THERE ARE SIMILAR NOTIONS REGARDING SOUND, WHICH ALSO (LIKE *Ākāsha*) IS NOT SOMETHING PRODUCED; CONSEQUENTLY, THE ILLUSORY IDEA THAT PEOPLE HAVE REGARDING SOUND (BEING LARGE, INCREASED OR SMALL, DECREASED) IS DUE TO OTHER CIRCUMSTANTIAL CONDITIONS; AS A MATTER OF FACT, 'LARGENESS' AND 'SMALLNESS' ARE NEVER PERCEIVED AS RESIDING IN SOUND; AND THE ASSUMPTION OF THE 'LARGENESS' AND 'SMALLNESS' (OF SOUND) IS DUE TO THE GREATER AND LESS KEENNESS OF ITS PERCEPTION (HEARING). AS REGARDS PERCEPTION, IT IS ACTUALLY FOUND TO BE VERY KEEN IF THE OBJECT PERCEIVED—THE JAR—IS ILLUMINED BY A LARGE SOURCE OF LIGHT,—BUT LESS KEEN WHEN IT IS ILLUMINED BY A SMALL LIGHT.—FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT SUCH PROPERTIES AS 'LENGTH', 'SHORTNESS' AND THE LIKE REALLY BELONG TO THE ARTICULATIONS."—(2230–2233)

COMMENTARY.

The purport of all this is as follows :—If what the Opponent puts forward as his Reason is the diversity of such character as greater or less intensity (in the Sound),—then such a Reason cannot be 'admissible'; because how could one, who holds Sound to be eternal, admit that the diversity of characters,—which, according to him, belong to other circumstantial conditions,—belong to the Sound ?—If, on the other hand, what is adduced by the Opponent as his Reason is the Cognition that people have of Sound being more or less intensive, which Cognition cannot be possible without some difference in the character of the Sound,—then the Reason is 'Inconclusive'; because when a large Pit is dug in the ground, there appears the Cognition of 'largeness' in the *Ākāsha* contained within the Pit,—even though the 'largeness' does not belong to the *Ākāsha*; in the same manner, in the case of Sound also,—which is absolutely causeless, not being produced at all,—the Cognition of greater or less intensity and the like would be due to the diversity in the articulations (that manifest the Sound),—even without the Sound itself having the said diverse characters.

This is what is said in the words—'*Consequently the illusory idea, etc. etc.*'

Question :—How is it known that the said idea is due to other circumstantial conditions,—and the characters do not belong to Sound itself ?

Answer :—'*Largeness and smallness, etc. etc.*'.—What is meant by this is as follows :—The man attributes the greater or less intensity, which really belongs to the Perception, to the Sound, and thus falls into an illusion; and it is not possible for the Sound itself to be *large* or *small*; because it has been proved through Recognition that Sound is one only.

The following might be urged :—If there were no such diversity in the character of the object perceived, how could it appear in its *Cognition* ?

The answer is—'*As regards Perception, it is found to be very keen, etc. etc.*'—In the case of the Jar, even though there is no diversity of characters, yet its Perception is more or less keen, on account of the largeness or smallness of the Light illumining it ;—in the same way, in the case of Sound also, the diversity of 'Length', 'Shortness' and the like is due to the diversity in the character of the articulation,—even though there is no such diversity of character in the Word-Sound itself.—(2230–2233)

The *Mīmāmsaka* again proceeds to show that the Proposition that 'the Word-Sound is not-eternal' is annulled by the fact that the denotative or expressive potency of the Word cannot be explained otherwise (than by the Presumption of the eternality of the Word) :—

TEXT (2234).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, A WORD, WHOSE RELATIONSHIP TO ITS DENOTATION HAS NOT BEEN APPREHENDED, CAN NEVER BE EXPRESSIVE. IF IT WERE SO EXPRESSIVE, THEN, EACH AND EVERY NEW WORD COULD EXPRESS ITS MEANING."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 242-243].—(2234)

COMMENTARY.

The Presumption that is here put forward is itself based upon another Presumption : For instance, the *expressive* Potency of the Word is proved by the Presumption that Verbal Cognition cannot be explained except on that basis ;—and this Potency cannot be explained except on the basis of the eternality of the Word ; hence this Presumption is based upon the previous Presumption.

This same idea is expounded in detail in the *Text*—where it is shown that the Word by itself cannot be expressive if its relationship with its denotation has not been apprehended.

'*If it were so expressive, etc. etc.*' ;—if the word, whose relationship to the denotation has not been already apprehended, were expressive of its meaning,—then even a new word,—never heard before,—could express its meaning ; for instance, words like 'Cow', etc. in the case of the inhabitants of the *Nārikēla-dvīpa* (the Coconut-Isle) (who are not cognisant of such words).—(2234)

Says the Opponent—As regards the argument just set forth, there is no dispute at all ; hence it is superfluous ; as a matter of fact, there is no one who holds that any meaning is expressed by a Word whose connection

what way does this fact of the relationship of the Word being known prove its *eternality* ?

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2235).

"THE COGNITION OF SUCH RELATIONSHIP OF THE WORD (TO ITS MEANING) COULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF THE WORD WERE NOT-ETERNAL ; BECAUSE, IF THE COGNITION OF THAT RELATIONSHIP IS ADMITTED, IT CERTAINLY PROVES THE EXISTENCE OF THE WORD AT SOME OTHER TIME ALSO."—[*Shloka-vārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 243-244].—(2235)

COMMENTARY.

The relationship between the Word and what is denoted by it can be established only when both are present before the man ;—and it is only when thus made that it could be cognised at a later time. All this could not be possible if the Word perished as soon as it was produced.

This is what is meant by the words—'*It would not be possible if the Word were not-eternal*'.

If then, it is admitted that the Word existed at the time, then the idea of its having existed at other times becomes irresistible ; as that would not be incompatible with the facts. This has been thus stated—'If it exists during that time, who can destroy it later on ?'—(*Text* 2139—*Shlokavārtika*—Eternality of Words, 366).

It might be argued that—It may be that the Word exists at the time that the relationship (with its denotation) is set up ; but later on, it would perish of itself.

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2236).

"IF THE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN RECOGNISED WITH ONE WORD, ANY OTHER WORD CANNOT BE EXPRESSIVE OF THAT MEANING (WHOSE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN COGNISED WITH ANOTHER WORD). FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN RECOGNISED WITH THE WORD 'COW', THAT DOES NOT MAKE THE WORD 'HORSE' EXPRESSIVE (OF THAT MEANING)".—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 244-245].—(2236)

COMMENTARY.

'*With one word*'—i.e. with the Word that existed at the time that the Convention was set up fixing its denotation.

The rest is easily understood.—(2236)

The following *Text* anticipates and answers an argument of the Opponent :—

TEXT (2237).

"IF IT BE URGED THAT—'THAT OTHER WORD ALSO (WHICH DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE CONVENTION) MAY BE EXPRESSIVE THROUGH ITS OWN INHERENT APTITUDE',—THEN, IN THAT CASE, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FIXED RULE, THERE COULD BE NO CERTAINTY AS TO WHICH IS THE WORD THAT IS REALLY EXPRESSIVE." —[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 245-246].—(2237)

COMMENTARY.

'*Other Word*'—i.e. if the Word that exists at the time of its use is held to be expressive, through its own inherent aptitude, like the Word that existed at the time of the Convention ;—that cannot be right ; because in the absence of a fixed rule, there could be no certainty as to which Word is expressive of which meaning.—(2237)

Says the Opponent—How do you say that there can be no certainty, when, as a matter of fact, it is clearly ascertained that it is by its inherent aptitude that the word expresses its meaning ?

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2238).

"IF THE USE OF WORDS BE ASSUMED TO BE BASED UPON ACTUAL EXPERIENCE AS TO WHICH WORD BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION (OF A CERTAIN THING),—THIS MAY SERVE THE PURPOSE OF THE HEARERS OF THE WORD ; IT CANNOT DO SO FOR THOSE WHO USE THE WORD."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 246-247].—(2238)

COMMENTARY.

True ; what has been asserted would bring about certainty in the minds of the hearers—as to a certain Word being expressive of a particular thing ; because they may have a certain cognition arising on the hearing of the Word. But this will not be possible for those who use the Word ; because they do not derive any cognition of anything from that Word ; as they use that Word for the purpose of bringing about the cognition for the hearers only. Under the circumstances, how could there be any certainty in the minds of the persons using the Word ?—(2238)

The same idea is further explained—

TEXT (2239).

"WITHOUT KNOWING WITH CERTAINTY (WHAT WORD EXPRESSES WHAT) HOW COULD THE USER MAKE UP HIS MIND AT THE OUTSET AS TO WHICH WORD HE SHOULD USE? IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DOES KNOW IT, THEN IT MUST HAVE BEEN KNOWN TO HIM FROM BEFORE."—[*Shloka-vārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 247-248].—(2239)

COMMENTARY.

The first objection applies to the view that the user does not definitely know (the Word as having a definite meaning). Under the other view, that he does know it at the time of using it,—it necessarily follows that the Word must have been known to him from before (as expressive of that meaning) which establishes its permanence. This is what is meant by the words '*If, on the other hand, etc. etc.*'—(2239)

Says the Opponent—The light of the lamp, even when newly lit, illumines the object; similarly the Word also would express its meaning (when heard and used for the first time).

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2240).

"LIGHT IS AUXILIARY TO THE PERCEPTION; HENCE, EVEN WHEN NEWLY LIT, IT ILLUMINES THINGS; [NOT SO THE WORD].—[IF IT BE URGED THAT] IN THE CASE OF THE WORD THE COMPREHENSION OF THE MEANING OF A CERTAIN WORD IS DUE TO ITS SIMILARITY TO ANOTHER WELL-KNOWN WORD;—THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT SO LONG AS THE SIMILARITY IS NOT RECOGNISED, THE WORD CANNOT BE EXPRESSIVE (OF THAT MEANING)".—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 248-249].—(2240)

COMMENTARY.

'*Light is auxiliary to the Perception*';—i.e. it is an appurtenance of the Perception; as a matter of fact, it becomes an auxiliary to Perceptional

Cognition, by embellishing either the Object or the Sense-organ ; and as such, even when newly lit, it serves the purpose of illumining things. As regards the Word, on the other hand, directly it denotes only supersensuous things, and as such it cannot be an auxiliary to Perception. So that there is no analogy between the two cases.

Or (the meaning of the *Text* may be as follows)—What is auxiliary to Perception illumines things independently of the idea of any connection between the two (the illuminator and the illuminated) ;—e.g. the Eye ;—Light is auxiliary to Perception ;—hence, even when newly lit, it illumines things ;—Word, on the other hand, pertaining, as it does, to imperceptible things, is not auxiliary to Perception.—Hence there is a vast difference between the two cases (of the *Lamp* and of the *Word*).

Says the Opponent—Even a new Word would express the meaning through its similarity to a previously-known Word.

The answer is—'*So long as the similarity, etc. etc.*'—So long as the Similarity has not been actually recognised, the expressiveness of the Word cannot be due to it ; otherwise there would be incongruities.—(2240)

Then again, the *recognition* of similarity may rest awhile ; as a matter of fact, no *similarity* is possible at all ;—this is what is explained in the following :—

TEXTS (2241-2242).

"WHICH PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL WORD WOULD IT BE, THROUGH *similarity* TO WHICH ANOTHER WORD WOULD BE ASSUMED TO BE EXPRESSIVE ? ALL THESE WORDS WOULD BE EQUAL, IN SO FAR AS NO ONE AMONG THEM HAS ITS CONNECTION (WITH THE MEANING) PREVIOUSLY KNOWN.—IF IT BE HELD THAT—'THE WORD PERCEIVED (HEARD) FIRST OF ALL DID ACTUALLY HAVE A MEANING [AND THE EXPRESSIVENESS OF THE OTHERS WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THEIR SIMILARITY TO THAT WORD]',—THEN (THE ANSWER IS)—HOW COULD IT CONTINUE TO EXIST FOR SUCH A LONG TIME ? AS A MATTER OF FACT, A WORD IS NOT COMPREHENDED AS HAVING A MEANING UNTIL IT HAS BEEN HEARD TWICE OR THRICE."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 249-250].—(2241-2242)

COMMENTARY.

When one Word has been admitted to be expressive, others could be assumed to be expressive on the ground of their similarity to that Word ; but this is not possible ; because all Words are equally recognised as *not* connected with a meaning.

It might be argued that—' the first Word that was heard at the time of the fixing of the Convention, certainly had a meaning,—and all the rest would be *similar* to this one '.

The answer to that is—' *How could it, etc. etc.*'—How could that first Word—heard previously—continue to exist during all this time when (*ex-hypothesi*) it must be destroyed as soon as produced.

It might be asked—Even if the Word is destroyed as soon as it is uttered,—why cannot it have a meaning ?

The answer to that is—' *A word is not, etc. etc.* '—That is, the connection between the Word and its Denotation is recognised only after repeated hearing of it.—(2241-2242)

It might be argued that—on the hearing of other words of the same kind, that Word in question would become expressive of the meaning.

The following *Text* shows that that is not possible :—

TEXT (2243).

" FOR PERSONS WHO HAVE NOT HEARD OTHER WORDS (LIKE IT), THE WORD, AT THE TIME, MUST BE MEANINGLESS (INEXPRESSIVE) ; THAT THE SAME WORD WOULD BECOME EXPRESSIVE AS SOON AS THE MAN HAS HEARD OTHER WORDS, WOULD BE A WONDER INDEED ! ".—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 251-252]—(2243)

COMMENTARY.

For those observers who have not heard other Words of the same kind,—the Word heard for the first time is not expressive of any meaning ; because ' similarity ' that rests on diversity is not there at the time.—That the same Word, for those same observers,—when they have heard other Words of the kind,—should become expressive would indeed be something extraordinary ! How could the two contradictory actions—of *expressing* and *not-expressing*—belong to one and the same (Word) ?

The compound ' *anyashrutīnām* ' is to be expounded as " those persons who have had the ' *Shruti* ', audition, hearing, of ' *anya* '—other Words of the same kind ".—(2243)

Having thus proved that Words are eternal, on the ground that otherwise they could not be expressive, the *Mīmāmsaka* now proceeds to prove

the same on the ground that otherwise no connection could be set up between the Word and its meaning :—

TEXTS (2244-2245)

" NO CONNECTION CAN BE SET UP WITHOUT PRONOUNCING THE WORD; AND WHEN THE WORD PERISHES AS SOON AS IT IS PRONOUNCED, IT CAN HAVE NO NEED FOR ANY CONNECTION. CONSEQUENTLY, AS THE WORD WILL HAVE PERISHED AND WOULD NOT HAVE HAD ITS CONNECTION SET UP, THE FIRST WORD MUST BE INEXPRESSIVE (MEANINGLESS); HOW THEN COULD THE SUBSEQUENT WORD ALSO, WHICH HAS HAD NO CONNECTION SET UP, BE RECOGNISED AS *expressive* ? "—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 256–258].—(2244-2245)

COMMENTARY.

First of all there is utterance of the Word,—then the setting up of its connection (with its denotation),—then its actual use, in practice ;—such is the way in which Words are dealt with in actual practice. How could all this process be gone through if the Word perished immediately on being uttered, and as such how can it be open to any sequential operation ? It is not only that for what has perished, no connection can be set up ; there would not be any use in setting up any such connection ; as it would not be present at the time of usage ; and it is only for the purposes of use that Conventions (regarding words and their meanings) are set up.

The words ' *Consequently, etc. etc.*' sum up the conclusion ; the compound ' *asambandhanaṣṭatvāt* ' is to be explained as—' because it would be *asambandha*—without its connection set up,—and because it would be *naṣṭa*—perished—the first word—that was there at the time of making the Convention,—must be inexpressive '.

It might be said that—' the Word appearing at the time of usage would be expressive '.

The answer to that is—' *How then could the subsequent Word, etc. etc.*'—(2244-2245)

It might be urged that—if the successive utterance, etc. of the non-sequential Word is not possible,—they may be simultaneous.

The answer to this, from the *Mīmāmsaka*, is as follows :—

TEXT (2246).

"THE UTTERANCE OF THE WORD, THE SETTING UP OF ITS CONNECTION AND ITS USE,—ALL THIS PROCESS IS, BY ITS VERY NATURE, SUCCESSIVE ; HOW COULD ANY ONE PERFORM ALL THIS SIMULTANEOUSLY ? "—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 258-259].—(2246)

COMMENTARY.

(1) Utterance of the Word, (2) the setting up of its connection, (3) actual usage,—all these three acts are, by their very nature, such as can be done only one after the other ; and it is absolutely impossible to do them all at the same time. And when there is no simultaneity, there can be no setting up of the Connection. If succession were waited for, that would mean that the Word continues to exist for some time (other than the one at which it is produced).—(2246)

The *Mīmāmsaka* reaffirms his view in the following :—

TEXTS (2247-2248).

"FOR THOSE PERSONS WHO LIVE AT DIFFERENT TIMES AND PLACES, ETC. —PRIOR TO THE HEARING OF OTHER WORDS—THERE CANNOT BE EVEN ONE SUCH WORD AS HAD ITS CONNECTION SET UP.—EVEN IF THE IDEA BE THAT THE CONNECTION IS '*asserted*' (NOT SET UP OR CREATED),—THE REFUTATION OF THAT ALSO WOULD BE THE SAME ; AS NO SUCH 'ASSERTION' IS POSSIBLE IN REGARD TO WHAT HAS PERISHED, OR WHAT IS NON-EXISTENT, OR WHAT EXISTS ONLY AT THE PRESENT MOMENT".—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 260-261].—(2247-2248)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*ādi*', '*etcetera*', includes the states of childhood, youth and so forth.

'*Prior to*'—this has to be construed with '*hearing of other Words*'.

'*Perished, etc. etc.*'—'*what has perished*'—i.e. the *past*;—'what *is non-existent*'—the *future*; with regard to these two no 'assertion of connection' can be made, because they are non-existent at the time;—as regards '*what exists*'—i.e. the *present*, which is being uttered,—that also perishes immediately; how could it continue to exist till the setting up of the Connection?—(2247-2248)

The same idea is further explained:—

TEXTS (2249–2251).

"WHICH WORD WOULD IT BE WHICH THE SPEAKER WOULD SPEAK OF TO THE HEARER, AS BEING EXPRESSIVE OF MEANING,—WHEN HE IS UNABLE TO UTTER THE WORD THAT HAS BEEN HEARD PREVIOUSLY?—HE CANNOT SPEAK OF THE WORD AS EXPRESSIVE. HE MIGHT SPEAK OF IT AS *similar*; BUT, IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE HEARER TO RECOGNISE IT AS SIMILAR TO THAT EXPRESSIVE WORD; BECAUSE HE HAS NEVER HEARD THAT ORIGINAL EXPRESSIVE WORD; WHILE THE NEW WORD THAT HE HEARS IS NOT EXPRESSIVE. AND WHEN THE MAN WHO IS A *Speaker* NOW BECOMES THE *Hearer* AT A LATER TIME, THE SAME DIFFICULTIES WOULD APPEAR."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 261–264].—(2249–2251)

COMMENTARY.

The Speaker cannot speak of the previously heard Word, to the Hearer, because it has perished already; the Word that he does speak to him,—that he cannot prove to be expressive; because this Word has not yet had any connection set up in regard to itself.

It might be possible that he might speak of it as similar to the expressive Word.—But that also is not possible.—This is what is explained in the words—'*But in that case, etc. etc.*'—What is desired in this connection is not *similarity* to anything, but similarity to the *expressive* Word; and that is not possible. If the Hearer had heard any expressive Word, then the similarity could be pointed out to him; as a matter of fact, however, the Hearer has not heard the expressive Word at the time that the Convention regarding its meaning was set up; hence what has been suggested is not possible.

It might be urged that the Word that is being spoken of to him by the Speaker might be expressive.

The answer to that is—'*The new Word that he hears is not expressive*';—the Word that is being uttered at the moment is not expressive; because no connection has been set up in relation to it; as has been already pointed out.

'*When the man who is the Speaker, ètc. etc.*'—What is meant by this is that when the present Speaker, in his return, becomes the Hearer,—then all these difficulties would affect him also,—i.e. all those difficulties just shown under *Text* 2250.

Thus then, for all Speakers, there can be no expressive Word at all ;—this is the upshot of the whole argument.—(2249–2251)

The following *Text* sums up the *Mīmāmsaka's* position :—

TEXT (2252).

"FOR ALL THESE REASONS, THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE WORD AND ITS MEANING SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AS ETERNAL ; IT CANNOT BE BASED UPON CONVENTION ; AS THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE IN ANY WAY."—(2252)

COMMENTARY.

In the following *Text*, the *Mīmāmsaka* sets forth the view opposed to his own—

TEXT (2253).

'THE REQUISITE CAPACITY DOES NOT BELONG TO THE *Denoter* (WORD) AND THE DENOTED (MEANING), BY THEMSELVES ; THE IDEA THAT PEOPLE DERIVE FROM WORDS IS DUE TO CONVENTION ;—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE WINKING OF THE EYE.'—[*Shloka-vārtika—Sambandhākṣēpaparihāra,* 12].—(2253)

COMMENTARY.

As between the Denotative Word and the Denoted meaning, there is no such capacity inherent in their very nature, by virtue of which one is *denotative* and the other *denoted*.

Question :—How then is any idea deduced from the Word ?

Answer :—'*The idea that people, etc. etc.*'—When the causal potency of something is such that it stands in need of Convention, then that cannot be its natural potency or capacity ;—for example, some idea is derived from the *winking of the Eye* ;—the causal potency of the Word in bringing about the notion of its meaning is dependent upon Convention ;—hence here we find something contrary to a wider term.

What the Opponent does here is to refute the objections that have been urged by the *Mīmāmsaka* against the conclusion that 'Words are not-eternal'.—(2253)

The answer to the above (from the *Mīmāmsaka*) is as follows :—

TEXTS (2254-2255).

"IS THIS CONVENTION MADE FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL MORTAL BEING ? OR FOR EACH UTTERANCE OF THE WORD ? OR ONLY ONCE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD, BY SOME ONE PERSON ?—DOES THE CONNECTION ALSO (OF THE WORD WITH ITS DENOTATION) DIFFER WITH EACH INDIVIDUAL ? OR IS IT ONE ONLY, FOR ALL ?—IF IT IS ONE, IT CANNOT BE ARTIFICIAL ;—IF IT IS DIFFERENT WITH EACH, THERE SHOULD BE SOME IDEA OF THIS DIFFERENCE."—[*Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣēpaparīhāra*, 13-14].—(2254-2255)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Convention' is in the form 'this (Word) is the name of this thing (object denoted)' ;—for the purpose of comprehension, it could be set up either (*a*) for each individual person,—or (*b*) for each utterance and use by each person,—or (*c*) it would be set up aimlessly once only, at the beginning of the world—at the time of creation—by some one Person—an ordainer, in the shape of God.—These three alternatives are possible.

'*Does the Connection also, etc. etc.*'—The connection also between the Word and its Denotation,—when it is set up,—would it sometimes differ with each living being ? Or would it be one only ?—This is another point for consideration.

If it were one only, it would, like the 'Universal', continue to remain through all variations of time and place, and as such it could not be 'artificial' ; that is, it would be *eternal.*

If, on the other hand, it is different with each living being,—having a different character for each person,—then it would follow that there should be cognition of its difference (and diversity) ; as diversity in *Cognition* is always based upon diversity of what is *cognised.* As a matter of fact, in the case of the words, 'Cow' and the rest, even after the word has been used hundreds of times, there is no cognition of any difference ; as is clear from the fact that in usage it is always regarded as one and the same.—(2254-2255)

Further, if the Connection is different with each person, then there must be cognition of difference, and this would put an end to all use of the Word. This is what is shown in the following :—

TEXT (2256).

" As there would be difference between the ideas of the Speaker and the Hearer (in regard to the Connection),—the use of the Word would become vitiated ; as the idea of the Connection in the Mind of the Speaker would be one, while that in the mind of the Hearer would be totally different ".—[*Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣēpaparihāra*, 21-22].—(2256)

COMMENTARY.

'*Difference between the ideas*'—The complete phrase should be 'difference between the Connection that forms the *object* of the ideas'.—Hence the sense comes to be this :—The object, the matter, that figures in the ideas of the Speaker and the Hearer,—being different, there could be no usage based upon the idea of the denotation (of the Word) being one and the same.

Question :—Why so ?

Answer :—'*As the connection in the mind, etc. etc.*'

The *Mīmāmsaka* now takes up the view that 'the Convention is made for each mortal being' (the first alternative, under *Text* 2254) ; and points out the defect in it :—

TEXTS (2257–2263).

" For the purpose of setting up the connection for the benefit of the Hearer,—which 'connection' could the Speaker have recourse to ?—The Connection which he has perceived before,—*that* he cannot set up for the Hearer ; while the new one that he might set up has never been actually found to be expressive ..... If it be argued that—'the same arguments apply to the Jar and such things also',—then the answer is that it is not so ; because in the case of these what is recognised is the 'Universal', whose existence has been already established ;—even as regards the 'Individual' (Jar), that individual which has been perceived to be efficient cannot be set up ; while that individual which may be set up has not been found to be efficient in bringing about its effect.—Even with all this, however, in the case of utterances, the potency or efficiency has been recognised on the basis of the 'Configuration' (i.e. the 'Universal').—This 'Universal' can have no beginning ; but your 'Connection' has beginning.—If, in connection with that (Connec-

TION) ALSO, YOU ADMIT OF AN ETERNAL 'UNIVERSAL' (COMMONALTY),—THEN OUR VIEW OF THE MATTER BECOMES ESTABLISHED. BUT EVEN SO, THERE CANNOT BE A DUAL FORM. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE 'CONNECTION' IS ONLY A KIND OF *Potency* ; AND OF THIS NO DIVERSITY IS PERCEIVED ; IT IS ALWAYS INFERRED FROM ITS EFFECTS, AND AS SUCH, IT FOLLOWS THE DIVERSITY IN THE EFFECTS.—IN FACT THE POTENCY IS ALWAYS PRESUMED ON THE BASIS OF THE FACT OF SOMETHING WELL-KNOWN NOT BEING OTHERWISE EXPLICABLE ; AND WHEN THIS PURPOSE (OF EXPLAINING) HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE PRESUMPTION OF *one* POTENCY, THERE CAN BE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ASSUMING SEVERAL ".—[*Shlokavārtika —Sambandhākṣēpaparihāra,* 22–29].—(2257–2263)

COMMENTARY.

'*That he cannot set up for the Hearer*' ;—because it has perished (according to the Opponent).

'*Has never been found to be expressive*',—because it has never been perceived before.

'*In the case of the Jar and other things*'.—By putting forward this incongruity, the Opponents mean to suggest the 'Inconclusive' character of the *Mīmāṁsaka's* Reason. What is meant is that what has been urged is applicable to the case of the Jar, etc. also ; for instance, the Jar that has been actually found to be efficient in accomplishing an effective action cannot be made again, because it perished as soon as produced ; while the one that is made now has never been actually found to be efficient.

The answer to this is—'*It is not so ; because in the case of these, etc. etc.*'.—'It is not so' denies the Opponent's assertion.—Why is it not so ?—Because the 'Universal' has been established.

This same idea is further clarified—'Even with regard to the *Individual, etc. etc.*'.—Even though the individual Jar has had its efficiency perceived in the past in the *fetching of water,* yet that individual cannot be made again ; as it has come and perished ; while the one that is made now, its capacity for effective action has not yet been ascertained.—Even so, the capacity for effective action is taken for granted in all individuals, on the basis of the 'Universal' (Commonalty).

How so ?

'*This can have no beginning.*' —'This' stands for the 'Universal'. In some places the reading is '*na cha tasyādimattā, etc.*' the meaning of which is as follows :—Of *the efficiency to bring about effects like water-fetching and the like,* there is no beginning in time ; because the 'universal' is always eternal ; and it is absolutely non-different from its substrata (in the shape of the Individuals) ; as declared in the words—'The Universal has no existence apart from the Individual'.

Says the Opponent—'The *Connection* (between Word and Meaning) also

The answer to this is that that cannot be right; this is what is explained in the words—'*But your connection has beginning*'.

Further, if you admit of the eternal 'Universal' in the case of the *Connection* between the Word and its meaning,—in that case it becomes established that there *is* an entity that is eternal; and this is exactly our view.

It might be urged that that fact (of eternality) does not become established in connection with the *Word*, which is the matter under consideration.

The answer to that is—'*But even so, there cannot be a dual form*';—the 'two forms' consisting of the 'Connection' and the 'Universal'; only one form is possible, not the *Universal*; because the 'Universal' subsists in several individuals; while the 'Connection' is one only.

Question:—How do you know that the *Connection* is one only ?

Answer:—'*As a matter of fact, the Connection is only a kind of Potency, etc. etc.*'—The 'Connection' is not anything different from the *Potency*.

Question:—What if that is so ?

Answer:—'*And of this no diversity is perceived*'.—'*Diversity*'—plurality.

Question:—Why is it not perceived ?

Answer:—'*It is always inferred from its effects*';—that is, in all cases, it can only be inferred from the effects it produces; as declared in the words—'Potencies of all things can be proved only by the fact of their effects not being otherwise explicable'.—It is for this reason that the Potency only follows the diversity of its effects; that is, when it gives rise to any notion of diversity regarding itself, it is only in accordance with the diversity of its effects; that is to say, on the ground that there can be no idea of diversity in the Potency unless there is diversity in its effects.—In the case in question, there is no diversity in the effect. Because the effect (in the case of the Words) consists only in the bringing about of the particular cognition; and this cognition could be based either upon the *Word* or upon the *Object* (denoted by it). There is no diversity in the former; because the Word is always recognised as the same. Nor can there be diversity in the cognition based upon the Object; because even when the word 'Cow' has been uttered hundreds of times, the cognition produced is never of any other kind (save that of the *Cow*).

The upshot of the whole is stated in the words—'*In fact, the Potency, etc. etc.*'—It is because the cognition of the meaning (denotation of the object, is not otherwise explicable that the Potency of the 'Denoted and Denoter' is presumed; and as this purpose is accomplished by a single Potency, the assumption of several Potencies is absolutely useless.

Nor can the diversity of the Potency be *inferred* on the basis of the fact of denotation not being otherwise explicable; all that this fact can indicate is *mere Potency* (not its *diversity*).—(2257–2263)

The following *texts* proceed to show that for the following reason also the notion of the Connection being made cannot be right, and consequently, the Connection must be eternal :—

TEXTS (2264-2265).

" At the time that the Connection is asserted, if the word ' Co is uttered, some people, being cognisant of the Connecti comprehend the meaning,—while others do not do so. C sequently, if, at any time, the Connection were non-existe no one would comprehend its meaning.—It may be argi that—' if the Connection were there, all men would c prehend it '.—But that is not possible ; because (even thoi there) the Connection may not be known to certain persoi —[*Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, 30-31].— (2264-226!

COMMENTARY.

When some one says ' This *Cow* should not be touched with the fo some people, having been cognisant of the Connection of *Denoted and Der* between the word and the particular animal, comprehend the object, thro that Connection ; while others who are not cognisant of the Connection c prehend only the verbal form, not its meaning. Such being the case, if Connection were not a real entity, then all men, experienced in usage, w be unable to comprehend the meaning. Because the same thing ca have the two mutually contradictory characters of being *existent* and *existent.* From this it follows that the Connection must be there permane

Says the Opponent—' If the Connection is always there, then how that all men do not have the comprehension of the meaning at all time

The *Mīmāmsaka* anticipates this objection and supplies the dete answer to it, in the words—' *If the Connection were there, etc. etc.*'.—' *is not possible, etc.*' sets aside the objection.

Why so ?

' *Because the Connection may not be known to certain persons.*'—(2264-2

Says the Opponent—' Even if the Connection is not known (to s persons), why should it not bring about its own effects ? Even th hidden in the holes of the Threshing Yard, the seed does not relinquis own function of producing the sprout '.

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2266).

" The Connection is only an *indicator* ; hence (for its function it stands in need of being cognised itself ; it is for this reaso that, though present, it does not do the *indicating* until it is itself cognised."—[*Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, 32].—(2266)

COMMENTARY.

The nature of the *Indicator* is different from that of the *Producer* ; Word, like the Smoke, is only an *Indicator*, not a *producer*, like the s Hence the objection raised is not applicable.—(2266)

Says the Opponent—It is not possible for the same thing to have the two contradictory characters of *being existent* and *being non-existent*; similarly it cannot be right for the same thing to be both *known* and *not known*. If there is no incompatibility between these two, why should there be incompatibility between *existence* and *non-existence*?

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2267–2269).

" IT IS OFTEN FOUND THAT THOUGH A CERTAIN THING *exists*, IT IS *not known*; BUT IT IS NEVER FOUND BY ANY PERSON THAT WHAT IS ABSOLUTELY *non-existent* IS *existent*; BECAUSE *existence* AND *non-existence* BEING MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY, CANNOT BELONG TO THE SAME THING. THERE IS NO SUCH CONTRADICTION BETWEEN *being known* AND *being not known*; BECAUSE *knowledge* SUBSISTS IN THE COGNISANT *person*; AND AS PERSONALITIES VARY, THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY; HENCE THE *absence of knowledge*, AS RESIDING IN ONE PERSON, DOES NOT BECOME EXCLUDED (BY THE *presence of knowledge*, IN ANOTHER PERSON).—[*Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, 33–35].—(2267–2269)

COMMENTARY.

It is incompatible for two mutually contradictory properties to reside in the same thing,—not when they reside in different things. As regards *being known* and *being not known*,—these reside in different persons; hence there can be no incongruity in this. The same cannot be said of *existence* and *non-existence*, which have been held (by the Opponent) to reside in the same thing (the Connection). Such, in brief, is the sense of the argument.—(2267–2269)

Says the Opponent—In the case of the two characters of *being known* and *being not-known*,—these two also imply the mutually contradictory characters of *existence* and *non-existence* as residing in the same substratum [it being the Object that has the characters of *being known* and *being not-known*, even though the *knowledge* resides in the men]; hence the said incongruity vitiates this view also. Because the *cognition* and *non-cognition* of things are invariably concomitant with their *existence* and *non-existence*; because they are based upon these; if it is not so, then it behoves you to explain why when two persons are standing upon equally suitable places, one sees the thing while the other does not.

In anticipation of this argument, the *Mīmāmsaka* says :—

TEXT (2270).

"THE WHITE OBJECT STANDING BEFORE PERSONS SOME OF WHOM ARE BLIND AND THE OTHERS ARE NOT,—THE OBJECT IS NOT SEEN BY THOSE WHO ARE BLIND, WHILE IT IS SEEN BY THOSE WHO ARE NOT; BUT THIS DOES NOT MAKE THE OBJECT *existent* AND *non-existent*."—[*Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, 37].—(2270)

COMMENTARY.

The Colour present before two persons—of whom one is blind and the other not so,—is actually seen only by one whose vision is perfect, and not by the other; and even for these men, this fact does not make the Colour *existent* (for the one) and *non-existent* (for the other).—The same would be the case with the Connection also.—(2270)

In order to meet the question as to what is the cause of this,—the *Mīmāmsaka* offers the following explanation :—

TEXT (2271).

"THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY IN THIS CASE, BECAUSE THERE IS DIVERSITY IN THE CAPACITY AND INCAPACITY OF MEN. IN THE CASE IN QUESTION (OF WORDS) ALSO, THERE IS NO CAUSE OF THE PERCEPTION (OF THE MEANING), OTHER THAN THE *Connection*."—[*Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, 38].—(2271)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows :—Mere *existence* is not the cause of a thing being perceived; the cause of it lies in the capacity of the perceiving man; it is for this reason that even when the thing is existent, its non-perception by some one who is devoid of the capacity to perceive it, does not involve any incongruity; hence 'non-cognition' cannot be said to be invariably concomitant with *non-existence*.

Says the Opponent—If that is so, then, even when the *Connection* (of the Word and its meaning) is not there, the cognition or non-cognition of the meaning by men would be determined by the presence and absence of the capacity in the men; so that it all stands on the same footing.

The answer to this is—'*There is no cause, etc. etc.*'.—That is, the cognition of the meaning always follows from the cognition of the Connection.—'*Other*' goes with 'cause'.

'*Of the perception*'—i.e. of the apprehension of the meaning of the Word.

'*Darshanasya*'—the Genitive is to be construed with '*hētuḥ*'.

In '*Sambandhāt*', the Ablative is to be construed with '*anyaḥ*'.

'*In the case in question*'—i.e. in the matter of the usage relating to Words and their meanings.

Other people take the first half of the *text* itself as providing the reason demanded by the Opponent, and explain the term '*Sambandhāt*', as 'apart from the capacities of men'; and '*atra*' as standing for the 'white object' spoken of above.—(2271)

In the following *Text*, the *Mīmāṃsaka* sums up the argument as hearing upon the matter under discussion:—

TEXT (2272).

"THUS THEN, THE 'KNOWLEDGE OF USAGE' STANDS ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THE SENSE-ORGANS; SO THAT THOSE WHO HAVE THE SAID KNOWLEDGE APPREHEND THE MEANING, WHILE OTHERS, NOT HAVING THE SAID KNOWLEDGE, DO NOT APPREHEND IT,—JUST AS THE BLIND MAN (BEING DEVOID OF THE VISUAL ORGAN, DOES NOT APPREHEND COLOUR)."—[*Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, 39].
—(2272)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*vyavahāra*', 'usage', here stands for the *Connection between the word and its meaning*, in the sense that it is on the basis of this that words are used—'*vyavahriyatē asmāt*';—the 'Knowledge' of this Connection, stands on the same footing as the sense-organs; for instance, those alone who have the sense-organ perceive the object,—while those who have not do not perceive it even though the object is there; similarly, those who have the knowledge of the Connection comprehend the meaning from the Word, while those who do not have that knowledge do not comprehend it, even though the Connection is there;—so really there is perfect analogy between the two cases.—(2272)

[Under the view that the Connection of the Word with its meaning was created, set up at a certain time, by a certain person] it has to be explained, who the Person was who created the Connection and to whom he communicated it.—It cannot be right to say that the man learns it by himself; as the same might be said regarding others also.—If it was communicated to the present man by some one else,—then it should have been communicated to that man also by some one else,—then, in that case, there being no beginning, the Connection must be regarded as eternal.

This is shown by the *Mīmāṃsaka* in the following:—

TEXT (2273).

"As a matter of fact, for all persons ignorant (of the Connection), the Connection becomes known through long-continued tradition,—and there has been no beginning of the Connection."—(2273)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows :—The Connection between the Word and its meaning must be regarded as preceded by the usage of elderly people,—because it is a *Connection*,—like Connections of the present time,—the Connection under dispute is also a *Connection* ; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(2273)

Having thus established the conclusion that it is not possible for the Convention to be set up with regard to each mortal being (the first alternative suggested in *Text* 2254),—the *Mīmāṃsaka* proceeds to reject the other alternative (suggested there) that it is set up in reference to each utterance.

TEXTS (2274–2277).

"Convention in regard to each utterance cannot be made by usage.—At the time of the beginning of the Creation, there could not be any such action ; and no such time is admitted by us."—[*Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepaparihāra*, 42].—The view held by us is that the World was never otherwise than what it is now.—As for the 'universal Dissolution', it cannot be known that there can be any such in reality. In fact 'Dissolution' may be a name for the *Night* only, when there is *cessation of all activity* ; the *Day* in that case would be 'Creation', because all sorts of activity proceed at that time. Or 'Dissolution' may be there in the form of the *Destruction of particular countries* or Destruction of particular families.—There is no evidence for any such *Dissolution* as consists in the destruction of all things."—(2274–2277)

COMMENTARY.

'*By usage*'—i.e. through the setting up of usage ; what is meant is that, otherwise, there could be no setting up of the usage prior to the setting up of the Connection.

It has been asserted that the Connection could have been set up either at the beginning of Creation or it might be set up in the present. This is rebutted by the words—'*At the time, etc. etc.*'—'*Such time*'—i.e. the time of the dissolution of the world, when there would be no connection between words and meanings.

'*Otherwise than what it is*' ;—i.e. in the state of the utter annihilation of all things ;—as there is no evidence for this.

Question :—How then do people speak of the 'Dissolution' ?

Answer :—'*As for Universal Dissolution, etc. etc.*' ;—'*cannot be known*'—by people :—'*in reality*' what is meant is that an *assumed* destruction of all things may not be denied.

These assumptions are exemplified—'*Dissolution may be the name for Night only*'.

Question :—Why is not the real 'Dissolution' admitted ?

Answer :—'*There is no evidence, etc. etc.*'—(2274–2277)

Granting that there is real 'Dissolution' ;—even so, as at that time, there would be no creative Person, in the shape of God, who has not entirely lost his memory, intuition and other faculties,—no setting up of the Connection would be possible.

This is shown in the following :—

TEXT (2278).

"As a matter of fact there can be no eternal Creator and Destroyer, in the shape of God or any such Being, who, not having lost his memory, could set up the Connection."—(2278)

COMMENTARY.

'*There can be, etc. etc.*'—Because the possibility of any such Being has been repudiated in detail.—(2278)

In the following *texts*, the *Mīmāṁsaka* anticipates the objections of the Opponent—

TEXT (2279).

"[Says the Opponent]—'[Even though the *Letters* may be eternal] the arrangement (order) of the Letters cannot be eternal ;—consequently what is *expressive* cannot be eternal. Because what is regarded as *expressive* is the *Word* ; and the idea of the Word is dependent upon the said order (of Letters)'."—[*Shlokavārtika*—Eternality of Words, 278].—(2279)

COMMENTARY.

The Word is held (by the *Mīmāṁsaka*) to consist of the definite arrangement of the Letters,—not of any such single entity as the 'Sphoṭa' [which,

according to the Grammarian, is what, in the case of every Word, is really the entity representing the whole Word, which expresses the meaning];—and as the arrangement or order of the Letters is always dependent upon the whim of man (the Speaker), it cannot be eternal; and in this way the Letters also must be regarded as non-eternal; because the 'arrangement' is not anything different from the *Letters.*

How so?

'*Because what is regarded as expressive, etc. etc.*'—It is the Word, consisting of the Letters, that is regarded to be *expressive*; because the idea of 'Word' is due to the particular arrangement of the Letters, not to any such other entity as the '*Sphoṭa*';—and the arrangement is due to human agency.—(2279)

The same idea is further explained—

TEXTS (2280-2281).

"[THE OPPONENT CONTINUES]—'AS, ACCORDING TO YOU, THE LETTERS ARE ALL-PERVADING, ANY PARTICULAR ARRANGEMENT CANNOT BE INHERENT IN THEMSELVES; BECAUSE THE ARRANGEMENT IS THE PRODUCT OF ARTICULATION WHICH IS NOT-ETERNAL,—IT MUST, ON THAT ACCOUNT, BE NON-ETERNAL.—FURTHER, THE SAID ARRANGEMENT MUST BE DEPENDENT UPON THE WHIM OF THE SPEAKER, AS IT OWES ITS APPEARANCE TO HIS DESIRE TO SPEAK. THUS THE ETERNALITY OF THE LETTERS WOULD BE USELESS FOR YOU'."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 279-280].—(2280-2281)

COMMENTARY.

According to you—Mīmāmsakas—Letters are all-pervading; hence there can be no order or arrangement among them, in relation to *space*; nor can it be in relation to *time*, because they are eternal; hence it could be there only as due to the *articulation* that manifests them;—and as this *articulation* is not eternal, what is due to it must also be non-eternal.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—'What is due to something non-eternal must be non-eternal,—e.g. the Jar;—the order of the Letters is due to something non-eternal; hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.'

Then again, what comes about through the man's 'desire to speak' must be treated by the intelligent as of *human origin*,—like the shaking of the hands, the winking of the Eye and so forth ;—and the Order of the Letters (in a word) comes about by the desire of man ;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(2280-2281)

It might be urged that—the Letters themselves, without any order, as they become heard by the Ear, would express the meaning.

The Opponent's answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2282-2283).

" 'WORDS, WITHOUT SOME ORDER, HAVE NEVER BEEN KNOWN TO BE EXPRESSIVE ; HENCE IT IS THE ORDER (OR ARRANGEMENT) WHICH SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE *Word*. FOR THOSE PEOPLE ALONE, ACCORDING TO WHOM THE *Word* IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE LETTERS, AND DEVOID OF ANY ORDER OF SEQUENCE (OR ARRANGEMENT), CAN THE ASSUMPTION OF THE ETERNALITY OF WORDS HAVE ANY USE '."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 282-283].—(2282-2283)

COMMENTARY.

The Letters themselves, without any order, have never been found to be expressive of meanings ; hence a definite order or arrangement of Letters has got to be admitted. Under the circumstances, it is the *order* that comes to be the *Word*, and also *expressive*,—for you, *Mīmāṁsakas* ; and all this character cannot belong to the Letters themselves.

This *Order*, however, is something non-eternal ; hence what is *expressive* must also be non-eternal ; hence the assumption of the eternality of Words is absolutely futile. Because what is desired by you is to prove the eternality of only that Word which is *expressive*,—not of any other ; hence the proofs that you adduce in support of the Letters only are of no use in the matter under consideration ; because the mere Letters are not *expressive* ;—then as regards what is *expressive*, i.e. the order or arrangement of the Letters,—it is not regarded as eternal ; hence all your effort is futile.

There are some people,—e.g. the Grammarians,—who regard the *Sphoṭa*, which is an impartite entity as a whole, apart from the Letters, to be *expressive* ;—for these people alone the assumption of the eternality of the Word can have any use ; because the said entity '*Spoṭa*' is eternal.—(2282-2283)

To the above arguments of the Opponent, the *Mīmāṁsaka* offers the following reply :—

TEXT (2284).

"THE CONTINGENCY OF THE *order* OR *arrangement* BEING REGARDED AS THE *Word* DOES NOT ARISE FOR US. BECAUSE THE *order* OR *arrangement* AS SUBSISTING IN ANYTHING ELSE HAS NEVER BEEN FOUND TO BE ILLUMINATIVE (EXPRESSIVE)."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 284].—(2284)

COMMENTARY.

'Order' consists in a certain sequential arrangement; any such *arrangement* cannot become expressive,—under our view; because it would not be universally true.—This is shown by the words—'*Because, etc. etc.*'—'*Subsisting in anything else*',—e.g. that subsisting in gems, pearls and so forth. —(2284)

Further, it is not only the order *subsisting in the Letters* that is held to be expressive.—Why ?—The reason is explained in the following :—

TEXT (2285).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE ORDER OR ARRANGEMENT IS ONLY A PROPERTY OF THE LETTERS; IT IS NOT REGARDED TO BE A DISTINCT ENTITY BY ITSELF. THE IDEA, IN FACT, IS THAT WHAT ARE EXPRESSIVE ARE *the Letters as cognised in the said Order*."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF LETTERS, 286-287]. —(2285)

COMMENTARY.

'*Not a distinct entity*'—i.e., as expressive independently by itself. Otherwise, there would be real difference between the Property and the Object to which it belongs,—which difference is not desirable.

Question :—What is it then that is expressive ?

Answer :—'*The idea in fact, etc. etc.*'—'*Ittham*', in a particular order.

What is meant is as follows:—It is not merely the *Order* that is expressive;—nor the Order as subsisting in the Letters;—nor merely the *Letters*; what are expressive are the *Letters as arranged in a certain order*; hence in the matter of *expression*, the Order is not the principal factor; because the Letters are cognised as having the *Order*; hence the Order occupies only a secondary position; and it is the Letters that are recognised as the thing possessing that Order as their property. This is what is meant by the *Text*.—(2285)

Two arguments have been urged (by the Opponent, under *Text* 2280) to the effect—(1) that the Letters are the products of Articulation, and (2) that they are dependent upon the whim of the Speaker.—It is pointed out by the *Mīmāmsaka* in the following *texts* that both these Reasons are 'inadmissible' :—

TEXTS (2286-2287).

S A MATTER OF FACT, THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE IS NOT A PRODUCT; BECAUSE IT IS ALWAYS ACCEPTED AS AN ALREADY ESTABLISHED ENTITY; THE SPEAKER DOES NOT ADOPT ANY ORDER INDEPENDENTLY BY HIS OWN CHOICE; IN FACT, HE ALWAYS DESIRES TO UTTER THE WORD IN THE SAME FORM IN WHICH IT HAS BEEN UTTERED BY OTHERS IN THE PAST; AND OTHER PERSONS COMING LATER ALSO UTTER IT IN THAT SAME FORM;—THUS IT IS THAT THIS ALSO IS WITHOUT BEGINNING,—LIKE THE CONNECTION (OF THE MEANING)."—[*Shloka-vārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 287–289].—(2286-2287)

COMMENTARY.

'*Because it is always, etc. etc.*'—i.e. the Speaker adopts the already ;ing order.

This is further clarified—'*The Speaker does not, etc. etc.*'.

Like the *Connection*, the *Order* also is without beginning.—(2286-2287).

The argument is summed up by the *Mīmāmsaka* in the following :—

TEXT (2288).

IUS THEN, EVEN THOUGH THE ORDER IS NOT SOMETHING *unchangeable* ND *eternal* IN THAT SENSE), YET IT IS *eternal*, IN *usage*. AND WE HAVE TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO REFUTE THE IDEA OF MEN BEING INDEPENDENT (IN THEIR CHOICE OF THE ORDER OF LETTERS USED)."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 289-290].—(2288)

COMMENTARY.

'*Naḥ*'—the Genitive ending is due to the verbal affix found in *tiṣedhyā*'.

The objection that has been urged is therefore not applicable.

Thus though the Order is not eternal in the sense of being *unchangeable*, the Hill,—yet its eternality has to be accepted on the basis of the usage :perienced persons.

What this means is that the Order is eternal for all practical purposes,—not *unchangeably* eternal, like the Hills.—(2288)

Question :—If that is so in the case of the Order, why is not the :nality' of the Letters also regarded as being for practical purposes ?

TEXTS (2289-2290).

"In the case of the Letters however, such eternality would not be possible if they were not really unchangeable; it is only when the Letters themselves are eternal that their *Order* can appear through usage; just in the same manner as the Jar and other things are made only when the eternal Atoms are there; in the absence of these, the making of these things would have no basis at all, and none such is ever perceived."—[*Shlokavārtika*—Eternality of Words, 290–292].—(2289-2290)

COMMENTARY.

Like the Order, the Letters also could not be regarded as eternal *in usage,* though not *unchangeably* eternal, and the phenomena of the comprehension of the meanings of words explained on that basis.

Question :—Why can it not be so explained ?

Answer :—'*It is only when the Letters, etc. etc.*'—If the Letters were *unchangeably eternal,*—in that case, the usage would be possible through tradition among people and thence the appearance of the Order; i.e. the Order would acquire its existence; as for example, the making of the Jar, etc. proceeds from the Atoms as their basis.

In some places, the reading is '*kramādayaḥ*' (for '*kramodayaḥ*'); in which case the '*ādi*' would include their 'Connection', 'Recognition' and so forth.

Question :—' Why cannot the making (and appearance, of *Jar*, etc. and *Order*) be possible without the eternality of the Letters and the Atoms ? '

Answer :—'*In the absence of these, etc. etc.*'—' in the absence of these ' stands for ' if both, the Letters and the Atoms, were not *unchangeably eternal* '.

Says the Opponent—Just as the Atoms are the constituent cause of the Jar and other things,—so of the Letters also, there would be subtler constituent parts; as has been declared (by Grammarians) that—' Of Letters there are constituent parts, of which the Letters themselves are only the fourth stage '. Under the circumstances, how is it that Letters are described as *unchangeably eternal* ?

Answer :—This does not affect our case. It has been explained in course of the Refutation of *Sphoṭa* (*Shlokavārtika*), that Letters have no constituent parts.—(2289-2290)

Further, if Letters were not eternal, in the sense of being *unchangeable,*—then, in the mind of every user of words, the idea could not be there that ' I am uttering only those words that have been used by others '; and yet as

a matter of fact, this idea *is* there ; hence it follows that this could not be possible if the Letters were not eternal.

This is what is explained in the following :—

TEXT (2291).

"THE IDEA IN THE MIND OF EVERY SPEAKER IS ALWAYS THAT 'I AM UTTERING WORDS THAT HAVE BEEN USED BY OTHER PERSONS'; THIS IN ITSELF MAKES THEM ETERNAL ; AND THERE IS NOTHING FOR YOU THAT WOULD BE INDICATIVE (OF A CONTRARY CONCLUSION)."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 294].—(2291)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent—If the *Order* of the Letters, *Ga* and the rest, is not eternal *in reality*,—nor are the *articulations* manifesting them, nor those Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc.,—then one cannot bring about these prompters of the articulations [as they are past and gone immediately on coming] ; and the new ones that one does bring about have never before been found to be such *prompters* ;—under the circumstances, how can the Letters, manifested in a certain order, become the means of comprehending the meaning ?—(2291)

In view of all these arguments, the *Mīmāṃsaka* says :—

TEXT (2292).

"JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE JAR AND SUCH THINGS, THEIR USE IS CHARACTERISED (AND INDICATED) BY THE 'UNIVERSAL' ;—SO IN THE SAME MANNER, THE ORDER OR ARRANGEMENT (OF THE LETTERS) WOULD BECOME CHARACTERISED AND INDICATED THROUGH THE 'UNIVERSAL'."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 295].—(2292)

COMMENTARY.

Just as in the case of the Jar, etc., even though they are non-eternal, yet their use is indicated by the 'Universal',—so, in the same way, even though the particular arrangement of the Letters may be non-eternal, their use could be determined and explained.—(2292)

How the *use* could be determined and indicated is next explained :—

TEXTS (2293-2294).

"SUCH UNIVERSALS AS THE 'PALATE', ETC. ARE ALWAYS PRESENT (IN THEIR UNIVERSAL OR COMMON FORM) IN ALL MEN ; AND IT IS THROUGH THESE THAT THE SPEAKER EMITS THE *Articulations* ;—AND THERE ARE DISTINCT UNIVERSALS OF THESE (ARTICULATIONS) ALSO, WHICH SERVE TO BRING ABOUT THE MANIFESTATION OF THE SOUNDS, AND THERE ARE AS MANY OF THESE AS THERE ARE LETTERS ;—OR IT IS THE PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS (ARTICULATIONS) THEMSELVES AS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SAID UNIVERSALS THAT BRING ABOUT THE MANIFESTATION OF THE PARTICULAR LETTER-SOUNDS."—[*Shloka-vārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 296-297].—(2293-2294)

COMMENTARY.

Such *Universals* as 'the Palate' and other speech-centres subsist in the individual Palates of all men ; and as such are present in all men ;—it is through these Universals that the Speaker determines these speech-centres, and then *emits*—exhales—through them the *Articulations* in the shape of the manifestive air-currents ; this is in accordance with the maxim that 'there can be no idea of the Qualified until there is cognition of the Qualification'.

Though these *Articulations* are evanescent,—yet like the Universal 'Cow' and the like, there are as many 'Universals' as there are Letters ; and these same Universals, associated with the Individuals, become manifestaters of the Letter-Sounds.

Or, the individual Articulations themselves, associated with the Universals, proceed to manifest the Sounds in consonance with the Letters. This is an alternative view.—(2293-2294)

Says the Opponent—Though there are distinct Universals of the Articulations, yet, even when these Articulations are marked by those Universals, they cannot bring about the particular order in which the Letters are manifested,—unless the Order is there. Because even though, through their respective Universals, they are distinct from one another, yet there can be no Order inherent in themselves ; because they are impartite things. Under the circumstances, how can there be any idea of the Order among Letters, brought about by the Order in their manifester ?

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2295).

"THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE AMONG THE ARTICULATIONS WOULD BE DUE TO THE ORDER AMONG THE CONJUNCTIONS AND DISJUNCTIONS OF THE PALATE, ETC.; AND THE ETERNALITY OF BOTH WOULD BE DUE TO THEIR RESPECTIVE UNIVERSALS."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 298].—(2295)

COMMENTARY.

Though there is no Order among the Articulations by themselves, yet the Order among them is brought about by the Conjunctions and Disjunctions.

The eternality of both,—i.e. (1) of the Order of the Conjunctions and Disjunctions with the Palate, etc., and (2) of the Order of the Articulations,—is due to the Universals subsisting in them respectively.

Thus everything is all right.—(2295)

Question:—When the Order is non-eternal by itself, how can its eternality be indicated by the Universal, by virtue of which it would form part of Usage?

Answer:—

TEXT (2296).

"JUST AS IN THE CASE OF *Moving About* AND OTHER ACTIONS, THERE IS AN ORDER OF SEQUENCE, THROUGH THE 'UNIVERSAL' SUBSISTING IN THE VARIOUS FACTORS IN THE ACTION,—SO A SIMILAR ORDER OF SEQUENCE MAY BE THERE AMONG THE PALATE, ETC., THE ARTICULATION AND THE LETTER, THROUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE UNIVERSALS."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 299].—(2296)

COMMENTARY.

Just as in the case of the particular Actions of Moving About and the like,—'and the like' including Ant-lines, etc.—the presence of the Order of Sequence becomes a part of usage, through the 'Universal', etc. subsisting in the various factors,—here also '*etcetera*' includes the Universals in the Ant-lines, etc.,—so, in the same manner, the presence of the Order of Sequence among the Palate, the Articulations and the Letters is adopted in use, as indicated by the Universals subsisting in the Palate, etc.

The compound '*tālvādidhvanivarṇabhāk*' is to be expounded as '*tālvādi*', 'Palate, etc.'—'*dhvanayaḥ*', 'Articulations',—and '*varṇāḥ*', 'Letters' [a copulative compound]—'that which bears this' is '*tālvā . . . bhāk*'. Thus what is meant is that—(*a*) the Order of the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, indicated by its own 'Universal', is the cause of the exhalation of

the Articulation,—(2) the Order of the Articulations, due to the Order of the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc., indicated by its own 'Universal', becomes the cause of the Order in the manifestation of the Letters; and this last becomes the cause of the comprehension of the meaning.

In some places, the reading is '*bhāgāḥ*'; under which the meaning would be as follows :—Just as the *parts* of the Actions of *Moving About* and the like, which appear in a certain Order of Sequence, become the basis of usage, when they are marked by a 'Universal' or by some other property,—similarly the Order of Sequence in the Palate, etc. becomes part of the usage.

Some people read '*Kramānusmṛtirēvam syāt*' (in place '*Kramānuvṛtti-rēvam syāt*'); which would be construed as follows :—Just as the parts of the Actions of *Moving About*, etc. are *remembered* as marked by the Universal, etc.,—similarly in the case of the Palate, etc. also there would be remembrance of the Order, as marked by the *Universal*, etc.—(2296)

Or, the Order of the Articulations may not be due to the Order of the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc.,—it may be due to the Articulations themselves, because they *are* made up of component parts.—This is the view put forward in the following :—

TEXT (2297).

"OR, THE INDIVIDUALS (ARTICULATIONS) THEMSELVES, BEING EXTREMELY SUBTLE IN THEIR NATURE,—THERE IS COGNITION OF THE PROPERTIES OF THE 'UNIVERSAL'; AND IT IS THROUGH THIS THAT THERE IS COGNITION OF ORDER AMONG THE LETTERS, EVEN THOUGH THESE ARE ALL-PERVADING."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 300].—(2297)

COMMENTARY.

'*Individuals*'—stands for the particular Articulations. The parts—components—of the Articulations—which appear in a certain order,—are extremely subtle; hence there can be no usage through them; consequently the properties of the Universal—such as *eternality* and the rest—become recognised—definitely known—as the causes of the manifestation of the Word-Sound.

Question :—What if that is so?

Answer :—'*It is through this, etc. etc.*'—Even though the Letters are all-pervading, yet they appear as if in an Order of Sequence, on account of the Order of the Articulations which always appear in a certain order.—(2297)

The following *text* sums up the discussion :—

TEXT (2298).

"THUS IT IS THAT THE LETTERS, FOLLOWING UP THE PROPERTIES OF THE ARTICULATION WHICH APPEAR THERE AS ETERNAL, BECOME EXPRESSIVE OF DIVERSE MEANINGS."—[*Shlokavārtika* —ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 301].—(2298)

COMMENTARY.

'*Properties of the Articulation*',—such as sequential Order, greater or less intensity, limitation in space and so forth.

'*Which appear there as eternal*',—through the *Universals*.

'*Following up*'—in accordance with.—(2298)

Thus, it has been explained in detail that, if on account of their being eternal and all-pervading, Letters cannot have any Order, etc. by themselves, —even so, all this Order, etc., really belonging to the manifesting Articulations, become attributed to the Letters and thereby become contributories to the comprehension of the meaning of (the Word).—Now the *Mīmāṃsaka* proceeds to set forth another view, under which the said distinctions of Order, etc. really belong to Time, of which the Articulations are only the qualifying adjuncts; and these being perceived in the Letters, become contributories to the comprehension of the meaning.—

TEXT (2299).

"THE *Order* OF THE LETTERS, AS ALSO THE SHORTNESS, LENGTH AND PROLONGATION,—ALL THESE ARE ONLY DISTINCTIONS OR DIVISIONS OF TIME; AND THEY COME TO BE RECOGNISED AS CONDITIONED (OR AFFECTED) BY THE ARTICULATIONS."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 302].—(2299)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*dhvanyupādhayaḥ*' is to be expounded as—'The distinctions of Time which have the manifesting Articulations for their qualification'.—(2299)

Says the Opponent—People who have postulated *Time* have regarded it as one, all-pervading and eternal; as has been declared in the following words:—'Some people regard Time as a substance which is one, eternal and all-pervading,—and something quite apart from the operation of modifiable substances';—under the circumstances, how can there be any 'distinctions' (or divisions) of Time?

The *Mīmāṃsaka's* answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2300-2301).

"TIME IS ONE, ALL-PERVADING AND ETERNAL,—AND YET IT IS KNOWN TO BE 'DIVIDED' ALSO, AMONG ALL THINGS ;—JUST LIKE LETTERS ; AND IT BECOMES MANIFESTED BY CERTAIN THINGS IN CERTAIN CASES ;—WHEN IT IS MANIFESTED IN CONNECTION WITH LETTERS, IT BECOMES CONTRIBUTORY TO THE *act of expressing* (OR DENOTING) ; AND AS IT EXISTS ELSEWHERE ALSO, ITS FORM IS REGARDED AS ETERNAL."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 303-304].—(2300-2301)

COMMENTARY.

'*Divided also*' ;—the term 'also' goes with all that has gone before—it is *one also, eternal also, all-pervading also* ; though it has been misplaced in the *Text.*

Question :—In what way is it 'divided' ?

Answer :—'*Among all things, like Letters*'.—What is meant is as follows:—Though the Letter, *Ga* for instance, is one only and eternal, yet when it comes to be manifested by a particular Articulation at a particular place, then it is known as divided through the divisions of place, etc. ; similarly *Time* also ; though it pervades over all things, yet when it comes to be manifested by a certain action in regard to a certain object, it becomes known as 'divided' or 'distinct' ; and when it is manifested in connection with Letters, *it becomes contributory to the act of expressing.*

Question :—If Time is so 'divided', how is it regarded as eternal and all-pervading ?

Answer :—'*As it exists, etc. etc.*'—'*Elsewhere*'—i.e. in Creepers, Leaves of trees and so forth ;—because it exists in these also, its *eternality* and *all-pervasiveness* become recognised and established.—'Eternality' alone is mentioned in the *Text*, by way of illustration.—(2300-2301)

TEXT (2302).

"FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE IS NO SUCH PROPERTY IN WORDS AS IS PERISHABLE ; CONSEQUENTLY IT BECOMES ESTABLISHED THAT THE WORD IS ETERNAL, FOR THOSE WHO UPHOLD THE ETERNALITY OF LETTERS."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 305].—(2302)

COMMENTARY.

'*From all this, etc. etc.*'—This sums up the *Mīmāmsaka's* own view.

'*Such property*'—as *Order*, etc.—(2302)

Says the Opponent—If the *Order* then is a property of *Time*, or of the manifesting Articulation,—and does not *really* belong to Letters,—then how does it become contributory to the expressing of the meaning ? Certainly the property of one thing cannot belong to the other.

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2303).

"AS MATTER OF FACT, A PROPERTY BELONGING TO ONE THING DOES BECOME AUXILIARY TO ANOTHER THING,—AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT IN THE CASE OF THE SPEED OF THE HORSE.—AS REGARDS 'ETERNALITY', IN THE CASE OF ALL THINGS, THE ONLY PROOF OF IT CONSISTS IN PRESUMPTION."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 306].—(2303)

COMMENTARY.

'*As has been pointed out*'—in such assertions as 'People going in a boat, etc. etc.' where the 'boat' is meant to stand for all kinds of conveyance.

'*Like the Speed of the Horse, etc.*'—For example, when people are riding a horse, the speed of the horse is contributory to the man's reaching a distant place, and also the man's notion that the trees on the roadside are moving. Similarly the *Order*, though belonging to the Articulation, becomes contributory to the Letters bringing about the comprehension of the meaning.

Having thus shown in detail that the assertion of the *non-eternality of Words* is annulled by Presumption, the *Mīmāmsaka* sums up his position in the words—'*As regards eternality, etc. etc.*'—The term '*tasmāt*' as introducing the summing up is to be regarded as understood here.

'*In the case of all things*'—What is meant is that it is not the *eternality of Letters* only that is proved by the fact that the expression of meaning by the Letters cannot be otherwise explained,—but the eternality of the Palate, etc. and also of the Articulations. This has been declared in the *Bhāṣya* (Shabara. 1. 1. 18, Trans., p. 37) in the following words :—'If the Word ceased to exist as soon as uttered, then no one could speak of anything to others ; and in that case, the Word could not be uttered for the benefit of another. On the other hand, if the Word does not cease to exist, then it is only right that on hearing the Word several times, there is comprehension of its meaning'.—(2303)

The *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds to point out that in denying the eternality of Words, the Opponent goes against (*a*) his own words, (*b*) against his own doctrine, (*c*) against scriptures, and (*d*) against common experience :—

TEXTS (2304-2305).

" IN SEEKING TO PROVE THE NON-ETERNALITY OF WORDS, THE OTHER PARTY INCURS THE ODIUM OF CONTRADICTING HIS OWN WORDS, ETC. ; AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVERY PROPOSITION IS ASSERTED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING ABOUT THE COMPREHENSION OF WHAT ONE DESIRES TO PROVE ; AND IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT THE NON-ETERNAL WORD CANNOT EXPRESS ITS OWN MEANING. CONSEQUENTLY, AS YOUR OWN ASSERTION EXPRESSES ITS MEANING, IT FOLLOWS THAT IT MUST BE ETERNAL ; AND THUS THERE IS REJECTION OF THE DESTRUCTIBILITY (NON-ETERNALITY, OF THE WORD)."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 313-314].—(2304-2305)

COMMENTARY.

'*His own words, etc.*'—' Etc.' is meant to include the contradiction of his own *accepted doctrines.*

'*It has been explained*'—Under the Text—' A Word is not expressive if its connection with the meaning is not known '. (See *Text* 2234.)

'*Consequently, it follows, etc. etc.*'—The ' eternality ' follows from—is proved by—the comprehension of the meaning. That is, the eternality is proved by the fact of the ' comprehension of meaning ' being otherwise inexplicable.—(2304-2305)

The following *Texts* point out that the Opponent's assertion implies the rejection of his own accepted doctrine :—

TEXTS (2306).

" HAVING ADMITTED THE CAPACITY OF WORDS TO EXPRESS THEIR MEANING, IF THE OPPONENT PROCEEDS TO ESTABLISH HIS CASE, HE CLEARLY SETS ASIDE THE ' NON-ETERNALITY ' (OF WORDS), BY HIS OWN ACCEPTED DOCTRINE ".—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 315].—(2306)

COMMENTARY.

The *Mīmāmsaka* shows that the Opponent's Proposition goes against all scriptures—

TEXT (2307).

"FOR ALL PARTIES, THE PERISHABILITY (NON-ETERNALITY, OF WORDS) BECOMES ANNULLED BY 'SCRIPTURE' (VERBAL AUTHORITY), THROUGH THE POTENCIES OF WORDS IN THE BRINGING ABOUT OF THE COGNITION OF THEIR MEANINGS,—WHICH POTENCIES FORM THE BASIS OF EACH AND EVERY SCRIPTURE".—[*Shloka-vārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 316].
—(2307)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*arthapratīti, etc. etc.*' is to be expounded as—'those potencies—of words—that are evinced in the bringing about of the cognition of their own meanings.'—The sense is that these serve to set aside the Proposition asserted by the Opponent.—(2307)

The *Mīmāmsaka* next points out that the Opponent's Proposition is annulled by common experience—

TEXTS (2308-2309).

"IN THE MANNER SHOWN BEFORE, THE OPPONENT'S PROPOSITION IS ANNULLED BY *common experience* ALSO.—THERE IS ANNULMENT BY *Inference* ALSO, FOR REASONS STATED BEFORE.—[*Shlokavārtika* —ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 317].—ANNULMENT BY PERCEPTION ALSO HAS BEEN POINTED OUT BEFORE—ON THE GROUND OF THE *one-ness* OF WORD-SOUND BEING DEFINITELY PROVED BY RECOGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE AUDITORY ORGAN".—(2308-2309)

COMMENTARY.

'*In the manner shown above*',—in the preceding text. But it should be read as follows—'For all parties the perishability of words becomes annulled by the potencies of words to bring about the comprehension of their meanings,—which potencies are definitely recognised by all men—and also by common experience'.

The words 'There is annulment by Inference, etc. etc.' serve to remind the reader of what has been said before regarding the Buddhist's Proposition being opposed to Inference, etc. The '*reasons stated before*' have been of several kinds—those detailed in the *Texts* 2121 *et seq.*

'*Has been pointed out before*'—under *Text* 2117.—(2308-2309)

The *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds to point out the defects in the 'Subject' (Minor Term) and in the 'Reasons' (Probans) of the Reasoning put forward (by the Opponent)—

TEXTS (2310–2312).

"IT HAS TO BE EXPLAINED WHAT THE '*Shabda*', 'WORD-SOUND', IS WHICH IS BEING PROVED TO BE PERISHABLE.—(*a*) IS IT THE 'AGGREGATE OF THE THREE ATTRIBUTES'?—OR (*b*) SOMETHING ATOMIC?—OR (*c*) 'A QAULITY OF *Akāsha*'?—OR (*d*) SOMETHING IN THE FORM OF MERE *Sound*, AS APART FROM THE LETTERS? OR (*e*) SOMETHING IN THE FORM OF AIR*, NOT EXPRESSIVE (OF MEANINGS)? OR (*f*) '*Sphoṭa*' IN THE FORM OF WORDS AND SENTENCES? OR (*g*) MERE 'SIMILARITY'? OR (*h*) THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHERS'?—ALL THESE MAY BE NON-ETERNAL; ACCORDING TO US *eternality* DOES NOT BELONG TO THESE.—HENCE YOUR REASONING IS OPEN TO THE DEFECTS OF (1) HAVING A 'SUBJECT' WHOSE EXACT NATURE IS NOT KNOWN OR ADMITTED, AND (2) HAVING A 'PROBANS' WHICH HAS NO SUBSTRATUM (OR BASIS)".—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 318–321].—(2310–2312)

COMMENTARY.

The Texts sets forth the several views that have been held by various philosophers regarding the exact nature of '*Shabda*' 'Word-sound' (in the present context).

(*a*) According to the *Sāṁkhyas*, '*Shabda*' is held to be something consisting of the 'Three Attributes' of Harmony, Energy and Inertia.—(*b*) According to the *Digambara* (*Jaīnas*), it is something *atomic*;—'pudgala' is *Atom*; what pertains to the *pudgala*, is *paudgala*, 'atomic'; i.e. consisting of the Atom.—(*c*) The followers of *Kaṇāda* hold it to be a 'quality of *Ākāsha*'.—(*d*) According to the common people, it is something of the nature of mere Sound, as apart from the Letters; as has been declared in *Patañjali's Bhāṣya*—'Or, *Shabda* among men is known as *sound* whose meaning is well known'.—(*e*) According to the author of the *Shikṣā*, it is of the nature of *Air*, not expressive; as declared by them 'The Air becomes the *Shabda*'.—(*f*) The Grammarians hold *Shabda* to consist of the *Word-sphoṭa* and *Sentence-sphoṭa*; as has been said by them—'The sounds sow the seed in the *Buddhi*, along

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* Text 2311 presents what may be regarded as a 'literary curiosity'. Here we have a quotation from the *Shlokāvartika*—Chapter on *Shabdanityātā*, *Shloka* 319. *Kamalashila* says, this represents the view of the *Shikṣā* that 'the Shabda consists of Air and is *inexpressive*'; the reading in the quotation being '*vāyurūpamavāchakam*'. The reading in the *Shlokavārtika* itself, however, is '*vāyurūpo'rthavāchakaḥ*', which makes the *Shabda*, '*arthavāchaka*', *expressive* of meaning. The *Nyāyaratnākara* says this is the view of the *Shikṣā*.—One or the other—*Tattvasangraha* and its Commentary on the one hand, and *Shlokavārtika* and its Commentary on the other, must be wrong; both cannot be right, as representing the view of the *Shikṣā*. Pāṇini's *Shikṣā* does not help to solve the riddle,—On the face of it, the reading adopted in the *Tattvasangraha* appears to be wrong; as the subject-matter of the whole discussion is the *expressive Shabda*, not that which is *inexpressive*.

:h the last articulation, and when this seed has developed by repetition, ; *Shabda* becomes cognised '.—(*g*) According to *Vindhyavāsin*, *Shabda* ısists in 'similarity'.—(*h*) According to the *Bauddhas* what expresses the aning consists in the 'exclusion of others', called '*Apoha* of others'.

If what the Buddhist seeks to prove is the 'non-eternality' of these ht kinds of 'Shabda'—as postulated by the *Sānkhya* and others,—then 'Subject' becomes open to the defect of being futile, which is expressed its own form; as such 'Subject' has been rejected by us. Nor do the *māmsakas* wish to prove the eternality of such *Shabda* as these.

Further, any such 'subject' as *Shabda* in the particular forms of the ıree-Attribute entity' and the rest is not admitted or known, so far as are concerned; hence the 'subject' becomes open to the charge of having exact nature unknown. The Probans or Reason also, on that same ount, becomes one whose substratum (in the shape of the *Subject* or ıor Term) is not *admitted* or *known*; and any such 'subject' is not admitted ıll.—(2310–2312)

TEXTS (2313-2314).

F THEN, YOUR 'SUBJECT' OR 'MINOR TERM' CONSISTS OF THE *Shabda* AS POSTULATED BY US, THEN, BOTH THESE FALLACIES BECOME APPLICABLE TO YOU (WHO DO NOT ADMIT OF ANY SUCH *Shabda* AS HELD BY US).—IF MERE *Shabda* (IN GENERAL, WITHOUT ANY QUALIFICATION) WERE ASSERTED AS THE 'SUBJECT' OF YOUR REASONING, THEN, IT WOULD MEAN THAT FOR YOU, THE *Universal* 'SHABDA' ITSELF IS NON-ETERNAL; AND SUCH A VIEW WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE VIEW ACCEPTED BY ALL MEN THAT THE *Universal* IS ALWAYS ETERNAL; IN ONE FORM OR THE OTHER, THE 'UNIVERSAL' IS REGARDED BY EVERY ONE AS ETERNAL".—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 321–323].—(2313-2314)

COMMENTARY.

We, *Mīmāmsakas*, hold that '*Shabda*' consists only in the Letters 'Ga' the rest, it is not anything apart from these;—and if this is the *Shabda* :h the Buddhist and others make the 'Subject' of their Proposition, *both these fallacies*—the Proposition having the exact nature of its Subject ıown and the Reason having no basis—would befall them.

If mere '*Shabda*' *were asserted*—i.e. as the subject of the Proposition,— for you the universal 'Shabda' would itself be *non-eternal*;—the ,se 'be non-eternal' is to be supplied. Because the epithet 'mere' ıs the exclusion of all particular features, what else—apart from the *versal*—could it be that would be '*mere Shabda*'? Thus by implication proposition would be declaring the non-eternality of the *Universal* ıbda' itself.

'Be it so, what then?'

That cannot be right; as '*such a view would be contrary, etc. etc.*'—for .nce, the Buddhists themselves who postulate the Exclusion ...

of others', have declared that 'it is the *Universal* that stands'. So that the view now put forth would involve the contradiction of what has been admitted by them.

This is what is shown in the words—'*In one form or the other, etc. etc.*'—In whatever form the 'Universal' has been postulated by philosophers, in accordance with their respective doctrines, it is held, by all parties, to be *eternal*. If it were not so, then, like the Individuals, each Universal, appearing after the other, would become intermingled; and the very character of the 'Universal' would become lost.—(2313-2314)

Having thus pointed out the defects in the 'Subject' through the various alternative views regarding the nature of the thing itself (*Shabda*) the *Mīmāṁsaka* now proceeds to point out the same, through the various alternative views regarding the exact nature of the Probandum (*non-eternality*):—

TEXTS (2315-2316).

"THEN AGAIN, IF BY 'NON-ETERNALITY' YOU MEAN *proneness to absolute destruction*, THEN, SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, THE 'SUBJECT' COMES TO BE ONE WHOSE QUALIFICATION IS *not admitted*.—IF WHAT IS MEANT IS *some sort* OF CHARACTER WHICH MAKES *Shabda* LIABLE TO BEING CALLED 'NON-ETERNAL',—THEN SUCH 'NON-ETERNALITY' WOULD BE ONE THAT IS ADMITTED BY US ALSO,—IN THE SENSE THAT FROM THE 'UNMANIFESTED STATE' IT COMES INTO THE 'MANIFESTED STATE'".—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 326-327].—(2315-2316)

COMMENTARY.

If by 'non-eternality' you mean that the Word-Sound is liable to absolute destruction, leaving no trace behind,—then, so far as we, *Mīmāṁsakas*, are concerned, the qualification would be 'inadmissible', and this would vitiate your premiss. Because for the *Mīmāṁsakas*, as for the *Sāṅkhyas*, there is no such thing as '*absolute* destruction'; because even when the Jar disappears, it continues to exist in the form of a Potency; in the case of things like the Lamp also, the view is that (when it is blown out) its subtle particles become scattered in all directions.

If however what you mean to prove is that—the Word-sound is *somehow* capable of being called 'non-eternal',—then the argument is open to the charge of being 'futile'; because even when Word-sounds are eternal, it is admitted by us also that they may be called 'non-eternal' in the sense of going from the 'unmanifested state' to the 'manifested state' and *vice-versa*.—(2315-2316)

So far the Proposition (of the Buddhist) that 'Word is non-eternal' has been criticised in detail. The *Mīmāṁsaka* now proceeds to criticise his Reason—'Because it is perceptible by the Senses':—

TEXT (2317).

F THE REASON THAT IS PUT FORWARD IS ONLY *amenability to the ense-organs*,—THEN IT IS CLEARLY RECOGNISED AS *fallacious*, IN VIEW OF THE *Universal* WHICH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED ".—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 343-344].—(2317)

COMMENTARY.

'*Only amenability to the sense-organs*',—without any such qualification being a '*product*' and so forth.

If the Reason (Probans) is put forward in this unqualified form, then it ›mes 'fallacious', 'Inconclusive', in view of the 'Universal' which been established before; because no 'negative concomitance' would ıvailable (to confirm the Premiss).—(2317)

The following might be urged :—Even though, by reason of the other y (Vaisheṣika) admitting the *Universal*, the negative concomitance is available,—yet as the *Bauddha*, who is the main opponent of the *Mīmām*-, does not admit the *Universal*, the said negative concomitance would uite available; how then can the Probans be said to be *Inconclusive* ? The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2318).

ſST AS THE REASON CEASES TO BE A TRUE REASON IF IT DOES NOT ESIDE IN THE 'SUBJECT', ACCORDING TO THE OTHER PARTY,—SO ALSO, IF IT IS DEVOID OF AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE ".—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 344-345].—(2318)

COMMENTARY.

The principle is that 'that Probans alone is able to prove or disprove :h is admitted by both parties'; hence, that Probans which is not itted by any one of the two parties to reside in the 'Subject' becomes acious'; in the same manner, it becomes fallacious, if either party not admit its affirmative and negative concomitance (with the ›andum).

The construction is '*anvayavyatirēkayoḥ asiddhayoḥ*', 'if the affirmative negative concomitance are not admitted'.—(2318)

Question :—If that Probans alone can prove or disprove which is admitted ›oth parties,—then, how is it that you yourself have urged the 'inconveness' of a Reason, against the *Buddhist*, on the basis of the 'Universal' ch is not admitted by him) ?

Answer :—

TEXT (2319).

"IN THE CASE CITED, IT MAY BE THAT THE 'UNIVERSAL' IS NOT ADMITTED BY THE PARTY ADDUCING THE PROBANS; EVEN SO, THE PROBANS REMAINS INVALID, SO LONG AS THE 'UNIVERSAL' HAS NOT BEEN REJECTED."—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 345-346].—(2319)

COMMENTARY.

Even though, by the Buddhist and others who have put forward the Probans in question, the 'Universal' is not admitted as something wherein the contrary of the Probandum is present,—yet, as a matter of fact, the existence of the Universal cannot be denied. The sense is that, even under the circumstances, the Probans is one whose concomitance with the contrary of the Probandum is *suspected* (and hence invalid).—(2319)

The *Mīmāmsaka* puts forward another objection against the Probans and the Probandum,—through another alternative—

TEXTS (2320-2321).

"IN REGARD TO *amenability to the senses* AND THE REST (THAT HAVE BEEN CITED BY THE OPPONENT), IT HAS TO BE CLEARLY ASCERTAINED WHAT IT REALLY IS; (*a*) IS IT THE SAME AS THE INDIVIDUAL (THINGS IN WHICH IT SUBSISTS)? OR (*b*) IS IT SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THEM?—[AND IF IT IS DIFFERENT FROM THE INDIVIDUALS]—(*c*) IS IT DISTINCT WITH EACH INDIVIDUAL? OR (*d*) ONE AND THE SAME WITH ALL?—UNDER ALL THESE, ACCORDING AS THE ALTERNATIVE THAT MAY BE ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER PARTY, THE REASON WOULD BE SUBJECT (RESPECTIVELY) TO THE FALLACIES OF (*a*) BEING 'TOO SPECIFIC', (*b*) BEING 'INADMISSIBLE', (*c*) AND 'HAVING THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM'.—[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 346–348].—(2320-2321)

COMMENTARY.

'*And the rest*'—includes *non-eternality.*

An examination is to be made as to the exact nature of the said 'amenability to the senses': (*a*) Is it the same as the Individuals? (the individual things in which it subsists)?—Or (*b*) is it something different from them?—and, if it is different from them, it has to be examined whether these different amenabilities are (*c*) different with each individual object? or (*d*) one and the same with all?

(*a*) If the 'amenability to sense' is the same as the individuals, the Probans is 'too specific'; as there can be no 'negation' of individual; and

like its own form, one Individual, would not be present in another Individual [so that there could be no concomitance, negative or positive, of it].

(*b*) and (*c*) If it is different from the Individuals,—as such difference is not admitted by the *Mīmāmsaka*, whether it be different or the same in regard to each individual, it would, in either case, be 'Inadmissible'.

It is for this reason that the defect in the fourth alternative (*d*)—whereby the 'amenability' is different from the Individuals, but the same in all—has not been separately mentioned. Because there would be room for it only if the difference were admitted.

In regard to 'non-eternality' (which is another Reason put forward by the Opponent, against the expressiveness of words),—if it is different from the Individuals, the Corroborative Instance would be devoid of the Probandum.—If, on the other hand, it is non-different from them, the Instance would be certainly devoid of the Probandum; because one Individual can never be present in another Individual.—(2320-2321)

Next the *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds to point out the 'Inconclusive' character of another Probans cited by the Opponent—'Because it is invariably concomitant with effort':—

TEXTS (2322–2324).

"'Being perceived as following from effort' has been adduced as a Reason for the Word being a product and non-eternal. This is 'Inconclusive', in view of certain things that are *not-momentary*;—such as the three things: (1) Conscious Destruction, (2) Unconscious Destruction, and (3) Ākāsha: (1) When the destruction of things is brought about intentionally, it is regarded as 'Conscious Destruction';—(2) when destruction is *not* brought about intentionally, it is 'Unconscious Destruction';—both these, being 'imperishable', have been regarded (by the *Bauddha*) as 'uncaused' also."—[See *Shlokavārtika*—Eternality of Words, 22-23]—(2322–2324)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by '*Prayatnānantarīyatva*' is the character of *being perceived as following after an effort*.—And as this character is present in cases where the Probandum is absent, the said character, adduced as the Probans, for proving that Words are *products* and *non-eternal*, is 'Inconclusive'. For instance, the Buddhists postulate (1) 'Conscious Destruction', (2) 'Unconscious Destruction', and (3) '*Ākāsha*' as three entities which are unmodifiable and *not-momentary*, i.e. eternal. And yet, the Probans in question ('being perceived as following after effort') is found in these also.

This is what is pointed out by the words—'*when the destruction, etc. etc.*'

is called 'Conscious Destruction'; while that which is not intentional, is 'Unconscious Destruction'; such is the scheme of the Buddhists.

'*Tēṣām*'—of things like the Jar.

'*Tau cha*'—i.e. the Conscious and Unconscious Destructions.

'*Uncaused also*';—'also' includes 'non-eternal'.—(2322–2324)

How these two Destructions are 'uncaused' and 'eternal' and how they subsist in the Probans,—is pointed out in the following Texts,—from the point of view of the Opponent (*Bauddha*):—

TEXTS (2325–2328).

"THEY DECLARE THAT 'DESTRUCTION' IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY ITSELF, AND IS *without cause* . . . WHEN FUEL COMES INTO CONTACT WITH FIRE, THERE PROCEEDS A SERIES OF FIERY EMBERS.—*Destruction* IS NATURAL, AND INHERENT IN EVERYTHING THAT IS BORN; IT IS SUBTLE, AND MERGED IN A HOMOGENEOUS 'SERIES'; IT IS NOT PERCEIVED; WHEN HOWEVER A PECULIAR CAUSE OPERATES UPON THE HOMOGENEOUS 'SERIES', THEN, THROUGH A PECULIAR EFFECT, THE DESTRUCTION BECOMES MANIFESTED IN ITS GROSS FORM. THUS, THAT SAME CAUSE FROM WHICH THE HETEROGENEOUS 'SERIES' HAS BEEN PRODUCED, ALSO SERVES TO MANIFEST THE DESTRUCTION, THOUGH THIS DESTRUCTION IS NOT PRODUCED BY THAT CAUSE."—[*Vide Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 24–29].—(2325–2328)

COMMENTARY.

'*They*'—Buddhists.

Says the Opponent—As a matter of fact, we find the wood being burnt by fire, and the Jar smashed by the bludgeon; where there are causes of Destruction; how then can Destruction be *without cause*?

Answer:—'*When fuel comes into contact, etc. etc.*'—In this case what the Fire is the cause of is not Destruction, but the fiery embers,—as is ascertained through positive and negative concomitance; specially as Destruction exists by its very nature.

Question:—If Destruction is something that exists by its very nature,—how is it that it is not preceived there prior to the contact of such causes as the Fire and the like?

Answer:—'*It is subtle*'—Being deceived by the appearance of the several similar factors in the 'homogeneous series', people fail to perceive the Destruction in its subtle form; in fact by the perception of the homogeneous series, they are led to imagine that the object is 'undestroyed'

'*Peculiar cause*'—in the shape of the Bludgeon.

'*Peculiar effect*'—in the shape of the Potsherds.

It is under these conditions that the grossness of the Destruction becomes manifested.

'*Heterogeneous series*',—of a different character.

'*Hētoḥ*' is to be conducted with '*yataḥ*'.—'*Tēna*'—by that same ıse,—which has been referred to by the pronoun in '*yataḥ*'—is the struction manifested.—Such is the construction with the preceding use.—(2325–2328)

In the following *Text*, the *Mīmāmsaka* points out that the Probans in ɜstion is present in the contrary of the Probandum :—

TEXT (2329).

'HUS AS THIS DESTRUCTION, PERCEIVED AFTER THE EFFORT INVOLVED IN THE STROKE OF THE BLUDGEON, IS FOUND TO BE *uncaused*,—YOUR PROBANS BECOMES 'FALSE', 'INCONCLUSIVE'." —[*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 29-30].—(2329)

COMMENTARY.

'*This*'—the two kinds of Destruction.

The compound '*Prayatnā, etc.*' stands for 'invariably concomitant ı effort involved in the stroke of the Bludgeon'.—(2329)

It was asserted (under *Text* 2322) that the Probans is shown to be ɔonclusive' in view of three factors. Inconclusiveness due to *two* factors been shown,—in the shape of the two kinds of Destruction; that due to third factor of '*Ākāsha*' is next pointed out :—

TEXTS (2330-2331).

kāsha ALSO, BEING ETERNAL,—WHEN SURROUNDED BY EARTH AND BY ATER,—BECOMES MANIFESTED (RENDERED PERCEPTIBLE) BY THE REMOVAL OF THESE BY MEANS OF *digging* AND *pumping out*; SO THAT HERE ALSO THERE IS APPREHENSION OF *Ākāsha* FOLLOWING AFTER AN EFFORT; CONSEQUENTLY THE PROBANS URGED IN CONNECTION WITH WORD BECOMES 'INCONCLUSIVE'."—(*Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 30–32].—(2330-2331)

COMMENTARY.

'*By the removal of these*'—The removal of the Earth by digging with the le, etc.

'*Tatra*'—in regard to the Word-sound.

'*Darshanam*'—i.e. apprehension following from effort.—(2330-2331)

Having thus pointed out the defects in the Probans (of the Opponent), *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds to point out those in the Corroborative Instance :—

TEXTS (2332–2334).

"THE EXACT NATURE OF THE (OPPONENT'S) CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE ALSO HAS GOT TO BE EXAMINED :—IF IT IS MEANT TO BE TAKEN IN ITS DIRECT DENOTATION (I.E. THE UNIVERSAL), THEN, IT IS DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM.—IF IT IS TAKEN IN THE INDIRECT DENOTATION, AS INDICATING THE INDIVIDUAL,—THEN THE QUESTION ARISES AS TO ITS BEING THE SAME AS, OR DIFFERENT FROM, THE UNIVERSAL. IF IT IS DIFFERENT (FROM THE UNIVERSAL), THEN THE 'OBJECT' BECOMES ONE THAT CANNOT BE ADMITTED BY US ; WHILE IF IT IS NOT DIFFERENT (FROM THE UNIVERSAL), THEN THE OBJECT IS ONE THAT CANNOT BE ADMITTED BY OTHERS.—IF IT IS SOMETHING *indefinite* (VAGUE),—THEN SUCH A THING CANNOT BE EITHER ENTIRELY *eternal* OR ENTIRELY *non-eternal*, FOR US. BECAUSE THAT ELEMENT IN IT WHICH IS CALLED THE 'UNIVERSAL' IS ETERNAL, WHILE THE OTHER ELEMENT IS PERISHABLE ; AND IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED BEFORE THAT EVERY OBJECT HAS A MIXED CHARACTER".—[VIDE *Shlokavārtika*—ETERNALITY OF WORDS, 350–352].—(2332–2334)

COMMENTARY.

The term '*Sapakṣa*' (which is that wherein the Probandum is known by all to be present) here stands for the Corroborative Instance (in the reasoning of the Opponent, where the *Jar* has been cited as an instance of what *is perceived as appearing after effort* and is *non-eternal*).

The question, as regards the Instance that has been cited (the 'Jar') is—is the word meant to be taken in its direct denotative sense (which is the *Universal*) ?—Or in the sense of the *Individual* Jar ?

If it is meant to be taken in the direct sense, then it is defective, in so far as it is devoid of the Probandum (Non-eternality). '*Shruti*' here stands for the *Word* ;—the '*artha*' is what is directly denoted by it ;—and what is so denoted is the *Universal* 'Jar' ;—and the *Universal* is admitted by all parties to be *eternal* ;—hence there cannot be presence, in it, of *non-eternality*, which forms the Probandum.

In some places, the reading is '*jātyarthaḥ*' in place of '*shrutyarthaḥ*' ; under which '*jāti*' is to be taken as in apposition to '*artha*'. The meaning however remains the same as before.

If the second alternative is meant—that the word 'Jar' stands for the *Individual* Jar,—then also, it has to be considered whether the Individual that is intended to be the corroborative Instance is the same as, or different from, the Universal; that is, whether the Individual is something different from the Universal ? Or non-different from it ?

If it is different, then the object cited as the Instance is one that cannot be admitted by the *Mīmāmsaka* ; because the *Mīmāmsaka* does not hold the Universal to be something absolutely different from the Individual, as the *Vaishēṣikas* and others do ; as has been asserted in the words—'For us the Universal is nothing different from the Individual'.

If, on the other hand, the Individual is meant to be *non-different* (from the Universal),—then the object cited as the Instance is one that cannot be admitted by the Buddhist and others. These ‘ others ’ do not regard the *Universal* as non-different from the *Individual.*

If the Jar is meant to be the Instance, in the indefinite form, free from all conceptual contents like *difference and non-difference,*—even then, according to us, the Instance comes to be one devoid of the Probandum. This is what is asserted in the words—‘ If it is *something indefinite, etc. etc.* ’—‘ *Tat* ’ stands for the *Jar.*

Question :—How so ?

Answer :—‘ *That element, etc. etc.* ’—Of the entity called ‘ Jar ’, that factor which is called the ‘ Universal ’ is eternal, while the other factor which is called the ‘ Individual ’ is perishable.

Question :—How can one and the same thing have two mutually contradictory characters ?

Answer :—‘ *Mixed character, etc. etc.*—(2332–2334)

The *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds again to point out the defects in the Corroborative Instance, through the various alternatives that are possible in regard to the Probandum :—

TEXT (2335).

“ In the same manner, the exact nature of ‘ non-eternality ’ (your Probandum) also has got to be considered. If what is meant is absolute Destruction,—then the Instance is devoid of this Probandum, for us. If it is otherwise, then the Instance is devoid of the Probandum, for you.—Thus briefly has the way been shown for finding defects in your argument ”.—[*Shlokavārtika*—Eternality of Words, 353].—(2335)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant by your Probandum, ‘ non-eternality ’—is *absolute* Destruction,—then for us, *Mīmāmsakas,* the Instance is devoid of the Probandum ; because we do not admit of any *absolute* Destruction of things ; as they always remain in the form of *Potencies.*

Though the word used in the Text is the common word, ‘ *nāsha* ’, yet from the Context, its meaning appears to be restricted to *utter, absolute destruction.* If it were not so, why should the writer have urged the argument that the Instance is devoid of the Probandum ?

Question :—The question as to what is meant by ‘ non-eternality ’ has been already discussed before under *Text* 2315 ; why is it discussed over again ?

Answer :—True ; but it was discussed there for the purpose of pointing out the defects in the 'Subject', while on the present occasion it is discussed for the purpose of pointing out the defects in the Corroborative Instance. This is the difference.

If, on the other hand, 'non-eternality' that is meant is not in the form of 'absolute Destruction',—but in the form of 'appearance and disappearance',—then the answer is—'*If it is otherwise*',—i.e. if 'non-eternality' is something other than 'Absolute Destruction'.

'*For you*'—'there is absence of Probandum'—this has to be construed here also ;—i.e. in the *Instance.*—As you, Buddhists do not admit of 'Destruction with a residue'—as the *Sankhyas* do. Hence under your view, the Instance cited would be devoid of the Probandum.

This is the way in which the arguments in support of the non-eternality of Words have to be refuted,—which has been expounded for the learned ; other arguments may also be put forward by intelligent people themselves. —(2335)

The *Mīmāmsaka* next sets forth these objections of the opponent against his doctrines :—

TEXTS (2336–2338).

"[SAYS THE OPPONENT]—'THOUGH THE WORD, THE MEANING AND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM HAVE BEEN PROVED TO BE ETERNAL, YET SO FAR AS THE VALIDITY (RELIABILITY) OF THE MEANING OF THE SENTENCE IS CONCERNED, THAT CANNOT BE ADMITTED.—[*Shloka-vārtika*—ON SENTENCE—1].—IT MAY BE THAT THE MEANING OF SENTENCES HAS BEEN ASSUMED BY THE MĪMĀMSAKAS, WITHOUT ANY BASIS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONVENTIONS OF MEN,—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF SUCH TECHNICAL TERMS AS *guṇa*, *vṛddhi* AND THE LIKE.—FURTHER, BEING IN THE FORM OF A COMPILATION, THE VEDA MUST BE REGARDED AS A HUMAN PRODUCTION, LIKE A BOOK OF STORIES. AND YET THERE IS NO RELIABLE PERSON (KNOWN, WHO COULD BE THE AUTHOR OF THE VEDA) ;—THE VEDA THEREFORE MUST BE REGARDED AS *unreliable*'." [SEE *Shlokavārtika*—ON SENTENCE, 108–110].—(2336–2338)

COMMENTARY.

The 'meaning of sentence' consists in the Injunction or Prohibition of particular acts as associated with particular means of accomplishment ; herein too lies the validity or efficiency of the Vedic Injunction as a 'Means of Right Cognition' ; it does not rest in what is expressed by *words*, Consequently when the validity or authority or reliability of the Veda has to be proved,—what has been established regarding the eternality of the Word, its meaning and the connection of these, is of no use in the matter at issue.

Further, whenever there is *cognition of the meaning of a sentence*, it is always found to be *based upon Convention*; e.g. sentences like '*ād-guṇaḥ*' (Pāṇini's *Sūtra*, defining what is 'guṇa'), bring about the cognition of what is meant by the technical terms '*guṇa*', '*vṛddhi*' and the like;—the cognition of the meaning of the Injunctive Sentence is *cognition of the meaning of a sentence*;—hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.—This is what is shown in the words—'*In accordance with Conventions, etc. etc.*'

'*Like the technical terms, etc. etc.*'—The affix '*vati*' has the sense of the Locative.

In support of the said idea it is added—'*without any basis*'.—That is, it is just possible that without any reason,—through their unbridled imagination,—for the purpose of making a living—the 'Sacrificers' have assumed the meanings of such Vedic sentences as—'Desiring Heaven, one should offer the *Agnihotra*'.

Then again, as a matter of fact, whatever is a *compilation* is a human product,—e.g. Dramas and Stories,—and the Veda is a compilation of words;—hence this is a reason based on the nature of the thing.

Thus then, as the Veda is a human work, it must be unreliable—like the words of the man by the roadside.

It might be that it is reliable because it is the work of a reliable person. The answer to that is—'*There is no reliable person known, etc. etc.*'—(2336–2338)

To the above, the *Mīmāṁsaka* makes the following answer:—

TEXTS (2339-2340).

"The eternality of the Sentence is to be asserted in the same manner in which the eternality of the Connection (between Word and Meaning) has been asserted.—[*Shlokavārtika*—On Sentence, 365].—Even though in the case of the technical words like '*vṛddhi*', what has been asserted may be possible, because these deal with perceptible things; in regard to the Veda however, the idea of 'conventionality' is not possible; because by whom has the connection between Heaven and the Sacrifices (spoken of in the Veda)—which is beyond the reach of the senses,—been perceived?"—(2339-2340)

COMMENTARY.

The reasoning that has been put forward above in support of the view that the Connection between the Word and its Meaning cannot be artificial,—under the *Text* 2257,—on the basis of that same reasoning the eternality of the Vedic Sentence also may be asserted.

The *Mīmāṁsaka* points out the 'inconclusive' character of the reasoning put forward by the Opponent, under *Text* 2337,—in the words—'*Because*

these deal, etc. etc.'—In the case of the *Sūtras* like '*adēṅguṇaḥ*', as they deal with things that are perceptible, it is possible that the ideas conveyed may be based upon Convention;—this however is not possible in the case of the *Veda*; because *Heaven* and such things—which are spoken of in the *Veda*,—are beyond the reach of the senses, and hence no Convention could be made (by men) regarding them.—(2339-2340)

Says the Opponent—If that is so, then the Vêda may be meaningless. The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2341-2342).

"IT CANNOT BE MEANINGLESS; AS ITS MEANING IS CLEARLY APPREHENDED".—(2341)

COMMENTARY.

'It'—stands for the *Veda*.—(2341)

The Opponent has urged (under *Text* 2338 the fact of the Veda being on 'aggregate' as a reason for its unreliability. By means of a counter-reason, the *Mīmāmsaka* shows that the said reason is 'Inconclusive':—

TEXTS (2341-2342).

"AS REGARDS THE ARGUMENT BASED UPON THE FACT OF THE VEDA BEING AN *aggregate*, THE COUNTER-ARGUMENT SHOULD BE STATED AS FOLLOWS:—ALL VEDIC STUDY (BY ANY PERSON) IS ALWAYS PRECEDED BY PREVIOUS 'STUDY' BY HIS TEACHER,—BECAUSE IT IS CALLED 'VEDIC STUDY'—LIKE THE 'STUDY' CARRIED ON AT THE PRESENT TIME".—[*Shlokavārtika*—ON SENTENCE, 365-366].—(2341-2342)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent—The same can be said in regard to the 'study' of the *Mahābhārata* also: all 'study' of the *Mahābhārata* is always preceded by the previous study by the Teacher,—like the 'study' at the present time; but it will not be right to argue thus; hence the counter-argument put forward is 'inconclusive'.

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2343).

HE ARGUMENT MIGHT BE URGED IN REGARD TO THE *Mahābhārata* LSO ; BUT IT IS BLOCKED BY THE DISTINCT 'REMEMBRANCE' (MENTION) OF ITS WRITER. THOUGH THERE ARE SUCH 'REMEMBRANCES' IN REGARD TO THE VEDA ALSO,—YET, THEY ARE ALL BASED UPON 'COMMENDATORY' DESCRIPTION ".—[*Shlokavārtika*—ON SENTENCE, 367].—(2343)

COMMENTARY.

The same argument might be urged in regard to the *Mahābhārata* also ; the Author, Vyāsa, is clearly 'remembered' (mentioned); hence such ssertion is rendered impossible by this mention of the author, and hence ıot be made. There is no such *mention* of the 'Author' in the case of Veda.

Says the Opponent—In regard to the Veda also, the Author is mentioned, ıch passages as—'*Agnirāvashchakruḥ sāmāni . . . atharvānāṅgirasaḥ*'.

The answer to this is—'*Though there are such, etc. etc.*'—As regards the tion of 'authors' in the Veda, *that is based upon commendatory descrip-* ; '*arthavāda*' is the '*vāda*', description, of '*artha*', 'facts'; this ription is the basis of the said mention (of Authors in the Veda); hence word '*chakruḥ*' in the passage quoted does not stand for *creating* or *ucing*, but for *remembering*; so the meaning is that the persons named *ıembered*' the *Sāman*, etc.—(2343)

Question :—How has this meaning been determined ?

Answer :—

TEXTS (2344-2345).

HE PAST AND FUTURE TIMES CAN HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH ANY *Author* OF THE VEDA',—BECAUSE THEY ARE POINTS OF TIME,—LIKE THE *Present* TIME AS PERCEIVED.—IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT *Brahmā* AND THE REST ARE NOT THE *Makers* OF THE VEDA,—BECAUSE THEY ARE PERSONS, ETC. ETC.,—LIKE ORDINARY MEN ".—(2344-2345)

COMMENTARY.

The two arguments here set forth are easily understood.—(2344-2345)

In the following *Texts*, the whole subject-matter of the Context is summed y the *Mīmāmsaka* and supported by arguments :—

TEXTS (2346–2350).

"THUS THEN, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD CLEARLY THAT THE ASSERTION IN THE VEDA IS NOT FALSE (UNRELIABLE);—BECAUSE IN THE EXPRESSION OF ITS MEANING, IT IS NOT DEPENDENT UPON A SPEAKER,—JUST LIKE THE WORD IN THE EXPRESSION OF THE WORD-MEANING".—(2346).

"THE COGNITIONS DERIVED FROM THE VEDA MUST BE RIGHT,—BECAUSE THEY ARISE FROM THE ETERNAL SENTENCE,—LIKE THE COGNITION OF THE SENTENCE ITSELF.—THE ARGUMENTS DETAILED BEFORE ARE ALL APPLICABLE HERE".—[*Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣepa*, 2].—(2347).

"THE COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE VEDIC INJUNCTION MUST BE RELIABLE; (*a*) BECAUSE IT IS PRODUCED BY CAUSES FREE FROM ALL DEFECTS;—LIKE THE IDEAS PRODUCED BY THE INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE, OR BY THE ASSERTION OF TRUSTWORTHY PERSONS, OR BY PERCEPTION;—(*b*) ALSO BECAUSE IT IS PRODUCED BY AN ASSERTION WHICH DOES NOT EMANATE FROM AN UNRELIABLE PERSON, AND BECAUSE IT IS FREE FROM SUBLATION AT ALL TIMES AND PLACES,—LIKE THE IDEA PRODUCED BY THE ASSERTION OF A RELIABLE PERSON".—[*Shlokavārtika*, SUTRA 2, 184-185]. (2348-2349)

"IT BEING THUS ESTABLISHED THAT THE VEDA IS AUTHORITATIVE AND RELIABLE,—THE LONGSTANDING BEGINNINGLESS LINE OF TEACHERS AND PUPILS THAT HAS BEEN ASSUMED TENDS TO PROVE THAT IT IS FREE FROM DEFECTS".—(2350)

COMMENTARY.

That which produces a cognition, independently of the person using it, with regard to a certain thing, cannot be false in respect of that thing; e.g. the *Word* as bringing about the cognition of its own meaning;—the Vedic Sentence produces the cognition of its meaning, independently of any speaker in the shape of its Author;—hence there is apprehension of a condition contrary to the wider condition;—'falsity' being 'less wide' than 'being productive of cognitions through dependence upon the composing Person', which latter thus is the '*vyāpaka*', the 'wider condition',—the '*viruddha*', 'contrary', of this would be 'being productive of cognitions independently of the composing person'; and this latter condition is apprehended in the case of the Veda.

'*Like the Word in the expression of its meaning*';—this is meant to show that Words are productive of cognitions in conformity with the real state of things; and the 'cognition produced by the word' is not meant to be the Corroborative Instance; the *words* themselves being that instance.—Thus then, in the argument, *Word* is the Minor Term; and what is sought to be proved in regard to it is its *non-falsity* on account of its being the cause of

cognitions in conformity with the real state of things ;—consequently, the Corroborative Instance also should have exactly the same character ; otherwise the Instance would be *devoid of the Probandum.*

There is another argument, which is formulated as follows :—That Cognition which is brought about by an eternal sentence must be in conformity with the real state of things and hence right ;—just like the cognition of the verbal form of the sentence itself ;—the cognition of the fact of the performance of *Agnihotra*, etc. leading to Heaven is produced by the eternal sentence ;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—The eternality (of the Veda) has been proved in detail already ; hence the Probans in this argument cannot be said to be 'Inadmissible'.

'*The Cognition brought about by the Vedic Injunction, etc. etc.*'—This has been already explained.

There are two other arguments, formulated as follows :—The Cognition that is not produced by the assertion of an unreliable Person,—and also that which is free from contradiction (sublation, annulment) throughout the variations of time, place and personalities, must be reliable,—like the Cognition produced by the assertion of a reliable person ;—of this same kind is the Cognition produced by the Vedic Injunctive Sentence ;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing concerned.

The first of the Reasons adduced here cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible' ; because it has been proved at great length that the Veda is not the work of a Person.

Nor can the second Reason be regarded as 'Inadmissible' ; because, as has been explained in the following passage—'The idea brought about by the assertion—"Desiring Heaven, one should perform sacrifices"—is not an uncertain one ; that is, it is not in the form that—Heaven may or may not follow from the performance of sacrifices ; in fact, the idea is a definitely certain one that Heaven does follow ; and when this is cognised for certain, it cannot be false. That Cognition alone is false which, having appeared, becomes sublated by the notion that *such is not the actual case* ; the idea in question (that Heaven follows the performance of sacrifices) is never found to be so sublated at any time, or in regard to any person, or under any circumstances, or at any place. Hence it follows that it is not false or wrong' —(*Shabara-Bhāṣya* on 1. 1. 2, *Translation*, Page 5).

From all this it becomes established that the Veda is reliable, by itself, being as it is, the basis of all ideas of *Dharma* and allied matters ;—and like Light, it is a trustworthy source of knowledge for all men. Hence, it becomes established that all such theories as 'all that exists is mere *Idea*', which have been propounded by the Buddhists and others, cannot be right.—(2346–2350)

Says the Opponent—If, like Light, the Veda is, by itself, a reliable source of knowledge for all men,—then how is it that the Buddhist and others do not accept that view ? It cannot be right that for them, the Veda is not a reliable source of knowledge.

Anticipating this, the *Mīmāmsaka* supplies the following answer :—

TEXT (2351).

"THUS, LIKE LIGHT, THE VEDA BEING THE 'EYE' FOR ALL MEN,—THE HOSTILITY THAT ARISES AGAINST IT AMONG SOME PEOPLE, IS LIKE THE HOSTILITY OF THE OWL (TO LIGHT),—AND IS THE EFFECT OF THEIR DEMERIT".—(2351)

COMMENTARY.

When the Sun, which is the common Eye of all, has dispelled all darkness by its mass of effulgent rays and shines all round,—colour does not become visible to the owl which has its Eye inefficient in the performing of its functions; in the same way, people like the Buddhists, whose Eyes of Intelligence have become disabled by Demerit, have their vision obstructed,—even when the one common Eye of all people, in the shape of the *Veda*, is there.

The particle '*Kila*' is meant to indicate *displeasure*.

[*Here ends the case for the Reliability of the* VEDA, *the* REVEALED WORD. —*Next follow the arguments* AGAINST *the Reliability of the* REVEALED WORD, *Veda.*]

The said 'hostility' to the Veda is now expounded:—

TEXT (2352).

ALL THIS IS THE PRODUCT OF THE FALSE PRIDE OF THE TWICE-BORN PEOPLE. THERE IS NO TRUTH IN THIS, EVEN BY THE SLIGHTEST CHANCE.—(2352)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ghuṇākṣaravat*'[1]—even by the slightest chance; like the 'Crow and the Palm-fruit'.—(2352)

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[1] '*Ghuṇākṣara*'—when insects get into a piece of wood and make holes in it, some times, the holes that appear become, by chance, so arranged as to assume the shape of Letters; hence '*Ghuṇākṣara*', 'insect-letters', stands for 'mere-chance'. So also 'Crow and the Palm fruit' stands for *mere chance*; exemplified by the case when the Palm fruit drops from the tree when the Crow sits upon it, it is mere chance, as the coming of the Crow cannot be the real cause of the falling of the fruit.

It has been argued (by the *Mīmāmsaka*) that "that which is free from the contact of defects conducive to *falsity* must be the source of *true* cognition, etc. etc.".—The Author, for the sake of argument, admits the Reason here adduced, and then proceeds to show that it is 'inconclusive'—

TEXT (2353).

EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO AUTHOR, THE VEDA CANNOT BE REGARDED AS SAYING WHAT IS TRUE ;—BECAUSE IT IS DEVOID OF THOSE EXCELLENCES IN ITS SOURCE WHICH WOULD MAKE IT TRUTHFUL ;—JUST AS IN THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS, THE WORD IS NOT REGARDED AS *false*.—(2353)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ēṣā*' stands for the Veda.

A man under the influence of Love and Hatred, etc. is found to say things that are *not true* ; in this way, through positive and negative concomitance, it is ascertained that there are certain defects which lie at the root of *falsity* ; similarly a man full of mercy and other good qualities is found to be truthful ; hence these good qualities are excellences that lie at the root of *truthfulness*.—Thus, in the absence (in the case of the *Veda*) of these causes of truthfulness, the effect, in the shape of *Truthfulness*, also should be non-existent.—So that even though the Veda may not be the work of a Person, its *truthfulness* is not established ; hence the Reason put forward by the *Mīmāmsaka* is 'Inconclusive'.—(2353)

Question :—"But how is it ascertained that the excellences are absent ?"

Answer :—

TEXT (2354).

IT IS ONLY IN THE CASE OF THE WORKS OF PERSONS THAT THE QUESTION ARISES AS TO WHETHER THE EXCELLENCES ARE THERE OR NOT. HENCE THERE IS NO NEED FOR SUCH AN ENQUIRY IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ; AND WE HAVE NOT THE SLIGHTEST IDEA OF THERE BEING ANY EXCELLENCE AT ALL.—(2354)

COMMENTARY.

What this shows is that the grounds for denying the *defects* in the case of the Veda are also the grounds for denying the *excellences* also [viz. : the absence of a Person as the author].—(2354)

Summing up the argument, the Author proceeds to show that whe do not find the causes (of truthfulness and falsity), there cannot be possibility of the Veda being either *true* or *false* :—

TEXT (2355).

THUS, INASMUCH AS THE CAUSES OF *truthfulness and falsity*,—IN SHAPE (*a*) OF WISDOM AND MERCY AND (*b*) OF ABSENCE OF MERCY, ETC.,—ARE NOT THERE, THE SAID TWO QUALITIES CANNOT BELONG TO THE VEDA.—(2355)

COMMENTARY.

Wisdom, etc. are the causes of *truthfulness*, while the absence of me etc. are the causes of *falsity*,—respectively.

'*The two*'—i.e. Truthfulness and Falsity.—(2355)

The following *Texts* show what follows when the Veda is neither *tru* nor *false*—

TEXTS (2356-2357).

THUS THE VEDA IS REDUCED TO FUTILITY,—LIKE SUCH SENTENCE 'SIX CAKES'.—IF IT BE ARGUED THAT "MEANINGS ARE ACTUA COMPREHENDED (FROM VEDIC SENTENCES), IN RESPECT OF ACT AND ACTIVE AGENTS",—[THE ANSWER IS THAT] THERE MAY SUCH COMPREHENSION IN CASES WHERE THERE ARE EXPLANATI SUPPLIED BY MEN,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE DOINGS OF *Urvash* EVEN THOUGH THE WORDS (OF THE VEDA) BY THEMSELVES NOT REALLY CONVEY ANY SUCH MEANING AT ALL,—AS HELD BY —(2356-2357)

COMMENTARY.

The Veda now turns out to be as 'futile' and meaningless as such s utterances of the mad-cap as 'six cakes', 'ten pomegranates' and the

Says the *Mīmāmsaka*—"In seeking to prove the futility of the V the Buddhist makes his Proposition contrary to a perceptible fact; bec it is directly perceived that the Vedic sentence actually provides the c prehension of the idea that 'from the performance of the *Agnihotra*, fol

In answer to this, the Author, with a view to leaving no room for the Opponent to say anything, says—'*There may be such comprehension, etc. etc.*'—The idea is as follows:—There would have been annulment of our Proposition if we tried to prove the meaninglessness of the Veda by itself; what we are doing is only to put forward a *Reductio Ad Absurdum*; and this cannot set aside our Proposition, as there is no Proposition in such an argument at all; all that is done is to show that when the other party does not admit the absence of the narrower factor even when the wider factor is absent, he incurs an undesirable incongruity and contradicts his own words.

Nor is our Proposition contrary to any perceived fact. Because, even when the Veda is really meaningless, such comprehension of meaning as has been urged may be the effect of the explanations provided by people; for instance, in regard to the Vedic sentence 'Heaven follows from the *Agnihotra*', some one may say—'what are described in this sentence are the doings of *Bharata*, *Urvashī* and other persons'; and even though he may have offered this explanation without actually knowing the meaning of the sentence, yet subsequently, the man actually has the comprehension of the said idea from the sentence. But this does not make the Vedic sentence really *expressive* of that meaning.—In the same manner, the 'comprehension of the meaning' that has been urged by the other party may proceed from the Vedic sentence, even though, in reality, this sentence may be entirely meaningless.—How then can our Proposition be annulled by 'a fact of Perception'.—(2356-2357)

Further, it may be that in the Veda, there is absence, only of the defects conducive to *falsity*, not of the excellences; even so, the 'inconclusiveness' of your Probans is irresistible. This is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2358).

EVEN IF THERE BE NO DEFECTS, TRUTHFULNESS DOES NOT BECOME PROVED SIMPLY BECAUSE THE OTHER ALTERNATIVE MUST BE ACCEPTED; BECAUSE THERE IS A THIRD ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE, THAT OF 'MEANINGLESSNESS'.—(2358)

COMMENTARY.

If, in connection with Words, there were only two possible alternatives—*falsity* and *truthfulness*,—then, the absence of one alternative would necessarily imply the presence of the other; there is however a third alternative possible—that they are *meaningless*; under the circumstances, the negation of *falsity* does not necessarily imply the assertion of *truthfulness*; as there is no negation of the other alternative of *meaninglessness*.—(2358)

TEXTS (2359–2361).

IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT—"THE VEDA BY ITSELF, INDEPENDENT OF ANY PERSONALITIES, STANDS CAPABLE OF BRINGING ABOUT THE TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS,—AND IT IS ON THAT GROUND THAT IT IS REGARDED AS TRUTHFUL AND RELIABLE".—IF THAT IS SO, THAT KNOWLEDGE SHOULD BE APPEARING INCESSANTLY,—BECAUSE ITS CAUSE IS ALWAYS THERE,—AS AT THE MOMENT INTENDED.—OR AT THE TIME THAT ONE COGNITION APPEARS, ALL COGNITIONS PROVIDED BY THE VEDA SHOULD APPEAR SIMULTANEOUSLY,—BECAUSE IT IS AN EFFICIENT CAUSE,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE INTENDED COGNITION.—(2359–2361)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"If we had regarded the *Veda* as *truthful* by reason of the presence of Mercy and such other excellences in its author, then, as the excellences would be resting in the Person,—when this Person would cease to exist, the excellences would disappear, and thence the *truthfulness* based upon the excellences would also disappear. As a matter of fact, however, it is by its very nature that the Veda is the source of knowledge of real things,—and this capacity of the Veda is not due to any excellences in any Person; hence there can be no 'inconclusiveness' in our Reason. Nor is there any possibility of the Veda being *meaningless*".

Anticipating this argument of the *Mīmāṁsaka*, the Author says—'*If that is so, etc. etc.*'—Just as, it is by its very nature that the Veda has a meaning,—in the same way it might be possible that it is false; so that the Reason still remains *Inconclusive*. This is going to be further explained later on.

If the Veda were the source of knowledge, by its very nature, then the cognitions provided by it should appear at all times and all simultaneously, as their efficient cause would be there always. How then can the contingency of being *meaningless* be avoided?

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When the efficient cause of a certain thing is there, that thing must come about,—e.g. the cognition of the Agnihotra provided by the Vedic sentences;—the efficient cause, in the shape of Veda, of all cognitions arising from the Vedic sentences, is always present; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(2359–2361)

The Author next points out another objection against the idea of cognitions appearing simultaneously:—

TEXT (2362).

AFTER THAT THE VEDA'S CAPACITY TO BRING ABOUT COGNITIONS WOULD CEASE ; CONSEQUENTLY THE VEDA COULD NOT BE ETERNAL. IF THE SAID CAPACITY CONTINUES TO EXIST, THEN THE SAME COGNITIONS SHOULD APPEAR AGAIN.—(2362)

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, if, after having simultaneously produced all the Cognitions, the Veda loses the capacity to produce Cognitions, then, on account of the cessation of that capacity, which forms the very essence of the Veda, the Veda itself becomes liable to cease to exist.—If however, the *Veda* does *not* lose that capacity, then, later on, the same set of Cognitions should appear again. Hence, we conclude that no eternal thing can possess any capacity for effective action.—(2362)

In the following *Text*, the author puts forward a likely explanation to meet the argument that 'when the efficient cause of a thing is present, that thing must appear' :—

TEXT (2363).

IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT—" THE VEDA STANDS IN NEED OF EXPLANATIONS, ETC., AND AS THESE EXPLANATIONS APPEAR IN SUCCESSION, THE COGNITIONS (BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE VEDA) ARE HELD TO BE SUCCESSIVE ALSO."—(2363)

COMMENTARY.

The 'etc.' is meant to include Conventions.

'*These*'—stands for the *explanations*.—(2363)

This objection is answered in the following :—

TEXT (2364).

IT CANNOT BE SO ; WHEN IT IS EFFICIENT (AND HAS THE CAPACITY)—WHAT SORT OF 'DEPENDENCE' COULD THERE BE ? IF IT IS EFFICIENT BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THAT ON WHICH IT IS DEPENDENT,—WHAT HOPE, THEN, CAN YOU HAVE OF ITS BEING *eternal* ?—(2364)

COMMENTARY.

It is only when something is *inefficient* by itself, that it needs the help of others in securing the required efficiency ; when, however, a thing is quite

efficient by itself, there is no imperfection in its character ; what sort of *need* or *dependence* could there be in that case ?

If it be held that at first it is *inefficient*, but subsequently, it becomes *efficient* through the contact of contributory causes,—then you had better give up all hope for the eternality of the Veda !—(2364)

Question :—" How so ? "
Answer :—

TEXT (2365).

IF IT WAS PREVIOUSLY INEFFICIENT, AND IS MADE EFFICIENT BY THE EXPLANATIONS,—THEN IT BECOMES A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE THROUGH THE HELP OF PERSONALITIES, AND HENCE THE WORK OF A PERSON.—(2365)

COMMENTARY.

The underlying idea is that the efficiency or potency is not something apart from the Veda itself ; if it were something different, then as there would be no connection between the Veda and the efficiency, the Veda would not be an active agent at all ; as effects are produced from efficiency only.

'*Source of knowledge*'—The Veda as source of knowledge, comes to be born of Personalities ; the form of the Veda itself becomes born of Personalities; and as all this is not different from the Veda, the Veda itself becomes 'born of personalities'.—(2365)

Further, it is not only that by dependence upon something else, the Veda becomes non-eternal ; the assumption that it is not the work of an author also becomes futile.—This is shown in the following :—

TEXTS (2366–2368).

THE VEDA, AS IT STANDS, PROVIDES NO KNOWLEDGE TO US, UNTIL IT IS ILLUMINATED (EXPLAINED) BY PERSONS WHO ACT AS LAMPS. CONSEQUENTLY THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE ASSUMPTION THAT WHAT BRINGS ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS IS SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT THE WORK OF A PERSON ; BECAUSE THE KNOWLEDGE IN QUESTION DOES PROCEED FROM THE EXPLANATIONS PROVIDED BY PERSONS. THUS THE CHARACTER OF *not being the work of a Person*, EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE PRESENT IN THE VEDA, IS OF NO USE ; BECAUSE THE ONLY RESULT PRODUCED BY THE VEDA—I.E. KNOWLEDGE—IS DEPENDENT UPON PERSONS.—(2366–2368)

COMMENTARY.

The idea that the Veda is not the work of a Person is postulated for the purpose of showing that the knowledge provided by it must be right ;—

this assumption also is not independent of personalities in providing that knowledge,—hence the assumption is entirely futile. In fact, the Persons, as authors of the Veda, might very well be the reliable source of right knowledge,—what is the use of assuming this *independence of Personalities,* which, after all, is itself dependent on personalities ?—(2365–2368)

It might be argued that—in order to avoid the contingency of the Veda becoming non-eternal, and also that of the assumption of the Veda being independent of Personalities becoming futile,—the Veda is held to be *always* efficient,—then this view becomes open to the objection already pointed out.—This is what is shown in the following :—

TEXT (2369).

IF THE VEDA IS ALWAYS EFFICIENT (TO PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE), THEN WHY SHOULD IT REQUIRE ANYTHING ELSE ? THE REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING FOR YOU FROM THE PRESENCE OF THAT SINGLE EFFICIENT CAUSE.—(2369)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—" Even if the help of Personalities is needed, the idea of *freedom from Personalities* does not become futile ; because what is made clear (explained) by the Persons is the meaning as it is there already,—they do not *produce* anything new ; if they produced something new, then alone would the independence of those Persons become admitted ; and in that case, being beset with attachment and other Defects, if they were to set about producing Vedic texts giving expression to wrong ideas, how could they be prevented ? "

The answer is that all these contingencies would arise also under the view that the knowledge of the meaning of Vedic Sentences is brought about by the explanations provided by Persons.

This is what is shown in the following :—

TEXTS (2370-2371).

PERSONS, BEING FREE AGENTS, PROCEEDING TO EXPLAIN THE VEDA, ACCORDING TO THEIR WHIMS, COULD NEVER BE CHECKED BY ANY ONE. CONSEQUENTLY, BEING BESET WITH SUCH DEFECTS AS DELUSION, VANITY, ETC., THEY MIGHT PROVIDE WRONG EXPLANATIONS OF THE VEDA.—THERE IS ROOM FOR SUCH A SUSPICION.—(2370-2371)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, no such Person has been postulated as is independently cognisant of the *meaning of the Veda,* which is beyond the reach of the senses,

who would expound this meaning. Because the power of such a Person to perceive supersensuous things through his knowledge of the Veda, cannot belong to him independently by himself ;—and the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda also is not possible without the power to perceive supersensuous things ;—thus there is an unavoidable mutual interdependence.

This is what is shown in the following :—

TEXTS (2372-2373).

THE OTHER PARTY DO NOT ADMIT ANY PERSON CAPABLE OF PERCEIVING SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS ;—AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN HEAVEN AND SACRIFICIAL PERFORMANCE CANNOT BE OBTAINED EXCEPT FROM THE (VEDIC) INJUNCTION ; BECAUSE FOR YOU, THERE IS NO PERSON WHO IS CAPABLE OF DIRECTLY PERCEIVING SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS ; AS WHOEVER HAS ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THESE HAS IT ONLY THROUGH THE ETERNAL WORDS.—(2372-2373)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*achodanam*' is to be explained as—'that for which there is no Injunction'; i.e. that which is independent of the Injunction.

The reason for this is next stated—'*Because, etc. etc.*'

Question :—"Why is this also so ?"

Answer :—'*As whoever, etc. etc.*'—As has been declared in the following words—'For these reasons there is no Perceiver of supersensuous things; whoever knows anything about these knows it only through the *Eternal Word*'—(2372-2373)

The following might be urged—"The Veda itself would make known to such a person its own meaning, without any action on the part of that Person ; so that there is no mutual interdependence".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2374).

THE VEDA, BY ITSELF WITHOUT ANY SUPPORT, CANNOT ALWAYS MAKE KNOWN ITS OWN MEANING ; IN FACT, IT STANDS IN NEED OF EXPLANATIONS BY PERSONS,—SUCH EXPLANATIONS BEING LIKE THE STICK HELD BY THE BLIND MAN.—(2374)

COMMENTARY.

When the Vedic sentence is heard by a man for the first time, it does not make known its meaning to that man, if he does not know the conventions (regarding the words and their meanings).

Question:—" What then does it do ? "

Answer:—'*It needs, etc. etc.*'—The compound is to be explained as—'that which is similar to the stick held by the blind man'.—(2374)

Question:—" It may be in need of it; where is the harm ? "

Answer:—

TEXT (2375).

WHEN PULLED UP BY THE EXPLANATIONS, THE VEDA MIGHT FALL INTO THE WRONG PATH; AND IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD NOT BE RIGHT TO REGARD THE VEDA AS THE 'EYE' (ILLUMINATING THINGS) LIKE THE LIGHT.—(2375)

COMMENTARY.

'*Sa*'—stands for the *Veda.*

'*Tayā*'—stands for the Explanations by men.

'*Might fall into the wrong path*'—by providing a wrong knowledge of things, expressing things as they are not.

Thus, it cannot be right to say, as has been said (by the *Mīmāmsaka*)—'The Veda, like Light, is the one eye for all men, and there should be no objections raised against it'. (*Text* 2351).—(2375)

The following *Text* sums up the discussion:—

TEXT (2376).

EVEN THOUGH BY ITSELF, THE VEDA MAY BE ABLE TO BRING ABOUT COGNITIONS,—YET ITS VALIDITY (RELIABILITY) CANNOT BE QUITE CLEAR; AS IT IS DEPENDENT UPON PERSONALITIES.—(2376)

COMMENTARY.

It has been already explained that what is efficient cannot bring about cognitions through the help of Personalities.—Even granting that the Veda is efficient and yet it is productive of Cognitions through the help of Personalities,—even so, though it may be able to bring about cognitions through the help of Personalities, yet its validity and reliability would not be clearly possible.—Such is the construction of the sentence.

The particle '*api*' is misplaced; it should be construed after '*sati*'.—(2376)

The following *Text* further clarifies this same idea:—

TEXT (2377).

THE VALIDITY OF A MEANS OF COGNITION IS ACCEPTED ON THE GROUND OF ITS BRINGING ABOUT COGNITIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REAL STATE OF THINGS. IF THEN, THE VEDA DEPENDS UPON EXPLANATIONS PROVIDED BY MEN, THE ASSUMPTION OF ITS VALIDITY (RELIABILITY) CANNOT BE RIGHT.—(2377)

COMMENTARY.

'*The assumption of its validity cannot be right*';—because under *Text* 2375 it has been shown that 'it might fall on the wrong path'.—(2377)

From the above it follows that it is not right to assert as has been asserted (by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2350, above) that—'The Veda being reliable, a beginningless line of Pupils and Teachers tends to make it faultless'.

This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2378).

THUS, THE VEDA *not* HAVING BEEN PROVED TO BE VALID, ANY BEGINNINGLESS LINE OF PUPILS AND TEACHERS, EVEN THOUGH ASSUMED, CANNOT MAKE IT FAULTLESS.—(2378)

COMMENTARY.

After '*mānē*', we should read '*a—sthitē*'.—(2378)

Question:—"Why cannot it make it faultless?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2379).

BECAUSE NOT A SINGLE PERSON AMONG THEM IS HELD TO BE CAPABLE OF PERCEIVING SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS; HENCE, EVEN THOUGH ASSUMED, THE TRADITIONAL LINE OF PUPILS AND TEACHERS CAN BE ONLY A LINE OF BLIND PERSONS.—(2379)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"If it is a line of blind people,—what then?"

TEXT (2380).

WHEN A BLIND MAN IS LED BY ANOTHER BLIND MAN, HE IS NOT SURE TO GET AT THE RIGHT PATH; HENCE THE ASSUMPTION OF THE BEGINNINGLESSNESS OF THE LINE (OF PUPILS AND TEACHERS) IS ENTIRELY FUTILE.—(2380)

COMMENTARY.

This has been thus asserted in the *Shabara-Bhāṣya* (1. 1. 2)— In regard to such things as are beyond the senses, the words of men cannot be a reliable source of knowledge; just as the words of persons born blind cannot be a reliable source of knowledge regarding shades of colour '.—(*Translation*, page 5).

Hitherto objections against the Veda have been urged after having admitted (for the sake of argument) that the beginninglessness of the Veda is proved by 'the line of Pupils and Teachers'.—Now it is going to be shown that this also is not so proved :—

TEXT (2381).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO MEANS OF KNOWING FOR CERTAIN THAT THIS THING (THE VEDA AND ITS MEANING) HAS NOT BEEN MADE (COMPOSED) BY SUCH LATER BEINGS AS *Manu*, *Vyāsa* AND OTHERS.—(2381)

COMMENTARY.

'*No means of knowing, etc. etc.*'—;—because the matter is entirely imperceptible.

The following might be urged—" When we regard the Veda as valid and reliable, it is not because it is the source of true knowledge and hence not the work of any person; we do so simply because the connection between words and their meanings is eternal and what they express is true. This could not be possible if the Veda were the work of a Person ".

But this also is 'Inconclusive'; where is the ground for the hard and fast rule that what expresses the truth must not be the work of a Person? —But granting that it is so;—even so the view is open to objections.

This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXTS (2382-2383).

THE VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE VEDA MAY BE DUE MERELY TO ETERNAL CONNECTION EXPRESSIVE OF TRUE THINGS ; EVEN SO, THERE IS NO ONE WHO EVER PERCEIVES THAT CONNECTION, WHICH IS BEYOND THE SENSES. ALL THAT IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORDS (OF THE VEDA) IS SUPERSENSUOUS ; HENCE ITS CONNECTION ALSO MUST BE SUPERSENSUOUS; WHILE ALL HUMAN BEINGS BY THEMSELVES ARE INCAPABLE OF SEEING THINGS BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES.—(2382-2383)

COMMENTARY

'*Satyārtha*' qualifies '*nityasambandha*'.

As a matter of fact, the 'eternal connection' is something that has been assumed ; and if it did not bring about the cognition of the meaning, its assumption would be futile ; certainly it has no other character except that of being productive of the cognition of the meaning ;—the operation of the connection consists only in bringing about the cognition of the meaning ; how then can there be a Connection which does not bring about such Cognition ? It is not by its mere presence that the Connection brings about the cognition ; it does so only when it is itself recognised ; if it were not so, then the cognition of the meaning would appear also in one who is ignorant of the convention (bearing upon the connection between words and meanings) ; and yet the connection cannot be recognised by any one ; because one member of the connection—in the shape of Heaven, etc.—being beyond the reach of the senses, the connection itself must also be beyond it.

It might be argued that—"People capable of perceiving supersensuous things would recognise the connection".

The answer to that is—'*All human beings, etc. etc.*'—as has been declared in the following words—'Thus there is no direct perceiver of things beyond the senses ; if people know these things it is only through the Word'.

'*Anatyakṣadṛshaḥ*'—capable of perceiving supersensuous things.—(2382-2383)

It might be urged that—"the Veda itself would make this Connection known".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (2384).

THE VEDA CERTAINLY DOES NOT SAY—'SUCH AND SUCH IS MY CONNECTION WITH THE MEANING'; AS REGARDS THE 'CONNECTION OF THE MEANING' THAT WOULD BE FIXED BY MEN, AND WOULD NOT DIFFER FROM BEING 'THE WORK OF MAN'.—(2384)

COMMENTARY.

It is not that the Veda-Personality, over-flowing with sympathy, his mind bent upon piety, devoted to doing good to others, and charitably disposed, invites the Brāhmanas and offers to them the meaning of the Veda. saying to them—'O Brāhmaṇas, such and such is my meaning, please accept this'.

Question :—"In that case, the Brahmaṇas would themselves imagine the meaning".

Answer :—'*As regards, etc. etc.*'

The following *Text* explains the 'non-difference' mentioned in the preceding *Text* :—

TEXT (2385)

JUST AS IT IS SUSPECTED THAT WHAT THE WORD OF MAN SAYS MAY BE UNTRUE,—IN THE SAME WAY, MAY IT NOT BE SUSPECTED THAT THE MEANING IMAGINED BY MAN MAY BE WRONG ?—(2385)

COMMENTARY.

It sometimes happens that with the intention of knowing things in a jumbled up form, men make use of confused and jumbled up words,—in the same way, they may imagine and determine the meaning of words in the same confused manner. Where then is the difference between the two ?

'*Sā*'—stands for *wrongness.*

'*Shaṅkyā*'—might be suspected.—(2385)

At first, it was explained that the Veda itself being unreliable, the assumption of the 'line of pupils and teachers' is futile. Now, it is granted (for the sake of argument) that the Veda is reliable ; and then shown that in either case, the assumption of the 'line of pupils and teachers' is futile :—

TEXT (2386).

EVEN IF THE VEDA IS A RELIABLE SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE, THE BEGINNINGLESS 'LINE OF PUPILS AND TEACHERS' THAT HAS BEEN ASSUMED BECOMES LIKE A 'LINE OF BLIND PERSONS'.—(2386)

COMMENTARY.

In the following *text*, the Opponent urges the fallacy of 'Impossibility' against the foregoing assertion of the Buddhist to the effect—'May it not be suspected, etc. etc.' (*Text* 2385):—

TEXTS (2387-2388).

"THE COGNITION THAT ARISES IN REGARD TO HEAVEN AND SUCH THINGS, FROM THE VEDIC SENTENCES SPEAKING OF THE *Agnihotra*, ETC. IS FOUND TO BE FREE FROM DOUBT AND UNCERTAINTY,—JUST LIKE THE FIRM CONVICTION THAT PROCEEDS FROM SENSE-PERCEPTION. WHY THEN SHOULD THE VEDA, BRINGING ABOUT SUCH COGNITION NOT BE REGARDED AS RELIABLE? IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE IDEA THAT ONE DERIVES FROM THE WORDS OF THE VEDA IS NEVER DOUBTFUL AND UNCERTAIN."—(2387-2388)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ārēka*'—is *doubt, uncertainty*.—'*ādi*' is meant to include *mistake, wrongness*.—As declared in the *Shabara-Bhāṣya* (1. 1. 2)—'The idea brought about by the assertion—Desiring Heaven, one should perform sacrifices—is not an uncertain one; i.e. it is not in the form—Heaven may or may not follow from the performance of sacrifices; in fact, the idea is a definitely certain one—that Heaven does follow; and when this is cognised for certain, it cannot be false. That Cognition or Idea alone is false which, having appeared, becomes sublated by the notion—such is not the actual case; the idea in question—that Heaven follows from the performance of sacrifices—is never found to be so sublated at any time, or in regard to any person, or under any circumstances, or at any place. Hence it follows that it is not false or wrong.'—(*Translation*, p. 5).

If it were not so, then why should not your mind be swinging in doubt, even when you may be actually feeling the huge flame of fire with gleaming sparks flying on all sides? In fact, under the circumstances, there would be nothing reliable for you.

Such is the sense of the Opponent (*Mīmāmsaka*).

His argument may be formulated thus:—That Cognition which is free from doubt and mistake must be regarded by all intelligent men as 'valid

and reliable';—e.g. the certain cognition of fire that the man has who desires heat for cooking and whose mind is not under delusion;—and the Cognition arising from the Vedic sentences speaking of the *Agnihotra*, etc. is free from doubt and mistake; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing.

'*Na-avalambīta*'—is to be construed with (as governing) '*pramānatām*'.

'*Tām kurvan*'—bringing about such cognition.—(2387-2388)

The author answers the above argument in the following—

TEXTS (2389-2390).

IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE UNCERTAINTY DOES ARISE (IN THE CASE OF THE VEDIC SENTENCE), JUST IN THE SAME WAY AS IN THE CASE OF ANOTHER ASSERTION TO THE CONTRARY; AND INTELLIGENT PEOPLE DO NOT PERCEIVE ANY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO CASES. IN FACT, IN REGARD TO THINGS BEYOND THE SENSES, THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THEIR *existence* OR *non-existence*.—IF IT BE URGED THAT—"THIS CERTAINTY DOES ARISE FROM THE VEDIC SENTENCE",—THEN (THE ANSWER IS)—WHY CANNOT THERE BE CERTAINTY REGARDING THE CONTRARY OF THAT, FROM ANOTHER SENTENCE?—(2389-2390)

COMMENTARY.

If your Reason means that the notion that intelligent men obtain from the Veda is free from uncertainty, etc.—then it is not 'admissible'; because the notion that the intelligent man has of *Agnihotra leading to Heaven* is just as uncertain as that of Agnihotra *not* leading to Heaven; in fact, in the matter of all supersensuous things, there can be no cause for any absolutely certain cognition as to the thing being *existent* or *non-existent*; because the corroboration of the actual perception of the real state of things is equally unavailable in both cases.

'*As in the case of another assertion to the contrary*'—The '*vati*' affix is added to the word with the Locative ending.

It might be argued that—"the certainty is obtained from the Vedic sentence itself; why seek for another cause for it?"

The answer to this is—'*Why cannot there be, etc. etc.*'—i.e. certainty contrary to what is asserted in the Vedic sentence.

'*From another sentence*'—i.e. from one emanating from a man.

'*Why cannot there be*'—i.e. there must be.—Hence that also should be regarded as valid and reliable; as the 'absence of sublation' would be equally available in both cases.—(2389-2390)

It might be argued that—"As a matter of fact intelligent Vedic scholars do actually obtain unshakeable notions from the Veda; hence the Reason

The answer to that is that such notions may be obtained; but even so, if the Reason is not 'inadmissible', it certainly is 'Inconclusive'.

This is shown in the following—

TEXTS (2391–2393).

THAT VEDIC SCHOLARS DERIVE UNSHAKABLE NOTIONS FROM THE VEDA IS DUE TO THEIR MINDS BEING INFLUENCED BY FAITH; AND THIS IS EQUALLY PRESENT IN OTHER PEOPLE'S MINDS, IN RESPECT OF OTHER ASSERTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, QUITE AS UNSHAKABLE NOTIONS ARE DERIVED BY THE BUDDHISTS REGARDING TROUBLE AND SUFFERING RESULTING FROM SACRIFICES WHICH INVOLVE THE KILLING OF ANIMALS. OF THIS LATTER NOTION WE DO NOT FIND ANY SUBLATION TILL NOW. IF IT BE SAID THAT "THERE MAY BE SUBLATION OF IT AT SOME FUTURE TIME AND PLACE",—THE SAME IS EQUALLY POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF THE VEDIC SENTENCE ALSO.—(2391–2393).

COMMENTARY.

'*Sā*'—the firm conviction.

'*Anyēṣām*'—of the Buddhist and other people.

'*Anyataḥ*'—from such sentences as 'From sacrifices, involving the killing of animals, proceed trouble and suffering'.

This is what is shown in the sentence beginning with '*For example, etc. etc.*'—It is easily understood.—(2391–2393)

The Author again shows that the premiss regarding the Veda being independent of personalities is 'inconclusive':—

TEXTS (2394–2397).

IF THE VEDA EXPRESSED ITS MEANING BY ITSELF INDEPENDENTLY OF CONVENTIONS MADE BY THE WHIMS OF MEN,—THEN IT MIGHT BE VALID AND RELIABLE. AS, IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD NOT ABANDON ITS MEANING, EVEN WHEN EXPLAINED OTHERWISE BY MEN WITH MINDS PERVERTED BY DELUSION, VANITY AND OTHER DEFECTS;—AND IT WOULD DIRECTLY BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THAT MEANING ALONE, AND NOT EXPRESS ANY MEANING THAT MAY BE DESIRED BY MEN.—IF HOWEVER, IT DEPENDS UPON THE WHIMS OF MEN, THEN IT DOES NOT DIFFER FROM THE COMMON ASSERTIONS OF MEN; AS IN THAT CASE THE EXPRESSING OF MEANING WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON MEN, AND IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT IT MAY BE WRONG.—(2394–2397)

COMMENTARY.

The whims of men are unfettered; if then the Veda depended, in the expressing of its meaning, upon Conventions made by the whims of men,—

it would not express the meaning that is desired ; as there would be nothing to restrict it. On the other hand, if the Veda expressed its meaning independently of the Conventions, then it would be possible for it to be valid and reliable ; because regardless of the explanations propounded by men, it would directly express its meaning ; even though it might be explained otherwise by men, it would never abandon the function of expressing its own meaning by itself,—exactly as the eye and other organs do not abandon their inherent function of apprehending things.—This is the sense of the whole argument.

'*Ākhyāyamāna*'—Being explained.

'*Aram*'—Quickly ; at once.

'*Wrong*'—i.e. the whims of men may be wrong.—(2394–2397)

It may be that, on account of the Veda not being the work of an author, its connection with its meaning is inherent; even so, however, what is desired by the *Mīmāmsaka* is not proved ; as the Reason adduced remains 'Inconclusive'.

This is the view expounded in the following :—

TEXTS (2398-2399).

IT IS SAID THAT THE VEDA, NOT BEING THE WORK OF AN AUTHOR, HAS THE INHERENT CAPACITY OF ASSERTING WHAT IS TRUE ;—BUT WHY CANNOT IT BE SUSPECTED THAT WHAT IT SAYS IS NOT TRUE ? JUST AS ITS TRUTHFULNESS IS DEDUCED FROM THE FACT THAT BY ITSELF, IT BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION OF WHAT IS TRUE,—IN THE SAME MANNER IT MIGHT BE SUSPECTED THAT BY ITSELF IT BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION OF WHAT IS NOT TRUE.—(2398-2399)

COMMENTARY.

'*Prākṛtam*'—pertaining to its nature ; inherent.—(2398-2399)

The following text proceeds to urge that the reason for the validity and reliability of the Veda may be held to lie in the fact of its being the work of a reliable person ; why rely upon its not being the work of anyone, which only shows your stupidity ?

TEXTS (2400-2401).

FURTHER, IF YOU ARE REALLY EAGER TO REGARD THE VEDA AS VALID AND RELIABLE, THEN TRY AND PROVE THAT IT IS THE WORK OF A PERSON FREE FROM DEFECTS AND SO FORTH. IF IT IS COMPOSED BY A FAULTLESS AUTHOR AND IS EXPOUNDED IN THE WORLD BY FAULTLESS EXPOUNDERS, IT CERTAINLY CAN BE THE MEANS OF OBTAINING THE COGNITION OF THE REAL TRUTH REGARDING THINGS.—(2400-2401)

COMMENTARY.

'*And so forth*'—is meant to include the faultless *expounders*—(2400-2401)

Question—" How can validity and reliability be accepted as attaching to the Veda as *composed* and *explained* by faultless persons ? "
Answer :—

TEXT (2402).

THE WELL-DEFINED AND EXCELLENT WORDS OF PERSONS FULL OF WISDOM AND COMPASSION, EVEN THOUGH EMANATING FROM PERSONALITIES, ARE ACTUALLY THE MEANS OF TRUE COGNITIONS.—(2402)

COMMENTARY.

This has been thus declared by *Shabarasvāmin* (in his *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 1. 1. 2)—" As regards the assertion of ordinary men, if it emanates from a trustworthy person,—or if it pertains to something that is directly perceived by the senses,—it must be true ". (*Translation*, p. 4.)
'*Sadvāchaḥ*'—Excellent assertions.—(2402)

The following *Text* again shows the 'inconclusiveness' of *not being the work of a Person* as a Reason for *reliability*.

TEXT (2403).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE VEDA CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A SOURCE OF RIGHT COGNITION, SIMPLY BECAUSE IT IS NOT THE WORK OF MAN. BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN FOUND THAT SUCH THINGS AS *forest-fire* AND THE LIKE (WHICH ARE NOT THE WORK OF MAN) ARE THE SOURCE OF FALSE COGNITIONS.—(2403)

COMMENTARY.

Mistaken cognitions do not always arise from the presence of defects in men ; even in cases where no such defects are possible,—e.g. in the case of

such things as *forest-fire*,—there are wrong cognitions in regard to the Blue Lotus and such things [the *Blue* Lotus appearing Red under the glare of the extensive fire].

'*Dāva-vahni*'—is the wild fire burning in the woods. What is meant to be cited as the source of wrong cognition is that Fire which starts by itself through the friction of dried bamboos, etc. in the forest. That fire on the other hand which is produced by men by rubbing together of two sticks,—this cannot be regarded as 'not the work of man'; and hence this could not invalidate the *Mīmāmsaka's* Reason.

'*Forest-fire and the like*'—'*and the like*' is meant to include the Mirage and such phenomena.—(2403)

How these are the source of wrong cognitions is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2404).

IN THE GLARE OF FIRE, THE *Blue* LOTUS APPEARS AS *Red*.—IF IT IS SAID THAT—"IN THIS CASE THE FIRE IS THE CAUSE OF THE WRONG COGNITION, AND IS A *product* (NOT ETERNAL)"—[THEN, THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING *Text*].—(2404)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be said (by the *Mīmāmsaka*)—"The mere fact of *not being the work of a person* has not been put forward by us as the Reason (for Reliability),—what is meant by us to be the Reason is that fact along with the fact of *not being a product*.—Or it is this character of *not being a product* that is indicated by the character of *not being the work of a Person*. Hence the Reason is not rendered Inconclusive by the case of the Forest fire, which is a product (with a beginning)".—

This is the *Mīmāmsaka's* answer which is anticipated and set forth in the words—'*In this case, the Fire, etc. etc.*'

'*Taddhētuḥ*'—the source of wrong cognition.—(2404)

The answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXT (2405).

DOES THE 'CHARACTER OF BEING A PRODUCT' MAKE THINGS THE SOURCE OF WRONG COGNITIONS? IN THAT CASE, *Smoke* WOULD NOT BE THE CORRECT INDICATOR OF FIRE.—(2405)

COMMENTARY.

That alone can be a qualification of the Reason (Probans) which serves to differentiate the Probans from the contrary of the Probandum;—other-

wise, if any and every qualification could make the Reason *conclusive*, then no Reason could ever be *Inconclusive*; because qualifications would easily be available by the mere wish for it;—the character of *not being a Product* does not set aside its *capacity to bring about wrong notions*; because if *being a product* were known to be the cause of *being a source of wrong notions*, then the absence of the former might mean the absence of the latter also.

The Opponent might say—" It *is* so known ".

The answer to that is—'*In that case, etc. etc.*' —If the *character of being a Product* were the reason for *being the source of wrong notions*,—then *the character of not being a Product* would be the reason for *being the source of right notions*;—because Right and Wrong Cognitions being mutually contradictory, both could not proceed from one and the same cause; e.g. Fire, which is the source of *Heat*, cannot be the source of *gold*; consequently, as *Smoke* is a *product*, it could not be the means of the *Right Notion* of Fire.—(2405)

The following might be urged:—" What is meant by us is, not that *the character of being a product* is the cause of *wrong cognition only*, but that the said character alone is the cause of the wrong cognition; there is no other cause for it; we do not assert that Right Cognition can never be brought about by what is a *Product*. Everything that is a *product* is not equally regarded by us as being the cause of Wrong Cognition; by virtue of which, the Right and Wrong Cognitions being mutually contradictory, all that is *not-product* would be the source of Right Cognition. What is meant by us is that Products being multifarious, it is only some Products that are the source of Wrong Cognition,—e.g. *jaundice*, etc.—while some are the source of Right Cognition,—e.g. the whole lot of undiseased sense-organs. If it were not so, then, on finding that some products like Ice are the source of cold,—it might be presumed by implication that *warmth* which is contrary to *cold* is due to something that is *not* a Product. As a matter of fact, however, this is not so.—Thus, inasmuch as we do not deny the fact of the Product being the source of Right Cognition, Smoke does remain the means of Right Cognition (of Fire) ".

Anticipating this argument, the Author answers it in the following—

TEXT (2406).

THUS, EVEN THOUGH NOT THE WORK OF A PERSON, THE VEDA CANNOT BE THE SOURCE OF RIGHT COGNITION; HENCE THE ASSUMPTION OF IT IS ENTIRELY FUTILE.—(2406)

COMMENTARY.

If the *character of being a Product* were the cause of both Rightness and Wrongness,—then the absence of that character would mean the absence of both Right and Wrong Cognition; consequently the fact of the Veda *not being a product* could not be a ground for its being a source of Right Cognition;

as that is not a cause of this latter; hence the qualification—'not being a product'—as applied to the Probans, is useless.

The following might be urged—"By the qualification—'not being the work of man', what is meant is not the 'Positive-Negative' Premiss, but a purely negative Premiss; the sense being that—*being a Product,* which is the contrary of the Probans ('not being the work of man'), is concomitant with 'falsity', which is the contrary of the Probandum ('Truthfulness'),—because *falsity* is found in the words of man only—hence wherever there is *the character of not being a Product,* which is contrary to that with which *Falsity* is invariably concomitant,—there, *the character of not being a Product,*—which is negatively concomitant with *falsity*—being negatived, its concomitant, *Falsity,* also becomes negatived; and thus it would follow that *what is not a Product* asserts what is true; and as thus the desired conclusion would be got even without the affirmative premiss, any statement of such a Premiss would be useless".

True; this is so. If the concomitance between the two contraries is admitted. But it is not admitted. For instance, there would be concomitance between the two contraries of the Probandum, if against the Probans, which is contrary to the Probandum, there were a sublative cognition. There is, however, no such sublative cognition. Mere non-perception does not prove non-existence; as it is not a conclusive proof for non-existence.

The following might be urged—"*Being a Product* is the contrary of *not-being a Product*; in the former we find *falsity,* whence it follows by implication that what is *not a Product* is *devoid of falsity*".

This is not right. From seeing something in one place, it does not follow that it does not exist elsewhere; because one and the same thing is found to be concomitant with mutually contradictory things. For instance, the single character of *non-eternality* is found to be concomitant with what is *produced by effort* and also what is not so produced; and the mere fact of *non-eternality* being found in what is produced by effort, cannot lead to the conclusion that it does not exist in what is not produced by effort.

Further, if the mere fact of *falsity* being sometimes found in what is a Product were to mean that the two are invariably concomitant, then it might be that *truthfulness* being found in words proceeding from men,—*truthfulness* and *proceeding from men* may be regarded as invariable concomitants;—and consequently, on the cessation of the character of *being a product, falsity* should cease,—as also *Truthfulness* should cease; so that the mere fact of *not being the work of a Person* does not prove *truthfulness*. Enough of this discussion.—(2406)

The Author has, so far, proved, in detail, the 'Inconclusiveness' of the following Reasons (propounded by the *Mīmāṁsaka,* in support of the Reliability of the Veda)—(*a*) that it is free from all defects conducive to *falsity,* as implied by the fact of its not being the work of man,—(*b*) that it is not the work of man, as indicated by the absence of defects,—(*c*) that it is not the work of man, which has been directly stated in so many words. He now proceeds to show the 'inadmissibility' of these :—

TEXTS (2407–2409).

FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE REASONS IN SUPPORT OF (1) THE VEDA NOT BEING THE WORK OF A PERSON, (2) OF THERE BEING ONLY A 'MANIFESTATION' OF IT, AND (3) OF ITS BEING ETERNAL,—AS ALSO (4) OF THE ETERNAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE WORDS AND ITS MEANING,—HAVE ALL BEEN SET FORTH USELESSLY. BECAUSE, EVEN IF THE VEDA HAS ALL THIS CHARACTER, IT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED TO BE THE SOURCE OF TRUE KNOWLEDGE; AS HAS BEEN JUST STATED IN DETAIL. HENCE WE ARE NOT PAYING MUCH ATTENTION TO THE REFUTATION OF THIS IDEA (OF THE VEDA NOT BEING THE WORK OF A PERSON). WHO WOULD EVER CARE TO REFUTE WHAT HAS NO BEARING UPON THE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION?—(2407–2409)

COMMENTARY.

(1) The idea of its not being the work of a Person, (2) the idea that there is 'manifestation' of it, and (3) the idea that it is eternal;—the Reasons in support all this.—'*Sādhana*' being that by which something is proved, i.e. Reason, Probans.—Various kinds of such Reasons have been shown above already.

'*Tasmin*'—even if all this be true.—'*Asya*' of the Veda.

'*Upagamyatē*'—cannot be accepted.

'*Vyāsataḥ*'—in detail.

'*Ētatpratikṣēpē*'—to the refutation of all this idea—of the Veda *not being the work of a Person* and so forth.

Even if all this is true, what is wanted by the *Mīmāmsaka* is not accomplished;—and as this has been explained already; if a further refutation of all this were done, it would be of no use in the present discussion.—(2407–2409)

This same idea is further explained—

TEXTS (2410-2411).

THE QUESTION THAT IS BEING CONSIDERED NOW IS THE IDEA OF THE VEDA BEING THE SOURCE OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE; AND IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT IT CANNOT BE SO, EVEN IF IT BE NOT THE WORK OF A PERSON.—WHAT LITTLE IS SAID IN THIS CONNECTION (BY THE OTHER PARTY) IN SHEER VANITY,—ALL THAT VANISHES IN THIS SAME WAY, FOR ALL MEN OF KEEN INTELLECTUAL VISION.—(2410-2411)

COMMENTARY.

'*Āhopuruṣikā*'—vanity.—The nominal affix '*vuñ*' being due to the

'*Men of keen intelligence*',—whose vision, in the shape of Intelligence, is very keen.—(2410-2411)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka* under 2095, above, that 'the author of the Veda' is not cognisable by any of the five Means of Knowledge, etc. etc.

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2412).

THE ABSENCE OF THE *Means* OF COGNITION DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THE ABSENCE OF THE *Object* OF COGNITION ; BECAUSE THE LATTER ARE NOT CAUSES WITH WHICH THE FORMER IS INVARIABLY CONCOMITANT.—(2412)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this the most important argument (of the *Mīmāmsaka*) is 'inadmissible'.

It is only what is all-pervading, e.g. the *Cause*, which, being absent, indicates the absence of the less pervasive, e.g. the *Effect* ; because these two are related to each other—the all-pervasive to the less pervasive, by the relation of co-essentiality, and the Cause to the Effect by the relation of the one being produced by the other ;—and for you, the *effect* and the *less-pervasive factor* cannot be present when their correlatives are not there.—As regards the Means of Cognition, they cannot be *pervasive over*, and the Cause of, all things. For instance, it is quite possible for a thing far removed in time and place and nature, to exist even without the Means of Cognition applying to it ; hence the said Means of Cognition cannot be pervasive over all things. Nor can the Means of Cognition be regarded as the *Cause* of all things, for the same reason ; specially as it is the other way about, the *Means* of Cognition itself being the effect or product of the *Objects* of Cognition. And yet when the Effect is absent, it does not imply the Absence of the Cause ; as such a premiss is found to be false. And what is neither the Cause nor all-pervasive cannot indicate the absence of its correlatives ; as, if it did, there would be incongruities.

Thus it is established that in the proving of the absence of the *Object* of Cognition only, the absence of the Means of Cognition only, if cited as a Reason, is clearly 'inconclusive' and wrong.—(2412)

The same 'Inconclusiveness' is further confirmed by the possibility of the Reason in the Contrary of the Probandum :—

TEXT (2413).

THUS, EVEN THOUGH NOT COGNISABLE BY THE *five* MEANS OF COGNITION, THE AUTHOR OF THE VEDA IS NOT AMENABLE TO 'NON-APPREHENSION' (NEGATION) ALONE ;—HE BEING JUST LIKE THE AUTHOR OF THE STORY-BOOK WHOSE AUTHOR IS NOT KNOWN.—(2413)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tat*'—Thus ; therefore.

Construe thus—'*Pañchabhiḥ agamyopi shrutēḥ kartā*'.

'*Avijñāta, etc.*'—The compound is to be expounded as—'those whose authors are unknown' ; and this to be taken as in opposition to (qualifying) '*ākhyāyikādi*' ; and then the Genitive Ending and the '*vati*'—affix.—(2413)

The following *Text* points out the 'inadmissibility' and hence 'Inconclusiveness' of the *Mīmāmsaka's* Probans :—

TEXT (2414).

IF THE AUTHOR OF THESE STORY-BOOKS IS INFERRED FROM THE FACT OF THEIR BEING EXPRESSIVE OF DISTINCTLY CLEAR MEANINGS,—THEN WHY CANNOT THE SAME BE DONE IN REGARD TO THE VEDA ALSO ?—(2414)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tēṣām*'—stands for the story-books, etc.

'*Why cannot, etc. etc.*'—That is, why is not the Author of the Veda also inferred from its being expressive of distinctly clear meanings ?—there being no difference between the two cases. Thus the Reason—'because there is no means of knowing such an Author' becomes 'inadmissible', 'untrue'.—(2414)

Further, the Reason as adduced by the *Mīmāmsaka* can have two meanings—(1) that the Author is not cognised *by any one* through the Five Means of Cognition, and (2) that he is not so cognised *by the Mīmāmsaka himself* ;—in the former sense, it is *Doubtful-hence-Inadmissible* ; and in the latter, it is *Inconclusive*.—This is shown in the following :—

TEXTS (2415–2417)

AS REGARDS HIS BEING NOT COGNISED BY ALL BEINGS,—THAT IS ALWAYS *doubtful*; AS IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AT SOME TIME BY SOME MEANS OF COGNITION, HE MIGHT BECOME COGNISED BY SOME ONE. BECAUSE THAT HE IS SO UNCOGNISABLE CANNOT BE CLEARLY ASCERTAINED BY ALL LIVING BEINGS OF ALL THE THREE WORLDS COMING TOGETHER WITHOUT EXCEPTION.—AS REGARDS HIS BEING NOT COGNISED BY THE *Mīmāmsaka* HIMSELF, IT IS CLEARLY 'INCONCLUSIVE', BECAUSE THAT DOES NOT PROVE WITH CERTAINTY THAT THERE IS NO COGNITION BY OTHER PERSONS.—(2415–2417)

COMMENTARY.

'*Imam*'—i.e. the fact that the Author of the Veda is not cognised *by anyone.*

'*Tathā hi, etc. etc.*'—confirms the said 'Inconclusiveness'—through the convictions of other people and also the cogitations of students.—(2415–2417)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2088, that "the Author of the Veda is not *perceived*".

The following *Text* shows that this Reason is 'inadmissible':—

TEXT (2418).

IT IS THROUGH PERCEPTION THAT THE READERS OF THE VEDA ARE RECOGNISED AS THE 'MAKERS'. IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO REGARD THEM AS 'MANIFESTERS'; BECAUSE THE 'MANIFESTATION' OF ETERNAL THINGS IS IMPOSSIBLE.—(2418)

COMMENTARY.

If the opinion held is that 'no *maker* of the Veda is ever perceived',—then, in as much as *readers* of the Veda are always seen, what is asserted is clearly 'inadmissible'.

If the idea held is that the *first* 'maker' of the Veda has not been seen,—even so the fact remains *doubtful—hence—inadmissible*; it being possible that he might have been seen by some one at some time.

If the idea is that the 'Readers' cannot be regarded as 'Makers' or 'Authors',—they are only the 'manifesters' of the Veda,—then the answer to that is that—'*It cannot be right, etc. etc.*'—'*Tē*' stands for the *Readers.*

That the 'Manifestation' of eternal things is not possible is going to be explained later on.

Question:—"How then can there be a 'Manifester' of the *non-eternal* Jar?"

Answer :—True ; there can be no 'Manifester' for *non-eternal* things also.

Question :—"How then are things like the *Lamp* regarded as 'Manifesters' ?"

Answer :—No ; in the cases cited, the Lamp is really the *producer* of the Jar, inasmuch as it produces the jar capable of bringing about its cognition ; and it is spoken of as 'Manifester', in order to indicate the exact nature of the 'producing' done by it.

Such a 'Manifester' is not possible in the case of the Veda ; because its nature is such that its successive stages of production are not clearly perceptible.—(2418)

Even granting that there can be a 'Manifester' of the eternal thing ;—such a 'Manifester' does not differ from the 'maker'.—This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2419).

The Vedas being perceptible in their character, there is appearance of them when there is operation of the 'Manifester' : If they existed even before that operation, then they should be perceptible at that time also.—(2419)

COMMENTARY.

Nothing can be regarded as 'Manifester' unless it *does* something ; otherwise there would be incongruities ; and if it *does* something, then it becomes admitted that it is the *producer* ; because the *production* of a particular thing consists only in the coming about of another character.

'*Being perceptible in their character*'—This qualifies the *Vedas.*

It might be argued that—"the Vedas were perceptible in their character even before ; then how can they be said to appear through the operation of the *Manifester*" ?

The answer to this is—'*If they existed even before, etc. etc.*'—'*Tēṣām*' stands for the Vedas that are perceptible in their character.—(2419)

The same idea is further supported :—

TEXT (2420).

The Veda is recognised as capable of being treated as the *effect produced* by the 'Manifester',—because it appears only when this latter is present ;—like the Sprout in the presence of the Seed.—(2420)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows :—When one thing is found to appear when there is functioning of another thing, the former is capable

of being treated as the effect produced by the latter,—for instance, the sprout, appearing when the seed functions, is regarded as its effect ;—the Veda is found to appear only when the functioning of the Reader (Manifester) is there ; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

'*Being treated*' consists in abandoning or securing the thing.—'*Ādi*' stands for *being cognised, being spoken of* and so forth.

The Reason here adduced is not 'inadmissible' ; if it were, then the Veda would be perceived even before (its manifestation by the Reader).

Nor is the Reason 'Inconclusive' ; as there can be no other reason for its being treated as a *product*.—(2420)

It has been argued under *Text* 2088 above that—" The *Author of the Veda* has not had his relationship perceived previously, etc. etc.—hence he cannot be *inferred* ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2421).

BECAUSE THEY APPEAR IN THE SEQUENTIAL FORM IN WHICH THEY BECOME MANIFESTED,—LIKE DRAMAS AND STORIES,—THE VEDAS MUST BE THE WORK OF AN AUTHOR ; THUS THE AUTHOR IS COGNISED BY MEANS OF INFERENCE ALSO.—(2421)

COMMENTARY.

The reasoning may be formulated as follows :—What appears in the sequential order of the manifestation must be the work of an author ;—like Dramas and Stories ;—the Veda appears in the sequential order of its manifestation ;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The Reason here adduced cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible' ; because Letters are actually always cognised in a sequential order.—(2421)

The following *Text* shows that the Reason just adduced is not 'Inconclusive' :—

TEXT (2422).

OTHERWISE [IF THE VEDA WERE NOT THE WORK OF A PERSON],—AS THE VEDA WOULD BE ETERNAL AND ALL-PERVADING, THERE COULD BE NO SEQUENTIAL ORDER IN IT. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO SEQUENCE IN WHAT IS ETERNAL ; AS THERE CAN BE NO 'MANIFESTATION' OF IT.—(2422)

COMMENTARY.

'*Otherwise*'—if the Veda were not the work of a Person, and if it were eternal and all-pervading,—then there should be no sequence in regard to it.

Because in the case of the Veda, there cannot be any sequence of *time*, as there is in the case of the Seed and the Sprout; because being eternal, the words must be all synchronous.—Nor can there be sequence of *place*, as there is in the case of the line of ants; because, being all-pervading, they must occupy the same points in space.—Nor can there be sequence of *manifestation*; because what is eternal cannot have any peculiarity imposed upon itself, and hence cannot become *manifested*.—(2422)

It has been argued under *Text* 2089 that—"there is no Verbal authority,—either *eternal* or *artificial*,—which declares an Author of the Veda".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2423).

IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT 'VERBAL AUTHORITY', 'ANALOGY' AND 'PRESUMPTION' CANNOT BE THE MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION;—HENCE IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO BRING THESE FORWARD.—(2423)

COMMENTARY.

'*It has been shown*'—under the chapter on the *Means of Right Cognition.*

'*Tāsām*'—of Verbal Authority, Analogy and Presumption.—(2423)

It has been argued under *Text* 2096 that—"The Veda is held to be without an Author, in order to remove the chances of unreliability, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2424).

IF THE IDEA OF THE VEDA BEING WITHOUT AN AUTHOR IS INSISTED UPON, IN ORDER TO REMOVE ALL CHANCES OF ITS UNRELIABILITY,—THEN, SUCH AN IDEA, BEING A POSITIVE ENTITY, MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY MEANS OF PROOFS.—(2424)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"How can that idea be a positive entity?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2425).

THE VEDA IS REGARDED TO BE SELF-SUFFICIENT,—BECAUSE IT DOES NOT DEPEND UPON THE ACTION OF ANY PERSON; AND THE SAID *self-sufficiency* MUST BE EITHER THE PROPERTY OF A POSITIVE ENTITY ONLY, OR SUCH A POSITIVE ENTITY ITSELF.—(2425)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by the Veda 'being without an Author' is that it is *self-sufficient*; as the argument that is put forward is that "the Veda is independent of the action of Persons, and hence valid and reliable as a means of knowledge". If it were not so, then what peculiar character would it be which would be proved by the proving of the fact that the Veda is not the work of an Author ?

This character of 'not being the work of an author' is the *property of an entity* for those who regard the distinction between the thing and its property as real.—As a matter of fact, however, the 'property' is only the nature of the entity itself, and is spoken of as its 'property' for the purpose of precluding other diversities. This is what is meant by the words—'*or a positive entity itself*'—'*Such*'—i.e. self-sufficient.—(2425)

It has been argued under *Text* 2100, that—"when the proofs adduced to prove the existence of such an Author are refuted, the absence of such a one follows as a matter of course".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2426–2428).

IF CERTAIN PROOFS ARE ADDUCED IN SUPPORT OF THE VIEW THAT THERE IS AN AUTHOR OF THE VEDAS,—IF THESE PROOFS ARE REFUTED, IT DOES *not* NECESSARILY FOLLOW THAT THERE IS *no* SUCH AUTHOR. IN FACT ON THE REFUTATION OF THE PROOF OF HIS EXISTENCE, WHAT FOLLOWS IS THAT THERE IS NO CERTAINTY REGARDING HIS EXISTENCE; SIMILARLY THE MERE SETTING ASIDE OF THE IDEA OF HIS EXISTENCE IS NOT ENOUGH TO BRING ABOUT ANY CERTAINTY AT ALL.—AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN ON THE CESSATION OF THE MEANS OF COGNITION, THERE IS NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE THING CONCERNED; HENCE ALL THAT IT CAN PROVE IS THAT THERE IS NO CERTAINTY REGARDING EITHER OF THE TWO VIEWS.—(2426–2428)

COMMENTARY.

When a certain proof is adduced for the purpose of bringing about certainty regarding a certain thing,—if that proof is refuted,—all that will

follow would be that there would be no certainty relating to it; it would not follow that the thing itself does not exist. Because on the cessation of the *Means* of Cognition, the *object* of Cognition does not cease,—as has been explained above—on the basis of its being the *Means* or the *Pervader*.

'*Astē*'—on being refuted.

All that can be asserted with reason is that 'neither of the two views is proved'; the particle '*iti*' has to be added, after '*nāsti*'.—(2426–2428)

The same idea is further strengthened by means of an example :—

TEXT (2429).

FOR INSTANCE, WHEN ON THE GROUND OF 'INCORPOREALITY', THE OTHER PARTY SEEKS TO PROVE THE ETERNALITY (OF WORD-SOUNDS),—AND AGAINST THIS IT IS POINTED OUT THAT, IN VIEW OF *Pleasure*, WHICH ALSO IS 'INCORPOREAL' (AND YET NOT-ETERNAL), THE SAID REASON IS 'INCONCLUSIVE',—IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW (FROM THIS COUNTER-ARGUMENT) THAT THE WORD-SOUND IS PERISHABLE.—(2429)

COMMENTARY.

For example, the man who holds the Word-Sound to be eternal,—with a view to prove the said eternality, which is one entity,—puts forward the argument that 'the Word-Sound must be eternal, because it is incorporeal, like *Ākāsha*';—thereupon his opponent puts forward the counter-argument that—'The Word-Sound cannot be regarded as eternal, on the ground of its incorporeality, because in view of the case of Pleasure, the said reason is inconclusive';—in this way, though the Reason for the entity, in the shape of 'eternality', has been refuted, yet it does not become proved that the said Word-Sound is *not-eternal*;—*so also in the case in question*—this clause is to be taken as understood.

The term '*yathā*' in the *text* is misplaced; it should be understood as coming after '*uktēpi*'.

After the word '*Shabdaḥ*', the phrase '*nityaḥ siddhyati*' has to be added. Or, a single use may be taken as serving both purposes,—as in the case of '*Bhīmā*' and others.—(2429)

It has been argued above—under *Text* 2101, that—"when the other party adduce proofs in support of the two ends of the Veda, the upholders of the Veda have their purpose accomplished by the refutation of those proofs".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2430).

THUS THEN, WHEN A PROOF HAS BEEN ADDUCED IN SUPPORT OF THE TWO ENDS OF THE VEDA,—BY THE REFUTATION OF THAT PROOF, THE UPHOLDERS OF THE VEDA DO NOT HAVE THEIR PURPOSE ACCOMPLISHED.—(2430)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tat*'—Therefore, thus.

'*They do not have their purpose accomplished*'—i.e. their opinion does not become established.—(2430)

It has been urged above by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under the *Text* 2105, that—"*Eternality* is what is meant by the two characters of *being not produced* and *being not destroyed*, and both these being of the nature of Negation, do not require any proof for themselves".

The Buddhist's answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2431-2432).

IF 'ETERNALITY' IS WHAT IS MEANT BY *being not produced* AND *being not destroyed*,—THEN, INASMUCH AS BOTH WOULD BE OF THE NATURE OF MERE NEGATION,—THE SAME MAY BE SAID REGARDING THE *non-entity* ALSO. CONSEQUENTLY, JUST AS THE ETERNALITY OF THE 'SKY-LOTUS' IS NOT REAL, IN THE SAME WAY THE *reliability* OF THE VEDA ALSO DOES NOT BECOME ESTABLISHED.—(2431-2432)

COMMENTARY.

There are two assumptions here—(1) that eternality is asserted on the basis of the two characters of *being not produced* and *being not destroyed*, which are of the nature of *absolute negation*,—and (2) that these latter are of the nature of *Relative Negation* ;—under the former view (1) the Reason being 'inconclusive' (doubtful) in view of the 'Sky-lotus', the 'eternality' of the Veda does not become established as a *real* entity ; because in the case of the 'Sky-lotus', though both the said characters of *being produced* and *being destroyed* are denied,—yet its *eternality* does not become established as a *real* entity ; the same happens in the case of the Veda ; hence the Reason is 'Inconclusive' ; and from this it would follow that, as in the *Sky lotus*, so in the Veda also, there would be no *reliability*.—(2431-2432)

The following *Text* shows that the Reason in question is also 'Inadmissible' :—

TEXT (2433).

EVEN THE DENIAL OF THE CHARACTERS OF *being produced* AND *being destroyed* CANNOT BE ADMITTED; AS IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT 'THE PROOF IS SET ASIDE'. HENCE *Eternality* DOES NOT BECOME ESTABLISHED.—(2433)

COMMENTARY.

'Set aside'—Refuted.

'*Tat*'—Hence.

If the latter view (2)—put forward in the Commentary on 2431—is accepted,—then it should not be said that 'because they are of the nature of Negation, they do not need any proof for themselves'.

This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (2434-2435).

IF THE TWO CHARACTERS MEANT TO BE THE REASONS FOR ETERNALITY ARE OF THE NATURE OF RELATIVE NEGATION,—THEN, PARTAKING OF THE NATURE OF AFFIRMATION, THEY DO STAND IN NEED OF PROOF FOR THEMSELVES.—THUS, FOR PEOPLE WHO DO NOT WISH TO PROVE 'ETERNALITY' AS A REAL ENTITY, THE SAID ETERNALITY DOES NOT BECOME PROVED MERELY BY THE REJECTION OF THE TWO CONTRARY VIEWS.—(2434-2435)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(2434-2435)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2106, that—"One who asserts the falsity of the Vedic Word, on the basis of Inference, has his Proposition annulled by the force of the cognition derived from the Veda".

The Buddhist's answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2436).

THE REASON THAT HAS BEEN ADDUCED BY US IN ITS THREE-FOLD FORM,—CANNOT BE REFUTED EVEN BY YOUR FATHER.—(2436)

COMMENTARY.

'*The Reason that has been adduced*',—under the Chapter on 'Inference'; where the three kinds of Reason have been described, as (1) based upon the nature of things, (2) based upon the relation of Cause and Effect, and (3) based on Non-apprehension.

Such a Reason cannot be refuted; because it is inseparable from the real state of things.—No one can alter the real nature of a thing; because that would mean the producing of another state of the thing; and when another state of the thing is brought about, it does not mean anything for the thing itself; as that would lead to incongruities. Consequently when a certain thing has been proved by proofs, it cannot be set aside by any one. Otherwise if there were setting aside of what is established by proof, the proof itself would become vitiated; this would mean that there would be no confidence in any thing; and hence that proof would not be reliable at all.—(2436)

The same idea is further explained in the following :—

TEXTS (2437-2438).

THE PERSON WHO HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF IN THE VEDA AS 'NOT PERISHING',—THE DENIAL OF SUCH A PERSON THROUGH INFERENCE HAS BEEN CLEARLY SET FORTH IN THE SECTION WHERE 'THE NO-SOUL DOCTRINE' HAS BEEN EXPOUNDED.—THE 'UNIVERSAL' AND OTHER THINGS ALSO HAVE BEEN SHOWN THERE TO HAVE BEEN DISCARDED. THE INFERENCE BASED UPON WELL-RECOGNISED INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE, AS EXPLAINED BEFORE, IS WHAT SETS ASIDE THE SOUL.—(2437-2438)

COMMENTARY.

It has been declared in the Veda—'This indeed is the Soul'; and in reference to this Soul, it is asserted—'It is imperishable, it never perishes';—and again—'Indestructible indeed is the Soul, characterised by indestructibility'.—'*Does not perish*'—i.e. is eternal. '*Arē*'—is an expletive.

'*Universal and other things*'——'Other things' stands for Qualities and Substances.—In what way these have been discarded by proofs, has been shown under the chapter on the 'Six Categories'.—And the Inference that discards the Soul is one based upon well-recognised Premisses, shown under the Chapter on 'No-Soul'.—(2437-2438)

Says the Opponent—"What is declared by the Veda—how can it be discarded by Inference? If the idea provided by a Means of Right Cognition were discarded,—then why should the Inference also not be discarded?"

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2439).

When the Inference is firmly based upon the nature of things—who would be the stupid person who would discard it on the strength of mere Words,—or by the cognition born of such Words?—(2439)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tasyāḥ*—of the Inference.

Words depend upon the whim of the Speaker, and as such they can have no fixed relationship to any real state of things; hence it cannot be regarded as a Means of Right Cognition in regard to the state of things.—Inference, on the other hand, always appears on the basis of the Probans which is inseparably related either by sameness or by causality; and as such it is inseparably connected with the thing; that is why it is a Means of Right Cognition and is capable of discarding notions to the contrary.

'*Tadbhāvinyā*'—proceeding from words.—(2439)

If even when not inseparably related, the Word were a Means of Right Cognition, then there would be incongruities.—This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2440).

When a cognition proceeds from the words of a human-being, in regard to something beyond the Senses,—why do you not regard it to be as reliable as that derived from Sense-perception?—(2440)

COMMENTARY.

Why should not reliability belong to the words that 'Heaven does *not* result from the performance of the *Agnihotra*'? Because in both cases—[in the case of these words and in that of the Vedic declaration that Heaven does result from the performance of the *Agnihotra*]—the character of *not being denied* is equally present.—(2440)

The same non-difference between the two cases is further explained:—

TEXTS (2441-2442).

BOTH CASES ARE EQUALLY INDEPENDENT OF THE NEED OF A CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE,—AND BOTH ARE EQUALLY FREE FROM DEFECTS,—BECAUSE BOTH RELATE TO SOMETHING IMPERCEPTIBLE.—IT MIGHT BE URGED THAT—'IN THE CASE OF THE HUMAN ASSERTION, ITS SUBLATION OR DENIAL WOULD BE SUSPECTED, ON THE GROUND OF ITS PROCEEDING FROM A HUMAN BEING'.—IF THAT BE SO, THEN IN THE CASE OF THE VEDIC ASSERTION ALSO, THE SAID SUSPICION CANNOT BE ENTIRELY ABSENT; IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED ONLY NATURAL THAT IT SHOULD BE THE SOURCE OF FALSE NOTIONS.—(2441-2442)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—" It is possible that at the time that the human assertion is made, no defect may be found in it ; but, as it arises from a human source, the suspicion is always there that it may be false ".

The same may be said of the Veda also. Because *truthfulness* is as natural to it as *falsity*.

Hence there is no difference between the two cases.—(2441-2442)

It has been argued (by the *Mīmāmsaka*) under *Text* 2111 that—" while the Veda is clearly bringing about the cognition of things, etc. etc. "

But the same may be said in regard to the human assertion also to the effect that ' Heaven does not result from the performance of the Agnihotra.'

This is what is stated in the following :—

TEXT (2443).

WHILE THE WORD (HUMAN) IS CLEARLY BRINGING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THINGS, NO RIGHT-MINDED PERSON SHOULD SAY, THROUGH SHEER MALICE, THAT IT IS *human* (AND HENCE UNRELIABLE).—(2443)

COMMENTARY.

The assertion that ' Heaven does not follow from the performance of the *Agnihotra* ' is *human*—i.e. it proceeds from man ;—' such an assertion even though clearly bringing about the cognition of things, is not reliable for us, *Mīmāmsakas* '—this should not be said by any right-minded person, through sheer malice.—This is the sense of the passage in the *text*.—What is meant by this is that in the matter of what is entirely beyond the senses, the capacity to bring about cognitions belongs equally to human and non-human Words. Thus the capacity of bringing about cognitions being equally present in both, there can be no reason why reliability should belong to one and not to the other.

It cannot be right to urge that—"Defects being inherent in men, the falsity of their assertion is always suspected; which is not the case with superhuman assertions".

Because in the case of assertions not proceeding from man also, the suspicion is always likely that it may be bringing about false cognitions.—(2443)

The same idea is further explained :—

TEXT (2444).

THUS IN THE MATTER OF SUPER-SENSUOUS THINGS, ALL WORDS ARE OF EQUAL STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS; WHY THEN SHOULD YOU BE IN LOVE WITH ONLY ONE KIND OF THEM ?—(2444)

COMMENTARY.

'*All*'—Human and Non-human.

'*One kind*'—The non-human.—(2444)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2113,—"Even those who are hostile to the *Veda* do not assert any reason why it should not be a Means of Right Cognition, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2445).

THE PRINCIPLE JUST EXPLAINED FORMS THE REASON WHY IT IS ASSERTED BY THE WISE THAT THE VEDA CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION. AND IN THIS THEY SAY WHAT IS PERFECTLY TRUE.—(2445)

COMMENTARY.

'*The Principle just explained*'—viz. that 'Words, dependent upon mere whim, can have no inseparable connection with the real state of things'.

'*The wise*'—i.e. the Buddhists.

The Author of the *Bhāṣya* (*Shabara*) has declared as follows :—"The cognition derived from the Vedic assertion is *direct perception*; and no Inference can be reliable when it is opposed to Perception" (Sū. 1. 1. 2). [*Translation*, p. 6];—and again—"As a matter of fact it is the Vedic Injunction which is capable of making known what is past, present and future, also what is subtle or hidden or remote and such like; this cannot be done by any organ of sense". [*Translation*, p. 4.]

All this becomes discarded by what has been said above;—as all this is equally applicable to human assertions also.—(2445)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under 2114 that—" When people who have been intent upon the study, the retention and the exposition of the Veda and in the performance of acts enjoined therein, have not been able to detect any grounds of falsity, how can they be detected by persons who have kept themselves aloof from it ? "—

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2446-2447).

THERE IS NOTHING STRANGE IN THE FACT THAT PEOPLE, WHOSE INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN DULLED BY THE CONSTANT CONTEMPLATION OF THE VEDA, PROMPTED BY FALSE ATTACHMENT, HAVE FAILED TO DETECT THE SOURCES OF FALSITY (IN THE VEDA). THE *Pārasīka* PEOPLE WHO ARE ADDICTED TO THE PRACTICE DO NOT PERCEIVE ANYTHING WRONG IN THE REMARRIAGE OF THEIR MOTHERS.—(2446-2447)

COMMENTARY.

The compound is to be expounded as—' those who have been *jaḍīkṛta*—dulled—by the contemplation of the Veda which has been prompted by false attachment .'

' *Ādhyāna* ' is constant contemplation or pondering.

On account of these, false attachment, etc. they do not perceive the defect, even though it is there. As for example, the *Pārasīka* people see nothing wrong in the marriage of their mothers. So there is nothing strange in what has been urged by the *Mīmāmsaka.*—(2446-2447)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2117 that—" The eternality and all-pervasiveness of the Word is established, etc. etc. "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2448).

THE IDEA OF ' RECOGNITION BEING OF THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION ' HAS BEEN ALREADY DISCARDED ; AND AS WRONG COGNITION IS ALWAYS ASSOCIATED WITH ' CONCEPTUAL CONTENT ', THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING ETERNALITY.—(2448)

COMMENTARY.

Sense-perception has been defined as what is ' free from Conceptual Content and not wrong ' ; *Recognition* is *not* ' free from Conceptual Content ', as it always appears as associated with words, in the form ' this is that same '. —Nor is it ' not wrong '; because it envisages sameness between what was seen before and what is seen now ; and yet what is seen now can never

be the same as that seen on the previous occasion; as there could be no notion of *succession* in what is not *successive*. The *effect* is always something that follows from, is born of, something else; when an effect does not come into existence at a certain time,—if its cause is there in its efficient state, why should there be delay in the appearance of the effect ?—Then again, what is eternal does not stand in need of the help of anything; hence it is not possible for the delay to be due to the absence of that help. Hence the Cognitions that would proceed from the Eternal Source should all appear simultaneously.—The argument may be formulated as follows:—When the efficient cause of a certain effect is present, that effect must appear at the time;—for example, Visual Perception, when the complete set of its causes is present;—the cognitions proceeding from all words, 'Cow' and the rest, have the complete set of their efficient causes present at all times and under all conditions;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—Consequently,—because it is wrong, and because it is associated with Conceptual Content, *Recognition* cannot be regarded as *Perception*. All this has been already explained in course of the examination of the 'Permanence of things'.—(2448)

Even *Recognition* is not found to be present in the same form in all cases.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (2449–2452).

THE IDEA THAT THERE APPEARS IN REGARD TO WORD-SOUNDS IS FOUND TO BE MOSTLY DIVERGENT; AS IT IS OFTEN COGNISED IN SUCH FORMS AS 'THIS IS SPOKEN BY THE PARROT' AND 'THIS OTHER IS SPOKEN BY THE *Shārikā*'.—IF IT IS SAID THAT "THIS IS DUE TO THE DIVERSITY OF THE MANIFESTERS OF THE SOUNDS",—THEN, WE SHALL STATE THE REASONS FOR REJECTING THIS IDEA OF THE 'MANIFESTATION' (OF SOUNDS). ON THIS GROUND ALONE, ALL THIS WOULD BE ONE AND THE SAME. HENCE THERE CAN BE NO *manifester*, AND NO *manifested*. BECAUSE WHEN THE THING IS ONE AND INDIVISIBLE, THAT FACT PRECLUDES ALL NOTIONS OF DIVERSITY.—FURTHER, THERE CAN BE NO DETERMINATION, BASED UPON RECOGNITION, THAT 'THESE WORDS ARE *human*' AND 'THOSE OTHERS ARE NOT UTTERED BY MEN'.—(2449–2452)

COMMENTARY.

When certain word-sounds are uttered by birds,—like the Parrot, the *Shārikā* and the like,—there is always the notion of diversity, as that 'this is uttered by the Parrot', 'that by the *Shārikā*' and so forth; hence Recognition (Word-Sound) does not appear in all cases.

It might be argued that—"this notion of diversity, in regard to the utterances of the Parrot, etc. is due to the diversity among the manifesting

agencies" ;—that is nothing ; because the very idea of the 'manifesting agency' is going to be discarded.

This is what is said in the words—'*Soyam, etc, etc.*'—'*Soyam*' stands for the divergent notion.

Then again, even if the diversity in the Word were held to be based upon the diversity in the manifesters,—and not upon the Word itself,—then, there would be no confidence at all. This is the contingency that is indicated in the words—'*On this ground alone, etc. etc.*'—'*all this*'—i.e. the entire universe.

"Let that be so ; what then ?"

Answer—'*Hence there can be, etc. etc.*'—There could be no ideas of difference, such as 'this is the *manifester*' and 'that the *manifested*', which is based upon diversity ;—as there is no difference at all. For example, 'these words are human' and 'those others, like *Shanno dēvīḥ, etc.* are not human',—all such notions would not be possible for you who are so devoted to *Recognition* ; as there is no distinction at all.—(2449–2452)

In the following *Text*, the *Mīmāṁsaka* shows how there can be distinction between the *common* (secular) words and the *Vedic* words :—

TEXT (2453).

"SOME WORDS ARE FOUND ALWAYS IN ONE AND THE SAME ORDER OF SEQUENCE,—THE ORDER OF THE *manifesters* BEING FIXED ; THESE WORDS ARE HELD TO BE *not-human*, APPEARING, AS THEY DO, ALWAYS IN THE SAME FIXED ORDER OF SEQUENCE."—(2453)

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as the order of sequence in the manifesters is fixed and rigid,—there are certain words—such as '*Shanno dēvīḥ, etc.*'—which are always found in the same order ; hence, as always appearing in the same order, they are regarded as *not-human* in origin. It follows by implication that those which are otherwise—i.e. not found always in the same order—are *human*.—(2453)

The above idea is rejected in the following :—

TEXT (2454).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE IN THE MANIFESTING AGENCIES, PALATE AND OTHER SPEECH-CENTRES—IS SOMETHING THAT APPERTAINS TO MEN ; HENCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT MAY BE OTHERWISE.—(2454)

COMMENTARY.

That the words always appear in the same order cannot be admitted ; because the order in the words is held to be due to the order in the *manifesters* ;

and this order in the *manifesters*—i.e. in the Palate and other speech-centres,—is dependent upon the whim of man, and hence cannot be fixed ; as there can be no restraint on the whim of man. Consequently, there is no reasonable ground for believing that in any set of words—'*Shanno dēvīḥ, etc.*'—the order has been and is going to be always the same ; hence it is just possible that the order may be otherwise also.—(2454)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, in *Text* 2119, that—" Even though the Flame is momentary, yet there is Recognition, etc. etc."

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (2455).

THE IDEA OF ANY SUCH 'UNIVERSAL' AS 'FIRE' HAS BEEN REJECTED IN DETAIL. HENCE THE 'UNIVERSAL' THAT IS *recognised* CANNOT BE ETERNAL.—(2455)

COMMENTARY.

The Author next proceeds to show that all that has been said above applies to the case of *Letters* also :—

TEXTS (2456-2457).

SUCH RECOGNITION IS POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF LETTERS ALSO, WHICH ARE PERISHABLE,—FOR THOSE WHO HOLD THAT THE UNIVERSAL CAN BE *recognised*. THAT ELEMENT WHEREIN THERE APPEARS THE NOTION OF DIFFERENCE,—LIKE SLOW, FAST AND SO FORTH,—IN REGARD TO THESE THERE CAN BE NO RECOGNITION . . . . . . (?)—(2456-2457)

COMMENTARY.

'*Universal*'—in the form of the 'exclusion of others'.—(2456-2457)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2121, that—" The notions of the individual *Cow*-word, though diverse, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2458).

IN THE REASONS THAT HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD IN PROOF OF THE IDEA OF THE ONE-NESS OF THE WORD,—THERE IS NO INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE POSSIBLE ; BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONTRARY.—(2458)

COMMENTARY.

For proving the idea of the Word being one only, the Inferential Reasons that have been adduced are such that if a contrary conclusion is established,

there has not been shown any reason for sublating such a conclusion; consequently all those Reasons are *Inconclusive.*—(2458)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2128, that—"Everything that does this has been found to be permanent, like the universal aspect of Smoke, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2459).

AS REGARDS THE 'UNIVERSAL ASPECT OF SMOKE' . . . . . [LACUNA IN THE TEXT] . . . . YOUR ARGUMENT IS 'SUPERFLUOUS'.—(2459)

COMMENTARY.

What is spoken of as the 'Inferential Indicative' (Probans) is the 'Universal', which is only the Thing as 'excluded from heterogeneous things';—and this is *not eternal*; consequently your Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum'.—(2459)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka* under *Text* 2131, that—"If the one-ness of the Jar, which is urged, etc. etc."

The answer to this is the same, in regard to *Letters* also.

This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXTS (2460-2461).

IF THE ONE-NESS OF THE LETTERS *Ga*, ETC. THAT IS URGED AS AN UNDESIRABLE CONTINGENCY, IS IN REFERENCE TO THE 'UNIVERSAL ASPECT', THEN THE ARGUMENT IS SUPERFLUOUS; BECAUSE THE ASPECT OF 'EXCLUSION OF THE UNLIKE' IS ALREADY POSTULATED BY US AS ONE AND THE SAME IN ALL INDIVIDUALS.—IF THE INDIVIDUALS THEMSELVES WERE URGED TO BE ONE AND THE SAME, THEN THE REASON WOULD BE 'INCONCLUSIVE'; BECAUSE THE MULTIPLICITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL LETTER HAS BEEN DEFINITELY RECOGNISED, IN EVERY USE OF THEM, BY MEANS OF SENSE-PERCEPTION, ETC. —(2460-2461)

COMMENTARY.

Five arguments have been set forth (by the *Mīmāmsaka*) under *Texts* 2121 *et seq.*;—if what is meant to be proved by these is the one-ness of the

'Universal' in the shape of the 'exclusion of others', then they are superfluous, as proving what is already admitted by the other party; as a matter of fact, on the basis of the single uniform notion that people have in regard to all Individuals, the one 'Universal', in the shape of the 'exclusion of others', is admitted (by us).

If, on the other hand, what is meant to be proved is the one-ness of the Individuals themselves, in the form of their *Specific Individualities*; then the Premiss would be one that is contrary to and annulled by Perception and Inference; and this would make all the Reasons 'Inconclusive'.

'*By means of Sense-perception, etc. etc.*'—'*Ākṣa*' is *pertaining to* '*akṣa*', *sense-organ.* '*Etc.*' includes *Inference.* The Plural number is in view of the large number of individual Perceptions and Inferences.—(2460-2461)

Question:—"How is the diversity of Individuals recognised by Sense-perception?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (2462–2464).

DIVERSITY IN THE FORM OF 'AGREEABLE' AND 'DISAGREEABLE' AND SO FORTH, IS DIRECTLY PERCEIVED;—THE DIVERSITY AMONG COGNITIONS IS COGNISED ON THE GROUND OF THEIR APPEARING IN SUCCESSION,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE VIRGIN.—THE COGNITIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL '*Cow*-WORDS', APPEARING AT DIFFERENT TIMES AND PLACES, CANNOT ALL DENOTE ONE AND THE SAME OBJECT,—BECAUSE THEY ACTUALLY APPEAR AS DIVERSE,—LIKE THE COGNITIONS OF TASTE, COLOUR, ETC.—THE DIVERSITY IN THE COGNITIONS OF THE VARIOUS NOTES (OF SOUND) IN THE SHAPE OF THE '*Ṣaḍja*' AND THE REST IS COGNISED BY PERCEPTION ..... AS IS GOING TO BE EXPLAINED LATER ON.—(2462–2464)

COMMENTARY.

'*Manojña*'—pleasing to the mind, Agreeable;—the contrary of this is '*amanojña*', Disagreeable.

Annulment by Inference is next shown—'*The diversity among cognitions, etc. etc.*'—The exact meaning of this will be made clear below, under the following *Text.*

The Inference may be formulated as follows:—Those Cognitions that appear as different cannot all envisage the same object,—e.g. the cognitions envisaging Taste, Colour and so forth;—and the cognitions of the individual '*Cow*-words' appearing at different times and places appear as different; hence there is apprehension of the wider 'contrary'.

That the Reason here put forward is not 'inadmissible' is shown by the sentence—'*The diversity in the cognitions, etc. etc.*'—(2462–2464)

The Author supplies the proof for the statement just made (in 2462) regarding the fact that 'the diversity among Cognitions is proved by their appearing in succession, as in the case of the Virgin':—

TEXT (2465).

ALL THESE COGNITIONS OF THE '*Cow*-WORD', WHICH APPEARED YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY, CANNOT ALL ENVISAGE THE SAME OBJECT,—LIKE THE SUCCESSIVELY APPEARING COGNITIONS OF COLOUR AND ODOUR, ETC.—(2465)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be thus formulated:—Those Cognitions that appear in succession do not envisage the same object,—e.g. the Cognitions of Taste, Colour, etc. appearing one after the other;—all these cognitions of the '*Cow*-words' that appeared yesterday and to-day have appeared in succession;—hence there is apprehension of the wider contrary.—(2465)

The following *Text* shows that neither of the Reasons just adduced by the Buddhist is 'Inconclusive':—

TEXT (2466).

IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN ALL COGNITIONS WOULD HAVE ONE AND THE SAME OBJECT; THERE WOULD BE INCONGRUITY ALSO AS REGARDS THEIR APPEARING IN SUCCESSION, WHEN THEIR EFFICIENT CAUSE IS THERE ALL THE TIME. —(2466)

COMMENTARY.

'*Of all cognitions*'—i.e. of the cognitions of Taste, Colour and so forth.—The possibility of all having the same object, though appearing diversely—is the argument that annuls the Reason in question.

'*Incongruity as regards appearing in succession*'—would annul the reason 'because they appear in succession'.—(2466)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under *Text* 2133, that—"If the relationship in question were artificial, etc. etc.".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXTS (2467-2469).

It has been explained before that even though there is diversity among things, yet they have the inherent capacity of being conceived as one, with certain restrictions.—But even with such conception, there can be *one-ness*, etc. of the word. What the common man thinks is that there is repeated use of one and the same word.—The relationship also is possible when subsisting in several individuals. Consequently in all cases, there is a multiplicity of words, but they come to be conceived of as one.—(2467–2469)

COMMENTARY.

The meaning of this is easily understood.—(2467–2469)

Question :—" Why is it said that it is the *common man* that thinks so ? "
Answer :—

TEXTS (2470-2471).

In reality, there can be no relationship between the Word and its meaning ; (*a*) because there is difference between them,—and (*b*) because one is not born from the other. The relationship has only been imposed by people under an illusion.—That this is so has been explained in detail already. In fact, the whole position of the Word and its meaning is highly complicated ; as there is no invariable concomitance between them.—(2470-2471)

COMMENTARY.

'*Because there is difference*' ;—this precludes the relationship of *Identity* ;—'*because one is not born from the other*' ;—this precludes the relationship of Cause and Effect—Apart from these, there is no other relationship possible,—and without such a relationship, there can be no restriction regarding the Word expressing a definite meaning ;—if there were, there would be incongruities.—For these reasons, the connection between the Word and its meaning must be regarded as *imposed* upon them ; as has been explained

before, in the section dealing with 'Apoha', the 'Exclusion, of others'.—(2470-2471)

The *Mīmāmsaka's* argument has been formulated under the *Text* 2135, in the following words—"From this it follows that the Word is *not-artificial,* and it never perishes,—because it has an eternal relationship with an eternal entity—like the *Akāsha* and the *Atom*".

In the following *Text,* it is pointed out that the Reason and the Corroborative Instance herein adduced are both 'inadmissible'.

TEXT (2472).

ANY SUCH ETERNAL *universal* AS 'COW' HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED; THE RELATIONSHIP ALSO IS PURELY IMAGINARY; THE '*Ākāsha*' AND THE 'ATOM' ALSO HAVE BEEN DISCARDED. HENCE NEITHER THE PROBANS NOR THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE IS SOUND.—(2472)

COMMENTARY.

'*Any such eternal Universal, etc.*';—this asserts the fact of the *eternal* thing being 'inadmissible'.

'*The Relationship also, etc.*'—this asserts the 'inadmissibility' of the Reason 'because there is relationship'.

'*The Atom and the Ākāsha also have been discarded*',—this asserts the 'inadmissibility' of the two Instances cited by the *Mīmāmsaka.*

'*Rejected*', '*Discarded*',—in course of the chapter on the 'Six Categories'.

'*Na*'—denies the Reason, etc.

'*Tat*'—Therefore; hence.—(2472)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka* under *Text* 2136, that—"Inasmuch as the Word envisages several *Universals,* etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2473).

YOU MAY TAKE A LONG TIME IN EXPLAINING THE FACT OF THE WORD ('COW') BEING EXPRESSIVE OF THE ONE *Universal* 'COW', AS EXTRACTED (FROM AMONG THE SEVERAL UNIVERSALS); ON THE BASIS OF DELUDED PEOPLE COGNISING IT IN ONE AND THE SAME FORM.—(2473)

COMMENTARY.

The following *text* explains why this should be regarded as a 'delusion':—

TEXT (2474).

IN REALITY, THE THING IS MOMENTARY ; HENCE EVEN FOR THAT TIME IT CANNOT REMAIN STATIONARY ; HOW THEN CAN IT BE ADMITTED TO EXIST AT THE SUBSEQUENT TIME ?—(2474)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka* under *Text* 2140, that—" In the case of the Jar and other things, it is understood that they would become destroyed either through decay, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2475).

IN THE CASE OF THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS ALSO, THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR THEIR DESTRUCTION, WHICH CAN BE CLEARLY POINTED OUT AS 'THIS IS WHAT WILL DESTROY IT' ; HOW, THEN, CAN ANY SUCH CAUSE BE POINTED OUT IN THE CASE OF THE *Word* ?—(2475)

COMMENTARY.

'*This is what will, etc. etc.*'—As explained in the chapter on the 'Permanent Character of Things' ; where it has been explained that there can be no cause for the destruction of things. When in the case of the Jar also, there can be no cause for its destruction,—how can there be any for the destruction of the Word ?—The term '*nāshakāraṇam*' is to be construed with '*Shabdē*'.

What is indicated by this is that the *Mīmāmsaka's* Reasoning is superfluous, and the Corroborative Instance *per Dissimilarity* is 'inadmissible'. —(2475)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, in *Text* 2141, that—" Even though there are differences of Place, Time, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2476–2478).

THAT THERE IS MISTAKE IN RECOGNITIONS HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED BEFORE.—THE 'PROPERTY' VARIES WITH THE VARIATIONS OF PLACE, TIME AND PERSONS USING (THE WORD) ; AND THE VARIATIONS APPEAR IN THE SHAPE OF THE VARIOUS NOTES, *Ṣaḍja Ṛṣabha, Gāndhāra, Pañchama* AND SO FORTH ;—THE *Cogniser* ALSO IS PERCEIVED DIRECTLY ; THE INDIVIDUAL LETTER 'GA' IS ALSO CLEARLY DISTINCT.—ALL THIS DIVERSITY CANNOT BE REGARDED AS DUE TO THE DIVERSITY IN THE 'MANIFESTER' ; THAT THERE CAN BE NO 'MANIFESTATION' IN THE CASE OF *eternal* THINGS IS GOING TO BE EXPLAINED LATER ON.—(2476–2478)

COMMENTARY.

This is quite easy.—(2476–2478)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka,* under *Text* 2143, that—" The Individual Letter ' *Ga* ' has no existence apart from the substratum of the *Universal* ' Ga ', etc. etc.".

This argument is open to the charge of being ' superfluous ' :—this is what is shown in the following :—

TEXT (2479).

THE *Universal* ' GA ' IS NOT HELD TO BE SOMETHING REAL, DISTINCT FROM THE LETTER ' GA ' ; HENCE THE CHARGE OF ' FUTILITY ' IS IRRESISTIBLE, AS AGAINST THE *Mīmāṃsaka's* REASONING.—(2479)

COMMENTARY.

' *Iṣyatē* ', ' is held ' ; this is to be construed with the ' na ' following in the second line.—(2479)

TEXTS (2480-2481).

IF IT BE URGED THAT WHAT IS SOUGHT TO BE PROVED (BY THE *Mīmāṃsaka's* ARGUMENT) IS THAT IT IS NOT THE SUBSTRATUM OF THE *Universal* ' GA ', WHICH IS OF THE NATURE OF THE ' EXCLUSION OF OTHERS ',—THAT CANNOT BE RIGHT ; AS THAT WILL INVOLVE THE FALLACY OF THE BASIS OF THE REASON BEING ' INADMISSIBLE '.—INASMUCH AS THE LETTER ' GA ' IS NOTHING APART FROM ' THE EXCLUSION OF THE *Non-ga* ', TO WHICH OBJECT WOULD THE CHARACTER OF ' BEING NOT APPREHENDED BY ANY COGNITION OTHER THAN THAT OF *Ga* ' BELONG ?—(2480-2481)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—" What is meant to be proved by the reasoning in question is that the Individual is not the substratum of that *universal* ' Ga ' which is of the nature of the ' exclusion of others ' ; hence there is no ' futility ' in it ; because you (Buddhist) do not hold that the Individual *Ga* is not the substratum of the ' exclusion of others ' ".

This is the view combated in this *Text.*

Even when what is sought to be proved is put in this way, the Reason becomes ' inadmissible '. Because the ' exclusion of others ' is not anything different from the thing thus ' excluded ' from others ; in fact, it consists of the same Individual ' *Ga* ' ; and it is spoken of as ' exclusion of others ' or ' *Apoha,*' etc. when its precise nature is meant to be determined

which is thus done through the denial of other exclusions of unlike things. Consequently there being no such *object* which could form the subject of the argument,—to whom could the Reason,—in the form 'because it is not apprehended by any cognition other than that of *Ga*'—belong? To nothing at all.—(2480-2481)

As regards the Corroborative Instance cited by the *Mīmāmsaka*, in *Text* 2143,—'like the Universal *Ga* postulated by the other party',—that also is one of which the very basic object is not admissible. This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2482).

EVERY RIGHT INFERENCE REQUIRES SUCH CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE, ETC. AS ARE ADMITTED BY BOTH PARTIES. IN THE CASE OF THE INFERENCE IN QUESTION HOWEVER, THE OBJECTIVE BASIS (OF THE REASON) IS NOT SO ADMITTED. —(2482)

COMMENTARY.

'*Instance, etc.*'—The 'etc.' is meant to include the Reason (Probans) and other factors.—(2482)

Further, even when the first party does not state it in so many words, *that* is regarded as to be proved which he has in mind; and as a matter of fact, it is not merely the Universal 'Ga' which you have in your mind as to be proved; what you really desire is to prove, through this *Universal*, the one-ness of the letter '*Ga*'; and it has been already shown before that such a Proposition as the latter is annulled by Perception and other Means of Cognition.

This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXT (2483).

ALL THIS ATTEMPT OF YOURS IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVING THE ONE-NESS OF THE LETTER '*Ga*'; AND THIS IS CLEARLY AND UNDENIABLY ANNULLED BY PERCEPTION, AS ALREADY EXPLAINED TO YOU.—(2483)

COMMENTARY.

'*This attempt*'—at denying the substratum of the Universal 'Ga'.

'*Annulled by Perception*'—The particle '*cha*' includes 'annulment by *Inference*' also.

'Explained'—under the *Text* 2462 *et seq.*—(2483)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2145, that—" The entity in the form of the *Letter* is admitted by both parties, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2484-2485).

ALL THESE COGNITIONS OF THE LETTER ' GA ' WHICH APPEARED YESTERDAY AND TODAY, ETC. APPEARING IN SUCCESSION, CANNOT ENVISAGE ONE AND THE SAME THING,—LIKE THE COGNITIONS OF TASTE, COLOUR, ETC.—THUS THE ' ONE LETTER ' IS NOT SOMETHING ' ADMITTED BY BOTH PARTIES '. HENCE THE ' ETERNALITY ' THAT HAS BEEN ASSUMED APPERTAINS TO THE POSTULATED ' EXCLUSION OF OTHERS '. —(2484-2485)

COMMENTARY.

The term ' *uditā* ' is construed here also, with the endings changed.

Thus then, on account of the diversity of Words being annulled by Perception and Inference, there is no single entity in the shape of the ' Letter ' ; hence the *eternality* that has been assumed can only belong to the assumed ' exclusion of others ',—the idea of *one-ness* being due to the similarity of the conception.—(2484-2485)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2148, that—" When the Word-Sound is cognised by the Ear, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2486-2487).

AT THE TIME THAT THE WORD-SOUND IS HEARD, THERE IS NO PERCEPTION OF THE AIR-CURRENTS REACHING THE EAR AND EMBELLISHING THE AUDITORY ORGAN. WHEN THE SOUND IS COGNISED THROUGH THE EAR AS EMBELLISHED BY THE PITCH,—THERE IS IDEA OF THE PITCH AS RELATED TO THAT SOUND ; AND THIS IDEA IS CLEARLY ANNULLED BY DIRECT PERCEPTION. —(2486-2487)

COMMENTARY.

If it were known by any Means of Right Cognition that ' there are Air-currents embellishing the Auditory organ ', then there might be some

justification for saying that 'the Auditory organ is embellished by the Pitch'. As a matter of fact, however, no such Air-currents are known; hence there is the idea of the Pitch only as related to the Sound and that this idea is perceptional is entirely fanciful.—(2486-2487)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2150, that—"Those who have their minds perverted by the disorders of Bile perceive the *Sweet* as *Bitter*, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2488).

JUST AS THE NOTION OF 'BITTERNESS' WITH REGARD TO WHAT IS 'SWEET', AND OF 'YELLOW' WITH REGARD TO WHAT IS 'WHITE', IS WITHOUT AN OBJECTIVE BASIS,—OF THE SAME KIND WOULD THE NOTION OF THE WORD-SOUND ALSO BE.—(2488)

COMMENTARY.

This also sets aside the idea that 'the cognition of the Word-Sound is due to that'. Because the Cognition which has no shape cannot have anything else for its object; otherwise there would be incongruities.—(2488)

The following might be urged—"Even if the Word-sound is not the objective of the Cognition, why should the cognition be baseless (without an object)?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2489).

UNDER THE VARIATIONS OF 'FAST', 'MIDDLING' AND 'SLOW',—THE WORD-SOUND ITSELF DOES NOT APPEAR AS DIFFERENT. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHEN THE COGNITION ENVISAGES SOMETHING IN A FORM THAT DOES NOT BELONG TO IT,—WHY SHOULD NOT THIS COGNITION BE *objectless*? —(2489)

COMMENTARY.

The Cognition that appears is in the form of 'fast', 'medium' and 'slow';—and the Word-Sound cannot have the 'fast' and other forms;

because being eternal and all-pervading, it must have only one form;—there is nothing else that could have the 'fast' and other forms, and appear in the Cognition;—hence there being no real object of the said exact form, the Cognition is clearly *objectless*.—(2489)

The following might be urged—"The same Word-Sound, appearing in the 'fast' and other forms, would form the objective basis of the Cognition; as has been declared that 'in every case the objective basis consists in the external thing varying with the variations of Time and Place'."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2490–2493).

THE ASSERTION THAT 'ONE COGNISES THE ONE THING AS OTHERWISE' INVOLVES SELF-CONTRADICTION; IF WHAT IS COGNISED IS ANOTHER FORM, THEN HOW CAN THE *same* OBJECT BE SAID TO BE COGNISED? UNDER THE VIEW THAT COGNITION IS FORMLESS, IT WOULD EXIST ONLY IN THE *external* FORM; CONSEQUENTLY, IF WHAT IS COGNISED IS *external* AND YET NOT OF THE NATURE OF THE EXTERNAL THING,—THEN HOW IS IT THAT IT EXISTS? EVEN UNDER THE VIEW THAT COGNITIONS HAVE FORMS, THE COGNITION ALWAYS APPEARS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXTERNAL FORM; AND THEN ALONE IS THE OBJECT SAID TO BE 'COGNISED'.—IN THE CASE IN QUESTION, HOWEVER, THE COGNITION DOES NOT APPEAR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXTERNAL FORM.—HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT ALL THIS COGNITION, WHICH IS WRONG, IS ENTIRELY *objectless*—(2490–2493)

COMMENTARY.

'*Self-contradiction*'—'The same' and 'Otherwise' are mutually exclusive, the presence and absence of the one involving the absence and presence (respectively) of the other; and as such, these cannot co-exist in the same object.

Then again, under the view that forms do not belong to Cognitions, all Cognitions are false; while under the view that forms belong to Cognitions, all Cognitions are objectless. This is what is shown by the words—'*Under the view, etc., etc.*'—For those who regard the Cognitions as *formless*, what is perceived is the *Blue form* as subsisting in the Object. The Conch-shell does not really exist in the yellow form in which it figures in the wrong Cognition; hence this is all the more clearly *objectless*.

Says the Opponent—"If the yellow form is not in the Object, then it must be in the Cognition; otherwise, if it were in neither, how could there be cognition of it? Thus if it resides in the Cognition, it behoves you to explain how Cognition can be formless?"

This is true; but when we assert that Cognition is objectless, we do so, on accepting the view that Cognition is formless. One who holds Cognitions to be formless has got to provide an answer to the question that has been raised.

Even under the view that the form resides in the Cognition, the apprehension of the Object is explained on the basis of the idea that what is actually apprehended is that form of the Cognition which bears the imprint of the form of the Object. In the case of *wrong* Cognition there is no apprehension of the form of Cognition bearing the imprint of the Object; hence the Cognition is clearly objectless. Apart from *being with form* and *being without form,* there is no other alternative possible, in regard to the apprehension of things. Hence it follows that all Cognition, which is wrong, is objectless.—(2490–2493).

The following *Text* shows that in the case in question, there is no cause for mistake (wrong Cognition):—

TEXT (2494).

It cannot be right that there should be a 'Manifester',—specially for what is eternal,—in accordance with its embellishments (and modifications); consequently there cannot be diverse cognitions in regard to the Word-Sound.—(2494)

COMMENTARY.

In regard to '*Dhvani*'—i.e. Word-Sound,—the diversity of the *manifester* is said to be the cause of the illusion that there is diversity in the sound also. But for anything that is eternal, there can be no 'manifester'; as in regard to eternal things, there is nothing that the *Manifester* can do; and unless it does something to it, it cannot be its 'Manifester'; if it were, there would be an absurdity; and anything could be the 'Manifester' of anything.

For these reasons it cannot be right to hold that diverse Cognitions regarding the Word-Sound are due to the embellishments of the *manifestor*.—(2494).

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṁsaka* under *Text* 2170, that—"Just as the Lamp is regarded as the *manifester* of the Jar, through the aid that it affords to the Eye, etc. etc."

In the first of the following *texts*, the Author explains the opponent's position, and in the remaining texts, he sets forth the objections to it:—

TEXTS (2495–2499).

"JUST AS THE LAMP RESTRICTS THE POTENCY OF THE EYE TO THE PERCEPTION OF THE JAR,—SO WILL THE ARTICULATION RESTRICT THE POTENCY OF THE AUDITORY ORGAN TO THE APPREHENSION OF THE SOUND".—IF, AS IT STANDS BY ITSELF, THE SOUND IS CAPABLE OF BEING APPREHENDED BY THE AUDITORY ORGAN,—THEN WHY IS IT NOT APPREHENDED, WHILE THE AUDITORY ORGAN IS NOT EMBELLISHED ?—WHEN ITS EFFICIENT CAUSE IS THERE, THE APPREHENSION MUST FOLLOW ; AND THIS CONDITION IS PRESENT AT THE TIME OF THE EMBELLISHMENT OF THE AUDITORY ORGAN.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOUND IS NOT CAPABLE OF BEING APPREHENDED, HOW COULD IT BECOME APPREHENDED EVEN AT A LATER TIME ? IF THE APPREHENSION IS THERE, THEN WHAT IS APPREHENDED MUST BE SOME OTHER SOUND WHICH HAS THE REQUISITE CAPACITY.—IF THEN, EVEN AT A LATER TIME, THERE IS NO COGNITION (APPREHENSION) OF THE WORD-SOUND DUE TO ITS OWN INHERENT CAPACITY,—THEN IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT IT IS ASSERTED THAT IT IS PRODUCED BY THE EMBELLISHED AUDITORY ORGAN AND OTHER AGENCIES.—(2495–2499)

COMMENTARY.

It may be that the Auditory Organ is embellished ; but what you have to explain is—Whether or not the Word-Sound, by its very nature, is capable of bringing about the cognition of itself.

In the former case (i.e. if it *is* so capable),—then it should be cognised even before the Auditory Organ has been embellished.

This is what is said in the words—'*why is it not apprehended, etc. etc.*' '*Tasya*'—of the Word-Sound.—'*Tat*'—therefore.

The argument may be formulated, as before, thus—'If its cause is deficient etc.' ; and it may be added that in this case the embellishment of the Auditory Organ would be useless.

Under the latter view (that the Word-Sound by itself is *not* capable of bringing about its own cognition),—the Cognition of the Sound should not come about even when the embellishment of the Auditory Organ is there ; because the Sound must, for ever, remain incapable (of being cognised). So that under this view also, the embellishment of the Auditory Organ would be useless.

This argument may be formulated as follows :—When one thing does not deviate from the condition in which it was not able to produce a particular effect, it cannot produce that effect ;—as, for instance, the *Kodrava*-seed cannot produce the *Paddy*-sprout ;—and even on the embellishment of the Auditory Organ, the Word-sound does not deviate from the incapacity to produce Cognition ;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider condition.

That the Reason here adduced is not 'inadmissible' is shown in the words—'If the apprehension is there, etc. etc.'

'*Yogyatāyogī*'—that which has connection with the capacity.—(2495–2499)

Says the Opponent—" If the Word-Sound were held to be a cause of the production of the Cognition, then there might be some room for raising the question as to its being *capable* or *not capable* ;—as it is, however, what is held to be the cause of the Cognition of the Word-Sound is the embellished Auditory Organ,—and not the Sound ; hence there is no room for the objections that have been urged ".

The Author attacks the view directly and refutes it in the following :—

TEXT (2500).

IN THIS WAY THE WORD-SOUND WOULD BE UNCOGNISABLE ; AS IT WOULD NOT BE OF ANY USE IN ITS OWN COGNITION, AND, ON THAT ACCOUNT, IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFERENT FROM TASTE AND OTHER THINGS (SO FAR AS HAVING NO BEARING ON THE SAID COGNITION IS CONCERNED).—(2500)

COMMENTARY.

In this way, like Taste, etc., the Word-Sound also would have no bearing upon its Cognition; and this would mean that it is not cognisable by that Cognition.

This argument may be formulated as follows :—When a certain thing has no bearing upon a Cognition, it cannot be cognised by that Cognition ;—e.g. Taste, etc. in regard to Auditory Cognition ;—the Word-Sound has no bearing upon the Cognition of that Sound ;—hence there is apprehension of something contrary to the wider condition.

The reason here adduced is not 'Inconclusive' ; because, if what has no bearing upon a Cognition were cognised by that Cognition,—there would be no restriction at all, and Taste might also become cognisable by Auditory Cognition.—(2500)

Says the Opponent :—" The cause of the Cognition itself would serve to restrict its scope, and there would be no such absurd contingencies as have been indicated. Because it is the cognition of the Word-Sound—and not that of Taste, etc.—which is actually found to come about from the causal factors appearing immediately after the embellishment of the Auditory Organ,—because the efficiency of the causal factors is so restricted.—Even if the Word-Sound were necessarily regarded as the cause (of its own cognition), some restriction on the efficiency of the cause will have to be admitted ; because, if the question is raised—' when all things are equally the cause of the Cognition, then, why is it that the *cognition of sound* that is produced is of the nature of the *apprehension of sound* only, not of the apprehension

of the Auditory organ ?'—the only answer possible would be that the efficiency of the Causal factors is restricted in this manner".

Having reviewed all this, the Author answers the charge of 'Inconclusiveness' against his reason :—

TEXT (2501).

IT MAY BE TAKEN (FOR GRANTED) THAT THE COGNITION OF THE NATURE OF THE *Cognition of Word-Sound* MAY BE TAKEN AS PRODUCED BY THE EMBELLISHED AUDITORY ORGAN, ETC., SPOKEN OF BEFORE, —INDEPENDENTLY OF THE WORD-SOUND ITSELF.—(2501)

COMMENTARY.

'*Nāma*'—'may be taken'—this means that it may be taken for granted (for the sake of argument).—That this view is not tenable is going to be shown later on, under *Text* 2507.

'*By the embellished Auditory Organ, etc.*'—The 'etc.' includes the immediately following causal factors.—(2501)

Even if the Word-Sound is not the cause of the Cognition of it, there are incongruities. For instance, there are two alternatives possible—Is the Word-Sound endowed with the nature of being apprehended by its Cognition or not ?—If it is, then there is the following discrepancy :—

TEXTS (2502–2504).

THIS WORD-SOUND BEING OF THE NATURE OF WHAT IS APPREHENDED BY ITS COGNITION,—IN WHATSOEVER FORM IT CONTINUES TO EXIST [AND IT EXISTS FOR ALL TIME, *ex hypothesi*] AS 'WORD-SOUND',—THE SAID COGNITION ALSO WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE ALONG WITH IT,—UNDER YOUR THEORY [BY WHICH *apprehensibility by that Cognition* FORMS THE VERY NATURE OF THE WORD-SOUND] ;—OTHERWISE IT COULD NOT BE CONTINUING ALONG WITH THE COGNITION. AND BY THAT SAME COGNITION WOULD THAT WORD-SOUND BE APPREHENDED ;—THIS WOULD CERTAINLY INVOLVE THE WORST INCONGRUITY FOR YOU. ONE IS OF THE NATURE OF THE *Cognition*, AND THE OTHER IS OF THE NATURE OF THE *Cognised* ; AND THE TWO ARE THEREFORE TIED UP TOGETHER AS BY A CHAIN ; CONSEQUENTLY WHENEVER THE ONE IS THERE THE OTHER MUST BE THERE ALSO, WITHOUT FAIL.—(2502–2504)

COMMENTARY.

If the Word-Sound is of the nature of *being apprehended by its Cognition*, then, like the Word, its Cognition also should be eternal, existing at all times ; because the nature of apprehensibility by it continues for all

time (in the Word). For example, when the character of *holding the stick* belongs to Devadatta, it is not possible that the stick should not continue as long as Devadatta is there.

'*Tied up together as by a chain*'—'*Hi*' stands for *because*. The sense thus is as follows:—*Because* the nature of being *cognised* and the nature of being *Cognition* are tied together as by a chain,—therefore it becomes established that whenever the one is present, the other also has to be present,—without fail.—(2502–2504)

Question:—"Let that be so; what is the harm?"
Answer:—

TEXT (2505).

IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE WORD-SOUND, WHICH CONTINUES TO BE INSEPARABLY RELATED TO THE COGNITION PRODUCIBLE OF THE EMBELLISHED AUDITORY ORGAN, WOULD BE CLEARLY PRESENT EVEN WHEN THE AUDITORY ORGAN HAS NOT BEEN EMBELLISHED.—(2505)

COMMENTARY.

After the compound ending with '*Sambaddha*', the phrase '*Shabdaḥ unuvartatē*' is understood.

Thus then, because the Word connected with the Cognition producible by the Embellished Organ continues for all time,—therefore it follows that even for the man whose Auditory Organ has not been embellished, the said Cognition would be there; so that there would be no use for the Embellishment of the Auditory Organ.—(2505)

The second alternative [noted in the Introduction to *Text* 2502, that by its very nature, the Word-Sound is not endowed with the character of being apprehended by its Cognition'] also is open to the following objection:—

TEXT (2506).

IF THE WORD-SOUND IS NOT OF THE NATURE OF BEING APPREHENDED BY ITS COGNITION, THEN, IN THAT CASE, IT WOULD BE ON THE SAME FOOTING AS TASTE AND OTHER THINGS, WHICH ALSO ARE NOT OF THE NATURE OF BEING APPREHENDED BY THE COGNITION OF WORD-SOUND; AND IN THAT CASE, AUDITORY PERCEPTION WOULD NOT BE THE COGNITION *of Sound*.—(2506)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(2506)

All this has been said after admitting (for the sake of argument) that the Cognition, which is not helped by the Word-Sound, is of the nature

of the Apprehension of that Sound. The Author now proceeds to show that the idea of the Cognition having the nature of the Cognition of the Word-Sound is untenable, unless there is some connection between them.

TEXTS (2507–2509).

WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN THE COGNITION AND THE WORD-SOUND, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE COGNITION IS HELD TO BE OF THE NATURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF THAT SOUND ?—THIS RELATION CANNOT BE THAT OF IDENTITY, BECAUSE THE TWO ARE CLEARLY DIFFERENT. NOR IS THE ONE PRODUCED FROM THE OTHER ; BECAUSE THE WORD-SOUND IS (*ex hypothesi*) NOT PRODUCED ; AND IF IT WERE PRODUCED, THEN IT WOULD APPEAR AT ALL TIMES ; AND HENCE THE COGNITION OF THAT SOUND WOULD EITHER BE PRODUCED AT ALL TIMES,—OR IT WOULD NOT BE PRODUCED AT ALL. SUCH BEING THE UNDESIRABLE STATE OF THINGS, THE ASSUMPTION OF THE 'EMBELLISHMENT OF THE AUDITORY ORGAN' IS ENTIRELY FUTILE.—(2507–2509)

COMMENTARY.

There are only two kinds of relationship among things—the relation of Identity and the relation of Cause and Effect ; in no third form can any help be rendered ; and there can be no relationship between things which do not render some help to one another ; otherwise there would be incongruities.—Neither of these two relationships is possible between the Word-Sound and its Cognition ; and in the absence of such a relationship, how could the Cognition be of the nature of the apprehension of the Word-Sound ? If it did, there would be incongruities.

It might be urged that—" When the Cognition is produced, it is in the form of the Word-Sound, and it is on the basis of this that the Cognition is held to be of the nature of the comprehension of the Sound,—even though there is no relationship between the two ".

This cannot be right ; because Cognition has been regarded as *formless* ; the *Mīmāmsakas* do not admit the view that Cognitions have forms.—But even if it were as asserted, the view set forth cannot be right ; as in that case, the Sound would have to be regarded as *imperceptible*. That is, under the view, Sound would be *imperceptible*, not *perceptible* ; and hence there being no means of knowing it, the idea of its Cognition having the form of the Word-Sound would itself be an impossibility. It could not be known by the presence of its effect ; because it is not regarded as productive of effects.

The following might be urged—"Even for one who holds the view that Cognitions have forms, and the Object is *productive* of the Cognition,—the Object would be always imperceptible; how then can it be known that the Cognition has the form of the Object?"

True; but the way in which it is known is this—From the presence of the Effect, it is deduced that there is a Cause for it; and the idea that Cognition serves to differentiate the Blue and other forms, is got at from positive and negative concomitance. For instance, the Eye, the Light, and the Mind-functioning being common to all Visual Cognitions, the difference among the Cognitions of the Blue and others cannot be due to these; hence the implication is that there is some other Cause for it,—this implication being derived from the negative premiss just indicated; and hence it is concluded that the said difference must be due to this other Cause. And on the basis of this it is asserted that the form having been brought about by that, it is this form that is apprehended by the Cognition.—But even this way is not available for you; because you do not regard the Word-Sound to be a *Cause* at all.

The following might be urged—"The Eye and the other factors are themselves imperceptible; how is it known that these are present in all Visual Perceptions?"

All this is quite true, when we are discussing the doctrine of *Idealism*. The Idealist holds that the peculiarities of every Cognition are all due to the immediately preceding subjective causal factors,—as in the case of Dreams; and he does not regard them as due to any external or objective conditions. —But all that is being said on the present occasion is on the understanding that the External Object does exist. If it were not so, then the first point to be urged would be—how can the External Object be proved by the Effect? All that could be proved would be the presence of the *Cause*, not of anything *external, objective*; because it is quite possible that the said Cause may be something *internal, subjective*,—as in the case of Dreams.—Enough of this!

Even if the idea of the Word-Sound being *productive* is accepted,—the incongruity remains;—this is what is shown by the words—'*If it were produced, it would be produced at all times, etc. etc.*'—'*Sā*' stands for the *production*.

The argument is summed up in the words—'*Hence the Cognition of that Sound, etc. etc.*'

'*Or it would not be produced at all*',—under the view that Sound is *not productive*.

'*Undesirable state of things*'—that the Cognition must be either always present, or always absent.—(2507–2509)

Hitherto the Author has admitted (for the sake of argument) that there is Embellishment of the Auditory Organ;—and then proceeded to consider whether or not the *Object* is the productive Cause of the Cognition,—which consideration has led to the conclusion that the Embellishment of the Auditory Organ is absolutely useless.—He now proceeds to show that the **Embellishment** itself of the Auditory Organ is not possible:—

TEXTS (2510–2512).

COGNITION WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF THE EMBELLISHMENT WERE *occasional*; THE IDEA OF THE 'EMBELLISHMENT' WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE ONLY IF IT WERE OCCASIONAL. THE IDEA OF 'EMBELLISHMENT', WHICH IS A KIND OF POTENCY, IS DERIVED FROM THE EFFECT IN THE FORM OF THE COGNITION. NOW THIS COGNITION MAY EITHER APPEAR AT ALL TIMES, OR NOT APPEAR AT ALL. HOW THEN COULD IT INDICATE THE *occasional* EMBELLISHMENT (OF THE AUDITORY ORGAN)? HENCE THE EXPLANATION BASED UPON THE 'EMBELLISHMENT OF THE AUDITORY ORGAN' HAS NOT BEEN SOUND.—(2510–2512)

COMMENTARY.

Cognition as the effect of Embellishment could be occasional only if the Embellishment were occasional; otherwise if the Cause in its efficient state were there always, why should its effect be occasional? As a matter of fact however, the Embellishment is not *occasional*;—this is what is shown in the words—'*The idea of the Embellishment is derived, etc. etc.*'—That is to say, the Embellishment of the Auditory Organ, deduced from the coming about of its effect in the shape of the Cognition (of Sound), could only consist in a certain *Potency*;—as Potency alone is what can be deduced from an effect;—this Potency should form part of the Auditory Organ itself; it cannot be anything different from it; as in the latter case the Auditory Organ itself would not be the Cause of the effect (Cognition). Then again, as no sort of relationship can be known, whenever the Potency would be there, the resultant Cognition should also be there. If the Cognition is not there, then it could never follow from that Potency; and as a result of this, the Cognition could not be occasional. Under the circumstances, how could the occasional Cognition indicate the Potency as the 'Embellishment of the Auditory Organ'? It could never indicate it.—(2510–2512)

The following might be urged—"It is not an inherent Potency that is inferred from the effect in the shape of Cognition; what happens is that it is an entirely new Potency that is produced in the Auditory Organ by the Articulations; and it is this Potency that is inferred from the Cognition; hence it is quite reasonable that the occasional Cognition becomes indicative of the Potency".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2513).

THE POTENCY THAT IS PRODUCED IN THE AUDITORY ORGAN,—IF IT IS SOMETHING NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE ORGAN ITSELF,—THEN THAT DOES AWAY WITH THE ETERNALITY OF THE *Ākāsha* OR OF *Space*; AS IT WOULD BE SOMETHING PRODUCED.—(2513)

COMMENTARY.

The Potency that is produced in the Auditory Organ—(1) is it of the nature of the Organ itself ?—or (2) is it something different from it ?—or (3) is it different-non-different ?—These are the three alternatives possible.

Under the first alternative, like the Potency itself, the Auditory Organ—whether it consists of *Ākāsha* or of *Space*,—also becomes non-eternal;—why ? —'*as it would be something produced*';—i.e. because it is produced.

It might be argued that—" The view held is not that the Auditory Organ is non-different from the Potency; but that the Potency is non-different from the Auditory Organ ".

Now, just look at this working of sheer blindness ! When the nature of one thing is tied up with that of the other, how can this latter be far removed from it at the same time ? Because 'non-difference' between two things consists in the fusion of the natures of both into one. While the Milk remains at a distance from the Water, it does not become mingled with it; hence the explanation suggested is futile.—(2513)

The following *Text* shows that even if it be as suggested, the view remains open to objection :—

TEXT (2514).

THE 'EMBELLISHMENT' OF A THING, BEING NOT-DIFFERENT FROM THE THING ITSELF, MUST BE ETERNAL; CONSEQUENTLY THERE WOULD BE COGNITION OF THINGS AT ALL TIMES.—(2514)

COMMENTARY.

Like the form of the thing itself, the Embellishment also should be eternal, as it is non-different from it. So that this is an additional objection to which the said view is open.—(2514)

The following *Text* points out the objection against the *second* alternative (suggested in the Commentary on 2513,—that the Potency imparted to the Auditory Organ is *different* from it) :—

TEXT (2515).

IF THE POTENCY IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE AUDITORY ORGAN, THEN THERE CAN BE NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO.—FURTHER, THE AUDITORY ORGAN CANNOT BE AN ACTIVE AGENT (IN THE BRINGING ABOUT OF THE COGNITION), AS THE COGNITION WOULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE *Potency*.—(2515)

COMMENTARY.

If the Potency be held to be something different from the thing (the Auditory Organ),—then there could be no such relationship as 'this is the Potency of that'; because what does not derive any benefit from another thing cannot be dependent upon this latter. And as a matter of fact, the Auditory Organ does not benefit the Potency; because what has been held to render help to the Potency is only the manifesting agency in the shape of Articulation.—If the Auditory Organ be regarded as helping the Potency, then that Potency (of the Auditory Organ), which would help the Potency, would be something different from the Auditory Organ; and so on and on, there would be an Infinite Regress. And in this way, as the Potencies themselves would accomplish all that is necessary, the effect (in the shape of the Cognition) would follow from the Potency, and the Auditory Organ would not be an active agent in bringing it about; and this would render it liable to be regarded as a *non-entity*.

If (in order to escape from the Infinite Regress) it be held that the Potency that helps the Potency is not anything different (from the Auditory Organ), —then why should there be any hostility against the first Potency itself?

Then again, there would be the contingency of the Potency being produced constantly; as its Cause, in the shape of the Auditory Organ, is eternal; and what does not derive any benefit from anything else could not be dependent upon auxiliaries.—(2515)

The Author now takes up the *third* alternative (suggested in the Commentary on *Text* 2513,—that 'the Potency is different-non-different' from the Auditory Organ):—

TEXT (2516).

THE OTHER ALTERNATIVE ALSO—UNDER WHICH THERE IS NEITHER DIFFERENCE NOR NON-DIFFERENCE—HAS ALREADY BEEN OVERTHROWN.—THUS WHEN THE 'EMBELLISHMENT OF THE AUDITORY ORGAN' IS PUT FORWARD AS THE EXPLANATION, IT MUST BE DUE TO THE FACT OF THE PERSON PROPOUNDING IT BEING NOT 'EMBELLISHED' (CULTURED).—(2516)

COMMENTARY.

'*Already overthrown*'—under the chapter on the '*Pudgala*'. The reason for it lies in the fact, that the same thing cannot be both affirmed and

denied. For instance, 'Difference' and 'Non-difference' are mutually exclusive; and the *presence* of one is always characterised by the *absence* of the other; when between two things—e.g. 'Existence' and 'Non-existence'—the nature of one cannot be affirmed without the denial of the other, that is, it can exist only when the other is absent;—and when two things are mutually exclusive, the absence of one implying the presence of the other and *vice versa*,—the affirmation of one must be concomitant with the denial of the other. Consequently when the 'Difference' (of the Potency from the Organ) is denied, it implies the affirmation of *Sameness* (Non-difference); and it cannot be right to deny this latter also at the same time; because in that case there may be affirmation of Difference also.—Such are the objections that may be pointed out against the view that there is *difference-non-difference* (between the Potency and the Auditory Organ).—(2516)

TEXTS (2517-2518).

BY THESE SAME ARGUMENTS MAY BE REJECTED THE VIEW THAT THERE IS EMBELLISHMENT OF THE *Object* AND OF BOTH.—FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE CAN BE NO ROOM FOR THE VIEW THAT THERE IS 'MANIFESTATION' OF WHAT IS *eternal*. AND FROM THIS IT ALSO FOLLOWS THAT THERE CAN BE NO ROOM FOR ANY DISTINCTIONS THAT ARE MADE ON THE BASIS OF SUCH 'MANIFESTATION',—SUCH DISTINCTIONS AS THOSE OF 'LONG', 'SHORT', 'ORDER OF SEQUENCE' AND SO FORTH.—(2517-2518)

COMMENTARY.

'*By these same arguments*'—i.e. by putting forward the alternatives regarding the capacity or otherwise to produce Cognitions.

'*From all this, etc. etc.*'—This sums up the argument.

'*Order of sequence, etc.*'—'Etc.' is meant to include the *ultra-long*, the '*Udātta*' accent and so forth.—(2517-2518)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2174, that—"There are some people according to whom the Word-Sound is apprehended by the Auditory Organ, when it is produced but not in actual contact with that Organ, etc. etc."

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (2519).

EVEN WHEN THE 'ABSENCE OF CONTACT' IS EQUALLY PRESENT IN ALL CASES, THE COGNITION OF ALL THINGS DOES NOT COME ABOUT, BECAUSE THE CAPACITY OF THINGS IS ALWAYS RESTRICTED; AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE IRON BEING ATTRACTED BY THE MAGNET.—(2519)

COMMENTARY.

Though there is 'absence of contact' in all things, yet there is no possibility of the apprehension of the antecedent object, because the capacity of things is always restricted; for instance, the piece of substance called 'Magnet' draws to itself the piece of Iron (which is not in contact with it); and yet it does not draw all other things which also are not in contact with it.—(2519)

In the following *Text*, the Author anticipates and answers the objection that has been taken by *Shaṅkarasvāmin* against the admissibility of the instance of the 'Magnet' just cited:—

TEXT (2520).

IF IT BE URGED THAT—"THERE IS ATTRACTION BY THE MAGNET ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONTACT (OF THE IRON) WITH THE LIGHT EMANATING FROM THE MAGNET",—THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT, AS NO SUCH LIGHT IS VISIBLE, HOW IS IT KNOWN THAT IT EXISTS?—(2520)

COMMENTARY.

Shaṅkarasvāmin has argued as follows:—"In the case of the Magnet, the attraction of the Iron is due to its being penetrated by the Light-rays emanating from the Magnet; for, if it were not so, then there would be attraction of all Iron-pieces in the world. Even though the Light emanating from the Magnet is not perceived in the manner of the Light emanating from the Lamp, yet it can be inferred from the fact that there is attraction even where the Iron is at some distance, if there is nothing between the Iron and the Magnet".

The answer to this is—'*As no such Light, etc. etc.*'—The phrase '*it is not visible*' denies the propriety of the Light being existent,—on the ground of its non-apprehension.—(2520)

As regards the *Reductio ad Absurdum* put forward by the assertion that "there would be attraction of all the Iron-pieces in the world",—the answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (2521).

WHY IS IT THAT THE SAID LIGHT DOES NOT ATTRACT PIECES OF WOOD AND OTHER THINGS WHICH COME INTO CONTACT WITH IT ?—IF IT IS SAID THAT "IT DOES NOT DO SO BECAUSE ITS CAPACITY IS RESTRICTED",—THEN THE SAME MAY BE SAID REGARDING THE CASE OF 'NON-CONTACT' ALSO.—(2521)

COMMENTARY.

The same contingency is equally possible under the view that there is actual contact :—Why is it that the Light emanating from the Magnet does not attract all those things, wood-pieces and the like, that happen to be in contact with it ?

If the answer is that—"The said contingency does not arise as the capacity of things is restricted",—then the same may be said under the view that there is no contact in such cases ; who has deprived things of their capacity,—by virtue of which the same is not admitted in this case ?

Hence it follows that the assumption of the invisible rays of Light is futile.—(2521)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka,* under *Text* 2175, that—"For them, *the absence of contact* being equally present in the case of distant and near sounds, the apprehension and non-apprehension by people far and near would be equally possible, and there could be no order of sequence".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (2522).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE APPREHENSION BY MEN FAR, MIDWAY AND NEAR IS NOT IN ANY ORDER OF SEQUENCE AT ALL ; AS IN ALL CASES THE COGNITION IS PRODUCED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE USE (UTTERANCE OF THE WORD-SOUND).—(2522)

COMMENTARY.

'Successive Apprehension' is not admitted, because the Cognitions of all men appear simultaneously.—(2522)

It has been argued under the same *Text* (2175) that—"the greater and lesser intensity of Sounds would not be possible".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (2523).

JUST AS ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCES IN THE SHAPE OF *Remoteness* AND *Nearness*, THE COLOUR OF THINGS IS SEEN INDISTINCTLY AND DISTINCTLY (RESPECTIVELY),—IN THE SAME MANNER THERE WOULD ALSO BE THE COGNITION OF LESSER AND GREATER INTENSITY OF THE SOUND.—(2523)

COMMENTARY.

Colour also is perceived without contact with the Eye and is not all-pervading,—and its perception is distinct or indistinct ; in the same manner in the case of Sound also, which also is not all-pervading and not in contact with the Ear, there would be Cognitions of greater or less intensity.

Objection :—" The other party does not admit of the perception of Colour without contact ; how then is it put forward as the Corroborative Instance ? "

Answer :—This does not affect our position. Though it is by mere words that the other party does not admit it, yet what is vouched for by proofs must be *admitted* by both parties.

" What is the proof that vouches for the idea in question (that there is perception without contact) ? "

The proof is provided by the fact that there is simultaneous perception of near and remote things. A thing that has movement gets at the nearer object quickly, and at the remoter object with some delay ; when for instance, one goes from one village to another. But in the case of the Branch of the tree and the Moon seen through it,—the perception of both is simultaneous, as soon as the Eyes are opened. From this it is deduced that the Eye is operative without actually getting into contact with the object perceived.

In connection with this subject, *Uddyotakara* argues as follows :—" Inasmuch as Cognitions are produced quickly, there can be no perception of the time taken ; hence the idea, that 'the several Cognitions appear in the manner of the piercing of the hundred petals of the Lotus '. is not true ".

This is not right. In this way, in the case of the two words '*sara*' and '*rasa*' also, there should be no recognition of the order in which the letters are heard ; the quick production of the perception being present here also ; and if that is so, then there should be no difference between the Cognition of the word '*sara*' and that of '*rasa*'. And as there is ' quick production ' in the case of all Cognitions, there would be no perception of any order of sequence at all.—This has been already thrashed out in detail before.

Again says *Uddyotakara* :—" Even if the Eye were operative without contact, the wall would have no power to obstruct it ; hence there would be no concealment of things. Nor would there be this phenomenon that what is remote is not seen while what is near is seen.—It might be argued that—' That object alone is seen which comes within range of the Eye, and what does not do so is not seen '.—But that is not so ; without some sort of connection, there can be no *coming within range*. Because what is this *coming within range*, apart from *being connected* ? The only difference

is that what I call 'connection' is called by you 'coming within range'; there is no other difference".

This is not right. What is called by us *coming within range* is *becoming the Cause*;—not *Connection*. Because when the Eye produces Cognitions, the *Object*—Colour, etc.—becomes its auxiliary, and hence called its 'objective'; and it is not called so because it comes into contact with it.—The purpose served by the aid provided by auxiliaries is of two kinds—(1) mutual benefit, e.g. between the Light-rays and the thing within cover,—and (2) serving the same purpose; e.g. when the man sees Colour immediately on opening his Eyes.—In both ways, the *Object* of the Cognition is so called because it is its peculiar Cause, and not because it is *connected* with it.

"This same restriction or specification of the *Cause* would not be possible without some *Connection*."

Not so; because the necessary restriction is secured by the capacity of the Cause itself. In fact when the Cause is produced out of its own Cause, it is produced exactly in the form in which only some of it becomes productive of the Cognition, not all; because the difference among all things is due to the difference in their Causes.—Just as under your view,—even though the Connection is equally present in both cases, why is it that the Eye apprehends the *Colour* only, not the Taste?—It might be argued that—"the Taste is not apprehended because it is not connected with the Eye".—Why should not the same Connection be present in the case of Taste also?—as the *locus* of both (Taste and Colour) is the same; and there is nothing to restrict the Connection (to Colour only),—whereby, even though residing in the same locus, the Eye comes up to the Colour only and not to the Taste, though this also is present at the same place,—and also it does not come up to the Colour also if it is very remote.

It might be urged that—"the restriction would be due to its own Cause".

This can be said also under the view that the Eye is operative *without contact*.—Enough of this discussion.—(2523)

The following *Text* anticipates and answers an objection from the other party:—

TEXT (2524).

"HOW CAN THERE BE A SINGLE OBJECTIVE BASIS FOR COGNITIONS WHICH APPEAR AS DIVERSE?"—IF THIS IS URGED, THEN [THE ANSWER IS THAT] THE SAME OBJECTION, AS AGAINST THE UPHOLDERS OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD, IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR ALSO.—(2524)

COMMENTARY.

"How can there be a single object for Cognition which appears as diverse?"

What the Opponent means is that in this way the Cognitions of Colour, Taste, etc. might be said to have one and the same objective basis.

The answer to this is as follows :—' *The same objection, etc. etc.*' ;— '*To Cognitions of Colours*'—i.e. to Cognitions envisaging Colour—this same objection is equally applicable.—How can there be a single objective basis for the distinct Cognitions of things far and near ?

All this objection is applicable to those who uphold the reality of the External World, who attribute the form to the *Object*, not to the *Cognition*. Those, however, who uphold the *Idea* alone,—i.e. the Idealists,—for them all Cognition is equally *objectless*, being self-cognised, and is produced in the *distinct* and other forms ; and hence to these Idealists, the objection does not apply.—Those upholders of the External World who attribute the form to the *Cognition* do not admit that there is absolute sameness of form between the Object and the Cognition ; so that there would be the same form, in certain aspects ; and hence there would be no incongruity in there being the same object for Cognitions appearing as diverse ; consequently, the objection would not be applicable to these also.—(2524)

Question :—" What proof then is there *against* the idea that the Word Sound is apprehended only *on contact* with the Auditory Organ,—and *in support of* the idea that it is apprehended *without such contact* ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (2525).

UNDER THE VIEW THAT THE PERCEPTION (OF SOUND) IS THROUGH CONTACT (WITH THE SENSE-ORGAN), THE COGNITION OF THE SOUND OF THUNDER COULD NOT BE IN THE INTERRUPTED FORM,—LIKE THAT OF THE FEATHER IN THE EAR.—(2525)

COMMENTARY.

'*Like the feather in the Ear*',—this is an instance *per dissimilarity*; and the '*vati*'-affix is added to the word ending in the Genitive ending. The meaning thus is—when a man is engaged in tickling the Ear with a feather, the Sound made by the feather is heard as continuous, without interruption ; in the same manner, when there is Sound of Thunder spreading all round like the filaments of the *Kadamba* flower, and it is heard on reaching the Ear,—then this hearing also should be continuous, not interrupted.—It cannot be right to say that there is illusion of *break* on account of the peculiarity of the substratum wherein the conjunction of its Cause subsists. Because there is no perception of such place, etc. ; and no Cognition ever appears which imposes forms which have never been cognised ; e.g. the Visual Perception does not impose the form of Taste.—(2525)

Having thus stated the proof *against* the view that Sound is heard on getting into contact with the Sense-organ,—the Author next states the proof *in support of* the view that the perception takes place without the said contact :—

TEXT (2526).

Because the Auditory Organ brings about the Cognition of Sound as interrupted, therefore, like the Mind, it must be regarded as operating without contact;—not otherwise, like the Skin (Tactile Organ).—(2526)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tat*'—Therefore.

'*Not otherwise, etc. etc.*'—This supplies the Corroborative Instance *for dissimilarity*.—In the case of the Tactile Organ (which operates by contact), the perception is *not interrupted*, and the same would have been the case with the Auditory Organ also (if this also operated through contact).—(2526)

In the following *Text*, the Author anticipates the objection that the Corroborative Instance—of the *Mind*—is one that is devoid of the Probandum,—and supplies the answer to it :—

TEXT (2527).

For those people who declare that "the Mind also is operative through contact",—there should not be any cognition of far off things in a single moment.—(2527)

COMMENTARY.

Uddyotakara, *Kumārila* and others put forward the following arguments in support of the sense-organs being operative by direct contact :—" (*a*) The Eye and the Ear must be regarded as operative by contact,—because they are external organs,—like the Olfactory Organ. The qualification 'External' is added in order to avoid the charge of being 'false' in view of the *Mind* (which is *not* operative by contact).—(*b*) The Eye and the Ear must be regarded as operative by contact,—because being organs, they do not apprehend things hidden and far off,—like the Olfactory Organ. The qualification 'being organs' has been added for the purpose of excluding the *object*.—(*c*) Colour and Sound must be regarded as cognisable by means of those external organs that are operative by contact,—because they are objects of external organs,—like Odour and Taste.—(*d*) the Cognitions of Colour and Sound must be regarded as having for their objective basis such objects as are cognisable by means of external organs operative by contact,—like the Cognitions of Odour and Taste ".

The objections against these arguments are set forth in the following :—

TEXT (2528).

THE REASON THAT IS PUT FORWARD, IN THE FORM 'BECAUSE THEY ARE EXTERNAL ORGANS',—IN SUPPORT OF THE VIEW THAT THE ORGANS IN QUESTION ARE OPERATIVE BY CONTACT,—IS 'FALLACIOUS' (INCONCLUSIVE); BECAUSE IT IS UNLIKE THEIR OTHER PROPERTIES AND HENCE THERE IS CONTRADICTION (INCOMPATIBILITY).—(2528)

COMMENTARY.

The meaning is clear.—(2528)

The following *Text* supplies the answer to what has been urged by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under the *Text* 2176, to the effect that—" Thus from the point of view of the Vedic Scholar, let us examine the matter, etc. etc.' :—

TEXTS (2529-2530).

THE IDEA OF THE AIR-CURRENTS BEING SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE CONJUNCTIONS AND DISJUNCTIONS HAS BEEN ALREADY DISCARDED BEFORE; AND INASMUCH AS THE AIR IS NOT-MOMENTARY (ACCORDING TO THE *Mīmāmsaka*), THEY CANNOT BE THE SAME AS THE CONJUNCTIONS AND DISJUNCTIONS. FOR THE SAME REASON, AS THERE ARE NO DISTINCTIONS IN IT, THERE CAN BE NO MOVEMENT OF IT, SPECIALLY BECAUSE IT HAS NO VELOCITY, AND HENCE CANNOT GO ALONG AS LONG AS THE VELOCITY LASTS. —(2529-2530)

COMMENTARY.

'*Before*'—under the examination of the 'Six Categories'.

Says the Opponent—" If they are not *different*, then they may be *non-different*, same ".

Answer :—'*Inasmuch as the Air, etc. etc.*'—The Air-currents themselves, produced as conjoined and disjoined, are spoken of as the 'non-different Conjunctions and Disjunctions'; and what are *non-momentary* cannot become conjoined with things, in succession,—as they are all of one and the same form.—(2529–2530)

It has been asserted by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2179, that—" Having reached the *Ākāsha* in the Auditory Organ, the Air imparts a certain capacity to that organ, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2531-2532)

IF, ON REACHING THE *Ākāsha* IN THE AUDITORY ORGAN, THE AIR IMPARTS A CERTAIN CAPACITY TO THE ORGAN,—THEN WHY SHOULD THERE BE NO COGNITION OF THE AIR WHEN THERE IS COGNITION OF THE SOUND,—JUST AS THERE IS OF THE STROKE OF THE WHIP (WHEN THE WHIP-STROKE IS ALSO COGNISED ALONG WITH THE SOUND OF THE WHIP)?—THE IDEA THAT —"THE COGNITION OF THE SOUND OBSTRUCTS THE SAID COGNITION (OF THE AIR)"— CANNOT BE RIGHT, FOR ONE WHO IS COGNISANT OF THE WHIP-STROKE AND ANOTHER AIR (AT THE SAME TIME).— (2531-2532)

COMMENTARY.

There are two views possible in this connection—(1) that the Air is perceptible and (2) that it is not-perceptible.

Under the former view, at the time that Sound is cognised, there should be cognition of the Air also, as in the case of the whip-stroke.

It might be argued that—"as two cognitions cannot appear simultaneously, the cognition of Sound obstructs the cognition of the Air".

This cannot be right—in the mouth of one who is cognisant of the whip-stroke and the other Air, at the time that the Sound is cognised. Just as the 'Other Air' set up by the fan, and the 'whip-stroke' are both perceived at the time that the Sound is heard,—in the same manner there should be the perception of the touch of the Air reaching the auditory organ.

What this shows is that the assertion that there cannot be simultaneous cognitions is contrary to a directly perceived fact.—(2531–2532)

It has been explained already that the idea of simultaneous cognitions is due to the illusion caused by the quickness with which the cognitions appear. It may be that in the case of Cognitions appearing in succession there may be an illusion of simultaneity due to the quickness with which they appear; but in the present discussion, the said explanation is of no use; hence it is nothing.—This is what is asserted in the following:—

TEXT (2533).

EVEN THOUGH IN SOME CASES, THERE MAY BE ILLUSION OF SIMULTANEITY DUE TO QUICKNESS OF APPEARANCE,—YET THAT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PRESENT CONTEXT; BECAUSE HERE THE AIR IS NOT COGNISED AT ALL.—(2533)

COMMENTARY.

It may be that, on account of the quickness in the appearance of the Cognitions, there is an illusion of simultaneity. But this cannot apply to

the case where there is no perception of a thing which is quite perceptible. For instance, in the present context, there is absolutely no cognition—either successive or simultaneous—of the Air that has reached the regions of the Auditory Organ. Hence the explanation that " the illusion of simultaneity of Cognitions is due to the quickness with which they appear " can have no bearing on the present discussion ; i.e. it should be ignored.—(2533)

The following text takes up the *second* alternative view (suggested in the commentary on *Text* 2531,—that *the Air is not perceptible*) :—

TEXT (2534).

IF THE AIR (REACHING THE EAR) IS BEYOND THE SENSES (IMPERCEPTIBLE), AS ASSERTED BY THE FOLLOWERS OF *Kaṇāda*, AND ALSO BY YOURSELVES,—THEN, TO WHAT CAN ITS *amenability to Touch* BE DUE, WHICH HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF IN THE *Bhāṣya* ?—(2534)

COMMENTARY.

'*Followers of Kaṇāda*'—the *Vaishēṣikas* ; according to whom Air is indicated by (inferred from) Sound.

The author of your own *Bhāṣya*, Shabara has also declared that " when the aerial Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the imperceptible Air proceed from the Ear-drum, they are not perceived ". (Mī. Sū. 1. 1. 13.)

The objection to this view is set forth in the words—'*To what can its amenability to Touch be due ?*'—'*Spṛṣṭyāpti*' is the '*āpti*'—possibility of '*spṛṣṭi*'—touch. This is what the author of your Bhāṣya has spoken of ; how is that ? As against the view of the author of the *Shikṣā*, that 'the Air becomes the Sound ', the author of the *Bhāṣya* (*Shabara*) has said—(under Sū. 1. 1. 22) as follows—" If the Word-Sound were the product of Air, then it could only be Air in a particular shape ; as a matter of fact, however, we do not recognise any particle of Air in the constitution of the Word-Sound, in the manner in which we recognise the particles of yarn in the constitution of the Cloth ; therefore the Word-Sound cannot be a product of Air ;—if the Word-Sound were the product of Air, then we could perceive it with our tactile organ (as we perceive Air) ; and yet we do not feel by touch any air-particles in the Word-Sound ".—(*Translation*, p. 41.)—(2534)

Even granting (for the sake of argument) that Air is beyond the senses, imperceptible,—the Author proceeds to point out defects in the Opponent's arguments :—

TEXT (2535).

OR, THE AIR IN QUESTION MAY BE BEYOND THE SENSES; EVEN SO, THERE WOULD BE COGNITION OF THE TANGIBLE (AIR),—WHICH IS NEITHER HOT NOR COLD,—RESTING ON THE VARIOUS SUBSTANCES THAT MAY BE IN CONTACT WITH IT; JUST AS THERE IS OF OTHER AIRS.—(2535)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tadyogaḥ*'—contact with the different air-currents;—that which has this contact is '*tattadyogin*',—i.e. the substances known as 'Water', 'Fire' and 'Earth';—and that which is '*gata*'—resting, residing in these, is '*tattadyogigata*';—i.e. the Air resting on Water, Fire and Earth.—The compounding is in accordance with Pāṇini's *Sūtra* '*Dvitīyā—shritā,* etc. etc.'—This compound qualifies '*sprastavya*'—the tangible Air;—which is of a nature that is different from *hot* and *cold*.—There should be '*vit*'—Cognition—of the said Air.—'*Just as there is of other Airs*'—i.e. of Air other than that within the body of the Speaker, which Air is held (by the Opponent) to be the *manifester* of the particular Word-Sound.—The '*vati*'-affix is added to the word ending in the Locative.

What is meant is that there would be cognition of the Air in question, just as there is of the air during winter, carrying with it the coolness of the snows,—of that during summer, when all the quarters are filled with the burning rays of the sun,—of that during the season which is neither hot nor cold, which is yet felt by the touch to be cool or warm.—(2535)

In the following *Text*, the Author anticipates and refutes the Opponent's answer:—

TEXTS (2536-2537).

IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT "THERE IS NO COGNITION OF THE AIR IN QUESTION BECAUSE IT IS NOT IN CONTACT WITH THE TYMPANUM".—BUT, THEN, HOW IS IT KNOWN THAT IT HAS REACHED THE *Ākāsha* IN THE EAR?—FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT ALL THIS ASSUMPTION BY THE VEDIC SCHOLAR IS ABSOLUTELY BASELESS; IT IS NOT AGREEABLE TO THE LEARNED, AND SHINES ONLY AMONG VEDIC SCHOLARS.—(2536-2537)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tasya*'—of the Air.

'*Ayogaḥ*'—non-contact,—'with the tympanum'.

The rest is clear.—(2536-2537)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2198, that—" or, the idea that should be entertained is that the Auditory Organ consists of *space*, which idea would be in accordance with the Veda ".

As this is open to the same objections, the Author applies them to that view, in the following :—

TEXT (2538).

ALL THOSE OBJECTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN URGED AGAINST THOSE WHO HOLD *Ākāsha* TO BE *without parts*, SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO THAT VIEW ALSO UNDER WHICH THE AUDITORY ORGAN CONSISTS OF THE ONE INDIVISIBLE *Space*.—(2538)

COMMENTARY.

The view that the Auditory Organ consists of the indivisible Space, is open to all those objections—the futility of embellishment, the impossibility of embellishment, etc.—that have been urged against the view that it consists of the indivisible *Ākāsha*. Hence it is not necessary to state the objections against this other view separately.—(2538)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2185, that—" Even if the Auditory Organ were one and all-pervading, the Embellishment due to Articulation could affect only the material substratum of that organ, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2539–2544).

UNDER THE VIEW THAT *Ākāsha* IS ONE AND ALL-PERVADING, THERE CAN BE NO SUCH DIVISION AS THAT THE ONE IS THE SUBSTRATUM OF THE EMBELLISHED ORGAN AND THE OTHER IS NOT SO ; BECAUSE *Ākāsha* IS ONE (AND INDIVISIBLE).—IF THE AUDITORY ORGAN CONSISTS OF THE ONE *Ākāsha*, THEN IT CANNOT HAVE ITS TYMPANUM 'UN-EMBELLISHED '. CONSEQUENTLY, ANY RESTRICTION IN THE EMBELLISHMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE SUBSTRATUM CANNOT STAND. CONSEQUENTLY, WHEN THE ORGAN HAS SECURED THE EMBELLISHMENT IN ONE SUBSTRATUM, IT SHOULD BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION IN THE BODIES OF ALL MEN ;—ACCORDING TO THOSE WHO DECLARE THE ORGAN TO BE ONE ONLY. YOU MAY HOLD THAT COGNITIONS (SENSATIONS) APPEAR IN THE VARIOUS PARTS OF THE BODIES OF MEN ; BUT ACCORDING TO YOU, THERE CAN BE NO DIVERSITY OF PLACE FOR THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR, IN RELATION TO *Ākāsha* WHICH IS *one* ONLY.—THE OTHER PARTY MIGHT SAY—" ACCORDING TO US, THE SOUL IS WITHOUT PARTS, INDIVISIBLE, AND IT IS IN ITS ENTIRETY

THAT IT COGNISES THINGS, AND YET IT ACTUALLY APPREHENDS IT IN THE BODY ONLY";—BUT EVEN WITH THIS, THE VIEW IS OPEN TO OBJECTION: THERE WOULD, IN THIS CASE, BE NO SUCH DISTINCTIONS AS THAT OF THE 'DEAF' AND THE LIKE, AND FOR THE SAME REASON IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR ONE COGNITION NOT TO BE APPREHENDED BY ANOTHER SOUL; AS THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO.—(2539–2544)

COMMENTARY.

'*Anyat*'—the substratum of the unembellished organ.

Such distinction is not possible in the case of what is without parts, indivisible. If there were, it would have to be regarded as with parts, divisible.—If the distinction were merely *assumed* (not real), then there would be an incompatibility regarding its being *with* and also *without* effective action; because effective actions never follow in the wake of mere assumptions; they are always related to real entities. Consequently, if the organ has become embellished in one substratum, it acquires thereby the capacity to bring about the cognition of things; so that in another substratum also, as the organ would really be the same, it would be *embellished* everywhere, and hence capable of bringing about the Cognition of things.

Thus what has been said (in *Text* 2542) regarding "the Cognitions appearing in the several parts of the bodies of men", becomes set aside; because there can be no real division in what is *one* only.—This is what is shown in the words '*Puṁsām, etc. etc.*'

'*Pradhānavaidēshyam*'.—'*Pradhāna*', 'Principal Factor', stands for the *Body*;—'*Vaidēshya*'—residence in different parts of *Ākāsha.*

'*Ēvamuktēpi, etc.*'—because there can be no division for what is *one* only.

'*Avyavasthānam*'—impossibility of such distinctions.—(2539–2544)

The following *Text* shows how there is no difference between the two:—

TEXT (2545).

WHEN IT CANNOT ABANDON ITS PREVIOUS FORM, AND WHEN NO NEW FEATURES CAN APPEAR IN IT,—WHY CANNOT THE AUDITORY ORGAN COME WITHIN RANGE OF THE EXPERIENCE OF ANOTHER.—(2545)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—"there would be differences, by reason of the Auditory Organ being influenced by Merit and Demerit".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (2546).

INASMUCH AS IT IS ETERNAL, INDEPENDENT,—THE *Akāshic Auditory Organ* CANNOT BE INFLUENCED BY MERIT AND DEMERIT; AND HENCE SHOULD NOT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE EXPERIENCE OF ANY ONE AT ALL.—(2546)

COMMENTARY.

'Being eternal' is the reason for 'being independent' and also for 'being not influenced by Merit and Demerit'.—(2546)

Question :—"Even though it is independent, why cannot it be influenced (by Merit and Demerit)?"

Answer :—

TEXT (2547).

THE *Ākāsha* IS NEVER AFFECTED BY MERIT AND DEMERIT; BEING ETERNAL, IT CAN NEVER BE AN EFFECT; WHAT SORT OF 'INFLUENCE' THEN CAN THERE BE OVER IT?—(2547)

COMMENTARY.

'Being independent' implies that it is not an *effect*; and what is not an *effect* cannot be influenced or affected by anything; e.g. the Hare's Horn, or the 'Unconscious Destruction' of things;—and the Auditory Organ is not an *effect*;—hence there is apprehension of a character contrary to the wider term.

'*Being eternal*' sets aside the 'inadmissibility' of the Reason:—'*not being an effect, etc. etc.*' sets aside its 'inconclusiveness'.—(2547)

Says the Opponent:—"It is found that even what is not an effect is influenced by things: for instance, the Auditory Organ, which was not within range of one's experience before (in the case of the deaf) comes within its range, through the influence of medicines and charms. Thus your Reason becomes Inconclusive".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2548).

HOW COULD THE AUDITORY ORGAN COME WITHIN THE RANGE OF ONE'S EXPERIENCE, THROUGH THE INFLUENCE OF CHARMS AND MEDICINES, ETC.? BEING ETERNAL, IT CANNOT DERIVE ANY PECULIARITIES FROM THESE.—(2548)

COMMENTARY.

'*Medicines, etc.*'—'*etc.*' includes scratchings, operations.

'*How could it, etc.*'—i.e. if, even so, it did not have the character of an *effect*.

"Even if it is not an Effect, there would be *influencing* by the mere production of peculiarities."

Answer :—' Being eternal, etc. etc.'—(2548)

[Says the other party]—" If such is the case, then the substratum being not-eternal, the embellishment could be of that, and through that the Auditory Organ also, though eternal, would come to be influenced ".

This is the idea set forth and answered in the following :—

TEXT (2549).

" EVEN THOUGH THE SUBSTRATUM IS *not-eternal*, ITS *non-eternality* WOULD NOT BE OF THE NATURE OF *momentariness* " ;—IF THIS IS URGED, THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT), INASMUCH AS NO ADDITIONAL PROPERTIES COULD BE PRODUCED IN IT, *Deafness*, ETC. WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE.—(2549)

COMMENTARY.

'*If it is non-eternal*'—as its destruction would be sure to come in course of time,—till that time, it would continue to have one and the same form ; and hence, as in the eternal thing, so here also no additional properties would appear in it ; how then, could there be any ' embellishment ' of it ?—(2549) .

Even granting that additional qualities might appear,—the author points out that even so the theory is open to objection :—

TEXTS (2550-2551).

OR, THE ADDITIONAL PROPERTY MAY BE PRODUCED IN THE ORGAN ; BUT IN NO CASE COULD IT EXIST IN THE *Ākāsha* ; NOR COULD IT BE DUE TO ITS CONNECTION WITH ITS RECEPTACLE ; BECAUSE IT IS ETERNAL AND INDEPENDENT. HENCE, DEAFNESS, ETC. COULD NOT COME ABOUT THROUGH THAT EITHER.— EVEN IF *Ākāsha* WERE WITH PARTS AND *divisible*, THE ARGUMENTS WOULD APPLY TO IT, ON THE GROUND OF ITS *eternality*.— (2550-2551)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ēṣa*', '*it*'—stands for the *additional property*.

" Even if it does not exist there, it may come to it on account of its connection with its receptacle ".

It could not be due to its connection with its Receptacle.

As regards the argument that *Ākāsha* is not without parts,—the answer is that if the *divisible Ākāsha* is held to be eternal, then all the objections

that have been urged against the view that 'the *indivisible* Ākāsha is eternal', become applicable. This is what is meant by the words—'*Even if Ākāsha were divisible, etc. etc.*'—(2550-2551)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka,* in *Text* 2192, that—"Just as the village-lord, removed from the lordship, though continuing to live in the village, does not enjoy the privileges of the Lordship, similarly the soul of the deaf man deprived of the auditory organ, though continuing to dwell in the body, does not enjoy the experience of hearing sounds".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2552-2553).

EVEN FOR YOU, THIS 'REMOVAL FROM THE OWNERSHIP' CANNOT BE POSSIBLE,—UNLESS THE OWNERSHIP IS MOMENTARY. WHAT ADDITIONAL PROPERTY HAS BEEN PRODUCED IN IT, BY VIRTUE OF WHICH IT IS REMOVED FROM THE OWNERSHIP AND DOES NOT ENJOY THE SAME EXPERIENCE AGAIN ?—(2552-2553)

COMMENTARY.

This is quite easy.—(2552-2553)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka,* under *Text* 2194, that—"The vibrating air-particles, which are the manifesters, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2554–2558).

THUS THEN, THERE IS NO 'EMBELLISHMENT' POSSIBLE, EITHER IN THE AUDITORY ORGAN OR IN THE WORD-SOUND ; BECAUSE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE EMBELLISHMENT TO BE EITHER DIFFERENT OR NON-DIFFERENT (FROM THEM). FOR INSTANCE, IF THE EMBELLISHMENT IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE AUDITORY ORGAN AND THE SOUND, THEN THESE TWO CANNOT BE REGARDED AS 'EMBELLISHED' ; AS THESE WOULD HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EMBELLISHMENT ; BECAUSE BETWEEN TWO DIFFERENT THINGS, THE ONLY RELATIONSHIP POSSIBLE IS THE *Causal* ONE ; AND IF THIS RELATIONSHIP WERE THERE, THEN THE EMBELLISHMENT WOULD BE THERE AT ALL TIMES, AS ITS CAUSE WOULD BE THERE AT ALL TIMES.—EVEN UNDER THE VIEW THAT THE EMBELLISHMENT IS *not* SOMETHING DIFFERENT,—IT WOULD BE ETERNAL, LIKE THE AUDITORY

ORGAN AND THE SOUND; AND HENCE IT COULD NOT BE PRODUCED BY ANYTHING; CONSEQUENTLY THE COGNITION (DUE TO THE EMBELLISHMENT) WOULD BE EVERLASTING.—BECAUSE ALL THIS IS SO, THEREFORE ANY REGULATION OR RESTRICTION OF THE CAPACITY OF THE AIR-CURRENTS, ETC. CANNOT BE POSSIBLE; AND WHEN WHAT IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IS NOT PRESENT, THE CAPACITY TO ACCOMPLISH IT CAN BE OF NO USE.—(2554–2558)

COMMENTARY.

'*Yadā*'—*Because*—'*Evam*'—'Thus,—in the manner just described, this '*because*' has to be construed with '*tat*' 'therefore, etc. etc.' of *Text* 2558.

How this embellishment is not possible is explained in detail, in the words—'*Because it is not possible for the embellishment, etc. etc.*'—What is meant is as follows—When the embellishment comes, it could be either *different* or *non-different* (from the thing embellished); these are the only two possibilities, as the matter does not admit of a third alternative.

In the former case,—i.e. if it is *different*,—there could be no 'embellishment' of the auditory organ or of the Word-Sound; because what is brought about is different; and when the Jar is brought about, it is not the Cloth that is embellished. Nor can there be any relationship between the Embellishment and the said two (Auditory Organ and the Word-sound); by virtue of which by the bringing about of the Embellishment, which is their relative, those two could become embellished.—Because, as it has been held to be different, the relationship of the Embellishment with the Auditory Organ or the Word-Sound could not be of the nature of 'identity'; in fact whenever there is a relationship between two different things, it can be only of the nature of *Cause and Effect*; as there could be no help in any other way. If there were this relation of *Cause and Effect* between the Embellishment and the other two (Auditory Organ and Word-Sound),—the Embellishment would be there for all time, as its cause, in the shape of the Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound, would be there all the time (both of these being eternal, *ex hypothesi*).

Under the second alternative (that the Embellishment is *not different* from the Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound), the difficulty is that—'*Even under the view, etc. etc.*'—'*Tadvat*'—Like the Auditory Organ and the Word-Sound.—'*Asau*'—the Embellishment;—and hence, as it would be eternal, the Embellishment could not be produced or brought about by anything.

Thus, under the view that Cognitions are produced by the Embellishment, every cognition would be eternal. This is the difficulty in the Embellishment being eternal.

The whole argument is summed up in the words—'*Therefore any regulation or restriction, etc. etc.*'—(2554–2558)

The following *Texts* set forth the arguments in support of the view that *Word-Sound* is *not-eternal*.

TEXTS (2559-2560).

THUS,—INASMUCH AS NO 'MANIFESTATION' (OF THE WORD-SOUND) IS POSSIBLE,—*the Cognition of the Word-Sound* MUST BE REGARDED AS HAVING THIS CHARACTER THAT IT IS INVARIABLY CONCOMITANT WITH THE BIRTH (COMING INTO EXISTENCE) OF WHAT IS APPREHENDED BY IT,—LIKE THE COGNITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL JAR AND SUCH THINGS. —CONSEQUENTLY, BOTH 'PRODUCING' AND 'MANIFESTING',—AS BROUGHT ABOUT BY *effort* AND *articulation*,—WILL HAVE THE DIVERSITY OF THEIR CAPACITY DETERMINED BY PRESUMPTION BASED UPON THE NATURE OF THE EFFECTS PRODUCED BY THEM.—(2559-2560)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—What is occasional must be produced by a cause which also has had its production,—as for example, the cognition of the individual Jar;—and the Cognition of the Word-Sound is occasional; hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things.

The Reason cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible', because as a matter of fact, the said cognition is not found to appear at all times.—Nor can it be regarded as 'inconclusive'; as the idea of Sound being 'manifested' has been already discarded.—Nor again can it be regarded as 'contradictory'; because it is found to be present in all places where the Probandum is present.

'*Idam-phalam*' is a compound, meaning—'that which has *idam*'—this, i.e. being invariably concomitant with the birth of what is apprehended by it—for its '*phalam*', net gain, character.

The rest is easily understood.—(2559-2560)

The objections against the view that the Auditory Organ consists of *Space* have been already stated before; hence they are not stated again; the Author only reminds the reader of what has been said before :—

TEXT (2561).

ALL THOSE REASONS THAT GO TO INVALIDATE THE VIEW THAT THE AUDITORY ORGAN IS PART OF *Ākāsha*, SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY INTELLIGENT MEN TO APPLY ALSO TO THE VIEW THAT IT IS PART OF *Space*.—(2561)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, in *Text* 2204, that—"Even if the Embellishment pertains to the *Object*, it would affect that one object only, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2562).

THE ASSERTION THAT—"IF THE EMBELLISHMENT PERTAINS TO THE OBJECT, IT WOULD AFFECT THAT ONE OBJECT ONLY"—CANNOT BE RIGHT; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN DISCARDED; ALSO BECAUSE THE CAPACITY OF THINGS IS LIMITED. —HENCE THERE CANNOT BE EMBELLISHMENT OF THE OBJECT. —(2562)

COMMENTARY.

'*Na*'—That is, it *cannot* be right to assert that "if the Embellishment pertains to the Object it would affect that one object only".

"Why?"

'*Because it has been discarded*'—i.e. because the Embellishment itself has been rejected.—That is, the Embellishment, as different and as not-different, has been already discarded.

For the following reason also there can be no Embellishment of the Object.

"What reason?"

Because of the limitations of the capacity of things.—which are going to be pointed out.

After '*Niyatēḥ*' a '*Cha*' is understood; hence the meaning comes to be that—*also* because of the limitations of the capacity of things, there cannot be an Embellishment of the Object.—(2562)

The said 'limitation on the capacity of things' is illustrated—

TEXTS (2563-2564).

IF THE WORD-SOUND DID NOT POSSESS THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE COGNITIONS, THEN IT COULD NEVER BE COGNISED BY ANYONE ANYWHERE; AS IT COULD NOT HAVE ANY BEARING UPON ITS COGNITION.—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, IT DID POSSESS THE CAPACITY, THEN IT WOULD BE COGNISED BY ALL MEN, AT ALL TIMES AND AT ALL PLACES; AS IT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE CAUSE OF THAT COGNITION.—(2563-2564)

COMMENTARY.

By its very nature, the Word-Sound should be either *incapable* or *capable* of producing its cognition. These are the only two alternatives possible.—In the former case—i.e. if it is incapable—the Word-Sound would never be cognised by any one. In the latter case, it would be cognised by all men at all times; because it would always be of the same form.

From this it follows that the Embellishment can have no capacity at all.—(2563-2564)

The following might be argued—" Even if the Word-Sound had the capacity to bring about its cognition, it might not bring it about on account of forces to the contrary; similarly, even if it did not have the capacity, it could have the capacity imparted to it by auxiliary forces and thereby bring about the cognition ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2565).

IF THE WORD-SOUND IS, BY ITS VERY NATURE, DEFINITELY CAPABLE OR INCAPABLE,—WHAT HOSTILE OR HELPFUL FORCE COULD SET IT ASIDE ?—(2565)

COMMENTARY.

Unless a thing sets aside, or brings about, the nature of a thing, it cannot be regarded as hostile or helpful; otherwise there would be incongruities. And if the said *setting aside* or *bringing about* were admitted, the Word-Sound would lose its eternal character.—(2565)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, in *Text* 2205, that " Just as the Word-Sound, though produced and appearing equally with regard to all men, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2566-2567).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHEN THE WORD-SOUND APPEARS, IT IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING ITS COGNITION IN SOME PERSONS ONLY : HENCE WHEN IT IS PRODUCED, IT IS NOT COGNISED BY ALL MEN.—OR, HOW COULD IT BE THAT THE SOUND IS HEARD ONLY BY THOSE MEN IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO WHOM IT IS EMBELLISHED BY ARTICULATIONS,—AND NOT BY THOSE AT A DISTANCE ?—(2566-2567)

COMMENTARY.

What has been urged does not affect the view that *Word-Sounds* are *produced* (not eternal). Because whenever a Word-Sound is produced by its cause, it is produced as capable of bringing about its cognition under certain limitations: and it is on account of this that it is not heard by all men at all times.

The view, however, that the Sound is (eternal and) is only *manifested*,—is open to the said objection,—even if the Embellishment is possible. This is what is shown by the sentence beginning with '*or*'.

The objection that 'there should be hearing of far-off sound also' is applicable, not only to the view that the Word-Sound is endowed, by its very nature, with the capacity to produce its cognition,—but it is also applicable to the view that there is Embellishment (of the Word-Sound). Hence this has been set forth as another alternative view— '*Why it is not heard by persons at a distance ?*'—' is heard ' is to be construed here. What is meant is that it should certainly be heard.—(2566-2567)

The same idea is further clarified :—

TEXT (2568).

EVEN IN CASES OF PROXIMITY, THE EMBELLISHMENT IS SUPPOSED TO BE THE CAUSE (OF THE COGNITION) ; AND THIS EMBELLISHMENT WOULD BE EQUALLY THERE FOR PERSONS AT A DISTANCE ALSO.—(2568)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṁsaka*, in *Text* 2270, that—" Inasmuch as the idea of the Word-Sound being *produced* has been rejected, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2569-2570).

IF THE IDEA IS THAT PARTICULAR EMBELLISHMENTS ARE PRODUCED BY ARTICULATIONS, THEN IN THAT CASE, NO ONE CAN DENY THE IDEA OF THE SOUND BEING *produced*. BECAUSE THE PARTICULAR EMBELLISHMENT IS NOT SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE WORD-SOUND ; OTHERWISE THE WORD-SOUND WOULD BE INCOGNISABLE. CONSEQUENTLY THE WORD-SOUND ALSO SHOULD BE REGARDED AS *produced*.—(2569-2570)

COMMENTARY.

If the Embellishment is something that is *produced*, then there should be *production* of the Word-Sound also ; because it is not different from the Embellishment.—In case it is different, then, as the Cognition would be brought about by the Embellishment itself, the Word-Sound would not be an active agent in it ; and hence it would not be apprehended by that Cognition. For these reasons it should be admitted that the Word-Sound also is *produced*.—(2569-2570)

The following might be urged—" Just as for you, the Buddhist, the Word-Sound is produced as capable of bringing about a particular restricted

cognition,—so also for us, there is restriction in regard to the Embellishment also ; whereby the Sound is not heard by people at a distance ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2571).

HAVING BECOME EMBELLISHED ONCE, IF THE WORD-SOUND DOES NOT ABANDON THAT (EMBELLISHED) FORM, ON ACCOUNT OF ITS EVANESCENT CHARACTER,—THEN IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE HEARD FOR ALL TIME.—
(2571)

COMMENTARY.

Even if the idea be that—" The Word-Sound that is embellished is one that is capable of bringing about the cognition within the 'chain' of certain particular persons only "—there would be objections against it. For instance, if the Sound does not abandon the form which is capable of bringing about the cognition, then its cognition should continue to be produced for all time. If it abandons it, then it becomes evanescent, not eternal.—Hence it must be admitted that it is *produced*.—(2571)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka* in *Text* 2209, that—" As regards the view that there is embellishment of both, the assertion that it is open to both sets of objections is futile, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2572).

EVEN AS REGARDS THE VIEW THAT THERE IS EMBELLISHMENT OF BOTH, THE ASSERTION THAT IT IS OPEN TO BOTH SETS OF OBJECTIONS IS QUITE TRUE ; BECAUSE DEFICIENCY IS NOT IN ONE OF THE TWO ONLY ; AS THE PREVIOUS ONE CONTINUES.
—(2572)

COMMENTARY.

For those who hold the view that the Word-Sound is *produced*, it is possible that one or the other should be deficient ;—it is not possible for those who hold that there is *Embellishment* (not *production*) ; as for them, the previous embellished form would continue to exist.—(2572)

The said 'continuity' is further clarified.—

TEXT (2573).

THE AUDITORY ORGAN AND THE LETTER-SOUNDS THAT HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY EMBELLISHED BY THE MANIFESTERS CANNOT BECOME DESTROYED,—BECAUSE IF THEY DID, THEY WOULD BE NON-ETERNAL; AND CONSEQUENTLY THEY WOULD BE HEARD AT ALL TIMES.—(2573)

COMMENTARY.

'*Chyutiprāpteḥ*'—because of liability to become non-eternal. Otherwise, there would be Renunciation of Proposition (on your part).

'*Sarva-shrutiḥ*'—Hearing *at all times.*—not *of* all; as in the latter case, the compound would fall under the prohibition contained in Pāṇini's *Sūtra* '*Karmaṇi cha*'.—(2573)

The following might be urged—"It is of only a few limited number of persons whose Organ and Letter-Sounds would be embellished and fit for audition, and hence the Sound could not be heard by all men".

But in that case, there would be no hearing by those men who were going to hear other Letter-Sounds.

This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXT (2574).

IF THE EMBELLISHED ORGAN AND LETTER-SOUNDS WERE CAPABLE OF HEARING BY A FEW LIMITED PERSONS, THEN THERE WOULD BE NO HEARING FOR OTHER PERSONS WHO WOULD BE GOING TO HEAR THE SAME LETTER-SOUNDS.—(2574)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*niyatashrutiyogyau*' is to be explained as '*shruti-yogyau*'—capable of hearing—'*niyatānām puṁsām*'—by a few limited persons.

'*Anyavarṇa, etc.*'—This may be taken as 'other persons who would be going to hear that same sound',—or as 'persons who would be going to hear other sounds'.—(2574)

The following might be urged—"For the benefit of those other persons who would be going to hear the same sound, there would be another embellishment of the Auditory Organ and the Letter-Sound".

The following *Text* anticipates and answers this argument :—

TEXT (2575).

IF IT BE SAID THAT—"THE ORGAN AND THE LETTER-SOUND ARE EMBELLISHED AGAIN, AND ARE FIT FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE COGNITION OF THAT SOUND BY OTHER PERSONS",—THEN ALSO THERE WOULD BE CONTINUATION OF THE SAME ORGAN AND SOUND, AND HENCE OF THE *hearing* ALSO OF THE SAME SOUND AND BY THE SAME PERSON.—(2575)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*tadvarṇa, etc.*' is to be expounded as—fit for the *vijñāna*—cognition—of those Sounds by those persons;—"which Letter-Sounds?"—those that are heard by the other hearers;—and the 'persons' are the 'hearers of those sounds'.

'*Tayorēva*'—i.e. the Organ and Letter-Sound embellished previously.

'*Tayorapi*'—of the previous Person and Letter-Sound.

What is meant is that, when the Letters—*ka* and the rest—are heard later on by other persons, they should be heard exactly as they had been heard by the previous persons;—because their previous character would still continue.—(2575)

The following *Text* shows that if there is no such continuation as has been pointed out, then they become non-eternal:—

TEXT (2576).

IF THESE OTHER ORGAN AND LETTER-SOUND ARE DISTINCT (FROM THOSE EMBELLISHED BEFORE),—THEN WHY DOES NOT THE HOPE OF THESE BEING ETERNAL BECOME ENTIRELY BASELESS?—(2576)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(2576)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, in *Text* 2210, that—"Though the Sun is *one*, yet it is seen, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2577).

In the Water and other reflecting substances, it is not the same Sun seen in various forms; because the cognitions that are there all pertain to the reflected images, and are entirely devoid of any objective basis.—(2577)

COMMENTARY.

It has already been explained before that all wrong cognitions are, without exception, devoid of any objective basis; still it is explained again, in the following *Text*, in connection with the cognitions of the reflected images,—be they regarded as (*a*) *with* or (*b*) *without* form.—First the Author takes up the former view (that the Reflected Image *has a* form):—

TEXTS (2578–2582).

Even under your view, all Cognitions are *formless*, and it is only the external thing that is held to be *with form*. The Reflected Image that is seen is seen within the Water; and yet the Sun existing in the sky is not there in the Water.—"How is it then that it appears as if in the Water?"—It is through delusion, and hence it is that it is clearly devoid of an objective basis; because it has no connection with any object with that form.—If it is urged that "it is the same Sun that is perceived otherwise",—this would be another excellent assertion—the *same* and yet *otherwise*.—But in this way, every Cognition would apprehend everything. It would be the Cognition of the same Sun only if it were seen exactly as it is; when however, it is actually perceived in another form, how could it be the perception of the same Sun?—(2578–2582)

COMMENTARY.

For you, the *Mīmāmsaka*, Cognitions are *formless*, and it is the external object that is *with form*. Hence what is seen in the water cannot be the form of the Cognition; because forms are held to belong to external things only.—Nor is the Reflected Image held to be an entirely different thing; as in that case, it would not be a case of the perception of the Sun at all.—Nor does the Sun itself enter the water, by virtue of which it could appear there (as the Reflected Image); because it remains in the regions of *Ākāsha*—If it be asserted that—"it is through illusion that it appears in the water",—in that case, the Cognition would not have the Sun for its objective basis; because the form within the water does not belong to the Sun.—From all this it follows that the form that belongs to the object (Sun) does not figure in the

Cognition; and hence having no connection with that form, the said Cognition is clearly baseless (without an objective basis).

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When an Object has a form that does not figure in a Cognition, that Object cannot be the objective basis of that Cognition;—e.g. Colour cannot be the objective basis of Auditory Cognition;—the Sun does not have the form that figures in the Cognition of the Reflected Image;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character (which implies the absence of the less wide character).—The Reason here adduced cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible'; because in reality the Sun does not have the form that is within the water.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as 'Inconclusive'; as that would lead to incongruities; as in this way anything could be the objective basis of any Cognition.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as 'Contradictory'; as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is present.

It might be argued that—"It is the same Sun that is seen in the water, only it appears otherwise, on account of the difference in its position, and consequently, the Buddhist's Reason is 'Inadmissible'".

Who, except an audacious logician like yourself, could make such an assertion as 'it is the *same*—and *otherwise*'. Because the assertion 'it is the same' *affirms* that it is of the same form, and the assertion that 'it is otherwise' *denies* that it has the same form; how then could these two mutual contraries—*Affirmation* and *Denial*—appertain to the same thing (Sun)?

If, even when cognised as *otherwise*, the thing (Sun) were the *same*,—then the entire Universe might be regarded as the *same*; and as a consequence of this, the birth and death of things would come at the same time and all Cognitions would have one and the same object. From this it follows that if the thing were cognised as it actually exists in relation to particular time and place, etc. then, the same Sun would have been cognised. How then can our Reason be 'Inadmissible'?—(2578–2582)

Under the second view also—that Cognitions are *with form*,—the Cognitions of the Reflected Images are devoid of objective basis;—this is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (2583).

EVEN IF THE COGNITION BE *with form*, IT CAN BE REGARDED AS APPREHENDING AN OBJECT ONLY IF IT HAS A FORM THAT IS *not* DIFFERENT FROM THE OBJECT THAT IS COGNISED.—(2583)

COMMENTARY.

Even under the view that Cognitions are *with form*,—though the Cognition of the Reflected Image may be with form, yet, the external object can be said to be 'cognised' only when the form in which it is apprehended is not different from the external object itself,—and not when it is apprehended in a different form; if it were not so, there would be incongruities.

—In the case of the Cognitions of the Reflected Images, the apprehension is *not* of a form that is non-different from the form of the Sun; for if it were there, the Cognitions of the Reflected Images would be exactly the same as the *true* Cognition of the Sun itself.—(2583)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka* in *Text* 2221, that—"When a man is looking at the Sun and the Water, his eye (rays) proceed in two ways—one upwards and the other downwards, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2584-2585).

IT MAY BE THAT WHAT IS PERCEIVED BY THE DOWNWARD RAYS IS THE SUN SHINING ABOVE PRESENTED MEDIATELY; BUT EVEN SO, THE PERCEIVER REGARDS THE SUN SHINING ABOVE AS ACTUALLY DOWN IN THE WATER.—IF THE SUN WERE ACTUALLY PERCEIVED JUST AS IT STANDS, THEN IT WOULD BE COGNISED AS SUCH, NOT OTHERWISE. THIS HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED.—(2584-2585)

COMMENTARY.

'*What is perceived*'—by the Soul.

'*Shining above*'—this qualifies the 'Sun', as it exists.

'*Regards*'—i.e. the perceiving Soul thinks.

What is meant is as follows:—If what the Percipient Soul sees is the Sun shining above, presented to him mediately, through the downward rays,—how is it that he regards the Sun as actually down in the water, and not as shining above? It would be regarded as such, if it were actually apprehended as it exists; otherwise there would be incongruities.—(2584-2585)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmṣaka*, under *Text* 2224, that—"In the case of the man looking at the mirror, it is through illusion that, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2586).

SIMILARLY IT IS NOT TRUE THAT (IN THE CASE OF THE MAN LOOKING AT THE MIRROR)—"IT IS THROUGH ILLUSION THAT THE MAN COGNISES THE FACE AS FACING THE WEST, THOUGH IN REALITY WHAT HE ACTUALLY PERCEIVES IS THE FACE AS PRESENTED BY THE VISUAL RAYS PROCEEDING EASTWARD TO THE RAYS AS PROCEEDING WESTWARD."—(2586)

COMMENTARY.

The reason why this is not true is stated in the following:—

TEXT (2587).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE PERCEPTION OF THE REFLECTED IMAGE CANNOT HAVE THE MAN'S OWN REAL FACE AS ITS OBJECTIVE BASIS; BECAUSE WHAT FIGURES IN THE PERCEPTION IS SOMETHING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE REAL FACE; JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF TASTE AND SOUND, ETC.—(2587)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tadvilakṣaṇa, etc.*'—This word has to be construed as with the abstract ending '*tva*'; and as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound.

This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a Cognition envisages something entirely different from a certain thing, it cannot have this latter for its objective basis;—e.g. the Cognition of Taste cannot have Sound for its objective basis; or the Cognition of Sound cannot have Taste for its objective basis;—the Cognitions of the reflected image envisage something entirely different from the real face;—hence here we have the apprehension of something contrary to the wider factor.—(2587)

In the following *Texts*, the author points out that the Reason here put forward cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible':—

TEXTS (2588–2590).

IN A SMALLER MIRROR THE FACE APPEARS AS SMALLER;—THE TREE REFLECTED IN THE WATER APPEARS AS UPSIDE DOWN, AND AS SUNK IN THE WATER; THE OBJECT REFLECTED IN THE MIRROR FACES THE MIRROR,—NOT SO ITS REFLECTED IMAGE;—WHILE THE REFLECTED IMAGE IS IN THE WATER, THE OBJECT REFLECTED IS FAR OFF;—THE REFLECTED IMAGE ALWAYS VARIES WITH THE REFLECTING SURFACE, AS REGARDS ITS LARGENESS, SMALLNESS, ETC.,—NOT SO THE OBJECT REFLECTED.—FOR THESE REASONS OUR REASON CANNOT BE REGARDED AS 'INADMISSIBLE'. —(2588–2590)

COMMENTARY.

In a smaller mirror, the face, though really larger, appears as smaller;—the tree reflected in water is perceived top downward and as sunk in the

water ;—the face reflected in the mirror is perceived as facing the west ;—and in water, as being far off ;—similarly in such reflecting media as the Bright Sword and the like, the Reflected Image appears in varying degrees of length, etc. in accordance with the nature of the reflecting medium ; and yet the object reflected does not possess the varying length, etc. Thus then, the idea that the cognition of the Reflected Image envisages something different from the Reflected object, cannot be 'inadmissible'.—(2588–2590)

In the following *Text,* the author refutes the charge of 'Inconclusiveness' against his Reason :—

TEXT (2591).

IF, EVEN WHEN WHAT APPEARS IN THE COGNITION IS SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THE OBJECT, IT BE REGARDED AS THE COGNITION OF THAT OBJECT,—THEN ALL COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND AND OTHER THINGS, WOULD ENVISAGE ALL THINGS.—(2591)

COMMENTARY.

That all cognitions would have all things for their object is the Reason that serves to annul the conclusion of the other party.—(2591)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka* in *Text* 2218 that—" When the eye is slightly pressed by the finger, even a single object is perceived as diverse, because of the diversity in the functioning of the eye,—the same thing happens in the case in question also ".

This also is discarded by what has been said above.

TEXT (2592).

WHEN THE EYE IS SLIGHTLY PRESSED BY THE FINGER, IF A SINGLE OBJECT IS PERCEIVED AS DIVERSE,—THAT ALSO IS PURE ILLUSION, ENTIRELY BASELESS.—(2592)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka* under the *Text* 2225, that—" Even granting that the Reflected Image really exists in the different places,—there can be no plurality, etc. etc. ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2593).

THE REALITY OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE REFLECTED IMAGE HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCARDED BEFORE ; BECAUSE TWO CORPOREAL MATERIAL OBJECTS CANNOT EXIST TOGETHER, BECAUSE THEY ARE MUTUALLY OBSTRUCTIVE.—(2593)

COMMENTARY.

The idea of the Reflected Image being an entity has been rejected before ; where it has been shown that one corporeal object cannot occupy the same place as another and so forth.—(2593)

Granting that the Reflected Image is a real entity ; even so several such images can figure in the same Cognition ;—this is what is shown in the following :—

TEXT (2594).

EVEN IF THE REFLECTED IMAGE EXISTS IN SEVERAL PLACES, IT VARIES REGARDING ITS LARGENESS, SMALLNESS AND SO FORTH ; HENCE IT CANNOT BE ONE AND THE SAME.—(2594)

COMMENTARY.

'*And so forth*'—includes *length*, etc.

It might be argued that—" Even though there is diversity of *largeness* and the rest, yet in some way, on account of all being *blue, etc.*, they might figure in the same cognition ".

But even so, that does not prove real *one-ness* ; the *one-ness* might be *assumed* ; but as regards that, your argument would be futile (as that is admitted by us also).

If the *one-ness* were real, even when the Images are perceived in different places, etc.,—then there may be one-ness between the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Chāṇḍāla*, on the ground of both being *men* ;—there would be one-ness between your mother and your wife, on the ground of both being *women*,—one-ness also between your mouth and the lower orifice, on the ground of both being made up of Earth. In fact, the whole universe would be *one*, on the ground of everything being a *Entity* ; and in that case the contingency of the simultaneous birth and death of things would become irresistible.—(2594)

The following has been urged in the *Bhāṣya* (of *Shabara*) :—" It might be urged that it is not possible for one and the same thing to be seen simultaneously at several places ; but the foolish man who says this should look at the sun, where one and the same sun is seen in several places . . . . . It might be that its exact position is not ascertained on account of remoteness ; hence there is an illusion. The same may be said in regard to the Word-

Sound also ; there is no definite cognition of the exact position". (Sū. 1. 1. 15 ; *Translation*, pp. 35-36).

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2595–2599).

THE IDEA THAT APPEARS IN MEN AS TO 'THE SUN BEING OVER MY HEAD' IS SURELY WRONG ; BECAUSE ALL LIVING BEINGS SEE THE SAME SUN AT THE SAME TIME,—AND NOT DIFFERENT SUNS ; BECAUSE IN REALITY NO SECOND SOLAR DISC EXISTS ; IF IT EXISTED, IT WOULD SURELY BE SEEN, AND YET IT IS NOT SEEN ; HENCE IT IS DEFINITELY CONCLUDED THAT ONLY ONE SUN EXISTS.—AS REGARDS THE WORD-SOUND, HOWEVER, IT HAS NEVER BEEN DEFINITELY ASCERTAINED TO BE ONE AND THE SAME ; BECAUSE WHETHER APPEARING IN SUCCESSION OR SIMULTANEOUSLY IT IS CLEARLY CHARACTERISED BY MULTIPLICITY. EVEN WHEN SPEAKERS PRONOUNCE THE LETTER 'GA' AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME, THE DIFFERENCE AMONG THEM IS CLEARLY APPREHENDED.—(2595–2599)

COMMENTARY.

If the second solar Disc existed, it would be perceptible ; but it is never perceived ; hence it follows with certainty that it is one only ; hence the idea that 'the sun is above me' is held to be wrong.

The *one-ness* of the Word-Sound, however, is not recognised in this manner ; by virtue of which the idea of its being present in several places might be regarded as wrong. It is only when such one-ness is established that the idea of the said presence could be wrong. But that one-ness itself has not been established.

'*Solar disc*'.—The term '*rāvam*' is made up of the noun '*ravi*' with the '*aṃ*' affix.

Says the Opponent :—"The one-ness of the Word-Sound has certainly been definitely established through *Recognition*".

The answer to this is—'*It has never been definitely ascertained, etc. etc.*'—That is to say, the validity of Recognition as a means of Right Cognition has been already rejected.

The words '*even when, etc. etc.*' explain that even when the appearance is simultaneous, there is multiplicity.

'*Clearly*' ;—because all details regarding swiftness, middling and slow, etc. etc. are clearly perceived.—(2595–2599)

The following *Text* shows that there is diversity also when the letter is pronounced in succession :—

TEXT (2600).

WHEN THE LETTER IS PRONOUNCED IN SUCCESSION, ONE AFTER THE OTHER, THE DIVERSITY IS NOT ONLY DIRECTLY PERCEIVED, BUT ALSO INFERRED THROUGH THE INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE IN THE SHAPE OF THE FACT OF THE COGNITIONS APPEARING IN SUCCESSION.—(2600)

COMMENTARY.

'*Not only directly perceived*';—because even so it is clearly apprehended to be diverse, on account of the diversity in the *notes*, '*Ṣadja*' and the rest.

This cannot be a case of diversity among the *manifesters*; as that idea has been already discarded.

'*Through the Inferential Indicative*';—i.e. through *Inference* also; the argument being formulated as follows :—At the time that a thing does not come into existence, its cause is not present in an efficient form,—e.g. visual cognition does not appear when the set of its causes is devoid of the *Eye*, even though the other factors are there in the form of the Colour, the Light, the mental condition, and so forth;—at the time that the several cognitions of the single letter 'ga' appear, there do not appear those subsequent cognitions which are held to follow from the said cognitions;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider term; the presence of the efficient cause being invariably concomitant with *coming into existence*, and the said 'presence' being not there.

Says the Opponent :—"If what you seek to prove is the negation of the presence of the efficient cause *in general*,—then your argument is superfluous; because even though the eternal Word-sound is a *cause*, there may be a deficiency due to the absence of its auxiliaries, which renders the appearance of the subsequent cognitions impossible; and this fact is admitted by your opponent.—If, on the other hand, what you are negativing is the causal efficiency of the Word-Sound *in particular*,—then your Reason is 'Inconclusive', and the Corroborative Instance is 'devoid of the Probandum'. Because when the Visual Perception does not appear, its non-appearance is not due to the deficiency of the cause of the Word-Sound; it is due to the deficiency (absence) of the eye".

This is not right. What we seek to prove is the fact in its *general* aspect. Nor is our argument 'superfluous' in that case. Because if the eternal thing had need of another cause, then alone could our argument be 'superfluous'. As a matter of fact, however, the eternal thing does *not* depend upon another cause; because such a cause could not render any help to the eternal thing; and it is only what helps that is needed; otherwise there would be incongruities. Consequently, if the Word-Sound, independently, were held to be the cause, all the cognitions proceeding therefrom would always have the efficient cause present; and hence they would all appear at all times. If they did not, then the non-appearance of the cognitions proceeding therefrom would indicate the inefficiency of the Word-Sound itself. How then can our argument be 'superfluous'?

Even if what is meant to be proved were the deficiency of a *particular* Cause, our argument could not be 'inconclusive'; nor would our Corroborative Instance be 'devoid of the Probandum'; what is meant is as follows:—even when one thing is present, if the other thing does not come into existence, the former cannot be the cause of the latter,—according to you; —e.g. *Visual* organ does not appear when *Sound* is present;—even when the particular forms of the letter 'Ga' are there, the Cognitions held to proceed from them do not come into existence; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character.

Here also the fact of the Eternal Thing not needing another Cause supplies the reason for the annulment of the contrary conclusion. The case of the Seed in the granary cannot be cited to the contrary; because the seed cannot be the primary cause of the Sprout. We desist from labouring this point further.—(2600)

It has been argued above, by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2211, that—"Because it is dependent upon the manifesting articulations, therefore it is apprehended only at the place where they are, etc. etc."

Though this idea has been already refuted, the author reverts to it, in order to point out that the view is open to objection even if there be a manifester for eternal things:—

TEXTS (2601–2605).

It may be that the apprehension of the Word-sound is dependent upon the manifesting articulations; but even so it could be apprehended only as it really exists; otherwise, the apprehension would not be of that Sound at all; as its form would not figure in that apprehension. As a matter of fact, the Word-Sound is never apprehended as pervading over the whole *Ākāsha*. Why then does the Word-Sound follow the diversity of place of the Articulation? When manifested, it would appear by itself, like the Jar and other things. All this about the Cause has been said only by way of an elaboration of our argument. In reality the inefficiency of the *manifesters* has already been proved on the basis of the impossibility of *manifestation*.—As regards the directly perceptional notion that 'this is the same Word-Sound',—that has been already discarded; and it stands unrefuted that appearing in diverse places, the Word-Sound must be diverse.—(2601–2605)

COMMENTARY.

If the apprehension of the Word-Sound is dependent upon *manifesters*, [illegible] it that it is not apprehended as pervading the entire *Ākāsha*,

wherein it pervades? Its apprehension must be in that form; otherwise there would be incongruities; all this has been explained before. And yet the Word-Sound is not heard throughout the entire *Ākāsha*; hence it cannot be right that the hearing of sound is in accordance with the manifesting articulation; in fact, the apprehension must follow that Word-Sound alone of which it is the apprehension. Thus alone could there be apprehension of the Word-Sound, not otherwise. Consequently like the Jar and other things, the Word-Sound should always appear in its entire form. Such in brief is the sense of the text.

'*Tat*'—Therefore.—(2601–2605)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2227, that—"Just as the single person, Devadatta, passing from place to place, one after the other, does not become different, so the Word-Sound also does not differ simply because it is heard in several places".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2606-2607).

WHEN A MAN PASSES FROM PLACE TO PLACE, ONE AFTER THE OTHER,—IT IS SO BECAUSE HE IS IN A PERPETUAL FLUX; IF IT WERE NOT SO, THERE COULD BE NO SUCH 'GOING'; IF HE REMAINED FIXED, PERMANENTLY, THEN THE MAN, NOT DISSOCIATED FROM HIS PREVIOUS POSITION, WOULD CONTINUE TO REMAIN THERE; AND AS SUCH HE COULD NOT GET AT ANOTHER PLACE.—(2606-2607)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the non-eternal thing, the only 'movement' possible is in the shape of *being born in another place*; not so in the case of the eternal thing, which, unless it abandons its character as associated with one place, can never 'go' to another place.—This is what is pointed out by the *Text* 2607.—(2606-2607)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka* under *Text* 2230 above, that—"when a large pit is dug in the ground, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2608).

Ākāsha BEING UNDEFINABLE AND VAGUE, THERE CAN BE NO 'MANIFESTATION' OF IT; AND AS IT IS BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES, WHAT IS SEEN IN THE PIT, IS NOT *Ākāsha*, BUT *Light*.—(2608)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be proved that *Ākāsha* is a positive entity; hence there can be no 'manifestation' of it; specially as there is the idea of *Ākāsha* only when there is nothing tangible perceived; for instance, in deep darkness, when people do not meet with any obstruction, they are found to say—'there is nothing here, it is mere *Ākāsha*'.

Even for those who regard *Ākāsha* as a positive entity, it is beyond the reach of the senses; how then could there be any cognition of *Ākāsha*?—This is what is meant by the words—'*As it is beyond the reach of the senses, etc. etc.*'

Question:—"If this is so, then what is it that is seen in the pit?"

Answer:—It is only Light that is seen.—(2608)

The following *texts* point out that—even if *Ākāsha* is a positive entity, there can be no *manifestation* of it—

TEXTS (2609–2611).

FURTHER, AS IN THE CASE OF THE WORD-SOUND, SO IN THE CASE OF *Ākāsha* ALSO, THERE CAN BE NO 'MANIFESTATION'; SUCH 'MANIFESTATION' WOULD MEAN COGNITION; AND THIS WOULD BE EVERLASTING, AS ITS CAUSE WOULD BE ALWAYS THERE.—JUST AS, IN THE CASE OF THE WORD, THERE CAN BE NO *manifester*,—SO IT CANNOT BE IN THE PRESENT CASE ALSO; AND IN REALITY, IT IS AN ILLUSION APPEARING, THROUGH EXTRANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES, IN REGARD TO THE COGNITION OF THE WORD-SOUND. HENCE THE CONCLUSION IS THAT LENGTH, SHORTNESS AND THE REST ARE NOT PROPERTIES OF THE ARTICULATION. THEY COULD BE SO ONLY IF THE ARTICULATIONS WERE THE *manifesters* OF THE WORD-SOUND; AND THIS IDEA HAS BEEN REJECTED.—(2609–2611)

COMMENTARY.

'*They could be so*'—i.e. Length, etc. could be properties of Articulation.

'*This*'—the idea that the Articulations are manifesters of the Word-Sound.—(2609–2611)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2234, that—"a word whose relationship to its denotation has not been apprehended can never be expressive, etc. etc.".

TEXTS (2612-2613).

It has been frequently explained before that words and things that are entirely different from one another are capable of providing the same ideas. Hence it is not true that the Word becomes expressive only when its relationship to its denotation has been apprehended. Because, as already explained before, in reality, the Word, by itself, is not expressive at all.—(2612-2613)

COMMENTARY.

The sense of this is briefly as follows :—If what you are urging is the contingency that there would be no real denotative relationship between the Word and its denotation,—then your argument is futile ; because under the chapter on *Word,* the idea of the 'Universal', or the 'Specific Individuality' of things, being denoted by words has been refuted at length.

If what you are urging is in regard to the *illusory* denotative relationship, then your Reason is 'Inconclusive'. Because, as a matter of fact, there are certain things which, though entirely different from one another, serve to bring about cognitions of the same form ; and these would bring about the illusory denotative relationship between the Word and its meaning ;—as we have already explained in course of the discussion on '*Apoha*'. Consequently, as against the Buddhists, who are upholders of the doctrine of *Apoha,* all that has been urged is entirely worthless and flickers only for a moment.—(2612-2613)

The following *texts* explain the possibility of 'Denotation' on the basis of Illusion :—

TEXTS (2614–2616)

As a matter of fact, all cognitions produced by words are expressive of what is unreal ; because of the fact that there can be no denotation of the 'Universal' or of the 'Specific Individuality' and such things ; but even though in reality, there is diversity, people, through illusion, come to treat and speak of the word—'Cow' for instance,—as *one* only,—regarding all as the same.—This much of what has been said by the Great Brāhmaṇa (*Mīmāmsaka*) on the basis of the diversity of words is entirely baseless.—(2614–(2616)

COMMENTARY.

That idea is called '*Saṁvṛti*' (Illusory) which, by its appearance, *conceals*—'*saṁvṛṇoti*'—the real character of another—through not mani-

festing the real character of the thing; and it is purely 'fanciful'; hence the form of things that is presented by such an idea is called '*Saṃvṛta*,' 'illusory,' 'fanciful'.

This is what is meant by '*illusory* existence'; it is not *real*; in reality, it does not exist; and all 'illusory cognition' is devoid of objective basis.—(2614–2616)

The following might be urged—"If the one-ness of the Word is not *real*,—then how is it that words accomplish the purpose of affirming and denying things,—through mere (illusory) imposition?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2617-2618).

FOR INSTANCE, THE SHAKING OF THE HAND AND SUCH GESTURES ARE NOT REGARDED AS ONE AND THE SAME (AND YET THEY INDICATE AFFIRMATION AND DENIAL). THE COGNITIONS OF THE WORD-SOUND THAT ARE PRODUCED HAVE THE VARYING CHARACTERISTICS OF LENGTH, SHORTNESS, ETC.—[WHICH ALSO SHOWS THAT THE WORD IS NOT *one*];—THE IDEA THAT THE ONE WORD IS VARIOUSLY 'MANIFESTED' HAS BEEN DISCARDED. THERE IS NO 'COMMONALTY' (COMMON CHARACTER) PERCEPTIBLE IN THE SEVERAL APPEARANCES OF THE WORD; AND IT IS ONLY THROUGH CONVENTION THAT THEY BECOME AIDS TO THE COGNITION OF DENIAL, AFFIRMATION AND THE REST.—(2617-2618)

COMMENTARY.

'*Such gestures*'—such as *winking of the eyes, etc.*

'*With such varying characteristics as length, etc.*'—this has to be construed with '*buddhibhēdataḥ*,' '*the cognitions, etc.*'.

Nor can these characteristics be due to variations in the 'manifester'; as the very idea of such 'manifestation' has been discarded.—'*Tadvyaktiḥ*'—manifestation of the eternal thing (Word-Sound).

Nor can the Word serve as the basis of usage through a *commonalty*; as no such 'commonalty' is known; and a 'commonalty' that is not known cannot form the basis of usage; as in that case, the usage would go on for all time.

'*Aids to the cognition of denial, etc. etc.*'—The 'etc.' includes affirmation, permission, request and so forth.—The '*gati*' of these is their cognition, comprehension;—the '*aid*' to this is its *cause*.—It is the *shaking of the hand, etc.* that become such aids.—What is meant is that the same would be the case with words also.—(2617-2618)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under *Text* 2252, that—"For these reasons the relationship between the Word and its meaning is declared to be eternal".

TEXT (2619).

IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT WORDS DO NOT BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THINGS DIRECTLY,—BECAUSE THERE IS NO INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE BETWEEN WORDS AND EXTERNAL THINGS; ALL THAT THE WORDS DO IS TO INDICATE THE PRESENCE (IN THE SPEAKER) OF THE *desire to speak* (OF THINGS).—(2619)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, there is no real connection between the Word and the thing expressed by it,—which could be either eternal or non-eternal. Because it is not the external objects that words denote; as there is no invariable concomitance between them; as has been previously explained under the chapter on 'Word'. And if words were to denote things without such concomitance, then there would be incongruities.

Question :—"If that is so, then what is it that the words express"?

Answer :—'*All that the words do. etc. etc.*'—this 'desire to speak' also, they point to, not as something *denoted* by them; they only serve as signs indicative of it. That is why they have been spoken of as 'indicating' the *Desire to Speak*. What happens is that when the Word is uttered, there appears a 'conception' envisaging the *object*, and not envisaging the *Desire to Speak*; and what is not envisaged by the Word when heard,—how can that be regarded as 'denoted' by it?—(2619)

Question :—"If that is so, then what is the connection between the words and the said *Desire to Speak*,—by virtue of which they could serve to indicate that Desire?"

Answer :—

TEXT (2620).

WORDS ARE DEFINITELY KNOWN—THROUGH PERCEPTION AND NON-APPREHENSION—AS THE *effect* OF THE DESIRE TO SPEAK; HENCE BETWEEN THEM THE RELATIONSHIP IS CLEARLY THAT OF *Cause and Effect*.—(2620)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, words are definitely known—through Perception and Non-apprehension in oneself,—to be the effect of the *Desire to Speak*; hence the relation between them is that of *Cause and Effect*.—(2620)

Says the Opponent :—"If that is so, then Convention becomes useless; the said causal relation being determined by the said Perception and Non-apprehension".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (2621).

IT IS ONLY WHEN THE MAN HAS DEFINITELY RECOGNISED THE SAID CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP THROUGH CONVENTION THAT HE COMPREHENDS, FROM WORDS, THE *Desire to Speak* ; AS IN THE CASE OF THE GESTURES OF THE HAND.—(2621)

COMMENTARY.

The idea is as follows :—The causal relation that has been recognised is with mere 'Desire to Speak' in general; as for the said relation with a particular 'Desire to Speak', as this would naturally be present in the 'subjective chain' of another person (to whom the words are spoken), it could not be known except through Convention; hence it is for the due ascertainment of this that the Convention is made.

Says the Opponent :—" How can this be ascertained through Convention also ? If, at the time of the making of the Convention, the *particular desire* of the other person *to speak* were the means of bringing about the Cognition, then it might be that the Convention thereupon would, at the time of usage, serve to bring about the Cognition of the particular *desire to speak.* As it is, however, the said means is not there yet. Because the Convention cannot be made without pronouncing the Word ; so that if the particular 'desire to speak' were also comprehended from the same word, then there would be mutual interdependence. Because through Convention, the Word would indicate the particular Desire, and the Convention cannot be made without the Cognition of the particular and general *desire to speak* ; hence there would be clear mutual interdependence ".

This does not affect our position. As a matter of fact, the whole verbal usage is admitted only on the basis of one's own impressions ; because it is radically *wrong,* illusory,—like the ideas of the man with the blurred vision having the idea of 'two moons'. Where then does the point of the objection lie ?

Nor indeed is the Word the only means of knowing the particular 'Desire to Speak', in all cases. Because there are other ways also in which the Convention can be made,—such as actually pointing to the thing, through Context, etc. by positing a special meaning and thereby indicating the particular 'Desire to Speak'.

Thus there would be no mutual interdependence.

Then again, to you also, who uphold the affirmative view, the objection is equally applicable, that the Cognition of one man not bringing about the Cognition in another man, how can there be any certainty as to the speaker and the hearer having the Cognition of the same thing ?—And without the common Cognition of such a thing ; there can be no Convention.

The answer that you would make to this objection would be our answer also to your objection.

The following might be urged—" As the Word does not enter into the

through Convention? Any Convention that is made here cannot be indicative of any other meaning; if it did, there would be incongruities".

This does not affect our position. What is meant here by the term 'Desire to Speak' is that which, even when in confusion as to being in the form of the object or in its own form, does not vary with it. Because in reality it is only this that has the nature of the 'Desire to Speak'.

And it is this particular form of the 'Desire to Speak' that is meant here. Convention also is made in relation to this Desire, not in regard to the Specific Individuality of things; and hence that same particular Desire is what is indicated by the word. Thus alone is it possible for it to be conceived of in that form. Mere desire *in general* cannot be expressed by the word; as has been explained above.—(2621)

Question:—"If, as just explained, the causal relation of the Word is only with such form of the Object as varies with the speaker's 'desire to speak',—then, how is it that in several places, great teachers have declared the relationship of the Word to consist in the Convention itself,—or to be based upon Convention?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (2622-2623).

IT IS ONLY WHEN THE CONVENTION IS THERE THAT THERE COMES ABOUT THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP OF THE WORD WITH THE OBJECT VARYING WITH THE SPEAKER'S INTENTIONS. IT IS ON THIS ACCOUNT THAT IT HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE 'DUE TO CONVENTION'; AND INASMUCH AS IT IS MANIFESTED BY CONVENTION, THE SAID RELATIONSHIP COMES TO BE SPOKEN OF AS 'CONVENTION' ITSELF,—BUT NOT DIRECTLY, (ONLY FIGURATIVELY).—(2622-2623)

COMMENTARY.

'*Sāmayika*', 'conventional', is that which comes about—is present—when the '*Samaya*'—Convention—is present in the mind of the hearer. The term is formed from the noun '*samaya*' with the nominal affix '*Ṭhañ*'. Though this affix has been ordained as to be used in the sense of mere *presence*, yet, in reality, there being no difference between *presence* and *coming into existence*, in the present instance, it is the latter that is meant.

The Convention itself is present in the subjective 'chain' of the Speaker; and as the said relationship is manifested by that, the relationship comes to be spoken of as 'Convention' itself; but only figuratively. And it is not always present every time that the Word is used, as it appears only at certain times.—(2622-2623)

Says the Opponent—"If, as has been said, there is no real relationship between the Object and the Word,—then how does the said *causal relationship* come about?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2624).

THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT IS NOT ANYTHING DIFFERENT FROM THE THINGS THAT ARE THE CAUSE AND THE EFFECT; IT IS THESE THINGS THEMSELVES THAT ARE SPOKEN OF AS SUCH.—(2624)

COMMENTARY.

'*The Cause and the Effect*'—i.e. the two things of which one is the *Cause* and another the *Effect.*

'*Spoken of as such*'—as 'Causal relation', etc.—for the sake of brevity. —(2624)

Says the Opponent—"If that is so, then as they vary with each individual person, how could both the speaker and hearer recognise the same Relationship? For instance, the idea present in the speaker's mind is that 'I am speaking of the same thing and by the same word that I knew at the time of the Convention';—and in the mind of the Hearer also, the idea is that 'this man is speaking of the same thing by the same word'. If it were not so, then the cause (word) and the effect (cognition of the thing) being in two different places, how could there be any Usage at all?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2625).

EACH OF THE TWO IS APPREHENDED BY DULL-WITTED MEN AS ONE AND THE SAME; THUS IT IS THAT IT IS HELD TO CONTINUE DURING ALL THE TIME FROM THE CONVENTION TO THE USAGE.— (2625)

COMMENTARY.

'*Dull-witted men*'—i.e. people under illusion.

'*Gatē*'—apprehended.

'*Saṅkēta, etc.*'—i.e. the time taken—occupied—by the Convention and the Usage;—i.e. by the repeated idea of Cause and Effect and of sameness (of the Word and Meaning).—(2625)

Question:—"Why is not the Relationship regarded to be *really* one only, —and why should it be regarded as illusory (assumed)"?

Answer:—

TEXT (2626).

S NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE RELATIONSHIP TO BE *real* AND *one*. BECAUSE THE THINGS DENOTED BEING DISTINCT AND DIVERSE, THERE WOULD BE NO RELATIONSHIP AT ALL.—(2626)

COMMENTARY.

The one Relationship, when there, could subsist either in different, on-different, things.—It cannot subsist in different things; because each g rests within itself in its own distinct form; and there can be no inter- ture.—If it were in non-different things, then, as the entity would be only, wherewith would there be any Relationship? So that there would o Relationship at all.—(2626)

The *Mīmāmsaka* has raised the objection against the view that the ationship consists of the Convention, under *Text* 2254,—to the effect that Is this Convention made for each mortal being or for each utterance of Word? and so forth".

It is pointed out in the following *texts* that this argument is entirely ile':—

TEXTS (2627–2629).

REGARDS THE ASSERTION THAT—"THE CONVENTION BEING MADE FOR EACH MORTAL BEING, OR FOR EACH UTTERANCE, ETC. ETC."—HAS BEEN MADE WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE VIEW OF THE OTHER PARTY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE CONVENTION AS CONSTITUTING THE RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT BELONG TO THE TWO FACTORS (WORD AND ITS MEANING),—IT BELONGS TO THE MAN; THE ONLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO IS THAT ONE SERVES TO MANIFEST (INDICATE) THE OTHER; AND THIS RELATIONSHIP ALSO IS NOT DIRECT.—NOR DO THE OTHER PARTY HOLD THE CONVENTION TO PERTAIN TO EACH UTTERANCE;—NOR (ACCORDING TO THEM) IS THE CONVENTION MADE BY GOD, OR ANY OTHER BEING, AT THE BEGINNING OF CREATION; AS THE IDEA OF SUCH BEINGS HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED.—(2627–2629)

COMMENTARY.

What the author means is that the contingency that has been urged by *Mīmāmsaka* does not affect the Buddhist position. Because the Buddhist not hold that the relationship between the Word and Meaning is t; according to him, it belongs to the Man; so that if the said view und to be defective, that does no harm to the Buddhist. What belongs e thing cannot form the Relationship of another thing; if it did, there ld be incongruities.

It has been asked—"Is the Convention made for each utterance? Or e time of creation?"—where two alternative views have been shown.

The answer to that is that this does not affect our position, as we do not accept either of these views. This is what is said in the words '*Nor do the other party, etc. etc.*'—'*Ēnam*' stands for the Convention.—'*Parē*'—Buddhists. —'*God or any other beings*'—i.e. God, Brahmā and so forth.—(2627–2629)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2255,—"Would the Relationship vary with each being or would it be one only for all, etc. etc. ?"

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (2630).

THE RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH BEING MUST BE DIFFERENT, BECAUSE OF 'PERPETUAL FLUX'; AS FOR THE IDEA OF 'SIMILARITY', THAT IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH *difference*.—(2630)

COMMENTARY.

The second view is the one that is favoured. It would not involve the contingency of their being cognised as different; because, even when there is difference, there can be nothing incongruous in their being regarded as *similar*. Hence when the *Mīmāmsaka* said (in *Text* 2255) that 'there should be some idea of difference' he said what was 'inconclusive'.—(2630)

The following might be urged—"The *Perpetual Flux* is not admitted by us; why then should you say that it must be different on account of Perpetual Flux ?"

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2631).

THE COGNITIONS OF THINGS CLEARLY APPEAR IN SUCCESSION; HENCE THEY DECLARE THAT (RELATIONSHIP) ALSO TO BE *successive*; OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE NO SUCCESSION. —(2631)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tasyāpi*'—stands for the Relationships.

'*Āhuḥ*'—they (Buddhists) explain it as such.

'*Otherwise, etc. etc.*'—i.e. there would be no succession in the Cognitions also.—(2631)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2256, that—"As there would be difference between the ideas of the Speaker and the Hearer, the use of the Word would become vitiated, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2632–2635).

As the understanding is come to by many persons at one and the same time, the Convention is not held to be different (with each individual); just as in the case of the one *Blue-point*. It is not that one Connection or Relationship is present in the mind of the Speaker, and an entirely different one in that of the Hearer; because it is of one and the same form and is present, as such, in the minds of both. When the Speaker proceeds to lay down a connection for the benefit of the Hearer, he lays down only that connection which has been known to himself from before. Thus, inasmuch as its Recognition always appears in the same form,—even when the Word, etc. are different, he comes to cognise the oneness (of the Connection).—(2632–2635)

COMMENTARY.

Just as the Blue-point, even when seen by several people, does not become diverse,—similarly, even when the Convention regarding the connection is made by several people, the connected (Word) will not become diverse; what to say of the case where only two persons are concerned? That is to say, all the persons have the same notion regarding it. Consequently, the connection for the Hearer would not be different from that of the Speaker.—(2632–2635)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2258, that—"If it be argued that the same arguments apply to the Jar, etc. also, then the answer is that it is not so, because what is recognised in the case of these is the *Universal*, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2636–2639).

As regards the Jar and other things also, the 'Universal' has been already discarded.—The 'Configuration' ('Universal') is not held to be a quality of Material Substances.—Nor is the capacity of the Jar, to contain water for instance, known from its 'Universal'.—If the Jar, etc. are non-different from the 'Universal', then, like it, they also should be eternal. If then, they are different from the 'Universal', then it becomes open to objections relating to the relation between the two.—If the Relationship were something produced, then the Universal would be non-

ETERNAL.—HENCE THE CAPACITY (OF THE JAR) TO CONTAIN THE WATER CANNOT BE DUE TO THE 'UNIVERSAL'.—EVEN IF THE JAR ETC. WERE DIFFERENT,—THERE WOULD SURELY BE ALL THESE OBJECTIONS REGARDING THE 'CAPACITY'; AND THE EFFECTS OF THIS 'CAPACITY', IN THE SHAPE OF THE *containing of water*, ETC. WOULD THUS HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS ETERNAL.—(2636–2639)

COMMENTARY.

'*Already discarded*'—in course of the examination of the 'Universal'.

The refutation of the 'Universal' is briefly set forth here also: '*The Universal is not, etc. etc.*'—You, *Mīmāmsaka,* do not hold the 'universal' to be a quality of the material substances,—earth, water, etc.—like their dark colour, etc.,—as something distinct from those substances.—Though it is held to be visible, it is never seen.

Nor can it be right to regard it as non-different from these; as in that case the particular material thing also—like the Jar—would have to be regarded as *eternal,* just like its Universal.

Even when it is regarded as different from these things,—it becomes open to the objection that there can be no relationship between them. Between two different things, the only relation possible is the causal one—that the one should be produced by the other; so that if the Universal were regarded as *produced* by the Individual things,—then the Universal would become non-eternal, on account of its liability to being *produced,* like the Jar.

In some places, the reading is '*nityatā*', 'eternality', for '*anityatā*', 'non-eternality'; the meaning in that case is as follows:—If it is held that the Jar, etc. are produced from the Universal, then the Jar, etc. would have to regarded as eternal; that is, this cause being always there, the Jar, etc. would be there at all times.

If the Universal (or the Jar) be regarded as being of the nature of both, then it becomes open to the objections that relate to both;—and it also leads to its being deprived of its *one-ness*; because one and the same thing cannot be of the nature of two things. So that the two would be two distinct entities,—and not *one,* of the nature of both. If the thing be held to be neither the one nor the other, then it ceases to be an entity. It has also to be pointed out that one and the same thing cannot be both positive and negative.

'*All these objections*'—in the shape of (1) absence of relationship, (2) the contingency of being eternal and so forth.—There is the additional objection that the work of *containing water, etc.* also would have to be regarded as eternal.—(2636–2639)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka,* under *Text* 2262, that—"the Connection is only a kind of Potency, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2640-2641).

IF IT IS HELD THAT—"THE CONNECTION (OR RELATIONSHIP) IS ONLY A KIND OF POTENCY, AND THERE CAN BE NO DIVERSITY IN POTENCY",—THEN THE POTENCY OF THE WORD AND ITS MEANING WOULD BE ONE AND THE SAME, AS THERE WOULD BE NO DISTINCTION.—EVEN IF THERE WERE SOME DISTINCTION, THERE COULD BE NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE POTENCY AND THOSE TWO.—IF IT WERE SOMETHING PRODUCED, THEN IT COULD NOT BE ETERNAL; AND THERE IS NO OTHER POSSIBILITY FOR ANYTHING.—(2640-2641)

COMMENTARY.

'*There is no other, etc. etc.*'—There being objections—as explained before—to the Potency being or not being of the nature of both.—(2640-2641)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2264, that—"At the time that the Connection is asserted, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2642–2648).

AT THE TIME OF THE ASSERTION OF THE CONNECTION, WHEN THE WORD 'COW' IS UTTERED, SOME PEOPLE, WHO ARE COGNISANT OF THE CONNECTION, COMPREHEND ITS MEANING,—WHILE OTHERS DO NOT;—AND THE REASON FOR THIS LIES IN THE PRESENCE OF THE CONNECTION IN THE FORM AND MANNER IN WHICH IT HAS BEEN MADE KNOWN.—UNDER YOUR VIEW OF THE 'CONNECTION', HOWEVER, ALL MEN SHOULD COMPREHEND THE MEANING; BECAUSE ACCORDING TO YOU, THE CONNECTION CONSISTS OF *Potency* ONLY, AND POTENCY IS ETERNAL; SO THAT IT SHOULD BE ABLE TO BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE MEANING AT ALL TIMES; OR, OTHERWISE, IT SHOULD NOT BE FREE FROM LIMITATIONS.—IF BEING ETERNAL, IT WERE FREE FROM LIMITATIONS,—WHY SHOULD NOT ALL MEN COMPREHEND THE MEANING OF THE WORD?—IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, IT HAS LIMITATIONS,—WHAT WOULD BE THE REASON FOR SUCH LIMITATION, WHEN IT IS IN THE NATURE OF THE POTENCY ITSELF? A MAN WHO HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONVENTION (BEARING ON THE WORD), OR WHEN HE HAS FORGOTTEN IT,—DOES THE COGNITION OF THE MEANING APPEAR IN THE SAME ONE MAN? BECAUSE THE POTENCY RESTRICTED TO THE PRODUCTION OF THAT COGNITION IS THERE

ALL THE TIME.—THE IDEA IS THAT THE ETERNAL POTENCY IS EFFECTIVE ONLY WHEN IT IS ITSELF KNOWN,—SO THAT, IF THE *known* POTENCY BE DIFFERENT FROM THE *unknown* ONE,—THEN IT LOSES ITS ETERNALITY ;—WHILE IF IT IS THE SAME, WHY IS THIS DISTINCTION SET FORTH ?—(2642–2648)

COMMENTARY.

The proper idea would be that some people comprehend the meaning of words through that relationship of cause and effect which might be there; because the fact always remains that such relationship is the means of such comprehension.

But as regards the Relationship that you posit, everything is wrong. This is what is pointed out by the words—'*Under your view of the Connection however, etc. etc.*' That is (in the case of words) the Connection is held to be a form of *Potency*,—and Potency is described as *productive capacity* ;—and this capacity is held to be eternal and uniform ;—and always restricted to the bringing about of the cognition of the meaning.

Now the question that arises is—Being thus restricted to the bringing about of the Cognition of the meaning,—is this Potency held to be *without limitations*,—not limited to a few persons only—or is it otherwise ? These are the only possible alternatives.

Under the first alternative (that it is without limitations), all men would have the Cognition of the meaning at one and the same time.—Under the second alternative also, the cause that serves to restrict the said productiveness of the Potency to certain persons has got to be pointed out; because in the case of all evanescent effects, there are always certain causal factors that go to regulate and restrict their productivity; not so in the case of eternal things.

The following might be urged—"In the case of eternal things also, their very nature is such that they bring about only certain effects, not all. And certainly no one can object to the nature of things".

In that case, if such is its nature by itself, independently of other things, then, prior to the knowledge of the Convention, or on forgetting the Convention,—under such conditions also, the man who has comprehended that restricted meaning would continue to do so for all time; because the capacity of the Potency to produce that particular cognition would remain there permanently.

The following might be urged:—"As the Potency brings about the Cognition, the Potency in the shape of the Relationship can bring about Cognition only after it has itself been recognised,—not while it itself remains uncognised; hence the incongruity pointed out does not arise".

This is not right. If it is held that the Potency as *known* differs from the Potency as *unknown*,—then it loses its eternality.—If there is no difference between them, there is no justification for making any such distinction as the 'Potency known' and 'Potency unknown'. Because for the same person, one and the same thing cannot have the two mutually contradictory characters of being *known* and *unknown*.—(2642–2648)

Then again, the Potency would be *known* only when the means of knowing it would be there; as a matter of fact, however, this means is not there.—With this idea, the Author puts the following question:—

TEXT (2649).

FURTHER, BY WHAT MEANS DOES THE POTENCY BECOME KNOWN ?—(2649)

COMMENTARY.

In the following *Texts*, the Author sets forth in detail the answer from the view-point of the other party (the *Mīmāṃsaka*):—

TEXTS (2649–2651).

" IT IS BY MEANS OF PRESUMPTION :—THE PROCESS BEING AS FOLLOWS :—THE MAN PERCEIVES THE WORD-SOUND, THE EXPERIENCED MAN (PRONOUNCING THE WORD) AND THE THING SPOKEN OF—THROUGH *Sense-perception* ;—THE FACT OF THE HEARER HAVING COMPREHENDED THE MEANING IS COGNISED THROUGH *Inference* FROM HIS ACTIVITY; AND THE DUAL POTENCY IS COGNISED THROUGH THE FACT OF THE PHENOMENON NOT BEING CAPABLE OF ANY OTHER EXPLANATION ;—THUS IT IS BY PRESUMPTION THAT THEY RECOGNISE THE RELATIONSHIP VOUCHED FOR BY THE THREE MEANS OF COGNITION ".—[*Shloka-vārtika—Sambandhākṣēpaparihāra*, 140-141].—(2649–2651)

COMMENTARY.

The process of the comprehension of the Relationship has been thus described by *Kumārila*:—(1) First of all, through *Sense-perception*, one cognises the *Word* (pronounced), the *experienced man* who pronounces the word, and the *thing spoken of*;—after that, through *Inference*, through the Inferential Indicative in the shape of the activity (of the man), it is known that the Hearer has understood the meaning of the Word;—the 'activity' is spoken of as 'Inference', in the sense of what is instrumental in bringing about the Inferential Cognition;—then, through *Presumption*, he cognises the Potency as 'dual',—i.e. as subsisting in the Word and the meaning.—As the Potency itself is *directly* cognised through Presumption, it is said that 'they recognise it through Presumption'.—'*Vouched for by the three means of Cognition*—i.e. in the Cognition of which, all the three means of Cognition function—in the shape of Perception, Inference and Presumption.—(2649–2651)

The following *Text* sets forth the objection to the above view:—

TEXT (2652).

THE POTENCY CANNOT BE COGNISED IN THE MANNER SUGGESTED; BECAUSE THE PHENOMENON IS QUITE EXPLICABLE OTHERWISE; FOR INSTANCE, THERE IS NO DIFFICULTY IN THE COMPREHENSION OF THE MEANING OF THE WORD FROM THE WORD ITSELF AS AIDED BY CONVENTION.—(2652)

COMMENTARY.

This shows the inconclusive character of the Presumption (cited by the *Mīmāmsaka*);—the sense is that even without the eternal Relationship, the phenomenon of comprehension of the meaning of words can be explained, as shown.—(2652)

The assumption of the Potency is not right,—not only because there is nothing to prove its existence, but also because the very notion of it is annulled by proofs.—This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (2653–2655)

UNDER THE VIEW THAT THE POTENCY IS ETERNAL, THERE CAN BE NO NEED FOR ANYTHING IN THE SHAPE OF CONVENTION AND THE REST; AND THE COMPREHENSION OF THE MEANING OF THE WORD WOULD BE THERE AT ALL TIMES.—IF A WORD HAD THE POTENCY OF EXPRESSING OTHER MEANINGS ALSO,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE WORDS '*Kali*' AND '*Mārya*'—IT COULD NOT BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THOSE OTHER MEANINGS; AS THE POTENCY OF THE WORD IS RESTRICTED.—IS THE POTENCY HELD TO BE INDICATIVE OF THE SEVERAL MEANINGS, ONE OR DIVERSE? IF IT IS *one*, THEN AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME, THERE SHOULD BE COMPREHENSION OF THE SEVERAL MEANINGS OF THE ONE WORD ALL AT ONCE.—(2653–2655)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—Words that are expressive of things through the aid of Convention cannot have any eternal relationships,—e.g. such words as '*gāvī*' and the like;—all Vedic as well as secular words like '*go*' (Cow) are expressive of meanings through the help of Convention;—hence there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the contrary;—'dependence' being included under 'presence of non-eternal relationship', which is 'contrary' to the 'presence of eternal relationship'.

That this is so is going to be proved later on. On the present occasion ... the Invariable Concomitance is pointed out. It is through Relationship

in the form of *Potency,* —which is what brings about the comprehension of the meaning,—that Words are held to have a permanent relationship ;—thus Potency, being eternal, cannot be helped by anything else ;—hence it cannot need any such aids as the Convention and the like. Under the circumstances, the comprehension of the meaning of the word should be there at all times.

Further, such a Potency could either be restricted to one meaning or restricted to several meanings ?—If it is restricted to *several* meanings, is the potency of one Word to bring about the cognition of the several meanings, *one* or *several* ?—These are the only alternatives possible.

Under the first alternative, there could be no comprehension of meanings as is found in such cases as—when a different Convention has been set up in reference to diverse times and places, the Word actually expresses another meaning ; as for instance, in the case of the words '*Kali*' and '*Mārya*' as used among the *Draviḍas* and the *Āryas,* which respectively denote (among one people) 'the last point of time' (death ?) and the 'Peril of too much Rain' (?) ;—no comprehension would be possible as the Potency will have been restricted to one meaning only; as in the case of the Eye and other organs of perception ; the Eye certainly is not capable of being made by Convention to bring about the apprehension of Taste, etc.

Under the second alternative also, there would be the possibility of all men comprehending the meaning of the Word at one and the same time.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'*Of the one word, etc. etc.*'.—(2653-2655)

Another objection is pointed out against the same view :—

TEXTS (2656-2657).

AS THE POTENCY INDICATIVE OF THE MEANING REMAINS THERE AT ALL TIMES, THE COMPREHENSION OF THE MEANING BROUGHT ABOUT BY IT WOULD ALSO BE THERE AT ALL TIMES AND FOR ALL MEN.—IF, FOR THAT, IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE POTENCY IS DEPENDENT UPON CONVENTION, THEN IT WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON A HELPER ; AND BEING *helped,* IT COULD NOT BE PERMANENT, ETERNAL.—(2656-2657)

COMMENTARY.

'*For that*'—i.e. for the comprehension of the meaning.

'*Sā*'—the Potency.

'*Achalā*'—Eternal.—This is the reason why the Potency cannot be 'helped'.—(2656-2657)

Even granting the dependence of the Potency upon Convention ;—the Author points out another objection :—

TEXT (2658).

INASMUCH AS THE CONVENTION THAT SERVES TO INDICATE THE MEANING IS DEPENDENT UPON MAN,—THERE WOULD BE POSSIBILITY OF 'FALSITY' (MISTAKE) IN THE POTENCY, EVEN THOUGH BORN OTHERWISE.—(2658)

COMMENTARY.

With the view that you may have a clear and correct conception of the meanings of words, you have discarded the agency of man (in the matter of the Potency of words), regarding him as the source of confusion and mistake. —But when words used by certain persons become confounded regarding their exact signification,—then the Vedic scholars would have an equal Cognition of all those significations, and would they not themselves make a confusion among them ? Specially as those people would not be cognisant of the truth. Thus then the Convention would be dependent upon the whims of men ; and who could restrain this whim whence it has begun to operate, in the case of men ignorant of the truth ?—Thus the Convention born of the unrestrained whim would itself be unrestrained and hostile : and being so, why should it avoid the wrong signification ?—(2658)

Taking for granted (for the sake of argument) that the Word has the Potency of expressing several meanings,—the Author proceeds to point out another objection :—

TEXTS (2659-2660).

A SINGLE WORD MAY HAVE THE POTENCY TO EXPRESS SEVERAL MEANINGS. EVEN SO, SUCH THINGS AS THE '*Agnihotra*' AND THE LIKE, CANNOT ALL BE OF USE TO ALL MEN ; BECAUSE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY MAY EXPRESS THINGS CONTRARY TO WHAT IS DESIRED BY A CERTAIN PERSON. HENCE YOUR ASSUMPTION OF AN ETERNAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORD AND ITS MEANING IS ENTIRELY FUTILE.—(2659-2660)

COMMENTARY.

Even though words may have the capacity of expressing several meanings,—the things denoted by them are not capable of all effective actions ; as the causal efficiency of all things is restricted. If it were not so, then there would be nothing *destructive* or *non-destructive*.—Thus then, when one wishes to speak of something capable of accomplishing a particular fruitful act,—and proceeds to set about the Convention in connection with a Word which by its nature is capable of expressing things,—he should set up only that Convention which would be conducive to the expression of only that particular thing which he desires to speak of ;—but how could this be secured ? Thus, there being a possibility of mistake, there is no

point in assuming an eternal relationship between Words and Meanings.—(2659-2660)

The author again proceeds to point out the futility of the assumption—

TEXTS (2661-2662).

WHEN THERE IS NEED FOR THE CONVENTION, WHY ARE YOU SEEKING TO BOLSTER UP, WITHOUT REASON, THE 'RELATIONSHIP' IN THE SHAPE OF THE ETERNAL POTENCY?—IN THE MATTER OF EXPRESSING THE MEANING, THERE IS NOT FOUND, APART FROM CONVENTION, ANY OPERATION OF SUCH A FULL-FLEDGED ENTITY AS THE 'RELATIONSHIP'.—(2661-2662)

COMMENTARY.

If the Relationship, by its mere presence, were the cause of the cognition of the meaning, then, there would be such cognition even in a man who is ignorant of the Convention. Hence the need of Convention must be admitted. That being so, it being admitted that Convention is a means of comprehending the meaning,—why is any such thing bolstered up as a full-fledged entity in the shape of the eternal Relationship,—without any reason? Because the function of the Relationship would lie in the bringing about of the comprehension of the meaning; and if this is brought about by Convention, what is the use of assuming an eternal Relationship?—It has also been explained hundreds of times that being eternal, it cannot have any peculiar feature imposed upon it; and hence it cannot need the help of anything else.

If causal efficiency is attributed to a thing which has never been found to be efficient,—then why cannot it be assumed that on obtaining the *Harītakī*, the Celestial Beings would have their bowels moved?—(2661-2662)

In the following *text*, the author points out again the impossibility of the functioning of the Relationship in question:—

TEXT (2663).

ANY FUNCTIONING (OF THE RELATIONSHIP) HAS NEVER BEEN PERCEIVED, IN THE ABSENCE OF CONVENTION.—IF IT BE ASSERTED THAT THE RELATIONSHIP PROCEEDS FROM THE CONVENTION,—THEN DISASTROUS INDEED WOULD SUCH A REGRESS BE.—(2663)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tasmāt*'—stands for the Convention.

'*Disastrous, etc. etc.*';—as there would be an infinite regress involved in the assumption of something as the 'cause', whose capacity has never been

perceived. For instance, having assumed the Relationship, wherefore could you not go on assuming other causes with unknown potencies? 'Unseen Potency' would be common to both cases. And so on and on, there would be a disastrous regress.—(2663)

Having thus established the Invariable Concomitance (Premiss) of the Reasoning annulling the opponent's conclusion, the Author sums up the argument that mere 'Presumption' is 'inconclusive',—a fact which has been explained before already :—

TEXT (2664).

ALL USAGE BECOMES EXPLICABLE ON THE BASIS OF MERE CONVENTION PROCEEDING FROM THE WHIMS OF MEN; HENCE THERE IS NO REASON FOR POSTULATING THE RELATIONSHIP.—(2664)

COMMENTARY.

'*The Relationship*'—i.e. as an *eternal* factor.—(2664)

All this being established, the Author next proceeds to point out the self-contradiction involved in the argument of the *Mīmāmsaka*, set forth under *Text* 2273, to the effect that—"For all persons ignorant of the Connection, the Connection becomes known through long-continued tradition, etc. etc.".—

TEXTS (2665-2666).

IT IS MERELY SUSPECTED THAT THERE CAN BE NO OTHER EXPLANATION FOR USAGE; BUT THAT DOES NOT BRING ABOUT THE PROPER COGNITION OF THE CONNECTION (OR RELATIONSHIP) WHICH IS BEYOND THE SENSES.—AS ALL MEN WOULD BE IGNORANT, THERE COULD BE NO 'LONG-CONTINUED TRADITION' WHICH COULD ESTABLISH THE CONNECTION IN QUESTION. HOW THEN CAN SUCH AN ASSUMPTION BE MADE? —(2665-2666)

COMMENTARY.

If all men are ignorant,—then every preceding generation would also be ignorant; under the circumstances, how could the Connection be established by that tradition? No 'tradition' of Blind people ever tends to bring about the right cognition of Colour; as says *Shabara* in his *Bhāṣya*—'In matters like these mere human assertion cannot bring about right cognition, just as the word of the blind cannot bring about the right cognition of Colour'.

The following might be urged—"All men are called 'ignorant', in the sense that they cannot perceive things beyond the senses, and not that they do not know anything at all. And it is on the strength of the fact that

Verbal usage is otherwise inexplicable that it is believed with certainty that there have been generations of experienced men who have been duly cognisant (of the Connection in question)".

This is not right; because Verbal usage could proceed also on another basis—that of *Convention*. It has not been quite definitely ascertained, but it is doubtful whether this is eternal or non-eternal.—This is the reason why the Text has used the expression—'*it is suspected*'.—What is meant is that on the basis of the said 'Presumption', all that is sought to be proved is the mere *existence* of the Relationship; it indicates nothing about the peculiar feature of it;—that is, because there is no concomitance with such a feature. On this point, there is no difference between Presumption and Inference.

The following might be urged—"As a matter of fact, no non-eternal thing has ever been found to bring about the cognition of the meanings of words; nor can this be possible, as has been explained before; and it is this incapacity of the non-eternal that proves the Relationship (which brings about the said Cognition) to be eternal.

This same argument, however, can be urged against the *eternal* thing also. The Reason adduced is also 'inadmissible'; for instance, it can be said, with equal justification, that the *eternal* Relationship also has never been found to bring about the cognition of the meaning; and further, such things as gestures by the hand, etc., even though non-eternal, are actually found to be expressive of meanings; hence the Opponent's Reason is 'inadmissible'. Hence it cannot be admitted that "it is *not possible* for the non-eternal thing to bring about the cognition of the meaning". On the other hand, it is in the case of the *eternal* thing that the said expression cannot be right; because of the incongruity involved in the affective activity of the eternal thing being consecutive or concurrent.—What has been said therefore, deserves no consideration.—(2665-2666)

Having thus summed up the 'Inconclusiveness' of Presumption, the Author now sums up the argument to the contrary, annulling that Presumption:—

TEXT (2667).

FOR THESE REASONS, ALL SUCH WORDS AS 'COW', 'HORSE' AND SO FORTH CANNOT HAVE ANY ETERNAL RELATIONSHIPS,—BECAUSE THEY ARE DEPENDENT UPON CONVENTION,—LIKE SUCH WORDS AS '*gāvī*' AND THE LIKE.—(2667)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tat*'—Therefore.

'*Nityasambandhayoginaḥ*'—to be construed with '*na*'.

The formulation of this argument has been presented before.—(2667)

Says the Opponent:—"Such words as '*gāvī*' and the like are incorrect (grammatically); and as such these are not truly *expressive*; hence your

Corroborative Instance is inadmissible. This has been thus asserted by *Kumārila* (in *Shlokavārtika*—Eternality of Words, 276)—'For us, the word *Go* is eternal, and people have the idea of the animal Cow from such vulgar deformations of it as *Gāvī* and the like only when they resemble the original correct word *Go*; and the use of the incorrect form is due to incapacity'—The meaning of this is as follows:—The correct word *Go* being truly expressive, when people say that the idea of the Cow is derived also from the use of the incorrect (corrupt) words as *Gāvī* and the like, the said idea is *not* provided, by these incorrect words.—Then how does it arise?—It arises from its being like the original correct word *Go*;—this (use of the corrupt word) is due to the incapacity of the man to pronounce the correct form '*go*';—from this arises the peculiar action of the Palate and other Speech-centres, from which follows the utterance of the corrupt word *gāvī*. *Bhartṛhari* also has declared as follows:—'The child, on being taught, says *amba, amba* (Mother, Mother) in the indistinct form, and yet people knowing the correct word have the definite cognition from it; in the same manner, when the correct word should be used, if one uses the incorrect form, from that there is inferred a certain meaning through the intervention of the correct word'".

This idea is set forth in the following:—

TEXT (2668).

"THE CAPABLE (EXPRESSIVE) WORD '*go*' BEING THERE, IF THE IDEA OF THE COW ARISES FROM THE USE OF THE CORRUPT FORM 'GĀVĪ',—IT IS DUE TO ITS RESEMBLING THE ORIGINAL (CORRECT) WORD;—SUCH USE BEING DUE TO THE INCAPACITY (OF THE SPEAKER)."—(2668)

COMMENTARY.

The above argument is answered in the following:—

TEXTS (2669-2670).

THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT. HOW CAN ANY SUCH COGNITION OF THE RIGHT MEANING APPEAR ON ACCOUNT OF THE RESEMBLANCE TO THE ORIGINAL CORRECT WORD, AMONG FISHERMEN, ETC., WHO ARE IGNORANT OF THE SANSKRIT LANGUAGE?—FOR THESE REASONS IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED THAT THERE IS AN ETERNAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORDS AND MEANINGS. IT CAN ONLY BE BASED UPON CONVENTION; AS THAT IS POSSIBLE IN ALL CASES.—(2669-2670)

COMMENTARY.

'*Shanaka*' is the Fisherman.—'*Etc.*' includes the *Mlechchhas* and other people. In the case of these men what really happens is that it is only when

things are spoken of by correct Sanskrit words that they become confounded; hence in such cases, the cognition of the meaning cannot be due to resemblance to the original correct word.—(2669-2670)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under *Text* 2277, that—" Dissolution may be there in the form of the destruction of particular countries or the destruction of particular families, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2671–2673).

IF THERE BE DISSOLUTION IN THE FORM OF THE DESTRUCTION OF PARTICULAR COUNTRIES OR THE DESTRUCTION OF PARTICULAR FAMILIES,—OR IN THE FORM OF THAT UNDENIABLE DESTRUCTION POSTULATED BY THE BUDDHIST,—WHICH IS SUSPECTED OF AFFECTING BRAHMĀ, ETC. ALSO,—SUCH DESTRUCTION WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE VEDA ALSO. HENCE ANY SUBSEQUENT IDEAS THAT MIGHT APPEAR (AS BASED UPON THE VEDA) WOULD BE ONE WHOSE BASIS HAS BEEN DESTROYED, AND IT MIGHT BE ASSUMED THAT THEY MAY ALL BE FALSE AND WRONG, ARISING FROM DELUSION, STUPEFACTION, AND SUCH OTHER SOURCES; AND HENCE THE *Veda* NOW AVAILABLE WOULD BE ONLY A MERE SEMBLANCE OF THE ORIGINAL.—ALL THESE NOTIONS MIGHT GO ON ARISING UNTIL REASONS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO THE CONTRARY.—(2671–2673)

COMMENTARY.

The view held is as follows:—We also do not speak of a dissolution consisting in the disappearance of all words; nor do we admit of a beginningless Personality who creates and destroys the world. What we hold is that the entire universe is beginningless;—Verbal usage also (according to us) goes on, based upon Conceptions arising from beginningless Impressions.—But as regards the 'Dissolution' that you have described, as consisting in the 'destruction of particular countries' or the 'destruction of particular families',—as also the Buddhist's idea of Dissolution consisting in the withdrawal of the energy of Fire, Water and Air,—extending (*a*) horizontally over the '*Trisāhasra-mahāsāhasra*', (*b*) downwards to the very limits of the atmospheric Air, and (*c*) upwards, gradually, to the First, Second and Third stages of '*Dhyāna*',—which cannot be negatived by any proofs, and is therefore '*undeniable*',—which it is suspected, affects *Brahmā* and other Beings also;—under both these forms of Dissolution (one posited by the Opponent and the other by the Buddhist), the destruction of the Veda would be quite possible; and it would also be justifiable to assume that what is asserted there is all wrong; so that what is now known as the 'Veda' is something quite

different from the original, of which it is a mere 'Semblance', a mere husk, masquerading as the real Veda.—Such a suspicion is quite possible, and cannot be easily shaken off, until there are proofs to the contrary.—(2671–2673)

The following might be urged—"There *is* a proof annulling your conclusion. For instance, throughout the country men cannot alter the text of the Veda; from this we conclude that it has been so in the past and is going to be so in the future".

In anticipation of this, the author provides the following answer :—

TEXTS (2674-2675).

As a matter of fact, if there were a desire to alter the text of the Veda, the Words could not remain the same,—so also if there were no such desire in the minds of men,—then and not otherwise, could there be an impossibility of regarding the Veda and its meaning being other than the one usually accepted.—Even if this desire is not there, the suspicion does not altogether disappear.—(2674-2675)

COMMENTARY.

If it were a fact that even when one has the desire to alter the text of the Veda, there is no change in the words of the Veda,—or if the desire itself to change the text were impossible to be produced,—then alone could it be taken as proved that man has no capacity to alter the Vedic text; but that conclusion also could not apply to all men; as the mere non-perception (of such change) does not prove anything; and also because there is difference in the capacities of men.—As a matter of fact, however, it is quite possible for man to alter the text of the Vedic passages—such as '*Shanno devīrabhiṣṭayē, etc.*'—or to explain them as meaning something quite different from what they are regarded as meaning. For instance, we find that even *Mīmāṁsakas* and the Author of the *Nirukta* and others do often differ among themselves regarding the explanation of Vedic texts.—Hence the doubts regarding its veracity and fidelity cannot cease altogether.—(2674–2675)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṁsaka* under *Text* 2286, that—"The Order of sequence is not a product; it is always accepted as an established entity, etc. etc.",—where certain objections have been answered.

The rejoinder to that is as follows :—

TEXTS (2676–2678).

THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE IS NOT ACCEPTED BY ALL MEN AS FIXED FOR ALL; IN FACT, PEOPLE ADOPT THE ORDER OF WORDS AND SENTENCES AND LETTERS ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN WISH. IF THAT WERE NOT SO, THEN, FOR YOU, LIKE THE VEDA, THERE WOULD BE NO BOOK WRITTEN BY MEN; SO THAT THE COMPOSING OF ALL MEANINGLESS (OR WICKED) WORKS IS RENDERED IMPOSSIBLE AT ONE STROKE! BECAUSE THERE COULD BE NO CERTAINTY THAT THIS MAN IS UTTERING WORDS EXACTLY AS THEY HAD BEEN USED PREVIOUSLY BY OTHERS,—THEREFORE LIKE THE RELATIONSHIP, THEY ALSO COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS *beginningless*.—(2676–2678)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*padavākya, etc.*' is to be expounded as—'*pada*'—words —'*vākya*'—sentences—'*akṣara*'—letters;—the '*krama*'—order of sequence—of these.

'*Anarthagrantha, etc. etc.*'—construe as '*Kṛtiḥ dhvastā*', 'composing has been rendered impossible'.

'*Anarthagrantha*'—is a work which has no '*artha*'—sense; i.e. such meaningless sentences as 'ten pomegranates' and the like.—Or '*anartha*' may be 'works contrary to the Veda', *wicked*,—like those formulating the Buddhist doctrines, for instance.—The term '*mātra*' denotes *universality*. —'*kṛti*', doing, composing.—'*tathā*'—like the *Veda*.—

'*Aniyati*'—no certainty; i.e. there would be no certainty on the point.

'*Tat*'—Therefore.—(2676–2678)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2291, that—"The idea in the mind of every speaker is that 'I am uttering words that have been used by other persons'; this in itself makes them eternal, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2679).

THE IDEA THAT 'I AM USING THE WORDS THAT HAVE BEEN USED BY OTHER PERSONS' WOULD PROCEED FROM ILLUSION, DUE TO THE RECOGNITION OF SIMILARITY; JUST AS THERE IS IN THE CASE OF ACTS.—(2679)

COMMENTARY.

'*Karmabhēdavat*'—the '*vati*'—affix added after the Locative ending.

This points out the possibility of the recognition of similarity leading to a conclusion contrary to that desired by the other party, and thereby indicates its 'inconclusiveness' as a reason in support of the latter.—(2679)

The following might be urged—"How is it known that this is an illusion ?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (2680-2681).

As a matter of fact, the words uttered by a man are not exactly those used by others; as there are always differences of Accent and other details.—These latter are not properties belonging to the manifesting agency; because they are always perceived in the form of Letters. Consequently the Letters pronounced by each man must be regarded as distinct,—like the Jar and such things. This difference being quite clear, why are you denying the signs of that difference ?—(2680-2681)

COMMENTARY.

'*Accents*'—such as the '*Udātta*' and the rest.

'*Other details*'—including swiftness, slowness, and middling.

'*These are not properties, etc. etc.*'—'*These*'—i.e. Accent, etc.

"Why ?"

Because these Accents, etc. are always perceived in the shape of Letters; i.e. they are known as such.

'*The signs of that*'—The signs of the difference of the Letters.

'*Why are you denying*'—in the words 'there is no other sign for you' (*Text* 2291).—(2680-2681)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under *Text* 2292, that—"Just as in the case of the Jar and such things, etc. etc.".

The answer to that is as follows :—

TEXT (2682).

The idea that 'in the case of the Jar, etc. their use is characterised and indicated by the "Universal"' has already been discarded; because the Universal does not exist, and because it can have no connection with the Individual thing.—(2682)

COMMENTARY.

'*Already*'—under the chapter dealing with the 'Universal'.

'*Because it does not exist*'—i.e. because the Universal has no existence.

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Even if it exists, it can have no connection with the Individual thing, in the shape of the Jar; because it cannot be benefited by this latter. Hence its use cannot be regarded as characterised or indicated by the 'Universal'.—(2682)

The following *text* points out that, as a consequence of what has gone above, it follows that all that has been alleged by the other party on the basis of the 'Universal' is entirely irrelevant.—

TEXT (2683).

ALL SUCH *Universals*, THEREFORE, AS 'PALATE' AND THE REST VARY IN ALL MEN; CONSEQUENTLY WHEN THE SPEAKER UTTERS WORD-SOUNDS, HE DOES NOT DO SO THROUGH THOSE UNIVERSALS.—(2683)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṁsaka*, under *Text* 2294, that—"there are distinct Universals of the Articulations which serve to bring about the manifestation of the Word-Sounds, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2684).

THUS THERE ARE NO DISTINCT UNIVERSALS OF THESE ARTICULATIONS WHICH COULD SERVE TO BRING ABOUT THE MANIFESTATION OF THE WORD-SOUNDS; NOR ARE THERE AS MANY OF THESE AS THERE ARE LETTERS.—(2684)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tat*'—Therefore; thus.—(2684)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṁsaka*, under *Text* 2295, that—"The order of sequence among the Articulations would be due to the order among the Conjunctions and Disjunctions of the Palate, etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2685).

NOR, AS ASSERTED BY YOU, COULD THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE AMONG THE ARTICULATIONS BE DUE TO THE ORDER AMONG THE CONJUNCTIONS AND DISJUNCTIONS OF THE PALATE, ETC.; NOR COULD THE ETERNALITY OF BOTH BE DUE TO THEIR RESPECTIVE UNIVERSALS.—(2685)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṁsaka*, in *Text* 2296, that—"Just as in the case of Moving About and other actions, there is an order of sequence,

through the Universal subsisting in the various factors of the Action, etc. etc.".

As against this, it is pointed out in the following *Text* that the Corroborative Instance, 'Moving About, etc.' is 'inadmissible':—

TEXT (2686).

JUST AS IN THE ACTIONS OF MOVING ABOUT, ETC. THERE IS *no* ORDER OF SEQUENCE THROUGH THE UNIVERSALS,—SO TOO THERE IS *none* AMONG THE PALATE, ETC., THE ARTICULATION AND THE LETTER.—(2686)

COMMENTARY.

That is, because the very idea of the 'Universal' itself has been discarded.—(2686)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka* under *Text* 2297, that—"The individual Articulations themselves being extremely subtle, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2687).

THE COGNITION OF THE PROPERTIES OF THE UNIVERSAL *cannot* BE DUE TO THE SUBTLE NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUALS; *nor* CAN THERE BE, THROUGH THIS, THE COGNITION OF ORDER AMONG THE LETTERS, EVEN THOUGH THESE ARE ALL-PERVADING.—(2687)

COMMENTARY.

The second line is the answer to what has been asserted by the *Mīmāmsaka* in the second line of *Text* 2297.—(2687)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka* in *Text* 2298, that—"The Letters following up the properties of the Articulations, which appear there as eternal, become expressive of diverse meanings".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2688).

CONSEQUENTLY, THE LETTERS, FOLLOWING THE PROPERTIES OF THE ARTICULATIONS WHICH APPEAR AS ETERNAL, *cannot* BECOME EXPRESSIVE OF DIVERSE MEANINGS.—(2688)

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted by the *Mīmāmsaka* in *Text* 2294, that—"there are distinct Universals of the Articulations, etc. etc.".

Admitting this (for the sake of argument) the Author proceeds to point out objections against the idea of the 'Universal':—

TEXTS (2689-2690).

THERE IS ANOTHER POINT: GRANTING THAT 'THERE ARE UNIVERSALS WHICH SERVE TO MANIFEST THE SOUNDS, AND THERE ARE AS MANY OF THESE AS THERE ARE LETTERS',—UNDER THIS VIEW, AS THE MANIFESTER WOULD BE ALWAYS THERE, THE SOUND SHOULD BE HEARD AT ALL TIMES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE AMONG THE LETTER-SOUNDS CANNOT BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORDER OF THE MANIFESTATIONS.—(2689-2690)

COMMENTARY.

The several particles used here are to be taken as serving the purpose of introduction.

'*Iti*'—for this reason.

The meaning thus comes to be this:—As Universals are the manifesters of the Word-Sound, there should be apprehension of the Sounds at all times. And as there is no order of sequence among the manifestations . . .

[The passage is corrupt and full of *lacunæ*; hence unintelligible].—(2689-2690)

Granting (for the sake of argument) the relationship between the Universal and the Individual, the Author proceeds to point out objections—

TEXTS (2691-2692).

IF THE UNIVERSALS CONTINUE TO EXIST AS RELATED TO THE INDIVIDUALS, THE ETERNALITY OF THE INDIVIDUALS ALSO IS IRRESISTIBLE. OR (CONVERSELY), IF THE INDIVIDUALS EXIST AS RELATED TO THE UNIVERSALS, THEN THE UNIVERSALS ALSO SHOULD BE NON-ETERNAL, EVEN IF YOU DO NOT RELISH IT.—(2691-2692)

COMMENTARY.

Every Relationship subsists between two relatives; Universals are regarded as eternal; hence what exists in the form related to the Universal, must itself be eternal. Otherwise the Universals would not have their form consisting of the relationship of the Individuals. Similarly, as Individuals are held to be non-eternal, the Universals, which consist in the relationship to these, must also be non-eternal. If the Individuals are non-eternal, the

Universals must also be non-eternal. If it were not so, then, while one of the two relatives would be there in a perfect condition, it cannot be right for the other to be imperfect; as in that case, the Relationship itself would cease.—(2691-2692)

Another objection, urged before, is reiterated—

TEXT (2693).

THE FACT THAT THERE CAN BE NO CONNECTION WITH *manifestation* HAVING BEEN ALREADY ESTABLISHED, THE LETTERS THUS COULD NEVER BE EXPRESSIVE.—(2693)

COMMENTARY.

(Corrupt.)

It has been asserted by the *Mīmāmsaka* under *Text* 2300, that—" Time is one, all-pervading, eternal, etc. etc. "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2694–2698).

TIME, AS SOMETHING ONE, ALL-PERVADING AND ETERNAL, HAS ALREADY BEEN REJECTED; NOR IS IT MANIFESTED IN ALL THINGS, LIKE THE LETTERS, BY ANYTHING; AND IF IT IS MANIFESTED IN THE LETTERS, IT CANNOT FORM A FACTOR IN THE EXPRESSION OF THE MEANING OF WORDS;—AS IT IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM OTHER THINGS,—AND AS IT DOES NOT EXIST ELSEWHERE, IT CANNOT BE ETERNAL.—THUS THEN, THE ORDER OF THE LETTERS,—AS ALSO THEIR SHORTNESS, LENGTH, ETC.—ARE ALL ADJUNCTS OF THE ARTICULATION, AND ARE NOT SO MANY PHASES OF TIME.—THUS FOR YOU, THERE IS NO PROPERTY IN WORDS WHICH IS ETERNAL; HENCE IT BECOMES ESTABLISHED THAT THE WORD IS NOT-ETERNAL,—FOR THOSE WHO REGARD THE LETTER AS NON-ETERNAL.—NOR COULD IT FORM PART OF THE PROPERTY OF ANYTHING ELSE,—LIKE THE FLEETNESS OF THE HORSE,—IF IT WERE ASSUMED THAT THE MANIFESTING COGNITIONS BRING ABOUT THE MANIFESTATION OF THE WORDS.—(2694–2698)

COMMENTARY.

'*Already*'—under the chapter on the 'Six Categories'.

'*It is not manifested by anything*'—simply because it does not exist;—even if it existed, the manifestation of the eternal thing would also be eternal.

'*Not different from other things*'—i.e. it is non-different from other things. Because the nature of the Time that is manifested in the phenomenon consisting of the seed-sprout-creeper does not in any way differ from that which is manifested in the Letters.***** (Lacunæ in Text).

'*Not phases of time*'—because there is no such thing as Time. Even if it exists, its divisibility is not admitted.

The rest is easily intelligible.—(2694–2698)

TEXTS (2699–2704).

THE PRESUMPTION PUT FORWARD IN SUPPORT OF THE ETERNALITY OF ALL THINGS HAS BEEN ALREADY DISCARDED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN PROVED THAT THE COMPREHENSION OF THE MEANINGS OF WORDS IS POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN WORDS ARE NOT ETERNAL.—WHEN ONE LETTER-SOUND IS PRODUCED BY THE 'DESIRE TO UTTER,' FOLLOWING FROM THE DESIRE TO UTTER ANOTHER LETTER-SOUND,—THE FORMER IS HEARD IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE LATTER;—THE COGNITION PROCEEDING FROM THE COGNITION OF THE PRECEDING LETTER IS NOT HEARD VERY QUICKLY; IN FACT, WITH THE AID OF THE REMEMBRANCES OF THE PREVIOUS LETTERS, THE LATTER BRINGS ABOUT ITS OWN REMEMBRANCE LATER ON. THUS IT HAS THE CHARACTER OF AN *Effect*, IN RELATION TO THE COGNITIONS LEADING UP TO, AND APPREHENDING, IT.—OR, THE ORDER OF THE LETTERS MAY BE DEPENDENT UPON MEN. FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE LETTERS CLEARLY VARY WITH EACH WORD; AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF SUCH WORDS AS '*Dama*'-'*Mada*', '*Latā*'-'*Tāla*' ETC., WHERE THE LETTERS ARE THE SAME BUT THEIR ORDER DIFFERENT IN THE TWO WORDS. IT IS UNDER THIS ORDER OF SEQUENCE THAT THESE WORDS BECOME EXPRESSIVE OF DIFFERENT MEANINGS.—CONSEQUENTLY, THE ASSUMPTION OF THE '*Sphoṭa*' ALSO IS ABSOLUTELY FUTILE IN THIS CONNECTION.—(2699–2704)

COMMENTARY.

'*The Presumption has been discarded.*'—Under *Text* 2617, it has been shown that the Presumption is wrong and also annulled by other means of Cognition.

[The text is corrupt.]

The upshot of the whole of this argument is as follows:—In the 'chain' of the Speaker, from his desire to speak, there arises a series of Cognitions, each member of which is produced by its predecessor;—and these ideas arouse each Letter-sound; thus the several Letter-sounds come about; and these directly produce, in the 'chain' of the Hearer, successive Cognitions,—each member of which is helped by its predecessor; later on, these Cognitions

bring about successive remembrances relating to themselves, indirectly in due order.

Consequently, these Remembrances come to be regarded as 'effects' in relation to the cognitions appearing in the Speaker's 'chain', which have given rise to the Remembrances; while in relation to the cognitions appearing in the Hearer's 'chain', they come to be regarded as the 'Cause'. Herein lies their 'order of sequence';—nowhere else. Thus, as the character of the Letters in every word, is variable,—sometimes appearing as causes and sometimes as effects,—it is only right that in the case of such similar words as '*sara*' and '*rasa*', the resultant cognitions should be different. But this cannot be right if the Letters and words are *eternal*; as eternal things retain the same form at all times. Nor in their case can any order of sequence be regarded as something different from themselves. Even if it were something different, there would be no relationship between them; this is what is really meant.

The meaning of the words of the *Text* is now explained:—'*When one Letter-sound is produced*'—such is the construction.—In the case of such words as '*sadā*' and '*samaya*', there is the vowel '*a*' after '*s*',—there is desire to utter this arising from the desire to utter '*s*'; hence this is 'another desire'.—What is meant is as follows:—In the Speaker's 'Chain', there is one 'desire to utter' following from another, and so on; this desire is followed by the Letter-Sound produced,—this Sound brings about the Remembrance; such is the connection with what follows in the text later on.

Having thus described the fact of the Letters being 'effects' of the series of 'desires to speak' in the Speaker's 'Chain',—the author proceeds to point out the fact of its being the 'cause' of the cognitions appearing in the Hearer's 'Chain'—'*The former is heard, etc. etc.*'—'*Tasya*' refers to '*yaḥ*' in the previous line;—its hearing is produced, *it is heard*—'*immediately*'—without anything intervening.

Having thus shown that it is the cause of the Hearer's Cognition, the author now proceeds to show that it is the cause of Remembrance.—'*Not heard very quickly*'—quick hearing being incapable of being produced by Remembrance.—'*The latter*'—i.e. the later 'Letter'.—'*Remembrances*'—of the previous Letters in the chain.—'*With the aid*'—with the help of it, it arouses the Remembrance with regard to itself;—'*the cognitions leading up to, and apprehending, it*',—'*it*' stands for the *Letter*;—this is to be treated as a Copulative Compound; or even as a *Tatpuruṣa* or *Karmadhāraya*;—and in relation to these cognitions, these are 'effects'; but they are 'causes' in relation to the subsequent cognitions and remembrances.

Having thus discarded the idea of the 'order' being something different (from the Letters or Words), the Author proceeds next to discard the view of the Grammarians that the 'word' that is expressive is of the nature of a '*Sphoṭa*', which is something entirely different from the Letter-sounds,—by the sentence beginning with 'Consequently'.—(2699–2704)

[It has to be noted that the commentary is very incomplete in the printed text; and much of the translation there is based upon mere surmise.]

TEXTS (2705-2706).

THE '*Sphoṭa*' HAS BEEN ASSUMED BY THE GRAMMARIANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPLAINING THE COGNITION OF THE MEANINGS OF WORDS. —BUT THE LETTERS THEMSELVES BEING COMPETENT TO EXPRESS THE MEANING OF WORDS, THE ASSUMING OF THE SAID *Sphoṭa* IS FUTILE. AS IT WOULD BE PERCEPTIBLE (IF IT EXISTED), BUT IS NOT PERCEIVED, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT IT DOES NOT EXIST.—IF IT IS IMPERCEPTIBLE, THEN IT CANNOT BE INDICATIVE; LIKE THE INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE (WHICH IS EFFECTIVE ONLY WHEN PERCEIVED). —(2705-2706)

COMMENTARY.

[There is a lacuna in the text of the Commentary].

'*As it would be perceptible, etc. etc.*'—Nothing apart from the Letters,—in the form of Word, eternal and indivisible,—is ever perceived by auditory perception. On the contrary, what is clearly proved is the fact that no such '*Sphoṭa*' exists at all.

If the second view is accepted .... [the reference is clearly to the lacuna]—the cause could be either *positive* or *negative* or *both* positive and negative,—these are the only alternatives possible.—According to the first view (?) .... the Cause could be either the property of what is called '*Sphoṭa*', or that of something else. It cannot be the former, as the *Sphoṭa* itself has been shown to be non-existent. Nor could it be the property of something else; because it could not subsist in the 'subject'; just like the 'arms and feet' in the proving of the non-eternality of the Jar (?).—Nor could the cause be the property of something *negative*; as that could prove only the contrary of what is desired.—Nor could it be both *positive* and *negative*; as that is always 'inconclusive'.

Then again, is the '*Sphoṭa*' proved by a Reason based upon the nature of the thing? Or by one based upon the Causal Relationship?—The former view cannot be right; because as it is beyond the senses, its *nature* cannot be known; if it were known, there would be no point in seeking for the proof of its existence; as its nature would be already known; and the whole attempt is to prove its existence and nature.—Nor is the second view acceptable, because no *causal relation* can be known in relation to what is beyond the senses.

It might be argued as follows:—"In the case of the Auditory and other perceptions, when it is found that they appear only occasionally, it is concluded that they are dependent upon other causes also; and from that, by implication, it is concluded that there is the Auditory *organ*; in the same manner, in the case in question, the comprehension of meaning being the 'subject', it is found that even when the Letters are the same,—as in the case of the words '*sara*' and '*rasa*'—the meanings comprehended are

different; from which we shall infer the presence of another Cause, in the shape of the '*Sphoṭa*'".

This also cannot be right; because nothing apart from the Letters is known. As it has just been established that it is the Letters themselves which, varying in each Word, become capable of bringing about the comprehension of the meaning, through the variations in the relation of Cause and Effect. So that the assumption in question is entirely futile.

It is also implied that the same objections apply also to the view that the existence of the '*Sphoṭa*' can be *inferred.*

It might be argued that—"it is not to be *inferred,* but it is absolutely imperceptible".

The answer to that is—'*If it is imperceptible, etc. etc.*'—Just as the Inferential Indicative, while it is itself unknown, does not bring about any cognition,—so this *Sphoṭa* also, while itself unknown, cannot bring about the comprehension of the meaning.—(2705-2706)

TEXTS (2707–2710).

IF IT BE URGED THAT—"THE COGNITION FOLLOWS FROM ITS MERE EXISTENCE; AND AS ITS CAUSAL CHARACTER IS THERE, IT IS HELD TO BE ABLE TO BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION LIKE THE VISUAL ORGAN";—THEN, THE ANSWER IS THAT, IN THAT CASE, THE SAID COGNITION WOULD BE THERE AT ALL TIMES;—EVEN WHEN THERE IS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONVENTION, AND THERE IS NO HEARING OF THE LETTERS,—THERE WOULD BE COGNITION PROCEEDING FROM THE *Sphoṭa,* AS ITS EFFICIENT CAUSE WOULD BE THERE ALWAYS; AS THIS ENTITY (*Sphoṭa*) IS ETERNAL (ACCORDING TO THE GRAMMARIAN), AND IT HAS NO NEED FOR ANYTHING ELSE. NOR CAN THERE BE 'MANIFESTATION' OF IT BY ARTICULATION OR CONVENTION OR LETTERS; AS IT IS NEVER PERCEIVED; IT IS *cognition* ITSELF THAT IS SPOKEN OF AS 'MANIFESTATION' AND THERE IS NO COGNITION OF IT. HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT THE ASSUMPTION OF THE 'MANIFESTER' OF THE *Sphoṭa* IS ALSO FUTILE.—(2707–2710)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—"by its mere existence, the *Sphoṭa* would be the cause of the comprehension of meanings,—just as the visual and other organs are the cause of the cognition of things".

But in that case, the cognition proceeding from it should be there always; so that even without any idea of the Convention, etc. bearing upon the Word, the comprehension of its meaning would be there.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'*Even when there is, etc. etc.*'—The reason in support of this is next stated in the words—'*As this entity is eternal, etc. etc.*'.

It might be argued that—"It is only when the *Sphoṭa* has been manifested that it is held to be the cause of the comprehension of the meaning,—and not by its mere *presence*; so that the difficulty pointed out does not arise".

The answer to this is—'*Nor can there be manifestation, etc. etc.*';—'*as it is never perceived*'—never cognised; because it has been held to be *imperceptible.*

This same idea is further reiterated by the words—'*there is no cognition of it, etc. etc.*'.—(2707-2710)

The following might be urged—"It cannot be admitted that the thing *appears* and is yet *not perceived*; and it is an actual fact that the *Word as an indivisible whole* does *appear* in consciousness, in which there has been a development of the impressions of each preceding Letter (composing the Word)".

This is what is anticipated and answered in the following:—

TEXTS (2711-2712).

"WHAT HAPPENS IS THAT THE ARTICULATION PLANTS THE SEED IN CONSCIOUSNESS, AND IT BECOMES DEVELOPED BY THE LAST ARTICULATION,—AND THEREFORE THE *Word* APPEARS IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS".—THIS ASSUMPTION ALSO IS MADE WITHOUT REASON. BECAUSE EVEN SO, THE WORD IS NOT PERCEIVED TO APPEAR AS ANYTHING DIFFERENT (FROM THE LETTERS).—(2711-2712)

COMMENTARY.

'*Āvṛttaḥ*'—become; the impressions produced by the cognitions of all the Letters *become* developed in Consciousness.

'*Without reason*'.—What is meant is that what happens is that the Letters themselves, after the cognition of each, become subsequently included under the compounded cognition appearing in the form of Remembrance. Because as a matter of fact, *we* do not perceive,—nor does the Speaker perceive,—any *Word as an indivisible whole*, after the last letter has been cognised.—It is a mere dream on the part of the Grammarian, arising from the bewildered feeling that the idea of such word as a whole appearing in Consciousness would make things nice for him.—(2711-2712)

So far, the author has pointed out the objections against the view that "the *Sphoṭa* is eternal". He now proceeds to point out the objections against the view that "the *Sphoṭa* is without parts, indivisible',—which objections are applicable to both views,—of *eternality* as well as *non-eternality*:—

TEXTS (2713-2714).

WHETHER THE *Sphota* IS *produced* OR *manifested* BY THE ARTICULATIONS WHICH APPEAR IN SUCCESSION,—SUCH SUCCESSION IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE VIEW OF THOSE WHO UPHOLD THE *Sphoṭa*. WHEN THE *Sphoṭa* IS INDIVISIBLE (WITHOUT PARTS), THERE CAN BE NEITHER *manifestation* NOR *production* OF IT IN SUCCESSION. AS THEY WOULD NEVER LIE OUTSIDE THE ONE AND THE SAME FORM,—THEY WOULD BE THERE FOR ALL.—(2713-2714)

COMMENTARY.

Some *Vaibhāṣikas* hold that there is '*Sphoṭa*' of Sentences also, which is produced as the effect of words.

'*It is indivisible*'—i.e. an entity without component parts.

'*They would never lie, etc.*'—From the one form—produced or manifested —what is held to be unproduced or unmanifested could not be different.

'*They*'—i.e. the production and the manifestation,—would be there for all; so that there would be no need for the use of any other letters or words at all.—(2713-2714)

The following *Text* points out objections against the view that the *Sphoṭa* is with parts (divisible)—

TEXT (2715).

EVEN IF THE *Sphoṭa* IS WITH PARTS (DIVISIBLE), AS THE LETTERS EXPRESSING THEM WOULD DO SO ONLY IN SUCCESSION, WHY SHOULD NOT THE *Sphoṭa-parts* ALSO BE LIKEWISE? WHY SHOULD UNSEEN ONES BE ASSUMED?—(2715)

COMMENTARY.

Would each one of the *Sphoṭa-parts* be without meaning (inexpressive) or with meaning (expressive)?—If the former, then, as those parts would be appearing in succession, the whole *Sphoṭa*—like Letters—would be inexpressive. Its *expressiveness* might be assumed; as there would be attributing a form to a thing which does not have that form. Because the expressive sentence is said to have *one* form only, and its components are *inexpressive*; hence the expressive character of these latter could be only assumed—or figurative,—like the character of the Lion attributed to the Boy. The *expressiveness* thus being assumed, it is far better to regard the component *letters* themselves as expressive,—rather than assume the unseen *Sphoṭa-parts*, to no purpose.

If on the other hand the *Sphoṭa-parts* are expressive (the second view)— then there can be no need for several assumptions; because the 'Sentence' is described as a group of words conveying one complete idea; if each part

of the sentence were expressive, then there would be as many 'sentences' as those parts, and not *one* 'Sentence' composed of several component parts. And when the meaning of one of these parts would be comprehended, there would be comprehension of the meaning of the whole sentence. This has been thus declared—'If each of the parts were expressive, the assuming of several such would be futile; because the comprehension of the meaning of one part would bring about the comprehension of the meaning of the whole sentence'.—(2715)

It has been said under *Text* 2714 that—'in the case of the indivisible *Sphoṭa,* production and manifestation are not possible'.

The following *Text* sets forth the Opponent's answer to that:—

TEXTS (2716-2717).

"EVEN WHEN THE PRODUCING AND THE MANIFESTING (OF THE ENTIRE *Sphoṭa*) HAVE BEEN DONE ONCE BY ONE ARTICULATION, PEOPLE PRONOUNCE THE OTHER LETTERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF A CLEARER MANIFESTATION; BECAUSE IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE IT AS MANIFESTED ONCE;—THEREFORE IT IS MANIFESTED AGAIN AND AGAIN BY MEANS OF LETTERS WITH SIMILAR APPEARANCES."—(2716-2717)

COMMENTARY.

Even though the *producing* or *manifesting* of the entire *Sphoṭa* is done by a single Articulation,—yet the subsequent Articulations are not entirely useless; as these serve to render the manifestation clearer; just as a verse, when repeated again and again, becomes more distinct than by a single utterance;—and even though the frequent repetition does not produce anything new in it, yet the repetition is not useless; similarly in the case in question also, the later Articulations are not useless.—This is what is pointed out by the words '*yataḥ, etc. etc.*'—'*Duravadhārā*'—difficult to determine or ascertain.—(2716-2717)

The following *Text* sets forth the Author's rejoinder to the above argument (of the *Sphoṭist*):—

TEXT (2718).

WHEN, SIR, THAT SAME, OR SOMETHING ELSE, IS REPEATED AGAIN AND AGAIN,—IS IT NOT THE *manifestation* OF IT THAT IS REPEATED,—THERE BEING NO DIFFERENCE?—(2718)

COMMENTARY.

'*Nanu*' signifies address—'Sir'.

When '*that same*'—the Letter pronounced for the first time,—or '*something else*',—some other Letter contained therein,—is repeated again and

again,—is it not the *manifesting* that is done ? Certainly the *manifestation* would not fail to be accomplished when done by that. Thus then the only effect that the utterance of the subsequent Letters would have would consist in the repetition of the *manifestations,*—because all of them would be possessed of the same potency; this repetition can be repeated over and over again by the same Letter being repeated; consequently there would be no need for the utterance of the rest of the letters. Nor will it be right to regard the subsequent Letters as possessed of different potencies; because into what is indivisible and without parts, no new features can be introduced; and when no new features can be introduced, the assuming of diverse potencies would be useless.—(2718)

All that is said by the other party might happen, if the Manifestation were there; as a matter of fact, however, this Manifestation itself is not possible.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (2719).

THE 'MANIFESTATION',—AS IN THE CASE OF LETTERS,—CAN ONLY CONSIST IN THE EMBELLISHMENT OF THE OBJECT OR THE SENSE-ORGAN CONCERNED. AND HERE ALSO, IN REGARD TO THE COGNITION ENVISAGING THE *Sphoṭa*, THE SAID 'MANIFESTATION' CAN BE DENIED IN THE SAME WAY (AS IN THE CASE OF LETTERS).—(2719)

COMMENTARY.

'*As in the case of Letters*';—in connection with Letters, the idea that 'there is *manifestation* in the shape of the embellishment of the Object and the Sense-organ' has been refuted by showing that none of the alternatives possible is admissible regarding its capacity or otherwise of bringing about cognitions;—the same refutation is applicable to the present case also.

'*The cognition envisaging the Sphoṭa*'—'*Tat*' stands for the *Sphoṭa*. This is said on admitting (for the sake of argument) that there is such a *cognition.*

What is meant is as follows:—If there did really appear in consciousness a verbal entity called '*Sphoṭa*' as something apart from the Letters,—then its 'manifestation' could be possible; as 'manifestation' would mean 'apprehension'. As a matter of fact, however, no such entity appears in Consciousness,—as already explained before.—But, let it appear in Consciousness; even so, the said 'manifestation' cannot be acceptable; as by its very nature, it cannot be either capable or incapable of being apprehended. —(2719)

The following *text* sums up the position and proceeds to show that the comprehension of the meaning of words is possible even without the *Sphoṭa*:—

TEXT (2720).

FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT IT IS THE WORD THAT IS APPREHENDED ON THE WAKE OF THE PREVIOUS SUCCESSIVE COGNITIONS OF ALL THE COMPONENT LETTERS,—WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF THE COMPREHENSION OF THE MEANING. —(2720)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent—" The Letters in a Word stand in a definite order,—they are perceived also in a definite order ; Remembrance is always in accordance with the previous perception ;—how then can there be the single cognition envisaging all the Letters, which can only be of the nature of remembrance,—except through the *Sphoṭa* ? Certainly when the thing has been cognised as without order, there can be no appearance of the Letters which are there in a definite order ? "

In anticipation of this argument, the Author supplies the following answer :—

TEXT (2721).

WHAT HAPPENS IS THAT—WHEN THE FINAL LETTER IN THE WORD HAS BEEN COGNISED, THE IMPRESSIONS LEFT BY THE COGNITION OF ALL THE LETTERS BRINGS ABOUT THE REMEMBRANCE OF ALL THE LETTERS SIMULTANEOUSLY.—(2721)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this is as follows :—First of all, there is apprehension (of the Letters),—then the Remembrances immediately following from them come about in the same order as the Letters ;—then from these Remembrances, there follows the cumulative cognition of all the Letters,—this cognition also is of the nature of Remembrance ; because it only envisages things that have been previously perceived.—(2721)

In the following *Text* the Author points out that what has been stated is admitted by all parties,—and it is not only his own assumption :—

TEXT (2722).

ALL PARTIES AGREE THAT THERE IS SUCH SUBJECTIVE (CUMULATIVE) COGNITION IN CONNECTION WITH ALL THINGS,—EVEN WHEN THEY ARE COGNISED IN A CERTAIN ORDER OF SEQUENCE.—(2722)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ētat*'—stands for the cumulative cognition.—(2722)

The following *Text* points out that this view, being in due accord with reason, deserves to be accepted :—

TEXT (2723).

In case this is not admitted, then, in connection with things seen one after the other, there could be no such cumulative cognition as there is in the idea of 'a hundred' and other numbers.—(2723)

COMMENTARY.

If all Remembrances appeared only in a certain order of sequence,—then, in connection with things seen one after the other, there could be no such conception of them at one and the same time as is involved in the idea of 'a hundred' and so forth; nor would there be any difference in the conceptions of the 'hundred' and the 'million' and so forth,—at the time of their appearance.—(2723)

The following *Text* sums up the discussion :—

TEXT (2724).

Thus then, though, in regard to the Letters, the cognitions, auditory and mental, that appear at first are in an order of sequence,—yet, later on, there is Remembrance of them all, at the same time. —(2724)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—" If it is as stated, then the said cumulative cognition itself may be the cause of the comprehension of the meaning,—not the Letters; as these will have long ceased to exist. But this cannot be right; because all men, down to the child, knows that the meaning is comprehended immediately on the cognition of the Word ".

In anticipation of this argument, the Author supplies the following answer :—

TEXT (2725).

Thus the Letters do enter into it; as the things denoted are not far removed from them; this is the reason why people speak of the cognition as proceeding from the Word.—(2725)

COMMENTARY.

'*Enter into it*'—i.e. enter into the said Cumulative Cognition.

'*Laukikaiḥ*'—the nominal affix has been used here in the reflective sense. —(2725)

Says the Opponent :—" Even so, as the Letters will have ceased long ago, they do not exist at the time of the comprehension ; how then could they enter into the cumulative Cognition ? "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2726).

ALL THIS IS QUITE COMPATIBLE WITH THE VIEW THAT COGNITIONS HAVE FORMS ; OTHERWISE, AS THEY WOULD BE DESTROYED, HOW COULD THEY FIGURE IN THE REMEMBRANCE ?—(2726)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—" Why is it not compatible with the view that Cognitions have no forms ? "

Answer :—' *Otherwise, etc. etc.* '.

Thus the cumulative cognition that *Kumārila* has urged against the upholder of the *Sphoṭa*—that " when the last Letter has been cognised, there is a simultaneous Remembrance of all the rest, brought about by the impressions of these " [*Shlokavārtika, Sphoṭa,* 112, reproduced here under *Text* 2721, with a slight variation]—is true only in accordance with our view, not in accordance with the *Mīmāṁsaka's* view, that Cognitions are *formless.* This is what is meant by the *Text.*—(2726)

Says the Opponent :—" It is true according to the *Mīmāṁsakas* also ; because under their view, the Letters are *not* destroyed ; hence there is nothing to prevent their figuring in the cognition ; it is only that their appearance has become concealed ; they are there all the same ".

This is what is anticipated in the first part of the following *Text,* and answered by the last part beginning with ' It cannot be so ' :—

TEXT (2727).

IF IT IS ARGUED THAT—" THE PREVIOUSLY COGNISED LETTERS HAVE ONLY THEIR APPEARANCE CONCEALED, BUT WHEN REMEMBERED, THEY ARE THERE ALL RIGHT ",—THEN, THE ANSWER IS THAT —IT CANNOT BE SO ; AS, IF IT WERE SO, THEN THERE WOULD BE A CLEAR IDEA OF THEM.—(2727)

COMMENTARY.

If the same Letters that had been heard before are lying with their appearance concealed, and are subsequently apprehended by the cumulative cognition, then like their own cognition, the cumulative cognition also should apprehend them quite distinctly ; as the form is exterior to the cognition and it is of one and the same form.—Further, if they have their

appearance concealed, how can they appear? Because 'appearance' is of the nature of *apprehension*.—(2727)

Then again, if it were possible for what is *past* to continue to exist, then what is asserted might be true; as a matter of fact however, what is past does not continue to exist; hence the said appearance of the Letters in the Cumulative Cognition cannot be right.—This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXT (2728).

SUCH CONTINUANCE, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED; IF THERE WERE SUCH CONTINUANCE, THEN THE REMEMBRANCE SHOULD APPEAR AT THE TIME OF THE COGNITION OF THE APPREHENSION OF THE LETTERS; BECAUSE THE TWO WOULD HAVE ONE AND THE SAME CAUSE.—(2728)

COMMENTARY.

'*Already*'—i.e. under the Chapter on the 'Three Points of Time'.

In support of this he adduces an argument annulling the Opponent's idea —'*If there were such continuance, etc. etc.*';—at the very time when there is cognition of the apprehension of the Letters, there would be the likelihood of the Remembrance appearing. This is the argument that sets aside the *Mīmāmsaka's* view.

'*Having the same cause*'—Their causes are not different.—(2728)

The Grammarians urge the following objection—"If there is no such single entity as the '*Sphoṭa*', of the nature of the Word,—then how is it that on the utterance of the word '*go*', ('Cow'), there appears the single cognition in the one form of '*gauḥ*' (and not in that of the component letters)?"

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2729).

WE ARE NOT OBJECTING TO THE SINGLE COGNITION IN THE FORM OF '*gauḥ*', THE *Cow*; BUT THE NOTION OF *oneness* REGARDING THE WORD IS DUE TO THE FACTS—(1) THAT IT IS APPREHENDED BY A SINGLE IDEA AND (2) THAT IT DENOTES A SINGLE THING.—(2729)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ēkamatitva*'—the fact of there being a single cognition.

'*Tadgrāhyaika, etc. etc.*'—It is apprehended by a single cognition,—and it serves a single purpose.—The compound being of the 'Copulative

kind.—What is meant is that—(1) because it is apprehended by a single cognition, and (2) because it denotes the single object, the animal with the dewlap,—therefore the word '*go*' is said to be *one*.—(2729)

The following *Text* shows that the fact of being regarded as *one* is not true in all cases:—

TEXT (2730).

THE UNITARY CONCEPTION MAY BE POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'GO' ON ACCOUNT OF THE RAPIDITY (OF ITS UTTERANCE) AND OF THE SMALLNESS OF THE INTERVAL; BUT IN THE CASE OF SUCH WORDS AS '*Dēvadatta*', THE DIFFERENCE IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED.—(2730)

COMMENTARY.

'*Rapidity*'—quickness of utterance.

'*Smallness of the interval*',—the very slight separation between the letter-sounds.

'*Sā*'—the unitary conception, the idea of *oneness*.

In the case of words like '*dēvadatta*' the articulations are clearly perceived as distinct. Hence the unitary conception is 'inadmissible', in regard to a part of the 'Subject'.—(2730)

The same idea is further supported by a formulated argument:—

TEXT (2731).

THE COGNITION OF THE MEANING MUST BE REGARDED AS ARISING FROM THE LETTERS; BECAUSE IT APPEARS AFTER THE COGNITION OF THESE; WHAT IS LIKE IT ARISES FROM THAT,—LIKE THE COGNITION OF FIRE ARISING FROM SMOKE.—(2731)

COMMENTARY.

The formulation of the argument is as follows:—When one Cognition appears after another cognition, it must be regarded as arising from this latter, indirectly,—e.g. the cognition of the 'subject', *Fire*, proceeding from the cognition of the 'Indicative', *Smoke*;—the cognition of the Meaning appears after the cognition of the Letters; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

What is meant to be proved here is the fact of its being *regarded* as the effect of that other cognition; this is what constitutes the difference between the Probans and the Probandum.—(2731)

The following *Text* shows that the Reason adduced in the preceding *text* is not 'inadmissible':—

TEXT (2732).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE COGNITION OF THE MEANING IS NOT FOUND TO FOLLOW AFTER A COGNITION ENVISAGING A VERBAL ENTITY APART FROM THE LETTERS; HENCE NO OTHER WORD CAN BE EXPRESSIVE (OF THAT MEANING).—(2732)

COMMENTARY.

That 'cognition' of meaning does not exist which appears after a cognition envisaging any verbal entity apart from the Letters; what does exist is only that 'cognition of meaning' which appears after the cognition of the Letters. Hence the Reason adduced is not 'inadmissible'.

This also points out the fact of things being treated as *non-existent*—when, being perceptible, they are not perceived.—(2732)

The following *Text* points out that the said Reason is not 'Inconclusive':—

TEXT (2733).

IN ALL CASES, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCES ARE DEFINITELY KNOWN TO BE THE GROUND FOR REGARDING ONE THING AS THE *effect* OF ANOTHER; AND IT IS THUS THAT THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE IS RECOGNISED IN THE CASE IN QUESTION.—(2733)

COMMENTARY.

'*Kāryatā, etc. etc.*'—Being regarded as the cause, or basis, of being regarded as the *effect*.

"What is that basis?"

It is *positive and negative concomitance*.—This is co-ordinated with '*aṅgam*'.—The only basis for one thing being regarded as the *effect* of another lies in following the positive and negative concomitance between the two things. Hence the impossibility of there being any other basis for regarding the 'cognition of the meaning' as the effect of anything else (other than the Cognition of Letters) provides the proof for the annulment of a contrary conclusion. Hence the necessary Invariable Concomitance between the two becomes established.—(2733)

The following might be urged:—"It may be that the *Sphoṭa* is not expressive. The Letters themselves, being eternal, would be *expressive*; and

that these Letters are eternal has been established by Sense-perception and other Means of Cognition ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2734).

IT HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT EXPRESSIVENESS BELONGS TO NON-ETERNAL LETTERS,—THE 'RECOGNITION' AND 'INFERENCE', PUT FORWARD IN PROOF OF *eternality*, BECOME ANNULLED.—(2734)

COMMENTARY.

'*Pratyabhijñānumānē*' ;—i.e. Recognition *and* Inference.

In some places, the reading is '*pratyabhijñānumānam*'; in which case the compound is to be treated as '*Samāhara-Dvandva*'; or as a *Karmadhāraya*, involving the deletion of the term '*sahita*' (the meaning being 'Recognition *along with* Inference').—(2734)

The following *Text* points out that the argument put forward by the other party involves 'self-contradiction' :—

TEXTS (2735-2736).

THE OBJECTION IN QUESTION HAS BEEN URGED BY THE OTHER PARTY, THROUGH IGNORANCE THAT HIS DOING SO INVOLVES SELF-CONTRADICTIONS ON HIS PART; BECAUSE THERE ARE ALL THESE (SELF-CONTRADICTIONS), IF YOU HOLD TO THE VIEW OF THE ETERNALITY (OF LETTERS AND WORDS).—IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT IF WORDS ARE ETERNAL, THEY CANNOT BE EXPRESSIVE; BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT HAVE ANY CONNECTION WITH THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE (AMONG THE COMPONENT LETTERS) AND SO FORTH; ALSO BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT PERCEIVED AT ALL TIMES.—(2735-2736)

COMMENTARY.

'*All these*'—self-contradictions.

'*With the order of sequence*';—'*and so forth*' is meant to include the fact of their 'hearing' and 'remembrance' being successive. All this is so, because on account of the eternality (of words) the particular order of sequence cannot be due to *time*; and on account of their all-pervasiveness, it cannot be due to *place*; nor can it be due to *manifestation*; because the idea

of such 'manifestation' has been already rejected.—Similarly, in the bringing about of cognitions, *eternal* words can serve no useful purpose; as has been explained on several occasions.—(2735-2736)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2310, that—"It has to be explained what the *Word-Sound* is which is being proved to be perishable, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2737–2739).

THE 'INADMISSIBILITY OF THE REASON IN RESPECT OF ITS SUBSTRATUM' WHICH HAS BEEN SOUGHT TO BE PROVED BY THE PUTTING FORWARD OF A NUMBER OF LIKELY ALTERNATIVES REGARDING THE NATURE OF THE 'SUBJECT' (WORD),—IS ALL DUE TO IGNORANCE OF THE REAL CHARACTER OF *Inference*; BECAUSE THE 'SUBJECT' IS ALWAYS THAT WHICH ACTUALLY APPEARS (IN CONSCIOUSNESS). WHAT ACTUALLY APPEARS IN CONSCIOUSNESS IS WELL-KNOWN, WITHOUT COGITATION;—EVEN ORDINARY FISHERMEN KNOW THAT THAT ALONE CAN FORM THE 'SUBJECT'.—AND YET, IT IS ON THIS VERY POINT THAT DISPUTE HAS ARISEN AMONG BABBLERS. THERE CAN BE NO DISPUTE REGARDING A THING WHERE DIVERSITY IS CREATED ONLY THROUGH ONE'S WHIM.—(2737–2739)

COMMENTARY.

When the 'Subject' has been indicated in the unqualified form, the setting up of a number of alternatives regarding its qualification constitutes a 'Futile Rejoinder'.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (2740–2742).

WHEN THE 'SUBJECT' HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS, THE SETTING UP OF ALTERNATIVES REGARDING QUALIFICATIONS WOULD PUT A STOP TO ALL INFERENTIAL PROCESSES.—EVEN WITH REGARD TO THE (*Mīmāmsaka's*) INFERENCE THAT—"THE IDEA DERIVED FROM THE VEDIC INJUNCTION MUST BE RIGHT, BECAUSE IT IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY CAUSES FREE FROM DEFECT",—SEVERAL SUCH ALTERNATIVES COULD BE URGED AGAINST HIM, AS—'IF THE *Subject* IS MEANT TO BE THE COGNITION *brought about by Injunctions that are eternal and related to eternal denotations*, THEN THE PROBANS IS ONE WHOSE SUBSTRATUM IS NOT ADMITTED BY THE OTHER PARTY.'—(2740–2742)

COMMENTARY.

The Injunction is itself eternal,—and is related to the eternal denotation,—in the shape of the 'Universal';—the cognition brought about by such

an Injunction;—if that is the 'Subject', then the Probans is one that cannot be admitted by the other party.—(2740–2742)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṁsaka*, under *Text* 2315, that—"If by *non-eternality* is meant amenability to absolute destruction, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2743).

'ETERNALITY' CONSISTS IN *continuing in the same condition*; AND THE OPPOSITE OF THIS IS 'NON-ETERNALITY'. IF THE *continuing in the same condition* CEASES, WHAT IS LEFT THERE THAT COULD BE HELD TO BE 'EXTANT'?—(2743)

COMMENTARY.

'*What is left, etc. etc.*'—The 'condition' is not anything different from the entity to which it belongs; hence when the *condition* has ceased, the entity also, as a consequence, ceases. Otherwise, if one thing does not share the fate of another, it cannot be right to say that it is of the same nature as the other.—(2743)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṁsaka*, under *Text* 2744, that—"If the Reason that is put forward is only *amenability to sense-organs*, then it is clearly fallacious, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2744).

IF THE REASON PUT FORWARD IS ONLY *amenability to sense-organs*, IT IS CERTAINLY NOT RECOGNISED AS FALLACIOUS,—IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE 'UNIVERSAL' HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCARDED.—(2744)

COMMENTARY.

'*Already*'—under the chapter dealing with the 'Universal'.—(2744)

"If there is no 'fallaciousness', in view of the 'Universal',—even so, having its negation suspected, the Reason would be Inconclusive".—Anticipating this argument, the Author proceeds to point out the Invariable Concomitance of the Reason, 'amenability to sense-organs':—

TEXT (2745).

THAT WHICH SERVES AS THE CAUSE (BASIS) OF THE SENSE-PERCEPTION ENVISAGING IT IS SPOKEN OF AS 'AMENABLE TO SENSE-ORGAN'; BUT WHAT IS ETERNAL CAN NEVER BE A *cause*; THIS HAS BEEN ALREADY ESTABLISHED.—(2745)

COMMENTARY.

That object is spoken of as 'amenable to the senses' which serves as the cause of that Sense-perception which envisages that object; in the case of an eternal entity, however, no efficient activity is possible, either successively or simultaneously. Hence it is only right that there should be invariable concomitance (between *non-eternality* and *amenability to Sense-organs*).—(2745)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2320, that—"as regards *amenability to the Senses*, it has to be ascertained what it really is, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2746).

IT IS KNOWN TO ALL WHAT SORT OF A THING SERVES AS THE CAUSE (OF COGNITIONS); IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN THE SPECULATION LIKE THE ONE STARTED BY THE OPPONENT COULD BE STARTED EVEN WITH REGARD TO SUCH CAUSES OF COGNITION AS THE *Smoke* AND THE LIKE.—(2746)

COMMENTARY.

'*What sort, etc. etc.*'—i.e. the idea is accepted as sound without any hesitation.

If that were not so, then even in regard to *Smoke* (as the cause of the Inferential Cognition of Fire), the speculation could be started, as—Is the smoke mentioned as the Reason something that is amenable to the Senses? Or is it only a product of 'Idea' or 'Primordial Matter' or 'Time' and so forth? Is it a composite made up of Atoms? Or is it not so composed at all?—And in view of such speculations, the 'Smoke' as the Reason would become 'inadmissible' by one party or the other.—(2746)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2322, that—"*Being perceived as following from effort* has been adduced as a Reason for the Word being a product and non-eternal;—this is Inconclusive, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2747).

AS REGARDS 'INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION', ETC. THESE ARE NOT ADMITTED TO BE PRODUCTIVE (CAUSE) OF THE EFFECT IN THE SHAPE OF THE COGNITION FOLLOWING FROM EFFORT;—BECAUSE THESE ARE ALL PURELY 'ILLUSORY'.—(2747)

COMMENTARY.

'Cognition following from effort' is the effect,—of which the producer or cause,—is said to be 'Intentional Destruction', etc.; but these are not admitted to be such cause.—Such is the construction of the sentence.

If it is in accordance with the view of the *Sautrāntikas* that the Inconclusiveness of our Reason is urged by the *Mīmāṁsaka*,—then such 'Inconclusiveness' cannot be admitted; because, according to those same philosophers, the 'Intentional Destruction', etc. have a purely 'illusory' existence; and what is illusory cannot be productive of any effect; for, if it were, then it would lose that illusory character; because what is capable of effective action must be *real*, and everything other than this must be *illusory*; such are the characteristics of reality and illusoriness (unreality).—(2747)

If the 'Inconclusiveness' urged is from the standpoint of the *Vaibhāṣikas*, —even so, these people do not regard '*Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*' and the rest as of the nature of 'Destruction', as you have represented them to be.— This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (2748-2749).

THE TWO '*nirodhas*' ARE NOT REGARDED AS BEING OF THE NATURE OF 'DESTRUCTION'; BECAUSE '*Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*' IS REGARDED AS 'DISSOCIATION FROM IMPURITIES BROUGHT ABOUT BY WISDOM ONE AFTER THE OTHER'; WHILE '*Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*' IS THAT WHICH SERVES AS AN ABSOLUTE BAR TO THE APPEARANCE OF THE IMPURITIES.— THUS PEOPLE, NOT KNOWING THE TRUE DOCTRINES, AND DEPENDING UPON THE WRONG NOTIONS OF THINGS, CONTINUE TO WOBBLE.—(2748-2749)

COMMENTARY.

'*The two nirodhas*'—i.e. *Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* and *Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*'.

Question:—"In what form then are they regarded?"

Answer :—'*Sāshrayaiḥ, etc. etc.*'—There is '*nirodha*'—'dissociation'—from Impurities—which is attained by '*pratisaṇkhyā*', *wisdom*; hence this is called '*Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*'. And this varies with each associated object; hence the text has added the phrase '*one after the other*'. The idea is that as many of 'associated' factors there are, so many are the 'dissociated' factors also.—As regards the '*apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*',—this is the name given to that Dissociation which serves as an absolute bar against future impurities.—This is due, not to wisdom, but, to the inefficiency of the causal factors; that is the reason why it is called '*Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*'.

This has been thus declared—'*Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha* consists in dissociation one after the other; the other, *Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha,* consists in the absolute bar to the birth of the impurities'.—(2748-2749)

Even if these were of the nature of 'Destruction',—there is no 'falsity' or 'Inconclusiveness' in our Reason.—This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXT (2750).

THE *Ākāsha* AND THE 'DESTRUCTION' DO NOT 'FOLLOW FROM EFFORT',—AS THEY ARE ENTIRELY DEVOID OF CHARACTER. WHAT FORM THE BASIS OF THE IDEA OF THESE ARE: (1) THE POT-SHERDS, (2) THE MASS OF LIGHT AND SO FORTH.
—(2750)

COMMENTARY.

'*Prayatnā, etc. etc.*'—This compound is to be construed with '*na*'.

"Why?"

'*Because they are entirely devoid of character*'.—Because 'Destruction' consists merely in the *negation of the existence* of things,—and '*Ākāsha*' consists merely in the *negation of Tangibility*; hence both these—*Ākāsha* and Destruction,—are *devoid of character,* featureless. How then can they be *following after effort*? As it is only *character* that can be capable of effective action.

Question :—"What then is the basis of the idea of the Destruction, etc.?"

Answer :—'*The pieces, etc. etc.*'—'*mass of light*'; '*and so forth*' includes *mass of darkness* also.—(2750)

It has been urged by the *Mīmāmsaka,* under *Text* 2333, that—"If it is *indefinite,* then such a thing cannot be either entirely eternal or entirely non-eternal, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2751).

THE IDEA OF A DUAL CHARACTER OF ANY OBJECTIVE ENTITY HAS BEEN REJECTED. CONSEQUENTLY, IN THE CASE OF THE JAR, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT ONE ASPECT OF IT SHOULD BE ETERNAL, IN THE SHAPE OF THE 'UNIVERSAL'.—(2751)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṁsaka*, under *Text* 2335, that—"In the same manner the exact nature of *non-eternality* also has to be considered, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2752).

'NON-ETERNALITY' IS HELD TO CONSIST MERELY IN *the overthrow* (*negation*) *of the existing state*, AND IT IS THIS THAT IS THE PROBANDUM (IN OUR ARGUMENT); AND THE LAMP PROVIDES A CLEAR CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE OF THE SAME.—(2752)

COMMENTARY.

The 'non-eternality' that is meant to be our *Probandum* is that which is merely of the nature of the *negation of the existing state*; and in corroboration of this, we have the instance of the Lamp and such things. Wherefore then can our Corroborative Instance be 'devoid of the Probandum'?—(2752)

In the following *texts* the Author puts forward—from the Opponent's standpoint—the objection that the Instance of the *Lamp* also is 'devoid of the Probandum':—

TEXTS (2753–2755).

"THE PERISHABILITY (NON-ETERNALITY) OF THE LAMP-FLAME IS NOT ADMITTED. WHAT HAPPENS IN ITS CASE IS THAT VERY SUBTLE PORTIONS OF IT PASS ON TO ANOTHER PLACE VERY QUICKLY; A LARGE MASS OF LIGHT REMAINS AT THE POINT OF THE WICK; THAT PORTION WHICH GOES UPWARD IS CALLED THE 'FLAME'; THAT WHICH PASSES EVEN BEYOND THAT CONSISTS OF MERE LIGHT (DIFFUSED); THAT WHICH PASSES STILL FURTHER IS TOO SUBTLE TO BE PERCEIVED."—(2753–2755)

COMMENTARY.

The portions of the Flame pass on from point to point, very quickly; and it does not perish in a moment.—(2753–2755)

Question :—Why do not they all move along at one and the same time ?
Answer :—

TEXT (2756).

"THE PATH BEING OBSTRUCTED BY THOSE THAT HAVE GONE BEFORE, THE OTHERS DO NOT GO FORWARD AT THE SAME TIME ; AS THE PREVIOUS ONES GO ON MAKING ROOM, SO THE LATER ONES PROCEED FORWARD."—(2756)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—If the said portions of the Flame are capable of moving about, why do not they burn the grass or cotton that lies near it ?
Answer :—

TEXT (2757).

"EVEN THOUGH THEY MOVE ABOUT, THEY DO NOT OPERATE UPON THE GRASS AND OTHER THINGS."—(2757)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is that it is only when the Flame is in the massed form that it becomes operative,—not when it is scattered about.—(2757)

The answer to the above is as follows :—

TEXT (2757 *Second Half*).

ALL THIS IS MERE ASSUMPTION ; AS NO PROOF FOR IT HAS BEEN ADDUCED.—(2757)

COMMENTARY.

Granting (for the sake of argument) what the other party has said, the Author points out defects in their argument :—

TEXT (2758).

FURTHER, SO LONG AS THE POTENCY (OF THE FLAMES) REMAINS UNAFFECTED,—WHEN THEY COME INTO CONTACT WITH GRASS, COTTON AND SUCH THINGS,—THE POSSIBILITY OF THESE BEING BURNT DOES NOT CEASE ; AS BEFORE.—(2758)

COMMENTARY.

'*So long as, etc.*'—of the parts of the Flame.
'*As before*'—as in the massed state ;—there being no difference between the flame in the two states.—(2758)

If it is admitted that there is difference in the Flame in the two states,—then the loss of eternality becomes inevitable.—This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXT (2759).

IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN WHAT SORT OF 'ETERNAL THING' WOULD THE FLAME BE,—WHEN THERE REMAINS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ITS *efficient* AND *inefficient* STATES ?—(2759)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(2759)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka,* under *Text* 2339 that—"The eternality of the Sentence may be asserted in the same manner as that of the Relationship (between Word and Meaning)".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2760).

THE ETERNALITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED; HENCE IT IS NOT RIGHT THAT THE ETERNALITY OF THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS PROVED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THAT OF THE RELATIONSHIP.—(2760)

COMMENTARY.

With the idea that under your (*Mīmāmsaka's*) view, the *sentence* itself is impossible, of which you are seeking to prove the eternality,—the author proceeds to discuss the nature of the *Sentence*—

TEXT (2761).

WHAT IS THE 'SENTENCE' OF WHICH YOU ARE POSTULATING THE *Eternality*? IS IT WHAT CONSISTS ONLY OF THE LETTERS? OR OF THE LETTERS AS APPEARING IN A CERTAIN ORDER OF SEQUENCE? OR IS IT SOMETHING DIFFERENT (FROM THE LETTERS)?—(2761)

COMMENTARY.

(1) Is the 'Sentence' only the Letters pure and simple, without any qualifications?—Or (2) is it the Letters with the qualification of appearing in a certain order of sequence?—Or (3) is it something different from the

Letters,—in the form of *Sphoṭa* ?—There are these three possible views.—(2761)

The following *Text* points out the objections against the first view (that the 'Sentence' consists of the *Letters only*) :—

TEXT (2762).

LETTERS, DEVOID OF ORDER OF SEQUENCE, CANNOT BE EXPRESSIVE; HENCE SUCH LETTERS CANNOT CONSTITUTE THE 'SENTENCE'.—(2762)

COMMENTARY.

The objections against the second view (that the Sentence consists in the Letters arranged in a certain order) are stated in the following *Texts* :—

TEXTS (2762–2766).

NOR CAN THE LETTERS HAVE AN ORDER OF SEQUENCE. AS THEY ARE ALL-PERVADING AND ETERNAL, THERE CANNOT BE ANY SEQUENCE IN THEM OF EITHER TIME OR PLACE,—LIKE WHAT THERE IS IN THE LETTERS REDUCED TO WRITING, OR IN THE CASE OF FRUITS AND FLOWERS.—IF THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE WERE INHERENT IN THE LETTERS THEMSELVES, THEN THEY WOULD ALWAYS BE IN THE FORM '*sa-ra*', NEVER IN THE FORM '*ra-sa*'; AS THE LATTER WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FORMER ORDER, WHICH IS ETERNAL. THE LETTER 'RA' THAT MIGHT BE ELSEWHERE CANNOT BE SAID TO APPEAR IN ANY OTHER ORDER OF SEQUENCE, FROM OUT OF AIR. BECAUSE EVERY ONE OF THE LETTERS HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE *one* AND *eternal*. IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN 'RECOGNITION' PUT FORWARD BY YOU AS A REASON FOR ETERNALITY' AND 'ONENESS' WOULD BE INCONCLUSIVE; AS IT WOULD BE PRESENT EVEN WHEN THE LETTERS ARE DIVERSE.—(2762–2766)

COMMENTARY.

'*Nor can the Letters, etc. etc.*'—Because the order of sequence among things can be of only two kinds—spacial and chronological;—there is order of sequence in *space*, as in the Letters reduced to writing; and there is order of sequence in *Time* as in the case of the series consisting of the seed–sprout–trunk–flower–fruit.—The first kind of sequence (that is of space) is not possible in the case of Letters,—because they are all-pervading;—the Letters pervading over all things; consequently,—as in *Ākāsha*, so in Letters also—

there can be no sequence due to breaks in the continuity, because they occupy the whole space entirely; as all things subsist in one part of *Ākāsha* only.—Nor can sequence in *time* belong to Letters; because, being eternal, they must be all synchronous.

Then again, the order of sequence could either be made by man or be inherent in the Letters. It is not held to be due to man; as in that case the Veda would have to be regarded as the work of man.—If then, the sequence is inherent in the Letters, then the form would always be '*sa-ra*',—never '*ra-sa*'.

Nor can it be admitted that the Letters appearing in different words are different; because Letters have been proved to be eternal on the ground of their being recognised as the same everywhere. And it is the denial of this sameness that would be asserted in the said proposition (that they are different in different words). Otherwise Recognition (as the reason for *eternality*) would be Inconclusive.—(2762–2766)

It might be argued that—"the Sentence shall consist in the order of sequence in the manifestation (and appearance of the Letters)".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (2767).

THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE IN THE 'MANIFESTATION' CANNOT CONSTITUTE THE *Sentence*, BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT THERE CAN BE NO 'MANIFESTATION' OF WHAT IS ETERNAL.—FOR THIS REASON THE ETERNALITY OF THE SENTENCE CANNOT BE DUE TO ITS BEING RELATED TO THE *Universal* 'SENTENCE'. —(2767)

COMMENTARY.

The particle '*cha*' implies that the *Sentence* cannot consist of the *Sphoṭa* as something different from the Letters;—the idea being that that idea has been rejected by the *Mīmāṁsakas* themselves.

'*Nityē vyakti, etc. etc.*'—That is, it having been shown that there can be no 'manifestation' of what is eternal.—(2767)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṁsaka*, under *Text* 2339, that—"What is said by the Buddhist may be possible in the case of such technical terms as '*Vṛddhi*' because these deal with perceptible things; but in the case of the Veda, the idea of *conventionality* cannot be possible, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2768–2769).

JUST AS THE TECHNICAL WORDS LIKE '*vṛddhi*' HAVE THEIR MEANINGS CREATED BY THE WHIM OF MAN,—SO MAY ALSO BE REGARDED TO BE THE CASE WITH WORDS LIKE '*Svarga*', '*Yāga*' AND SO FORTH.— IN THE CASE OF SUCH WORKS OF MEN AS STORIES, DRAMAS AND NOVELS, THE CONNECTION BETWEEN WORDS AND MEANINGS IS NEVER MEANT TO BE REAL AND ETERNAL.—(2768-2769)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ichchhārachita, etc.*'—Whose meanings have been created by the wish of man.

'*Utpādya*'—The unheard of story created by the writer,—like that of *Mahāshvētā*;—and the drama, etc. which also have the same character.— In the case of these the connection between words and their meanings is not meant to be eternal, in the shape of an *inherent potency*. The same may be regarded to be the case with the *Veda* also.—This is the sense of the *Text*.—(2768–2769)

In the following *text*, an objection—based upon the Inadmissibility of the Corroborative Instance—is raised against the above argument,—from the standpoint of the other party :—

TEXT (2770).

"IN THE CASE OF THE WORKS CITED ALSO, THE *potency* IS ETERNAL; THE NON-ETERNALITY ATTACHES ONLY TO THE PARTICULAR USE OF THE WORD; AND IT IS ON ACCOUNT OF THIS LATTER FACT THAT THERE ARISE DOUBTS REGARDING THE ETERNAL POTENCY."—(2770)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the said stories, etc. also, the potency is held to be eternal. But the particular use of the words—which is made even when the things spoken of are not real,—which is made by men, is what is *not-eternal*; and it is by reason of this that there arise doubts regarding the eternal potency.— Hence the corroborative Instance cited (by the Buddhist) is 'inadmissible'. —(2770)

The answer to the above is as follows :—

TEXT (2771).

IN REALITY, THE THING SPOKEN OF IN THESE WORKS HAS NO REAL EXISTENCE OUTSIDE; WHEREIN THEN COULD THE MEANING BE ATTRIBUTED ?—IF IT BE SAID THAT—"THE MEANING IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE REFLECTED CONCEPTUAL CONTENT",—THEN, THE SAME MAY BE SAID REGARDING THE VEDA ALSO.—(2771)

COMMENTARY.

'*Existence outside*'—Things like *Mahāshvetā* have had no real existence in the external world.—(2771)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka* under *Text* 2340, that—"who has perceived the connection of such things as *Heaven, Sacrifice*, etc., all of which are beyond the reach of the senses ?"

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2772-2773).

WHO CAN EVER COGNISE THE POTENCY, IN THE FORM OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE WORD AND ITS MEANING ? THAT IS WHY IN THE CASE OF THE VEDA, EVEN THE *use* IS NOT REGARDED AS DUE TO HUMAN AGENCY.—IT COULD NOT BE LEARNT FROM MORE EXPERIENCED PEOPLE; BECAUSE, BY THEMSELVES, THESE ALSO ARE EQUALLY IGNORANT. THE ONLY COGNITION THEREFORE THAT MAY BE POSSIBLE IS THROUGH THE EXPLANATIONS PROVIDED BY MEN.—(2772-2773)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows :—By implication, you have yourself shown that the knowledge of the meaning of the Veda that there is proceeds only from the explanations provided by men. Because by its very nature, the potency rests in supersensuous things ;—hence the use or employment of the Word in regard to this potency cannot be due to man ; nor can the cognition of it be derived from the more experienced people ; because all these also are equally ignorant ;—the case therefore would be like the knowledge of Colour being obtained from blind men.—Hence, by implication, it follows that the said cognition must be due to explanations provided by men ; there is no other aternative possible.—(2772-2773)

The Opponent brings forward the following objection :—

TEXT (2774).

"THIS OBJECTION IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO THE SCRIPTURES COMPOSED (BY PERSONS)."—(2774)

COMMENTARY.

The objection that has been urged is applicable also to those scriptures that have been composed (by Persons). For instance, the question can reasonably be raised—whether the ideas that modern people derive from the words of Buddha and others dealing with supersensuous things are in accordance with the intentions of those Persons,—or the reverse.—(2774)

The answer to the above is as follows :—

TEXT (2774).

NOT SO; BECAUSE TO THESE (SCRIPTURES) PEOPLE HAVE RECOURSE THROUGH FAITH AND CONFIDENCE, EVEN IN REGARD TO THINGS THAT ARE OPEN TO DOUBT.—(2774)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tatra*'—to the Scripture propounded by a Personality, which deals with matters useful to men. That is, the wise followers of Buddha have recourse to their scriptures in full accordance with Reason,—and not by mere hearsay.

'*Faith and confidence*'.—The *confidence* born of well-ascertained notions obtained by means of the due pondering over reasons; as it is in things thus ascertained through proofs that people have confidence,—not in anything else; as in regard to other things, doubts never cease.

'*Things that are open to doubt.*'—In the case of assertions of Personalities, as the Person expresses what he means, there is a possibility of such ideas having come down through an unbroken line of men who have heard it from their predecessors; so that it is possible that there is an unbroken line of Tradition from the author down to the present day; and hence the ideas expressed are true. Such ground for confidence is not available in the case of the Scripture that has *not* proceeded from a Personality; as there is no Person who actually taught it.—Further, if there were a Teacher, then, as such a Teacher would be led to propound the Teachings for the benefit of men, it stands to reason that he would propound through words well-known among men; so that the meanings of those words could be rightly learnt from such use by the Teacher. This is not possible in the case of the Scripture that is not the work of a Person; as there can be no intention or effort in that case.—(2774)

Question :—"If this is so, then why do you not act in accordance with any Scripture (from among those propounded by human beings)? Mere doubtfulness would be equally present in the case of all".

The answer to this objection is as follows :—

TEXT (2775).

[WE HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE SCRIPTURE] THE ASSERTIONS WHEREOF ARE FOUND TO BE CONFIRMED BY PERCEPTION AND INFERENCE.—THAT CANNOT BE THE CASE WITH THE VEDA; AS THIS HAS BEEN HELD TO BE SELF-SUFFICIENT IN ITS AUTHORITY.—(2775)

COMMENTARY.

When the matter spoken of in the Scripture is not found to be incompatible with facts ascertained by Perception and Inference,—and one acts in accordance with this,—then alone does he act wisely,—even though the matter be in doubt;—not when he acts otherwise; because doubts regarding its being wrong and undesirable are aroused only by its being found to be contrary to well-ascertained facts of Perception (and Inference).

"If that is so, then in the case of the Veda, people would be acting in the same way."

Answer:—'*That cannot, etc.*'

'*As this has been held to be self-sufficient, etc. etc.*'—that is, it is regarded as an authority by itself; hence in this case it cannot be right to act after having examined the teachings by proofs and reasonings; as in that case, the authority or reliability of the Veda would be due to something exterior to itself.

Nor is it possible for the teachings of the Veda to be confirmed. Because in the Veda we read of the man, in due course, being the *actor* and the *experiencer*,—his own preceding and succeeding forms being imperishable and unborn;—and this cannot be right; as has been explained under the chapter dealing with the 'Soul'.—Then again, we read there of the *eternality* of certain entities; and that this also is wrong has been explained under the chapter dealing with the 'Permanence of Things'.—*Thirdly*, the followers of the Veda have held that there exist such things as the 'Universal' and the like, which, though really imperceptible, are declared to be perceptible; and similarly the successive Birth, Existence and Cessation of things have also been spoken of; all of which are absolute impossibilities.—Similarly, it has been taught that the Agent in whom no fresh attributes can be added, and who had not produced a single thing before, becomes the producer of something else; and similarly it has been taught that an established entity, though not produced as an effect, continues to exist, on the strength of something else;—and also the destruction of things by certain causes; and so on and so forth;—much is found that is quite contrary to all Forms of Right Cognition.—How then could any intelligent person undertake any activity on the authority of such a Scripture (as the Veda)?—(2775)

Kumārila has put forward another argument in support of the eternality of the Connection between Word and its meaning; and it is pointed out in the following *Text* that that argument is invalidated as 'Inconclusive',

with a view to such works composed by men as Stories, Dramas and the like :—

TEXT (2776).

WHAT THE OTHER PARTY HAS URGED IN THIS CONNECTION IS MOST IRRELEVANT AND HAS BEEN SAID WITHOUT PERCEIVING THAT THE SAID CHARACTER OF ORIGINAL STORIES AND DRAMAS, ETC. IS EQUALLY PRESENT IN THE VEDA ALSO.—(2776)

COMMENTARY.

'*Original stories, etc.*'—those whose subject-matter is entirely new.

'*Said character*,'—e.g. that of being composed by the mere whim of man.—(2776)

Question :—" What is it that has been said by the other party ? "

Answer :—

TEXTS (2777-2778).

" BARRING THE ETERNALITY OF THE WORD AND ITS MEANING, THERE COULD BE NO OTHER REASON FOR ACCEPTING THE ETERNALITY OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP. THEREFORE IN REGARD TO THE VEDA, THERE CAN BE NO BEGINNING FOR THE SAID RELATIONSHIP.—THE INFERENCE OF THE ORIGINATION OF THE SAID RELATIONSHIP IS NEGATIVED BY THE ABSENCE OF MEANS (CAUSES) ; AND AS FOR THE INFERENCE OF THE NON-ASSERTIBILITY OF PRE-ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIP, IT IS SET ASIDE BY DIRECT SENSE-PERCEPTION."—[*Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣēpa-parihāra*, 136–138].—(2777-2778)

COMMENTARY.

'*Word*'—consisting of Letters ;—'*its meaning*'—the Universal ;—both of these being beginningless, their Relationship also—in the shape of denotative Potency—must be beginningless ; that is to say, Potency being not-different from the thing to which it belongs, there can be no means of bringing about the said Relationship, whence it is inferred that there *is* no bringing about of it.

The argument is formulated as follows :—When one thing is devoid of the means of bringing about another thing,—the former cannot bring about the latter ;—the Potter is unable to make the Jar, when he is devoid of the means of making it, in the shape of the Clay, Revolving Stick, Wheel, Water, Thread and so forth ;—all men are devoid of the means of making the Relationship (between Words and meanings) ; hence there is apprehension of a character contrary to the wider character.

The Reason adduced here cannot be regarded as Inadmissible. Because it has been already proved that all men are without such means, under the passage—'To whom would the Speaker have recourse to for the purpose of making up the Relationship for the benefit of the Hearer?'

Question:—If that is so, then, as of the Cause, so of the absence of the assertion of Relationship itself, an Inference may be put forward.

The answer to that is that for the proving of the 'absence of the said assertion', the Reason—'being devoid of the means'—would be *inadmissible*. —(2777-2778)

In the following *Text*, the *Mīmāmsaka* shows how the said Reason would be Inadmissible:—

TEXT (2779).

"THE ONLY MEANS (OF COMPREHENDING THE MEANING) CONSISTS IN THE PERCEIVING OF ITS REPEATED COMPREHENSION BY EXPERIENCED PEOPLE. AND CERTAINLY THE FAILURE OF SUCH MEANS CANNOT BE ADMITTED, IN REGARD TO THE BRINGING ABOUT OF THE COMPREHENSION".—[*Shlokavārtika—Sambandhākṣēpa-parihāra*, 138-139].—(2779)

COMMENTARY.

The comprehension of the Relationship by experienced persons—perceived again and again—is the only way of asserting that Relationship: unless one knows the Relationship himself, he cannot speak of it to another person.

'*The failure of such means*,'—i.e. the said means being ineffective.

'*The comprehension*'—of the Relationship.—(2779)

In the following *Text*, the Author proceeds to point out the defects in the above reasoning (of the *Mīmāmsaka*):—

TEXT (2780).

ALL THIS WOULD BE TRUE, ONLY IF THERE WERE CERTAINTY IN REGARD TO THE MEANING OF THE VEDA; ONLY IN THAT CASE COULD THE NOTIONS OBTAINED FROM EXPERIENCED MEN BE TRUE (IN CONSONANCE WITH IT); OTHERWISE THE WHOLE FABRIC WILL FALL TO THE GROUND.—(2780)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued (under *Text* 2777) above that—"Barring the beginninglessness of the Word and its Meaning, etc. etc."—If, it is *eternality* of the Word and Meaning that is meant by their 'beginninglessness',—then

that is inadmissible; as the much wider conclusion to the contrary has been established in the form of the 'Perpetual Flux'.

If what is meant by the 'beginninglessness' of the Word and Meaning is that there is no beginning of the series of causes and effects,—then the Reason is 'Inconclusive', and also 'Contradictory'; because the Relationship has no existence apart from the Relatives; and consequently, that relationship also would be eternal like the Word and Meaning.

As regards 'Being devoid of the means, etc.' (*Text* 1978),—that also is 'Inadmissible'; because it has been proved that even when there is difference by their nature, there are some things that are capable of bringing about the idea of *sameness*. Consequently, what is meant is that there *is* a means available in the shape of the idea of the sameness of the thing cognised by both Speaker and Hearer. And it has also been pointed out (*Text* 2773) that 'the Cognition cannot be obtained from the experienced men, and they also are equally ignorant'.

'*Otherwise, it would fall to the ground*';—If it be held that "the experienced persons, though themselves ignorant, comprehend the Relationship"—then such a view would be clearly contrary to a fact of Sense-perception; the Proposition being like the assertion of the blind man relating to Colours.—(2780)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2341, that—"As regards the argument based upon the fact of the Veda being an aggregate, the counter-argument should be stated as follows:—Vedic study is always preceded by previous study,—because it is called 'Vedic study',—like the study carried on at the present time".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (2781).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO 'COUNTER-ARGUMENT' AGAINST THE REASON 'BECAUSE IT IS AN AGGREGATE'; BECAUSE THIS IS A CHARACTER WHOSE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE HAS BEEN RECOGNISED AS EMBRACING ALL THINGS. —(2781)

COMMENTARY.

That is, the character of having its invariable concomitance with all things has been duly recognised.

This shows that the Buddhist argument proceeds on the nature and capacity of things; as nothing else can embrace all things. And when an Inference has proceeded on the strength of the nature and capacity of things, there can be no counter-argument against it. Because the nature of things cannot be altered; nor is it possible for two mutually contradictory

characters to subsist in the same thing; or else it would cease to be *one* thing.—(2781)

The following *text* points out the all-embracing character of the said Reason (Premiss):—

TEXTS (2782-2783).

WHEN LETTERS ARE EXPRESSIVE, WITH DISTINCT MEANINGS, AND APPEAR IN A PARTICULAR ORDER OF SEQUENCE,—THEY COME TO BE KNOWN AS 'WORD', 'SENTENCE' AND SUCH GROUPS; IT IS THESE THAT HAVE BEEN SO SPOKEN OF AS 'AGGREGATES'.—AND IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT ALL THIS—EXPRESSIVENESS, DISTINCT MEANINGS AND ORDER OF SEQUENCE—IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF WORDS NOT EMANATING FROM PERSONALITIES.—HENCE THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE (PREMISS, PUT FORWARD BY THE BUDDHIST) REMAINS UNSHAKEN.—(2782-2783)

COMMENTARY.

'*So spoken of*,'—i.e. as 'aggregates'.

If Letters do not emanate from Personalities, then all this—expressiveness and the rest—is impossible; this has been proved by us already. And thus our Invariable Concomitance (i.e. the Premiss) becomes fully established.—(2782-2783)

Says the Opponent:—"The Reason (Premiss) that we have put forward (under 2342),—'because it is preceded by Vedic study',—also comprehends all things; as the Author of the Veda has never been found".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2784).

THERE IS NO SUCH CERTAINTY OF INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE IN REGARD TO 'THE CHARACTER OF BEING SPOKEN OF AS *Vedic study*'; HENCE SUCH A REASON IS OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF ITS NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE BEING DOUBTFUL.—(2784)

COMMENTARY.

'*Such certainty*'—as there is regarding the character of 'being an aggregate'; because in the case of 'being an aggregate', its negative concomitance with the contrary of the Probandum is *not* in doubt;—as it is in the case of the other party's reason—('being spoken of as *Vedic study*').—(2784)

The same idea is further explained:—

TEXTS (2785-2786).

IF IT WERE KNOWN FOR CERTAIN THAT MEN ARE UNABLE TO BRING ABOUT THE SAID ORDER OF LETTERS, ETC.—THEN ALONE WOULD THERE BE THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE DESIRED BY THE OTHER PARTY. THAT, HOWEVER, CAN NEVER BE KNOWN FOR CERTAIN; SUCH A CERTAINTY COULD BE OBTAINED ONLY IF THE CAPACITY AND PROPERTY OF ALL MEN WERE PERCEPTIBLE; AND THIS COULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY FOR A PERSON WHO IS OMNISCIENT.—(2785-2786)

COMMENTARY.

'*Such order*'—as is found in the case of such Vedic sentences as '*Svargakāmo*' *gniṣṭomēna yajēta*'.—If it were known for certain that all men were unable to compose such collocations of letters, then there might be certainty relating to the Invariable Concomitance (Premiss) urged by the other party. As a matter of fact, however, the said fact cannot be known except by an omniscient person.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'*This would be possible only for an omniscient person*'.—(2785-2786)

Says the Opponent—"There are certain characteristics in the Veda—such as *Teaching of Duty*, *difficulty of pronunciation* and the like,—which are never found in the words of men; whence it follows that it is inconceivable that the Veda should be the work of man; under the circumstances, how can our Reason be open to the charge of being doubtful and hence inadmissible?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2787–2789).

IT IS CLEARLY CONCEIVABLE THAT THE VEDA IS THE WORK OF MAN; AS IT SPEAKS OF WRONGFUL SEXUAL ACTS, KILLING OF ANIMALS AND TELLING OF LIES.—AS FOR THE CHARACTER OF BEING DIFFICULT TO PRONOUNCE, THE AGREEABLENESS OF SOUND, DIFFICULTY OF COMPREHENSION, *disagreeableness to the ear* AND SO FORTH,—THESE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VEDA ARE FOUND IN THE WORKS OF DECRIERS OF THE VEDA ALSO.—AS REGARDS SUCH PROPERTIES AS *capacity to cure poison*, ETC. THAT ARE FOUND TO BE TRUE,—THIS IS FOUND ALSO IN THE CASE OF INCANTATIONS LAID DOWN BY *Vainatēya* AND SUCH PERSONS.—(2787–2789)

COMMENTARY.

What the Author means is as follows:—Even if certain characteristics are not found in human assertions,—mere non-perception cannot prove

anything; so that the Reason still remains doubtful and inadmissible; it being just possible that there may be persons who would be able to compose works having the said properties of the Veda.

But the non-perception of the said properties itself cannot be admitted; because there are certain characteristics of the Veda,—such as the laying down of such 'Duty' as consists in wrongful sexual act and the like,—which are found in the works of the Decriers of the Veda also.

'*Wrongful sexual acts*'—such as ..... This is laid down in connection with the *Gosava*—sacrifice; where we read '*Upahā udakam chūṣati,* etc. etc.' —where '*Upahā*' stands for the Sacrificer; who is spoken of as *sucking water* ....

In connection with the *Ashvamēdha* and other sacrifices,—*the killing of animals* is laid down in the Veda; in such texts as—'At midday, six hundred animals are used, etc. etc.'

Telling of Lies—has been taught in the text—'Lying in joke does no harm; nor lying to women; or at the time of marriage; or when there is danger to life; or when there is danger of losing one's entire property; on these five occasions *Lying* is not sinful'.

The mention of these is found in the Veda; and these are found in the works of the detractors of the Veda also.

'*Tathā*'—also—'*Difficulty of pronouncing*',—'*Agreeableness*,' '*Incomprehensibility*'—such as in the Vedic text, '*Āmandrairindra, etc.*'; where the construction is difficult and far-fetched—'*ā*' being connected with '*yāhi*' occurring later on;—'Disagreeable to the ear'.—'*Ādi*'—includes broken words, ultra-long vowels, and difficulties of accentuation and so forth.

The capacity to cure poison, etc.—Or 'removing of poison' *and* 'peculiar potency'.—'*Etc.*' includes the curing of obsession by elements and other evil spells.

'*True*'—compatible with the real state of things.

'*Vainatēya, etc.*'—'Etc.' stands for the Incantations current among Buddhists and others.—(2787–2789)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2343, that—"what has been said regarding the Veda might be said regarding the Mahābhārata; but it is forestalled by the remembrance of its author, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2790).

CANNOT IN THIS WAY AN INFERENCE BE MADE REGARDING THE WORK OF HUMAN BEINGS—SUCH AS THOSE OF THE *Sugata* (*Buddha*)? —(2790)

COMMENTARY.

A similar Inference may be made, such as—The study of the words of the Buddha must have been preceded by similar study, because it is spoken

of as the 'study of the words of the Buddha',—like the present study of the same.—(2790)

Question :—" If that is so, then how can the words be regarded as those of the Buddha ? "

Answer :—

TEXTS (2791-2792).

BECAUSE ITS FORM WAS REVEALED BY HIM, THEREFORE THE WORDS ARE CALLED 'OF THE BUDDHA'. THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE AUTHOR THAT IS THERE MAY ALSO BE REGARDED AS MERELY COMMENDATORY.—IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT—" THIS IS NOT SO ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER PARTY ";—BUT IF THE REASON IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE, WHY CANNOT IT BE ACCEPTED ?—OR, IT MAY NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER PARTY ; EVEN SO, IT MAY BE REGARDED AS POSSIBLE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REASON.—(2791-2792)

COMMENTARY.

Its form—character, nature,—has been revealed by *Buddha*.

In this case also, the idea that people have regarding the author of the Buddhist Scripture may be explained as purely commendatory. And here also 'author' may be explained as 'rememberer'.

The following might be urged—" The Buddhists do not accept the view that the idea of the authorship of Buddha is purely commendatory,—hence why should you base your argument on this ? "

Answer :—'*The Reason being equally applicable* (to *Mahābhārata* and the Buddhist Scripture), etc. etc.'—If the idea is in accord with Reason, then why should the Buddhist not accept it ? It is not right for intelligent men not to accept what is in accordance with reason.

Even if the intelligent Buddhist does not accept this idea,—we still put this to you purely on the ground of reason.—(2791-2792)

This idea is confirmed by the words of the *Mīmāmsaka* himself—

TEXTS (2793–2795)

'AT ALL TIMES, MEN ARE MOSTLY PRONE TO TELLING LIES; JUST AS THERE IS NO CONFIDENCE IN REGARD TO THINGS PRESENT, SO ALSO THERE IS NONE REGARDING THE DESCRIPTION OF PAST EVENTS' (*Shloka-vārtika* SŪTRA 1. 1. 2; 144).—BY THIS REASON OF YOUR OWN, THERE CAN BE NO PERSON RECOGNISED AS THE AUTHOR OF ANY WORK AT ALL; EVEN THOUGH HE MAY BE DECLARING IT TO BE HIS OWN WORK.—THUS THEN, PLEASE ABANDON ALL HOPE IN THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE WORD WHICH DOES NOT PROCEED FROM A PERSONALITY; SPECIALLY AS IN SUCH WORDS HAVE BEEN MENTIONED MANY THINGS CONTRARY TO WHAT HAS BEEN SAID IN THE VEDA.—(2793–2795)

COMMENTARY.

'*By this reasoning, etc. etc.*'—i.e. the reasoning just stated.

The following might be urged—"Let all the Scriptures be such as are not the work of Personalities".

The answer to that is—'*Thus then, etc. etc.*'—That is, the mere fact of *not being the work of Personality* cannot prove the truthful character of the Revelation; as such a Reason would be 'inconclusive', in view of the words of *Buddha* and others. Because these latter speak of many things—such as 'there is no *Soul*' and so forth,—which are contrary to what is said in the Veda, and which, according to you, are not true. And it is just possible to suspect that the same may be the case with the words of the Veda also.—(2793–2795).

The 'Inconclusiveness' of the *Mīmāmsaka's* reasoning has been shown. The Author now proceeds to show that it is 'Contradictory' also, inasmuch as it demolishes what is desired by him—

TEXT (2796).

THEN AGAIN, IN THIS WAY WHAT WOULD BE PROVED WOULD BE ONLY *beginninglessness*, NOT *freedom from personal authorship*. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF THE VEDA WERE REGARDED AS NOT THE WORK OF ANY PERSON, THEN THE SAME MAY BE SAID IN REGARD TO OTHER REVELATIONS ALSO.—(2796)

COMMENTARY.

What the *Mīmāmsaka* desires to prove is the fact that the Veda is not the work of man; but what is proved by his reason is not this,—but, merely the fact of its being *without beginning*.

It might be argued that—" when it has been proved that it is without beginning, then, by implication it also becomes proved that it is not the work of man; because what is the work of a person cannot be without beginning".

The answer to this is—" *Under the circumstances, etc. etc.*'—That is, on the ground of there being no beginning, if a Revelation were proved to be not the work of man, then the same may be said regarding the customs of the *Pārasīkas* and others (in whose case also, there has been no beginning).—(2796)

The same idea is further explained—

TEXT (2797).

THE CUSTOMS OF THE *Pārasīkas* AND OTHERS MAY BE BASED UPON OTHERS; AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATHEISTS ALSO MAY HAVE ITS SOURCE IN THE IDEAS OF OTHER PEOPLE. —(2797)

COMMENTARY.

'*Based upon others*'—propounded through the ideas of other people.

'*Having their source in, etc. etc.*'—i.e. that which has its source in the notions and impressions of other people.—Or 'that which is prone to be brought about by the impressions of other people'. The '*Ka*'—affix in this case would have the reflexive sense.—It would be so, because even those doctrines that have been propounded on the strength of the propounder's own intuition,—proceed on the basis of the objective conceptions handed down by other people; hence these also have their source in those same conceptions, just as is the case with the customs of people based entirely upon what is actually visible.—(2797)

It might be argued that—" all these may be regarded as free from human authorship".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (2798).

EVEN IF SUCH *freedom from authorship* WERE PROVED,—WHAT GOOD WOULD THAT DO TO YOU? AS THE WHOLE ATTEMPT OF YOURS HAS BEEN TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHING OF TRUTHFULNESS. —(2798)

COMMENTARY.

'*Such*'—i.e. in regard to which there is likelihood of being untrue. —(2798)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2344, that—" The Past and the Future times can have no connection with any author of the Veda, etc. etc.".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXTS (2799–2800).

AS REGARDS THE PROBANS—'BEING TIME' AND 'BEING PERSON',—THE NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE OF THESE IS DOUBTFUL; BECAUSE, AS SHOWN BEFORE, IT HAS NOT BEEN PROVED THAT MAN IS INCAPABLE OF DOING THE WORK IN QUESTION.—THE IDEA OF 'MANIFESTATION' ALSO HAS BEEN REJECTED. HENCE THE SPEAKER HIMSELF SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE 'AUTHOR' (MAKER). THUS THEN, IN BOTH THE ARGUMENTS, THE INSTANCE IS DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUMS.—(2799-2800)

COMMENTARY.

The fact that the incapacity of all men to compose the Veda has been proved,—that would have served as the reason annulling the contrary conclusion; but as that incapacity has not been proved, the contrary of the Premiss remains in doubt. Hence the Reason becomes 'Inconclusive'.

'*As before*'—in the case of the Reason 'because it is spoken of as *Vedic study*'.

'*The Instance is devoid of the Probandum*',—i.e. the instance cited in the shape of the 'Common man of the present day'.—(2799-2800)

It has been asserted by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2346, that—" Please understand that the Vedic word is not false, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2801).

BECAUSE IT IS DEPENDENT UPON THE TEACHING OF MEN, AND BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN PROVED TO BE THE PRODUCT OF EFFORT,—THEREFORE 'FREEDOM FROM THE SPEAKER' DOES NOT RESIDE IN THE 'SUBJECT', NOR IN THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE.—(2801)

COMMENTARY.

'*In the Subject or in the Corroborative Instance,*'—i.e. in that which has been mentioned as the 'Minor Term', or that which has been

cited as the Corroborative Instance—(in the argument put forward by the *Mīmāṃsaka*).—(2801)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under *Text* 2347, that—"The Cognition brought about by the Veda must be correct, because it proceeds from the eternal sentence, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2802-2803).

THE ETERNALITY OF THE SENTENCE HAVING BEEN REJECTED, THE CHARACTER OF 'PROCEEDING FROM THE ETERNAL SENTENCE' IS CLEARLY RECOGNISED AS NON-EXISTENT IN THE 'SUBJECT' AND IN THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE.—THUS, THEN THE FACT OF THE VEDIC INJUNCTION NOT BEING THE WORK OF A PERSON BEING UNCERTAIN, YOUR SUBSEQUENT REASONS ALSO ARE OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF BEING *Doubtful—hence—Inadmissible.*
—(2802-2803)

COMMENTARY.

Here also, as before, the Reason is 'inadmissible', and the Corroborative Instance is 'devoid of the Probandum'.

The Locative ending in the term '*Dharmidṛṣṭāntayoḥ*' is with reference to the 'character of proceeding from the eternal sentence'.

'*Vākyasya*'—is to be construed with '*nityatvē*'; the Genitive ending denoting *relationship*'.

'*Nityavākyodbhavatvasya*' goes with '*asiddhiḥ*'.

'*Pashchimēṣu*'—the subsequent Reasons—such as 'being produced by causes free from defects' and so forth.—(2802-2803)

Other two Reasons put forward by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under *Text* 2349, are—(1) "because it is brought about by an assertion that does not proceed from an unreliable person";—and (2) "because there is nothing to annul the idea".

It is pointed out below that both of these are 'Inadmissible':—

TEXTS (2804–2806).

WHEN THE 'PERPETUAL FLUX' HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, THE VEDA, AS SOMETHING ETERNAL BY ITSELF, BECOMES CLEARLY DISCARDED.—HOW THEN CAN THERE BE ANY COGNITION PRODUCED BY IT ?—IT HAS CERTAINLY BEEN DECLARED IN THE VEDA OFTEN ENOUGH THAT 'IT DOES NOT PERISH' IN REGARD TO THE PURUṢA (SPIRIT, SOUL); BUT THE REJECTION OF THIS HAS BEEN CLEARLY SET FORTH ABOVE; HENCE THE REASON IS CLEARLY 'INADMISSIBLE'.—IF A MAN IS CAPABLE OF DIRECTLY PERCEIVING TIME, SPACE AND OTHER SOULS LIKE THE JUJUBE-FRUIT IN THE PALM OF HIS HANDS,—HE ALONE CAN HAVE A COGNITION FOR WHOM THERE COULD BE NO REJECTION (OF THE SAID IDEAS).—(2804–2806)

COMMENTARY.

"That which is eternal by itself becomes discarded"—such is the construction.

What is meant is as follows:—It having been proved, by Inference based upon valid Reasons, that all things are subject to 'Perpetual Flux', —the Veda, which has been held to be eternal, becomes discarded. '*Svarupēṇa*', by itself, has been added with a view to exclude the *subject-matter.*

'*How can there be any Cognition produced by it ?*'—That is, it cannot be.

This means that the Reason—'because it is brought about by assertions not proceeding from an unreliable person'—is Inadmissible, in respect of its substratum.

The words '*It has certainly been, etc. etc.*' show that the other Reason—'because it is free from annulment',—is 'inadmissible' by itself.—We read in the Veda that 'being imperishable, it perisheth not' and 'Indestructible indeed is this Soul'.—Of this Soul or Spirit, the rejection has been set forth in the chapter dealing with 'No-Soul'. Hence the Reason is surely 'inadmissible'.

Says the Opponent:—"There is the clear declaration (in the *Shabara-Bhāṣya*) that '*Injunction* is the name given to the assertion that prompts activity'; which shows that it is only a particular portion of the Veda that is called *Injunction,* not the whole Veda. And it is the 'Cognition produced by Injunction' that has been made the 'Subject' of our Reasoning. Consequently, even though there may be rejection of the Veda in regard to other matters, there can be no rejection of the Injunction. So that the Reason remains perfectly *admissible*".

This does not affect our position. In some place the entire Veda has been spoken of as '*Chodanā*' (Injunction),—which name has not always been applied to the *prompting* Sentence only. Otherwise, the sentence 'One should not injure living beings' would not be an *Injunction*; as it does not *prompt to activity.*

This also would be incompatible with the assertion in the *Shabara-Bhāṣya* —"Both are here spoken of in the Injunction,—that which is conducive to

welfare as also that which is conducive to trouble";—because the Injunction does not *prompt activity* that leads to trouble,—which would justify the assertion that 'Injunction speaks of what is conducive to trouble'.

Then again, the *Shabara-Bhāṣya* says—"The Cognition produced by the words of men is sometimes uncertain and wrong,—but there is nothing to show that the Cognition produced by the Veda is wrong".

As the *eternal* Veda has been discarded, you cannot prevent the suspicion that the said rejection may apply to the Injunction also. As *Kumārila* has declared—"The fact of the Veda being a *means* of Right Cognition shall be proved by the fact of its not being the work of any Person".

As a matter of fact, it is clearly seen that there is rejection of the assertions of the Veda relating to an eternal Soul,—even though it may not be the work of a person;—further, in the case of such Vedic assertions as—'Heaven follows from the performance of the *Agnihotra*', the said suspicion (of falsity) is inevitable. Hence, as pointed out above, the Reason remains *doubtful—hence—inadmissible.*

This is the reason why the Author reverts to his previous position and reaffirms the idea that the Reason is *doubtful—hence—Inadmissible*—'If a man is capable of *directly perceiving, etc. etc.*'

This also serves to set aside the following assertion (made in *Shabara-Bhāṣya*):—"The Cognition produced by the Veda is not found to be wrong either at another place or at another time or in another person; hence it must be true".—(2804–2806)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2351, that—"Thus, like Light, the Veda being the 'Eye' for all men, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2807-2808).

THE VEDA THUS IS SOMETHING OF WHICH THE EXACT FORM OR SUBJECT-MATTER IS NOT KNOWN TO MEN,—AND HENCE IT IS LIKE DENSE DARKNESS, FOR WHICH ONLY DULL-WITTED PERSONS CAN HAVE AN ATTACHMENT;—LIKE THE ATTACHMENT OF THE *Pārasīkas* TO THEIR CUSTOMS. HENCE, LIKE THE *Pārasīkas*, THOSE DULL-WITTED PERSONS ALSO, IGNORANT OF ITS MEANING, HAVE RECOURSE TO SUCH SINFUL ACTS AS THE KILLING OF ANIMALS AND THE LIKE,—UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRUITION OF THEIR PAST WICKED DEEDS. —(2807-2808)

COMMENTARY.

'*Rūpa*'—form, text;—'*abhidhēya*'—subject-matter.—'That of which both these *are unknown to men.*'

There is ignorance of the 'form' of the Veda; as one cannot, either by himself, or with the help of others, determine whether this is the exact letter, or some other letter, in the Text.

Similarly there is uncertainty regarding the subject-matter, meaning, of the Veda.

For these reasons, the Veda is like '*dense darkness*',—there being no light illumining it.

'*Past wicked deeds*,'—i.e. evil impressions left by past misdeeds;—the '*nisyanda*', fruition of that.

'*Like them*'—i.e. Like the *Pārasīkas*.—(2807-2808)

It has been asserted by the *Mīmāmsaka* at the very outset, that—"people, seeking for knowledge of *Dharma and Adharma*, must have recourse to the Veda, as the only Means of Right Knowledge".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2809).

THUS, IT HAS *not* BEEN PROVED THAT THE VEDIC INJUNCTIONS ARE THE VALID MEANS OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE OF *Dharma*; FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT ITS MEANING CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED BY ANY ONE, EITHER BY HIMSELF OR WITH THE HELP OF OTHER DULL-WITTED PERSONS.—(2809)

COMMENTARY.

'*Dharma*' has been mentioned by way of illustration; it includes '*Adharma*' also.—(2809)

Question:—"If that is so, then how can any definite idea be obtained regarding *Dharma* and other things?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2810).

FOR THESE REASONS, PLEASE SEEK FOR A PERSON WHOSE INNER DARKNESS HAS BEEN DISPELLED BY THE LIGHT OF KNOWLEDGE, AND WHO IS CAPABLE OF TEACHING THE CLEAR MEANING OF THE VEDA.—(2810)

COMMENTARY.

'*Inner darkness*'—Ignorance, 'Painful and Unpainful';—who has dispelled this by the light of knowledge.

'*Clear*'—correct; pure, free from impurities like animal-slaughter, wrongful sexual acts and so forth.

'*Seek for a teacher*';—i.e. it is only then that your idea of the Veda having no personal author would be of any use; otherwise the meaning being not cognisable, the said idea would be futile.

What is meant by this is as follows:—

The notion of yours, that the Veda is self-sufficient in its authority, cannot be right unless there is an omniscient Person;—hence such a Person has got to be admitted;—otherwise the authority and reliability of the Veda would be impossible; as explained above. Under the circumstances, it is far better to rely upon the word of this Person himself, for the knowledge of *Dharma* and such matters; what is the use of assuming the Word not proceeding from a Person,—the reliability of which Word must always remain doubtful?

It has been argued that matters like *Dharma* are not amenable to the direct meditative Perception of the Mystics.—This assertion also is defective; because it is going to be proved later on, by means of Inference, that there can be such perception in the case of Mystics.—(2810)

End of Chapter XXIV

CHAPTER XXV

Examination of the Doctrine of 'Self-sufficient Validity'.

COMMENTARY.

With the following *Text,* the author proceeds to further support the idea of his doctrine being 'free from all self-sufficient Revelation' (declared in the Introductory Texts) :—

TEXT (2811).

THUS THEN, IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE VEDAS ARE THE WORK OF A PERSONALITY, THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND VALIDITY ALSO BECOMES OVERTHROWN WITHOUT EFFORT.—(2811)

COMMENTARY.

With a view to establish the authority (and reliability) of the Revealed Word, the followers of Jaimini have declared that of all *Pramāṇas* (Cognitions and Means of Cognition) the validity is self-sufficient, inherent,—and its only invalidity is due to other causes, extrinsic. They argue that if their validity were extrinsic (due to other causes), there would be an infinite regress; which would strike at the root of all notions of the valid and invalid cognitions.

On this question, there are four views possible :—(1) Sometimes both validity and invalidity are inherent ;—(2) sometimes both are extrinsic ;—(3) Validity is extrinsic and Invalidity is inherent ;—(4) Validity is inherent and Invalidity is extrinsic.

(1) The first view is not tenable ; because would both Validity and Invalidity belong to the same individual cognition ? Or to different ones (Validity to one and Invalidity to another) ? It is not possible for two mutually contradictory and exclusive characters as Validity and Invalidity to belong to one and the same individual.—Nor can they belong to different individuals ; as there is nothing to determine which would belong to what ; and hence there could be no certainty regarding it ; which would mean that there would be no distinction between Valid and Invalid Cognitions which would not be confused. Because both being equally independent, there could be no certainty as to any particular Cognition being *valid only.* Because, as regards Annulment also, all difference between the two would become obliterated ; and there is no other means admitted that could definitely determine the one or the other. Thus any distinction as to one being valid and the other invalid would be impossible.

(2) Nor can the second view be right ; because the Cognition that had no character previously would have to be regarded as character-less. Further, *Validity and Invalidity* being mutually exclusive, if both of these were absent,

—no other character could be recognised as belonging to it; and thus it would become truly 'inexplicable', 'indeterminate'.—This has been thus declared (by Kumārila in *Shlokavārtika—Chodanā-Sūtra* 35 and 37)—'Both (Validity and Invalidity) cannot be intrinsic, as the two are mutually contradictory; nor can both be extrinsic; as in this case, the Cognition would have to be regarded as featureless (35)... If it be argued that the two characters might not be incompatible, as belonging to different Cognitions,—even so, as it is not dependent upon anything else, it cannot be determined which character belongs to which cognition.'

(3) Nor can the third view be right; [that *Validity* is inherent and *Invalidity*, is extrinsic];—as this involves an infinite regress. For instance, what is by itself intrinsically *invalid*, can never be expected to bring about *validity*; because it is itself *invalid*; nor could it be expected to proceed from what is *valid*; because it stands on the same footing as the other;—if it be expected that *validity* would come from outside,—then there would be an infinite regress. For the purpose of determining the *validity* of a single Cognition, one would have to follow up a series of such Means,—and the entire life of man would become used up.

For these reasons, there being no other alternative available, the *validity* of all *Pramāṇas* (Cognitions and Means of Cognition) must be regarded as *inherent* in them, and the *invalidity* as *extrinsic*.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When certain things are restricted to a certain thing,—they do not need anything else, so far as that thing is concerned,—e.g. *Ākāsha* and *Incorporeality*;—the Pramāṇas in question are restricted to the character of being *valid*;—hence there is apprehension of something contrary to the wider character.—The Reason adduced here is not 'Inconclusive'; a character which is impossible by itself cannot be thrust upon it by something else; e.g. *corporeality* cannot be thrust upon *Ākāsha*.—This has been thus asserted—'The Potency that is non-existent by itself can never be created by anything else.' [*Shlokavārtika—Chodanā-Sūtra* 47].—(2811)

With the following *Text*, the Author proceeds to point out objections against the above view (of the *Mīmāmsaka*); by showing the insignificant character of his proposition:—

TEXT (2812).

YOU HAVE MADE THE ASSERTION THAT—"THE VALIDITY OF ALL *Pramāṇas** SHOULD BE REGARDED AS INHERENT IN THEM"—[*Shlokavārtika, Chodanā-Sūtra* 47].—NOW WHAT IS THE MEANING THAT YOU ATTACH TO THIS ASSERTION?—(2812)

COMMENTARY.

To this question—what is the meaning that you attach to this assertion?—the other party provides the following answer:—

* The dual sense of the form 'Pramāṇa' as *Cognition* and *Means of Cognition* is brought out clearly in the Commentary on *Text* 2813. It has been thought best therefore to retain the original term '*Pramāṇa*' throughout this chapter.

TEXT (2813).

"[WHAT IS MEANT IS THAT] THE CAPACITY TO BRING ABOUT THE APPREHENSION OF THE COGNISABLE THING, ETC., BELONGS TO THE *Pramāṇas* BY THEIR VERY NATURE; THE CAPACITY THAT IS NOT INHERENT IN A THING BY ITSELF CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY ANYTHING ELSE."—(2813)

COMMENTARY.

If Cognition is what is '*Pramāṇa*' in the sense of the *form of Cognition*, then the capacity to bring about the apprehension of the cognisable,—i.e. the cognition of what is to be cognised,—must be inherent in it; because Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of things.—If, however, the Eye and the Organs are meant to be '*Pramāṇa*', in the sense of the '*means of Cognition*', then the capacity to bring about the right cognition of things must be inherent in it; and the Vedic Injunction also must have the capacity inherent in it, of bringing about the cognition of things beyond the senses. All this is included under the term '*ādi*', 'etc.' (in the compound '*meyabodhādikē*').

The argument in support of this idea is added in the words (of the second line)—'*The capacity that is not, etc. etc.*'.—(2813)

The same idea is further explained by the *Mīmāmsaka*:—

TEXT (2814).

"'INDEPENDENCE' (SELF-SUFFICIENCY) IS THE ONLY BASIS FOR 'VALIDITY'. IF 'DEPENDENCE' WERE ADMITTED, THEN THE 'VALIDITY' ITSELF WOULD BE DESTROYED."—(2814)

COMMENTARY.

'*Basis of validity*'—i.e. of the very idea of 'validity'.

'*Tadēva*'—Validity itself.—Because on the cessation of the more extensive character, the less extensive one cannot continue.—(2814)

The following might be urged—'Let the validity be destroyed; what is the harm?'

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2815).

"HOW CAN ANY REASONABLE PROTAGONIST ACCEPT A VIEW THAT STRIKES AT THE VERY ROOT OF THE MATTER—WHEN HIS EXPRESSION OF THIS VIEW ITSELF DESTROYS THE VERY MEANS OF ESTABLISHING IT ? "—(2815)

COMMENTARY.

'*Root of the matter*'—i.e. Validity.—This is '*struck at the root*'—done away with—by the idea of 'dependence on something else';—because it is contrary to a character more extensive than that. Because 'validity' is 'pervaded by'—less extensive than—'independence'; how then could this 'validity' obtain a footing, if there were the said 'dependence', which is contrary to 'Independence' which pervades 'validity' itself ?

'*When, etc. etc.*'—points out the Invariable Concomitance between 'Validity' and 'Independence'.

'*Yēna*'—Because.—(2815)

Question :—In what way does it destroy the means of establishing it ?

Answer :—

TEXT (2816).

"THAT 'VALIDITY' IS 'DEPENDENT' (NOT SELF-SUFFICIENT) CAN NEVER BE SECURELY ESTABLISHED ;—AND WHEN HIS REASON ITSELF HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED, WHO CAN PROVE THAT WHICH IS TO BE PROVED BY THAT REASON ? "—(2816)

COMMENTARY.

'*Cannot be securely established*';—i.e. it would involve an Infinite Regress.

Question :—There might be an Infinite Regress; what is the harm ?

Answer :—'*When the Reason, etc. etc.*'—i.e. that party whose Reason itself has not been established—duly ascertained.—What is meant is that it is only when the Indicator itself has *become known* that it indicates the object which is 'pervaded by'—invariably concomitant with—itself; it does not do so by its mere presence.—So that, when the Party himself has no definite idea of the Reason, how can he adduce that Reason for convincing the other party ?—(2816)

With the following *Texts*, the Author proceeds to refute the above arguments (of the *Mīmāmsaka* in support of the Inherent Validity of Cognitions):—

TEXTS (2817-2818).

IF THIS IS WHAT IS MEANT,—THEN THE SAID CAPACITY (POTENCY) OF ALL THINGS CANNOT BE NON-DIFFERENT FROM THEMSELVES, AS EXPLAINED BEFORE ;—IN FACT, 'CAPACITY' IS THE NAME GIVEN TO THAT FORM OF THE THING (CAUSE) WHICH IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING THE DESIRED EFFECT ; IF THEN, THAT FORM WERE NOT OF THE NATURE OF A POSITIVE *entity*, THEN THE SAID THING COULD NOT BE AN *active agent* (EFFICIENT CAUSE).—(2817-2818)

COMMENTARY.

Now what is it that is meant by the term 'inherent' (belonging to it by its very nature) ?—(*a*) Does it mean that it is 'inherent' in the sense that being eternal, it has no cause ? Or (*b*) that it is 'inherent' in the sense that, even though it is not-eternal, it appears at the same time that the Cognitions have their essence (existence) brought about by their causes,—and not that it is imposed upon them subsequently by other causes ?—These are the two alternative views possible.

Now, the *first* of these [that it has no cause] is not acceptable ; because (1) would such a 'Capacity' be something different (from the Cognition to which it belongs) ? Or (2) non-different from it ? Or (3) neither different nor non-different ? Or (4) both different and non-different ?—These four alternatives are possible.

Of these the first [that the Capacity is something *different*] cannot be accepted. Because, there can be no connection between them, and also because in that case, things could never be active agents, etc. etc.—as it has been explained several times, when the conclusion arrived was that in the case of all things, their capacity (Potency) is not anything different from the things themselves.

This is what is pointed out in the words—'*In fact Capacity is the name, etc. etc.*'—The 'Capacity' of the nature of things consists in its efficiency to produce its effect ; and if this 'nature' were not of the nature of a positive entity, then that entity could not be an *active agent* ; and thus (not being capable of effective action) it would become a 'non-entity'.—(2817-2818)

If it is meant that the Capacity is *not-different* (from the thing, the *Pramāṇa*),—then, it could not be 'natural', 'inherent'. Because things, as coming into existence through the efficiency of their causes, must be non-eternal ; so that the Capacity also, if non-different from the thing, would have to be regarded as *non-eternal*, on account of its coming into existence through the efficiency of its cause. Otherwise, not sharing the same fate, the two could not be *non-different*.

This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXT (2819).

HOW CAN SUCH A 'CAPACITY' OF *Pramāṇas*—WHICH IS NON-ETERNAL, AS COMING INTO EXISTENCE THROUGH THE EFFICIENCY OF ITS CAUSE,—BE HELD BY YOU TO BE 'NATURAL' 'INHERENT'?—(2819)

COMMENTARY.

Further, if the *Pramāṇas* are *non-different* from the said 'Capacity', they would themselves, like the Capacity, be *eternal* nad *without cause.*—This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXT (2820).

IF THE 'CAPACITY' (OF *Pramāṇas*) WERE 'NATURAL' (INHERENT), THE *Pramāṇas* THEMSELVES WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS *eternal* AND *without cause.* BECAUSE *Pramāṇas* WOULD BE OF THE SAME NATURE, THEY WOULD SURELY BE ETERNAL AND WITHOUT CAUSE.—(2820)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—"What is the harm if that is so?"
Answer :—

TEXTS (2821-2822).

IN THE EVENT OF THE *Pramāṇas* BEING *without cause*, THEY WOULD BE EITHER PERMANENTLY *existent* OR PERMANENTLY *non-existent*; BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT BE DEPENDENT UPON ANYTHING; UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE EFFECT CONTINGENT UPON THOSE *Pramāṇas* COULD NOT BE *occasional*;—AS A MATTER OF FACT, HOWEVER, THE *form* AS WELL AS THE *effect* OF *Pramāṇas* IS FOUND TO BE *occasional*;—HENCE IT IS CLEAR THAT FOR YOU, THE 'CAPACITY' IN QUESTION CANNOT BE 'NATURAL' (INHERENT).—(2821-2822)

COMMENTARY.

If they are without cause, they must either exist for ever, or never exist at all. That in the event of their eternality, they must exist for ever—is well known; hence it has not been mentioned separately.

Another incongruity is pointed out—'*Under the circumstances, etc. etc.*' '*Tadāyattam*'—contingent upon the *Pramāṇas.*

This shows that the Proposition of the other party is contrary to Perception and Inference. For instance, that the form of the Cognitions and their Means is *occasional,* is known by direct Perception,—and is also inferred from the fact of its effects appearing successively, one after the other. Thus these two Means of Cognition clearly set aside the idea of the said Eternality of Cognitions.—(2821-2822)

In the following *Text,* the other party makes an attempt at avoiding the two incongruities just urged :—

TEXT (2823).

IF IT BE HELD THAT—"THE FORM OF THE *Pramāṇas* ACQUIRES ITS MANIFESTATION THROUGH CERTAIN MANIFESTING AGENCIES; AND THEN THAT FORM, THROUGH THE HELP OF OTHER CAUSAL FACTORS, BRINGS ABOUT ITS OWN EFFECT"—*then the answer is as below.*—(2823)

COMMENTARY.

When the form of the *Pramāṇa* is manifested by the manifesting agencies, then alone it is apprehended, not otherwise;—hence, even though it is eternal, there is no possibility of its being apprehended at all times.—Nor can there be any possibility of its effect appearing at all times; because our idea is that it produces its effects only with the help of other contributory causes,—and not by itself alone. Thus it is that the effect comes about only occasionally, due to the presence or absence of these contributory causes. —(2823)

The answer to the above explanation of the *Mīmāṁsaka* is as follows :—

TEXT (2824).

THE WHOLE IDEA OF THE 'MANIFESTATION' OF THE ETERNAL THING AND ITS BEING DEPENDENT UPON OTHER CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES HAS BEEN REJECTED ALREADY; HENCE THE EFFECTS PRODUCIBLE BY THE *Pramāṇas* BY THEMSELVES SHOULD BE APPREHENDED AT ALL TIMES.—(2824)

COMMENTARY.

'*Manifestation—and—dependence upon other causes*'.—Under the chapter on the 'Revealed Word', the idea of 'manifestation' of the eternal thing has been refuted in detail; and it has also been explained that the thing that cannot be helped cannot be dependent upon other causes.

'*The effects producible, etc. etc.*'—'*Tat*' stands for the *Pramāṇas*; the effects of these by themselves, etc. etc.

The view that "the Potency may be both (different and non-different)" cannot be right, because they are mutually contradictory and also because it would be open to all the objections that have been urged against *Difference* as also those urged against *Non-difference.*

Nor can the view that "it is neither different nor non-different" be accepted. Because between two mutually exclusive things, the affirmation of one is inseparable from the denial of the other; hence it can never be right to deny it at the very time that it is affirmed; as the affirmation and denial of the same thing involves an incongruity. This objection is quite clear; hence it has not been stated in the Text.—(2824)

The Author now admits the last three alternative views (for the sake of argument), and then points out objections against them:—

TEXT (2825).

WHETHER THE *capacity* BE *different* OR *both* (DIFFERENT AND NON-DIFFERENT),—THE *Pramāṇa* ITSELF MUST BE ETERNAL,—BEING ASSOCIATED WITH THE ETERNAL *capacity*.—(2825)

COMMENTARY.

'*Pṛthaktvam*'—i.e. the view that the Capacity is *different* from the Cognition.—'*Ubhayātmakam*', 'Both';—this is by way of illustration; it should be taken as including the view that 'it is neither *different* nor *non-different*'.—Or this last also may be taken as mentioned in the same term '*ubhayātmaka*'; as this also consists of *both*—i.e. the denial of *both.*

Under all these three views, the Cognition must be eternal, by reason of its being related to the Capacity, which is eternal.—(2825)

Question:—"How so?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2826).

IF THAT WERE NOT SO, THEN THE CAPACITY COULD NOT BE ETERNAL; AS IT WOULD NOT CONTINUE IN THE SAME FORM;—BEING AT TIMES ASSOCIATED WITH THE COGNITION, AND NOT-ASSOCIATED WITH IT AT OTHERS.—(2826)

COMMENTARY.

'*If that were not so*'—i.e. 'if the Cognition associated with the Capacity were not-eternal,—then, the Capacity itself could not be eternal'.

"Why?"

'*Because it would not continue in the same form*'—i.e. because there would not be continuance of the same form.

The said 'non-continuance of the same form' is pointed out, by the words—'*being at times, etc. etc.*';—if the Cognition is not-eternal, then the Capacity would have two forms,—one associated with the Cognition, and the other not-associated with the Cognition; and it is not possible for the same thing to have two mutually contradictory characters; as in that case it would cease to be one; and there would be an end to all notions of difference.—(2826)

The Author now refers to the second alternative view [mentioned in the Commentary on 2817-2818; viz.: that "the Capacity is *inherent*, in the sense that though it is non-eternal, it appears at the same time that the *Pramāṇas* have their essence brought about by their causes"]:—

TEXT (2827).

IF THE VIEW TAKEN IS THAT—"THE CAPACITY IS PRODUCED BY THE CAUSES OF THE *Pramāṇas* THEMSELVES, AND IS NOT SOMETHING IMPOSED UPON THEM BY OTHER CAUSES, AFTER THEY HAVE COME OUT OF THEIR CAUSES",—[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS FOLLOWS IN THE FOLLOWING *Text*].—(2827)

COMMENTARY.

The following *Text* provides the answer to this view;—that it is open to the charge of 'futility':—

TEXTS (2828-2829).

THEN, THERE IS NO DISPUTE BETWEEN US. WHO IS THERE WHO COULD MAKE THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE CAPACITY OF AN INDIVISIBLE THING IS INFUSED INTO IT AFTER THAT THING HAS BEEN PRODUCED BY ITS CAUSES? BECAUSE THE FORM THAT IS SUBSEQUENTLY INFUSED INTO A THING BY OTHER CAUSES IS AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT ENTITY; AND IT IS NOT THE CHARACTER OF THIS OTHER ENTITY THAT IS BEING TAUGHT IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT.—(2828-2829)

COMMENTARY.

Both kinds of things, permanent and impermanent,—which are indivisible—come about in their complete form always, as one indivisible whole; and no causal factor can, later on, infuse into them any *capacity*; if any such capacity were infused, it would mean the production of an entirely new thing, and not the infusion of the Capacity as a new feature of the same thing. If the Capacity is not regarded as part of the nature of the thing, it would cease to be an active agent; as has been explained before.—(2828-2829)

The following might be urged—"It may be that no Capacity can be imposed upon an indivisible thing subsequently; why cannot it be imposed upon what is divisible?"

Answer :—

TEXT (2830).

'DIFFERENCE' AMONG THINGS HAS BEEN EXPLAINED AS CONSISTING IN THEIR BEING ASSOCIATED WITH CONTRARY (DIVERGENT) PROPERTIES; SO THAT, IF ON THE *appearance* OF THE COGNITION, THERE IS *non-appearance* OF THE CAPACITY,—THE SAID CONTRARY PROPERTY IS CLEARLY PRESENT IN THE CAPACITY.—(2830)

COMMENTARY.

The following *Text* proceeds to point out the objection that is specially applicable when things are impermanent:—

TEXTS (2831-2832).

WITH REFERENCE TO ALL THINGS, IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT THERE IS 'PERPETUAL FLUX'; HENCE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ANY EFFICIENT CAUSAL FACTOR TO IMPOSE A 'CAPACITY' UPON THINGS.—SUCH THINGS HAVE NO SUBSEQUENT EXISTENCE, BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THEY COULD ACQUIRE A CAPACITY FROM OTHER CAUSES, FOR THE BRINGING ABOUT OF ANY EFFECT.—(2831-2832)

COMMENTARY.

'*For the bringing, etc. etc.*'—such as the definite cognition of things.

The rest is easily understood.—(2831-2832)

The following might be urged—"If you have no dispute with us, then, why have you accepted the view that the validity of *Pramāṇas* is *extraneous*?"

Answer :—

TEXT (2833).

ALL THAT THE WISE BUDDHISTS ASSERT IS ONLY THIS—THOUGH PRESENT IN A CERTAIN COGNITION, THE CAPACITY CANNOT BE APPREHENDED BY ITSELF.—(2833)

COMMENTARY.

'*Apprehended*'—with certainty.

'*By itself*'—i.e. by the mere presence of the Cognition,—by the mere apprehension of things,—irrespectively of the subsequent conformity of its effects.—(2833)

The following might be urged—"Inasmuch as the Capacity is not anything different from the Cognition,—when the Cognition has been apprehended, the Capacity also becomes apprehended as a matter of course; then why cannot it be apprehended?"

Answer :—

TEXT (2834).

WHO CAN BE CAPABLE OF DEFINITELY APPREHENDING, FROM THE MERE NATURE OF THE COGNITION ITSELF, THE CAPACITY OF THE COGNISED THING, AS IT STANDS, TO BRING ABOUT ITS APPREHENSION AND ATTAINMENT?—(2834)

COMMENTARY.

'*Bodha*' is *apprehension*; '*āpti*' is *attainment*;—'*of the cognised thing as it stands*';—the capacity to bring about the said *apprehension* and *attainment*—[who can apprehend?]

'*Mere*'—independently of the properties of the cause,—such as 'Relationship' and the like.—(2834)

Question :—"Why can no one apprehend it?"

Answer :—

TEXT (2835).

[THE SAID CAPACITY CANNOT BE APPREHENDED WITH CERTAINTY] BECAUSE EVEN IN THE CASE OF SUCH COGNITIONS AS THAT OF THE 'HAIR-TUFT' WHICH CLEARLY ENVISAGE THE THING COGNISED—WHICH ARE ADMITTEDLY INVALID AND WRONG,—THE 'NATURE OF THE COGNITION' IS PRESENT.—(2835)

COMMENTARY.

'*Kēsha, etc. etc.*'—In the case of such illusory perceptions as those of the 'Hair-tuft' (perceived on pressing the Eyes).

What is meant by this is as follows:—Even when the Capacity has been apprehended, as the apprehension resembles an invalid cognition, there can be no certainty regarding it; just as in the case of the potency of antidotes to poison. Mere apprehension cannot bring about certainty; as confirmation by actual appearance is needed for that purpose; and there is certainty only in regard to that aspect on which other properties have not been imposed by causes of misconception.—(2835)

Question :—"How then can it be known with certainty?"

Answer :—

TEXT (2836).

HENCE WHAT IS NEEDED IS THE COGNITION OF 'EFFECTIVE ACTION' OR SOME OTHER FACTOR,—FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING ABOUT CERTAINTY,—*not* FOR INFUSION OF THE CAPACITY; AS IN THE CASE OF POISON, ETC.—(2836)

COMMENTARY.

'*Some other factor*'—such as the knowledge of the purity of its source.

'*Not for the infusion, etc. etc.*';—this has to be construed with '*anyat apēkṣyatē*'.

'*Asyāḥ*'—of the Capacity.

Because *certain cognition* subsists in the Cognising Person, it is only right that for the bringing about of such cognition other causes should be needed;—not so, for the purpose of infusing the Capacity; as this 'infusion' subsists in the Capacity,—and the Capacity having come about along with the Cognition, the 'infusion' also becomes accomplished on that.—(2836)

The following *Text* proceeds to explain the example of 'Poison, etc.' (cited under *Text* 2836):—

TEXTS (2837-2838).

IN THE CASE OF POISON AND WINE, IT BEING FOUND THAT THEY ARE SIMILAR TO OTHER THINGS, AND THEIR EFFECTS DO NOT APPEAR IMMEDIATELY,—FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE CERTAINTY OF THE COGNITION THAT IT IS REALLY POISON OR WINE, IT IS NECESSARY THAT ITS EFFECTS SHOULD BE DEFINITELY PERCEIVED, IN THE SHAPE OF UNCONSCIOUSNESS, SWEATING, INCOHERENT TALK AND SO FORTH.—IN THE SAME MANNER THE EXISTENCE OF THE CAPACITY IN THE COGNITION CAN BE ASCERTAINED ONLY ON THE APPEARANCE OF ITS EFFECTS.—(2837-2838)

COMMENTARY.

'*Being found, etc. etc.*'—the 'finding'—perception—of its similarity to '*other* things',—such for instance as the drink called '*Nāgara-pāna*'.

'*And the effects, etc. etc.*'—'*Effects*'—unconsciousness and the like;—the non-appearance of these immediately; that is, because their effects do not follow immediately.

'*For the purpose of the certainty, etc. etc.*'—the sure Cognition that it is really Poison or Wine.

'*The Capacity*'—in the Cognition, of apprehending and attaining (getting at) the cognised thing as it really exists.—(2837-2838)

The following *Text* points out that the Proposition (of the other party) involves contradiction of his own words :—

TEXTS (2839-2840).

FURTHER, INDISPUTABLE 'VALIDITY', CONSISTING IN 'CAPACITY', CAN BE ASCERTAINED THROUGH ANOTHER MEANS OF COGNITION,—AS HAS BEEN ASSERTED BY YOURSELF, IN THE DECLARATION THAT THE "CAPACITY OR POTENCY OF ALL THINGS IS PROVED BY PRESUMPTION BASED UPON THE FACT THAT THEIR EFFECTS CANNOT BE OTHERWISE EXPLAINED".—[*Shlokavārtika—Shūnyavāda*, 254]. NOW IF IT IS PROVED BY PRESUMPTION, WHY CANNOT IT BE REGARDED AS PROVED BY SOMETHING EXTRANEOUS TO ITSELF ?—(2839-2840)

COMMENTARY.

'*Why cannot it, etc.*'—It must be so regarded; that is, because the said Presumption is *another Pramāṇa*.—(2839-2840)

It has been argued (by the *Mīmāmsaka*) under *Text* 2814, that—"the validity itself would be destroyed, if it were held to be dependent on something else".

The following *Text* points out that this argument is 'Inconclusive' :—

TEXT (2841).

THE *validity*, BEING SOMETHING INDIVISIBLE, HAVING BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY ITS OWN CAUSES,—THERE WOULD BE NO DESTRUCTION OF IT BY ITS *dependence on something else*; AS SUCH DEPENDENCE IS NECESSARY ONLY FOR BRINGING ABOUT CERTAINTY (REGARDING THE VALIDITY).—(2841)

COMMENTARY.

The same idea is further clarified :—

TEXT (2842).

THE OTHER *Pramāṇa* IS NOT NEEDED FOR THE *bringing about* OF THE VALIDITY ITSELF; IT IS NEEDED IN THE *Pramāṇa* ONLY FOR THE COGNITION OF *certainty* REGARDING ITS EXACT CHARACTER.—(2842)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged :—"If you are seeking to prove the fact of the validity of Cognition being 'extraneous' in relation to the *Pramāṇa*

itself,—then we also admit it, and hence your argument is futile; because the existence of the Cognition itself is held to be proved by Presumption,—what to say of its *validity*, which consists in its Capacity?—In the matter, however, of the bringing about of its effect in the shape of the certain cognition of the object, the Cognition does not need anything else; that is why the validity has been described as 'self-sufficient', 'inherent'".

This cannot be right; because the certain cognition of the object of the Cognition cannot be got at without certainty regarding its validity. Because how can the object, which is still subject to doubt and uncertainty, be independent and self-sufficient, in the bringing about of its effect? If it were dependent upon apprehensions produced by other Means of Cognition,—how could you avoid Infinite Regress involved in your view? So what has been suggested is nothing.—(2842)

The following *Texts* point out the 'Inconclusive' character of the Reason —"because it is restricted to its presence [the Validity must be self-sufficient]":—

TEXTS (2843-2846).

THEN AGAIN, IN THE WAY THAT YOU HAVE ARGUED, *invalidity* ALSO WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS 'INHERENT'; BECAUSE (1) IF IT DID NOT EXIST THERE BY ITSELF, IT COULD NOT BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY ANYTHING; (2) BECAUSE 'SELF-SUFFICIENCY' IS THE ONLY BASIS FOR INVALIDITY, SO ON AND SO FORTH,—ALL THIS (THAT YOU HAVE URGED IN SUPPORT OF INHERENT *validity*) COULD BE URGED (IN SUPPORT OF INHERENT *invalidity*);—AND JUST AS (ACCORDING TO YOU) THE CAPACITY FOR NON-CONFORMITY (WITH THE REAL STATE OF THINGS) AND 'CERTAIN COGNITION' WOULD BE DUE TO OTHER CAUSES, SO (ACCORDING TO YOUR OPPONENT) WOULD BE THE CAPACITY FOR CONFORMITY AND CERTAIN COGNITION; SO THAT IN ALL THIS, BOTH WOULD BE ON THE SAME FOOTING.—UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT PECULIAR FEATURE HAVE YOU SEEN IN 'VALIDITY' WHICH IS NOT PRESENT IN ITS CONTRARY. ('INVALIDITY')—ON THE BASIS OF WHICH, THE FORMER HAS BEEN HELD TO BE 'INHERENT' AND THE LATTER 'EXTRANEOUS'?—(2843–2846)

COMMENTARY.

'*So also the capacity for conformity*'—'and certain cognition' is to be construed here also.

'*Both would be on the same footing*'—i.e. both *Validity* and *Invalidity*.

'*In its contrary*'—i.e. in *Invalidity*.

Some people argue as follows—"The *inherent character* of the Capacities is not due to their *eternality*; nor is it due to the fact of their coming about from the causes of the Cognition itself; and it does not appear later on—on account of its being not dependent upon other causes; as a matter of fact,

it is the *potencies* of things that come about, with specific characters, from the *nature* of the things themselves; and herein lies their 'naturalness' (or Inherent character). For instance, that same form (and character) which belongs to the causes is infused by them in their effect; for example, when the Jar is produced out of the potsherds, the colour and other properties in the Jar are brought about by the potsherds through their own properties; and as for the *capacity* to contain water, that capacity is not present in the potsherds, and hence that is not brought about in the Jar in the said manner; this *capacity* in fact, appears in the Jar by itself;—similarly, in the case of Cognitions, the capacity to differentiate and apprehend things, which is not present in the sense-organs and other causes of the Cognitions, is not brought about by these causes; it appears in the Cognitions by themselves.—Thus it is that the Capacity is 'natural' (inherent)".

This also is mere senseless babbling. Because by the same process of reasoning, *Invalidity* also may be shown to be 'inherent'. For instance, 'invalidity' consists in 'the capacity to differentiate and apprehend things otherwise than this real form'; and such capacity is not present in the Eye and other causes of Cognition.

Further, if it is true that the form that is not present in the Causes is not produced by them in the Effect,—then how is it that the Sense-organ and other causes of Cognition produce, in the Cognition, the form that was not present there before? Just as this form, though not present there, is produced there by the causes,—so, in the same manner, why could not they produce in it the capacity for apprehending things also? There can be nothing to prevent their producing such capacity.

Then again, if Potencies or Capacities are held to be non-different from the thing (to which they belong), then,—like the form of the Thing—the capacities also must have their existence concomitant with (and due to) their causes; whence then could they be 'natural' or 'inherent'?—If, on the other hand, the capacities are different from the thing,—then, as they would be existent by themselves, they would have no connection with their substratum (the Thing); as it would be rendering no help to them and what cannot render any help cannot be the substratum; otherwise, there would be incongruities. Further, as they would have no causes, they would be appearing by themselves without being dependent upon the exigencies of time and place. For instance, a thing, having come into existence, disappears only when it is dependent upon something else; that which is not so dependent, and operates by itself independently,—why should it cease to operate at any time or place? If that were so, then the capacities of things would not be restricted; anything could operate towards everything else.

Other people argue as follows:—"What has been said (by the *Mīmāṁsaka*, in *Text* 2812)—as to the validity of the *Pramāṇas* being inherent in them, is on the basis of what is seen of their effects. Because it is only as positive existent entities that effects are produced by the Causes;—as is clear from the fact that the producing of effects is always restricted. What are mere non-entities,—such as the 'sky-lotus'—cannot be produced anywhere; nor is oil produced out of Sands.—If the *non-existent* thing were pro-

duced, as all things would be equally *non-existent*, and there would be no difference among them on that score, their production should come about at all times and at all places".

This cannot be right; as, in that case, the Cause would be entirely futile. According to you, nothing that is *non-existent* is produced; while as for the *existent*,—as it does not stand in need of anything,—what is there that could be produced for it; then what is there by producing which the Cause would be an active agent? So that under this view there would be an end to the whole principle of Cause and Effect.

It might be argued that—"what is brought about by the Cause is the manifestation of what has been *existent*".

That cannot be; because the bringing about of the Manifestation also would be incompatible with the view that it is *existent* or *non-existent*. Because, in regard to the Manifestation also the same alternatives present themselves—before being brought about, has it been *existent* or *non-existent*?—In the former case, as nothing new is produced, the notion of its being 'produced' cannot be right. If it be held that there is manifestation of the *existent* Manifestation,—then there would be an infinite regress.—Nor is the second alternative acceptable; because the other party does not admit of the idea of anything *non-existent* being produced. Even if it be accepted, it would mean that in the case of a positive entity itself, what is produced is something *non-existent*.

Then again, when the Manifestation is produced, is it produced as something different from the entity manifested? Or as something not-different from it?—If it is something different,—then such production of the Manifested entity would have no effect on the manifested entity itself; because the producing of one thing can have no effect on a thing different from it; if it did, there would be incongruities.

It might be said that—"the manifestation is produced in what is related to the manifested entity".

That, however, cannot be so; because it cannot be related to it, as it is not benefited by it in any way.—If there is any benefit admitted,—if that is something different, etc. etc.—there is an Infinite regress. Hence there can be no relationship in the case.

If the Manifestation is *not-different* from the manifested entity,—then Causes become futile. If the Manifestation, in the form of some benefit, is produced out of the Entity in which it subsists,—then there should be such Manifestation at all times; as the *cause* of Manifestation, in the shape of the nature of the Entity, would be always there. It has been explained repeatedly that what cannot be benefited cannot depend upon anything else.

If then, the view is that what is produced is the Manifestation which is not-different from the entity,—that also cannot be right; as in that case there is nothing new produced. Because what the assertion, 'The Manifestation, non-different from the entity, is produced,' means is that 'the nature of the entity is produced'; and as this would be existent already, it could not need anything else; and hence the idea of its being produced would be most improper. Hence we are discussing this same view.

Then again, like the Manifestation, the entity also that would be produced would have to be *non-existent*; as there is no difference between the two (*ex hypothesi*). Or, like the nature of the entity, the Manifestation also that would be produced would be *existent*. Nor is this right; as nothing new is produced in this case; as there would be an infinite regress, as already explained.

Further, if it be held that the Cause operates upon what is already existent, then there would be no cessation of the producing of effects by Causes; as in that case, on securing *what*, would the Causes cease to operate ?—If it be urged that—"they would cease on securing the existence of the effect"—then that cannot be right; as, under your view, that *existence* would be already there. Hence that non-existent thing alone is produced of which there is a Cause,—and not such non-existent things as the 'sky-lotus'; as there are no causes capable of producing these latter.

Thus it is that the causal relation is always restricted by the limitations of the efficiency of the Cause. Everything cannot be regarded as capable of producing everything else; as the efficiency of all things is restricted within limits through a beginningless 'chain of causes'.

If the idea is that—"because validity, if not existent, could not be produced by anything else, therefore it is said to be *inherent*",—then, for the same reason, Invalidity also should be regarded as *inherent*. Hence the explanation is not worthy of notice.

Some people argue as follows:—"The *validity* of the Cognition consists in its capacity to bring about the apprehension of the Object; and this Capacity resting in the Cognition, which is momentary, if not existent by itself, cannot be produced; and no producing of it can be possible at any of the three points of time. For instance, it cannot be produced before the appearance of the Cognition, as it is in the Cognition that it subsists; and what is *subsistent* cannot be produced in the absence of the *substratum*; e.g. the painting cannot be produced in the absence of the wall;—as if it did, it would cease to be *subsistent*. It is for this same reason of the Capacity being subsistent in the Cognition, that both cannot be regarded as produced simultaneously; e.g. the wall and the painting, which are the *substratum* and the *subsistent* respectively, are not produced at one and the same time.—Nor, on the other hand, can the Capacity be produced in the Cognition after the latter has been in existence; because the Cognition is momentary, and cannot continue to exist so long.—It is on all these grounds that the validity of all *Pramāṇas* is held to be inherent in them".

All this cannot be right. Because, as regards the assertion that—"The *validity* of cognitions consists in the Capacity productive of the apprehension of things",—this is entirely irrelevant; because 'the apprehension of things' is synonymous with 'cognition'; and the Capacity subsisting in a Cognition cannot be productive of the same cognition; as in that case the capacity would not be subsistent in the Cognition; as the relation of cause and effect can be there only when both are there at one and the same time.

Then, it has been argued that—"being *subsistent*, the Capacity cannot be produced at the same time as, or before, the Cognition".—This also

cannot be right. Because, the two being non-different (*ex hypothesi*), the one cannot be subsistent in the other.

The fact of the matter is that when the nature of the thing itself is found to be capable of a particular effective action,—and there arises the question as to its exact character,—the same nature of the thing is called 'Capacity' (Potency); and it is not anything different. If the Capacity were something different from the Thing, the latter would cease to be an active agent; and there would be no possibility of any relationship between the two. This has been already discussed several times.—Thus then the *capacity* of the Cognition forms its very nature, and is subject to the same fate; and as such, before the appearance of the Cognition, it remains *non-existent,* just like the nature of the Cognition itself,—and is then brought about. There is no incongruity in this view of the matter.

It is also quite right that the Capacity is produced along with the Cognition itself; because the property that forms the *nature* of a thing must always share the same fate as that thing itself.

Or, the Capacity may be something different from the thing to which it belongs. Even so, as there can be no subsistence between the *existent* and the *non-existent,*—the said subsistence cannot be admitted. Because the Capacity cannot subsist in the Cognition, in the manner that 'Being' does: because it is always completely established and does not depend upon anything else. Nor can there be any substratum for the existent thing; as such a substratum can serve no useful purpose; as for instance, in the case of the *Vindhya* and the *Himālaya* mountains.—It might be said that—"what it brings about is continued existence".—But that cannot be right. Because the 'continued existence' cannot be anything different from the *existent* thing. In fact, it is the nature of the *existent thing* itself that is spoken of as 'continued existence', with a view to the denial of all other diversities. But the essence of the *existent* thing is not brought about by such a substratum; hence it is futile.—If the *continued existence* and the *existent thing* be different from one another, then anything tending to bring about *existence* would be futile; as what it would bring about is only something else, in the shape of the *continued existence*; but the bringing about of one thing cannot produce any effect in another thing; so in either case there would be futility of what brings about the *continued existence.*—It might be argued that—"it brings about an existence related to it".—That cannot be so; because there can be no relationship between 'continued existence' and the 'existent', as there is between the *permanence* and what brings about the permanence; and this would also lead to an infinite regress. This has been so often discussed.

Then again, if the 'continued existence' that makes the thing 'lasting', be admitted to be something different from that thing,—then, there can be no Destruction of anything at all; as the continued existence conducive to permanence would be always there.—Nor can it be asserted that—"Even though the continued existence is there, there would be destruction by causes leading to that Destruction". Because such cause also, being futile, could not bring about the Destruction. Because in this case also, the following

alternatives present themselves : When the cause of Destruction brings about the Destruction, does it bring this about as something different from the Thing destroyed ? Or is it the Thing itself ?—It cannot bring about the Thing itself ; as this is already there as an accomplished entity ; and if it brings about something different, then it brings about nothing in the Thing itself, which continues to remain as before. Then again, as there can be no Destruction of anything, the cause of Destruction must be futile ; all this has been discussed in detail in course of the examination of the 'Permanence of Things'.

Further, by its very nature, the thing could be either impermanent or permanent.—If then, the thing appearing from its cause is impermanent by its nature, then, as soon as that impermanent thing has come about, it should cease to exist by itself,—so that there would be nothing to be done by the two causes—that of *continued existence*, and that of Destruction.—If, on the other hand, the Thing is permanent, by its nature,—even so, as its nature could not be altered, there would be nothing that could destroy it ; and being permanent, by itself, there could be nothing that could make it lasting ; so in both cases the causes of Continuance and of Destruction would be futile.

Nor can it be right to hold that the Capacity subsists in something *non-existent*. Because what is *non-existent* is devoid of all character,—it cannot have anything introduced into it ; nor can it be operative ; hence it would be like the 'Hare's Horn'.

From all this it follows that the *Capacity* cannot be subsistent in anything.

If it were admitted that the Capacity *is* subsistent ;—even so, the Reason would be 'Inconclusive' ; because even though Colour, etc. do not subsist in the Jar, they are produced along with it.

Then again, the same could be said regarding *Invalidity* also ; for instance, *Invalidity* also consists in the capacity productive of the wrong apprehension of things ;—and when this Capacity subsists in the Cognition, it cannot be produced at any of the three points of time ; so that, as in the case of Validity so in that of Invalidity also, the Capacity consisting of this Invalidity should be *inherent* in the Cognition.

Further, if at any time, the Capacity of the cognition does not come into existence, then the Cognition becomes devoid of all Capacity. When a certain property is not produced in it at any time, how can that property belong to it ? For instance, *corporeality* can never belong to *Ākāsha*. Where, too, have the Capacities learnt this wonderful magic whereby, even though never produced in the Cognition at any time, they enjoy association with it ? —It might be said that—"They enjoy some wonderful substance by reason of their eternality".—But that is not possible ; because in that way everything would be endowed with such Capacities ; as there would be nothing to restrict them. When a certain thing is not under the influence of another, we see no reason why it should be restricted in its association with certain particular things only ; hence there can be nothing to show that such capacities belong to the Cognition alone, not to anything else. Consequently, there

being no restrictive agency near at hand, the *Capacities* should belong to all things; as has been explained before.

Nor can there be any substratum for these capacities, as no useful purpose could be served by such a substratum; specially because, being eternal, they cannot have any additional character produced in them.—Enough of this discussion!—(2843–2846)

The following *Text* continues the discussion on the real meaning of the Proposition of the *Mīmāṃsaka*:—

TEXT (2847).

" WHEN THE *validity* OF THE *Pramāṇas* IS DESCRIBED AS 'INHERENT',—WHAT IS MEANT IS THAT WHAT IS 'INHERENT' (SELF-SUFFICIENT) IS THEIR ACTIVITY TOWARDS THE BRINGING ABOUT OF THEIR EFFECT, AFTER THEY HAVE THEMSELVES COME INTO EXISTENCE."—(2847)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows:—" By the phrase 'self-validity' it is meant that after the *Pramāṇas* (Cognitions) have become born (come about), their subsequent activity towards the producing of their own effects is independent of other causes,—that is, their causal efficiency, after they have been born, rests in themselves; so that there is no room for the objections urged above";—this is what is meant by the other party.—The effect of the *Pramāṇas* themselves consists in either the certainty regarding their own validity, or the definite cognition of the object cognised. In the bringing about of this effect, the *Pramāṇas* do not need any other cause.—(2847)

Question:—Wherefore then is their need for other causes?
Answer:—

TEXT (2848).

" IT IS FOR THE SECURING OF THEIR OWN EXISTENCE THAT THINGS STAND IN NEED OF A CAUSE; WHEN ONCE THEY HAVE SECURED THEIR EXISTENCE, THEY BECOME OPERATIVE BY THEMSELVES TOWARDS THEIR OWN EFFECTS."—(2848)

COMMENTARY.

Having pointed out that things in general need a cause for securing their own existence,—the same principle is applied to the case in question, of the *Pramāṇas* or Cognitions:—

TEXT (2849).

"THUS COGNITIONS HAVE NEED OF THEIR CAUSES ONLY IN REGARD TO THE BRINGING ABOUT OF THEIR OWN BIRTH,—AND NOT IN REGARD TO THE BRINGING ABOUT OF THE CERTAINTY REGARDING THEIR OWN QUALITIES".—(2849)

COMMENTARY.

'*Regarding their own qualities*',—the Locative Ending is in reference to the substratum of the 'certainty'.

What is meant is as follows:—There are certain qualities belonging to the Cognitions themselves,—such qualities, for instance, as *being of the nature of right apprehension, being produced by perfect causes,* and so forth; in the bringing about of certainty regarding these qualities, they do not need any other causes.—(2849)

Question:—If that is so, then what sort of cause are the Cognitions in regard to the bringing about of the said qualities?

Answer:—

TEXT (2850).

"IN THE BRINGING ABOUT OF THEIR OWN VALIDITY AND THE DEFINITE COGNITION OF THE OBJECT,—THE COGNITIONS ARE SELF-SUFFICIENT, AND NOT DEPENDENT ON OTHER CAUSES;—AND IN THIS THEIR ACTION IS LIKE THAT OF THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS."—(2850)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*prāmāṇyārtha, etc.*' is to be expounded as the '*prāmāṇya*'—validity—and the '*artha*'—Object;—the '*vinishchiti*',—Cognition, of the said two; in the '*janana*'—producing, bringing about of the said cognition.—'*Arthanishchiti*' here stands for mere *observance*, the vague non-determinate cognition; because the subsequent determinate cognitions are in the nature of *certainty* itself.

'*Action*,' is *activity*, causal character.—(2850)

The following *Texts* explain the example of the 'Jar' as cited above:—

TEXTS (2851-2852).

"FOR ITS OWN PRODUCTION, THE JAR NEEDS SUCH CAUSES AS THE LUMP OF CLAY, THE POTTER'S STICK, THE WHEEL AND OTHER THINGS; BUT IN THE ACTION OF CONTAINING WATER, IT DOES NOT NEED THESE CAUSES.—THUS, ULTIMATELY, THERE MUST BE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE VALIDITY; IF THE VALIDITY WERE DUE TO OTHER CAUSES, THEN THERE WOULD BE AN INFINITE REGRESS."—(2851-2852)

COMMENTARY.

Having thus shown that there is no incongruity in his Proposition, the *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds to show the Invariable Concomitance of his Reason (Premiss)—'because it is present when the other is present'—'*Thus ultimately, etc. etc.*'—'*Antē*'—in the last cognition of the series.—'*Tat*'—validity.

Question :—Why should it be ultimately admitted ?

Answer :—"*If the validity, etc. etc.*'—(2851-2852)

The same idea is further clarified :—

TEXTS (2853-2854).

"IF THE VERY VALIDITY OF THE INITIAL COGNITION WERE DEPENDENT UPON OTHER COGNITIONS,—THEN, SEEKING FOR SUCH CORROBORATING COGNITIONS AT EACH STEP, WE COULD GET TO NO RESTING PLACE; BECAUSE, JUST AS THE FIRST COGNITION WOULD NEED CORROBORATION BY THE SECOND COGNITION, SO SHOULD WE SEEK FOR THE CORROBORATION OF THAT CORROBORATIVE COGNITION ALSO."—(2853-2854)

COMMENTARY.

'*Maulika*'—pertaining to the initial or first cognition; i.e. the validity inhering in the initial cognition.

Validity, if *extraneous*, could be due either to the corroboration of the resultant activity, or to the recognition of the perfect character of the cause of the cognition. The former of these cannot be accepted; this is shown by the words—'*Just as, etc. etc.*'—(2853-2854)

It might be argued that—in the case of the Cognition which is in conformity with effective action, its validity is held to be inherent, self-sufficient; hence there can be no Infinite Regress.

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2855).

"IF IN THE CASE OF SOME ONE COGNITION, THE VALIDITY IS ADMITTED TO BE INHERENT AND SELF-SUFFICIENT,—THEN WHY SHOULD THERE BE ANY HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE SELF-VALIDITY OF THE FIRST COGNITION ITSELF ?"—(2855)

COMMENTARY.

Under the second view also [that the extraneous validity is due to the recognition of the perfect character of the Cause] there would be Infinite Regress.—This is pointed out in the following :—

TEXTS (2856-2857).

"IF THEN THE VALIDITY OF SENSE-PERCEPTION AND OTHER COGNITIONS WERE DEPENDENT UPON THE PERFECT CHARACTER (OF THEIR CAUSES),—THESE PERFECTIONS THEMSELVES COULD NEVER BE THERE WITHOUT COGNITIONS ; HENCE ONE SEEKING FOR THIS OTHER COGNITION APPREHENDING THE PERFECTION OF THE CAUSE WOULD REQUIRE YET ANOTHER COGNITION APPREHENDING THE PERFECTION OF THIS LAST, AND SO ON AND ON."—(2856-2857)

COMMENTARY.

'*Dependent upon, etc.*'—i.e. dependent upon the recognition of the perfect character of its cause.

'*Validity*'—i.e. certainty regarding its validity.

'*Could never be there*'—i.e. could not become fit for being regarded as being there.

'*Tasyāpi*'—of the cognition apprehending the perfection.

'*Anyaparichchhinna, etc. etc.*'—i.e. the validity would be dependent upon the certainty of the perfection apprehended by another cognition.—(2856-2857)

An instance is cited in support of the above :—

TEXTS (2858–2860).

"JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE INITIAL COGNITION, SO IN THAT OF THE OTHER ALSO, THERE WOULD BE INFINITE REGRESS, AS BEFORE ; AND SEEKING FOR THEM ONE AFTER THE OTHER, WE COULD NOT SECURE A RESTING GROUND.—IN CASE THE COGNITION OF THE PERFECTION IS NOT HELD TO BE ONE THAT HAS ITS VALIDITY DEPENDENT UPON THE PRESENCE OF THOSE PERFECTIONS IN ITS CAUSE,—THEN THE INITIAL COGNITION OF THE OBJECT ALSO SHOULD NOT NEED THE VALID COGNITION OF PERFECTION IN ITS CAUSE.—THUS THEN, EVEN GOING ALONG TO A LONG DISTANCE, IF ONE HAS TO ADMIT,

AT SOME STAGE OR THE OTHER, THE SELF-VALIDITY OF THE COGNITION, —IT IS FAR BETTER TO ADMIT IT AT THE VERY FIRST STEP."—(2858–2860)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is that—just as in the initial cognition, the validity is dependent upon the perfections apprehended by another cognition,—so should it be in other cognitions also.

'*As before*'—as in the case of certainty of validity arising from corroboration.

'*One after the other*'—in each preceding cognition of perfections.

If, through fear of Infinite Regress, it be held that the validity of the cognition of perfection is inherent in it, self-sufficient,—then what hostility should there be against the cognitions of the object itself,—by virtue of which its validity is held to be *extraneous*, not *inherent* ? We do not perceive any reason for this.

Thus then the flying bird, not perceiving the end of the other shore, has to return to the place whence it started; consequently, there is no need for the making of baseless assumptions.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'*In case the cognition of the perfection, etc. etc.*'—'*Dependent upon the perfection*'—i.e. that which has its validity dependent upon the certain cognition of the perfection.—(2858–2860)

The following might be urged—There is a difference between the initial cognition on the one hand and the subsequent corroborative cognition, and the cognition of perfection on the other,—on account of which difference, while the validity of these latter two is *inherent*, that of the former is not so.

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2861–2863).

"ON WHAT GROUNDS HAVE THE CORROBORATIVE COGNITION AND THE COGNITION OF PERFECTION BEEN HELD TO BE SUPERIOR TO THE INITIAL COGNITION,—ON THE STRENGTH OF WHICH THE LATTER SHOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THOSE TWO ?—FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT VALIDITY MUST BE REGARDED AS INHERENT IN ALL COGNITIONS, AS A GENERAL RULE ; AND IT IS DISCARDED ONLY WHEN THERE IS EITHER AN ANNULMENT OF IT OR THE COGNITION OF ITS SOURCE BEING DEFECTIVE. EVEN THOUGH THIS WAY THE DISCARDING OF THE VALIDITY WILL BE DEPENDENT UPON EXTRANEOUS CAUSES, THERE WOULD BE NO INFINITE REGRESS. BECAUSE AFTER ALL, IT WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON VALIDITY, AND THIS IS THERE, INHERENT IN THE COGNITION."—(2861–2863)

COMMENTARY.

Objection :—If Cognition is self-sufficient in its validity,—then all Cognitions become valid, which is absurd.

The answer to this is—'*From all this it follows, etc. etc.*'—'*Utsarga*' is a general principle; and '*autsargika*' is that which is in accordance with the general principle.

'*Annulment*'—the certainty that the real state of things is different from that figuring in the cognition;—'*cognition of its source being defective*'.

Objection:—Thus then, Validity remaining there as a general rule,—how is it discarded? If the *invalidity* were held to be indicated by annulment and the cognition of the source being defective,—then this *invalidity* would be due to extraneous causes. It might be argued that—"it is so held by us". But, in that case, as in the case of Validity being extraneous, so here also, there would be Infinite Regress.

The answer to this is as follows:—'*Even though this would be dependent upon, etc.* There would be Infinite Regress if the *invalidity* (of one) were due to the *invalidity* (of another); as a matter of fact, however, *invalidity* is held to follow from *Validity*, which is different in kind from *invalidity*; and it has been established that Validity is self-sufficient; why then should there be an Infinite Regress?—(2861–2863)

The same idea is further explained:—

TEXTS (2864-2865).

"JUST AS VALIDITY IS NOT PROVED BY VALIDITY COGNITION,—SO INVALIDITY ALSO IS NOT PROVED BY INVALIDITY. IN THE CASE OF ONE THING BEING DEPENDENT UPON ANOTHER THING OF ITS OWN KIND, THERE CAN BE NO RESTING GROUND; IN THE CASE OF DEPENDENCE UPON SOMETHING OF ANOTHER KIND, ITS ROOT IS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED, BECAUSE IT IS DUE TO ANOTHER CAUSE."—(2864-2865)

COMMENTARY.

'*Something of another kind*'—i.e. *Invalidity*;—this is to be construed with—'the root is firmly established'.—The reason for this is stated in the words—'*because it is due to another cause*'; i.e. of which the cause consists of something else, in the shape of the Valid Cognition.

'*Has its root firmly established*'—i.e. whose root is unshakable by reason of its being free from the defects of Infinite Regress, etc.—(2864-2865)

The following might be urged—Though the sublating or annulling cognition may not have its validity dependent on something else,—yet it is only when that Cognition is recognised as itself unsublated that it can stamp invalidity upon another Cognition; not otherwise.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2866).

"THE SUBLATING COGNITION IS ALWAYS IN THE FORM OF THE COGNITION OF THE THING CONCERNED AS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS ENVISAGED IN THE PREVIOUS COGNITION; AND AS IN THIS FORM, IT IS NOT DEPENDENT FOR ITS VALIDITY UPON ANYTHING ELSE, IT SETS ASIDE THAT PREVIOUS COGNITION."—(2866)

COMMENTARY.

'*Sets aside*'—discards; i.e. rejects as *invalid*.—(2866)

The following might be urged—Even when the sublating Cognition is there, it is possible that there may be another Cognition sublating it,—just as there is one for the initial Cognition; how then can there be a cessation of the dependence upon another sublating Cognition,—by virtue of which the sublation of that Cognition would be accepted with certainty?

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2867).

"IT MAY BE THAT THERE TOO THERE MAY BE NEED FOR ANOTHER SUBLATING COGNITION IN CERTAIN CASES, WHERE SUSPICION MIGHT BE AROUSED IN THE MIND OF THE PERSON BY THE PREVIOUS COGNITION; BUT THAT SUSPICION CEASES AFTER VERY LITTLE EFFORT."—(2867)

COMMENTARY.

'*There, in some cases*'—i.e. in regard to the sublating Cognition in the form of the 'Cognition of the thing as different from that envisaged in the previous Cognition'.

'*Jātāshāṅkasya*'—the man whose suspicion has been aroused.

'*Pūrvēṇa*'—by the initial Cognition.

'*Sāpi*'—i.e. the dependence upon sublation.

'*Alpēna*'—i.e. by very slight *effort*.—(2867)

Question:—How does it cease?

Answer:—

TEXTS (2868–2871).

"IF ANOTHER SUBLATING COGNITION OF IT IS FURTHER SOUGHT FOR, THEN THE MIDDLE (SECOND) COGNITION WOULD BECOME SUBLATED; WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH THE VALIDITY OF THE FIRST COGNITION.—IF EVEN AFTER DUE EFFORT AT SEEKING FOR IT, NO OTHER SUBLATING COGNITION IS FOUND,—ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING NO BASIS FOR IT,—THEN NO COGNITION SUBLATIVE OF THE FIRST SUBLATIVE COGNITION WOULD BE FOUND; AND THUS THERE BEING NO SUBLATION OF THIS, THIS BECOMES STRONG AND HENCE SUBLATES THE INITIAL COGNITION; HENCE IT IS THE VALIDITY OF THIS LATTER THAT BECOMES DISCARDED. THUS THEN, THE INVESTIGATOR NEED NOT PROCEED BEYOND THREE COGNITIONS; AND WHEN THE MAN HAS NOT HAD ANY FURTHER SUBLATING COGNITION PRODUCED, HE NEED NOT SUSPECT THE PRESENCE OF SUCH COGNITION."—(2868–2871)

COMMENTARY.

If, on further investigation, one finds that there is a sublater of that sublater also, then, as the second Cognition would be set aside by this third sublater, the first Cognition would become valid. If the further (third) sublating Cognition does not appear, on account of the absence of the basic cause, then the second Cognition, which is more powerful, sublates the first Cognition, and thereby its validity becomes set aside.

'*Need not proceed beyond, etc. etc.*'—"Who?"—The Man, the observer.

Question:—"On the appearance of the third Cognition also, why is there no need for a further sublating Cognition,—as in the case of the second Cognition;—and why should there be only three Cognitions for the investigator?"

Answer:—'*When no further sublating cognition, etc. etc.*';—'*produced*'—found by the investigator.—(2868–2871)

Question:—"Why should it not be suspected?

Answer:—

TEXT (2872).

"IF THE MAN, THROUGH STUPIDITY, SHOULD IMAGINE THE EXISTENCE OF THE SUBLATING COGNITION, EVEN WHEN NONE HAS COME ABOUT,—HE WOULD BE BESET WITH DOUBTS IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND WOULD BE LANDED IN UTTER RUIN."—(2872)

COMMENTARY.

'*Utter ruin*'—Destruction; on account of having fallen off from the Truth.—(2872)

The following *Text* confirms the same idea by a quotation—

TEXT (2873).

"VĀSUDĒVA HIMSELF HAS DEPRECATED SUCH A SUSPICIOUS NATURE; IN THE WORDS—'NEITHER THIS WORLD, NOR THE NEXT,—O SON OF *Kunti*,—IS FOR THE MAN OF SUSPICIOUS NATURE'."
—(2873)

COMMENTARY.

'*Vāsudēva*'—*Viṣṇu.*
'*Son of Kunti*'—*Arjuna.*—(2873)

Objection :—"If that is so, then there should be no suspicion of sublation regarding the first Cognition also; and thus there should be validity of all Cognitions".

Answer :—

TEXTS (2874-2875).

"WHEN IN REGARD TO A COGNITION, A CERTAIN SUBLATION IS POSSIBLE,—AND ON BEING SOUGHT FOR, IS NOT FOUND,—THEN IN REGARD TO THAT COGNITION [IT HAS TO BE CONCLUDED THAT ITS SUBLATER DOES NOT EXIST]; AND IN REGARD TO SUCH A THING, INVESTIGATORS DESIRING THEIR OWN WELFARE SHOULD NOT TAKE THEIR STAND UPON IMAGINING THAT SUCH SUBLATION MIGHT APPEAR AT SOME TIME."
—(2874-2875)

COMMENTARY.

'*Yatra*'—in regard to a certain Cognition,—if a certain sublation is likely; but on being sought for, it is not found to appear,—then, in regard to that Cognition, '*it should be concluded that the sublater does not exist*'—this has to be taken as understood.—(2874-2875)

Question :—"How much of sublation is possible and in regard to which Cognition?"

Answer :—

TEXT (2876).

"PLACE, TIME, MAN AND CIRCUMSTANCES,—DIVERSITIES OF THESE ARE MET WITH IN ACTUAL EXPERIENCE; HENCE WHEN ONE IS SEEKING FOR SUBLATION, HE SHOULD SEEK FOR THEM IN THESE."—(2876)

COMMENTARY.

The compound—'*Dēsha, etc. etc.*'—is to be expounded as 'Diversities' of 'Place, Time, Man, and Circumstances'.—(2876)

The following *Texts* proceed to point out that of these diversities of Place, Time, etc.—only some are sublaters of a certain Cognition,—not all of all Cognitions; hence all should not be suspected in regard to all Cognitions :—

TEXTS (2877-2878).

"IF THERE IS A WRONG PERCEPTION DUE TO THE THING CONCERNED BEING AT A DISTANT PLACE, THERE WOULD, IN SOME CASES, BE A SUSPICION OF ITS REALLY BEING SOMETHING ELSE; AND THE LIMIT OF THIS POSSIBILITY WOULD EXTEND ONLY TILL THE MAN HAS APPROACHED NEAR THE THING; AND IN SUCH A CASE, THERE IS NO EXPECTATION OF ANY SUBLATION REGARDING TIME, MAN AND CIRCUMSTANCES; AS FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF THE COGNITION OF THE MIRAGE, ETC."—(2877-2878)

COMMENTARY.

'*Suspicion, etc.*'—of the thing being *Water* ;—'*in some cases*,'—in the case of such things as the Mirage.

'*Till the man has approached, etc. etc.*'—This has to be construed with '*limit of the possibility of sublation*'.

What is meant is as follows :—In a case where remoteness of the place is the only likely cause of misconception,—all that is necessary is to move upto the thing, for the purpose of finding out whether there is, or not, a sublating cognition; and in such a case, the sublation should not be expected or sought for, in regard to Time and the other factors; because these latter could not be the source of misconception.

An instance is cited—'*As for example, etc. etc.*'—'*Cognition of the Mirage*'—i.e. the cognition, in regard to the Mirage, that it is *Water*.

'*Etcetera*'—includes such notions as that of 'largeness', in regard to what is *small*, and the notion of 'smallness' in regard to what is *large*,—this being due to distance;—and other similar notions. In these cases, there can be no need for investigation of Time and other factors.

Similarly in regard to misconceptions due to Time, etc.—whenever there is possibility of a certain factor being the source of error, the enquiry should proceed in regard to that factor only; and not in regard to any other factor.—This is what is meant to be shown by means of the example cited.—(2877-2878)

The same idea is expressed in regard to particular points of *Time* :—

TEXT (2879).

"SIMILARLY WHEN AT A TIME OF DENSE DARKNESS, THERE ARE DOUBTS REGARDING THE ANIMAL SEEN BEING A COW OR A HORSE, FOLLOWED BY THE ASCERTAINMENT OF THE TRUTH,—THE LIMIT OF ALL THIS CONSISTS IN THE APPEARANCE OF LIGHT."—(2879)

COMMENTARY.

'*Santamasakāla*' is time when there is deep and dense darkness.—(2879)

The same idea is expressed in regard to particular *men* :—

TEXT (2880).

"SIMILARLY, IN REGARD TO THE MOON, THE MISCONCEPTION OF THE DIRECTIONS, AND THE LETTERS AND ACCENTS OF THE VEDA, AND SUCH THINGS,—THAT THE TRUTH IS OTHERWISE IS ASCERTAINED BY ENQUIRIES FROM OTHER PERSONS."—(2880)

COMMENTARY.

When a man thinks that he is seeing two moons, or has similar delusions,—that the truth is otherwise is ascertained by putting questions to other men ; and in that there is no dependence on Time and other factors.—(2880)

The same idea is stated in regard to *circumstances* :—

TEXT (2881).

"WHEN PERSONS HAVING THEIR PERCEPTIVE ORGANS DERANGED BY LOVE, HATE, INTOXICATION, MADNESS, HUNGER, THIRST AND THE LIKE, COME TO COGNISE THINGS THAT ARE COGNISABLE WITH DIFFICULTY,—THE CONTRARY CONCLUSION IS ASCERTAINED AFTER THE CESSATION OF THE SAID DERANGEMENT."—(2881)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tadabhāvāt*'—by the cessation of the *circumstances* created by Love, Hate, etc.—(2881)

The following *Texts* proceed to show that even in ordinary business-transactions, the conclusions of the Enquirer (Judge) require only *three* statements :—

TEXTS (2882–2885)

"IN TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO DEBT AND OTHER HEADS, WHEN THERE IS A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO DISPUTANTS, THERE IS ONE STATEMENT BY THE DEFENDANT AND TWO BY THE PLAINTIFF; AND IT IS FOR AVOIDING AN INFINITE REGRESS THAT NO FURTHER STATEMENTS ARE RECORDED;—AND IT IS ON THE BASIS OF THE SAID THREE STATEMENTS ALONE THAT THE MASTER (JUDGE), THE WITNESSES AND THE ASSESSORS SHOULD COME TO A DECISION.—THUS IN ALL CASES, THERE IS A FOLLOWING UP OF THREE COGNITIONS ONLY; AND IT IS FOR THIS SAME REASON THAT THE DEITIES ARE CALLED 'TRISATYA' (THREE-TRUTH).—THUS THEN, IF THE VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS IS INHERENT IN THEM, THERE IS NO INFINITE REGRESS; AND THE VALIDITY AND INVALIDITY REMAIN AS THEY HAPPEN TO BE IN REALITY."—(2882–2885)

COMMENTARY.

"Then again, if it be proved that the validity of Sense-perception and other *Pramāṇas* is due to extraneous causes,—the same is not the case with Verbal Cognition,—even so our position becomes established. Because the whole of this effort of ours is meant for the purpose of establishing the reliability of the Vedic Injunction; so that when it is proved that the validity of the Verbal Cognition is inherent, self-sufficient,—the reliability of the Vedic Injunction becomes automatically established;—what need there is then for our trying to prove the self-sufficient validity of the other forms of Cognition?"

With the above idea in his mind, the *Mīmāṁsaka* proceeds to prove the self-sufficient validity of Verbal Cognition:—

TEXTS (2886–2888).

"THAT WORD WHICH IS DEFINITELY KNOWN TO BE ETERNAL, OR UTTERED BY A TRUSTWORTHY PERSON, IS NEVER VITIATED BY THE HEARER OR THE SPEAKER;—BECAUSE TEACHERS AND FELLOW-STUDENTS HELP TO PREVENT MUTILATIONS THEREOF AND ARE FULLY COMPETENT TO PRESERVE SUCH ASSERTIONS.—CONSEQUENTLY, THE ASSERTION DOES NOT BECOME VITIATED BY THE DEFECTS WHICH ARE WARDED OFF BY THE EXCELLENCES (OF THE TEACHER, ETC.).—OR, WHEN THERE IS NO PRONOUNCER OR 'MAKER' OF THE WORD OR ASSERTION, THERE CAN BE NO DEFECTS, AS THERE WOULD BE NO SUBSTRATUM FOR THESE."—(2886–2888)

COMMENTARY.

Two kinds of Verbal Cognition are reliable, valid—that produced by the eternal Word, and that produced by the words uttered by a trustworthy

person.—That in both of these the cause or source is faultless is pointed out by the present text.

In that Word or Sentence which is eternal, there can be no defects relating to the Speaker or the Hearer; because such words and sentences are always preserved by Teachers and Students.

That Word or Sentence which is uttered by a reliable Person,—there also the presence of defects is rendered impossible by the presence in him of such excellences as those of Compassion and the like.

The faultlessness of the eternal Word is proved in another way also:—'*Or when there is no maker of the Word, etc. etc.*'—Defects, such as Love and Hate, etc. are properties of men; and as such they could reside only in the Maker; hence, when there is no substratum, in the shape of the Maker, how could they affect the words that have not emanated from a personal source? If they did, they would be without a substratum; because it is an essential feature of the *subsistent* that it must follow in the wake of the *substratum*.—(2886–2888)

Says the Opponent—In the case of the words of the trustworthy person, if their validity be held to be due to the fact of all defects being discarded by the excellent qualities of the Person,—then the validity would be due to those excellent qualities (not to the Cognition itself); so that the Infinite Regress would continue to vitiate this view.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2889-2890).

"IN THE CASE OF THE WORDS OF THE TRUSTWORTHY PERSON, TWO FACTS HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED: (1) THAT THERE ARE NO DEFECTS, AND (2) THAT THERE ARE EXCELLENCES;—THAT VALIDITY IS NOT DUE TO THE EXCELLENCES HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED BEFORE;—AND ON ACCOUNT OF THESE EXCELLENCES IN THE SPEAKER, THERE CAN BE NO DEFECTS IN HIM, THESE BEING DISCARDED BY THE EXCELLENCES. THUS THE VALIDITY BELONGS TO THE WORD ITSELF,—AND IS INDICATED BY THE ABSENCE OF THE DEFECTS."—(2889-2890)

COMMENTARY.

'*Doṣābhāva, etc.*'—The compound is to be expounded as—the '*dvaya*' '*two*'—which has for its '*ātmā*', nature,—consisting in the *absence of defects* and the *presence of excellences*.

'*Explained before*'—under *Text* 2856.

'*Discarded by them*'—i.e. by the excellences.

'*Indicated by the absence of defects*';—what is meant is that the function of the excellences free from defects consists only in the setting aside of the Defects, and not in creating *validity*.—(2889-2890)

Says the Opponent :—If Validity is held to be due to the certainty of the absence of defects,—then too, the Infinite Regress remains.—The Author sets forth this view in the following :—

TEXT (2891).

IF THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS IN THE WORDS OF THE TRUSTWORTHY PERSON IS DEDUCED FROM HIS EXCELLENCES, THEN THERE IS THE SAME INFINITE REGRESS,—FOR ONE WHO WOULD FOLLOW UP THIS PRESENCE OF EXCELLENCES.—(2891)

COMMENTARY.

According to the view detailed above, the absence of defects is to be deduced from the cognition of the excellences ;—the validity of this cognition of excellences again is to be deduced from the absence of defects ;—this absence of defects again is to be deduced from excellences ; and so on and on ; there would be the same Infinite Regress, which would obliterate all usages and distinctions.—(2891)

This is answered (by the *Mīmāmsaka*) in the following :—

TEXTS (2892-2893).

"THIS DOES NOT AFFECT US. THE COGNITION OF THE EXCELLENCES IS NOT NEEDED AT THE TIME. IT IS NOT *as cognised* THAT THE EXCELLENCES ARE OPERATIVE IN THE MATTER ; BY THEIR SHEER PRESENCE THEY ARE COMPETENT TO SET ASIDE THE DEFECTS ; AND WHILE THEY ARE THERE, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR ANY COGNITION OF THE DEFECTS OF THE MAN."—(2892-2893)

COMMENTARY.

'*While they are there*' ;—i.e. while the excellences are there.—(2892-2893)

Question :—If the cognition of the defects of man does not appear—what then ?

Answer :—

TEXT (2894).

"BECAUSE THE DEFECTS ARE NOT COGNISED, THEREFORE THEY DO NOT SET ASIDE THE VALIDITY; NOT BEING SET ASIDE, IT BECOMES ESTABLISHED BY ITSELF HERE ALSO."—(2894)

COMMENTARY.

'*The validity is not set aside*'—such is the construction.

Question :—Why is it not set aside ?

Answer :—'*Because they are not cognised*'; the defects are discarded by the excellences, hence being non-existent, they are naturally 'not cognised'.

'*Not being set aside, etc.*'—established, because not set aside. When there is no exception to a general rule, it becomes automatically established.

'*Here also*'—i.e. in the case of the words of the Trustworthy Person, not only in that of words not emanating from a Personality.—This is what is indicated by '*api*'.—(2894)

Says the Opponent—If, in the case of certain words emanating from a personality, no defects are found,—even so they are suspected; because they always subsist in such words. So that, just as the excellences, by their sheer presence, are capable of setting aside the defects,—so the defects also may be capable of setting aside the excellences;—why then should it be said that—'not being cognised, the Defects do not set aside the validity?'

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2895-2896).

"IN THE CASE OF WORDS EMANATING FROM PERSONALITIES, THERE IS ALWAYS ROOM FOR DOUBT WHETHER THERE ARE DEFECTS OR NOT. IN THE CASE OF THE VEDA, HOWEVER, THERE BEING NO AUTHOR, THERE CAN BE ABSOLUTELY NO SUSPICION FOR US REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF DEFECTS.—CONSEQUENTLY, JUST AS VALIDITY (AND RELIABILITY) IS ACCEPTED IN THE CASE OF THE VEDA, ON THE GROUND OF ITS BEING INDEPENDENT AND SELF-SUFFICIENT,—SO THE SAME VALIDITY BECOMES ESTABLISHED IN REGARD TO THE WORDS OF A TRUSTWORTHY PERSON ALSO."—(2895-2896)

COMMENTARY.

The idea is as follows :—"It is not necessary for us to prove the validity of the human assertion; in fact, all this effort of ours is meant for proving the authority of the Veda; so that, if the human assertion turns out to be invalid and unreliable,—that does no harm to the Veda; as its validity is proved by the *absence of defects*;—this is what is meant by the phrase '*on the ground of its being independent and self-sufficient*'.

This has been thus asserted in the *Bhāṣya* (Shabara)—'Hence the Veda is authoritative and reliable, because it is not dependent upon anything else; such being the case, there can be no need for another cognition or another Person; because the Veda is self-sufficient in its validity' (Sū. 1. 1. 5).—(2895-2896)

Then again, is it meant that the Veda operates upon things apprehended by other Means of Cognition? Or is it not so meant? These are the two alternatives possible.—If it is the second view that is accepted—that the Veda is not operative on things apprehended by other Means,—then that fact alone proves the self-sufficient validity of the Veda.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (2897).

"THE FACT THAT OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION NEVER HAVE ANY BEARING UPON WHAT IS SAID IN THE VEDA ESTABLISHES ITS VALIDITY.—OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE MERELY REITERATIVE."—(2897)

COMMENTARY.

'*What is said in the Veda*':—e.g. that 'Heaven follows from the performance of the *Agnihotra*', and so forth.

'*Other means of cognition*';—'Means of Cognition other than the Veda' are Sense-perception and the rest;—the '*bearing*' of these consists in their having these same for their objective;—and this 'bearing' is absent.

'*The fact*'—i.e. the fact that they have no bearing.

'*Asya*'—of the Veda.

If the other alternative view is accepted,—that the Veda envisages only those things that are apprehended by the other Means of Cognition,—then, one cognition (that produced by the Veda or that produced by other Means) would be apprehending what has been already apprehended by other Means; consequently the later of the two would become invalid. This is what is pointed out by the words '*Otherwise, etc. etc.*'; —'*otherwise*',—i.e. if it is held that the Veda as a means of Cognition is operative on what is also apprehended by other Means of Cognition, then,—as it would be envisaging only what has been already apprehended by other means, it would be as invalid as Remembrance.

Thus what is itself a valid Cognition cannot need the corroboration of other cognitions; hence it becomes established that all Cognitions are self-sufficient in their validity.—(2897)

The same idea is further elucidated—

TEXT (2898).

"SUCH CORROBORATION (BY OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION) DOES NOT FORM THE BASIS OF THE VALIDITY OF OTHER COGNITIONS ALSO; BECAUSE AMONG COGNITIONS ENVISAGING THE SAME THING, THERE CAN BE ONLY OPTION,—WHICH MEANS THAT VALIDITY CAN BELONG TO ONLY ONE OF THEM."—(2898)

COMMENTARY.

'*Other Means of Cognitions*',—i.e. the Means of Cognition other than the Veda,— i.e. Sense-perception and the rest.

'*Tulyārthānām*'—bearing upon one and the same thing.

'*To only one*'—the one appearing first of all; the other being only reiterative.

The validity of this first Cognition cannot be due to the other subsequent cognitions; because these latter are themselves invalid, inasmuch as they apprehend what has been already apprehended.—(2898)

Says the Opponent—In places where there is dense darkness, it is actually seen that a thing that has been apprehended (vaguely) by the first cognition is again apprehended (and defined) by later cognitions appearing after the appearance of light.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2899).

"EVEN IN A CASE WHERE THE THING IS DEFINITELY APPREHENDED BY THE LATER COGNITIONS,—THE THING HAS NOT BEEN CLEARLY AND DEFINITELY APPREHENDED BY THE FIRST COGNITION."
—(2899)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is that the first cognition, being uncertain and vague, cannot be valid.—(2899)

Further, if the validity of a Cognition were due to corroboration by other Cognitions,—then no validity could belong to the Cognition of a thing that has been born and immediately destroyed, or to the auditory perception; as no other cognition could operate upon them.—This is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (2900).

"NO VALIDITY COULD BELONG TO THE COGNITION OF A THING THAT IS DESTROYED IMMEDIATELY ON BEING BORN,—OR TO AUDITORY PERCEPTION,—BECAUSE THESE WOULD NOT BE CORROBORATED BY THE EYE AND OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION.—(2900)

COMMENTARY.

'*Not corroborated, etc. etc.*'—i.e. not related to one another by the relation based upon the sameness of their object.

The argument may be formulated thus:—That which does not need corroboration by other cognitions must be regarded as self-sufficient in its validity;—e.g. the auditory cognition produced once, and the cognition of what has been destroyed;—the cognition of what is asserted in the Veda does not need corroboration by other cognitions; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(2900)

In the following *Texts*, the *Mīmāmsaka* anticipates and answers the objection that the Corroborative Instance cited is devoid of the Probandum:—

TEXTS (2901-2902).

"IF IT BE URGED THAT—'THE VALIDITY OF THE AUDITORY COGNITION WOULD BE DUE TO ITS CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER AUDITORY COGNITION',—THEN OF THE VEDA ALSO, THE VALIDITY MAY BE DUE TO THE CORROBORATION OF ANOTHER COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE VEDA. IN BOTH CASES, THE (CORROBORATIVE) COGNITION IS NOT PRODUCED BY OTHER MEANS; HENCE THEY DO NOT NEED CORROBORATION BY COGNITIONS PRODUCED BY OTHER CAUSES."—(2901-2902)

COMMENTARY.

When the same sound is heard by several men,—another auditory cognition does become operative (upon the same object); hence it is through the corroboration of this other auditory organ that the validity of the first cognition is ascertained.

The answer to this is provided by the words—'*Of the Veda also, etc. etc.*'—

'*Due to corroboration by another cognition brought about by the Veda*';—i.e. due to the connection of another cognition produced by the Veda.

'*In both cases*'—i.e. in the case of the auditory cognition and that of the cognition of what is said in the Veda.

What is meant is as follows :—In the phrase ' it does not need the corroboration of other cognitions', what is meant by ' other cognitions' is *cognitions produced by other Means of Cognition*,—not the cognition produced by the same Means as the Cognition in question. Consequently, the Reason being a qualified one, the Corroborative Instance in our argument is *not* ' devoid of the Probandum'?

'*Corroboration of cognitions produced by other causes*';—the compound is to be expounded as—the '*Saṁvāda*'—corroboration—of such '*Jñāna*'—cognition—as is '*Kṛta*'—produced—by—'*hētvantara*'—other causes.—(2901-2902)

If it be argued that—' even the operation of such other cognitions as are brought about by the same means as the cognition in question makes the validity of this latter *extraneous*',—the argument is *futile* (superfluous).—This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXT (2903).

"JUST AS, IN THE CASE OF THE VALIDITY OF SENSE-PERCEPTION, THERE IS THE DEFINITE BASIS IN THE FORM OF CORROBORATION BY ANOTHER COGNITION PRODUCED BY THE SAME SENSE-ORGAN,—THE SAME SHOULD BE ASSERTED TO BE THE BASIS IN THE CASE OF THE VEDA ALSO."—(2903)

COMMENTARY.

'*Definite basis*'—as stated in the first line of *Text* 2901.—(2903)

Question :—How can this be said in regard to the Veda ?
Answer :—

TEXTS (2904-2905).

"WHEN THE COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY ANY ONE SENTENCE IS FOUND TO BE THE SAME AT ALL TIMES AND PLACES, AND IN ALL MEN,—THEN NO OTHER BASIS NEED BE SOUGHT FOR ITS VALIDITY. THUS THEN, WHEN A FIRM CONVICTION PRODUCED BY A SENTENCE IS NOT FOUND TO BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE COGNITIONS APPEARING AT OTHER TIMES AND PLACES AND IN OTHER MEN,—IT IS UNDOUBTEDLY VALID."—(2904-2905)

COMMENTARY.

'*Firm*'—free from uncertainty and mistake.

'*Cognitions appearing at other, etc. etc.*'—'*ādi*' includes 'men' also.—(2904-2905)

The following *Text* shows that the Reason adduced is not 'Inadmissible':—

TEXT (2906).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE VALIDITY OF VERBAL AND OTHER COGNITIONS IS NOT TO BE PROVED BY MEANS OF INFERENCE. OTHERWISE THE VALIDITY OF SENSE-PERCEPTION ALSO MIGHT HAVE TO BE PROVED BY INFERENCE (WHICH IS ABSURD)."—(2906)

COMMENTARY.

The cognition produced by the *Veda* cannot have its validity confirmed by Sense-perception, because what is said in the Veda is beyond the reach of the senses.—Nor can it be proved or confirmed by Inference; as that would lead to incongruities.

'*Shabdānām*':—this includes the cognitions produced by the Veda.

Or, particular details may be learnt from the Context.—(2906)

The following might be urged—We do hold that the validity of Sense-perception is proved by means of Inference.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2907-2908).

"IF THE VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS WERE PROVED BY ANOTHER COGNITION, THEN, OF THIS LATTER ALSO, THE VALIDITY WOULD BE PROVED BY ANOTHER, AND SO ON AND ON, THERE WOULD BE INFINITE REGRESS.—IF THE VALIDITY OF THE COGNITION THAT PROVES THE VALIDITY OF ANOTHER COGNITION BE NOT PROVED BY ANY OTHER COGNITION,—THEN THE SAME MIGHT BE THE CASE WITH THOSE WHOSE VALIDITY IS HELD TO BE PROVED BY OTHERS."—(2907-2908)

COMMENTARY.

If, like the Sense-perception, the Inference also had its validity proved by another Inference,—then there would be Infinite Regress.

If the validity of the cognition called 'Inference' were not proved by another cognition,—then in the case of Sense-perception also,—whose validity is held to be proved by Inference,—the validity would be such as is *not* proved by another cognition; as there would be no difference between the two cases.—(2907-2908)

In the following *Text*, the *Bauddha* supports the view that the Reason put forward is 'Inadmissible':—

TEXT (2909).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, SENSE-PERCEPTION, ETC. ARE NOT QUITE RECOGNISED AS '*pramāṇa*', 'VALID'; AND UNTIL THEY ARE SO RECOGNISED, NO BUSINESS WOULD BE POSSIBLE.—(2909)

COMMENTARY.

If Cognitions did not need (corroboration by) other Cognitions, then, in regard to Sense-perception and the rest, there could be no certainty as to their being 'valid'; and thus there would be an end to all business-transactions.—(2909)

To the above, the *Mīmāmsaka* provides the following answer :—

TEXT (2910).

"BEFORE THE COGNITION IS APPREHENDED, IT REMAINS THERE IN ITS OWN FORM; AND SO FAR AS ITS OWN OBJECTIVE IS CONCERNED, IT IS INDEPENDENT AND SELF-SUFFICIENT; AND AFTER ITS OWN OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN COGNISED, THE COGNITION ITSELF COMES TO BE COGNISED BY OTHER COGNITIONS."—(2910)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant is as follows :—Even though in regard to the definite cognition of its own form, the Cognition requires another Cognition,—yet there can be no end to business-transactions; because in regard to the apprehension of its own objective, the Cognition is independent and self-sufficient; and when the object has become apprehended, then by that alone can all transactions be carried on; what use then would there be for considering whether there is certainty or uncertainty? Because the sole purpose of all this lies in the definite cognition of the object concerned. Such in brief is the purport of the argument.

The meaning of the words is now explained—

'*Before the cognition is apprehended*'—i.e. before the certainty that 'this is valid'.

'*In its own form*'—i.e. in the form of the apprehension of the thing.

'*Independent*'—i.e. not depending upon another cognition, for the purpose of the apprehension of its object.

When this—its object—has become duly cognised, with certainty,—then, later on, the Cognition itself becomes cognised through Inference, etc. This has been thus declared—'One does not apprehend the Cognition until the object has been cognised; when the object has become cognised, then the Cognition becomes cognised by means of Inference'.—(2910)

The following might be urged—until the Cognition itself has been cognised, the apprehension of its objective cannot be possible, as has been thus declared—'There can be no perception of the object for one who has had no perception of the Cognition itself'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2911-2912).

"JUST AS OBJECTS ARE APPREHENDED BY THE EYE AND OTHER SENSE-ORGANS, WHICH LATTER ARE THEMSELVES UNCOGNISED,—SO, IN THE SAME MANNER ARE THINGS APPREHENDED BY COGNITIONS ALSO, WITHOUT THESE LATTER BEING THEMSELVES COGNISED. HENCE *becoming cognised* IS NOT OF MUCH USE IN THE *validity* OF THE COGNITION. FOR THE SAME REASON THE APPREHENSION OF THINGS ALSO IS OBTAINED FROM THE COGNITION THAT IS ITSELF UNCOGNISED."—(2911-2912)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(2911-2912)

If that is so, then the *invalidity* also of Cognitions could, in the same way, be regarded as *inherent* in them.—Anticipating this objection, the *Mīmāmsaka* provides the following answer:—

TEXT (2913).

"LIKE VALID COGNITION, INVALID COGNITION ALSO OPERATES UPON ITS OBJECT, BY ITSELF (INDEPENDENTLY); BUT THE FACT OF ITS BEING *false* CANNOT BE APPREHENDED WITHOUT ANOTHER MEANS OF COGNITION."—(2913)

COMMENTARY.

Invalid Cognition also has the semblance of the Valid Cognition, and hence it does apprehend [the '*na*' is wrongly put in] the object, by its mere existence; consequently, '*falsity*'—i.e. the fact of its envisaging an unreal thing—cannot be apprehended without another means of Cognition; we are going to show later on that this falsity is *extraneous*.—(2913)

Says the Opponent—The same is equally true of the valid Cognition also; because that also, in some cases, has the semblance of the Invalid Cognition.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2914-2915).

"THE FALSE CHARACTER OF THE THING IS NOT APPREHENDED BY THE FORMER (I.E. THE INVALID COGNITION) IN THE WAY IN WHICH THE TRUE CHARACTER (IS APPREHENDED BY THE VALID COGNITION). THUS THEN, IT IS ONLY WHEN THERE APPEARS THE COGNITION OF THE TRUTH BEING OTHERWISE,—OR THE COGNITION THAT THE SOURCE OF THE COGNITION HAS BEEN DEFECTIVE,—THAT THE FALSITY (INVALIDITY) OF THE COGNITION BECOMES RECOGNISED; NOT ON ANY OTHER GROUNDS. AT THE TIME THAT IT APPEARS IT IS ALWAYS RECOGNISED AS VALID."
—(2914-2915)

COMMENTARY.

'*The former*'—i.e. the invalid cognition.

'*Ātta*'—apprehended.

'*True character*';—this is a corroborative instance *per* dissimilarity.

What is meant is as follows:—Falsity is not apprehended by the Invalid cognition in the same way in which *truth* is apprehended by the Valid cognition; hence the two do not stand on the same footing. Because as soon as it is born, the Valid cognition is recognised as valid; but the Invalid cognition is not similarly recognised as invalid, as soon as it is born; because it has always the semblance of the Valid cognition.

'*Tadatrāpi, etc. etc.*'—This sums up the view that the Invalidity of Cognitions is extraneous.

'*Yadvā duṣṭakāraṇe*'—'*dhīḥ*' has to be construed here also.

'*It is only then that the falsity of the Cognition becomes apprehended*';—i.e. when there is the idea that the real state of things is otherwise,—and when there is the idea that the source of the Cognition has been defective.

The following might be urged—The falsity of the Cognition could be admitted only when it would be definitely known that these two ideas are actually true; and for the purpose of recognising the truth of these ideas, there would be need for another Cognition; so that there would be an infinite regress.

The answer to this is given in the words—'*At the time that it appears, etc. etc.*';—'*it*' stands for the said two ideas—(1) of the real state of things being otherwise and (2) of the source of the Cognition being defective.—Thus there would be no Infinite Regress.—(2914-2915)

The Buddhists and others have argued that the Words of the Veda must be false,—because they are words,—like such human assertions as 'Fire is cool'.

The *Mīmāmsaka* proceeds to show that this argument is 'Inconclusive'.—

TEXT (2916).

"FOR THESE REASONS, EVEN IN CASES WHERE THE FALSITY IS EXPLAINED TO OTHERS,—THESE TWO IDEAS HAVE TO BE POINTED OUT,——AND NOT MERE SIMILARITY."—(2916)

COMMENTARY.

'*In cases*'—such as that of the Vedic Injunction.

'*These two ideas*'—i.e. the idea that the truth is otherwise than what has been said in the Veda, and also that what has been so said has had a defective source.

'*Mere similarity*'—i.e. the mere fact of being 'words' and thereby being similar to human assertions.—(2916)

Question :—Why should mere similarity not be urged ?

Answer :—

TEXTS (2917–2919).

"THE IGNORANT MEN WHO, ON THE BASIS OF MERE SIMILARITY TO INVALID COGNITIONS, SEEK TO PROVE THE INVALIDITY OF *all* COGNITIONS,—FOR THEM SUCH AN ARGUMENT IS CONDUCIVE TO THEIR OWN RUIN. BECAUSE FOR THE OTHER PARTY ALSO, THERE COMES ABOUT AN ARGUMENT WHICH IS THE REFLECTION OF THE BUDDHIST ARGUMENT ; AND THUS BEING REFUTED BY THIS, THE ARGUMENT (OF THE BUDDHIST) TURNS OUT TO BE THE MEANS OF PROVING WHAT IS NOT TRUE ; AND AS SUCH, IT IS NOT CAPABLE OF SETTING ASIDE THE VEDIC INJUNCTION WHICH IS INHERENTLY VALID."—(2917–2919)

COMMENTARY.

If a Cognition were invalid simply because it is similar (to another Cognition which is invalid),—then all Cognitions would have to be regarded as invalid ; because some sort of similarity—such as *being an entity*—can be asserted in all cases.—Such is the meaning of the *Text* in brief.

Question :—How is it conducive to their own ruin ?

Answer :—'*For the other party also, etc. etc.*'—'*Other party*'—i.e. the *Mīmāmsaka*.—'*Reflection, etc.*'—just as the reflection appears after the reflected object, so, after the argument of the Buddhist, there appears the counter-argument of the *Mīmāmsaka*.

For instance, it is open to the *Mīmāmsaka* to argue as follows :—The words of the Veda are *not false*,—because they are *Words*, etc. etc. ;—like such human assertions as 'Fire is hot, bright and so forth'.

Thus being refuted—negatived—by such counter-arguments,—the argument that had been adduced by the Buddhist and others to prove the idea of Vedic Injunction being false is quite incapable of rejecting the Vedic Injunction.—Why ?—Because of the *inherent validity* of the Vedic

Injunction ;— that is to say, the validity of the Vedic Injunction is such as belongs to it by its very nature.—(2917–2919)

With the following *Text*, the Author begins the refutation *seriatim* of all the arguments that have been set forth by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Texts* 2848 onwards :—

TEXT (2920).

THE ANSWER TO THE ABOVE IS AS FOLLOWS :—AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE DISTINCTION THAT HAS BEEN MADE HAS SOME BASIS ONLY IN REGARD TO THOSE THINGS THAT ARE HELD TO CONTINUE TO EXIST AFTER BEING PRODUCED.—(2920)

COMMENTARY.

'*Has some basis*'—i.e. subsists in a real entity ; that is, because what does not exist cannot be operative.—(2920)

Question :—" What is this ' distinction ' ? .'
Answer :—

TEXT (2921).

IT IS ONLY FOR THE SECURING OF THEIR EXISTENCE THAT THINGS LIKE THE JAR STAND IN NEED OF A CAUSE ; WHEN ONCE THEY HAVE SECURED THEIR EXISTENCE, THEY BECOME OPERATIVE BY THEMSELVES TOWARDS THEIR OWN EFFECTS.—(2921)

[This is a parody of the *Mīmāmsaka's* assertion in *Text* 2848.]

COMMENTARY.

Question :—" Why can this not be possible in the case of Cognition also ? [why should it be restricted to things like the Jar only ?] "
Answer :—

TEXT (2922).

THAT COGNITION WHICH YOU ALSO REGARD AS NOT LASTING AFTER BEING BORN, BECOMES NON-EXISTENT AFTER HAVING SECURED ITS EXISTENCE ; WHAT SORT OF ACTIVITY OR OPERATION, THEN, COULD IT HAVE ?—(2922)

COMMENTARY.

'*What activity could the non-existent Cognition have ?*'—none whatsoever ; because what is non-existent is devoid of all capacity.

Even if it existed, as all entities are without desire and effort, they could not have any activity. Nor is there any effect to be produced by the Cognition, towards which the Cognition could operate.

"But there is to be produced by it the effect in the shape of making its object cognised".

Not so; 'making cognised its own object' means exactly the same that is meant by the term 'Cognition'; so your assertion would mean that the Cognition produces itself; indeed a most excellent assertion!

"The effect of the Cognition would be the bringing about of the certainty that the Cognition is right and valid."

That is not possible; because in the case of some Cognitions, there is no certainty; and in some the contrary is found to be the case.

What has been said has also shown that the present Proposition of the *Mīmāṃsaka* is contrary to Perception and other means of Cognition. For instance, if there is non-apprehension of what fulfills the conditions of perceptibility, and there is apprehension of something else,—it follows that what is non-existent cannot have any activity. The same is also proved by Inference,—being, as it is, formless, like the 'sky-lotus'.

The phrase '*which you also regard*' serves to point out that what has been asserted by the *Mīmāṃsaka* involves self-contradiction on his part.—(2922)

This same self-contradiction is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (2923-2924).

THE OPERATION OF CAUSES HAS ALWAYS BEEN FOUND TO BE SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE *birth* OF THE EFFECTS; IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE THIS FROM THE CASE OF COGNITION (*Pramāṇa*), THE TERM 'BIRTH' ('*janma*') HAS BEEN INTRODUCED [BY JAIMINI IN HIS *Sūtra* 1. 1. 4] —THE IDEA BEING THAT THE COGNITION DOES NOT CONTINUE TO EXIST FOR EVEN A SINGLE MOMENT, AND YET IT IS NOT BORN AS INVALID; ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH IT COULD OPERATE ONLY LATER ON TOWARDS THE APPREHENDING OF THE OBJECT,—IN THE MANNER OF THE SENSE-ORGANS.— [*Shlokavārtika*—SENSE-PERCEPTION, 54-55].— (2923-2924)

COMMENTARY.

In *Sūtra* I. I. 4, Jaimini has propounded the definition of *Sense-perception* as consisting in 'the *birth* of the man's apprehension following from the contact of the sense-organs with an existing object'; and the above four lines have been put forward by Kumārila in justification of the use of the term '*janma*' (Birth) in this definition; the sense being that the term 'birth' has been used in order to point out that the Cognition is valid as soon as it is *born*.

Question :—" What is the reason for this ? "

Answer :—' *The Cognition does not, etc. etc.* '—' *Tai* ' stands for the *Cognition*.—(2923-2924)

In the following *Text*, the Author anticipates and answers the rejoinder of the other party :—

TEXT (2925).

IF THE COGNITION IS HELD TO BE NOT-MOMENTARY AND EVEN ETERNAL, THEN THIS GOES AGAINST WHAT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ELSEWHERE, AND IT IS ALSO NULLIFIED BY REASONING. —(2925)

COMMENTARY.

In another context, *Kumārila* has declared the *unity* and *eternality* of Cognitions, as declared by him in the following words—" For us, Cognitions being of the same nature as the Spirit (Soul), are held to be *eternal* and *one* " [*Shlokavārtika*—Eternality of Words, 404].

Under this view, the Proposition put forward (that Cognitions are *eternal*) would go against what has been accepted elsewhere,—as also against Inference. For instance, it has been held that Cognitions are momentary ; as said in the *Bhāṣya* (Shabara)—" It is momentary and does not remain till the time of the appearance of another Cognition " (Sū. 1. 1. 5, page 9, line 17) ; and it also goes against the words of Kumārila himself, to the effect that— " Cognition does not continue to exist for a single moment " (*Shlokavārtika*—Sense-perception 55).—(2925)

The following *Text* points out how the assertion of the Eternality of Cognitions is nullified by reasoning :—

TEXT (2926).

(*a*) IT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN DETAIL THAT ALL THINGS ARE IN ' PERPETUAL FLUX ' ;—(*b*) AS FOR THE ETERNAL THING, IT IS NEVER *produced* ; WHAT NEED THEN COULD IT HAVE OF A CAUSE ?—(2926)

COMMENTARY.

If Cognition is eternal, then it cannot be right to hold that it needs a Cause ; this is pointed out in the words—' *As regards the eternal thing, etc. etc.* '—It is only what is produced that needs something else as its Cause ; what is eternal, however, can never be produced ; what need can that have of it ?—(2926)

In the following *Text* the author shows, through a formulated argument, that the idea of the *Mīmāmsaka* is annulled by Inference—

TEXT (2927).

FOR THESE REASONS, IT CAN BE ASSERTED THAT BY ITSELF THE COGNITION CANNOT BE VALID, THE VALIDITY COMES ONLY LATER IN RELATION TO ITS EFFECTS,—BECAUSE IT IS FEATURELESS,—LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS'.—(2927)

COMMENTARY.

In the following *Text*, the Author admits (for the sake of argument) that Cognitions are not-momentary, and then proceeds to show that the view of the other party is annulled by facts of Sense-perception and other forms of Cognition :—

TEXT (2928).

OR, COGNITION MAY BE *not-momentary*, AND IT MAY BY ITSELF BE OPERATIVE TOWARDS BRINGING ABOUT THE CONVICTION REGARDING ITS VALIDITY. BUT IN THAT CASE, WHY SHOULD THERE BE ANY DOUBTS, ETC. ?—(2928)

COMMENTARY.

If the Cognition itself produces the conviction regarding its own validity, then there should be no Doubt, etc. regarding the Cognition. The '*etc.*' includes *wrong cognition*, as also contradictions due to it, ideas to the contrary, setting forth of self-contradictory definitions, and non-conformity.

Thus, inasmuch as we do meet, after the Cognition, with Doubts, etc. which are contrary to the conviction of validity of the Cognition,—it is clearly established by Perception itself that there is no conviction in the case ; and this absence of Conviction becomes proved by Perception, exactly in the same manner as the absence of the Jar is established by the apprehension of the place devoid of the Jar.

Thus the Proposition that there is conviction regarding *validity* is annulled by a fact of Sense-perception.—(2928)

The following *Text* points out how there is incompatibility with Perception :—

TEXT (2929).

INASMUCH AS CERTAINTY REGARDING ITS VALIDITY WOULD BE OBTAINED FROM THE COGNITION ITSELF, THERE CAN BE NO ROOM FOR DOUBT OR WRONG COGNITION, ETC.—(2929)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tasmin*' stands for certainty regarding validity.—(2929)

Question :—" Why should there be no room for Doubt, etc. ? "
Answer :—

TEXT (2930).

INASMUCH AS CONVICTION AND WRONG COGNITION ARE MUTUALLY DESTRUCTIVE,—IF WRONG COGNITION BECOMES EXCLUDED, CONVICTION REMAINS ENTIRELY UNAFFECTED.—(2930)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—" Why should the two be mutually destructive ? "

Answer :—' *If Wrong Cognition becomes excluded, etc. etc.* '—*Conviction* has a form which is the reverse of Wrong Cognition ; hence it does not gain a footing until it has set aside the Wrong Cognition ; just as *warmth* does not gain a footing until it has set aside *coolness*. Hence when an object has been taken up by Conviction, where could there be any room for the Wrong Cognition ?—(2930)

The following *Text* points out that the *Mīmāmsaka's* view involves self-contradiction also :—

TEXT (2931).

THUS THEN, FOR ESTABLISHING THE VALIDITY OF THE COGNITION ARISING FROM THE VEDA,—ANY SUCH ASSERTION AS THAT IT ARISES FROM CAUSES FREE FROM DEFECTS AND SO FORTH, IS OF NO USE.—(2931)

COMMENTARY.

' *Hētūtthabhāva* '—character of arising from causes.

' *And so forth* '—includes—(*a*) the assertion of its not being the work of an untrustworthy person, (*b*) the assertion that it is never sublated. As has been declared in the following passage—" The Cognition produced by the Veda is valid,—(*a*) because it is produced by causes free from defects,—like cognitions produced by the Inferential Indicative, the Words of a Trustworthy Person, and Sense-perception ; also (*b*) because it is not the work of an untrustworthy person, and (*c*) because it is free from sublation " —(*Shlokavārtika,* Sū. 1. 1. 2 ; 184-185). Consequently, for the proving of the validity of the Cognition produced by the Veda,—when the *Mīmāmsaka* states a reason,—it becomes implied that the validity of that Cognition is due to extraneous causes ;—and this idea is negatived by the same writer when he asserts that " the validity of all Cognitions is inherent in themselves ". Thus there is clear self-contradiction.—(2931)

The following *Texts* anticipate and answer the rejoinder of the *Mīmāmsaka* to the above :—

TEXTS (2932–2934).

IF IT IS HELD THAT—" THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS HAVING BEEN ACCEPTED AS A FACT, THE ARGUMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN SET FORTH ARE ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF REFUTING THE DENIAL OF THE SAME ",—EVEN THAT CANNOT BE RIGHT; AS THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DENIAL; THERE CAN BE A SUSPICION OF SUCH DENIAL, ONLY SO LONG AS THE FIRM CONVICTION REGARDING THE VALIDITY HAS NOT APPEARED;—AS SOON AS THAT CONVICTION HAS APPEARED, WHENCE COULD THERE BE ANY SUSPICION REGARDING INVALIDITY,—FOR THE REMOVING OF WHICH YOUR ATTEMPT COULD BE USEFUL? WHEN A MAN HAS BEEN CONVINCED THAT THE TALL THING STANDING BEFORE HIM IS A POST, HE NO LONGER SUSPECTS IT TO BE ANYTHING ELSE.—(2932–2934)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—" when we put forward our arguments, it is not for proving the validity of the Cognition proceeding from the Veda; it is for refuting the invalidity that has been urged by the other party ".

This also cannot be right.—Why?—Because there can be no possibility of any suspicion of invalidity.—It has been declared that 'Conviction and Doubt are mutually destructive' (2930);—so that when Conviction has come about, whence could there be any suspicion of invalidity,—for the removing of which suspicion, your attempt at setting forth arguments could be fruitful?

An example is cited—'*When a man, etc. etc.*'—i.e. by the observer who has become convinced of its being the *post.*

'*Any thing else*'—in the shape of *tree* or *man* or some such thing.—(2932–2934)

Question:—" If that is so, then how can the suspicion of *invalidity* be removed without setting forth arguments?"

Answer:—

TEXT (2935).

WHEN A FIRM CONVICTION HAS APPEARED IN A CERTAIN FORM IN CONNECTION WITH A CERTAIN THING, FROM A CERTAIN CAUSE,—ALL SUSPICIONS TO THE CONTRARY ARE REMOVED BY THAT SAME CONVICTION.—(2935)

COMMENTARY.

'*Yadrūpanischayaḥ*'—in a certain form.

'*Tadviparyaya, etc.*'—the suspicion regarding that form or character.

'*Tata ēva*'—from the conviction regarding the same form.—(2935)

An example is cited in support of this:—

TEXT (2936).

WHEN THE EXISTENCE OF FIRE HAS BECOME COGNISED THROUGH INDICATIVES LIKE *Smoke*,—THE IDEA OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF FIRE BECOMES DISCARDED BY THAT SAME COGNITION. —(2936)

COMMENTARY.

'*The idea of its non-existence, etc. etc.*'—i.e. the non-existence of the Fire. —(2936)

The whole matter is summed up in the following :—

TEXT (2937).

THUS THEN, PLEASE ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF INVALIDITY IS OBTAINED BY ITSELF ; HENCE FOR THE DENIAL OF INVALIDITY, NO ARGUMENTS ARE NEEDED.—(2937)

COMMENTARY.

A consolidated argument is set forth in support of this same conclusion—

TEXT (2938).

IF THERE WERE ANY SUSPICION OF THE TWO KINDS OF 'INVALIDITY',—THEN THERE WOULD BE NO *certainty* REGARDING 'VALIDITY' ; SINCE THE THING IN QUESTION WOULD HAVE FORMED THE OBJECT OF WRONG COGNITION.—(2938)

COMMENTARY.

'*Two kinds of Invalidity*'—in the form of *Doubt* and *Wrong cognition*.—(2938)

In the following *Text*, the Author proceeds to point out 'self-contradiction' on the part of the *Mīmāṃsaka*, by showing that his view involves the incongruity of a character concomitant with the contrary :—

TEXT (2939).

WHEN A THING HAS BECOME THE OBJECT OF DOUBT OR MISCONCEPTION, THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THE REAL FORM OF THAT THING ;—AS IN THE CASE OF THE POST.—(2939)

COMMENTARY.

Doubt and Misconception are contrary to Certainty ; and when the thing has become subject to the former two,—and is concomitant with it—then there is no room for Certainty regarding it.—(2939)

In the following *Text*, the Author points out that the view of the Opponent is contrary to Inference,—and also asserts the establishment of his own view :—

TEXT (2940).

FOR EXAMPLE, (1) THE POST, (2) THE FIRE, AND (3) INVALIDITY ARE COGNISED EXTRANEOUSLY BY MEANS OF THE NOTIONS OF (1) THE CROW, (2) SMOKE AND (3) DEFECTS IN THE SOURCE OF THE COGNITION.—(2940)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be formulated as follows :—Things whose character has become subject to doubt and misconception can have their reality ascertained only by things extraneous to themselves,—e.g. the Post ;—the validity of cognitions, for some people, has become the object of Doubt and Misconception ; hence this is a Reason based on the nature of the thing concerned.

'*Balibhuk*' (Crow)—'*Dhūma*' (Smoke)—'*hētūtthadoṣa*' (defects in the source)—the '*pratyaya*'—notions of these ;—these are to be construed, respectively, with the '*Sthāṇu*' (Post)—'*Tēja*' (Fire) and '*Aprāmāṇya*' (Invalidity). [The presence of the *Crow* indicates that the upright object is the *Post*, not the *Man*.]

This shows the Invariable Concomitance of the Probans (with the Probandum).—(2940)

The following *Text* shows the presence of the Probans in the 'subject' and thereby sets aside the defect of 'Inadmissibility' from the Reason :—

TEXT (2941).

BECAUSE *validity* HAS BEEN DEFINITELY FOUND TO BE SUBJECT TO DOUBT AND MISCONCEPTION,—THEREFORE PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT ANY CERTAINTY REGARDING IT CAN BE OBTAINED ONLY EXTRANEOUSLY.—(2941)

COMMENTARY.

'*Yat*'—Because.

'*Gatam*'—found.

Question :—"What has been so found ?"

Answer :—*Validity.*

For example, it has been already shown that the cognition produced by the Veda is subject to Doubt and Misconception (i.e. it is found to be doubtful and wrong).

'*Tathā*,'—as in the case of the Post, the certainty is obtained only extraneously.

'*Tasya, etc.*'—This sets forth the conclusion resulting from the Reasoning.—(2941)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under 2932, that "the self-sufficient validity of cognitions having been accepted as a fact, the arguments that have been set forth are only for the purpose of refuting the denial of the same".—This cannot be right; because, under the circumstances, there could be no doubt regarding the *validity*; as has been explained.—The position now taken up is—that it may be granted (for the sake of argument) that the arguments have been adduced for the purpose of removing the suspicion of *invalidity*; but even so, that cannot be right, in accordance with your view.—This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXTS (2942-2943).

YOUR VIEW IS THAT—"IT IS ONLY IN THE SENTENCE IN WHICH THE NEGATIVE WORD IS FOUND THAT THERE IS DENIAL OF SOMETHING ELSE, AND IN ALL OTHER SENTENCES, IT IS THE POSITIVE DENOTATION ITSELF THAT IS APPREHENDED";—NOW IN YOUR ASSERTION (UNDER *Text* 2348) THAT "THE COGNITION PRODUCED BY THE VEDA IS VALID"—THE NEGATIVE WORD HAS NOT BEEN USED; HENCE IT CANNOT MEAN *the denial of invalidity*.
—(2942-2943)

COMMENTARY.

The view of persons like you, who hold that the denotation of words is always *positive*, is as follows :—" It is only when the negative word is used in a sentence, that 'the *denial* of other things' is comprehended,—in all other cases it is only *affirmation* that is expressed".—In the sentence embodying your argument—" The cognition produced by the Veda is valid, etc. etc.", the negative word has not been used; how then could it express the *denial of invalidity* ?—(2942-2943)

It has been argued by the Author himself (under *Text* 2928)—'How can there be Doubt and the rest, when the self-validity of the Cognition has become cognised ?'—The following *Text* proceeds to show what is meant by the term 'and the rest' in that sentence :—

TEXT (2944).

FURTHER, IF THE VALIDITY OF ALL COGNITIONS IS DULY RECOGNISED AS BEING INHERENT IN THEM BY THEMSELVES,—THEN WHY IS THERE A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION AMONG DISPUTANTS ?
—(2944)

COMMENTARY.

If the validity of all cognitions were inherent in themselves, then there could not be a difference of opinion among the various parties, regarding this validity.—(2944)

Question :—" How do you know that there is this difference of opinion ? "
Answer :—

TEXT (2945).

[THAT THERE IS DIVERSITY OF OPINION IS SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT] ONE PARTY CONSISTING OF THE 'PRĀCHYAS' (EASTERNERS OR ANCIENTS) ASSERT DEFINITELY THAT " THE VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS IS ALWAYS INHERENT, SELF-SUFFICIENT, IN THEMSELVES " ; WHILE OTHERS ASSERT THAT IN SOME CASES, THE VALIDITY IS SELF-SUFFICIENT, WHILE IN OTHERS IT IS DUE TO EXTRANEOUS CAUSES ;—AND THERE IS NO HARD AND FAST RULE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.—(2945)

COMMENTARY.

'*One party*'—i.e. the *Mīmāmsakas* ;—'*others*'—the Buddhists.

These others hold that some cognitions are self-sufficient in their validity ; e.g. (*a*) the direct perception of themselves by the cognitions by the Mystics, —(*b*) the cognition of the fruitful activity of things,—(*c*) Inferential Cognition,—(*d*) Repeated Perception ; this latter is definitely recognised as *valid* by itself as the possibility of misconception has been set aside by the repeated experience ;—while this is so in the case of some cognitions, in that of some others, the validity is derived from extraneous circumstances ; e.g. the cognition in dispute, arising from the Veda,—and also such Perception as has not had all possibility of mistake removed ; as repeated experience or the perception of effective action has not been obtained.

[Says the Opponent]—" If that is so, then, according to you, there should be no diversity of opinion in regard to Inference ; as its validity is self-sufficient. And yet there is such diversity of opinion ; as some people hold that Inference is brought about by the *three-featured* Probans ; some others hold that it is brought about by the *two-featured* Probans ; while there are others who hold that it is brought by a Probans that is *one-featured*.—Further, under this view, the setting up of the definition of things would be futile.—Similarly, the validity of Inference should not be expounded and justified as against the Materialist ; because here also, the validity is self-sufficient ".

Answer :—This does not affect our position ; because when we assert the *self-validity* of Inference, what we mean is as follows :—As a matter of fact, Inference proceeds from the definite cognition of the Probans which is invariably concomitant (with the Probandum) through *sameness* or *causation*, —and then even without confirmation by subsequent fruitful action, it has been ascertained that it is indirectly produced by the Probans as invariably concomitant with the said Probandum and hence never non-concomitant

with it. When the disputants quarrel in this matter, it is before the Inference has appeared,—and the reason for this quarrel lies in their ignorance of the nature of the Probans which is related (to the Probandum) by the causal relation; the quarrel does not arise *after* the Inference has duly come about; as at that time the exact nature of the said Probans has been duly recognised. It is for this reason that what the Teachers do, when putting forward the *definition* of things, is to explain the nature of the Probans related by the causal relation. How could any Inference come about from the cognition of a Probans other than the one mentioned?

As regards the argument of the Opponent that—"there should be no arguments addressed to the Materialist, for proving the validity of Inference";—it is not right; because what we are seeking to prove is not the *validity* of Inference, but its *use*. This we do because, even when the validity of Inference has been proved, the Materialist, deluded by listening to the false teachings of Economic Science (Philosophy of Property), does not make use of it,—as the *Sāṅkhyas* do; hence by showing to him the subject-matter of Inference, we seek to demonstrate to him the *use* of it;—by pointing out to him that—when one thing is produced by another, the latter is endowed with the capacity to bring about the former;—as is found in the case of Perception and its object;—and the cognition of the 'Subject' as containing the Probandum has been brought about by the perception of the Probans as invariably concomitant with the Probandum;—and by explaining to the Materialist all these conventions, we induce him to make use of Inference. Because in regard to Perception, he has used it as *valid* only on account of finding that it is not incompatible with the real state of things; and what 'non-incompatibility' could be there except that one should be produced by the other (as in the case of the Probans based upon causal relation)? This has been thus declared—'The validity of Sense-perception is proved by the fact that it does not appear when its object is not there; and as regards the causal character of that which is invariably concomitant, both the conditions are equally present in it'.—Consequently, as the *Sāṅkhya*, while recognising the fact that the elephant cannot stand on the tip of a grass-blade, has his mind confounded by listening to the scriptures, and consequently, while not making use of the said negative fact (of the elephant standing on the tip of the grass-blade) has recourse to activities;—similarly the Materialist also.

Then again, the validity of the cognition produced by the Veda has not been established; consequently, its validity could not be proved like that of Inference; because no Invariable Concomitance is established in this case; as it is this same validity that has got to be proved. Hence the two cases (that of the validity of cognitions produced by the Veda, and that of the validity of Inference as upheld by the Buddhist) do not stand on the same footing.—(2945)

The following might be urged—"There may be difference of opinion; but why should not this difference be there, if the validity of cognitions is self-sufficient?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2946).

DISPUTE ALWAYS ARISES FROM MISCONCEPTION,—AND SUCH MISCONCEPTION IS RENDERED IMPOSSIBLE BY THE CERTAINTY OF CONVICTION; HENCE WHEN THE VARIOUS PARTIES WOULD HAVE ASCERTAINED THE TRUTH (REGARDING THE SELF-VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS), THEY WOULD NEVER QUARREL AMONG THEMSELVES.—(2946)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this is that Dispute is always the effect of Misconception, which is always contrary to firm Conviction,—so that when there is Dispute, on any point, it follows that there is no firm Conviction; consequently, the Proposition that "the validity of Cognitions is self-sufficient" is contrary to Inference.—(2946)

The following *Texts* point out the perception of another fact which is contrary to firm Conviction:—

TEXTS (2947-2948).

IF THERE WERE A FIRM CONVICTION REGARDING THE SELF-VALIDITY OF ALL COGNITIONS,—THEN, BY VIRTUE OF THIS SAME CONVICTION, NO ONE COULD HOLD A DIFFERENT OPINION.—WHEN A MAN ACCEPTS THE *Invalid* AS *Valid*, HE BECOMES DECEIVED. WHEN, HOWEVER, THERE IS CONVICTION REGARDING *self-validity*, NO ONE CAN BE OPPOSED TO IT.—(2947-2948)

COMMENTARY.

Disagreement or diversity of opinion is always found to be the effect of a Misconception, which is always contrary to well-ascertained Conviction; therefore such diversity of opinion should not be there, in face of the opinion that all cognitions are inherently valid; because such a Conviction should have removed the misconception that could lead to the said diversity of opinion.

'*Opposed to it*'—i.e. holding a different opinion.—(2947-2948)

In the following *Texts*, the Opponent proceeds to put forward his arguments:—

TEXTS (2949-2950).

"ONE WHO ACTS IN PURSUANCE OF AN INVALID COGNITION MEETS WITH NON-CONFORMITY WITH REALITY; AND CERTAINTY REGARDING *invalidity* HAS BEEN HELD TO BE DUE TO EXTRANEOUS CAUSES AND ASCERTAINABLE BY A SUBSEQUENT SUBLATING COGNITION. ON THE OTHER HAND, ONE WHO ACTS IN PURSUANCE OF A VALID COGNITION DOES NOT MEET WITH THE SAID NON-CONFORMITY; AND IT IS IN REGARD TO THIS THAT WE HOLD THAT THERE IS FIRM CONVICTION REGARDING ITS VALIDITY BEING INHERENT AND SELF-SUFFICIENT."—(2949-2950)

COMMENTARY.

Non-conformity with reality comes to one who proceeds to act in pursuance of an invalid cognition; and it has already been admitted that the invalidity of cognitions is due to extraneous causes. As for the Valid cognition, on the other hand, one who acts in pursuance of that does not meet with non-conformity; and it is of this cognition that validity has been held to be inherent and self-sufficient. In what way then can there be annulment of the assertion of 'self-validity' by Inference ?

The answer to the above is provided in the following—

TEXTS (2951–2954).

WHAT HAS BEEN SAID IS NOT RIGHT; AS IT PROCEEDS FROM IGNORANCE OF WHAT IS MEANT BY US. WHAT IS MEANT BY US IN REGARD TO THE SUBJECT OF CONVICTION REGARDING THE SELF-VALIDITY OF ALL COGNITIONS IS AS FOLLOWS:—IN A CASE WHERE THE CONVICTION REGARDING SELF-VALIDITY IS NOT CERTAIN, WHAT IS COGNISED, BY ELIMINATION IS INVALIDITY; BECAUSE IRRESPECTIVELY OF THE FACT OF THE REAL STATE OF THINGS BEING OTHERWISE THAN THAT ENVISAGED IN THE COGNITION,—AND THE FACT OF THE SOURCE OF THE COGNITION BEING DEFECTIVE,—THE CONVICTION REGARDING ITS *invalidity* APPEARS IMMEDIATELY AFTER ITS BIRTH.—CONSEQUENTLY, THE INVALID COGNITION CANNOT BE SAID TO BE A CASE OF THE 'REVERSAL OF VALIDITY'; HENCE NO ONE WOULD EVER ACT IN PURSUANCE OF THE COGNITION THAT IS NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH REALITY; BECAUSE THERE IS ALWAYS A CERTAINTY REGARDING ITS NON-CONFORMITY.—(2951-2954)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by us is as follows:—If you accept the self-validity of all cognitions, then that would imply the acceptance of the fact that 'cogni-

tion' is invariably concomitant with the 'conviction of Validity'; and as a consequence of this, wherever the 'conviction of Validity'—which embraces all cognitions—does not appear, there, by implication, remains *Invalidity*; and 'Validity' and 'Invalidity' are mutually exclusive. Hence it follows by implication that *Invalidity* also is inherent in cognitions; irrespectively of any idea of its being not in conformity with reality or of its cause being defective; in fact the conviction regarding Invalidity follows from the mere non-appearance of the conviction regarding *Validity*. Thus what has been asserted (by the *Mīmāmsaka*)—to the effect that "the conviction regarding Invalidity follows from extraneous causes, in the shape of sublating cognitions" (*Text* 2949)—is not right.

Such being the case, as soon as the Cognition is born, its validity or invalidity becomes ascertained by the birth or otherwise of Conviction regarding its validity; so that the activity of no sane person can follow from an invalid cognition; how then can there be any possibility of the activity not being in conformity with reality?

'*Tadgatēḥ*'—i.e. from the conviction regarding non-conformity.

All these defects that have been pointed out regarding the Proposition (of the *Mīmāmsaka*) should be understood to be the defects in his Reason, which is hereby shown to be not-concomitant (with the Probandum); they should not be regarded as defects of the Proposition. Otherwise, as the Proposition does not form an integral part of the argument, the pointing out of defects in it would involve a 'Clincher' for the other party (the Buddhist).—(2951-2954)

In the following *Text* the Author points out the 'Inadmissibility' of the Corroborative Instance cited (under *Text* 2850) in the shape of the *Jar*:—

TEXT (2955).

IN THE CASE OF THE JAR, THERE IS NO TIME FOR ACTION, APART FROM THE TIME OF ITS BIRTH,—BECAUSE IT HAS A MOMENTARY EXISTENCE; HENCE THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE IS 'INADMISSIBLE'.—(2955)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent—"The Jar is actually seen after birth, independently of the Potter, etc. and found to be performing the useful function of containing Honey, Water and other fluids; how then can it be said that there is no time for its action, apart from the time of its birth?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (2956).

SUBSEQUENTLY TO THEIR BIRTH, THE JAR, ETC. DO NOT DEPEND UPON THE POTTER AND OTHER SUCH CAUSES ; BUT THEY DO DEPEND UPON THEIR OWN CONSTITUENT CAUSES AND OTHER THINGS ; SO THAT OF THE JAR ITSELF, THERE CAN BE NO ACTION.—(2956)

COMMENTARY.

'*Their own constituent causes*,'—in the shape of the preceding homogeneous 'moments'.—'*Other things*' include the man holding it.

What is meant is as follows :—What are seen subsequently are entirely different 'Jar-moments' appearing through their own constituent cause, etc. ; and no single Jar is known to exist after the moment of its birth ; for the simple reason that all things are *momentary*.—(2956)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2854, that—" Just as the first Cognition needs corroboration of the second Cognition, so would the latter need another, and so on and on there would be an Infinite Regress."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2957).

IF VALIDITY IS DEPENDENT (UPON SOMETHING ELSE), THERE CAN BE NO INFINITE REGRESS. HENCE THERE CAN BE CERTAINTY REGARDING SELF-VALIDITY ONLY WHEN THERE IS COGNITION OF EFFECTIVE ACTION.—(2957)

COMMENTARY.

The other party argues as follows :—

TEXT (2958).

" WHAT PECULIAR FEATURE IS THERE IN THE SECOND COGNITION, DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE PREVIOUS COGNITION, ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH IT IS NOT REGARDED TO BE ENTIRELY LIKE THE PREVIOUS COGNITION ? "—(2958)

COMMENTARY.

The answer to this (from the Buddhist) is as follows :—

TEXTS (2959–2962).

THE ANSWER TO THE ABOVE IS AS FOLLOWS :—IT IS CONFORMITY WITH THE REAL STATE OF THINGS THAT IS CALLED 'VALIDITY'; AND THERE IS NO FEATURE OF IT EXCEPT THE REPEATED COGNITION OF EFFECTIVE ACTION.—THE COGNITION ENVISAGING EFFECTIVE ACTION IS CLEARLY APPREHENDED; AND THE APPREHENSION BECOMES CONFIRMED BY THE AFTER-THOUGHT ENVISAGING THE SAME. THUS ITS OWN REAL VALIDITY HAVING BEEN DULY ASCERTAINED, IT DOES NOT STAND IN NEED OF ANY SUBSEQUENT COGNITION OF THE SAME EFFECTIVE ACTION. THUS THE VALIDITY OF THE COGNITION BECOMES MANIFESTED IN THE VERY FIRST COGNITION ENVISAGING THE SAID EFFECTIVE ACTION; AND THEREBY ITS VALIDITY BECOMES CONFIRMED.—(2959–2962)

COMMENTARY.

The purport of the above, in brief, is as follows :—The name '*Pramāṇa*', 'valid cognition,' is given to that cognition which is in conformity with the real state of things ;—as has been asserted in the declaration that—'*Pramāṇa* is that cognition which is in conformity with things' ;—this 'conformity' appears in the shape of effective action ;—as it is only for purposes of effective action that there is a desire to investigate the 'validity' of Cognitions ;—because the sane man investigates the validity or invalidity of cognitions only for the purpose of undertaking activity in accordance with it,—and not because he likes to do so ;—this effective action is one that figures in the notion of such acts as burning, cooking and the like ; as it is only when this cognition has appeared that the want of the man seeking to undertake the activity becomes supplied ;—this cognition of effective action, on account of the perceptibility of its own cognition, appears by itself ;—and as this apprehension is quite clear, it is followed by an afterthought, in accordance with the same apprehension,—which serves to confirm the cognition ;—all this is self-evident.—Nor does the man desire any other fruit resulting from the said cognition ; for the sake of which he would seek for the appearance of another cognition envisaging another effective action ; which would lead to an Infinite Regress. For instance, in ordinary life, the fruits of activity that are desired are in the form of prosperity and adversity (happiness and unhappiness) ; and this is accomplished by the appearance of joy and sorrow ; and men, being satisfied with this result, desist from further activity ; and this is what is meant when it is said that the result has been accomplished by itself.

As for the *first* cognition which has brought about the *second* cognition, the validity of that is said to consist only in the capacity to bring about the *second* cognition ; and the presence of this capacity cannot be ascertained by people who, on account of the absence of repetition, do not know of the effective action resulting from it ; hence it is ascertained only by the appearance of its effect in the shape of the *second* cognition.

It is for these reasons that the validity of the *first* cognition is said to be due to something extraneous to itself.—(2959–2962)

In the following *Texts*, the author sets forth another way of avoiding the *Infinite Regress* :—

TEXTS (2963–2965).

IF THE INITIAL COGNITION DID NOT ENVISAGE A REAL ENTITY, THEN THE SECOND COGNITION, IN THE FORM OF CONFIRMATION BY CONFORMITY TO THE REAL STATE OF THE THING, WOULD NOT APPEAR AT ALL; AS ITS CAUSE WOULD NOT BE THERE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN A MAN HAS THE COGNITION OF FIRE IN REFERENCE TO THE CLUSTER OF ASHOKA-BLOSSOMS, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR THE COGNITION ENVISAGING BURNING AND COOKING (WHICH ARE NOT BROUGHT ABOUT BY WHAT HAS BEEN COGNISED AS FIRE). IF THIS LATTER DOES APPEAR, THEN THE COGNISED OBJECT TURNS OUT TO BE NOT ANYTHING DIFFERENT FROM FIRE; BECAUSE FIRE IS ONLY AN ENTITY THAT IS CHARACTERISED BY THE CAPACITY FOR PRODUCING ITS EFFECT (IN THE SHAPE OF *burning*, *cooking* AND THE REST).—(2963–2965)

COMMENTARY.

If the *initial*—first—cognition had appeared in regard to a non-entity, then the subsequent cognition of its result (in the shape of effective activity) could not come about; because its cause would not be there; because the cognition of effective action is always concomitant with an entity. When the cognition does not envisage real Fire,—when for instance one has the idea of *Fire* in regard to the bunch of Ashoka-blossoms,—there do not appear the cognitions of such actions as *burning* and *cooking* (which are peculiar to Fire).

If such cognitions did appear, then the thing cognised would really be Fire itself;—why ?—because Fire is nothing else but what is characterised by the capacity to burn and to cook things.

'*Vibhāvasu*' is *Fire*.—(2963–2965)

The argument is summed up in the following :—

TEXT (2966).

FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT SO LONG AS THE COGNITION ENVISAGING EFFECTIVE ACTION DOES NOT APPEAR,—THERE IS ALWAYS A SUSPICION OF THE INITIAL COGNITION BEING WRONG (INVALID); BECAUSE OF THE CAUSES OF MISAPPREHENSION.—(2966)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent :—"Like the initial cognition, the cognition of effective action also is produced directly by the thing, Fire, itself;—then

why should there be suspicion of *invalidity* regarding the initial cognition only, and not regarding the other cognition ? "

Answer :—

TEXTS (2967-2968).

IN REGARD TO THE FIRST COGNITION, THERE ARE VARIOUS GROUNDS FOR SUSPECTING IT TO BE WRONG,—SUCH AS (1) THE NON-PERCEPTION OF ITS EFFECT (IN THE SHAPE OF EFFECTIVE ACTION), (2) PERCEPTION OF SIMILARITY, (3) INEFFICIENCY OF THE COGNITION AND SO FORTH. WHEN, HOWEVER, THERE APPEARS THE COGNITION ENVISAGING ITS EFFECT, THERE ARE NO SUCH GROUNDS ; BECAUSE THERE IS DIRECT PERCEPTION OF ACTION, WHICH IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE ENTITY COGNISED.—(2967-2968)

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the initial cognition (of Fire), there are several grounds for suspecting it to be wrong ; for instance, (1) immediately after the cognition, there does not come about its effect in the shape of Burning and the like, (2) it is similar to wrong cognitions, and (3) the inefficiency of the cognition ;—' *and so forth* ' includes *unconcernedness, absence of repetition, etc.*—In regard to the cognition of the effect, on the other hand, there is no reason to suspect it to be wrong ; hence its confirmation comes from itself.—(2967-2968)

In regard to the initial cognition also, when, by frequent repetition, etc. the grounds of suspicion have been dispelled, the validity comes by itself.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (2969).

IN THE CASE OF THE INITIAL COGNITION ALSO, EVEN THOUGH ITS EFFECT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN SEEN, IF THE COGNITION HAS BEEN REPEATED, A DISTINCT PECULIARITY IS PERCEIVED IN IT WHICH DIFFERENTIATES IT FROM COGNITIONS NOT PERTAINING TO THE THING CONCERNED, [AND THIS ESTABLISHES ITS VALIDITY].—(2969)

COMMENTARY.

A particular cognition may appear as initially clear and distinct, with all grounds of suspicion regarding its invalidity dispelled by repeated experience ; as is found in the case of mystics and in that of experts in gems and coins ; in the same manner, in other cases also, through repeated ex-

perience a clear and distinct cognition may appear, in regard to which all grounds of suspicion regarding invalidity have been dispelled; and it produces immediately after itself a Cogitative Cognition envisaging an object of the same kind,—and thereby it becomes cognised as dissociated from those heterogeneous things which have not figured in the preceding cognition;—in this way its *validity* is spoken of as being due to itself.

Some people hold the following opinion:—" Even when the cognition is repeated, there is certainty regarding its validity, in the shape of the capacity to bring about its effect,—and this certainty is brought about by Inference based upon the Probans in the form of 'similarity'; so that in all cases *validity* is cognised through extraneous causes,—and never by the cognition by itself ".

This view, however, we fail to comprehend. Because it is necessary to explain from what resource arises the conviction regarding the said Probans itself in the shape of *similarity* that is not confused.—If it be said that—" it is obtained through repetition ",—then, it means that through repetition, it is possible to cognise unconfused *similarity*, which is common to homogeneous things, and which serves to differentiate heterogeneous things,—because there are no grounds for wrong cognition. If that is so, then whence the hostility to *validity* itself,—whereby its cognition is denied, even when there are no grounds for wrong cognition ?

Further, what is this 'similarity' that is cognised ? If it consists in 'being of the form of cognition',—this is present in wrong *cognition* also; hence the Reason becomes 'inconclusive'.—If it consists in 'appearing in the red form' (in the case of the bunch of *Ashoka*-blossoms and Fire),—this is present in the blossoms also; hence the Reason becomes 'false'.—If it consists in 'producing the effect of Fire',—then it has to be explained, how this character is ascertained.—If for the proving of this, another Inferential Indicative is sought for, then there is infinite regress.—It might be argued that—" the similarity is cognised by itself, even without the help of the Inferential Indicative, by direct Perception, through repetition ". But in that case, if repetition is admitted to possess such capacity,—then why is it not admitted that certainty regarding the capacity (of Cognitions and things) also can come without the help of Inferential Indicatives ?—Then again, if it has been established that it is the effect of the cognition, then it is absolutely futile to follow up the Invariable Concomitance; as the recognition of 'being the effect of the Cognition' would itself, like the Inferential Cognition, prove the capacity of getting at its objective (in the shape of fruitful activity). That is to say, Inferential Cognition is brought about through the perception of the Probans as concomitant with the thing concerned, and thereby it becomes cognised as brought about, indirectly, by that thing; and it is on this ground that it is regarded as *valid by itself*,—and not through *similarity*; as otherwise, there would be an Infinite Regress;—in the same manner, in the case in question, the validity of the cognition would be self-sufficient by itself. Because, in a case where, even when it is known with certainty that the Probans resides in the 'Subject', the cognition of the Probandum does not come about;—and in such a case the

investigator would seek for the concomitance of the Probans in a Corroborative Instance; e.g. in the case of 'being an effect' and 'non-eternality';—in the case in question, however, the capacity of the cognition to get at its objective is proved by the fact of that being its effect and hence non-separable from it; consequently, *similarity* cannot serve as an Indicative, in this case.

Says the Opponent—"If that is so, then how is it that your Teacher has made the following assertion in reference to the Materialist:—'When the Materialist says that Perception is the only Means of Cognition, and Inference is not so,—and finds that while some particular perceptions are in consonance with the reality of things, while others are not so, the necessary definition could be so propounded only on the basis of Invariable Concomitance,—for the benefit of a person who would regulate his activity in accordance with this definition; and the definition thus propounded on the basis of *similarity* to what has been seen cannot escape from being something *inferred*'."

This does not affect us. This assertion has been made by our Teacher with reference to those cognitions of unapprehended things which appear in one's own 'chain' as well as in the 'chain' of others; that this is so is clear from the subsequent qualifying clause—'apart from the cognitions of apprehended things'. If it were not so, if validity in all cases were to be ascertained through *similarity*, then the qualifying exception 'apart from the cognitions of apprehended things' would be meaningless.

From all this it follows that that cognition, which appears as having all grounds of mistake dispelled by repetition, is self-sufficient in its validity.—(2969)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2854, that—"Just as the first cognition would need corroboration by the second cognition, so should we seek for the corroboration of that corroborative cognition also".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (2970–2972).

IF NO DIFFERENCE IS PERCEIVED,—THEN, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SUSPICION OF THE THING BEING OTHERWISE THAN COGNISED, THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING VALIDITY, UNLESS THERE IS A COGNITION ENVISAGING THE RESULTANT EFFECT. IN SUCH A CASE EVEN THOUGH THE VALIDITY MAY BE PRESENT THERE, IT CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED; IT IS RECOGNISED ONLY THROUGH THE SUBSEQUENT COGNITION OF ITS RESULTANT ACTIVITY. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE *first* COGNITION NEEDS ITS CORROBORATION; AND FOR THE SAME REASON IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO SEEK FOR THE CORROBORATION OF THE CORROBORATIVE COGNITION ALSO.—(2970–2972)

COMMENTARY.

Even in case where the Validity has been apprehended, there can be no certainty regarding it, because of the presence of the causes of misconception;

and in such cases, the Validity is ascertained only extraneously, through the cognition of the resultant activity ; and what is desired by the man having been secured by this, there is no need for further corroboration by another corroborative cognition ; as there is in the case of the initial cognition.—(2970–2972)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under *Text* 2855, that—" if the Validity of some cognition be held to be self-sufficient, why should there be hostility to the same being the case with the initial cognition ? "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (2973).

OF THE SECOND COGNITION, THE VALIDITY IS SELF-SUFFICIENT, BECAUSE THERE ARE NO CAUSES FOR MISAPPREHENSION ; IN THE CASE OF THE FIRST COGNITION, HOWEVER, THERE IS HOSTILITY TOWARDS ITS SELF-VALIDITY, ON ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF MISAPPREHENSION. —(2973)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent :—" That cognition,—which is concomitant with the suspicion of invalidity, and hence in regard to which there is no certainty regarding its capacity to get at its objective,—would be like Inference and hence not valid. Because, in the case of Inference, when there is doubt regarding the invariable concomitance of the objective, no validity attaches to it ; in the same manner Perceptions also would be not valid ".

This does not affect our position. Because when Perception is regarded as valid, it is not because it represents itself as invariably concomitant with its objective, like Inference ;—but only as tending to the envisaging (or ideating) of the objective. Because it is called 'valid', when it presents the desired object to the man seeking for effective action ; and this *presentation* of the object is not done either by carrying the man to the place where the object lies, or by carrying the object to the place where the man is ; it is done by prompting the man to activity. Nor does it prompt the man to activity by taking hold of his hand ; it does it by showing the objective of that activity ;—and this *showing* of the objective is nothing but the cognition of the object figuring in the Perception.—In a case where there is doubt, there also there certainly is cognition of the object figuring in the Perception ; if there were no cognition of it, it could not figure in the doubt at all. As the functioning of the Perception would be complete by this much,—if there is a doubt later on, regarding the invariable concomitance of the object (with the Perception),—this doubt could not prevent the functioning of the Perception ; so that even when there is this doubt, the validity of the Perception remains intact.—That Perception, however, which appears as beset by the idea of a form contrary to the object figuring in the Perception, is not valid ; e.g. the Perception of the *Mirage* beset by the idea of *Water* ; and the reason

for this lies in the fact that the aforesaid functioning of the Perception does not take place. Similarly when there is cognition of the yellow colour in the Conch-shell, or that of the gem in the light radiating from it,—all this cognition is clearly invalid; as in both these cases, the cognition is not in accordance with the real state of the things concerned.

The apprehension or non-apprehension of the Perception is due to what actually figures in it,—it is not due to mere conformity with the real state of things. In the cases just cited, the thing that actually figures in the cognition is not as it really exists at the particular time and place; in fact the time and place are not the same at all; as time and place also make a difference in the nature of things; if it were not so, there would be an end to all notions of difference.

As for *Inference*, on the other hand, as it is by its very nature, *conceptual*, it envisages generalities,—and hence the idea of what forms its object cannot be determined by what actually figures in the cognition; because the object (in the form of generalities) cannot figure in the cognition; its object therefore can be determined only by the conviction (certainty) that it produces; as has been thus declared—'The form that is not determined by convictions,—how can that form the objective of those cognitions?'—Thus it is that though Inference is devoid of the actual appearance of the object, yet it is brought about by the inference of the perception of things that are invariably concomitant, and hence becomes indirectly tied down to the object; and it is on this that its validity is based. Hence in this case, certainty regarding the invariable concomitance is essential; as otherwise, Inference could not come about at all.

For these reasons, Perception cannot be regarded as standing on the same footing as Inference.—(2973)

In the following *Text*, the other party urges that—"if the validity of Cognitions depends upon extraneous causes, there is mutual interdependence":—

TEXT (2974).

"If the validity of the cognition is not definitely ascertained,—then how could any sane person have recourse to activity? Because what is wanted is not cognised."—(2974)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, in every case it is necessary that the sane man should have the conviction of the validity of his cognition, and then have recourse to activity following from that cognition; and when this activity is there, then alone can there be any conviction of the validity of the cognition; so that there is mutual interdependence.—Thus then, the sane man having no conviction regarding the desired thing, how could he have recourse to any activity?—(2974)

The following *Text* supplies the answer to the above:—

TEXT (2975).

OUR ANSWER TO THE ABOVE IS AS FOLLOWS :—IT IS THROUGH THE DOUBTFUL COGNITION ITSELF THAT THE CLEVER MAN HAS RECOURSE TO ACTIVITY ; AND THIS DOES NOT DETRACT FROM HIS CLEVERNESS.—(2975)

COMMENTARY.

Activity is of two kinds—(*a*) tending to fruitful activity, and (*b*) tending to the ascertainment of validity.—As regards the former, it has been already explained how that activity is possible, even when there is Doubt ; and the reason for this lies in the fact that Sense-perception prompts man to activity by the mere Cognition of the thing envisaged by it ; and such activity does not detract from the cleverness of the man ; because in the case of agriculturists, activity is found, even though the issue in the matter is doubtful. This is what is meant by the Text.—It will not be right to assert that—" agriculturists are regarded as intelligent agents only because they have recourse to activity only when they are *sure* regarding the efficacy of the measures adopted by them ".—Because the Measures are always dependent upon the nature of what is meant to be obtained through them ; and hence, if there is no certainty regarding the *End*, there can be none regarding the *Means* (or Measures).—(2975)

The following *Text* proceeds to point out that the second kind of activity (that tending to the ascertainment of *validity*) is all the more proper,—where there is Doubt regarding validity :—

TEXT (2976).

IT IS BECAUSE OF THE MAN HAVING ACTED ON THE BASIS OF A DOUBT, IN REGARD TO THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY,—THAT ITS BEING THE PROPER MEANS CAN BE ASCERTAINED ; SO THAT THERE IS THIS EVEN WHEN THERE IS DOUBT.—(2976)

COMMENTARY.

Because, in regard to the ascertainment of validity, the man acts through a doubtful idea, and thereby he ascertains the fact of the thing being the proper *Means*,—therefore it is only right that there should be activity in regard to that Means, even when there is Doubt.—(2976)

Question :—" How is the fact of its being the *Means* ascertained ? "
Answer :—

TEXTS (2977–2979).

WHEN I HAVE RECOURSE TO ACTIVITY ON THE BASIS OF A DOUBTFUL COGNITION,—IF I SUCCEED IN OBTAINING THE FRUIT OF THAT ACTIVITY, THEN CERTAINTY REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF THAT COGNITION WOULD BE AUTOMATICALLY APPREHENDED; IT CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED IN ANY OTHER WAY.—NOR CAN IT BE REASONABLE TO RAISE THE QUESTION AS TO 'HOW THE MAN HAS RECOURSE TO THE SAID MEANS'. FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THERE IS NO OTHER WAY AVAILABLE. AS A MATTER OF FACT, WITHOUT THE *Means*, NO ONE CAN GET AT THE *End*.—THUS, EVEN WHEN ACTING ON THE BASIS OF A DOUBTFUL COGNITION, THE MAN DOES NOT LOSE HIS CHARACTER OF BEING A *sane* PERSON.—(2977–2979)

COMMENTARY.

'*Acting on the basis of a doubtful Cognition*'; i.e. having recourse to activity, through a mere suspicion that his Cognition *may* be valid and right.

The rest is easily understood; hence it is not explained in detail.—(2977–2979)

In the following *Text*, the other party proceeds to show that the idea of validity being ascertained by means of the Cognition of effective action is 'Inconclusive',—and thereby to support his contention that there is mutual interdependence :—

TEXT (2980).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, COGNITION ENVISAGING EFFECTIVE ACTION IS PRESENT IN DREAMS ALSO; AND YET, ON THAT ACCOUNT, IT IS NOT VALID;—NOR IS ITS SOURCE, THE FORMER COGNITION, VALID."—(2980)

COMMENTARY.

'*Its source, the former Cognition*'—i.e. the Cognition of effective action;—this should be construed with '*is not valid*'.—(2980)

The answer to the above is as follows :—

TEXTS (2981-2982).

IT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE THE WHOLE OF THAT STATE IS ILLUSORY, HAVING NO BASIS IN THE EXTERNAL WORLD;—HENCE IN THOSE STATES, THERE CAN BE NO CONFORMITY WITH EXTERNAL OBJECTS;—ALL THESE ARE KNOWN IN THEIR OWN FORMS, NOT DIFFERING, IN THIS, FROM THE MIND AND THE MENTAL STATES. THIS IS THE REASON WHY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO STATES IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED.—(2981-2982)

COMMENTARY.

If what has been urged is against the Buddhist who accepts the reality of the external world, then the Reason adduced is 'inadmissible'; this is what is meant by the first two lines.

What is meant is that the said upholder of the external world admits the validity of Cognitions to be based upon conformity to the real state of things,—and not upon conformity to the Cognition of effective action;—in the case of dreams, there can be no conformity to the real state of things; because all parties are agreed on the point that the entire dream-state is illusory; hence in that state all the Cognitions that appear are without objects, hence they are objectless. Thus then, as the conditions of validity can be applicable to Cognitions of the waking state only, it is not right to urge the 'inconclusiveness' (or falsity) of our Reason on the basis of Dream-Cognition.—This is what is meant by the Text.

Further, the 'Cognition of effective action' that appears during dreams is one that has never appeared before,—it is fleeting,—and confused; while the reverse of it is the case with similar Cognition during the waking state; how then can the validity of this latter be doubtful in view of what happens in the former?

If, on the other hand, what has been urged is against the *Yogāchāra* (Idealist), then it has no bearing upon the case in question. Because it is for the practical man (from the practical point of view) that *Valid Cognition* has been defined as 'Cognition in conformity with the real state of things';—and in this connection, 'conformity' can consist only in the Cognition envisaging effective action; as it is only when this latter has appeared that people regard the Cognition in question as 'valid'; and it is for this purpose that people have recourse to activity towards things. This practical Cognition can be only one appearing during the waking state; because it is only activities during this state that are regarded by people as *real*; never those occurring during dreams. Thus then, so long as 'being waking Cognition' has not been introduced as a necessary qualification, there can be no 'inconclusiveness' or 'falsity' in view of what happens during dreams.—(2981-2982)

TEXT (2983).

THE FOLLOWING MIGHT BE URGED:—"IT BEING ASCERTAINED THAT ITS VALIDITY IS DUE TO EXTRANEOUS CAUSES, THE *Cognition* SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'COGNISED'".—THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN THIS.—(2983)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"The validity of all Cognitions being equally due to extraneous causes, why should there be this distinction? And under these circumstances, the *Cognition* itself becomes the *object cognised*, which is extremely incongruous".

This is the objection urged by the Opponent. The answer to this is that—'*there is no incongruity in this*';—'*adaḥ*', this.—There is no incongruity in this, as 'cognition' and 'cognised' are relative terms like 'cause' and 'effect', and 'Father' and 'Son'.—(2983)

The same idea is further explained:—

TEXTS (2984-2985).

THE VALIDITY OF THE COGNITION IS ALWAYS ASSERTED IN REFERENCE TO THE THING APPREHENDED BY IT; AND THIS VALIDITY BEING APPREHENDED BY ANOTHER COGNITION, THE FORMER COGNITION DOES BECOME 'COGNISED';—AND THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN THIS, AS THE NOTIONS OF 'COGNITION AND COGNISED' ARE BASED UPON RELATIVITY,—AS IN THE CASE OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT' AND THE LIKE.—(2984-2985)

COMMENTARY.

When a certain thing is apprehended by a Cognition, this Cognition itself does not become the 'cognised' in relation to itself; but in relation to the other Cognition that asserts its validity, it becomes the 'cognised',—and is not a 'Cognition'; hence there is no incongruity or 'admixture'; just as one and the same thing, spoken of as 'cause' and 'effect', in relation to different things, does not make an undue 'admixture'.—(2984-2985)

The following *Text* sums up the argument:—

TEXT (2986).

THUS, IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THE IDEA OF VALIDITY, BEING ASCERTAINED THROUGH THE COGNITION OF EFFECTIVE ACTION, DOES NOT INVOLVE INFINITE REGRESS; AS ALL FURTHER NEED HAS CEASED.—(2986)

COMMENTARY.

'*As all further need has ceased*';—'*Parākāṅkṣā*' is to be treated as a *Karmadhāraya* compound; '*parā*'—'another', 'further'—being a qualification for '*ākāṅkṣā*'—'need'.—Or it may be taken as *Tatpuruṣa*—'need for *another*'—i.e. anything other than *conformity* to the reality;—because all such need has ceased.

Further, when it is said that 'Cognition in conformity with reality is valid',—it provides the definition (peculiar characteristic) of that Cognition which brings about the result in the shape of the Cognition of effective action. This definition is not applicable to the Cognition of the result itself; under the circumstances, how could there be any room for the objection that this Cognition also should be regarded as valid? For instance, when the *Seed* is defined as the *cause of the Sprout*,—do the wise ones raise the question that the Sprout also should be regarded as the *Seed*? What happens in this case is that the fact of the *Seed* being the 'cause of the Sprout' is cognised only when one sees the *Sprout* (rising from it); in the same manner, the Cognition is cognised as 'valid' only when its result in the shape of effective action is perceived; and this result is not apprehended by another Cognition; only if it did, would there be an Infinite Regress. Because the Cognition of the result, which is in the shape of Cognition, is cognised by itself (not by another Cognition); and there can be no mistake or illusion in the Cognition in regard to itself; because if there were any uncertainty regarding it, the Cognition of itself could not come about at all. Thus there is nothing in what has been urged by the other party.—(2986)

Now, the Opponent urges, in *Text* 2987, the objection that—"in the event of the validity of Cognitions being ascertained through the perfection of its cause (source), there would be an Infinite Regress";—and this objection is answered in the subsequent *Texts* 2988–2990:—

TEXTS (2987–2990).

"EVEN WHEN THE COGNITION HAS COME ABOUT, ITS VALIDITY IS NOT ASCERTAINED UNTIL THE PERFECTION OF ITS SOURCE HAS BEEN APPREHENDED BY ANOTHER COGNITION [SO THAT THERE IS AN INFINITE REGRESS]."—(2987)—THE ANSWER OF THE WISE ONES TO THIS IS THAT THERE CAN BE NO INFINITE REGRESS; BECAUSE THE SAID PERFECTION OF THE SOURCE IS APPREHENDED BY THE COGNITION OF CONFORMITY, WHICH IS NOT DEPENDENT UPON ANYTHING ELSE;

AS THE CONFORMITY OF THE RESULT IS PERCEIVED WHEN THE OBJECT IS NEAR BY; AND FROM THAT FOLLOWS THE COGNITION OF THE PERFECTION OF THE SOURCES (OF THE COGNITION) WITHOUT ANY EFFORT. IN THE CASE WHERE THE OBJECT IS NOT IN CLOSE PROXIMITY, THE COGNITION ARISING FROM IT MUST BE VALID, BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY IT (THE PERFECT CAUSE),—JUST LIKE THE COGNITION APPREHENDING THE OBJECT WHICH IS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY (TO THE OBSERVER).—(2987–2990)

COMMENTARY.

There are two kinds of Cognition—one envisaging the object near the observer, and the other envisaging the object remote from him. As regards the former, its validity is ascertained, *not* by the recognition of the perfection of its cause, but from the Cognition of its being in conformity to effective activity. Because, in this case, the Cognition of the perfection of its sources is not possible, until its truth is recognised through its conformity to effective action; and when its truth has been recognised, if the Cognition of the perfection of its sources comes later on, it can serve no useful purpose.

As regards the Cognition envisaging *remote* things, its validity can be ascertained through the Cognition of the perfection of its sources;—this is what is pointed out in the sentence—'*In the case where the object is not in close proximity, etc. etc.*'—For instance, the validity of the Cognition of the *golden conch-shell,* which is far remote from the observer, can be ascertained only from the fact of its being brought about by it,—i.e. being brought about by perfect (efficient) causes,—just like the Cognition of the white conch-shell, which is near the man. This argument may be thus formulated —That Cognition which has been brought about by perfect causes must be valid,—e.g. the Cognition of the white conch-shell, lying near the observer;—this particular Cognition envisaging the remote object, in the shape of the *yellow* conch-shell, is one that has been brought by perfect causes;—thus this is a reason based upon the nature of the things concerned.—(2987–2990)

Says the Opponent:—" The Reason adduced in this argument is 'inadmissible'; because the 'perfection of the cause' cannot be recognised without 'conformity with the real state of the thing'; because the Sense-organs (which are the cause of Cognitions) are themselves beyond the reach of the senses; and when 'conformity with the real state of things' is needed, that in itself constitutes well-ascertained *validity*; so that the recognition of 'the perfection of the cause' would serve no useful purpose; as it would come after the validity has become ascertained.—It might be argued that—'At times, from the Cognition of the object close by, one would find that it is in conformity with effective action and from that he would know that the source of the Cognition has been perfect, and then he would conclude that the Cognition is *valid*; while at other times, in the case of the remote object, even though

he may not be cognisant with the fact of its being in conformity with effective action, and yet, in course of time, he would become assured of the perfection of the source of the Cognition, and then secure certainty regarding its validity'.—But this cannot be right. Because things being momentary and perishable, their activity cannot be always of one and the same form; because, as the result of the influence of a succession of causal conditions, they would be acquiring diverse potencies."

Anticipating all this, the Author supplies the following answer :—

TEXTS (2991–2993).

IN REGARD TO THE CONCH-SHELL BEFORE OUR EYES, WHEN IT IS FOUND THAT THE EFFECTIVE ACTION RESULTING FROM ITS COGNITION IS ONE THAT CAN BE PRODUCED BY THE *white object*, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE COGNITION OF THE *white* CONCH-SHELL IS NOT ONE PRODUCED BY EYES AFFECTED BY JAUNDICE. THE PURITY (PERFECTION) OF THE CAUSE HAVING BECOME THUS RECOGNISED, IF, AT THE SAME TIME, THERE SHOULD ARISE THE COGNITION OF THE *yellow* COLOUR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONCH-SHELL MADE OF GOLD,—AS THAT ALSO WOULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY FLAWLESS CAUSES, THERE WOULD BE CERTAINTY REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF THAT COGNITION,—JUST AS IN THAT OF THE COGNITION OF THE *white* COLOUR IN CONNECTION WITH THE WHITE CONCH-SHELL, WHICH HAS LED TO EFFECTIVE ACTION.—(2991–2993)

COMMENTARY.

What is meant by this is as follows :—We do not mean that, in the case of the Cognition of the remote object, appearing at some other time,—its validity is ascertained through the perfection of its source ;—if this were our opinion, then alone could our Reason be 'inadmissible', on account of the possibility of fresh potencies appearing under the influence of successive causal conditions ;—what we do mean is that, in the case of the Cognition of the white conch-shell near us, at the same time that we have the certainty regarding the flawlessness of the cause brought about by the securing of the effect due to the *white* colour,—there appears the Cognition of the *yellow* colour in the golden conch-shell lying far away from us,—it is concluded that as the perceptive cause has been found to be flawless, the said Cognition of the yellow colour must be valid, true.—It is not possible that the source of Cognition should have become changed at the same time ; as in that case, there would be no conformity of the Cognition of the proximate object with effective action.—(2991–2993)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that what has been just said should be quite acceptable to the *Mīmāmsakas* :—

TEXT (2994).

THE AUTHOR OF THE *Bhāṣya* ALSO HAS SAID THE SAME THING BY THE MENTION OF THE ATTACK OF HUNGER, ETC.; HENCE IT IS THROUGH SHEER DELUSION THAT THE INFINITE REGRESS HAS BEEN URGED.—(2994)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that the *Mīmāmsaka's* proposition involves self-contradiction also. For instance, the Author of the *Bhāṣya* (*Shabara*) has declared as follows (Sū. 1. 1. 5, p. 8) :—" When the Mind or the Sense-organ becomes beset with hunger, etc.,—or when the external object is beset with smallness, etc.,—then the Cognition turns out to be wrong ; when they are not so beset, the Cognition is right ; because the contact of the Sense-organ—Mind—and object is the cause of Cognition ; when this contact is not present, there can be no Cognition ; hence any defect in the said contact becomes the cause of wrong Cognition ;—when the three factors are defective, the resultant Cognition is wrong ; as is clear from the fact, that on the removal of the defect, the correct Cognition is secured.—If it is asked—' how can it be known that the cause is defective ? ', the answer is that, if, on careful scrutiny, no defect is discovered, then there being no ground for asserting that there is defect, we conclude that the cause is free from defect."

In this passage, the Author of the *Bhāṣya* has clearly stated that the validity of the Cognition is ascertained from the recognition of the flawlessness of the cause. If this were not meant, then what would be the sense of the phrase ' on careful scrutiny ' ?

Thus this goes against the assertion that the validity of Cognitions is self-sufficient.—(2994)

It has been asked by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 2861 *et seq.*—" On what grounds have the Corroborative Cognition and the Cognition of perfection been held to be superior to the initial Cognition ? "

The answer to this, so far as the Corroborative Cognition is concerned, has been explained before ; now the Author provides the answer, in regard to the Cognition of perfection :—

TEXT (2995).

THE VALIDITY OF THE INITIAL COGNITION IS NOT RECOGNISED, BECAUSE OF THE SUSPICION THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY DEFECTIVE CAUSES. THIS IS THE POINT IN WHICH THE ' COGNITION OF PERFECTION ' HAS BEEN REGARDED AS *superior*.—(2995)

COMMENTARY.

' *Mānatā* '—validity.

' *Ādyasya* '—of the Cognition of the object itself. It is called ' initial ' because it comes before the Cognition of the perfection of the cause.

'*Tat*'—therefore.—(2995)

The following *Text* shows the faultlessness of the activity :—

TEXT (2996).

THUS THE PERFECTION OF THE CAUSE BEING ASCERTAINED THROUGH THE COGNITION OF EFFECTIVE ACTION,—IN A CASE WHERE THERE IS NO EFFECTIVE ACTION AT ALL, THE FUNCTIONING CANNOT BE DEPRECATED.—(2996)

COMMENTARY.

'*Akṛtārtha, etc.*'—that which has not performed any effective action.

'*Avāchyā*'—not to be deprecated.

The idea is that it is so, because it is preceded by the ascertainment of validity.—(2996)

It has been asserted by the *Mīmāṁsaka*, in *Text* 2862, that—" Validity must be regarded as inherent in all Cognitions as a general rule, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (2997–2999).

IF SELF-VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS IS THE GENERAL RULE, AND IT IS DISCARDED WHEN THERE IS EITHER AN ANNULMENT OF IT OR THE COGNITION OF ITS SOURCES BEING DEFECTIVE,—THEN VALIDITY BECOMES REALLY DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF ANNULMENT AND ABSENCE OF THE COGNITION OF THE SOURCE BEING DEFECTIVE ; AND FOR YOU THUS THE CERTAINTY REGARDING VALIDITY IS DUE TO EXTRANEOUS CAUSES. BECAUSE THE SAID 'ABSENCE' IS A *negative* COGNITION, WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE OTHER FORM OF POSITIVE COGNITION,—THIS OTHER FORM BEING 'NON-APPREHENSION' ACCORDING TO YOU, AND 'INFERENCE' ACCORDING TO US.—(2997–2999)

COMMENTARY.

The first two lines reproduce the opinion of the other party, and the other lines state the objection against that opinion.

If the Cognition of annulment, etc. discards the Validity, then it means that conviction regarding Validity is due to the absence of the Cognition of the annulment, etc. ; and this would mean that it is due to causes extraneous to the Cognition itself. Because 'Non-apprehension' (Negation) has been accepted as a distinct form of Cognition.

According to our view the form of Cognition called 'Non-apprehension' is included under 'Inference', and is not a distinct form of Cognition.—(2997–2999)

'Further, the said general rule and its exception being 'conceptual',—inasmuch as they pertain to Words and their meaning,—would be always uncertain (flexible); hence they have no room in a discussion regarding the nature of entities; because all things are restricted within the limits of their own nature, and as such do not admit of the nature of other things. Hence when you put forward the general rule and its exception in this connection, it shows that you are ignorant of the real objective of Rules and Exceptions. For instance, in accordance with the reasoning propounded by yourself. a general rule and exception, contrary to those put forward by you, can be conceived.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3000-3001).

BY THIS SAME REASONING (THAT YOU HAVE PUT FORWARD) THE *Invalidity* ALSO OF COGNITIONS MAY BE PROVED TO BE INHERENT IN THEM; AS THE SAME MAY BE ASSERTED IN SUPPORT OF IT AS FOLLOWS —'THEREFORE SELF-INVALIDITY OF COGNITIONS IS THE GENERAL RULE, AND IT IS DISCARDED WHEN THERE IS EITHER ABSENCE OF ANNULMENT, OR ABSENCE OF THE COGNITION OF ITS SOURCE BEING DEFECTIVE.'—(3000-3001)

COMMENTARY.

Kumārila has declared as follows:—"For these reasons the Validity of the Cognition must be taken as following from its being of the nature of apprehension, and it can be discarded by the Cognition of the fact of the real object cognised being really unlike what figures in the Cognition, and by the Cognition of defects in its cause".—(*Shlokavārtika,* 1. 1. 2; 53).

The following *Texts* show that the same may be said regarding 'Invalidity' also:—

TEXTS (3002-3003).

SIMILARLY, THE INVALIDITY OF COGNITION MUST BE TAKEN AS FOLLOWING FROM ITS BEING OF THE NATURE OF APPREHENSION, AND IS DISCARDED BY THE COGNITION OF ITS BEING IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REAL NATURE OF THINGS AND BY THE COGNITION OF EFFICIENCY OF ITS SOURCE.—IF 'INVALIDITY' WERE DUE TO EXTRANEOUS CAUSES, THERE WOULD BE INFINITE REGRESS; BECAUSE IT COULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THE VALID COGNITION, AND THIS IS ITSELF UNSTABLE.—(3002-3003)

COMMENTARY.

An '*a*' should be read before '*pramāṇatā*'.

'*Yathārthajñāna*' is Cognition of its being in conformity with the real state of things;—'*Hētūtthaguṇa-jñāna*' is Cognition of the efficiency of the cause.—These two terms form a Copulative Compound.

It has been argued (by the *Mīmāmsaka*) under *Text* 2863, that—"If it is due to extraneous causes, then there is no Infinite Regress, because it would be dependent upon Validity and this is there all right".—The answer to this is—'*If Invalidity were due, etc.*'—'*Ētat*' stands for Invalidity,—'*tat*', for the Valid Cognition.—(3002-3003)

Question :—"Why is it unstable, not firmly established?"
Answer :—

TEXTS (3004-3005).

FOR INSTANCE, YOU ASSERT 'VALIDITY' ON THE GROUND OF THE ABSENCE OF SUBLATING COGNITION; AND 'ABSENCE OF SUBLATION' ALSO IS HELD TO BE A DISTINCT FORM OF COGNITION, NAMED 'NON-APPREHENSION';—SO THAT THE VALIDITY OF THIS LATTER ALSO IS ASSERTED ON THE GROUND OF THE ABSENCE OF SUBLATING COGNITION; AND THIS PROCESS PROCEEDING ON AND ON, THERE CAN BE NO RESTING GROUND (STABILITY). —(3004-3005)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued (by the *Mīmāmsaka*), under *Text* 2866, that—"The sublating Cognition consists in the conviction that the thing cognised is otherwise than as cognised; and this conviction, being self-sufficient, sets aside the preceding Cognition".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3006).

BECAUSE THE FACT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE SUBLATING COGNITION BEING SELF-SUFFICIENT HAS NOT BEEN PROVED, THEREFORE IT CANNOT SET ASIDE THE PRECEDING COGNITION.—(3006)

COMMENTARY.

As the form of Cognition called 'Non-apprehension' is always dependent upon something else, its validity cannot be regarded as proved.—(3006)

The following *Text* proceeds to confirm the view that the Opponent's view involves an Infinite Regress :—

TEXT (3007).

IF VALIDITY IS ADMITTED IN SOME CASES, EVEN WHEN THERE IS NO ABSENCE OF THE SUBLATING COGNITION,—THEN WHY SHOULD THERE BE HOSTILITY AGAINST THE INITIAL COGNITION ?—(3007)

COMMENTARY.

If, in order to avoid Infinite Regress, it be held that in some cases there is validity, even though the sublating Cognition is not absent,—then, in the case of the initial Cognition also, there need be no dependence upon *the absence of sublation*; and in this way, all Cognitions would be equally valid.—(3007)

It has been argued (by the *Mīmāṃsaka*) under *Text* 2867, that—"It may be that there too, there may be need for another sublating Cognition in certain cases, where suspicion might be aroused in the mind of the person by the previous Cognition; but that suspicion ceases after very little effort".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3008-3009).

IF THE SUBLATING COGNITION SETS ASIDE THE PRECEDING COGNITION, BECAUSE ITS VALIDITY IS SELF-SUFFICIENT,—WHY SHOULD THERE ARISE ANY SUSPICION REGARDING IT ? WHAT COULD BE SUSPECTED WOULD BE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER SUBLATING COGNITION WITH SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY ; BUT SUCH A SUSPICION WOULD BE SELF-CONTRADICTORY, AND COULD NEVER ARISE IN REGARD TO WHAT HAS BEEN DULY ASCERTAINED.—(3008-3009)

COMMENTARY.

If the sublating Cognition is one of which the validity is not dependent upon anything else,—then, how could there arise any suspicion regarding its sublation,—in view of which it is said that 'there may be need for another sublating Cognition'? Hence there is clear self-contradiction—involved in the statements that 'the validity of the sublating Cognition is self-sufficient' and that 'its sublation is suspected'.—Because what is meant by 'independence', 'self-sufficiency', is that it has become an object of firm conviction; and as a matter of fact, where there is firm conviction, any suspicion regarding it is absolutely impossible. Because as between 'certainty' and 'uncertainty', one always sets aside the other; and 'suspicion', as envisaging both ends, operates in the manner of 'uncertainty', 'doubt'.—(3008-3009)

It has been argued (by the *Mīmāmsaka*) under *Text* 2869, that—" If, even after due effort at seeking for it, no other sublating Cognition is found,—on account of there being no basis for it,—then no Cognition sublative of the first Cognition would be found, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3010–3017).

UNDER THE THEORY OF THE SELF-VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS, THE VALIDITY BEING ASCERTAINED BY ITSELF, WHY SHOULD AN EFFORT BE MADE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A SUBLATING COGNITION ?—BECAUSE, WHEN THE VALIDITY OF A COGNITION IS NOT DEFINITELY COGNISED BY ITSELF, ITS SUBLATING COGNITION IS GOT AT WITHOUT EFFORT. THUS, WHY SHOULD THERE BE SAID TO BE '*three* COGNITIONS' FOR THE INVESTIGATOR ? IN FACT THERE IS NOT ROOM FOR A SINGLE ONE ; THE CONVICTION REGARDING IT HAVING COME ABOUT BY ITSELF. —IF IT BE HELD THAT—" EVEN WHEN NO SUBLATING COGNITION IS ACTUALLY FOUND, THERE ARISES SUSPICION DUE TO DOUBT ; BECAUSE THE *non-apprehension* OF SUBLATING COGNITION IS NOT ALWAYS CONCOMITANT WITH ITS ABSENCE " ;—THEN, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHY HAVE YOU BECOME SATISFIED WITH ONLY *three* (COGNITIONS) ? BECAUSE, AS BEFORE, EVEN WHEN THE SUBLATING COGNITION IS NOT THERE, ITS PRESENCE COULD ALWAYS BE SUSPECTED ; AND THIS SUSPICION OF SUBLATION COULD NOT CEASE UNTIL ONE MET WITH CONFORMITY TO EFFECTIVE ACTION ; HENCE THE RESTRICTION TO *three* ONLY IS ENTIRELY FUTILE.—THUS THEN, EVEN IN A CASE WHERE NO SUBLATION HAS ACTUALLY APPEARED, ITS PRESENCE CAN ALWAYS BE SUSPECTED ; SPECIALLY AS CASUISTRY CAN NEVER LEAD TO THE ASCERTAINMENT OF TRUTH.—EVEN THOUGH A MAN MAY HAVE HAD THE UNSUBLATED COGNITION OF THE CONCH-SHELL AS *yellow*, THROUGHOUT HIS LIFE,—SUCH COGNITION CAN NEVER BECOME VALID.—(3010–3017)

COMMENTARY.

If Validity is ascertained by itself, then Validity being invariably concomitant with conviction,—where there is *no conviction*, there, by implication, would be Invalidity ; so that the presence of its sublating Cognition becomes secured without any effort ; hence any effort to prove the existence of the said sublating Cognition would be futile. So that there is no room for even a single Cognition on the part of the investigator ; what to say of *three* ? Hence when it is said that 'the Cognition of the investigator does not proceed beyond three ', it is something entirely irrelevant. This is what is pointed out in the *Text* beginning with the word '*Ataḥ*' (*Text* 3012).

The following might be urged—" The absence of the sublating Cognition cannot be ascertained by mere non-apprehension of it ; because even when a

thing is existent, it is not apprehended if it happens to be remote, or very small, or hidden; so that *non-existence* is not invariably concomitant with *non-apprehension*; hence it is that effort is made for proving that there is no sublating Cognition ".

If that is so, then please give up the idea of any such restriction as that 'the investigator should have only *three* Cognitions'; because, as in the case of the first Cognition, so in all other Cognitions, the presence of sublation would be suspected; until the Cognition of the fruit (result) of the Cognition has appeared,—how can the suspicion of sublation be prevented, in view of which, there could be the restriction of the number of Cognitions to *three* only? Unless there is proof for it, mere proclamation cannot bring about the cessation of suspicion in the minds of intelligent men. Because the whole investigation regarding Cognitions proceeds on the basis of real things; and what has been started is not mere Casuistry, whereby only a few Cognitions are examined.

If the validity of Cognitions rested upon the limitation of the investigation to *three* Cognitions only,—then in the case of men who have suffered from the jaundiced eye throughout their life, as the conch-shell is always cognised as *yellow*,—that Cognition would be quite valid.—(3010-3017)

The following question might be raised:—If the Cognition is *invalid*, how is it that the sublation of it does not appear after the investigation of the *three* Cognitions?—The answer may be that, because it does not appear, therefore it is concluded that it does not exist.—The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3018).

IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT THE SUBLATING COGNITION DOES NOT APPEAR BECAUSE THE CAUSE OF THE REMOVAL OF THE DEFECT IS NOT AVAILABLE, OR BECAUSE OF SOME OTHER REASON; HENCE THE SUSPICION REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS BEING THERE DOES NOT CEASE.—(3018)

COMMENTARY.

'*Cause of the removal of the defect*'—such as the dropping of the juice of the *Droṇa-flower* into the eyes (which cures the jaundice);—when no such remedy is available, the Cognition sublating the Cognition of *yellowness* in the conch-shell does not appear.

'*Or because of some other reason*';—for instance, when looking at the mass of mirage and mistaking it for water, if one does not move up to it, the corrective Cognition envisaging the sandy desert as distinguished from water does not appear.—(3018)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka* under *Text* 2872, that—" If the man, through stupidity, should imagine the existence of the sublating Cognition, even when none has come about, he would be beset with doubts in all his dealings, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3019–3021).

THUS, EVEN WHERE THE SUSPICION (OF SUBLATION) IS DUE TO STUPIDITY, THERE IS ALWAYS SOME GROUND FOR IT ; WHEN THERE IS COGNITION OF THE PERFECTNESS OF THE CAUSE AND THAT OF CONFORMITY TO REALITY, THERE ARISES NO SUSPICION IN THE MIND OF THE WISE. SO THAT HE DOES NOT BECOME BESET WITH DOUBT IN ALL HIS DEALINGS : AS HIS MIND HAS BECOME FREE FROM DOUBT, ON THE COGNITION OF THE SAID PERFECTNESS AND CONFORMITY. —IF EVEN AFTER THIS, A FOOLISH MAN ENTERTAINS SUSPICIONS,—IT IS IN REFERENCE TO SUCH A PERSON THAT THE SUSPICIOUS CHARACTER SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DEPRECATED BY THE UNBORN ONE (IN THE *Bhagavadgītā*).—(3019–3021)

COMMENTARY.

It has been explained that all doubt and suspicion cease when the perfect character of the cause, and conformity with reality have become perceived.

It has been asserted by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under *Text* 2873, that—" Suspiciousness has been deprecated by *Vāsudēva*, etc. etc.".—What the person making this assertion has shown by this is only his own devotion to the *Bhakti-cult*, not the real state of things. A mere assertion, without reasons, does not carry conviction regarding the real state of things, to any intelligent person whose mind has risen above the normal.

The words of *Vāsudēva* (that have been quoted) were pronounced in an entirely different context, and are not incompatible with our view of things. —This is what is shown by the words—' *If, even after this, etc. etc.*'—' *After this* '—i.e. after having perceived the *perfectness of the cause* and also *conformity to reality*,—one,—like yourself,—entertains suspicions,—as asserted (under *Text* 2834) that—' the corroboration of the corroboration also has to be sought for ',—such suspicious character is what appears to have been deprecated by the ' Unborn One '—*Viṣṇu*.—(3019–3021)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, under *Text* 2874, that—" When, in regard to a Cognition, a certain sublation is possible,—and, on being sought for, is not found,—then in regard to that Cognition, it has to be concluded that there is no sublation at all ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3022-3023).

IF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY IS DEPENDENT UPON THE EXIGENCIES OF PLACE, TIME, THE MAN AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES,—IT IS CLEAR THAT THE DEFINITE COGNITION OF VALIDITY IS DEPENDENT UPON EXTRANEOUS CAUSES. FOR INSTANCE, THE PLACE AND TIME HAVING BEEN ASCERTAINED THROUGH THE ABSENCE OF SUBLATION, THE ASCERTAINMENT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE INITIAL COGNITION CLEARLY FOLLOWS FROM OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION.—(3022-3023)

COMMENTARY.

In this the Author points out the self-contradiction involved in the position of the other party.—For instance, if the Cognition of validity is held to be dependent upon the exigencies of place, time, the man and the attendant circumstances,—then it is clearly meant that the validity is due to extraneous causes; because as regards place, time, etc., when it is ascertained by means of other Means of Cognition, that there is no sublation,—it follows that the initial—first—Cognition is valid;—when this view has been accepted, how can one avoid the conclusion that the validity of Cognitions is due to extraneous causes? Surely the *absence of sublation* can be ascertained only by other Means of Cognition. Under the view that the validity of Cognition is inherent in it, all Cognitions would have to be regarded as *valid*; in order to avoid this contingency, you will have to assert that '*self-sufficient validity* belongs only to that Cognition of which there is no sublation';—and this *absence of sublation* cannot be cognised by mere non-apprehension; as such a conclusion would be wrong; hence the said absence can be ascertained only by the non-apprehension of that which would have been apprehended (if it existed); as it is only this that is invariably concomitant with 'absence of sublation'; and this 'non-apprehension of what would have been apprehended' cannot be any other than that which follows from the Cognition of its conformity with reality;—so that it would mean the acceptance of the view that certainty relating to validity can be obtained through other Means of Cognition; [and this would be contrary to your doctrine of the *self-validity* of Cognitions].—(3022-3023)

It has been argued by the other party, under *Text* 2882, that—"In such dealings as debts, as between two parties, while the plaintiff makes only one statement, the defendant makes two, [hence there need be the following up of only *three* Cognitions]".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3024–3026).

AS REGARDS DEALINGS REGARDING DEBT, ETC. WHICH ADMIT OF ONLY *three* STATEMENTS,—THIS CONDITION (OF THREE STATEMENTS) IS APPLICABLE TO THOSE CASES ONLY, AND SHOULD NOT BE CITED IN CONNECTION WITH *Validity*.—IN THOSE CASES, THE TWO DISPUTANTS MAKE STATEMENTS ON RECALLING THINGS TO THEIR MEMORY, AND DO NOT FIND TIME TO MAKE A CAREFUL SCRUTINY OF THINGS. AS REGARDS THE VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS HOWEVER, THINGS HAVE GOT TO BE DETERMINED IN REGARD TO THE REAL STATE OF THINGS,—AND NOT BY MERE CASUISTRY. HENCE THE DEALINGS THAT HAVE BEEN CITED ARE NOT ANALOGOUS TO THE SUBJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION.—(3024–3026)

COMMENTARY.

The exact position regarding the validity of Cognitions, which is related to the real nature of things, forms the subject under consideration; while the transactions relating to Debt, etc. consist in Casuistry and are related to Conventions made by the mere whims of men; the citing of these transactions therefore only shows your ignorance of the subject under consideration.—(3024–3026)

It has been asserted under *Text* 2884, that—" it is for this same reason that Deities are called *Tri-satya* (Three-truth) ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3027).

THE FACT OF THE DEITIES BEING CALLED 'TRISATYA' CANNOT LEAD TO ANY CERTAINTY (REGARDING VALIDITY); IN FACT, IF THIS CERTAINTY DOES NOT FOLLOW FROM THE VERY FIRST (STATEMENT), IT CANNOT FOLLOW FROM OTHERS.—(3027)

COMMENTARY.

'*From the first*'—i.e. from the first statement;—if the certainty does not follow,—then that certainty cannot follow *from others*—i.e. from the two statements coming later on.—(3027)

The same idea is further elucidated :—

TEXT (3028).

INASMUCH AS THE LATER TWO STATEMENTS ARE OF THE SAME TWO MEN,—IF THERE IS NO CONFIDENCE IN THE FIRST ONE, WHAT PECULIARITY IS THERE IN THE OTHER TWO (WHICH MAKES THEM MORE TRUSTWORTHY)?—(3028)

COMMENTARY.

'*Later*'—i.e. appearing at a later time.

'*No confidence*'—no certainty of conviction.

'*In the other two*'—The two other than the first, i.e. the two coming at a later time.

The man who makes one, and also two, false statements,—why should he not make a third false statement? Who is there to prevent him doing it—by virtue of which conviction should result from the third?—(3028)

It has been asserted, in *Text* 2885, that—"under the view of self-validity, there is no Infinite Regress, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3029).

THUS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REASONING SET FORTH PREVIOUSLY, THERE IS INFINITE REGRESS INVOLVED UNDER YOUR VIEW ALSO. AND VALIDITY AND INVALIDITY REMAIN AS THEY ARE IN REALITY.—(3029)

COMMENTARY.

'*The reasoning set forth previously*'—i.e. the one set forth under *Text* 3004 *et seq.*—(3029)

It has been argued under *Text* 2886 that—"the Word that is eternal or proceeds from a trustworthy person does not become vitiated by the defects of the hearer or the speaker".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3030-3031).

THE ETERNAL WORD HAS BEEN DISCARDED BY US PREVIOUSLY IN DETAIL. UNDER YOUR VIEW, THERE IS NO TRUSTWORTHY PERSON ENTIRELY FREE FROM ALL DEFECTS; AND HOW CAN A PERSON BE 'TRUSTWORTHY', WHEN THE MASS OF HIS IGNORANCE HAS NOT BEEN DISPELLED? BECAUSE ON THE PRESENCE OF THE DEFECTS, IT IS ALWAYS OPEN TO SUSPICION THAT HIS WORD MAY BE FALSE.—(3030-3031)

COMMENTARY.

'*Previously*'—i.e. under the Chapter on 'The Revealed Word', the idea of the 'Eternal Word' has been refuted in detail; and when its very existence is not admitted, how could there be any investigation regarding its self-sufficient validity?

As regards the 'trustworthy person',—no such person is admitted by the *Mīmāṁsaka* himself; any work written by him also becomes inadmissible. Because, if a man has had all the defects,—Love, Hate, etc.—which are the source of untruth,—completely destroyed, then alone he can be regarded as 'trustworthy'; otherwise, how could *trustworthiness* be accepted in the case of a man whose mind is beset with the sources of untruth, in the shape of Love, Hate and other defects? And you, *Mīmāṁsakas*, do not admit of any such person as has completely shaken off the entanglements of the 'Afflictions' (Defects); hence there can be no 'word of the trustworthy person' for you.—(3030-3031)

Then again, granting that there is a 'trustworthy person'; even so any 'word' (assertion) of such a person cannot be said to be known.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3032–3034).

EVEN THOUGH SUCH A 'TRUSTWORTHY PERSON' MAY BE BORN,—WHO COULD COME TO KNOW OF THE HOST OF HIS GOOD QUALITIES, AND THEREBY HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE WORDS OF SUCH A TRUSTWORTHY PERSON?—IF THERE WERE SOME ONE WITH SUPERNORMAL VISION WHO COULD PERCEIVE HIS EXCELLENT QUALITIES,——WHAT USE COULD SUCH A PERSON HAVE FOR ANY 'WORDS OF THE TRUSTWORTHY PERSON'? BECAUSE HE WOULD HIMSELF KNOW ALL THINGS, INDEPENDENTLY OF ALL ASSERTIONS. AS FOR ANY OTHER PERSON, AS HE COULD NOT RECOGNISE THE 'TRUSTWORTHY PERSON', HE COULD NEVER LEARN OF THINGS FROM HIS WORDS.—(3032–3034)

COMMENTARY.

Unless it has been found who the 'trustworthy person' is, it cannot be ascertained what is 'the word of the trustworthy person'; and it is not

possible to find out who is the 'trustworthy person'; because the man who has got rid of all his 'Afflictions and defects' and who is capable of perceiving supersensuous things may be able to recognise the 'trustworthy person'; but the word of such a trustworthy person can serve no useful purpose for such a man, as he would himself be able to perceive all things and as such would not depend, for his activity, upon the 'trustworthy person'; hence the recognition of such a person would be of no use to him. As for other ordinary men, whose vision is limited, they cannot recognise the 'trustworthy person'; and hence they cannot learn anything from the words of such a person; as there could be no certainty about it.—(3032–3034)

It has been asserted by the other party, under *Text* 2887, that—"Teachers and Fellow-students help to prevent mutilations in the Eternal Word, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3035).

UNDER THE THEORY OF 'SELF-VALIDITY', THE CERTAINTY COMES ABOUT FROM THE BIRTH OF THE COGNITION ITSELF; HENCE THERE CAN BE NO 'MUTILATION'; WHAT THEN IS THERE TO BE PREVENTED?—(3035)

COMMENTARY.

'*Nishchayajātitaḥ*'—on account of certainty having come about.—Otherwise, if the certainty did not come about from the Cognition itself,—then the doctrine of 'self-validity' would be done away with.—(3035)

It has been asserted, under *Text* 2888 that—"the assertion does not become vitiated by the defects which are warded off by the excellence of the Teacher, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3036).

IT IS TRUE THAT THE ASSERTION IS NOT VITIATED BY THE DEFECTS, WHICH ARE WARDED OFF BY THE EXCELLENCES; BUT AS THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THE EXCELLENCES, THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THE SAID FACT (OF NOT BEING VITIATED).—(3036)

COMMENTARY.

It may be true that the assertion of highly qualified men is not vitiated by defects, these latter being warded off by the excellences; but even so, inasmuch as the excellences present in the 'chain' of other persons is

beyond the reach of the senses, there can be no certainty regarding it ; and in the absence of such certainty, there can be no certainty regarding the assertion of the qualified person ; and what has not been duly ascertained cannot be self-sufficient in its validity.—(3036)

It has been argued by the other party in *Text* 2888, that—" as there is no maker (composer), there could be no defects, for which there would be no receptacle ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3037).

THE IDEA THAT THE 'ETERNAL WORD' IS WITHOUT A 'MAKER' HAS BEEN ALREADY REFUTED ; CONSEQUENTLY IT CANNOT BE RIGHT THAT " THERE BEING NO MAKER, THERE COULD BE NO DEFECTS, FOR WHICH THERE WOULD BE NO RECEPTACLE."—(3037)

COMMENTARY.

'*Already*'—under the chapter on the 'Revealed Word'.—(3037)

It has been argued under *Text* 2889, that—" in the case of the assertion of trustworthy persons, two facts have been perceived—the absence of defects and the presence of excellences ; and it has already been shown how validity cannot be due to the excellences ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3038-3039).

HOW VALIDITY CAN BE DUE TO EXCELLENCES HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED ; AND SO LONG AS THE EXCELLENCES ARE NOT RECOGNISED, THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS CANNOT BE PERCEIVED.—THUS THEN, IT CANNOT BE RIGHT THAT THE ASSERTION, VALID BY ITSELF, IS INDICATED BY THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS ; BECAUSE, NOT BEING COGNISED, THE *absence of defects* CANNOT SERVE AS AN INDICATOR.—(3038-3039)

COMMENTARY.

'*Has been explained*'—under *Text* 2988.

It has been asserted above (2890) that—" the assertion, valid by itself, is indicated by the absence of defects ".—This is not right : because excellences are beyond the reach of the senses, and when they cannot be cognised, the *absence of defects* also, which consists in the *presence of excellences*, cannot be noticed.—This is what is said in the words—'*The absence of defects cannot serve as an indicator*' ; that is, it cannot serve the purpose of indicating the validity ; because it is itself uncognised.—(3038-3039)

The following *Text* shows that what is itself unknown cannot serve as an indicator:—

TEXTS (3040-3041).

UNLESS PEOPLE KNOW THE *stick*, THEY CANNOT HAVE ANY IDEA OF THE *stick-holder*. THUS THE IDEA OF THE 'SELF-VALIDITY' BEING INDICATED BY *the absence of defects* BECOMES DISCARDED BY SELF-CONTRADICTION.—THE *absence of defects* CAN QUALIFY THE 'WORD' ONLY WHEN ASCERTAINED BY THAT MEANS OF COGNITION WHICH CONSISTS OF NON-APPREHENSION; AND IN THIS WAY VALIDITY OF A COGNITION WOULD BE DUE TO SOMETHING EXTRANEOUS TO ITSELF.—(3040-3041)

COMMENTARY.

Further, *absence of defects* may be a qualification; but even so, the objection remains,—as there is possibility of self-contradiction. For instance, if Validity is indicated and qualified by the *absence of defects*, then it would clearly mean that Validity is *extraneous*; and this would go against and discard the assertion that Validity is *inherent*.

This same idea is further clarified in the words—'*the absence of defects can qualify, etc. etc.*'.—If the *absence of defects* is ascertained through the Means of Cognition known as 'Non-apprehension', then alone it could serve as a qualification (and an indicator); because what is not ascertained cannot serve as a qualification; and there is no other Means of Cognition that could bring about the certain Cognition of the *absence* (of defects);—consequently it becomes clearly asserted that the Validity of the Cognition follows from Non-apprehension, which is something different from the Cognition itself.—(3040-3041)

It has been argued by the other party, under the *Text* 2893, that—"while the excellences are there, there does not appear any Cognition of the defects of the man".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3042).

EVEN WHEN THE EXCELLENCES ARE THERE, THE COGNITION OF THE DEFECTS OF THE MAN DO APPEAR. IF THERE IS NON-COGNITION OF EXCELLENCES, HOW CAN THERE BE ANY COGNITION OF THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS?—(3042)

COMMENTARY.

If, while the excellences are there, there can be no Cognition of the defects (of the Man), then,—as the excellences, lying within the 'chain'

of another person, and hence beyond the senses, would not be cognised,—there could be no certainty regarding the *absence of defects*; as the 'absence of defects' consists in the 'presence of excellences'; and unless there is Cognition of the place devoid of the Jar, there can be no Cognition of the *absence of the Jar*.—(3042)

The same idea is further clarified—

TEXT (3043).

DEFECTS,—IN THE SHAPE OF HATE, DELUSION AND THE LIKE—ARE SET ASIDE BY EXCELLENCES,—IN THE SHAPE OF KINDNESS, WISDOM AND SO FORTH; CONSEQUENTLY, IF THERE IS NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THESE LATTER—*kindness*, ETC.—HOW CAN THERE BE ANY COGNITION OF THE ABSENCE OF THOSE (DEFECTS)?—(3043)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tēṣām*' '*of those*'—i.e. of the Defects.—(3043)

Kumārila has argued as follows:—"At the time (of the Cognition of the *absence of defects*) the excellences do not function on being themselves cognised; in fact, it is by mere presence that they help in the cognising of the *absence of defects*".—[*Shlokavārtika* 1. 1. 2; 67.]

This is the objection set forth in the following:—

TEXT (3044).

"AT THE TIME (OF THE COGNITION OF THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS), THE EXCELLENCES DO NOT FUNCTION ON BEING THEMSELVES COGNISED; IN FACT, IT IS BY MERE PRESENCE THAT THEY HELP IN THE COGNISING OF THE *Absence of Defects*."—[*Shlokavārtika* 1. 1. 2; 67].—(3044)

COMMENTARY.

'*They help*'—they help towards bringing about the certainty regarding the *absence of defects*.—(3044)

The answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXTS (3045-3046).

IF IT WERE SO, THEN, THERE WOULD BE NO (*a*) DOUBT, NOR (*b*) WRONG COGNITION (MISCONCEPTION),—IN THE CASE OF THE PERSON RECOGNISED AS 'TRUSTWORTHY'—IN THE SHAPE OF (*a*) 'ARE THERE DEFECTS IN THIS PERSON OR NOT?', AND (*b*) 'THERE *are* DEFECTS IN HIM'. AND YET THERE ARE SUCH DOUBT AND WRONG COGNITION IN SOME MEN: UNTIL IT IS RECOGNISED THAT HE IS THE RECEPTACLE OF EXCELLENCES.—(3045-3046)

COMMENTARY.

If, in bringing about certainty regarding the *absence of defects*, excellences functioned by their mere presence,—then in the case of the person recognised as 'trustworthy', no one could have any Doubt or Misconception in regard to the *absence of defects*; as both these will have been barred by the certainty.—And yet such is not the case; so long as the certainty relating to the presence of the excellences does not come about,—there certainly do appear Doubt and Misconception regarding the *absence of defects*. Hence it follows that the excellences are not operative by their mere presence.—(3045-3046)

TEXT (3047).

IF THERE WERE CERTAINTY REGARDING THE SELF-VALIDITY (OF COGNITIONS) EVEN WHEN THERE IS NO COGNITION OF THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS,—THEN, IN REGARD TO THE SPEAKER, THERE COULD NOT BE THE 'CONTRARY COGNITION' SPOKEN OF ABOVE (UNDER 3045).—(3047)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—"The excellences may not be operative towards the bringing about of the certainty regarding the absence of defects; even so, from the uncertain absence of defects there would follow the certainty regarding validity".—This also cannot be right; as in that case, as before, there could be no diversity of opinion in regard to the speaker recognised as 'trustworthy'. Because when there is certainty regarding the self-validity of the assertion,—there can be no such notions in regard to the person making that assertion, as—'is he telling the truth or not,—or is he not telling the truth at all?'—The term '*vimati*' (contrary Cognition) here stands for *Doubt* and *Misconception*; '*vimati*' being '*mati*', notion, that is 'contrary'; and as Doubt envisages both the extremes, it can be regarded as 'contrary'.—(3047)

Kumārila has again argued as follows—" Thus then, from excellences follows the absence of defects,—from this absence, follows the absence of the two forms of Invalid Cognition; consequently the general law remains undenied ", and so forth.—[*Shlokavārtika* 1. 1. 2; 65].

This also cannot be right, when there is no certainty regarding the *absence of defects*.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3048-3049).

WHEN THERE IS NO COGNITION OF THE *absence of defects*, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY COGNITION OF THE *absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition*,—FROM WHICH THE CERTAINTY REGARDING VALIDITY COULD BE DEDUCED ?—AND IF, EVEN WHEN THERE IS NO COGNITION OF THE ABSENCE OF THE TWO KINDS OF INVALID COGNITION, THE *Self-Validity* (OF THE COGNITION) WERE COGNISED,—THEN, AS BEFORE, THERE WOULD BE NO DOUBT OR MISCONCEPTION AT ALL.—(3048-3049)

COMMENTARY.

If there came about a Cognition free from the Doubt and Misconception, which are 'contrary' to that Cognition,—then that Cognition should be *valid*; otherwise, if the matter were beset with the contrary notions, how could the general law come in at all ? Because the two contrary notions, Doubt and Misconception, are effects of defects; hence there can be no certainty regarding the absence of these contrary notions, unless there is certainty regarding the absence of defects.

'*The absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition*'—i.e. the absence of Doubt and Misconception.—(3048-3049)

The following *Text* points out the 'contrary Cognition':—

TEXT (3050).

[THE CONTRARY COGNITION BEING IN THE FORM]—(*a*) 'IS HIS ASSERTION TRUE OR UNTRUE ?' (DOUBT),—OR (*b*) 'IT IS ABSOLUTELY UNTRUE' (MISCONCEPTION); [THESE WOULD BE 'CONTRARY'] BECAUSE THERE IS THE CERTAINTY THAT ALL COGNITIONS ARE VALID BY THEMSELVES.—(3050)

COMMENTARY.

So far it has been explained that the *absence of defects* and other conditions do not, by their mere presence, help in the bringing about of the certainty regarding Validity; now the Author proceeds to explain in detail that if the certainty regarding the said *Absence of Defects* were essential,

then (*a*) the validity would be extraneous, and (*b*) there would be an Infinite Regress :—

TEXT (3051).

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY THAT THERE SHOULD BE DEFINITE COGNITION OF ALL THE THREE FACTORS—(1) ABSENCE OF DEFECTS, (2) ABSENCE OF INVALID COGNITIONS AND (3) PRESENCE OF EXCELLENCES.—(3051)

COMMENTARY.

(1) Absence of defects, (2) absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition (Doubt and Misconception), and (3) the presence of excellences,—the Cognition—certainty—of all these must be admitted. Otherwise, there could be no certainty regarding *Validity*, as has been explained already.—(3051)

Question :—" If the definite Cognition of these three is not admitted, what then ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (3052).

IN REGARD TO ALL THESE, THERE WOULD BE THE TWO POSSIBILITIES—IS THE COGNITION OF THESE VALID OR INVALID ? HOW THEN WHAT IS ITSELF INVALID BE A FACTOR IN THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY ?—(3052)

COMMENTARY.

The *Cognition* of the said three factors, which is regarded as a factor in Validity,—is it valid or invalid ?—These are the two alternatives possible.—If it is *invalid*, then it cannot form part of the certainty regarding *validity*,——as it is itself invalid; if the witness (evidence) has been regarded as untrustworthy, he cannot help in the decision regarding the matter under dispute.—(3052)

TEXTS (3053-3054).

[IF THE SAID COGNITION IS *valid*, THEN] ITS CERTAINTY REGARDING ITS VALIDITY COULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF VALIDITY WERE EXTRANEOUS.—HOW AGAIN IS IT ASCERTAINED THAT THE SAID COGNITION (OF THE THREE FACTORS) IS VALID ?—IF IT BE SAID THAT—" IT IS DEDUCED FROM THE ABSENCE OF COGNITIONS TO THE CONTRARY ",—THEN THE QUESTION ARISES—IS THIS DEDUCTION ITSELF VALID OR NOT ?—THUS ALL THE OBJECTIONS URGED ABOVE COME BACK IN FULL FORCE.—(3053-3054)

COMMENTARY.

If the second alternative (put forth under 3052) is what is accepted,—then the validity of the Main Cognition turns out to be *extraneous*; and there is Infinite Regress also.

In order to indicate this Infinite Regress, the Author puts the question—'*How again, etc. etc.*'.

'*So'pi*'—i.e. the absence of the Cognition to the contrary.—(3053-3054)

Question:—"How does the same objection become applicable here also?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (3055-3056).

THE VALIDITY OF THE COGNITION IN QUESTION COULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF VALIDITY WERE EXTRANEOUS;—HOW TOO CAN THE INVALID COGNITION BRING ABOUT A RIGHT COGNITION IN KEEPING WITH THE REALITY OF THINGS? IT IS TO BE CONSIDERED HOW THE VALIDITY OF THIS ALSO BECOMES APPREHENDED;—IT MAY BE DEDUCED FROM THE ABSENCE OF COGNITIONS TO THE CONTRARY AND SO FORTH;—ALL THIS COMES ABOUT WHICH CANNOT BE DESIRABLE (FOR THE OTHER PARTY). —(3055-3056)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily comprehensible.

'*How the validity of this, etc. etc.*'—i.e. of the absence of the Cognition to the contrary.—(3055-3056)

Then again, if the Validity in all cases is determined in accordance with the principle propounded in the following assertion—"From Excellences follows the Absence of Defects; from this absence follows the absence of the two forms of Invalid Cognition; consequently the general law remains undenied"—(*Shlokavārtika* 1. 1. 2; 65),—then it would mean that the very first Cognition is valid, and there would be Infinite Regress also.

This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3057-3058).

THUS THEN,—"FROM EXCELLENCES FOLLOWS THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS; FROM THIS ABSENCE, THERE FOLLOWS THE ABSENCE OF THE TWO FORMS OF INVALID COGNITION; HENCE THE GENERAL LAW REMAINS UNDENIED";—IF THE VALIDITY IN ALL CASES IS DETERMINED ON THIS PRINCIPLE, THEN IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO,—ALL THE AFORESAID OBJECTIONS BECOME APPLICABLE; AND IT ALSO INVOLVES AN INFINITE REGRESS.—(3057-3058)

COMMENTARY.

'*Aforesaid objections*'.—That is, Excellences and the rest lying in the 'chain' of other persons, they are beyond the senses of people of limited

vision,—hence there can be no certainty relating to them; this would mean that there is no certainty relating to the *absence of defects* also;—and uncertain also is the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition; so that Validity could not be established on the basis of Excellence, etc. If these (Excellence, etc.) help in the matter by their mere presence, then there could be no Cognition to the contrary;—all this host of objections would be applicable to all cases.—(3057-3058)

Further, *Kumārila's* assertion quoted above—"therefore from Excellences follows the Absence of Defects, etc. etc."—has declared *validity*, and also the *absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition* and *the Absence of Defects*,—as part and parcel of the certainty.—Now the 'absence' here spoken of can be either (*a*) of the nature of 'absolute negation of what is possible', or of the nature of 'relative negation'; these are the only two alternatives possible.

The following *Text* points out the objections against the *first* alternative (that it is of the nature of *absolute negation*):—

TEXTS (3059-3060).

THE ASSERTION THAT "THERE IS VALIDITY WHEN THERE IS *Absence of Defects*" CONTAINS A *negation*; IF THIS NEGATION IS MEANT TO BE *absolute*; THEN IT CAN NEVER BE PROVED.—IT CANNOT BE PROVED BY *apprehension*, BECAUSE IT IS OF THE NATURE OF NEGATION;—NOR CAN IT BE PROVED BY *Non-apprehension*, AS THAT WOULD INVOLVE AN INFINITE REGRESS.—(3059-3060)

COMMENTARY.

If it is *Absolute Negation* that is meant, then it cannot be proved. Because would such Negation be proved by itself? or by something else? If it is proved by itself, (1) would it be due to its being of the nature of 'self-illumination'? or (2) to the fact of its bringing about *certainty*?—If it is proved by something else, is it proved, (3) by *Apprehension*? or (4) by *Non-apprehension*?—These are the alternative views possible.

(1) Now, it cannot be right to assert that it is proved by itself, through its being 'self-luminous'; because it is a non-entity, while 'luminousness' is the property of entities; it is Cognition alone that is proved by its own apprehension, on account of its being 'self-luminous' by nature;—not so Negation, which is of the nature of the denial of the nature of things.

(2) Nor can the Negation be regarded as proved by itself, through bringing about *certainty*. Because as a matter of fact, Negation is devoid of all capacity; hence it cannot *bring about* anything. fI it did bring about anything, it would have to be regarded as an *Entity*; and secondly, as it would not be possible for it to have any new peculiarity produced in it, its effect would be such as comes about from it itself, independently of all contributory causes, and hence the appearance of such an effect would be incessant.

(3) If the Absence be regarded as proved by something else,—through *Apprehension*,—that also is not possible;—why?—because it is of the nature of *Negation*, and there can be *Apprehension* only of what is a *positive* entity.

(4) Nor lastly can it be right to hold the view that the Absence is proved through *Non-apprehension*. Because that would involve an Infinite Regress. For instance, this Non-apprehension also being negative in character,—how is it proved? By itself? Or through something else? All these questions arise here. It cannot be by itself, because of the objections urged above; nor can it be through something else, as that would involve an Infinite Regress.—(3059-3060)

The said 'Infinite Regress' is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (3061).

IF THE ABSENCE OF DEFECTS AND THAT OF THE TWO KINDS OF INVALID COGNITION ARE PROVED BY *Non-apprehension*,—AND THIS *absence of apprehension* IS PROVED BY ANOTHER *Non-apprehension*,—THEN THERE IS INFINITE REGRESS.—(3061)

COMMENTARY.

'*Doṣā, etc. etc.*'—The compound is to be expounded as 'the absence of Defects, and of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition'.—(3061)

The following *Texts* point out the objections against the view that the '*absence* of Defects, etc.' is of the nature of *Relative* Negation (the second alternative suggested in the Introduction to *Text* 3059):—

TEXTS (3062-3065).

IF THE ABSENCE IS OF THE NATURE OF *Relative* NEGATION,—THEN ITS COGNITION WOULD ONLY BE THE NEGATION OF SOMETHING OTHER THAN ITSELF; SO THAT THE *Cognition of the absence of defects* WOULD BE OF THE NATURE OF THE *Cognition of excellences*; AND IT WOULD THUS COME TO BE OF THE NATURE OF THE COGNITION OF THE INTENDED VALID COGNITION. THE COGNITION OF THE ABSENCE OF THE TWO KINDS OF INVALID COGNITION ALSO WOULD TURN OUT TO BE OF THE CONTRARY NATURE. OR, IN CASE THE ABSENCE OF THE TWO KINDS OF INVALID COGNITION WERE COGNISED INDEPENDENTLY BY ITSELF,—HOW COULD YOU SECURE THE CONVICTION THAT THE REST OF IT IS VALID?—IF IT BE URGED THAT "THE CONVICTION IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT WELL-KNOWN FACTS COULD NOT BE EXPLICABLE OTHERWISE",—THEN THIS

CONVICTION WOULD BE GOT AT EITHER THROUGH PRESUMPTION, OR THROUGH INFERENCE, OR THROUGH SOME OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION; SO THAT IT WOULD BE DERIVED FROM SOURCES OTHER THAN THE COGNITION ITSELF.—(3062–3065)

COMMENTARY.

Through Relative Negation, 'Absence of Defects' would be the same as 'Excellences'; hence the *Cognition* of the said absence also would be the same as the *Cognition* of Excellences;—and this cannot be desirable (for you); because of your assertion that—"The Excellences do not operate, *as cognised*".

The 'absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition' also becomes the same as 'Valid Cognition', under the view that it is Relative Negation that is meant by 'absence'; hence the Cognition of 'the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition' also would be of the nature of the intended 'Valid Cognition'; and in that case the assertion—that "there is absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition, hence the general law remains undenied",—cannot be right; as it involves a confusion of thought; for instance, the same Cognition being known to be valid,—if from that same fact it is deduced that the Cognition is valid,—such a confused assertion of Cause and Effect, becomes difficult to understand; as there is no difference (between the two Cognitions).—Further, if the two were regarded as different, because the cause must be different from the effect, then it comes to this that 'the Cognition of the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition' is different from 'the Cognition of the valid Cognition'; while it is not right to regard what is of the nature of 'Relative Negation', as different from the valid Cognition.

'*Or, in case the absence of the two kinds, etc. etc.*'—This argument admits (for the sake of argument) the Cognition of 'the absence of the two kinds of Invalid Cognition',—and then, in accordance with the views of the other party, shows that the Validity of Cognitions becomes *extraneous*.

'*Due to the fact that well-known facts, etc. etc.*'—That is, "there is no other alternative possible except the self-validity of all Cognitions except the Doubtful and Wrong Cognitions".—(3062–3065)

The following *Text* proceeds to show the 'Inconclusive' character of the reasoning set forth in the assertion that—"From Excellences follows the absence of defects, etc.".—(*Shlokavārtika* 1. 1. 2; 65):—

TEXTS (3066–3070).

FROM THAT SAME REASONING OF YOURS IT MIGHT FOLLOW THAT THE INVALIDITY IS INHERENT IN COGNITIONS; AS THE SAME ARGUMENTS APPLY CLEARLY TO, AND CAN BE ASSERTED IN REGARD TO, THAT VIEW ALSO;—HENCE IT IS THE ABSENCE OF EXCELLENCE THAT FOLLOWS FROM THE DEFECTS; AND FROM THAT ABSENCE FOLLOWS THE ABSENCE OF VALIDITY; HENCE THE GENERAL LAW STANDS

UNDENIED.—INASMUCH AS THIS GENERAL LAW IS THE CREATION OF MERE WHIM, IT CAN BE ASSERTED QUITE CLEARLY IN REGARD TO INVALIDITY, JUST AS WELL AS IN REGARD TO VALIDITY.—BECAUSE IT IS IN THE NATURE OF APPREHENSION THAT COGNITION IS REGARDED AS *Invalid*,—AND IT IS DISCARDED ONLY BY THE KNOWLEDGE THAT IT IS RIGHT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REALITY OF THINGS, AND BY THE COGNITION OF THE EXCELLENCE OF ITS SOURCES;—AND THE INVALIDITY IS NOT SET ASIDE BY THE EXCELLENCES, AS THESE HAVE NOT BEEN COGNISED; HENCE BEING NOT-DENIED, THE INVALIDITY REMAINS ESTABLISHED AS BEING INHERENT IN THE COGNITION.—(3066–3070)

COMMENTARY.

'*Adaḥ*'—This.

Question:—"What is it that can be asserted?"

Answer:—It is this:—'*Hence it is the absence, etc. etc.*'

'*Mānavat*'—the '*vati*'-affix is added after the Locative, the meaning being—'*as in regard to validity*'.

'*Tadapi*'—Invalidity.

The rest is easily understood.—(3066–3070)

It has been argued under *Text* 2895, that—"In the case of words emanating from personalities, there is always room for doubt, whether there are defects or not; in the case of the Veda, however, there being no author, there can be absolutely no suspicion, for us, regarding the presence of defects".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3071).

IN THE CASE OF WORDS EMANATING FROM PERSONALITIES, THERE IS ALWAYS ROOM FOR DOUBT WHETHER THERE ARE DEFECTS OR NOT; AND AS IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT THERE MUST BE AN AUTHOR OF THE VEDA, IT IS NOT TRUE THAT WE CAN HAVE NO SUSPICION REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF DEFECTS IN IT.—(3071)

COMMENTARY.

Under the Chapter dealing with the 'Revealed Word', it has been proved that there must have been an author of the Veda; hence the statement 'because there is no author' cannot be admitted. Hence it is *not* true that, for us, intelligent people, there is no suspicion regarding the presence of defects in the Veda; in fact, the suspicion is actually there.—(3071)

It has been asserted under *Text* 2896, that—" Thus, because the validity of the Veda is accepted on the ground of its being self-sufficient, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3072).

THUS, WHAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF THE VEDA BEING SELF-SUFFICIENT, CANNOT BE ADMITTED,—BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF FACT, THAT ALSO IS DEPENDENT UPON THE AUTHOR.—(3072)

COMMENTARY.

'*That also*'—i.e. the Veda.—(3072)

It has been argued under *Text* 2897 that—" The fact that other Means of Cognition never have any bearing upon what is said in the Veda establishes its validity ; otherwise, it would be merely reiterative ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3073).

IN CASE THERE IS NO CORROBORATIVE COGNITION, NOR PERFECTION IN ITS SOURCE,—THE APPEARANCE OF DOUBT, AND CONSEQUENT *invalidity*, IS INEVITABLE, IN THE VEDA. —(3073)

COMMENTARY.

Confirmatory Cognition of effective action, and the Cognition of perfection of the cause,—supply the source of the certainty regarding Validity ; and both these are not admitted (by the other party) in the case of the Veda ; consequently there are no means of ascertaining the validity of Cognitions provided by the Veda ; hence there can be no certainty regarding such validity ; as the effect cannot appear without its cause.—(3073)

It has been argued under *Text* 2898 that—" such corroboration does not form the basis of the validity of other Cognitions also, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3074).

IN THE CASE OF THE VALIDITY OF OTHER COGNITIONS ALSO, SUCH CORROBORATION IS ALWAYS REGARDED AS THE GROUND (FOR VALIDITY) ; HENCE CERTAINTY MUST BE BASED UPON THAT CORROBORATION.—(3074)

COMMENTARY.

'*Such corroboration*',—in the shape of conformity with reality, and Cognition of perfection.

The objection that this involves Infinite Regress has already been refuted. Hence there is no truth (conclusiveness) in the premiss that "what is valid does not need the corroboration of another Cognition". Because for the purposes of certainty, such corroboration is always needed.—(3074)

The same idea is further explained :—

TEXT (3075).

IT IS ONLY WHEN THE VALIDITY IS THERE THAT CERTAINTY REGARDING IT IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THIS (CONFIRMATION), AND THIS DOES NOT PRODUCE A FRESH VALIDITY IN IT.—(3075)

COMMENTARY.

This also serves to set aside the argument set forth under *Text* 2899—to the effect that—" Even in a case where the thing is definitely apprehended by the later Cognitions, the thing has not been clearly apprehended by the first Cognition ".—Because the fact of the certainty of validity being brought about by later Cognitions cannot deprive the first Cognition of that validity which consists in its capacity to lead to its object.—(3075)

It has been argued under *Text* 2900, that—" no validity could belong to the Cognition of a thing that is destroyed immediately on being born, etc. etc.".

TEXT (3076).

IN THE CASE OF THE THING THAT IS DESTROYED IMMEDIATELY ON BEING BORN, VALIDITY DOES BELONG TO THE COGNITION ; IN FACT, IT IS THERE, EVEN IN A CASE WHERE THERE IS NO CERTAINTY REGARDING IT,—THE CERTAINTY APPEARING IN THE MANNER DESCRIBED.—(3076)

COMMENTARY.

'*Sā*'—validity.—(3076)

The manner in which certainty appears is described in the following :—

TEXTS (3077-3079).

WHEN THERE IS COGNITION OF THE EXCELLENCE OF THE CAUSE AND OTHER CONDITIONS, THEN THERE FOLLOWS CERTAINTY;—AND ALSO WHEN EFFECTIVE ACTION IS FOUND DIRECTLY, IN THE SHAPE OF *burning*, ETC.;—OR REPEATED FUNCTIONING BRINGS ABOUT THE RESULT INDEPENDENTLY.—WHEN THERE IS ABSENCE OF ALL THESE MEANS (OF CERTAINTY), THEN THERE IS NO CERTAINTY AT ALL. THUS EVEN IF VALIDITY WERE THERE, IT WOULD BE UNCERTAIN,—AS GOOD AS NON-EXISTENT; THAT IS WHY IT IS SAID THAT IT IS NOT PRESENT.—(3077-3079)

COMMENTARY.

'*If effective action is found*'—'then there is certainty'—this has to be construed with this.

Says the Opponent:—"As the Cognition of effective action envisages an entirely different thing, the certainty regarding the validity of the preceding Cognition cannot be due to that. For instance, the visual Cognition of water can apprehend colour only, as there is no composite substance; as for the Cognition of effective action in the shape of Bathing and the like, it can be secured only by means of Touch; how can the Cognition of one thing confirm the validity of the Cognition of another thing? If it did, then there would be incongruities".

Answer:—This does not affect our position. As a matter of fact, when two objects occur in the same 'chain', which are invariably concomitant,—the Cognition of one object will certainly establish the validity of the Cognition of the other. In the instance cited, the Colour and the Touch do not exist entirely apart from one another; in fact both are placed under exactly the same circumstances. So that, even if the first Cognition is objectless, it proceeds on the basis of a definite objective; and the subsequent Cognition apprehending the Touch which is invariably concomitant with the object of the previous Cognition is not needed for the bringing about of certainty of conviction.

Says the Opponent:—"Even so, as all things are momentary, the functioning of the later Cognition cannot envisage the Touch which is invariably concomitant with the Colour envisaged by the previous Cognition; how then could the certainty follow from that?"

Answer:—This does not affect our position; because the subsequent *colour-moments* have the same effective action as the *colour-moments* envisaged by the previous Cognition; hence all of these *colour-moments* stand on the same footing and share the same fate; and hence are treated as one and the same. In fact, people with limited vision do not deal with 'moments' at all.

Or, the object envisaged by the later Cognition is invariably concomitant with the colour, etc. envisaged by the previous Cognition; hence even though

the previous Cognition being the cause of the later one, the two are regarded as distinct,—yet there is no incongruity in the idea of the certainty being brought about by it.—(3077-3079)

It has been argued under *Text* 2900, that—"no validity could belong to Auditory Cognition because it could not be corroborated by the Eye and other means of Cognition".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3080-3082).

IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THERE CAN BE NO CORROBORATION OF AUDITORY COGNITION BY THE EYE AND OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION. BECAUSE COLOUR, SOUND AND THE REST ARE DEPENDENT UPON THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES. IN FACT ALL THESE ARE MUTUALLY CONCOMITANT AND, AS OCCURRING IN THE SAME 'CHAIN', THEY ARE THE CAUSE OF EACH OTHER. THUS IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE IS RELATIONSHIP AMONG THEM. THROUGH THESE THEN THERE IS CONNECTION AMONG THEIR COGNITIONS ALSO ; JUST AS BETWEEN 'SMOKE' AND 'THE EFFECT OF WET FUEL'. THUS AUDITORY COGNITION WOULD BE QUITE VALID,—ON ACCOUNT OF BEING CORROBORATED BY OTHER COGNITIONS.—(3080-3082)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be admitted that the Auditory Cognition cannot be corroborated by other Cognitions. Because the sound emanating from the Lute, and the colour of the Lute are both dependent on the same circumstances ; and are consequently inseparable and invariably concomitant with one another ; so that the two are quite related ; just like 'Smoke' and the 'Effect of wet Fuel'. And as both appear in the same 'chain' and are mutually dependent, each preceding factor becomes the cause of each succeeding factor ; so that there is between them this direct causal relation also.—Thus among the Cognitions also of the said Colour, Touch, etc. there is similar causal relation, based indirectly upon the above-mentioned relation.

In this way, Auditory Cognition can be quite valid, because of its being related to the other Cognitions, through the Eye and other Means of Cognition. —For instance, when one hears from a distance the sound proceeding from the Lute, if he wants to have the Lute, there arises a doubt in his mind as to whether or not it is the sound of the Lute that he has heard,—this doubt being due to the fact of the sound of the Lute being similar to the sound of the Flute ; he then proceeds towards the Lute ; and when he actually sees the Lute, the Doubt that had arisen as to the sound being of the Lute or of the Flute or of singing becomes set aside. At a place where the man hears what he thinks to be the reverberations of the sounding of the Drum, and proceeds towards it, if he does not perceive the drum,—then there being

absence of the necessary corroboration, he concludes that the Cognition is *invalid*.—(3080-3082)

It has been argued under *Text* 2902, that—" In both cases, the Corroborative Cognition is not produced by other means, hence they do not need corroboration by Cognitions produced by other causes ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3083).

THIS COGNITION PRODUCED BY OTHER MEANS IS QUITE CERTAIN ; THAT IS WHY THE CORROBORATION BY COGNITIONS PRODUCED BY OTHER MEANS IS DESIRED.—(3083)

COMMENTARY.

'*This Cognition*'—apprehending the shape of the Lute, etc.—(3083)

It has been argued under *Text* 2903, that—" just as in the case of the validity of Sense-perception, there is the definite basis in the form of corroboration by another Cognition produced by the same sense-organ,—the same should be asserted to be the basis in the case of the *Veda* also ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3084).

THUS, IN THE CASE OF THE VALIDITY OF SENSE-PERCEPTION, THERE IS THE DEFINITE BASIS IN THE FORM OF CORROBORATION BY OTHER COGNITIONS PRODUCED BY SEVERAL SENSE-ORGANS ; BUT SUCH IS NOT FOUND TO BE THE CASE WITH THE VEDA.—(3084)

COMMENTARY.

'*Such is, etc. etc.*'—i.e. Corroboration by other Cognitions produced by several Sense-organs.—(3084)

Question :—" How is this found to be the basis in the case of Sense-perception ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (3085).

THE FIRST COGNITION OF *Water* THAT APPEARS IS PRODUCED BY THE EYE ; THEN THERE FOLLOWS THE LATER COGNITIONS RELATING TO *drinking* AND *bathing*, AS DEPENDENT UPON THE GESTATORY ORGAN AND THE BODY (RESPECTIVELY).—(3085)

COMMENTARY.

'*Produced by the eyes*'—i.e. the visual Cognition of Colour.

'*Later Cognition*',—i.e. one appearing at a later time.—(3085)

It has been argued under *Text* 2904, that—" when the Cognition brought about by any one sentence is the same at all times and places, and in all men,—then no other basis need be sought for its validity ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3086-3087).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY ANY ONE SENTENCE IS NEVER FOUND TO BE THE SAME AT ALL TIMES AND PLACES, AND IN ALL MEN ; AS IN ALL CASES THERE ARISES DOUBT. IT IS TRUE THAT THE SAME WORDS—' HEAVEN IS ATTAINED BY THE PERFORMANCE OF *Agnihotra* AND OTHER RITES " —ARE HEARD BY ALL MEN ; BUT IT IS DEVOID OF ALL ELEMENTS OF CERTAINTY,—RESEMBLING THE MERE CROAKING OF FROGS.—(3086-3087)

COMMENTARY.

This shows that the corroboration by facts cannot be admitted. Because when the Sentence—' From the performance of Agnihotra, follows Heaven '—is heard, the intelligent man derives no certain Cognition from it; hence it cannot be admitted that it is the same at all times and places.—(3086-3087)

The following *Text* proceeds to show that the Cognition is not the same in all men :—

TEXT (3088).

EVEN AMONG BRĀHMAṆAS THERE IS DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN REGARD TO 'HEAVEN' AND SUCH THINGS; HENCE THE COGNITION DERIVED FROM THE VEDA IS NOT FOUND TO BE THE SAME IN ALL MEN.—(3088)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, the author of the *Nirukta* and other authorities describe 'Heaven' as—' the abode of Personalities superior to human beings,—located in such places as the summit of Mount *Mēru*,—the place affording superhuman pleasures,—full of numerous amenities ';—while the *Mīmāṁsakas* describe it as ' a particular form of happiness found among men '.

In regard to 'Sacrifices' also, there is difference of opinion. For example, it is heard that in ancient times it was only animals made of flour that were sacrificed; while other wicked and cruel people have declared that it was the living animal that was sacrificed.—(3088)

It has been argued under *Text* 2905, that—" when a firm conviction produced by a sentence is not found to be incompatible with the Cognitions

appearing at other times and places and in other men, it is undoubtedly valid ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3089).

As regards the firmness of the conviction produced by the Vedic Injunction,—that has been already rejected ; because as a matter of fact, the said firmness is always doubtful ; as the matter apprehended by the said Cognition is similar to others.—(3089)

COMMENTARY.

'*Already*'—i.e. under the chapter on the 'Revealed Word'.

'*Is similar to others*' ;—i.e. it stands on the same footing as the notion derived from such human assertions as 'the performance of *Agnihotra* does *not* lead to Heaven'.—(3089)

Further, it is a mere assertion of yours that—"the Cognition produced by the Vedic Injunction does not vary at different times and places, etc.".

This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXT (3090).

How have the Brāhmanas, who are certainly not omniscient, been able to ascertain that "the cognition produced by the Vedic Injunction is the same at all places and times" ?—(3090)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued under *Text* 2906, that—"the validity of verbal and other Cognitions is not to be proved by means of Inference, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3091).

As a matter of fact, it has been already explained that the validity of Perception also is ascertained by means of Inference. For instance, a certain Perception is valid, because it is produced by flawless causes, like other Perceptions.—(3091)

COMMENTARY.

That argument is called '*Reductio ad Absurdum*' which indicates an undesirable possibility ; and it is not undesirable that the validity of Percep-

tion should be proved by Inference ; hence what has been urged cannot be a *Reductio ad Absurdum*.—How the validity of Perception can be proved by Inference has been shown before ; this is what is recalled in the words—'*For instance, etc. etc.*'—'*Like other perceptions*'—i.e. like Perceptions bearing upon things before one's eyes.—(3091)

It has been argued under *Text* 2907, that—" If the validity of Cognition were proved by another Cognition, then, of this latter also, the validity would be proved by another and so on and on, there would be Infinite Regress ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3092).

THE VALIDITY OF ALL COGNITIONS IS NOT PROVED BY OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION ; AS IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT THERE IS NO MISCONCEPTION INVOLVED IN THE CASE WHERE THERE IS COGNITION OF EFFECTIVE ACTION.—(3092)

COMMENTARY.

That there is no misconception in the case where there is Cognition of effective action has been proved above under *Text* 2959.

Thus validity being dependent upon corroboration by the Cognition of effective action, there can be no Infinite Regress.—(3092)

The following *Text* shows that there can be no Infinite Regress even when validity is proved by means of Inference :—

TEXT (3093).

WHEN THE INFERENCE IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE INDICATIVE (PROBANS) IN THE SHAPE OF ITS NATURE AND ITS EFFECT,—THE INDICATIVE WHEREOF THE 'INFALLIBILITY' HAS BEEN ASCERTAINED,—THERE CAN BE NO MISTAKE IN IT.—(3093)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ātmā*' *nature*,—and 'effect' ;—such being the name of the Indicative (Probans) ;—of which Indicative, the 'infallibility' has been duly ascertained.

What is meant is as follows :—When the 'nature' and 'effect' of the Probans has been duly ascertained on the basis of 'sameness' and 'causal relation,'—and on the strength of these Probans, there follows the Inference,—this Inference is valid by itself ; as there can be no room for mistake in such Inference.—Thus there would be no Infinite Regress.—(3093)

It has been argued under *Text* 2908, that "If the validity of the Cognition that proves the validity of another Cognition be not proved by any other Cognition,—then the same might be the case with those whose validity is held to be proved by others".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3094).

IN SOME CASES, THE MISTAKE OR ILLUSION THAT ARISES FROM THE VARIOUS CAUSES OF ILLUSION IS SET ASIDE BY ANOTHER COGNITION; BECAUSE THERE IS NO CERTAINTY IN SUCH A CASE. —(3094)

COMMENTARY.

In some cases, it so happens that there being no means, in the shape of repeated Cognition, of securing certainty, some sort of illusion or mistake comes in; hence the validity cannot rest in the Cognition itself.—(3094)

It has been asserted, under *Text* 2910, that—"Before the Cognition is apprehended, it remains there in its own form, and so far as its own objective is concerned, it is independent and self-sufficient, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3095).

THERE CAN BE NO 'MANIFESTED THING' UNTIL ITS MANIFESTATION HAS BECOME MANIFESTED; HENCE IT MUST BE ADMITTED THAT THE COGNITION ITSELF IS ACTUALLY COGNISED,—JUST LIKE THE SENSE-PERCEPTION IN OTHER PERSONS.—(3095)

COMMENTARY.

'*Avyakta, etc.*'—The compound means 'that thing of which the manifestation has not become manifested'.

The Cognition must itself be cognised. If it were not cognised, then there would be the contingency of the absence of Cognition of all things. Because what is spoken of as 'Cognition' of a thing is only its *manifestation*—nothing else;—if this *manifestation* then were imperceptible, the thing itself would be imperceptible; just as the object envisaged by another man's Cognition is not perceived by one, because its *manifestation* is not manifested to the latter.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When to a certain person the manifestation of a thing has not become manifested, that thing cannot be perceptible to him;—e.g. the object envisaged by the perception appearing in another man;—the Cognition in question is one of which the manifestation

has not become manifested to any person ;—hence there is apprehension of something contrary to a more extensive character.

The reason here adduced cannot be regarded as 'inconclusive'; because if the thing were perceptible without its manifestation having come about, all things would become perceptible.—Such, however, is not the case. Hence the case is quite the reverse.—(3095)

It has been argued, under *Text* 2911, that—"Just as objects are apprehended by the Eye and the other Sense-organs, which are themselves not cognised, so, in the same manner, are things apprehended by Cognitions, without these latter being themselves cognised, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3096).

BEING THEMSELVES 'INSENTIENT' THE EYE AND OTHER SENSE-ORGANS DO NOT APPREHEND THINGS ; THEY ONLY SERVE AS THE CAUSE OF COGNITION OF THOSE THINGS.—(3096)

COMMENTARY.

Like the things themselves, the Sense-organs are *insentient*; hence they do not directly apprehend things; they only serve as the cause of the Cognition of those things,—by virtue of which fact it is assumed that things are apprehended by them; hence it may be that though themselves uncognised, things are 'apprehended' by them, in the sense that they bring about the Cognition of the things. The Cognition itself, however, does not do any such thing for the things; by virtue of which it could be said that "though itself uncognised, it apprehends things, like the Eye and other Sense-organs".

"But the Cognition does bring about the *manifestation* of things."

That cannot be right; because "manifestation" is synonymous with 'Cognition'. As a matter of fact, all such words as '*abhivyakti*', '*upalabdhi*', '*parichchhitti*', '*samvēdana*', etc. etc. are synonymous and do not denote different things. And the Cognition cannot be its own instrument; as the operation of anything upon itself involves an incongruity; also because things *produced* are *existent*, while those *not produced* are *non-existent*. That is, when the Cognition would bring about itself, would it do so when it is itself *produced?* Or would it do so when it is itself *not-produced*? The first alternative cannot be accepted, because it would be produced as being on the same footing as itself; because when one thing does not stand on the same footing as itself, it cannot be of the same nature as this latter; if it did, there would be incongruities ;—nor can it be right to bring about a nature that has been already produced; because there is no additional peculiarity introduced; and also because there would be no end to such *bringing about* of things.—Nor can the second alternative be accepted; simply because it does not exist; and there can be no functioning of what does not

exist; because the *non-existent* is characterised by the absence of all capacity; so that, if it did function, it would cease to be *non-existent*. In fact *capacity for efficient activity* is what constitutes the *existence* of things.

Thus there is no analogy between the example cited by the other party and the case it is meant to illustrate.—(3096)

It has been argued under *Text* 2912, that "The fact of *being cognised* is of no use in the matter of the validity of Cognitions, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3097).

THUS THEN, THE FACT OF *being cognised* IS OF GREAT USE IN THE MATTER OF THE VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS; BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO APPREHENSION OF THINGS WHICH IS NOT ITSELF COGNISED.—(3097)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent—"If the Cognition is cognised by its own Cognition, then its validity is self-sufficient, inherent in itself".

This is what is anticipated and answered in the following:—

TEXTS (3098-3099).

EVEN IN THE COGNITION OF ITSELF BY ITSELF, THERE IS THIS FACT THAT THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING ITS VALIDITY, ON ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CAUSES OF MISCONCEPTION BEING PRESENT. CONSEQUENTLY IT IS NOT ASCERTAINED THAT WHAT IS COGNISED IS A REAL ENTITY; BECAUSE MERE APPREHENSION CAN ALSO BE DUE TO SIMILARITY, AND THERE IS ALWAYS THE POSSIBILITY OF THE IMPOSITION (MISCONCEPTION) OF SOMETHING ELSE.—(3098-3099)

COMMENTARY.

Merely because the thing has been cognised is not enough to bring about perfect certainty relating to it; because certainty is dependent upon other causes; as has been explained in several places. Hence even when the Cognition is cognised by itself, its capacity to get at its object remains uncertain, because causes of misconception may be present, in the shape of similarity, absence of repeated experience and so forth, which bar the way to certainty. Specially because *certainty* of conviction is something different from mere apprehension. Thus it is for the excluding of misconception that extraneous conditions are needed, in view of which the validity of Cognition is held

to be *extraneous*, not *inherent*; which view is not open to objection.—This is what has been thus declared—' The Cognition itself is cognised by itself, but its validity is ascertained by usage '.

' *Tathātvē* '—regarding its validity.—(3098-3099)

It has been argued under *Text* 2913, that—" Like valid Cognition, Invalid Cognition also operates upon its object by itself; but the fact of its being false cannot be apprehended without another means of Cognition ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3100).

JUST AS REPEATED COGNITION IS REGARDED AS VALID BY ITSELF,—SO ALSO IN SOME CASES WRONG COGNITION IS INVALID BY ITSELF. —(3100)

COMMENTARY.

' *Repeated Cognition* '—such Cognition as has been apprehended repeatedly.

Just as in some cases validity is recognised as self-sufficient—as asserted above;—in the same manner, in some cases, *wrongness* or *Invalidity* also is recognised by itself. For instance, it is found that people suffering from deranged vision recognise, through repeated experience, the wrongness of the illusion regarding the ' Hair-tuft ' immediately after its appearance. —(3100)

It has been argued under *Text* 2914, that—" It is only when there appears the Cognition of the truth being otherwise that the falsity of a Cognition becomes recognised ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3101).

IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT THE IDEA OF FALSITY OF THE COGNITION BEING ' DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF SUBLATING COGNITIONS AND TO THE COGNITION OF ITS SOURCE BEING DEFECTIVE ' INVOLVES INFINITE REGRESS. HENCE THE *falsity* (INVALIDITY) CANNOT BE RECOGNISED MERELY ON THE BASIS OF THE SAID COGNITIONS.—(3101)

COMMENTARY.

' *Already explained* '—under *Text* 3004.

' *Tat* '—Hence.—(3101)

It has been argued under *Text* 2915, that—" Invalidity does not become recognised on any other grounds; at the time that it appears, it is always recognised as valid, etc. etc. ".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3102-3103).

IT CANNOT BE RECOGNISED THAT IT IS VALID AT THE TIME THAT IT APPEARS;—BECAUSE IT IS NON-CONCEPTUAL AND BECAUSE SELF-COGNITION IS NOT ADMITTED.—NOR CAN IT BE RECOGNISED BY ANOTHER COGNITION; BECAUSE IT IS NOT THERE AT THE TIME; ALSO BECAUSE ITS PRESENCE IS NOT MANIFESTED; OR BECAUSE OF AN UNDESIRABLE CONTINGENCY.—(3102-3103)

COMMENTARY.

At the time that the Cognition appears (comes about)—(*a*) is it recognised by itself that it is valid? Or (*b*) is it so recognised by another Cognition, appearing at the same time? Or (*c*) by another Cognition, appearing at another time?—These are the three alternatives possible.

(*a*) The Cognition cannot be recognised by itself, as valid; because, as regards themselves, all Cognitions are *non-conceptual* (indeterminate), and hence any such notion as that 'this is valid' is impossible.

(*b*) Nor is the apprehension of a Cognition by another Cognition admitted (by the other party); because it has been held that Cognition is always uncognisable.

Nor can the Cognition be cognised by another Cognition, appearing at the same time; because two Cognitions can never appear at the same time.

Nor can it be cognised by another Cognition, appearing at another time; because if there be no Cognition of this other Cognition,—what is cognised by that third Cognition cannot be known; so that the Cognition cognised by that third Cognition would be one whose manifestation has not been manifested; and if it be held that this also is cognised by yet another Cognition, there would be an Infinite Regress.—(3102-3103)

It has been argued under *Text* 2916, that—" Even in cases where the falsity is explained to others,—these two ideas have to be pointed out,—and not mere *similarity* ".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3103–3106).

IN CONNECTION WITH THE VEDA, IT HAS BEEN ALREADY POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS A SUBLATING COGNITION IN THE FORM OF *Inference* ; HENCE BY THE REJECTION OF THE 'SOUL' AND OTHER THINGS MENTIONED IN THE VEDA, IT BECOMES ESTABLISHED THAT THE COGNITION DERIVED FROM THE VEDA CANNOT BE VALID.—AS IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT THE VEDA IS THE WORK OF A PERSONAL AUTHOR, THE FACT OF ITS HAVING A DEFECTIVE SOURCE IS ALWAYS OPEN TO SUSPICION.—IF THE CAPACITY IN QUESTION (*i.e.* VALIDITY) WERE INHERENT IN COGNITIONS, JUST AS THE CAPACITY TO BURN IS INHERENT IN FIRE,—THEN SUCH VALIDITY SHOULD BELONG TO WRONG COGNITIONS ALSO.—THUS IT IS OPEN TO SUSPICION THAT THE COGNITION PROVIDED BY THE VEDA PROCEEDS FROM A DEFECTIVE SOURCE, AND WHAT IS *suspected* TO BE DEFECTIVE DOES NOT DIFFER FROM WHAT IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED TO BE DEFECTIVE.—(3103–3106)

COMMENTARY.

Mere *similarity* is not urged by the Buddhists as what annuls the Cognition provided by the Veda ; what is urged by them is that such things as the *Soul*, the *Universal* and the like, which are mentioned in the Veda, are rejected by all Means of Valid Cognition. This has been explained in the Chapters dealing with the 'Soul', etc.

Further, under the chapter on the 'Revealed Word', it has been proved that the Vedas must be the work of an author ;—or even if they were without an author,—it is possible that there may be sources of falsity, as there is in the case of the Forest-fire (which is regarded by some people as self-produced, which is not true) ; consequently it is possible that what is said in the Veda may be false ;—this is what has been urged by the Buddhists, not mere *similarity*.

The following might be urged—"Even though this may be possible, yet, how can mere possibility establish the invalidity (falsity) of what is said in the Veda ?"

The answer to this is—'*What is suspected to be defective, etc. etc.*'—The compound '*Shaṅkyadoṣam*' is to be expounded as—'that in which defects are suspected'.

'*Does not differ, etc.*'—Because the validity of both is equally liable to being regarded as *non-existent*.—(3103–3106)

The following *Text* sums up the argument—

TEXT (3107).

FOR THESE REASONS 'SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY' IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE VEDA ALSO; CONSEQUENTLY PLEASE ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THE VEDA HAS BEEN COMPOSED AND EXPOUNDED BY PERSONS WHO ARE DEFINITELY RECOGNISED AS FREE FROM DEFECTS.—(3107)

COMMENTARY.

'*Kṛtākhyāta*'—composed and expounded.—'*Expounded*'—Explained.—'*By persons free from defects—the Veda has been composed and expounded*'.—The compound thus is the 'Instrumental *Tatpuruṣa*'.—'*Nishchita*'—'definitely known'—qualifies the said 'character of being composed and expounded by persons free from defects'.—This view, please accept,—if you wish to establish the validity (reliability) of the Veda.

What is meant is that,—if this view is accepted, then the validity would be *extraneous*; if this view is not accepted, then there can be no validity at all.—(3107)

The following *Texts* set forth Kumārila's answer to the argument that 'the view should be accepted that the Veda is the work of a Person recognised as free from defects':—

TEXTS (3108–3113).

"AS THERE GO ON APPEARING ON THE SCENE EXPOUNDERS OF THE VEDA WHO ARE BESET WITH LOVE, HATRED, ETC.,—PEOPLE BECOME MORE AND MORE CAREFUL IN THE PRESERVING OF THE VEDIC TEXT. TO THIS END, THEY GO ON INVESTIGATING ALL SUCH MINUTE DETAILS AS—(*a*) WHICH SCHOLAR HAS A WEAK MEMORY?—(*b*) WHO WAS THE EARLIER SCHOLAR?—(*c*) WHO WOULD COMMIT MISTAKES REGARDING ACCENTS?—(*d*) WHO WOULD BE BREAKING UP WORDS IN THE WRONG PLACES?—WHEN THERE ARE SO MANY ENTHUSIASTIC SCRUTINISERS BUSY WITH THE GUARDING OF THE VARIOUS POINTS OF DANGER, WHY CANNOT THE SERIOUS READER STUDY THE VEDA FREE FROM FLAWS?—IF VEDIC SCHOLARS, THOUGH THEMSELVES PURE AND HONEST, WERE INDIFFERENT TOWARDS THE PURITY OF THE VEDA, THEY MIGHT BE UNABLE TO NOTICE THE VEDIC TEXT MUTILATED;—AND IN THIS WAY IN COURSE OF TIME, THE VEDA, DISREGARDED AND MUTILATED, WOULD BECOME SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT, A MERE SEMBLANCE OF THE VEDA.—UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF THE VEDA IS CONSTANTLY AND CAREFULLY GUARDED BY PERSONS WHO KEEP A CHECK UPON PERSONS BESET WITH LOVE AND HATE BENT UPON MUTILATING THE VEDA,—THEN THE VEDA WILL NEVER LOSE ITS REAL FORM".—(3108–3113)

COMMENTARY.

(*a*) The memory, etc. of which scholars are weak?—(*b*) who has learnt the Veda from whom?—(*c*) who is likely to commit mistakes in the Accent,

etc. ?—(*d*) who would read the text, breaking up the words in the wrong place ?—when in regard to each reader of the Veda, all these points are being critically examined by Vedic scholars who are enthusiastically devoted to their task,—how can any reader of the Veda, under the circumstances, not read the Veda with care ?

What is meant by this is that, under the circumstances, as there can be no suspicion regarding the validity of the Veda,—why should the view be admitted that 'the Veda is the work of a person definitely recognised as free from defects' ?

For instance, if students of the Veda, pure and honest themselves, were indifferent and did not notice the mutilations of the Veda being carried on,—then it would be possible that in course of time, that Veda would become a mere semblance of the original. As a matter of fact, however, the said pure-minded Vedic scholars are ever alert in putting a check upon people beset with Love and Hate bent upon mutilating the Veda,—the Veda is always carefully perceived. How then can it ever lose its original form ?—(3108–3113)

The following might be urged (by the Opponent of the *Mīmāmsaka*)—Though the Veda is constantly guarded by the said scholars, yet may it not be that having become destroyed at the Universal Dissolution, when it reappeared, it did so in the wrong form ?

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3114).

"WHAT WE HOLD IS THAT THE WORLD HAS NEVER BEEN UNLIKE WHAT IT IS NOW ; AND NO UNIVERSAL DISSOLUTION CAN EVER BE PERCEIVED IN REALITY."—(3114)

COMMENTARY.

The Author supplies the answer to the above argument of Kumārila's—in the following :—

TEXT (3115).

IT CANNOT BE AS ASSERTED. BECAUSE IT MAY BE POSSIBLE THAT THE ACTUAL VERBAL TEXT HAS REMAINED THE SAME ; BUT THAT THE SAME HAS BEEN THE CASE WITH THE COMPREHENSION OF ITS MEANING CANNOT BE ADMITTED UNLESS IT IS ACTUALLY SEEN.—(3115)

COMMENTARY.

All that may be regarded as explained by the above is the fact that the verbal text of the Veda has remained the same ;—but the same has not been the case with the means of comprehending the meaning of the Vedic

texts; hence so far as this is concerned, it has to be admitted that it has been composed and expounded by a person or persons recognised as free from defects.—(3115)

Even as regards the verbal text, there can be no certainty regarding its being the same at all times and places, merely by seeing no change in it,—except to an omniscient person.—This is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3116-3117).

THAT THE VERBAL TEXT HAS REMAINED THE SAME CAN BE ASCERTAINED ONLY BY A PERSON TO WHOM ALL MEN, AND ALL TIMES AND PLACES ARE VISIBLE LIKE THE FRUIT IN THE HAND; IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN, WHY SHOULD THERE HAVE BEEN A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION DUE TO THE DIVERGENCE OF TIME, PLACE, PERSONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES?—(3116-3117)

COMMENTARY.

The argument in support of the preceding assertion is stated in the words —'*If it were not so, etc. etc.*'—If the verbal text had remained the same, then there could be no difference of opinion—doubt—among persons, regarding it, by reason of the divergence of place, time, etc.—(3116-3117)

It has been asserted (by *Kumārila*) under *Texts* 2275 and 3114 that—"the world has never been known to be unlike what it is now and that no Universal Dissolution can be admitted".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3118).

YOU HAVE NO PROOF FOR THE NOTION THAT THE WORLD HAS ALWAYS BEEN AS IT IS NOW. THE EXISTENCE OF THE '*Samvarta*' (DISSOLUTION) ALSO CANNOT BE DENIED SIMPLY BECAUSE IT IS NOT SEEN.—(3118)

COMMENTARY.

There is no evidence in support of the idea that the World has always been as it is now.

The Buddhists speak of the '*Samvarta*' as the dissolution of all things;—the Smṛti-writers also have declared that—'This world was a mass of darkness, unknown and undiscernible, unthinkable, unknowable, as if asleep all round' (*Manu*, Chapter I);—where we have the mention of two kinds of '*Samvarta*', 'Dissolution'; and there is no proof to the effect that there is no such Dissolution,—on the strength of which the world could always remain as it is now.—Merely because a certain thing is not seen, it does not follow

that it does not exist; because it often happens that a thing, even though existent, is not seen; specially as it is not known that there is invariable concomitance between 'non-existence' and 'non-perception'.—(3118)

Then again, the validity of the Veda being self-sufficient, it always brings about certainty regarding its subject-matter; so that there can be no delusion regarding it;—and as it is eternal, there is no likelihood of its essential nâture being altered;—thus in neither of the two ways can there be any mutilation of the Veda,—in accordance with your view. Under the circumstances, all the attempt that has been made by Vedic Scholars to preserve the text of the Veda has been superfluous.

This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3119–3122).

UNDER THE VIEW THAT THE VALIDITY OF COGNITIONS IS INHERENT IN THEM, CERTAINTY OF CONVICTION MUST BE REGARDED AS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE VEDA *by itself*, IN REGARD TO ITS OWN FORM (TEXT); HENCE THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBILITY OF DELUSION IN RESPECT TO THAT.—THUS, THERE BEING NO ROOM FOR IGNORANCE, OR DOUBT, OR MISCONCEPTION,—EVEN THE INFANT OF THE BRĀHMAṆA SHOULD NOT REQUIRE ANY TEACHING.—JUST AS THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE THING WHOSE ROOT (CAUSE) IS UNKNOWN,—HOW COULD THERE BE ANY DESTRUCTION (MUTILATION) OF WHAT IS ETERNAL AND SUPERIOR EVEN TO THE DIAMOND (IN ITS INDESTRUCTIBILITY)?—IF IT BE SAID THAT "THERE MAY BE DESTRUCTION IN THE SHAPE OF PERVERSION OF THE MANIFESTATION",—THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH *manifestation* OF WHAT IS ETERNAL HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED.—HENCE IF WISE PEOPLE SEEK TO PRESERVE THE VEDIC TEXT, THE ATTEMPT IS ENTIRELY SUPERFLUOUS.—(3119–3122)

COMMENTARY.

'*Infant of a Brahmaṇa*'—a Brāhmaṇa-child.

Thus far it has been shown that the destruction (or mutilation) of the Veda is not possible, if it is self-sufficient in its validity. The author now proceeds to show that it is not possible, on account of its *eternality* also; to this end, he puts the question—'*How could there be, etc. etc.?*'

'*If it is urged, etc. etc.*'—this is to be construed with 'destruction' of the preceding sentence.

'*Sā*'—manifestation.

'*Asya*'—of the Veda.—(3119–3122)

The following *Text* sums up the whole section:—

TEXT (3123).

FOR THESE REASONS PLEASE ACCEPT THE VIEW THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN AUTHOR OF THE VEDA,—ONE WHO IS CAPABLE OF SEEING THINGS BEYOND THE SENSES, WHO HAS SHAKEN OFF THE ENTIRE MASS OF DARKNESS AND IGNORANCE, AND WHO IS CONVERSANT WITH THE MEANING OF THE VEDA AND ITS DIVISIONS. —(3123)

COMMENTARY.

'*Darkness*'—i.e. Ignorance, 'afflicted' as well as 'unafflicted' [*vide Yogasūtra*— '*Vṛttayaḥ-kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ*']; the 'mass' of this Ignorance has been shaken off by him;—'*conversant with its divisions*'—i.e. the right expounder. '*Author*'—i.e. of the Veda.

Thus it has been established that the Proposition (of the *Mīmāṁsaka*) is found to be entirely annulled by Means of Valid Cognition,—his Reason, in the shape of 'being present when the other is present', is *Inconclusive*,—the proof for the Reason (adduced by the Buddhist) being present where the Probandum is present has been already indicated above, under *Text* 2939.

As regards the four alternatives set forth (by the *Mīmāṁsaka*) under the commentary on *Text* 2811, [(1) Both validity and invalidity are *inherent* in cognitions,—(2) Both are *extraneous* at times,—(3) Validity is *inherent* and Invalidity is *extraneous*,—and (4) Validity is *extraneous* and Invalidity is *inherent*],—and the objections urged against three of them,—they do not affect the Buddhists at all. Because they do not accept any of these alternatives, their view being that there can be no hard and fast rule in the matter; as it has been already explained that both these, Validity and Invalidity, may be sometimes *inherent* and sometimes *extraneous*. Hence it was not right to put forward the said four alternatives only; as a fifth alternative was also possible that there can be no hard and fast rule applying to all cases.

Other people have offered an entirely different explanation of the *Proposition* (regarding the *self-validity* of Cognitions):—" *Validity* consists in being of the nature Consciousness; hence it must be natural (inherent) in all cognitions,—it cannot be due to the presence of any excellences; as even in the absence of excellences, when there is *wrong cognition*, it is quite possible that there should be the 'essence of cognition'. It is for this reason and in this sense that Cognition is spoken of as 'self-valid'. All that the excellences do is to remove the defects; hence for the removal of defects, the validity of the cognition needs the excellences; and these are not needed for the bringing about of the *validity* itself".

The above view cannot be right. Because it is not correct to say that *validity* consists in being of the nature of Consciousness; as in that case there would be validity in wrong cognitions also.—If it be held that—" Validity is a particular form of Cognition itself ",—then it should not be said that—" Validity is natural and inherent in cognitions, and not brought about by excellences; because even in the absence of excellences, when there is wrong

cognition, it is quite possible that there should be validity" (as asserted above). Because if Validity were held to be a particular form of Cognition, —then alone could there be any justification for the pointing out of the falsity of the premiss that the same validity is due to the presence of excellences,—not of anything else. As a matter of fact, however, when it has been asserted that "it is present also in wrong cognition', the falsity pointed out is not in the premiss that '*the particular form* of Cognition is due to the presence of excellences',—but in regard to Cognition *in general*; and the other party does not hold that *cognition in general* is brought about by excellences; it is only a *particular* cognition that is held to be so brought about; and it is not possible to point out falsity in the premiss that 'a particular cognition is brought about by excellences'.

Then again, we also do not hold the *extraneous validity* to be due to excellences; by denying which you are seeking to prove *inherent validity.* What we hold is that a particular cognition, even though apprehended, might be due to a mistake, and as such it cannot bring about the certainty of conviction in accordance with the said apprehension; hence it is concluded that validity, being due to the appearance of the said conviction, must be *extraneous.*

Further, the same may be said in regard to *Invalidity* also; as follows—*Invalidity* is of the essence of cognition;—and this is natural and inherent in cognitions,—and not due to *defects*; because it is possible even when there is no defect, as in the case of Right Cognition; that is why *Invalidity* is said to be *inherent*; and all that the defects do is to set aside the Excellences; hence it is for the setting aside of the excellences, that the Invalidity needs the defects,—not for the bringing about of the Invalidity itself.

Thus there is nothing in the explanation put forward above by some people.

Ubēyaka, on the other hand, has declared as follows:—"The validity of cognitions consists, not in their being of the nature of Consciousness, but in being in conformity with the real state of things; because, in a case where there is Consciousness, if there is no conformity with the real state of things,—the cognition is *invalid*; e.g. the cognition of *silver* in regard to the piece of shell; and conversely, even when there is no Consciousness, if there is conformity with real state of things, the cognition is valid; e.g. the cognition of smoke in Fire. Hence from this positive and negative concomitance, it follows that *Validity* consists in being in conformity with the real state of things".

"The cognition of this conformity proceeds from that same cause which brings about the original cognition itself,—not from any other circumstantial conditions; it is in this sense that the validity of cognitions is spoken of as *inherent* in themselves;—the term '*sva*' (in the word '*svataḥ*') stands for '*svakīya*', 'what belongs to oneself'; so that the word '*svataḥ*' means 'due to its own cause'. The second half of the passage—'the capacity which is not present in the thing itself cannot be produced in it by something else',—only serves to point out the reason for denying the idea of its being brought about by other circumstances; the meaning being

that 'the capacity which is not present in the thing itself cannot be brought about by *anything else*,—i.e. by anything else besides the causes bringing about the Cognition itself'."

The following might be urged against the above view:—As a matter of fact, the causes of cognitions are common to valid as well as invalid cognitions; how then could validity be invariably concomitant with the mere character of 'being the cause of cognitions'?—From this it is clear that validity is due to other circumstantial causes, not merely to the cause of the cognition itself. This 'other circumstantial cause' must be one that is accompanied by excellences; so that the cause of validity would consist also in the excellences of the Sense-organs and other Instruments of Cognition. In the case of *Verbal Cognition* the excellence of this other cause, as ascertained from actual experience, consists in 'being composed (spoken) by a trustworthy person'. So that there being no such *composer* (or Speaker) in the case of the Veda, it would have to be regarded as *invalid*.

The answer to this (provided by *Ubēyaka*) is as follows:—"What has been just asserted does not affect our position; because it cannot be proved that validity is due to other circumstantial causes. It is not possible for us to recognise any positive functioning of the Excellences towards the bringing about of the effect in the shape of *validity*; what produces the idea of the cognition being in conformity with the real state of things is the cause in the shape of the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition themselves, independently of anything else. As regards the function of the ointment (applied to the Eyes to remove defective vision),—that tends only towards the removal of defects, and not to the producing of excellences".

It might be argued that—The Sense-organs and the other Means of Cognition are there in the case of the invalid cognition also; so that under the above view, validity should be produced in all cases: as the cause of it would be there in its efficient condition.

"This is not so,"—says *Ubēyaka*—"because after the defects have been cured, other causes would become operative towards the bringing about of particular effects".

The following might be urged:—Why is not the contrary of this accepted —that the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition bring about *wrong* cognitions, independently of other things,—and that on the cure of the excellences, other circumstantial causes become operative towards bringing about the right cognition in conformity with the real state of things?

Ubēyaka's answer to this is as follows:—"True; this is so; but through positive and negative concomitance, it has been found in the case of Inference, that what brings about the validity is that same 'presence of three factors' which brings about the cognition itself; and hence it is assumed that in the case of Perception also, the validity would be produced by the same cause that produces the cognition. As regards the wrong cognition, on the other hand, it is an effect that is not found to be produced by the Sense-organs and other Means of Cognition, and hence it leads to the assumption that it must be due to other circumstantial causes.—Thus there can be no objection to our explanation of *validity*".

[The Author's answer to the above view of *Ubēyaka*]—All this is certainly not free from objections. For instance, it has been asserted that "the validity of cognitions consists in its being in conformity with the real state of things; and that it proceeds from the cause of the cognition itself".—This is superfluous, futile; because we also admit that 'that cognition alone is valid which is in conformity with the real nature of things',—which clearly means that *Validity* consists in being in conformity with the real state of things.—But the 'cognition' is specially mentioned as qualifying 'validity'; validity is not regarded as belonging directly to the *Smoke* and such other means of cognition, which are themselves not of the nature of 'cognition'; hence it cannot be admitted that validity consists *only* in 'being in conformity with the real state of things'. Specially because it is Cognition alone which is primarily operative towards things to be abandoned or acquired. For instance, even though the *Smoke*, which is invariably concomitant with *Fire*, is there,—the Agent does not have recourse to activity towards the securing of the Fire, until the *cognition* of the *Smoke* comes about; which shows that it is the cognition that is the direct and immediate prompting agent towards the man's activity. This has been thus declared—'The Cognition must be valid, because that is the primary cause of activity towards things to be abandoned or obtained'.

As regards the character of 'being in conformity with the real state of things', which belongs to the Cognitions, and which is there in the form of the capacity to lead up to the thing cognised,—this consists in this same *getting at the thing*; as it is only in regard to this that Invariable Concomitance is possible; and the capacity of things forms their very nature or essence; hence who could ever think of securing it from other things,—in view of which it would have to be specially denied? Because when the thing itself has been produced, it cannot be that its property and nature have not been produced. If this were so, then there would be incongruities.

This *validity* then, though being the very essence of the cognitions, cannot be recognised until the effects of the cognition have been brought about,—because of the presence of causes likely to lead to wrong cognitions. Hence the effect is ascertained from extraneous causes such as the *cognition of effective action*. Hence when the validity is said to be *extraneous*, it is in reference to the said certainty regarding it, not in reference to its being *produced*. Consequently, there can be no useful purpose served by the denial of the *production* of the validity by other causes; as on that point there is no dispute at all. As regards the *certainty*, however, regarding the capacity of things, you also hold that it is brought about by extraneous causes. This has been declared thus (by *Kumārila* himself)—"The capacities of things are proved through Presumption based upon the fact that certain effects cannot be explained otherwise" [*Shlo-Vā.*, p. 341].

As regards the argument that "the capacity that does not belong to a thing by itself cannot be produced by anything else",—which has been put forward in support of the denial of the idea of the validity being due to other circumstantial causes,—that is equally applicable to Invalidity also; so

that that also should have to be regarded as *inherent* in the cognition. Hence the Reason adduced is no Reason at all; as it is false and inconclusive.

It has been argued that—" Excellences are never recognised as operating positively towards the bringing about of Invalidity ".

It cannot be understood what the clear meaning of this affirmation is. What is the meaning of this 'positive operation'?—If it means intentional activity towards the producing of a certain effect, following upon the determination that 'I shall do this',—then such activity cannot be possible for the Sense-organs. Nor is it possible for things to act intelligently and intentionally; because all things being momentary, *effort* and *activity* are impossible; consequently, for the Sense-organs also, no positive activity is possible; and hence they can never serve as *Causes.*—If it be argued that—" even without any operation in the form of *activity*, the Sense-organs operate, by their mere presence, towards the production of effects; and as such are held to be *Causes* ",—then the answer is that this can be said, with equal reason, in regard to *Excellences* also. In the producing of the effects, all Causes are not always found to have an activity apart from their mere presence.—The following might be urged—" When the Excellences are present, the Defects disappear, and thence comes about *validity*; so that, as they act through the disappearance of the defects, it is said that there can be no positive operation possible for the Excellences ".—The same, however, may be said regarding the Defects also; for instance, when the Defects are present, the Excellences disappear and thence there comes about *invalidity*; hence towards the bringing about of Invalidity also, the Defects would have no positive operation. Thus Invalidity also would be inherent,—there being no difference between the two cases. As a matter of fact, Defects are never found to set aside Excellences and operate directly towards the bringing about of Invalidity. Hence there can be no causal relation apart from the condition that the presence and absence of one thing is concomitant with the presence and absence of the other. Such causal relation is equally possible for Defects as well as Excellences.

It has been argued that—" The form of the Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition, independently of anything else, serves to bring about cognitions in conformity with the real state of things ".

This also is not right; because, all cognitions would, in this case, be valid,—as their efficient cause would be always present; specially as they would be of the nature of Consciousness. The character of *being of the nature of Consciousness,* as present in cognitions, is inseparably related to the preceding cognition; so that even when there are defects, their efficient cause and the said character would be there in the case of all cognitions;—the character of *being in conformity with the real state of things* would also, in the same way, be there in all cognitions.

The following might be urged—" In the case of Defects bringing about Invalidity, the efficient cause would not be there in all cases; because Validity and its opposite, being mutually exclusive, could never be present in the same cognition. The character of *being of the essence of Consciousness,* however, can be present in all cases, without any opposition ".

If that is so, then the Sense-organ by itself, independently of everything else, cannot turn out to be the cause; because, even when the Sense-organ is there in its efficient condition, its effect, in the shape of *Validity*, does not come about. What is independent of everything else can never fail to be productive of its effect; and when between two things, one does not come about even when the other is there, the former cannot be regarded as having the latter as its only cause; if it did so, there would be incongruities.

Then again, you have got to explain this—If *Validity* has its efficient cause present in its perfect condition, why is it that it does not come about, even when the Defects are there?—If the answer is that—" it does not come about on account of the presence of the *Defect*, which is a cause operating against the Validity ",—then, the same may be said regarding *Invalidity* also; it does not come about at the time on account of the presence of the *Sense-organ, etc.* which are the cause operating against the Invalidity.

Further, even if the Validity were unwilling to come about because it is afraid of the Defect which operates against it,—how could its own cause which is present there in its efficient condition, ignore the effect? In fact, the untrammelled potency of the cause would be manifested only if it forced the effect to come about, even though unwilling.—If the idea is that the Sense-organ would not bring about Validity, when its potency would be obstructed by the presence of Defects,—then, being impotent, it could not bring about the Cognition either. Otherwise it would not be true that " Validity is brought about by the cause of the Cognition itself "; as it would not come about even when the Cognition has come about. If between two things, one is not produced even when the other has been produced,—then both cannot be regarded as necessarily having the same cause; as for instance, when the *paddy*-sprout is not produced on the production of the *Kodrava*-sprout;—and it has been found that even when the Cognition has been produced, its Validity is not always produced; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character.—Then again, when a Potency forms the very essence of a thing, nothing can obstruct it, without destroying the nature of that thing. Thus then it may be possible to assert as follows—' Please accept the view that there is validity of *all Apprehensions*, because the Potency which is inherent in a thing cannot be destroyed by anything else' [a parody of *Kumārila's* assertion].

The following might be urged—" What is held to be the cause of *validity* is not the mere Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition, but only such Sense-organ, etc. as are *free from defects*; so that the above objections are not applicable ".

If that is so, then it comes to this that what brings about the Validity is the *Sense-organ as along with Excellences*—which is something different from the cause of the Cognition itself; because it is only when a thing is equipped with Excellence that it can be *free from defects*. Thus you cannot say that " the validity is not known to be brought about by other circumstantial causes ".

" What the Excellences operate towards is the *removal of defects*, not the producing of *validity* ".

'That cannot be right. 'Removal' is a mere negation; hence there can be no operation towards it; for instance, it is not possible for anything to have any operation towards a non-entity, like the 'Hare's Horn', which is not something to be produced.

It has been argued that—"In the case of Inference, it has been found that the presence of the *Three-factors*, which produces the Cognition, brings about the Validity also".

This also is *inadmissible.* What brings about the Inferential Cognition is, not merely the presence of the *three factors*, but also such excellences in the *cogniser* as *absence of delusion*, and *full remembrances and impressions.* For instance, even when the *three factors* are present, if the man has no recollection of the relationship and other impressions regarding these factors, the Inferential Cognition does not appear at all; consequently, from this positive and negative concomitance, it is clear that it is not true that what produces the *validity* is the same cause that produces the *cognition* itself. Hence the conclusion to the contrary remains irresistible.

It has also been argued that—"The effect in the shape of *wrong cognition* does not proceed from the mere Sense-organs".

This is an extremely audacious statement. It implies the possibility of Wrong Cognitions appearing independently of the Sense-organs. When one thing, by its very nature, does not proceed from another, it can never be dependent upon the latter; as otherwise, it would lead to absurdity. As a matter of fact, even the cognitions of 'two moons' and the like which appear in men suffering from defective vision, never appear independently of the Sense-organs.

Further, if *Validity* is described as 'conformity with the real state of things',—then how is it ascertained that the Cognition produced by the Veda is in conformity with the real state of things,—in view of which you, who are a man of limited vision, come to regard it as *valid*? In fact, the presence of a potency in a thing cannot be ascertained by men who have not perceived the effects of such Potency. If it were so ascertained, it would lead to incongruities.

Thus it is found that the Validity is not proved in the case of the Veda,—in the hope of establishing of whose reliability all this verbal net-work has been spread out (by the *Mīmāṁsaka*); so that all this effort has been like the effort of the man who thumps mere *husks*, in the hope of finding *rice.* This point need not be laboured any further.—(3123)

End of Chapter XXV

CHAPTER XXVI

Examination of the 'Person of Super-normal Vision'

COMMENTARY.

It has been declared in the Introductory Verses (*Texts* 5-6) that—'The great Teacher, the best of Expounders, has expounded the doctrine of the *Intervolved Wheel of Causation*,—having abounding Mercy acquired during vast æons of time; after bowing to this same Teacher, this *Compendium of True Doctrines* is being composed'.—Herein it has been asserted that the Doctrine of the 'Intervolved Wheel of Causation' is qualified as having been taught by an Omniscient Person.

In support of this notion, the Author proceeds with the mere introduction of this subject :—

TEXT (3124).

THUS, IT HAVING BEEN PROVED THAT THE VALIDITY OF ALL COGNITIONS IS NOT INHERENT IN THEMSELVES, NO ATTEMPT IS MADE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF THE PERSON COGNISANT OF THINGS BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES. —(3124)

COMMENTARY.

Thus,—i.e. by the reasonings just set forth,—it is established that the Validity of all Cognitions is *not inherent* in themselves;—hence the existence of a Person knowing all things, even those beyond the reach of the Senses, becomes established without any effort; consequently, for the purpose of proving this no further effort is being made.—(3124)

Question :—"How does it become established without effort?"
Answer :—

TEXTS (3125–3127).

INASMUCH AS THE VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE VEDA ALSO IS DUE TO A PERSON,—IT FOLLOWS FROM THAT ITSELF THAT THE SAID VALIDITY IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF THAT PERSON IS COGNISANT OF SUPER-SENSUOUS THINGS. IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN THE PERSON WOULD BE LIABLE TO IGNORANCE, DOUBT AND WRONG COGNITION; AND WHEN SUCH A PERSON WOULD BE THE AUTHOR OF THE VEDA, THIS LATTER COULD NOT HAVE ANY VALIDITY,—LIKE OTHER ASSERTIONS. INASMUCH AS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN HEAVEN AND SACRIFICIAL

PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN ASSERTED BY HIM AFTER FULL KNOWLEDGE, IT IS CLEAR THAT HE IS COGNISANT OF SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS. THIS MUST BE ADMITTED BY OTHERS ALSO.—(3125–3127)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tasya*'—of the Person.

'*Tataḥ*'—the Person, its composer.

'*Tasmin*'—in the Veda;—the Locative ending is in relation to the word '*Pramāṇatā*', 'Validity'.

'*Validity*'—capacity to make known supersensuous things in accordance with their true nature.—This has been said in reference to the view of the other party.

What is meant is as follows:—If you must insist upon the validity and reliability of the Veda,—then that validity must be due to the Person who composed it, and not to the Veda itself. This has been explained already. If this Author of the Veda is capable of perceiving supersensuous things,—then alone can reliability belong to him; otherwise if the author were liable to wrong and doubtful cognitions, the Veda would be just like the utterances of mad and demented people, and hence entirely unreliable. Hence it follows that the Author of the Veda, whose existence has been proved in the chapter on 'The Revealed Word', must be regarded, at least by implication, to be one who is capable of perceiving supersensuous things. Hence there should be no denial of such an Author.

As a rule, men have their powers of perception beset with defects like Love and Hate, and hence they are unable to perceive supersensuous things; having realised this truth, people lose all hope of establishing the validity of scriptures composed by such men; so when one seeks to obtain the knowledge of what is *Dharma* and what is *Adharma*, he will rely upon the reliability of the Veda,—just like the bird which is unable to perceive the shore.

With this idea, the *Mīmāmsakas*, being devoid of all excellent qualities (?), deny the existence of the Person cognisant of supersensuous things; their argument being as follows:—"All men being beset with Love and Hatred, etc. as also by Ignorance, and not knowing how to get rid of these, they become confused; hence there can be no Person who is capable of perceiving supersensuous things; consequently, *Dharma* can be known only through the Veda, not through the senses; 'as it is the Veda only which can make known things past, present and future, subtle and remote and near,—not so the Sense-organ or any other Means of Cognition' (*Shabara-Bhāṣya*). In support of this view, they put forward the following reasoning: A thing that falls within the scope of the Means of Cognition known as 'Non-apprehension', which consists in the absence of the five means of Cognition (Sense-perception and the rest), can be regarded by the wise only as *non-existent*; e.g. the 'sky-lotus',—the omniscient Person falls within the scope of the said 'Non-apprehension';—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things; the Probandum consisting of *capability of being used and regarded*. As for the negation of this, it can be cognised by 'Non-apprehension' only".—(3125–3127)

Says the *Mīmāṁsaka's* Opponent :—All that is cognisable is included under the five things, Colour (Taste, Odour, Touch and Speech) ; and men who know all these are well known ; hence the *Mīmāṁsaka's* Proposition—that 'there is no one who knows all things'—is contrary to ordinary experience ".

The *Mīmāṁsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3128).

"ALL THAT IS PERTINENT TO THE PRESENT CONTEXT IS THE DENIAL OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF *Dharma* (BY MAN) ; WHO IS DENYING THE POSSIBILITY OF A PERSON KNOWING OTHER THINGS ? "—(3128)

COMMENTARY.

" In the present context, which deals with the question of the Reliability of the Veda, all that is meant by us is the denial of the existence of any person who knows all things relating to *Dharma*,—not the denial of the person knowing all things that are included under the denotation of the term 'all'. Thus if people apply the term 'omniscient' (*all*-knowing) to a certain person, in the sense that he knows all things *except Dharma and Adharma*,—we do not deny this ; hence our Proposition does not run counter to ordinary experience ".—(3128)

" Further, if you Buddhists also urge, against us, the possibility of regarding, as 'all-knowing', the man who knows all things except *Dharma and Adharma*,—then that is entirely superfluous.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3129).

"IN EVERY CASE, THE TERM 'ALL' IS USED IN REFERENCE TO THE CONTEXT ; HENCE IF THERE IS A PERSON KNOWING *all things* RELATING TO A CERTAIN CONTEXT,—WHAT HARM DOES THAT DO TO OUR POSITION ? "—(3129)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—What is that 'all' that relates to the present context ?

Answer :—

TEXT (3130).

"THERE ARE CERTAIN EFFECTS (SPOKEN OF) WHICH, IF FOUND IMPOSSIBLE IN RELATION TO THE OBJECT DENOTED BY THE WORD, ARE APPLIED TO THE WORD ITSELF ; HENCE THE MAN WHO KNOWS THE *word* 'ALL', MAY BE CALLED '*all*-KNOWING' IN NAME."—(3130)

COMMENTARY.

" For example, in Grammar, we find such assertions as '*agnērḍṛk*' and so forth which lay own such effects as the addition of certain affixes ;

now this effect cannot be brought about in the thing denoted by the words concerned; consequently, by implication, they are applied to the words themselves, by Grammarians.—In the same manner, if you also, finding that it is impossible for any one to know *all things,* explain the term 'all' appearing in the statement of your doctrine, as standing for the *word* 'all',—so that the man knowing the *word* 'all' would be '*all*-knowing',—then this may be so *in name,*—i.e. in *name* only; for no one can prevent a man applying to words any meaning he likes; as the *naming* of things depends upon the mere whim of man".—(3130)

TEXT (3131).

"If the thing related to the context is some such thing as Oil, Water or Clarified Butter,—and if a person knowing all about such a thing is called 'all-knowing',—then he may be so; we do not deny that."—(3131)

COMMENTARY.

"If what is meant by the term 'all' are things other than *Dharma and Adharma,*—such as Oil, Water, Clarified Butter, etc.—and the Person is regarded as 'all-knowing' on account of his knowledge of these things,——then your argument is superfluous".—(3131)

"Further, is the 'all-knowing' person regarded as such—because he knows a little of the universe as a whole? Or because he knows the whole of it in full detail?—If the former, then it is futile; it being admitted by us.—This is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3132-3133).

"The whole universe is included under the two terms 'positive' and 'negative'; if one who knows this epitome of the world is called 'all-knowing',—then who is there that does not accept such an 'omniscient' person?—In the same way, the term 'all' may be applied on the basis of such universal terms as 'knowable', 'cognisable' and the like (which include *all* things); if one who knows this is called 'omniscient',—who can object to this?"—(3132-3133)

COMMENTARY.

"The whole world, consisting of things that are mutually exclusive, is 'negative'; and when the things are spoken of *positively,* it is 'positive';—

thus those two characters, 'positive' and 'negative', have been described by us as standing for the entire universe; if, it is on the basis of the knowledge of the whole world in this form (as consisting of Positive and Negative entities), that the 'Omniscient Person' is sought to be proved,—even this is acceptable to us. But this alone cannot prove the 'omniscient character' of any person".

'*This epitome of the world*'—*Being of the Positive and Negative form* constitutes the 'epitome' of the World, in the sense that it *epitomises it.*

Similarly if the whole world is viewed as 'knowable', 'cognisable', etc.—and one knowing it thus is 'all-knowing',—then this also is what is readily admitted by us.—(3132-3133)

TEXT (3134).

"WHEN CERTAIN PEOPLE HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SUCH AND SO MANY ARE *all* THE THINGS THAT EXIST,—ALL THOSE WHO KNOW THIS AND THOSE WHO HAVE LEARNT THE WORKS WRITTEN BY THEM SHOULD BE '*all*-KNOWING'."
—(3134)

COMMENTARY.

It might be that there are some people who have come to the conclusion in their own systems that so many are *all* the things that exist, and have postulated them to be as such;—e.g. the *Bauddhas* have postulated the 'Five Thought-phases';—the *Vaīshēsikas* have postulated the 'Six Categories';—the *Naiyāyikas* have postulated the 'Sixteen Categories',—'Means of Cognition', 'Objects of Cognition' and so forth;—the *Sāṅkhyas* have postulated the twenty-five Principles—'Primordial Matter', the 'Great Principle' and so forth.—And one who knows these is held to be 'all-knowing'.—In this way, it leads to absurdities; such as people who read the works written by these people also become 'all-knowing'.—(3134)

TEXT (3135).

"FOR INSTANCE, ONE WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THE SIX 'OBJECTS OF COGNITION', THROUGH THE SIX 'MEANS OF COGNITION', WOULD BE 'KNOWING ALL' IN AN EPITOMISED FORM; WHO IS THERE WHO WOULD NOT ADMIT SUCH AN OMNISCIENT PERSON?"—(3135)

COMMENTARY.

It might be urged that—'If a man, through the six Means of Cognition—Perception, Inference, Analogy, Word, Presumption and Non-apprehension—cognises the six kinds of objects, he would be regarded as *omniscient*';—but this also would be futile, proving what is already admitted. Because

—(*a*) Perception being restricted in its scope to the five objects, in the shape of Colour, etc. cannot apply to *Dharma and Adharma*; (*b*) Inference also, envisaging the *subject* as related to the *Probans* which has been cognised by Perception, cannot appertain to *Dharma and Adharma*; because *Dharma*, etc.—are beyond the reach of the senses; hence no relationship of these with anything can be apprehended by Perception;—(*c*) as regards the Word, even though it appertains wholly to imperceptible things, yet through verbal cognition one cannot be regarded as 'perceiving supersensuous things'; because verbal cognition, envisaging imperceptible things, cannot be of the nature of *Perception*; and the man who is wholly addicted to non-perceptional cognition can never be one 'perceiving supersensuous things';—(*d*) as regards Analogy, envisaging Similarity and its adjuncts, can never apply to *Dharma and Adharma*; as has been thus declared—'Hence what is remembered would be qualified by *similarity*,—and this would be the object of Analogical Cognition; or the similarity as resting in that thing' (*Shlokavārtika*—Analogy, 37);—(*e*) as regards Presumption, it envisages only a thing different from the one in question, which, as heard of or seen, would be inexplicable without that other thing; hence, it cannot appertain to *Dharma and Adharma*; as there is nothing either seen or heard of, which cannot be explained without the presumption of *Dharma and Adharma*. Even if Presumption does envisage *Dharma and Adharma*,—it cannot be of the nature of *Perception*; hence one who rests upon it cannot be said to be 'directly *perceiving* Dharma and Adharma';—(*f*) as regards *Non-apprehension*, as it envisages only the *absence of cognisable things*, it can never envisage *Dharma and Adharma*.—(3135)

Thus it has been explained that the attempt to prove the *Omniscient* Person on the basis of the knowledge of the epitomised form of things, is superfluous. The *Mīmāmsaka* now proceeds to point out objections against the idea of the 'Omniscient Person', on the basis of his knowing the whole world in detail:—

TEXT (3136).

"IF ONE ASSUMES THE EXISTENCE OF A PERSON CAPABLE OF DIRECTLY PERCEIVING ALL THINGS IN DETAIL,—SUCH ASSUMPTION IS ABSOLUTELY FUTILE AND FALSE."—(3136)

COMMENTARY.

'*Mudhā*'—Futile, useless; because it is not conducive to the fulfilment of any purpose of man.

'*False*'—not true, as envisaging an impossibility.—(3136)

The following *Text* shows in what way it is an impossibility—

TEXT (3137).

"EVEN IN A SINGLE BODY, THERE ARE SO MANY ATOMS, AND SO MANY HAIRS, ETC. ;—WHO CAN KNOW ALL THESE ?"—(3137)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, it is impossible for men to know in detail all the atoms contained even in a single body ; what to say of the knowledge of all the little details that go to make up the entire Universe ?—(3137)

The following *Text* points out the futility of assuming the Omniscient Person :—

TEXT (3138).

"IF AN ATTEMPT WERE MADE TO PROVE THAT ONE HAS THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DETAILS OF ALL INDIVIDUALS AND COMPONENTS OF THE WHOLE WORLD,—IT WOULD BE AS FUTILE AS THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CROW'S TEETH."—(3138)

COMMENTARY.

'*Components*'—Hands and Feet, etc.—'*Individuals*'—in the shape of the particular trees, *Dhava, Khadira, Palāsha* and so forth.—'*Samasta, etc.*'—all components and individuals ;—the '*details*' of these are in the shape of atoms, hairs, leaves and so forth ;—one who has the knowledge of all this is '*Samasta . . . jñāna*',—the term '*jñāna*' standing for *one who knows*—the '*Lyuṭ*-affix' in '*jñāna*' denoting the active agent ;—any attempt to prove,—establish the presence of—such a *knower*—would be absolutely futile ; that is, because, being *impossible* and not having any bearing upon *Dharma and Adharma,* it can be of no use in fulfilling any purpose of man.—(3138)

This same idea is further supported by means of an illustration :—

TEXT (3139).

"JUST AS THE ASSERTION THAT 'ONE KNOWS ALL THINGS WITH HIS EYES' IS FUTILE, SO ALSO WOULD BE THE PROPOSITION THAT 'THERE IS A PERSON CAPABLE OF DIRECTLY PERCEIVING ALL THINGS'."—(3139)

COMMENTARY.

This means that the Proposition is superfluous and also contrary to common experience.—(3139)

The following *Text* proceeds to point out where there is difference of opinion, and the proving of which would be useful for man :—

TEXTS (3140-3141).

"BY PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF THE PERSON KNOWING ONLY *Dharma and Adharma*, WHOM THE BUDDHIST POSTULATES,—ONE SECURES THE RELIABILITY AND ACCEPTABILITY OF THE SCRIPTURE COMPOSED BY HIM; AND BY DENYING THE SAID PERSON, ONE SECURES THE UNRELIABILITY AND REJECTABILITY OF THE SAID SCRIPTURE.—THUS WHEN PEOPLE PROCEED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF THE PERSON KNOWING ALL THE LITTLE DETAILS OF THE ENTIRE WORLD, THEY PUT THEMSELVES TO THE UNNECESSARY TROUBLE OF WRITING TREATISES ON THE SUBJECT AND CARRYING ON DISCUSSIONS ON THE SAME."—(3140-3141)

COMMENTARY.

'*Sva-dharma, etc. etc.*'—the Person cognisant of *Dharma and Adharma*,—as posited by the Buddhist himself; when there is *proving* or *denying* of such a Person. The compound is to be taken as with the Locative ending. When there is (*a*) proving and (*b*) denying of such a person,—it becomes established whether the scripture composed by such a person is to be (*a*) accepted or (*b*) rejected, respectively.

What is meant is as follows :—If the Party postulating the said Person succeeds in proving that such a Person exists as his Instructor fully conversant with *Dharma and Adharma*,—then it becomes established that the scripture composed by him should be accepted; on the other hand, if the Party denying the said Person postulated by the other party as conversant with *Dharma and Adharma* only, succeeds in refuting the existence of such a Person,—it becomes proved that the Scripture composed by the said Person should be rejected;—when, however, one gives up all consideration of only *Dharma and Adharma*, and proceeds to compose treatises and carry on discussions regarding the 'Omniscient Person' who is affirmed by one party as knowing all the minute details of the whole world, and is denied by the other party,—such attempt involves useless trouble.

The Locative ending at the end of the compound—'*Sarva, etc.*'—connotes 'for the purpose of';—while that at the end of the compound '*granthavādayoḥ*', it connotes the *receptacle* of the *attempt*.—(3140-3141)

The following might be urged—If there is no Person cognisant of *Dharma and Adharma*, then how can people have any idea of what is *moral, good* and what is *immoral, evil* ?

The *Mīmāṁsaka*'s answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3142–3144).

"PERCEPTION AND OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION REGARDING THE OMNISCIENT PERSON HAVING BEEN DISCARDED, IT WOULD FOLLOW THAT MORALITY AND IMMORALITY ARE COGNISABLE THROUGH SCRIPTURE (RELIABLE WORD) ONLY.—THIS ALONE BEING SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE DOCTRINE OF THE *Mīmāmsaka*, IF AN EFFORT IS MADE TO REFUTE THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, IT IS LIKE AN ATTEMPT TO KILL WHAT IS ALREADY DEAD. THE 'PERSON COGNISANT OF *Dharma*' HAVING BEEN REJECTED, ON THE GROUND OF HIS VERY ROOT BEING CUT OFF,—IF PEOPLE GO ON ASSERTING THE EXISTENCE OF OMNISCIENT PERSONS, IT IS LIKE THE THUMPING OF HUSKS."—(3142–3144)

COMMENTARY.

'*Kevalāgama, etc. etc.*'—i.e. being cognisable through the reliable Word only.—Though the term '*āgama*' connotes the *reliable word* in general, yet, here, by implication, it should be taken as standing for that Word (or Scripture) which does not emanate from Man.

'*This alone, etc. etc.*'—That is, only by the rejection of the Person cognisant of Dharma, the *Mīmāmsaka's* doctrine, that '*Dharma* is that beneficial thing which is indicated by the Veda', becomes established; even so, if we make further repeated efforts—as shown later on—for rejecting the Omniscient Person, it is useless; the desired result having been already achieved, such further Effort is like the killing of what is already dead.

The Omniscient Person having been rejected, if the Buddhists still make attempts to prove his existence, that also,—as not bringing about the desired result,—is like the *thumping of husks*, by the person seeking for *Rice*; involving needless labour. Just as in the case cited, after the rice has been removed, if the man seeking for rice proceeds to thump the husks, it is entirely useless,—so also, when the main factor of the Person cognisant of *Dharma*, etc. has been set aside, if the Buddhist proceeds to prove the existence of the Person knowing all the little details that go to make up the world, which is of no use in regard to the main factor,—such attempt is entirely useless. Herein lies the similarity to the *thumping of husks*.

'*On account of their very root having been cut off*',—i.e. of whom the main point, regarding the knowledge of *Dharma and Adharma*, has been refuted.—(3142–3144)

The following *Text* shows that the said attempt of the Buddhist to prove the Omniscient Person is not only futile,—it also involves something undesirable for him:—

TEXT (3145).

"IF THE PERSON HAS THE DIRECT PERCEPTION OF ALL THINGS, THEN HE SHOULD HAVE DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH TASTES, ETC. ALSO AS ARE UNCLEAN;—WHO COULD ASSUME THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A PERSON?"—(3145)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—The omniscience of the Teacher has been inferred by the Buddhists from the fact of His having propounded the teaching of the truth regarding all things; hence this Inference annuls the *Mīmāṁsaka's* 'Proposition' [that 'there can be no Omniscient Person']; and his Reason also is inadmissible.

Anticipating this objection, the *Mīmāṁsaka* supplies the following answer:—

TEXT (3146).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE WORDS OF THE BUDDHA AND OTHERS ARE NOT FOUND TO PROVIDE ANY KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT IS CONTAINED IN THE *Vedas*, THE *Upavedas* AND THE SUBSIDIARY SCIENCES AND THEIR AUXILIARIES; HOW THEN CAN SUCH A PERSON BE REGARDED AS 'OMNISCIENT', WITHOUT REASON?" —(3146)

COMMENTARY.

Vedas—named '*Ṛk*', '*Yajuṣ*' and '*Sāman*'.—'*Upavēdas*'—*Āyurvēda, Dhanurvēda* and the like.—'*Subsidiary Sciences*'—the six subsidiaries of the Veda, in the shape of *Shikṣā, Kalpa, Vyākaraṇa, Nirukta, Chhandas* and *Jyotiṣa*.—'*Auxiliaries*'—the parts of these, in the shape of Verbal Roots, etc. including the Commentaries, etc. of these.

The '*artha*' of these is what is contained in them.

Of this '*artha*', 'contents', of the said works,—no knowledge is provided by the words of *Buddha* and other Teachers. That is, no words of the *Buddha* are found to expound what is contained in the Veda, etc. As a matter of fact, no such Person is found who has composed a Scripture that provides the knowledge of all things; the reason for this being that the various scriptures are found to deal with different subjects.—(3146)

It might be argued that—when it is found that the Teachings of *Buddha* deal with a few things, it is inferred that He knows those things also which have not been taught by him, from the perceived fact that He is possessed of the requisite capacity; hence the said objection (annulment by Inference) against the *Mīmāṁsaka's* proposition still remains.

This is anticipated and answered in the following:—

TEXT (3147).

" IF IT BE HELD THAT THINGS NOT SPOKEN OF IN THEIR TREATISES WERE KNOWN TO THE TEACHERS,—THEN ALL POETS, BY THE COMPOSING OF THEIR POEMS, MIGHT BE REGARDED AS *omniscient.*"—(3147)

COMMENTARY.

If it be held, on the strength of Inference, that—" even when a certain thing is not mentioned in the works composed by the Teachers, it must have been known to them ",—then those poets also who have composed works relating to stories created by their own imagination, could be assumed to be omniscient, on the ground of their powers of perception; there being no difference between the two cases.

Thus the Reason (of the Buddhist) becomes 'Inconclusive'.—(3147)

The following might be urged—In the case of *Buddha*, the Teachings are found to be related to supersensuous things; not so the works of poets; hence the knowledge of all such things is inferred only in the case of Buddha, not in that of others. If it were not so, the person who does not possess the knowledge of *all* supersensuous things could not have the knowledge of even *some* of these things; as there would be no difference between the two cases. Consequently the addition of the qualification—' being a person knowing supersensuous things' would prevent the Reason applying to the case of Poets and hence from 'Falsity' (Inconclusiveness).

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3148).

" WHEN THERE ARE MANY OMNISCIENT PERSONS, PREACHING MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY DOCTRINES,—THE GROUNDS OF RELIABILITY BEING THE SAME IN ALL,—WHICH ONE OF THESE SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AS RELIABLE ? "—(3148)

COMMENTARY.

There are many Teachers,—*Buddha, Kapila, Kaṇāda, Gautama* and so forth,—who are regarded by their respective devotees as omniscient; and each one of these is sought to be proved to be omniscient;—which one of them is to be definitely recognised as reliable ? The ground of omniscience, in the shape of having taught doctrines relating to supersensuous things, is equally present in all of them.—It cannot be right to regard them all as omniscient; because what is taught by them is mutually contradictory. When several persons propound teachings contrary to each other, they cannot all be regarded as knowing the truth; as the truth regarding any particular thing can be one only; hence it cannot admit of mutually contradictory properties.—(3148)

'If it be said that—*Buddha* is the only one to be accepted as such—then the *Mīmāṃsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3149).

"IF *Buddha* IS OMNISCIENT, THEN WHAT IS THE PROOF FOR *Kapila* NOT BEING SO.—IF BOTH ARE OMNISCIENT, THEN HOW IS IT THAT THERE IS DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN THEM ? "—(3149)

COMMENTARY.

It might be said that both are omniscient ;—in view of this, it is added—'*If both, etc. etc.*'—(3149)

The following might be urged—When the Word of any one has been found to be true to facts,—it is that same person in regard to whom it is inferred that his words relating to all things would be in keeping with reality.

The *Mīmāṃsaka's* answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3150).

"IN THE MATTER OF ONE MATTER, OF ARITHMETIC FOR INSTANCE.—ALL BEINGS—*Jina*, *Buddha* AND OTHERS,—ARE FOUND TO BE TRUTHFUL ; AND NO DISTINCTION IS FOUND AMONG THEM."—(3150)

COMMENTARY.

The words of all men,—*Jina*, *Buddha* and others,—are found, in the one matter of Arithmetic,—to be true, quite in keeping with the real state of things ; in fact, when people speak of a lot of things, it is not possible that not one should be true ; as has been declared in the following words—'When a man talks a lot, it cannot be that not a single word is true'.—Thus then, the reason being equally present in all cases, no difference can be recognised among men, and all should be regarded as omniscient.—This however cannot be true, because they have propounded mutually contradictory teachings,—as already pointed out above.—(3150)

It might be argued that—When, in regard to a person it is found that, on being scrutinised by all Means of Cognition, what he has said cannot be gainsaid,—then that person alone can be regarded as omniscient.

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3151–3153).

"THAT SAME REASON, BY WHICH THE OMNISCIENCE OF ONE PERSON IS PROVED, MERELY ON ACCOUNT OF YOUR LOVE FOR YOUR OWN VIEW OF THINGS,—IS FOUND TO BE PRESENT IN OTHER PERSONS ALSO;—THE OBJECTIONS ALSO THAT THE BUDDHISTS, WITH GREAT ZEAL, URGE AGAINST THE ARGUMENTS IN PROOF OF THE OMNISCIENCE OF *Jina*, ARE ALSO URGED BY THE *Jainas* (AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY).—UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOW CAN ANY DEFINITE CONCLUSION BE ARRIVED AT THROUGH SUCH REASONINGS AND COUNTER-REASONINGS, WHICH ARE UNCERTAIN AND SWALLOWED BY THEIR OWN REFLECTIONS?"—(3151–3153)

COMMENTARY.

There is a certain reasoning adduced by the Buddhists in support of the omniscience of *Buddha*;—in this form—'*Buddha* must be regarded as a person who directly knew the true nature of all things,—because he has taught things unheard of, uninferred and in conformity with the real state of things,—just like the ordinary man who has seen water and talks about it'. This same reasoning is put forward by the *Digambara Jainas* for proving the omniscience of *Jina*.—So that the matter remains as doubtful as before.—Again, when the *Jaina* has put forward his reasoning in support of the omniscience of *Jina*,—the Buddhists put forward objections against it,—in the form—'The teachings of *Jina*, in regard to *Syādvāda* and other doctrines being impossible, he cannot be regarded as omniscient'; these same are urged by the *Jainas* when the Buddhist adduces his reasoning in support of the omniscience of *Buddha*,—the Jaina's counter-reasoning being—'Buddha cannot be regarded as omniscient because his teachings regarding the Perpetual Flux, etc. are impossible'.

In this way this becomes a case like that of Reflection and Counter-reflection: When the reflected object is there, its reflection appears; in the same way when the Reasonings and Counter-reasonings have been put forth, reasonings and counter-reasonings to the contrary come forward. These reasonings and counter-reasonings thus being always uncertain,—they are swallowed by their own reflections; how then can there be any definite conclusion regarding the omniscience of any Person?—(3151–3153)

The following might be urged that—That person alone may be regarded as omniscient in whose case no objection can be urged to the contrary.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3154).

" In this way pseudo-omniscient persons having been beaten off by each other, the few that remain shall be beaten off by the upholder of the Veda."—(3154)

COMMENTARY.

The *Mīmāmsaka* asserts his own superiority in the following:—

TEXTS (3155-3156).

" Any herb that has been touched by the teeth of the mongoose removes the poison of all serpents, even when applied in play (carelessly); in the same way any stray secular and spiritual argument proceeding from the mouth of the Vedic scholar will destroy the poison of all serpent-like Buddhists and others."—(3155-3156)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—What is this 'stray argument'?
Answer :—

TEXTS (3157-3158)

" Who can (reasonably) assume (accept) the existence of a Person (omniscient) who can be rejected by such Reasons as—'being knowable', 'being cognisable', 'being an entity', 'being existent' and so forth? The man who assumes the existence of an omniscient Person knowing all things through a single Means of Cognition may certainly apprehend all such things as Taste, Odour, etc. through the eyes alone."—(3157-3158)

COMMENTARY.

When several such Reasons as 'being knowable' and the rest,—which are free from such defects as 'being equally co-existent with the Probandum and the absence of the Probandum'—are available for refuting the idea of the Omniscient Person,—such a person must be an utter impossibility; and cannot be accepted by any sane person.

For instance, the following reasoning may be set forth—'*Buddha* cannot be omniscient, because he is *knowable, cognisable*, an *entity, existent*, a *speaker*, a *person* and so forth,—like any common man on the road'. These Reasons could not be regarded as 'Inconclusive'. Because a man is

called 'omniscient' because he knows all things; this knowledge of all things could be either through Sense-perception or through Mental Perception.—It cannot be through Sense-perception; because the scope of such Perception is limited and it cannot envisage *all* things; this reasoning may be thus formulated —Perceptions through the eye and other Sense-organs are restricted in their scope, because they are produced by the Sense-organs which are always restricted in their scope; that is why in ordinary life, they are never found to go beyond the bounds of those limitations; consequently the apprehension of *all things* through these is an impossibility. Otherwise there would be no need for more than one sense-organ; and the result of this would be that all such divergent things as Taste, Odour, etc. would become apprehended by means of a single Cognition! The Buddhist who makes such an astounding assumption,—as is clear from his assertion that "By one He knows all, by one He sees everything",—could apprehend all such divergent things as Taste, Odour, etc.; through the one Perception proceeding from the eye alone!

No such assertion can be made; for if it were so, then there would be the apprehension of several things through a single Cognition at one and the same time. It could be possible only through several Cognitions; because there cannot be several Cognitions at one and the same time. Even if it were possible, there could be no apprehension of *all* things; because the mind of another person cannot be envisaged by the Sense-perception of any man; nor is it possible for him to apprehend, by its means, things beyond the reach, of the senses,—such as those that are remote or too small or hidden and so forth.—(3157-3158)

The following might be urged—Though it is true that at present the perceptions derived from the Eye and other sense-organs do not apprehend diverse and heterogeneous things,—yet it is possible that at some time in the past, such apprehension of divergent heterogeneous things did appear in a certain Person.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3159).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE PERCEPTION OF CERTAIN THINGS THROUGH CERTAIN CAUSES IN THE PAST WAS EXACTLY AS IT IS FOUND TO APPEAR AT THE PRESENT TIME."—(3159)

COMMENTARY.

The nature of things is always determined by the exact concomitance of definite causes, not haphazard. If it were not so, then all characters could be attributed to all things; and if such were the case, then how could it ever be possible for the nature determined by causes to be otherwise? That is to say, it is not possible for the Smoke,—which has its existence concomitant with Fire—to be produced from anything else.

' Nor can the view be accepted that the apprehension of all things comes about through *Mental Perception*,—[the second alternative put forward in the commentary on 3157-3158, on p. 1405, *line* 2].—Because, though Mental Perception may envisage all things,—yet it has no independent operation of its own towards the apprehension of things; if it had, then there would be no deaf or blind persons. It is then dependent upon something else; and as a matter of fact it is found that it envisages only those things that have been apprehended by Perception through the Senses; so that there can be no apprehension by Mental Perception of anything that has not been envisaged by Sense-perception,—such things, for instance, as are remote, small, hidden, and the mind of another person and so forth.—(3159)

The following might be urged—Through Practice and other causes, it is found that the powers of intelligence and other faculties vary with each Person; and from this is deduced the possibility of a Person in whom these powers have reached the highest stage of perfection [and such a person would be omniscient].

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3160-3161).

"THOSE PERSONS WHO HAVE BEEN FOUND TO BE SUPERIOR TO OTHERS ARE SO ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF INTELLIGENCE, MEMORY AND STRENGTH,—WHICH VARY SLIGHTLY WITH VARYING PERSONS,—AND NOT ON ACCOUNT OF THE CAPACITY TO PERCEIVE SUPER-SENSUOUS THINGS.—EVEN THE INTELLIGENT MAN WHO IS CAPABLE OF PERCEIVING SUBTLE THINGS IS SUPERIOR TO OTHER PERSONS, WITHOUT GOING BEYOND THE LIMITATIONS OF HIS OWN KIND."—(3160-3161)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, however much he has practised, no one has been found to become capable of perceiving things beyond the reach of the senses. For instance, a man, even though exceptionally intelligent, and capable of apprehending things that can be apprehended only by keen intelligence,—is never found to transcend the limitations of his own species,—i.e. the human weakness, in the shape of the absence of abnormal vision and the like,—and he is never found to be endowed with such abnormal vision, etc. Consequently there is no justification for any such assertion as the following which has been loudly proclaimed by Buddhists—'He sees with abnormal eyes, pure and transcending beyond the limitations of man, beings entering into excellent states and even inferior states, etc. etc.'.—(3160-3161)

Granting that all Intelligences become superior by practice and exercise—even so, they become superior without transcending their inherent limitations.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3162-3163).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, IN THE MATTER OF THE AUDITORY PERCEPTION OF SOUNDS, SUPERIORITY AMONG MEN IS FOUND IN THE APPREHENDING OF DISTANT AND SUBTLE SOUNDS,—NOT IN THE APPREHENDING OF COLOUR AND OTHER THINGS. SIMILARLY IN THE MATTER OF VISUAL PERCEPTION, WHAT IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE ATTAINMENT OF SUPERIORITY IS THE PERCEPTION OF REMOTE AND SUBTLE COLOUR,—NOT THE PERCEPTION OF SOUND AND OTHER THINGS."—(3162-3163)

COMMENTARY.

'The apprehensions'—Cognitions—'of distant and subtle sounds';—the Instrumental ending connotes 'Indication'. In some places, the reading is '*upalabdhitaḥ*', in the Ablative; connoting 'reason'; the '*tasi*' at the end coming under the rule '*Vidhāyādi*, etc.'

'*The apprehension of sound, etc.*'—is not brought about by the Eyes.—(3162-3163)

Hitherto it has been shown that Sense-perception cannot transcend its limitations; it is now going to be shown that in the case of Mental Cognition also, the superiority that is perceptible does not go beyond the range of the subject of repeated experience:—

TEXT (3164).

"SIMILARLY GREAT SUPERIORITY IS OFTEN FOUND IN MEN, IN THE MATTER OF SCIENTIFIC DISCUSSIONS; BUT THAT ALONE DOES NOT PROVE THAT THE MAN IS AN EXPERT IN *all* SCIENCES."—(3164)

COMMENTARY.

The same idea is further clarified:—

TEXTS (3165–3167).

"WHEN ONE HAS LEARNT GRAMMAR, HIS INTELLIGENCE GOES VERY FAR IN THE MATTER OF CORRECT AND INCORRECT FORMS OF WORDS; BUT NOT IN THE MATTER OF THE DETERMINATION OF STARS, DATES, ECLIPSES AND SUCH SUBJECTS.—SIMILARLY, THE ASTRONOMER, THOUGH SUPERIOR IN THE MATTER OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MOON, THE SUN, ECLIPSES AND SO FORTH, IS INCAPABLE OF DETERMINING THE CORRECTNESS OF SUCH WORDS AS '*bhavati*' AND THE LIKE.—AGAIN A MAN, VERY SUPERIOR IN HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE VEDA, HISTORY AND SUCH SUBJECTS, IS UNABLE TO VISUALISE SUCH MATTERS AS CREATION, DEITY, AND *Apūrva*."—(3165–3167)

COMMENTARY.

'*Astronomer*'—one who knows the science of the stars.

'*Vēdētihāsa, etc.*'—The compound is to be expounded as meaning—one who has the superiority relating to his knowledge of the Veda, etc.'

'*Apūrva*'—stands for *Dharma and Adharma* (Merit and Demerit).—(3165–3167)

Further, even when the superiority transcends the limitations of its subject, it does not reach its highest point; it is found to proceed only up to a certain point.—This is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (3168).

"THE MAN, WHO CAN JUMP INTO THE SKY TO THE HEIGHT OF 15 FEET, CAN NEVER JUMP TO THE HEIGHT OF EIGHT MILES,—HOWEVER MUCH HE MAY PRACTISE JUMPING."—(3168)

COMMENTARY.

For example, it may so happen that men who, by reason of the accumulation of fat, are unable to jump to the height of even two feet, succeed in reducing their fat by means of exercise and become capable of jumping to the height of 15 feet; but even so, though they may carry on the exercise hundreds of times, they can never jump to the height of 8 miles in the sky.—(3168)

In the following *Text*, the *Mīmāmsaka* sums up his position:—

TEXT (3169).

"THUS THEN, EVEN WHEN THE SUPERIORITY OF KNOWLEDGE PROCEEDS VERY FAR, IT CAN COMPREHEND ONLY A LITTLE MORE THAN OTHERS,—IT CAN NEVER COMPREHEND THINGS BEYOND THE SENSES."—(3169)

COMMENTARY.

'*Atishayajñāna*'—superiority of knowledge.—The compounding is according to the rule '*Tritīyā, etc.*'—The Instrumental Ending connotes *instrumentality.*—(3169)

The same idea is further clarified :—

TEXTS (3170-3171).

"WHILE THE MAN IS SEATED IN A HUT, THE SENSE-PERCEPTION THAT HE HAS HAS ITS RANGE RESTRICTED WITHIN THAT HUT, IT DOES NOT EXTEND INTO ANOTHER HUT. THOSE THINGS AGAIN WHICH ARE SEPARATED FROM ONE ANOTHER BY INTERVENING LANDS, HILLS AND OCEANS, COUNTRIES, CONTINENTS AND ISLANDS,—WHO CAN PERCEIVE ALL THESE WHEN SEATED IN ONE PLACE ?"—(3170-3171)

COMMENTARY.

'*Varṣa*', '*Continent*'—a particular region of the world ; e.g. the region of *Bhārata* is called '*Bhārata-varṣa*'.—(3170-3171)

In the following *Text*, the *Mīmāmsaka* shows that his view is supported by others also :—

TEXTS (3172-3173).

"WHEN *Nala* AND *Ṛtuparṇa*,—WHO WERE EXPERTS IN MATTERS RELATING TO HORSES AND TO GAMBLING, RESPECTIVELY—WERE GOING TOGETHER IN THE CHARIOT, *Ṛtuparṇa* MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT—'ALL MEN DO NOT KNOW ALL THINGS,—NO ONE CAN BE OMNISCIENT,—THERE IS NO END TO KNOWLEDGE, RESTING IN ANY ONE MAN'."—(3172-3173)

COMMENTARY.

'*Samvāha*'—chariot.

The following story has been told—There was a King named *Nala* ; not being expert in the art of Gambling, he lost his entire kingdom at Gambling ;

he had a queen named *Damayantī*. The King, having lost his entire kingdom, went away into the forest, accompanied by the said Queen alone. When he reached the forest, he became separated from her, through ill-luck. Having his face clouded with tears due to separation from his beloved wife, the King drowned in the ocean of grief and anxiety,—his body emaciated,—went about wandering hither and thither; and (in brief) somehow managed to secure a living under King *Ṛtuparṇa*, and remained there *incognito*. His Queen somehow reached her father's place. In order to fetch her husband, she proclaimed it far and wide that *Damayantī* was going to choose a husband. When King *Ṛtuparṇa* heard that *Damayantī* was going to choose a husband, he started to go there, accompanied by *Nala* as his charioteer. *Ṛtuparṇa* was an expert in the art of Gambling, but did not know much about horses; while *Nala* was an expert in matters relating to Horses, but did not know much about Gambling. *Ṛtuparṇa* somehow came to know that *Nala* was an expert in matters relating to Horses. Having come to know this, he said to *Nala*—'Please teach me the science of Horses'.—*Nala* said—'I shall teach it to you, if you will teach me the art of Gambling'.—Thereupon *Ṛtuparṇa* said—'*All men do not know all things, etc. etc.*'—Then *Nala* learnt the art of Gambling from *Ṛtuparṇa*, and won back his kingdom.

Such is the story.—(3172-3173)

Further, if a man is omniscient, he must know the past and future things also; otherwise, if he knew only what came up at the moment, then he would be only a *partial knower*, not *all-knowing* (omniscient); and yet it is not possible for any one to know future things.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (3174).

"SENSE-PERCEPTION HAS NEVER BEEN FOUND TO POSSESS THE CAPACITY TO APPREHEND FUTURE THINGS; AND AS FOR INFERENCE AND OTHER FORMS OF COGNITION, THESE CAN NEVER COME ABOUT WITHOUT THE INDICATIVE AND OTHER FACTORS."—(3174)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Sense-perception is brought about by the capacity of things; and as what is still in the future cannot be an entity, a thing,—Sense-perception cannot apply to it.

Nor can Inference apply to it; because there can be no Inferential Indicative; there can be no Indicative which is known to be concomitant with what is in the future; because what has not yet appeared is non-existent. '*Other factors*' include the Corroborative Instance.

The mention of the *Future* is only by way of illustration; what has been said should be taken as applicable to the *Past* also; because, the past thing also being a non-entity, there can be no functioning of Sense-perception over it.

Thus the invariable concomitance (Premiss) relating to the Reasons—'being cognisable' and the rest (put forward under *Text* 3157)—becomes

established ; and this implies the establishment of the Invariable Concomitance of the previously-mentioned Reason—'being envisaged by the only Means of Cognition, *Non-apprehension* '.—(3174)

Having thus established the Invariable Concomitance of his Reason, the *Mīmāṃsaka* sums up his position :—

TEXT (3175).

"THUS THEN, THERE CAN BE NO ONE WHO PERCEIVES THINGS BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES ; HE ALONE KNOWS SUCH THINGS WHO KNOWS THEM THROUGH THE ETERNAL WORD."—(3175)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—It is not through the Eternal Word alone that all men know things ; for instance, *Shākya-Muni* (*Buddha*) knows things from the words of sages like *Kanaka, Kāshyapa* and the like ; and others know them from His words.

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3176-3177).

"IF SOME ONE, NOT ACCEPTING THE ABOVE, THINKS THAT IN THE CASE OF *Buddha* AND OTHERS THE KNOWLEDGE OF SUPER-SENSUOUS THINGS HAS BEEN DERIVED FROM THE WORDS OF OTHER MEN,—THEN, HE SHOULD ASSERT THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE WORDS OF THOSE OTHER MEN, ON THE GROUND OF THEIR STANDING ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THOSE WORDS (OF *Buddha*) ; —AND THE UNRELIABILITY OF THIS LATTER SHOULD BE ASSERTED ON THE BASIS OF THE REASONS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED."—(3176-3177)

COMMENTARY.

'*This*'—what has been just said,—'He alone knows such things who knows them through the Eternal Word' ;—one who does not accept this and thinks that the Buddhist and others do not know all things through the Eternal Word, but through the word uttered by other Persons ; e.g. *Buddha* knows them through the scriptures composed by other persons, like *Kanaka, Kāshyapa* and others ;—one who makes this assertion should assert the unreliability of those words—i.e. of the words of those other persons ; because they stand on the same footing as the words of the person who has been seen by one and who is held to be omniscient.—He should also assert the unreliability of the man,—the composer of the scripture himself,—why ?

—because of the Reasons adduced before—such as 'being cognisable' and the rest.—(3176-3177)

Says the Opponent—The line of *Buddhas* has been without beginning; hence the doctrine propounded by them is also beginningless; so that on account of the beginninglessness of both these being exactly like that of the Veda and the Vedic Tradition,—they must be regarded as free from defects.

The answer to this from the *Mīmāmsaka* is as follows:—

TEXT (3178).

"THE *beginninglessness* THAT IS ASSERTED IN REGARD TO THE COMPOSER AND THE UTTERANCES EMANATING FROM HIM IS ITSELF BASED UPON TWO INVALID NOTIONS; HENCE IT CANNOT PROVE THE RELIABILITY OF THE SAID COMPOSER AND HIS WORDS."—(3178)

COMMENTARY.

The same idea is further explained:—

TEXT (3179).

"THE WORDS OF *Shauddhodani* (BUDDHA) CANNOT BE RELIABLE, BECAUSE THEY ARE DEPENDENT UPON OTHERS; SO ALSO *Buddha* HIMSELF CANNOT BE RELIABLE BECAUSE HE HAS NO DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF *Dharma*."—(3179)

COMMENTARY.

Just as *Buddha* himself and his words are unreliable, so also are *Kanaka*, *Kāshyapa, etc.* and their words.—(3179)

TEXT (3180).

"THE *beginninglessness* OF SUCH PERSONS, EVEN THOUGH ASSUMED, RESTS UPON WHAT IS INVALID, AND HENCE CANNOT ITSELF BE FAR REMOVED FROM INVALIDITY."—(3180)

COMMENTARY.

The *beginninglessness* of such persons and their words,—even though assumed,—is not very far from Invalidity; because it rests upon an invalid basis.—(3180)

TEXTS (3181-3182).

" THUS THEN, WHEN THE BUDDHISTS, LIKE *Pseudo-Mīmāṁsakas*, ASSERT THE SIMILARITY OF *Buddha* AND OTHER PERSONS TO VEDIC SCHOLARS, ON THE GROUND OF ALL THESE BEING *without beginning*,—THIS IS ONLY A FORM OF IGNORANCE, AND DOES NOT MAKE THEM EQUAL; BECAUSE EVEN SO, WHAT WOULD BE *without beginning* WOULD BE ONLY THE *unreliability* AND *reliability* OF THESE TWO SETS OF PERSONS (BUDDHA, ETC. AND VEDIC SCHOLARS) RESPECTIVELY."
—(3181-3182)

COMMENTARY.

If the *similarity* that is pointed out between *Buddha* and others on the one hand and the Vedic Scholars on the other, is in regard to both being *beginningless*,—then our answer is that mere *beginninglessness* does not establish their *reliability*; because neither *relidbility* nor *unreliability* is incompatible with *beginninglessness*; all that would happen would be that *beginninglessness* would belong to the Reliability of Vedic Scholars, while it would belong to the Unreliability of Buddha and others; and neither Reliability nor Unreliability would belong to both, on the ground of *beginninglessness*.—This is the upshot of the whole argument.—(3181-3182)

This same idea is further clarified by means of an example :—

TEXTS (3183-3184).

" THE GOOD POINTS OF WHAT IS RELIABLE, AND THE BAD POINTS OF WHAT IS UNRELIABLE,—BOTH BEING *beginningless*,—ARE EQUAL ONLY IN SO FAR AS THEY ARE *beginningless*. FOR INSTANCE, REAL GOLD HAS BEEN IN USE SINCE TIME WITHOUT BEGINNING AND END,—SO HAS BEEN *unreal* GOLD ALSO; BUT DO THE TWO BECOME EQUAL ? "—(3183-3184)

COMMENTARY.

'*Pramāṇa, etc.*'—The compound is to be expounded as—' the good and bad points of what is Reliable and what is Unreliable '.—(3183-3184)

Now the Vedic Scholar proceeds—(1) to refute the objection that " the Reason, in the shape of *being amenable to non-apprehension, is inadmissible* ",—(2) to prove the non-existence of the omniscient Person,—and (3) to prove that the case of the Veda is different :—

TEXT (3185).

"FOR THE BENEFIT OF THOSE PEOPLE WHO DECLARE (1) THE OMNISCIENCE OF *Buddha* AND OTHERS, AND (2) THE ETERNALITY OF THE VEDA, AS STANDING ON THE SAME FOOTING,—THE POINT WHEREIN THE LATTER DIFFERS FROM THE FORMER IS NOW GOING TO BE POINTED OUT."—(3185)

COMMENTARY.

'*Declare as standing on the same footing.*'—Some people hold the opinion that—" Both—Buddha, etc. and the Veda—are equal sources of right knowledge, hence the knowledge of supersensuous things can be obtained from the words of Omniscient Persons, as also from the Veda ".—To these people it is now pointed out wherein the case of the *Veda* differs from that of the said Persons.—(3185)

" As a matter of fact, the existence of the *Omniscient Person* has not been vouched for by any one of the five Means of Cognition—Perception, Inference, Word, Analogy, Presumption;—how then can such a Person, who falls within the scope of 'Negation' (Non-apprehension only) and is *non-existent*, stand on the same footing as the Veda which is known to all men down even to the milk-woman?—With this idea, the Vedic Scholar proceeds to refute the idea of the Omniscient Person being cognisable by any one of the five Means of Cognition, Perception and the rest:—

TEXT (3186).

"THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS NOT SEEN BY US AT THE PRESENT TIME;—NOR IS THERE ANY INDICATIVE RECOGNISED AS PART (OF THE SUBJECT), WHICH COULD LEAD TO HIS INFERENCE."—(3186)

COMMENTARY.

" By means of Perception we, men of limited vision, do not see the Omniscient Person; because the perception of men of limited vision is of three kinds:—(1) Perception through the Senses, (2) Perception through the Mind, and (3) the Self-Cognition of all minds and mental phenomena.—None of these three kinds of Perception can bring about the Cognition of the Omniscient Person; because He does not form an object of such Cognition; (1) Perception through the senses is restricted to the five objects—Colour, Odour, Taste, Touch and Sound; hence the mental functions subsisting in the 'chain' of other persons cannot figure in Perception through the Senses.—(2) Nor can the Omniscient Person be the object of Perception through the Mind; because the Mind, as such, apprehends only such things as have been already apprehended by Perception through the Senses; and hence it is, like this latter, restricted to the same objects, Colour and the rest.—(3) Nor can He be the object of 'Self-cognition'; because this apprehends only such mind and mental operations as occur in one's own 'Chain'; and

consequently, it cannot apprehend the mind, etc. occurring in other 'Chains', or even such mental operations occurring in one's own 'Chain' as are yet to come. As regards the Perception by Mystics,—such perception forms the subject-matter of dispute; hence the question regarding the Omniscient Person being perceived or not perceived by Mystics does not arise at all.

(2) "Nor can the Omniscient Person be proved by means of *Inference*. The Buddhists have regarded Inference as based upon three kinds of Indicative (Probans)—[viz. :—(*a*) Based on non-apprehension, (*b*) Based on causal relation, and (*c*) Based on the nature of things]. (*a*) In the present instance, what is needed is a positive reason, hence there is no room for *non-apprehension*.—(*b*) Nor is there room for *causal relation*; because the causal relation is always based upon Perception, and no Perception is possible of the far off Omniscient Person; whose causal relation with anything therefore is impossible.—(*c*) As for the *nature of things*, any Reason based upon that also cannot prove the existence of the Omniscient Person; because such a Person himself being imperceptible, his *nature*, which must be inseparable from himself, cannot be apprehended; hence it cannot serve as an Indicative which is '*perceived*'—well-known, recognised,—as '*being part*'—of the 'Subject' (Omniscient Person),—leading to the inference of the Omniscient Person.

Then again, any Reason that may be adduced in proof of the existence of the Omniscient Person, cannot escape from the three kinds of flaw (fallacy) —being 'inadmissible', 'contradictory' and 'inconclusive'. For instance, when the Reason is adduced, is it adduced as a property belonging to a positive entity? Or to a negative entity? Or to both?—These are the only three alternatives possible.—As regards the Omniscient Person, there can be no such 'Property belonging to a positive entity' as is admitted by both parties; because that *positive entity* itself (in the shape of the Omniscient Person) is yet to be proved;—if he were admitted, there would be no dispute at all; if a party accepts the idea of such a property belonging to that entity, how could he not accept the entity itself? Because the mere property cannot exist without its substratum in the shape of the entity.—Nor can the Reason proving the Omniscient Person consist of a property belonging to a negative entity; because such a Reason would prove the non-existence of the *entity*, and hence it would be 'contradictory'.—Nor, lastly, can the Reason be one that belongs to both; because such a Reason would be 'inconclusive'. How could any Reason which belongs to both positive and negative entities serve as proving the existence of an entity,—which it could do only if it were inseparable from the entity, and if it were excluded from existence in the Negative Entity, which is present in cases where the contrary of the Probandum is present?

Thus none of the three kinds of Indicative, as part of the 'Subject', can bring about the Inference of the Omniscient Person, whose existence, therefore, cannot be proved.—(3186)

The following *Text* shows that the Omniscient Person cannot be cognised by means of the *Word*:—

TEXT (3187).

"THERE IS NO SCRIPTURAL DECLARATION AFFIRMING AN ETERNAL OMNISCIENT PERSON. HOW CAN ANY SUCH PERSON BE PROVED BY A DECLARATION THAT IS ARTIFICIAL AND NOT TRUE?"—(3187)

COMMENTARY.

That Cognition is 'verbal' which proceeds from Words, in regard to things not in close proximity to the man. It is of two kinds—that produced by the eternal Word, and that produced by the utterances of men. As asserting the existence of the Omniscient Person, there is no eternal scriptural Word; hence the former verbal Cognition is not possible in this case.—What we read in the *Upaniṣads* regarding 'Him who is truthful in word, truthful in volution, truthful in desires—He should be sought after, He should be sought to be known', and so forth,—all this should be understood to be merely commendatory.

As regards the human assertion that is quoted, such as—'The Blessed Lord the *Tathāgata*, the *Arhat*, is Truly Enlightened, etc.',—no reliability can attach to such assertions. How then could any reliable information be deduced from such an unreliable source?—(3187)

The following might be urged—We do not accept the Omniscient Person on the strength of any and every stray assertion; we do so on the strength of the assertions of that same Blessed Lord, such as—'I am omniscient, perceiving all things, there is nothing that is unknown to the *Tathāgata*, etc. etc.'. Thus it is on His own word that we accept His omniscience.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3188).

"IF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS RECOGNISED AS SUCH ON THE STRENGTH OF HIS OWN WORD,—HOW COULD THIS BE REGARDED AS ESTABLISHED, IN VIEW OF THE MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE OF BOTH?"—(3188)

COMMENTARY.

Under the circumstances, there would be an objectionable interdependence.—(3188)

Question:—How so?

Answer:—

TEXT (3189).

"THE ASSERTION IS TRUE BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN MADE BY THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, AND SUCH AN OMNISCIENT PERSON EXISTS BECAUSE HE ASSERTS IT. HOW CAN BOTH THESE NOTIONS BE ESTABLISHED WITHOUT SOME OTHER WELL-KNOWN BASIS ?"—(3189)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, there can be no certainty regarding the reliability of his word unless it is recognised that it has been spoken by an Omniscient Person; and that the speaker is omniscient is learnt from his own words; hence there is clear interdependence.

'*Without some other well-known basis*'—i.e. some other well-known reason.—(3189)

The following might be urged—The existence of the Omniscient Person is accepted on the basis of the words of such men as *Shrāvaka-Achchhāriputra* (?), who says—'This worthy scion of the *Shākya-race* is omniscient'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3190).

"WHEN PEOPLE ADMIT OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON ON THE BASIS OF THE BASELESS ASSERTIONS OF PERSONS WHO ARE NOT OMNISCIENT, WHY CANNOT THEY DERIVE THE SAME KNOWLEDGE FROM THEIR OWN WORDS ?"—(3190)

COMMENTARY.

The assertion of men whose reliability has not been demonstrated does not differ from one's own assertion; hence there is no reason why the Buddhists should not derive their knowledge of the Omniscient Person from their own words. We see no reason—except stupidity—why they should seek to know it from the words of other persons.—(3190)

The following view might be held—There have been innumerable *Tathāgatas* (Enlightened Ones) in the past and they are going to appear in the future; and it is from the words of one of these that we derive the knowledge of the omniscience of the other; and that of the omniscience of the former from the words of a third, and so forth.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3191).

" FOR THE PROVING OF THE EXISTENCE OF ONE OMNISCIENT PERSON, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ASSUME SEVERAL OMNISCIENT PERSONS; AND IF A SINGLE ONE OF THESE HAPPEN TO BE NOT-OMNISCIENT, HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RECOGNISE THE OMNISCIENT PERSON."—(3191)

COMMENTARY.

If for the purpose of proving the existence of one Omniscient Person, one goes on following up a series of Omniscient Persons, no man with limited vision could ever get at certainty regarding the Omniscient Person,—even at the end of his whole life; hence several Omniscient Persons would have to be assumed. [See *Shlokavārtika* 1. 1. 2, 135.]—(3191)

Then again, we shall lay aside, for the present, the idea that people of the present day are incapable of knowing the Omniscient Person as no such is present before them; as a matter of fact, even people who lived at the same time as that Person could not know him, because they would themselves be *not-omniscient.*—This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXTS (3192-3193).

" AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN THE CONTEMPORARIES OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON COULD NOT KNOW HIM AS 'OMNISCIENT', AS THEY WOULD BE DEVOID OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE COGNITIONS OF THAT PERSON [OR, OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE THINGS COGNISED BY THAT PERSON].—[SEE *Shlokavārtika* 1. 1. 2, 134]. AND IF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS NOT RECOGNISED BY ANY ONE,—FOR THAT MAN, THE ASSERTION OF THAT OMNISCIENT PERSON COULD NOT BE RELIABLE; AS THE VERY BASIS OF THAT ASSERTION WOULD BE UNKNOWN,—AS IN THE CASE OF THE ASSERTION OF OTHER ORDINARY MEN."
[SEE *Shlokavārtika* 1. 1. 2, 136.]—(3192-3193)

COMMENTARY.

The compound '*tajjñānajñēya, etc. etc.*' is to be expounded as—' they are devoid of—without—that Cognition *which has for its object*—i.e. which envisages—the Cognitions of the Omniscient Person '.—Or as ' who are devoid of the Cognition of all the things cognised by that Person ',—because he is himself *not omniscient.*

By merely looking at the body, one does not conclude that ' he is omniscient '; because such conclusion must be accompanied by the recognition of the presence of exceptional knowledge (in the Person); this ' exceptional knowledge ', in order to be able to prove omniscience, must envisage *all*

things; and this fact of the Cognition envisaging *all* things cannot be recognised unless the things comprehended by that Cognition are known; for instance, the Cognition of the 'man *with the stick*' is not possible unless one knows the *stick*.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When the Cognition of one thing forms the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of another thing, there can be no Cognition of the latter thing without the Cognition of the former thing;—e.g. the Cognition of the *stick* being the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of the *man with the stick*, there is no Cognition of the *man with the stick* unless there is Cognition of the *stick*;—the Cognition of things cognised by the Omniscient Person, which is the necessary adjunct of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person himself, is not possible for men of limited vision; hence there is non-apprehension of the more-extensive character (which implies the absence of the less extensive); because the *Cognition of the necessary adjunct* is more extensive (wider) than the Cognition of that to which the said adjunct belongs; and the former is absent in the case in question.

Thus then, even in the case of a man contemporaneous with the Omniscient Person, unless such a man is himself omniscient, he cannot know the Omniscient Person; so that for such a man, even the assertions of Omniscient Persons would be of doubtful veracity and hence unreliable; as the basis of it—the grounds of certainty regarding reliability, in the shape of the definite cognition of the Cognitions of the Omniscient Person,—would be absent.

'*As in the case of the assertion of ordinary men*'—i.e. of the assertion of common people.—(3192-3193)

The following view might be put forward:—Without any effort the Omniscient Person makes his omniscience known to his disciples by attracting their minds through His unfailing knowledge of their character and the workings of their mind.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3194-3195).

"EVEN IF A PERSON WERE TO COMPREHEND THE THINGS KNOWN TO ALL HIS DISCIPLES, HE WOULD NOT BE 'OMNISCIENT'; AS HE WOULD BE DEVOID OF THE COMPREHENSION OF THE THINGS KNOWN TO PEOPLE OTHER THAN THOSE DISCIPLES.—NOR IS IT POSSIBLE TO COMPREHEND ALL THE THINGS COGNISED BY ALL MEN; AS THERE CAN BE NO COMING TOGETHER OF MEN OF THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, INHABITING ALL THE THREE REGIONS OF THE WORLD."—(3194-3195)

COMMENTARY.

Even if the man who knew only those things that were known to the people contemporaneous with, and in close proximity to, himself,—he could

not be 'omniscient'; as he would have no knowledge of things known to persons other than those, who may be contemporaneous with him, but not in close proximity to him. By knowing only a part, one does not know the whole; if he did, there would be an absurdity.

As a matter of fact, it is not possible to comprehend even all those things that may be known to *all* his contemporaries who may be in close proximity to him. Because there can be no comprehension of what is far off and what is known to people having no connection with him.

The following might be urged—It may be that all men approach the *Tathāgata* simultaneously,—and whatever questions they put, He answers them all,—so that the people do come to know what is known to that Omniscient Person.

The answer to this is that—'*there can be no coming together, etc. etc.*'—nowhere is it possible to bring together men of the past, present and future,—or those inhabiting the regions of Heaven, the Nether World and the World of Mortal Beings.

Or, the three 'regions' may be taken as standing for the 'Imaginary', 'Objective' and 'Subjective' Regions.—(3194-3195)

The following might be urged—If the Omniscient Person did not possess the power to know the things known to all men,—how could He have the power of comprehending even *some* of those things? And yet He did have the power to comprehend some of those things; hence we conclude that He did possess the power to know *all* things.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3196–3198).

"A MAN WHO KNOWS LITTLE CAN DELUDE A FEW MEN, TO THE EXTENT THAT, HAVING THEIR MIND DELUDED BY DEVOTION, THEY COME TO ACCEPT HIM AS OMNISCIENT. THROUGH THE ART OF CHIROMANCY, SOME PEOPLE ARE ABLE TO KNOW WHAT HAS BEEN EATEN, WHAT IS BEING THOUGHT OF, WHAT LIES WITHIN A MAN'S FIST AND SO FORTH,—THOUGH THEY ARE ENTIRELY DEVOID OF ANY KNOWLEDGE OF *Dharma* AND COGNATE MATTERS. SIMILARLY, PEOPLE EXPERT IN THE ARTS OF ILLUSION, MAGIC, ETC. DECEIVE AN IGNORANT MAN;—BY WHICH THEY APPEAR TO BE OMNISCIENT."—(3196–3198)

COMMENTARY.

By knowing only a few supersensuous things, a man cannot be regarded as possessing knowledge of *Dharma and Adharma*;—because such a reasoning would be inconclusive in view of the case of men expert in chiromancy, magic and so forth. For instance ,by the use of certain incantations and medicinal

herbs, people are found to comprehend rightly the food a man has eaten, the thing he has thought of in his mind, the thing lying in his closed fist; and yet merely by this, they do not become persons conversant with such things as *Dharma and Adharma*. For instance, some people who are expert in magic are able to show to people strange gardens, flying cars, celestial damsels, and heavenly beings in the sky. Hence in view of all this, the reason adduced must be rejected as 'Inconclusive'.—(3196–3198)

Says the Opponent—In the *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*, Brahmā and other Beings have been described as *omniscient*; as we read there of Brahmā's knowledge and dispassion being 'unobstructed'. How then can it be said that the existence of the Omniscient Person is not vouched for by the Scriptural Word?

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3199–3201).

"THE DESCRIPTION THAT WE MEET WITH IN *Itihāsas* AND *Purāṇas* OF *Brahmā* BEING OMNISCIENT AND OF HIS KNOWLEDGE AND DISPASSION AS UNTRAMMELLED,—ALL THIS SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE FIGURATIVE SENSE,—LIKE THE COMMENDATORY DECLARATIONS RELATING TO *Mantras*.—OR, THE 'UNTRAMMELLED KNOWLEDGE' THAT IS SPOKEN MAY BE TAKEN AS REFERRING TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF *dharma* AND OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO THE PARTICULAR CONTEXT;—WHAT IS MEANT IS THAT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH THINGS AS 'DUTY', 'PROPERTY', 'PLEASURE' AND 'LIBERATION', IS 'UNTRAMMELLED'; IT CANNOT REFER TO *all things*."—(3199–3201)

COMMENTARY.

Just as, in regard to Vedic *Mantras* there are Commendatory Declarations, so in the *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa*, the assertion of the omniscience of *Brahmā* and other Beings, should be taken as Commendatory Declarations. When a set of words directly expressing one thing is taken as expressing something else, it is called '*arthavāda*', 'Figurative or Commendatory Declaration'.

Or the meaning may be that the knowledge of *Brahmā* is untrammelled so far as the things spoken of in the *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* are concerned,—such as Duty, Property, Pleasure and Liberation; and it does not refer to the knowledge of *all things*.—(3199–3201)

Question:—If the knowledge of Brahmā relating to other things were 'trammelled' (obstructed),—then how could it be called '*untrammelled*'?

Answer:—

TEXT (3202).

" *Being untrammelled* DOES NOT MEAN THAT IT ENVISAGES *all things*; IT MAY BE CALLED 'UNTRAMMELLED' WHEN IT IS SO ONLY IN RELATION TO ITS OWN PARTICULAR OBJECT."—(3202)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—If that is so, then so far as the particular object of a Cognition is concerned, the Cognition of all men is 'untrammelled'; what peculiarity then would there be in the Cognition of *Brahmā* that it alone should be specially called 'untrammelled'?

Answer:—

TEXTS (3203-3204).

" THAT IS SO BECAUSE IT IS ONLY THE COGNITION OF *Dharma*, ETC. THAT IS FRUITFUL; NO USEFUL PURPOSE IS SERVED BY THE COGNITION OF SUCH ORDINARY THINGS AS THE *Tree* AND THE LIKE.—THUS THEN, INASMUCH AS THIS WHOLE FRUITFUL COGNITION IS NOT OBSTRUCTED, IT IS CALLED 'UNTRAMMELLED'."—(3203-3204)

COMMENTARY.

This is the explanation given:—As regards *Dharma* and other matters useful for man, it is the knowledge of Brahmā alone that is *untrammelled*,—not of others. That is the reason why the knowledge of Brahmā alone—not others,—has been called 'untrammelled', by reason of its not being obstructed in relation to its own objective.

'*Aupayika-jñāna*'—The knowledge of such useful matters as *Dharma* and the rest.

'*Yāvat*'—whole. This qualifies '*jñānam*', 'knowledge'.—(3203-3204)

The following *Text* offers another explanation:—

TEXT (3205).

" OR, THE KNOWLEDGE SPOKEN OF MAY BE THAT OF HIS OWN 'SELF'—BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE PRACTICE OF MEDITATION; AS SUCH KNOWLEDGE WOULD NEVER BE OBSTRUCTED, IT IS SPOKEN OF AS 'UNTRAMMELLED'."—(3205)

COMMENTARY.

'*Self*'—Spirit.

'*Tasya*'—the knowledge of that same *self*.—(3205)

Question :—In connection with God, we read of 'ten imperishable qualities', in the shape of knowledge and the rest; and if He is equipped with these imperishable qualities, why cannot He be regarded as *omniscient* ?

Answer :—

TEXT (3206).

"WHEN *Shaṅkara* IS SPOKEN OF AS EQUIPPED WITH 'TEN IMPERISHABLE QUALITIES' IN THE SHAPE OF KNOWLEDGE, DISPASSION, SUPREME POWER AND SO FORTH,—HE ALSO IS 'POSSESSED OF KNOWLEDGE' ONLY IN THE SENSE OF KNOWING HIS OWN SELF."
—(3206)

COMMENTARY.

'*Knowledge*'—recognition of truth;—'*Dispassion*'—detachment from objects;—'*Supreme Power*'—of eight kinds, 'Smallness', 'Lightness', 'Greatness', 'Attainment', 'Capacity for Enjoyment', 'Power', 'Control', 'Freedom of Movement';—these ten qualities belong to God, in their imperishable form.

'*Smallness*'—is that quality by virtue of which having assumed a subtle body, one becomes capable of going to happy regions, being unseen by people.

'*Lightness*'—by virtue of which one moves about like Air.

'*Greatness*'—by virtue of which one is respected among all men, honoured and worshipped as the greatest of the great.

'*Attainment*'—by virtue of which one gets whatever he thinks of.

'*Capacity for Enjoyment*'—by virtue of which one, when having strong desires, is capable of satisfying them and enjoying things.

'*Power*'—by virtue of which one becomes the master of the Three Regions.

'*Control*'—by virtue of which one brings under his control all beings moveable and immoveable,—and becomes master of them.

'*Freedom of Movement*'—by virtue of which one is able to live in all regions,—of Brahmā, of Prajāpati, of *Devas*, of *Gandharvas*, of *Yakṣas*, of *Rākṣasas*, of *Pitṛs*, of *Pishāchas*, of human beings, of lower animals and other places.

'*Only in the sense of His knowing His own self*'.—It is on account of knowing His own self that He is 'equipped with knowledge',—not because He knows *all things*.—(3206)

Question :—How is it that, though knowing only a part of things, *Shaṅkara* alone—and no one else—is spoken of as 'equipped with knowledge'?

Answer :—

TEXT (3207).

"HIS KNOWLEDGE CONSISTS ONLY IN THE DIRECT PERCEPTION OF HIS PURE SELF; WHEN THE SOURCE OF THAT KNOWLEDGE IS NOT PURE, THE KNOWLEDGE ITSELF IS CALLED 'IGNORANCE'."—(3207)

COMMENTARY.

'*Pure*' qualifies the '*Self*';—the perception of this.

'*Its basis*'—the basis of the perception of the pure self.—What is that *basis*?—The Self itself.—When this Self is *not-pure*, then the 'perception of the Self' that appears is called 'no knowledge', 'Ignorance'; because it is of a low order.—(3207)

Says the Opponent:—If you admit that it is possible for *Brahmā* and others to acquire pure knowledge through the practice of Meditation,—then, why should there be hostility towards *Buddha* and others,—by virtue of which the knowledge of these latter is not held to be 'nntrammelled' and 'pure'?

In anticipation of this, the Vedic Scholar presents another view and thereby shows the difference between *Brahmā* and the others:—

TEXTS (3208-3209).

"IT MAY BE THAT *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu* AND *Mahēshvara* ARE EMBODIMENTS OF THE VEDA, AND AS THE VEDA CONSISTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS, THESE ARE OMNISCIENT; BUT HOW COULD THAT APPLY TO MAN? WHERE, ON ONE SIDE ARE THE MORTAL MEN, BUDDHA AND THE REST,—AND WHERE ON THE OTHER, ARE THE SAID THREE SUPERIOR DEITIES? HENCE THE IDEA THAT THE FORMER, IN RIVALRY TO THE LATTER, ARE ALSO OMNISCIENT,—IS SHEER DELUSION."—(3208-3209)

COMMENTARY.

As the Veda forms their very self, they are called '*embodiments of the Veda*'.

The Veda '*consists in the knowledge of all things*' because it is the Means of obtaining the knowledge of all things.

What is meant is as follows:—

In the case of *Brahmā*, etc. also, the 'untrammelled knowledge' of *Dharma*, etc. does not come about independently; it comes only through the Veda.—This however you do not admit in the case of *Buddha*, etc., whose knowledge is held to be dependent upon themselves.—Further, in the case of *Brahmā, etc.*

it is only possible that there should be pure knowledge through the Practice of Meditation; because being Deities, they are superior to all Persons; and also because they are named in the Veda. In the case of a human being, on the other hand, there is no possibility of any such capacity; as his character is quite the reverse. Hence the idea that human beings also are omniscient is sheer delusion;—i.e. this is mere deluded fancy on your part.—(3208-3209)

The following might be urged—If *Brahmā*, etc. are named in the Veda, then, why should not the Veda be regarded as *non-eternal*, on account of its connection with non-eternal things? If the Vedas are held to be eternal, then the idea that Brahmā, etc. are spoken of in the eternal Veda is incongruous, as the said *Brahmā*, etc. are not-eternal. If there is no incongruity in this, then there can be no incongruity in *Buddha*, etc. also being mentioned in the Veda.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3210).

"THERE IS MENTION OF THE THREE DEITIES, BRAHMĀ, ETC., IN THE VEDA, WHICH IS ETERNAL; AND YET THE ETERNALITY OF THE VEDAS DOES NOT BECOME IMPAIRED; BECAUSE BRAHMĀ AND THE REST ARE THEMSELVES ETERNAL."—(3210)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tannityatvāt*'—on account of the eternality of *Brāhmā* and the other Deities.—(3210)

The same idea is further clarified in the following—

TEXTS (3211-3212).

"THEY ARE EQUIPPED WITH ETERNAL QUALITIES AND ETERNAL FUNCTIONS; HENCE THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN THESE BEING MENTIONED IN THE ETERNAL VEDA.—ON THE OTHER HAND, *Buddha*, ETC. ARE PERISHABLE BEINGS, HENCE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO BE MENTIONED IN THE ETERNAL SCRIPTURE. AND WHEN THE SCRIPTURE IS HELD TO BE ETERNAL, THE ASSUMING OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS ENTIRELY FUTILE."—(3211-3212)

COMMENTARY.

'*To be mentioned in the eternal scripture*'—Because, if they were so capable, the relationship between the Word and its meaning would have to

be regarded as ephemeral, not-eternal; because the other party does not admit of an eternal scripture;—and because, if they did admit of it, the postulating of the Omniscient Person would be entirely futile.—(3211-3212)

The same idea is further explained:—

TEXTS (3213-3214).

"RATHER THAN ADMIT THE IDEA OF THE SCRIPTURE INDICATING THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, IT IS FAR BETTER TO ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT IT INDICATES *Dharma*. BECAUSE THE CLEAR KNOWLEDGE OF *Dharma* (DIRECTLY FROM THE VEDA) IS SUPERIOR TO THE UNCLEAR KNOWLEDGE DERIVED INDIRECTLY THROUGH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON MENTIONED IN THE VEDA.—THUS IT CANNOT BE MAINTAINED THAT THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS SPOKEN OF IN THE SCRIPTURES."—(3213-3214)

COMMENTARY.

Rather than entertain the idea that the Eternal Scripture mentions the Omniscient Person, it is better to accept the idea that Dharma is taught by that Scripture.

Question:—In what way is it better?

Answer:—'*Because the clear knowledge, etc. etc.*'—The knowledge of *Dharma* derived from the Veda is clear and direct; because the light emanating therefrom is equally available for all things. On the other hand, the Dharma learnt through the knowledge of the Omniscient Person mentioned in the Scripture is indirect and indistinct; because the said Person has retired into *Nirvāṇa* and cannot be clearly perceptible. Even when He had not retired into *Nirvāṇa*, He would have no desires, and hence could not impart any teachings. Even if He did impart teachings, these could not be heard by all men at all times and places.—(3213-3214)

The following *Text* shows that the Omniscient Person cannot be vouched for by 'Analogy':—

TEXT (3215).

"IF ANY PERSON *similar* TO THE OMNISCIENT PERSON WERE SEEN AT THE PRESENT TIME, THEN ALONE COULD THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON BE COGNISED ON THE STRENGTH OF ANALOGY."—(3215)

COMMENTARY.

Analogy, as a Means of Cognition—based upon similarity and its adjuncts,—envisages the far off things, and is invariably concomitant with the Cogni-

tion of a *similar* thing ; for example, there is remembrance of the Cow through the perception of the *Gavaya* ;—it is not possible for any one to perceive at the present time any person *similar* to the Omniscient Person ;—hence, on account of the *similar thing* not being perceptible, Analogy cannot be operative in the case in question.

This argument may be formulated as follows :—When any object similar to an object is not perceptible, the latter cannot be amenable to Analogy,—e.g. the Son of the Barren Woman ;—any person similar to the Omniscient Person is not perceptible ;—so there is non-apprehension of the wider character.—(3215)

Further, it is not only that the knowledge of the Omniscient Person cannot be derived from Analogy ; on the contrary, it would be right for all men to deduce, from Analogy, the fact that there can be no Omniscient Person.

This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (3216).

"FINDING THAT ALL MEN OF THE PRESENT TIME ARE *not* OMNISCIENT,—THE CERTAINTY IS DERIVED FROM ANALOGY BASED UPON THIS SIMILARITY, THAT ALL OTHER MEN (OF THE PAST AND THE FUTURE) COULD NOT BE OMNISCIENT."—(3216)

COMMENTARY.

In order to show that the Omniscient Person cannot be known through Presumption, the *Vaidika* puts forward the view of the other party :—

TEXTS (3217-3218).

"SOME ONE MAY ACCEPT THE OMNISCIENT PERSON ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS : (A) 'THE TEACHINGS OF BUDDHA RELATING TO *Dharma and Adharma* CANNOT BE EXPLAINED, IF THERE BE NO OMNISCIENT PERSON ;—THUS FROM *Presumption*, ONE CAN ADMIT THE OMNISCIENT PERSON,—EVEN THOUGH IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT PERCEPTION AND THE OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION ARE NOT CAPABLE OF AFFORDING THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAID PERSON'."—(3217-3218)

COMMENTARY.

'The teachings of Buddha and others that are met with cannot be explained, except on the *presumption* of His omniscience ;—i.e. if *Dharma* and all such things were not known to Him. Hence, even though Perception, etc. have been denied, as vouching for the existence of the Omniscient Person,

yet through Presumption it becomes established that the Omniscient Person does exist'.

If any one holds this view, then he understands things wrongly. This is what is meant.—(3217-3218)

The following *Texts* show that the argument put forward just now may be regarded as *Inference*; it need not be taken as *Presumption*:—

TEXTS (3219–3221).

"'(B) OR, THIS ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON MAY BE STATED IN THE FORM OF THE FOLLOWING INFERENCE OF THE *Sāmānyatodṛṣta* KIND (DIFFERENCE FROM THE UNIVERSAL TO THE PARTICULAR):—IN EVERY OTHER CASE TEACHING IS FOUND TO BE PRECEDED BY THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE THING TAUGHT, AND WHEREVER THERE IS TEACHING, IT IS ALWAYS PRECEDED BY THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT TAUGHT; AS IN THE CASE OF THE POTENCIES OF *Harītakī* AND SUCH THINGS;—THE TEACHING OF *Dharma and Adharma* HAS BEEN GIVEN BY BUDDHA;—HENCE IT IS INFERRED THAT THE TEACHING MUST HAVE BEEN PRECEDED BY A KNOWLEDGE OF THOSE MATTERS."—(3219–3221)

COMMENTARY.

The special mention of the '*Sāmanyatodṛṣta*' Inference (from the Universal Premiss) implies the impossibility of the Particular Premiss; as a matter of fact, it is only when the relation between the particular Probans and the particular Subject has been perceived, that, at a later time, the same Probans is made to yield an Inference that sets aside all doubts on the point; and it is this Inference that is called '*Vishēṣatodṛṣta*' (based on a particular Premiss). As a matter of fact, no relationship has been perceived between the Omniscient Person and the Teaching of *Dharma*, etc.; hence this can be an instance of Inference from a Universal Premiss only. For instance, it has been found as a universal truth that in any one 'chain', the *Teaching* is always preceded by *knowledge*; hence just as in the case of Dēvadatta, it having been found that his change of place is preceded by movement, so in the case of the sun, the change of place leads to the inference of its movement;—in the same manner, from the fact that Buddha imparted teachings relating to *Dharma*, it is inferred that He possessed the knowledge of *Dharma*.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—Every Teaching is preceded by the Teacher's knowledge of what is taught;—e.g. the teachings relating to the potencies of the *Harītakī*;—Buddha's teaching of *Dharma* is Teaching; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(3219–3221)

The *Mīmāmsaka's* answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXTS (3222-3223).

" AS THE FACT IS CAPABLE OF ANOTHER EXPLANATION, THE PRESUMPTION (PUT FORWARD) HAS NO EFFICACY (IN PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON). FOR THE SAME REASON, THE INFERENCE THAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD IS NOT VALID. FOR INSTANCE, THE FACT OF *Buddha* AND OTHERS HAVING TAUGHT *Dharma*, ETC. CAN BE EXPLAINED IN ANOTHER WAY—FOR INSTANCE, AS BEING DUE TO DREAMS, OR TO DELUSION, OR TO THE VEDA ITSELF, OR TO WRONG TEACHING."—(3222-3223)

COMMENTARY.

Teaching by people may be due to delusion and other causes also ;—hence both, the Presumption and the Inference cited, are *inconclusive.*

Question :—How can it be otherwise explained ?

Answer :—' *To dreams, etc. etc.*'—as declared in *Shabara's Bhāṣya* (1. 1. 2.)—' Teaching proceeds from delusion also ; and when there is no Delusion it proceeds from the Veda also '.—Teaching proceeding from *Delusion* is found in cases where things dreamt of are taught ; and that proceeding from the *Veda* is found in the case of the teachings of *Manu* and others.—(3222-3223)

As regards *Sugata* and others, who are ignorant of the Veda,—their teachings might have proceeded from sheer Delusion ;—for the purpose of deceiving people.

This is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3224-3225).

" THOSE WHO ARE IGNORANT OF THE VEDA CANNOT HAVE THEIR TEACHING BASED UPON THE VEDA ; IT CAN PROCEED FROM DELUSION ONLY. IN THE WORLD THE TEACHINGS THAT ARE PROPOUNDED BY WICKED TEACHERS ARE NOT BASED UPON THE VEDA ; THEY PROCEED EITHER FROM DELUSION OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF DUPING THE DISCIPLES."—(3224-3225)

COMMENTARY.

' *Atadāshrayāt* '—not based on the Veda.—(3224–3225)

Question :—How is it known that the teaching of *Buddha* does not proceed on the basis of the Veda ?

Answer :—

TEXTS (3226-3227).

"IF THE TEACHING OF *Buddha* HAD BEEN BASED UPON THE VEDA, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPARTED TO ONLY SUCH PERSONS AS WERE VEDIC SCHOLARS,—JUST LIKE THE TEACHINGS OF *Manu* AND OTHERS. AS A MATTER OF FACT, HOWEVER, BUDDHA'S TEACHINGS ARE FOUND TO HAVE BEEN IMPARTED TO IGNORANT PERSONS AND *Shūdras*; HENCE IT MUST BE DEFECTIVE AND ILLUSORY, LIKE THE MAKING OF COUNTERFEIT COINS."—(3226-3227)

COMMENTARY.

If Buddha's teachings regarding *Dharma* had been based upon the Veda, then, He would have imparted them,—like *Manu* and other teachers—to learned *Brāhmaṇas*; as a matter of fact, however they were imparted—not to *Brāhmaṇas*, but to the ignorant *Shūdras*; hence we conclude that the teaching must be '*illusory*'—false, just like the making of counterfeit coins.—(3226-3227)

As regards *Manu* and others, these were learned in the Veda; hence their teachings regarding *Dharma, etc.* are all based upon the Veda,—they are not independent of it.—This is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (3228).

"AS REGARDS *Manu* AND OTHERS, WHO ARE WELL-KNOWN AMONG VEDIC SCHOLARS, AND WHOSE COMPILATIONS ARE ACCEPTED BY VEDIC SCHOLARS,—THEIR ASSERTIONS HAVE THEIR SOURCE IN THE VEDA."—(3228)

COMMENTARY.

The tree Vedas,—*Ṛk, Yajuṣ* and *Sāman*—are called '*Trayī*', 'Triad'. those who know these are '*Trayīvid*', 'Vedic scholars'—*Brāhmaṇas.*

These Teachers are such as have their compilations accepted by Vedic scholars.

The reason for this acceptance is stated—'*Their assertions proceed from the Veda*'. They are persons whose assertions have their source in the Veda.—(3228)

Question:—How is this also known?

Answer:—

TEXT (3229).

"IT IS NOT CONCEIVABLE THAT THESE TEACHERS SHOULD HAVE COMPILED THEIR WORKS AND THEN IMPARTED THEM TO OTHERS,—WITHOUT HAVING FOUND, OR SHOWED TO THE PUPILS, THE ORIGINAL VEDIC TEXTS."—(3229)

COMMENTARY.

'*Imparted*'—Taught.

Thus, it having been found that the Omniscient Person cannot fall within the scope of any of the five Means of Knowledge,—it follows that he must fall within that of the sixth, Non-apprehension, *Negation*. Hence the Reason that 'he is envisaged by Negation' becomes established.—That this Reason is not Inconclusive has been already shown above; that this is so is proved by the fact that the regarding of the Person as *non-existent* cannot have any other cause.—(3229)

Some people have held the following opinion:—We do not seek to single out any particular person as being *omniscient*; all that we seek to prove is the possibility of there being such a Person; our idea being that there is some one who is omniscient,—or that omniscience does exist in some person—as can be deduced from the fact that there are ascending grades of wisdom.

The answer to these is as follows:—

TEXTS (3230-3231).

"IF PROOFS WERE ADDUCED TO PROVE THAT 'THERE IS SOME ONE WHO IS OMNISCIENT', OR THAT 'THERE IS OMNISCIENCE IN SOME MAN',—THEN THAT WOULD FALL SHORT OF YOUR PROPOSITION. IN FACT THESE ASSERTIONS DO NOT REPRESENT WHAT IS MEANT TO BE PROVED. THERE IS NO PURPOSE IN PROVING WHAT IS ASSERTED IN THE ABOVE FORM."—(3230-3231)

COMMENTARY.

It has been explained before that the Reason adduced by the Buddhist is Inconclusive; the *Mīmāmsaka* therefore proceeds to point out the defects in his 'subject' (Proposition).

What the Buddhist wishes to prove is the omniscience of his own Teacher,—not merely Omniscience in general. Because, when the Omniscient Person is sought for by the intelligent man,—it cannot be for mere fun. The man seeking for Him does so with the idea that—'From His words I shall find out what *Dharma and Adharma* are and regulate my activity or inactivity accordingly'. Even if the existence of the Omniscient Person in general were proved, it could have no effect upon the activity of the

man; because there can be no conviction regarding the words of such a Person until a particular person had been found to be really such. Hence it is the particular Omniscient Person whose existence should be proved by one who wishes to regulate his activity. Thus therefore the general assertion would be far short of the Proposition.

'*What is meant to be proved*'—i.e. the fact that one wishes to establish.

'*Saḥ*'—i.e. the particular Omniscient Person, in the person of your own Teacher.

'*Anayā*'—the Proposition now put forward.

'*What is asserted*'—i.e. the vague statement that 'some Omniscient Person exists' or 'omniscience belongs to some one',—without reference to any particular person. By the proving of such a Proposition, no useful purpose would be served.—(3230-3231)

Question:—How so?
Answer:—

TEXT (3232).

"BY PROVING *some* OMNISCIENT PERSON IN GENERAL, YOU CANNOT GET AT THAT PARTICULAR PERSON WHOSE OMNISCIENCE YOU ARE ASSERTING FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING THE TRUTHFULNESS OF HIS WORD."—(3232)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—Why cannot such a Person be got at?
Answer:—

TEXT (3233).

"SO LONG AS *Buddha* IS NOT PROVED TO BE OMNISCIENT, HIS WORDS REMAIN FALSE (UNRELIABLE). HOW CAN THE TRUTHFULNESS OF BUDDHA BE ESTABLISHED BY THE PROVING OF *some* OMNISCIENT PERSON IN GENERAL?"—(3233)

COMMENTARY.

Because so long as the Omniscience of *Buddha himself* is not proved, there can be no certainty regarding the truthfulness of His Word.—On the proving of *some* Omniscient Person in general, the truthfulness of *Buddha's* words does not become established. Because the requisite Invariable Concomitance is not there.—(3233)

The same idea is further elucidated:—

TEXT (3234).

"'THE OMNISCIENCE OF ONE PERSON CANNOT ESTABLISH THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THE WORD OF ANOTHER PERSON. IT IS ONLY WHEN THE TWO ARE CO-SUBSTRATE—THAT THEY SUPPORT ONE ANOTHER."—(3234)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—When is there invariable concomitance between the two (Omniscience and Truthfulness) ?

Answer :—'*It is only, etc. etc.*'—'*Co-substrates*'—subsisting in the same Person.—'*Tayoḥ*'—between 'omniscience' and 'truthfulness of word'.—'*Support*'—signifies causal relation.

What is meant is as follows :—It is only when the two reside in the same Person that Omniscience can be the reason for *truthfulness* ; not otherwise. If it were not so, there would be incongruities.—(3234)

The following *Texts* show that these same arguments serve to reject the argument that other people have put forward in support of the existence of the Omniscient Person :—

TEXTS (3235–3237).

"[THE ARGUMENT PUT FORWARD IS]—'ALL THE THINGS THAT THERE ARE IN THIS WORLD MUST BE PERCEPTIBLE TO SOME PERSON,—BECAUSE THEY ARE ENTITIES, COGNISABLE AND KNOWABLE,—LIKE THE CURD, COLOUR, TASTE AND OTHER THINGS'.—INASMUCH AS MERE KNOWLEDGE IS MENTIONED, IT FALLS SHORT OF THE ORIGINAL PROPOSITION (OF THE BUDDHIST) ; SO THAT THE 'OMNISCIENT PERSON' WHOSE EXISTENCE IS DESIRED TO BE PROVED DOES NOT BECOME ESTABLISHED IN THIS MANNER.—IF SOME PERSON OTHER THAN *Buddha* HAD BECOME OMNISCIENT, OF WHAT USE COULD THIS KNOWLEDGE BE IN THE PROVING OF THE RELIABILITY OF THE WORDS OF BUDDHA ?"—(3235–3237)

COMMENTARY.

'Whatever is endowed with *cognisability, knowability* and the *character of being an entity*, must be perceptible to some person,—e.g. the Curd, Colour, Taste and so forth,—all things have the said characters of *knowability, etc.* ;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.'

Here also, as before, it has to be pointed out that the conclusion falls far short of the desired Proposition, and the Reason is Inconclusive.

Thus then, it is not possible to prove the existence of the Omniscient Person, either *in general* or *in particular*. Hence it becomes established that there can be no Omniscient Person. And when there is no Omniscient Person, there can be no words of such a Person; consequently no man can undertake an activity through such words.—(3235–3237)

Or, there may be an Omniscient Person; even so, there can be no 'words' ('assertion') uttered by Him,—on which your activities could be based.—This is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (3238-3239).

"When He occupies the Ten Stages, and all His Attachment and other defects have ceased, then alone He can apprehend all things, through His Knowledge which is like pure crystal. When rapt in Meditation, His mind concentrated on the idea of all things, He would be pervaded by all things; and would not be able to impart any teachings."—(3238-3239)

COMMENTARY.

Standing upon the Ten Stages, all imposities of Attachment, etc. having disappeared, His Knowledge becomes like the pure crystal, whereby all cognisable things become apprehended;—such is your explanation.

Now, at this stage, His mind would be concentrated—being intent upon the idea of all things; so that He could not be in a position to propound any techaings relating particularly to *Dharma*; being unable to perform all these functions all at once.—(3238-3239)

It might be said that "He would impart the teaching on waking from Meditation".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (3240).

"At the time that He would teach some one thing, like any ordinary speaker,—it would be the assertion of a man with partial knowledge, not that of an Omniscient Person."—(3240)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Speaking can never proceed without some Cognition; hence when He would teach *Dharma*, He could do so only when His mind

would be in the *conceptual state*; and in this state there is no difference between the child and the wise man; so that He would be *not-omniscient,* and His assertion would not be the assertion of the Omniscient Person.—(3240)

The following might be urged—He does not actually teach anything at all; as He is always rapt in *non-conceptual* (indeterminate Abstract) Communion; what happens is that, under His supervision, there become revealed the teachings relating to the various forms of *Dharma,* in the shape of the ideas of things. This has been thus declared—'During the night that *Buddha* became enlightened, and when He reached *Parinirvāṇa,*—at that time, not a single syllable was uttered by Him, nor was anything said;—why?—because *Buddha* is ever rapt in Communion; what happens however is that His disciples, who can grasp only teachings expressed in spoken words, hear sounds proceeding from the mouth of Buddha, like that of wool issuing out of the *uṣṇīṣa* (*turban*?)'.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3241–3243).

"THE FOLLOWING ASSERTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE (BY BUDDHISTS)—'WHEN *Buddha* IS RAPT IN COMMUNION, AND STANDS UNRUFFLED LIKE THE *Chintā-jewel,*—TEACHINGS ISSUE FORTH, FREELY, FROM EVEN THE WALLS; AND WITH THE HELP OF THESE, MEN COME TO KNOW ALL THAT THEY WANT TO KNOW; AND THUS THEY QUICKLY SECURE ALL THAT IS GOOD FOR THEM'.—SUCH ASSERTIONS SOUND WELL ONLY WHEN ADDRESSED TO PEOPLE IMBUED WITH FAITH; WE HOWEVER ARE WANTING IN THAT FAITH, AND HENCE ASK FOR REASONS."—(3241–3243)

COMMENTARY.

'*Chintā-ratna*' is the *Chintāmaṇi,* a gem believed to provide all that one desires.

The upshot of the whole is as follows:—An assertion like the one just made, without any reasons in support, sound well only when addressed to the faithful; people like us, however, admit of only such things as can be supported by reasons, and hence Reason is what we ask for; how then can we accept such assertions wholly unsupported by reasons?—(3241–3243)

Then again, the assumption put forward may be true; even so, as regards the teachings issuing forth from the walls, there would always be a doubt as to their proceeding under the supervision of the Omniscient One; hence intelligent enquirers cannot rightly believe them to be true and reliable.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3244–3246).

"TEACHINGS ISSUING FROM THE WALLS COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS TAUGHT BY A RELIABLE PERSON. IN FACT, THERE WOULD BE NO CONFIDENCE IN THEM,—IT BEING DOUBTFUL BY WHOM THEY HAVE BEEN PROPOUNDED—HAVE THEY BEEN PROPOUNDED BY *Buddha*, OR BY DECEITFUL *Brāhmaṇas*, PUT FORWARD IN JOKE, BY MEANS OF WORDS BEARING THE SEMBLANCE OF THE WORDS (OF BUDDHA), —OR BY PETTY UNSEEN ELEMENTALS AND OTHERS.—FOR THESE REASONS, PEOPLE WHO REGARD THEMSELVES AS WISE SHOULD PLACE NO CONFIDENCE IN SUCH TEACHINGS."—(3244–3246)

COMMENTARY.

All this is easily comprehensible.—(3244-3246)

So far the Author has set forth arguments, from *Kumārila's* point of view, against the Buddhist view that there are Omniscient Persons.—He now sets forth arguments adduced by the two writers, *Sāmaṭa* and *Yajñaṭa*, against the idea of the Omniscient Person :—

TEXTS (3247–3261)

"THUS THEN, THERE IS NO ROOM FOR THE OMNISCIENCE OF MEN. WE NOW PROCEED TO CONSIDER WHY THE OMNISCIENT PERSON HAS BEEN POSTULATED ?—YOUR OMNISCIENT PERSON—DOES HE APPREHEND ALL THINGS BY A SINGLE COGNITION ? OR BY SEVERAL COGNITIONS ? AND THEN, DOES HE APPREHEND THEM ALL AT ONCE ? OR IN SUCCESSION—NOTICING ONLY THE MORE IMPORTANT THINGS ? IN NO CASE HAS IT BEEN SEEN THAT A SINGLE COGNITION APPREHENDS SUCH CONTRADICTORY THINGS AS *pure* AND *impure* AND SO FORTH ; NOR HAVE SEVERAL DIVERGENT COGNITIONS BEEN FOUND TO APPEAR AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME.—WHO TOO IS THERE WHO COULD APPREHEND, EVEN IN HUNDREDS OF YEARS, EACH OF THE ENDLESS NUMBER OF THINGS, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE ?—EVEN IF THE PERSON, BY HIS OWN UNDIVERSIFIED NATURE, APPREHENDS ALL THINGS,—HE CANNOT APPREHEND THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITIES OF ALL THINGS. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON WHO KNOWS THE THINGS ONLY IN THEIR GENERAL FORM ? SPECIALLY AS IN NO OTHER FORM IS THE THING APPREHENDED.—THEN AGAIN, THIS UNIFORM COGNITION COULD BE EITHER TRUE OR FALSE.—IF IT BE HELD TO BE *true*, THEN THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO PERCEIVED FACTS ; AS IT WOULD MEAN THAT ALL IS *one*, WITHOUT A SECOND ; AND THE RESULT OF THIS

WOULD BE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SUCH DIVERSE ENTITIES AS THE DISCIPLE, THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, *Dharma*, *Adharma*, AND THE TEACHINGS OF THE SAID PERSON; AS THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THESE WOULD NOT BE COGNISED.—IF THE ONE UNIFORM COGNITION BE HELD TO BE *false*, THE OMNISCIENT PERSON TURNS OUT TO BE A DELUDED PERSON; SO THAT NO CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE REPOSED IN HIS WORDS, WHICH ARE LIKE THE WORDS OF DEMENTED AND INTOXICATED MEN.—IF THEN THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS HELD TO BE THAT PERSON WHO APPREHENDS ALL THINGS AND THEIR CAUSES, THROUGH A SINGLE ABNORMAL COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY COMMUNION,—THEN THERE CAN BE NO MEANS OF COGNITION TO VOUCH FOR HIS EXISTENCE,—IN THE SHAPE OF PERCEPTION OR INFERENCE OR WORD, THAT IS NOT PRODUCED BY THAT PERSON HIMSELF. HENCE THE CONCLUSION WOULD BE THAT SUCH A PERSON DOES NOT EXIST.—WHETHER SIMULTANEOUSLY OR SUCCESSIVELY, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY INFERENCE WITHOUT AN EFFECT?—AS A MATTER OF FACT, A CERTAIN PERSON CAN EITHER HAVE NO POTENCY AT ALL, OR IF HE HAS, THEN HE WOULD HAVE ALL POTENCIES; SO THAT ALL BEINGS WOULD BE ABLE TO HAVE THE COGNITION OF ALL THINGS. AND YET AS A MATTER OF FACT, WANTING IN THE NECESSARY MEANS, PEOPLE DO NOT COGNISE ALL THINGS.—THE IDEA THAT 'THERE IS ONE PERSON WHO HAS ACQUIRED SPECIAL POWERS NOT COMMON AMONG MEN, AND HE KNOWS ALL THINGS'—IS ENTIRELY BASELESS.—THUS THEN, NO OMNISCIENT PERSON OF ANY KIND IS CONCEIVABLE. CONSEQUENTLY NO HUMAN ASSERTION COULD BE THE MEANS OF PROVIDING THE KNOWLEDGE OF *Dharma*."—(3247–3261)

COMMENTARY.

Does the man regarded as 'omniscient' know all things at one and the same time? Or in succession, one after the other?—Or, does He apprehend the whole world as *one*, in one form, such as *eternal* and the like? Or only the more important things—those for instance that are useful to men, such as the effects following from Acts and so forth?—Or is He called 'omniscient' because He possesses the capacity to know all things,—like Fire, which, though not actually devouring all things, either simultaneously or in succession, is yet called 'all-devourer'?

Under the first alternative, two alternative views are possible. Does He know all things simultaneously through a single Cognition? Or through several Cognitions?—He could not know them through a single Cognition; because never has it been seen that several mutually contradictory things,—such as the *pure* and the *impure*—are apprehended by a single Cognition.

It might be argued that—what happens is that at one and the same time there exist in Him several Cognitions envisaging the various mutually contradictory things.

'The answer to this is—'*Nor have several divergent, etc. etc.*'—This has to be construed with '*na dṛṣṭaḥ*', changed from the '*dṛṣṭam*', of the previous clause. As a matter of fact, several Cognitions in the same 'Chain' of a Cognition have never been found to appear. * * * *

[Several lines of the text are missing here.]

[The Buddhist's answer to the *Mīmāmsaka's* arguments against the Omniscient Person,—embodied in *Texts* 3128–3261.]

TEXTS (3262-3263).

THUS HAVE THE *Mīmāmsakas* ARGUED, BEING FIRM BELIEVERS IN THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE VEDA.—BUT WE HAVE ALREADY PROVED IN DETAIL THAT THE VEDA IS THE WORK OF A PERSON.—HENCE THE CONCLUSION IS IRRESISTIBLE THAT THERE IS A PERSON WHO HAS THE DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS; AND NO ONE CAN KNOW THINGS BY MEANS OF THE ETERNAL WORD, WHICH IS AN IMPOSSIBILITY.—(3262-3263)

COMMENTARY.

Thus the conclusion is that there is a Person who perceives things directly by Himself, not through the 'Eternal Word'; because the 'Eternal Word' is an impossibility.

'The '*ēva*' after '*draṣṭā*' should be construed after '*sākṣāt*'.—(3262-3263)

It may be possible to have the 'Eternal Word'; even so, however, it cannot be right to accept it as a means of knowing supersensuous things.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (3264).

THE 'ETERNAL WORD' CAN NEVER HAVE THE CAPACITY TO BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF ITS OWN MEANING;—BECAUSE THERE IS INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN 'SUCCESSION' AND 'SIMULTANEITY'.—(3264)

COMMENTARY.

'*Its own meaning*'—what is expressed by the word.—Or, '*sva*' (in '*svārtha*') may stand for the 'self', the nature, of the Word;—and '*artha*' for what is expressed by it; so the compound '*svārthajñāna*' would mean 'the Cognition of the Word itself and its meaning'.

For the bringing about of such Cognition, the capacity of the 'Eternal Word' could be either inherent in itself, or due to other contributory causes. It cannot be inherent in it; because in the matter of an Eternal Thing bringing about its effect, there is incompatibility between *succession* and *simultaneity*;

and apart from these, there is no other method possible whereby there could be effective action; as the two (succession and simultaneity) are mutually exclusive. Hence all effective action must be invariably concomitant with *succession* and *simultaneity*.

Now, in the case of the 'Eternal World', it cannot bring about the Cognition of its 'meaning' in *succession*; because at the time that the first effect is being brought about, the cause would not have lost its capacity to bring about the subsequent effects (Cognitions); so that all these should appear, all at the same time. Nor is it possible for these effects to be brought about in succession; because even at the later moment,—just as at the moment of the bringing about of the first effect—the efficiency of the cause would be there intact, and hence there would be an incongruity if it did not bring about the first effect over again.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When a thing is devoid of a wider character, it must be devoid of the less wide character;—e.g. the Jar, which is devoid of the character of 'tree', is devoid of the character of '*shimshapā*' (a particular tree); the 'Eternal Word' called Veda is devoid of the character of 'succession and simultaneity' which includes under itself the character of 'effective action';—hence, by implication, there is non-apprehension of the wider character.—Thus it is not possible for the 'Eternal Word' to have the said capacity inherent in itself.

Nor can the said capacity be due to any other contributory cause. Because the capacity being nothing apart from its very nature, cannot, like this nature, be brought about by any such cause. Even if there were some such cause, any relationship to it would be impossible. This has been discussed several times.

Thus then, the idea of the Cognition of supersensuous things being due to the 'Eternal Word', being rejected by Inference, cannot be accepted.—(3264)

It has been argued that—"The *Perceiver of Dharma* cannot exist, because the only means of Cognition by which his existence can be envisaged is 'Non-apprehension' (Negation)."

In answer to this, the Buddhist is going to show from the other party's own point of view, that this Proposition that 'there can be no *Perceiver of Dharma*' is annulled by Presumption, and the Reason adduced ('because envisaged by non-apprehension') is Inadmissible:—

TEXTS (3265–3267).

FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THINGS LIKE HEAVEN, SACRIFICE AND THE LIKE HAVE BEEN SPOKEN OF BY THE PERSON WHO KNEW THEM BY HIMSELF. IN FACT, UNDER YOUR VIEW ALSO THE AUTHOR OF THE VEDA WOULD BE SUCH A PERSON CAPABLE OF PERCEIVING SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS;—OR A PERSON WHO KNOWS ALL ABOUT PRIMORDIAL MATTER, SPIRIT AND OTHER THINGS; OR ONE WHO KNOWS OF ALL THINGS.—IN FACT, IF SUCH AN AUTHOR WERE NOT

ADMITTED, THERE COULD BE NO RELIABILITY IN THE VEDA. THUS THEN, THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE 'PERCEIVER OF DHARMA' HAVING BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY PRESUMPTION,—IT ANNULS THE DENIAL OF SUCH A PERSON WHICH YOU HAVE ELABORATED IN SUCH DETAIL.—(3265–3267)

COMMENTARY.

'*By Himself*'—independently of all else; i.e. independently of the knowledge provided by the Veda.

'*Such a Person*'—i.e. the like of whom you are denying.

'*Brought about by Presumption*';—i.e. by the force of the doctrine that the Veda is reliable.

It is on this ground that the opponent's Reason—'because He is envisaged by Negation'—becomes Inadmissible; because He is actually envisaged by Presumption.—(3265-3267)

Under *Text* 3129 *et seq.* it has been asserted by the Opponent that "the term 'all' is used in reference to the context",—and on this several alternatives have been put forward and many objections urged (against the idea of the *All-knowing*, Omniscient, Person).

But there is no room for all this; because we do not admit of any such idea. When we postulate the Omniscient Person, we do not mean that He knows all possible things, even those other than *Dharma*. And the objections urged would be applicable to only such an idea. In fact, the 'Omniscient Person' postulated by us is one whose mind has become freed from all aberrations and afflictions, obstacles to knowledge and impurities,—by virtue of which *Dharma* and other things all become revealed to his consciousness. Against such a view you have not put forward a single argument.

Again, it has been argued by the Opponent under *Text* 3137 that—"In one body alone, there are so many atoms, etc. etc.—and who can know all these?—etc. etc."—This is a mere assertion, made without any proof; and nothing can be proved by a mere assertion without reasons in support of it.—Because in this way, all things would be established for all men.

With a view to all this, the Author makes the following statement:—

TEXTS (3268-3269).

FURTHER, WHAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED—AS TO THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ANY ONE KNOWING ALL HAIRS AND NAILS, ETC.—IS WITHOUT ANY BASIS, DUE ENTIRELY TO IGNORANCE; BECAUSE IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THERE MAY BE SOME ONE FOR WHOM ALL THINGS BECOME MANIFESTED BY THE CLEAR AND UNFLINCHING LIGHT OF KNOWLEDGE;—AND NO REASON HAS BEEN ADDUCED AGAINST SUCH POSSIBILITY.—(3268-3269)

COMMENTARY.

'*Without any basis*'—that in support of which the three-factored Probans is not available.

The knowledge is '*clear*', free from impurities, and aberrations obstructing the vision of things to be known ;—it is '*unflinching*', not shaken by the gusts of passion, etc.—The knowledge is spoken of as 'light', because it *illumines* things ; all things—*Dharma*, etc.—become 'manifested'—made known. The irregular compounding is done on the strength of implication.

'*No reason has been adduced, etc. etc.*'—i.e. any proof to the contrary.—It is not only that no proof has been adduced ; in fact, there *can* be no proof to the contrary.

(A) For instance, there can be no Perception annulling the idea of the Omniscient Person ; because He is not amenable to that Means of Cognition. It is only when a thing is amenable to Perception that, if it is cognised as something contrary to its well-known form, such cognition is annulled by Perception ; e.g. when Sound is cognised as inaudible, this Cognition is annulled by the perception of audibility. There can be no such annulment in a case where Perception is not applicable at all. As a matter of fact, the Cognitions appearing in the 'Chain' of other people are never amenable to perception by one who is not omniscient ; and it could be only if such were the case, that the assertion of Omniscience could be annulled by Perception. And the reason for this inapplicability of Perception lies in the fact that all men are possessed of limited powers of vision. If such Cognitions were amenable to Perception by any one, that person himself would be omniscient ; and hence Omniscience could not be denied.

The following might be urged—"We do not mean that it is by being applied to the Omniscient Person that Perception proves His non-existence,—but as being inapplicable to it. That is, when Perception is not applicable to a certain thing, it proves the non-existence of that thing ; e.g. in the case of the 'Hare's Horns'. In a case where Perception does apply, the thing perceived does exist ; as in the case of things like the Sword. As regards the Omniscient Person, Perception has never been found to be applicable ; hence, from this *inapplicability of Perception* it is inferred that the Person does not exist".

This is entirely irrelevant. Because the conclusion that is deduced from the *inapplicability of Perception* cannot be said to have been brought about by *Perception* ; because presence (*applicability*) and absence (*non-applicability*) cannot co-exist in the same thing. Further, the *inapplicability of Perception* is not invariably concomitant with *non-existence* of the thing concerned ; and it is only if it were so that the *non-existence* could be inferred from *inapplicability of Perception* ; because even when a thing is there, Perception is found to be inapplicable, if the thing is hidden or remote, etc.

The following might be urged—"We do not say that the inapplicability of Perception proves non-existence ; all that we mean is that when the Perception is inoperative, it proves the non-existence".

This is a mere change in the wording of your statement ; there is no difference in the meaning ; mere change of words cannot alter facts ; or else there would be incongruities.—Because 'cessation', or 'not-operating' of a thing means the denial or negation of existence ; the same meaning is also expressed by the word 'become inoperative', 'ceased' ; the only

difference is that while one (*cessation*) denies other things and expresses the one thing meant, the other ('ceased') expresses the same thing without denying other things. In reality, both terms express the 'non-existence' of the thing concerned. What again is non-existent cannot be a *cause*; and *non-existence* is characterised by the absence of all potencies. It is for this reason that when one thing is productive or illuminative of another, it is so productive or illuminative only when its *existence* is there, not when its existence has ceased; e.g. the Seed which is productive of the sprout, and the Lamp which is illuminative of colour; and when these two (Seed and Lamp) have *ceased*, they are not able to do the producing or the illuminating.

Further, what is the meaning of the statement that—"Perception, having ceased, proves non-existence"? If the meaning is that Perception has ceased, disappeared, from the 'present' state,—then it would imply that it is there in the 'past' and 'future' states; and it has been already proved that the 'past' and the 'future' thing does not exist at all;—how then could there be any operation of what is non-existent?—If, secondly, the meaning of the statement is that though existing at the *present* time, it does not come about (appear) in connection with a certain thing,—and it is in this sense that Perception is said to have 'ceased' (become inapplicable), —even so, this cannot prove the non-existence of the thing in question; as the premiss would be wrong and fallible; as the mere fact that Visual Perception does not appear in connection with Odour, Taste, etc. cannot prove that these latter do not exist.—Thus Perception cannot prove the non-existence of anything.

[Says the Opponent]—"If that is so, then how is it that, on the basis of Perception, in the form of Non-apprehension, you declare, in another place, the non-existence of the Jar?"

This is not so. What is said there is, not that Perception proves non-existence of the thing because the thing is envisaged by Non-apprehension,—but that, when two things are capable of figuring in the same Cognition, if only one appears there, it means the non-appearance (non-existence) of the other. And the reason for this lies in the fact that both cannot be cognised in one and the same form, on the ground that the capability is equally present in both.—In the case in question however, we have never definitely cognised the fact of *Omniscience* figuring in the same Cognition as anything else; the presence of which latter could lead us to deduce the non-existence of Omniscience; because this latter is always absolutely imperceptible.

Thus it is clear that Perception cannot annul the notion of the Omniscient Person.

(B) Nor can Inference prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because it is held that Inference always envisages *affirmation*; as is clear from the fact that it is only *Non-apprehension* that has been regarded as envisaging *negation*. For this same reason, the other three Means of Cognition, Presumption (Analogy and Word) cannot prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person.

The following might be urged—"When we assert that there is no Omniscient Person, we are not asserting an *absolute* negation; all that we

are asserting is the *Relative* Negation, Negation *of omniscience*, in relation to all men ; so that there is certainly room for the operation of Inference and other Means of Cognition ".

It may be so ; but even so, Inference is not possible ; because there is no Indicative (Probans) known to be present in all men, which is invariably concomitant with *Omniscience.* Such character as 'being knowable', 'being a Teacher' and so forth, which have been put forward,—all these are Inconclusive, as we are going to show later on.

Nor again is Presumption able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because, in the first place, we do not admit of any Means of Cognition apart from Perception and Inference. Secondly, even if there are other Means of Cognition, Presumption is not capable of proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because Presumption is based upon the idea that a certain well known fact—seen or heard of,—is not explicable otherwise than on the basis of the unseen factor which is thus *presumed* ;—and as a matter of fact, there is no well-known fact—seen or heard of—among men, which is not explicable except on the basis of the *non-existence* of the Omniscient Person, which, therefore, should be *presumed.*

Nor is Analogy able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. What is cognised by means of Analogy is, either the remembered thing having for its adjunct the similarity of the thing before the eyes,—or mere similarity of the thing before the eyes, to the Remembered Thing. For example, when a man who has had the perception of the Cow goes to the forest, and sees the *Gavaya* there, he perceives in this latter, the similarity to the *Cow.* This has been thus declared—'Thus what is remembered and perceived as similar, forms the object of Analogy,—or the Similarity itself' (*Shlokavārtika Upamāna,* 37). Thus the object that is remembered forms the object of Analogical Cognition ; and what is remembered is only what has been apprehended before, not anything else ;—and there is no Omniscient Person who has apprehended the Cognitions occurring in the 'Chain' of all men ; hence these could not be remembered by any one. Nor is there anything apprehended by all men which is definitely known as possessing properties in common with *non-omniscience*, on the basis of which the *non-omniscient* character of all men could be cognised through Analogy.—As regards the quality of 'existence' etc. which has been found in the non-Omniscient Person, those also have not been found to be in common with non-omniscience. Besause the quality of 'existence' is not incompatible with the Omniscient Person also. Further, the perception of 'existence' in the *Gavaya* does not lead to the Analogical Cognition of the Jar being similar to the *Gavaya.* All men may be alike on the ground of being *existent* ; but that does not prove their *non-omniscience.*

This also refutes the argument that has been set forth by the other party under the *Text* 3216.

Nor again can Word, as the Means of Cognition, set aside the existence of the Omniscient Person.—As regards the Word emanating from human beings, that is regarded by the *Mīmāmsaka* as itself unreliable in matters beyond the senses. And as regards the Word not emanating from human beings, that

cannot be reliable, as we have shown above. Nor is there any Vedic assertion found to the effect that all men are *non-omniscient*.—Nor can the mere fact of something not being mentioned in the Veda establish the non-existence of that thing; because all things are not meant to be spoken of in the scriptures. Otherwise, there would be non-existence of the marriage of your mother and such things, as these are not mentioned in the Veda.—Nor again can it be right to deduce that a certain thing is not mentioned in the Veda at all from the fact of its not being mentioned in a certain text. Because there being many 'Rescensional Texts' of the Veda, it is always probable that the thing may be mentioned somewhere in them.—And we are going to show later on that a certain Vedic Text does speak of the Omniscient Person.

The non-existence of the Omniscient Person cannot be proved by the argument that He forms the objective of the *Means of Cognition* called 'Negation' (Non-apprehension). Because if this 'Negation' as a means of Cognition is described as consisting in the *absolute* negation of Cognition,—then, it cannot form either the *Cognition*, or the *Means of Cognition*, of anything at all; and hence the Omniscient Person could not be envisaged by it; as it is a non-entity; and hence cannot be a *Means of Cognition* (or Cognition).

If, on the other hand, 'Negation', is held to be of the nature of *Relative Negation*—standing for the *negation of the entity*—in the shape of the *Means of Cognition*,—even so, as it would be of the nature of the negation of the 'Means of Cognition', it could not be reliable at all. One who is a *non-Brāhmaṇa* cannot be a *Brāhmaṇa*.

The following might be urged—"Negation, as a Means of Cognition, is not described by us as consisting in the exclusion of all *Means of Cognition*; it is described as a particular form of Cognition, only different from the five other Means of Cognition".

If that is so, then it behoves you to explain in what form it appears.

"It appears in this form—Inasmuch as the Omniscient Person is not cognisable by any one of the five Means of Cognition, He does not exist."

If it is in this form, then it is not a 'Means (or form) of *valid* Cognition'; as it is Inconclusive, False. Because the inapplicability of *the five Means of Cognition* cannot set aside the entity in the shape of the Omniscient Person, which is not invariably concomitant with the said *inapplicability*; on the strength of which the said Cognition (that the Omniscient Person does not exist) could be regarded as *true*.

Thus it is established that there is no Proof that sets aside the possibility of the existence of the Omniscient Person.—(3268-3269)

The following might be urged—"That same *Non-apprehension* which you have described as a form of Inference, will be the proof against the existence of the Omniscient Person; what need have we to seek for another proof?"

It is true that Non-apprehension is a proof, a Means of Cognition. But the following has to be borne in mind, in this connection:—When you put forward 'Non-apprehension' as proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person, do you mean the absence of your own apprehension? Or the

absence of the apprehension of all men ? The Non-apprehension also,—is it meant to be without any qualification,—as is shown by the absence of any such qualifying phrase as 'of what fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility' ? Or is it meant to be qualified in some way ?—The non-existence of the Omniscient Person cannot be proved by unqualified Non-apprehension by yourself.

This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3270).

MERE '*non-apprehension*' CANNOT PROVE HIS NON-EXISTENCE. BECAUSE APPREHENSION IS NEITHER THE 'CAUSE' NOR THE 'PERVADER' OF THINGS.—(3270)

COMMENTARY.

The term 'mere' has been added with a view to exclude the qualification 'fulfilling the conditions of apprehensibility'.

'*Cannot prove His non-existence*'—i.e. cannot prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person.

"Why ?"

Because, *in regard to things*, Apprehension is neither the 'cause' nor the 'pervader'.—As a matter of fact, Apprehension by people of limited vision is not the 'pervader' of things,—in the sense in which the 'Tree' is the 'pervader' of the '*Shimshapā*' (a particular Tree).—[That is, *all things* are not *apprehended*, just as all *trees* are not *Shimshapā*; i.e. 'being a thing' is wider than 'being apprehended']; because even when the 'thing' is there, there may be no "apprehension' of it by reason of remoteness and other circumstances.—Nor is 'apprehension' the 'cause' of things,—in the sense in which *Fire* is the cause of *Smoke*; because it is the *things* that are the cause of *apprehension*.—When one thing is neither the 'cause' nor the 'pervader' of another thing, the absence of one cannot mean the absence of the other; for, if it did, there would be incongruities. As regards the presence of the 'Non-apprehension' of the effect, it does not imply the absence of all Causes, but implies the absence of only that Cause whose capacity is *untrammelled*; and in the case in question, for men of limited vision, the capacity of things to bring about Apprehension is not *untrammelled*; by virtue of which the absence of Apprehension could prove the non-existence of the things.—(3270)

Question :—"Even when there is absence of the 'Cause' and the 'Pervader', why should that imply the absence of something else ?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (3271-3272).

WHEN THERE IS ABSENCE OF (*a*) THE 'CAUSE' AND (*b*) THE 'PERVADER', IT IS ONLY RIGHT AND PROPER THAT THERE SHOULD BE ABSENCE OF (*a*) THE 'CAUSED' AND (*b*) THE 'PERVADED'; (*a*) BECAUSE THE BIRTH OF THE ONE PROCEEDS FROM THE OTHER, AND (*b*) BECAUSE ONE IS OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE OTHER;—FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THERE IS ABSENCE OF (*a*) THE FIRE AND (*b*) THE TREE, THERE IS ABSENCE OF (*a*) THE SMOKE AND (*b*) THE 'MANGO-TREE, ETC.'—IF IT WERE NOT SO, (*a*) THE ONE COULD NOT BE THE CAUSE OF THE OTHER, AND (*b*) THERE WOULD BE DIVERSITY.—(3271-3272)

COMMENTARY.

'*Caused*'—that which has a cause; i.e. the effect;—the *Dvandva* compound is between 'caused' and 'pervaded';—these two are construed with the foregoing '*nivṛttiryujyatē*',—the meaning being that 'it is only right and proper that there should be absence of the *Caused* and the *Pervaded.*

The reason for this is supplied—'*Because the birth of the one, etc. etc.*'——(*a*) When there is absence of *Cause*, there is absence of *Effect*, because the *Effect* derives its existence from the *Cause*; e.g. when there is absence of Fire, there is absence of Smoke. (*b*) Similarly when there is absence of the *Pervader*, there is absence of the *Pervaded*; because the Pervaded is of the same essence as the Pervader,—both being of the same nature; e.g. when there is absence of the *Tree*, there is absence of the *Mango*, *Khadira* and other particular Trees; because it is only a particular *Tree* that is known as the 'mango'.

If it were not so,—i.e. if on the absence of the Cause, the Effect were not absent,—then the Cause would not be a true cause at all. Because when one thing can be present even when the other is absent, the latter cannot be the cause of the former; otherwise, there would be absurdities. Similarly when one thing is not absent when the other is absent, they cannot be of the same nature, e.g. the *Cow* and the *Gavaya*. Hence it follows that when the Pervader is absent, the Pervaded must be absent,—and where the Cause is absent, the Effect must be absent; it would not imply the absence of anything else; as that would lead to incongruities.

This has been thus declared—'Thus when a certain nature is related to a thing, its absence would imply the absence of that thing; and the absence of the cause would imply the absence of the effect; because of the infallibility of their relationship. If it were not so, why should the absence of the one mean the absence of the other? Because a man has no *horse*, does it mean that he should have no *Cow* either?'—(3271-3272)

If it is insisted upon by the other party that one's own Apprehension is the Cause and Pervader of *all things*—then his Proposition involves self-contradiction.—This is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3273-3274).

IF YOUR OWN APPREHENSION IS RECOGNISED—THROUGH SOME MEANS OF COGNITION, AS BEING THE 'CAUSE' AND THE 'PERVADER', OF ALL THINGS,—THEN YOUR OWN OMNISCIENCE BECOMES ESTABLISHED, WITHOUT ANY EFFORT. WHY THEN SHOULD YOU YOURSELF BE HOSTILE TO YOUR OWN OMNISCIENCE ?—(3273-3274)

COMMENTARY.

'*Hētutvavyāpakatvayoḥ*'—The Genitive Ending is in relation to '*nishchaya*'.

'*Upalambhasya chārthēṣu*'—The Genitive Ending in '*Upalambhasya*', and the Locative Ending in '*arthēṣu*' is in reference to the 'Cause' and the 'Pervader'; the former connoting the relationship of these, and the latter the fact of their being *envisaged*.

What is meant is as follows :—If, through some Means of Cognition, you have recognised the fact of your own Apprehension being the 'Cause' and 'Pervader' of all things,—then, your own omniscience becomes clearly asserted; because unless one is omniscient, his Apprehension can never comprehend *all things*. And yet you are putting forward proofs in support of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Thus there is clear self-contradiction on your part.—(3273-3274)

Thus it has been shown that mere Non-apprehension, without a qualification, does not deserve to be put forward as proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Nor will it be right to put forward 'Non-apprehension' as qualified by the phrase 'of what fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility', as the reason for denying the existence of that Person.—Because when such 'Non-apprehension' is put forward, it could be put forward, (*a*) either directly by itself,—for instance, as the argument 'the Jar does not exist, because while conditions of being apprehended are present, it is not apprehended', so also would be the argument proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person ;—or (*b*) indirectly, by other words, by pointing out the absence of something which is the Pervader of its cause and which is apprehensible ; e.g. when it is said 'There can be no Smoke here because there is no Fire', or 'The particular tree *Shimshapā* cannot be here, as there is no *Tree* at all'. It has been already explained that the absence of one thing does not necessarily mean the absence of another, except when they are invariable concomitants or when one is the 'Cause' or the 'Pervader' of the other. For if it did, there would be incongruities. Nor does mere absence of the 'Cause' and the 'Pervader' prove the absence of the thing the absence of whose 'Cause' and 'Pervader' has not been definitely ascertained. So here also it would be necessary to add the qualifying phrase that 'it should fulfill the conditions of apprehensibility'. This same principle would apply to the case of the Omniscient Person also.

Or, the *negation* of a thing can follow only from the *affirmation* of something else which is directly or indirectly contrary to the former,—not if

this is not so contrary; as in the latter case, it would be possible for both to co-exist. For instance, when it is said that 'there can be no coolness of touch here as there is Fire', we have the *affirmation of Fire* which is directly contrary to *coolness*, from which *affirmation* follows the *negation* of *coolness*; the same should be the case with the negation of the Omniscient Person also. Similarly, the negation of the Omniscient Person could follow only from the affirmation of something indirectly contrary to Him, or of something contrary to its Pervader; e.g. *coolness* is the 'pervader' of the *Icy-touch*,—the contrary of *Coolness* is Fire,—and when there is affirmation of this Fire, there follows the negation of the *Icy-touch*.—The said *negation* of a thing would follow also from the *affirmation* of something contrary to the cause of that thing; e.g. when there is affirmation of *Fire*, which is contrary to *coolness* which is the cause of *thrilling chill*, there follows the negation of the said *chill* which is the effect of coolness.—Or, the negation of a thing would follow also from the affirmation of an effect contrary to that thing; e.g. when there is affirmation in regard to a certain place, of the Smoke which is an effect of Fire which is contrary to coolness, there follows the negation of the *coolness* of touch.—Or the negation of a thing can follow from the apprehension of an effect contrary to the cause of that thing; e.g. when there is perception of *Smoke* which is the effect of *Fire* which is contrary to coolness which is the cause of thrilling chill,—there follows the negation of this chill; the argument being—'This place cannot contain a person who has caught the chill, because we find here *Smoke*'.—Or again the negation of a thing may follow from the affirmation of something invariably concomitant with the contrary of that thing; e.g. when there is affirmation of *dependence* which is invariably concomitant with *impermanence* which is contrary to *Permanence*, there follows the negation of *Permanence*.

Now none of these arguments for negation is applicable to the proving of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person; because the Omniscient Person is always *inapprehensible*, while all the conditions described are cases of negation of things that are *apprehensible*.

This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3275-3276).

FOR THESE REASONS, THE OMNISCIENT PERSON CANNOT BE ONE 'CAPABLE OF BEING PERCEIVED'; IF HE *were* CAPABLE OF BEING PERCEIVED, THEN THAT ALONE WOULD ESTABLISH HIS OMNISCIENCE, WITHOUT ANY EFFORT ON OUR PART. IN FACT, HOW CAN THAT PERSON BE PERCEPTIBLE TO YOU WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS,—UNLESS YOU ALSO HAD THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS?—(3275-3276)

COMMENTARY.

For the reasons explained above, for fear of incurring self-contradiction, you cannot regard the Omniscient Person as 'apprehensible' by yourself. As in that case it would mean that you are yourself omniscient.

"Why ?"

Answer :—'*How can that Person, etc. etc.*'—If your own knowledge comprehended all things, then alone could the Omniscient Person be *apprehensible* to yourself,—not otherwise ; because the Omniscient Person can never be apprehended by one who is not himself omniscient.—(3275-3276)

The following might be urged—"The Omniscient Person may not be *apprehensible* by us ; even so, why should the said negative arguments not be urged in proof of his *non-existence* ?"

Answer :—

TEXT (3277).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, ANY 'NON-APPREHENSION'—IN THE CASE OF THINGS OF THE NATURE OF THE 'PERVADER', THE 'CAUSE' AND THE 'NATURE' OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON—WOULD NOT BE OPERATIVE, BECAUSE BY HIS VERY NATURE, HE IS IMPERCEPTIBLE.—(3277)

COMMENTARY.

Because the Omniscient Person is not apprehensible by you, therefore the 'pervader', the 'cause' and the 'nature' of the Omniscient Person, if not apprehended, cannot be regarded as the 'non-apprehension of what is apprehensible'. That is to say, the arguments based upon the non-apprehension of the 'pervader', of the 'nature', or, of the 'cause',—which are the first three arguments urged above,—are not applicable.—(3277)

Says the other party :—"In that case, the other arguments may be operative ; even so the non-existence of the Omniscient Person would become proved".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3278-3279).

THIS 'NON-APPREHENSION' PROCEEDS IN *nine* WAYS : DUE TO ITS BEING PUT FORWARD IN DIVERSE WAYS CONSISTING OF THE *non-cognition* AND *cognition* OF THE SAID THREE AND THEIR CONTRARIES (RESPECTIVELY). AND WHEN IN ITS VERY BASIC FORM, THE 'NON-APPREHENSION' HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE INAPPLICABLE TO THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, THE OTHERS BECOME SET ASIDE WITHOUT MUCH EFFORT.—(3278-3279)

COMMENTARY.

This—the aforesaid non-apprehension—of (1) the nature, (2) the Pervader and (3) the Cause—with its ramifications becomes *ninefold*.

"How?"

Answer:—'*Due to, etc., etc.*'—The term '*tat*' stands for the aforesaid three, called: (1) 'Nature', (2) 'Pervader', and (3) 'Cause';—'*tadviruddha*' is that which is contrary to these; this also is three-fold—(1) contrary to 'Nature', (2) contrary to 'Pervader', and (3) contrary to 'Cause';—the term '*ādi*' includes (1) the contrary effect, (2) the effect contrary to the cause, and (3) those pervaded by its contraries.—The second '*tat*' refers again to the said three—(1) Nature, (2) Pervader and (3) Cause;—so that the compound '*tat-tadviruddha*', stands for (*a*) the three (Nature, etc.), and (*b*) the contraries of these three;—the '*agati*' and '*gati*' stand for the (*a*) *non-cognition* and (*b*) *cognition* of these respectively, i.e. the *non-cognition* of the Nature, the Pervader and the Cause, and the *cognition* of the contrary of these;—the diversities are due to these;—and the arguments are put forward on the basis of all this.

That which is due directly to the non-cognition of these, the Non-apprehension of the Nature, Cause and Pervader, has been pointed out above; of this same basic Non-apprehension, all the other Non-apprehensions are merely indirect indicatives; hence this three-fold Non-apprehension forms their 'basis'. For instance, the 'cognition of the contrary' indicates (1) the apprehension of the contrary of its Nature, (2) the apprehension of the contrary of its Pervader and (3) the apprehension of the contrary of its Cause.—The term '*ādi*' indicates (1) the apprehension of the contrary effect, (2) the apprehension of the effect contrary to the cause, and (3) the apprehension of what is pervaded by the contrary.—All these indirectly indicate, respectively, the Non-apprehension of the Nature, of the Pervader and of the Cause.

Thus by showing that the three basic forms of Non-apprehension are not able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person, the incapacity of their ramifications to do the same follows without effort; hence no attempt need be made for proving that these ramifications also are unable to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because, when the root itself has been cut off, the branches cannot continue to live.

In reality, the Non-apprehension of the *nature* of the thing itself is the root of all; it is only in view of the diversity of other things that the *three-fold* Non-apprehension has been spoken of as the 'basis' or 'root'.—(3278-3279)

The following might be urged—"If the Omniscient Person is not amenable to Apprehension,—then it may be that a particular Non-apprehension of Him is not possible; but His 'Cause' and 'Pervader' are certainly amenable to Apprehension; why then cannot there be particular Non-apprehension of these two? The contraries also of these being amenable to apprehension, why should not there be apprehension of these contraries?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3280-3281).

EFFECT AND CAUSE, PERVADED AND PERVADER, AND CONTRARINESS—ALL THESE,—AS ALSO THE 'NATURE' OF THE THING WITH A QUALIFICATION—ARE POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN THE THING IS PERCEPTIBLE.—THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, HOWEVER, IS NOT PERCEPTIBLE FOR YOU; HENCE ALL THESE 'NON-APPREHENSIONS' ARE NOT CAPABLE OF PROVING HIS NON-EXISTENCE; AND ANY OTHER FACTOR OF NEGATION, THERE IS NONE.—(3280-3281)

COMMENTARY.

'*Kārya, etc.*'—is a copulative compound formed of—(1) the relation of Effect and Cause, (2) the relation of Pervaded and Pervader, and (3) the relation of Contrariness.

(1) The relation of Cause and Effect can be proved only by the Non-apprehension of what is perceptible; and as the Omniscient Person is not perceptible, there can be no relation of Cause and Effect with Him. (2) Nor is the relation of Pervader and Pervaded possible in regard to Him; as that also has to be preceded by the Non-apprehension of what is apprehensible; for instance, when the absence of one thing is always followed by the absence of the other, the latter is said to be 'pervaded' by the other; and the said absence is not possible except where there is Non-apprehension of what is apprehensible.—(3) Contrariness also is recognised only between two perceptible things, not between those that are not perceptible.—For instance, there is 'contrariness' between two things when they can never co-exist; and this is perceived by you when there is absence of one while the other is present—even when the efficient cause of the former is present; and as a matter of fact, the presence and absence of things cannot be ascertained unless the things themselves are capable of being apprehended.—The other kind of 'contrariness' consists in *mutual exclusion*; and it is recognised in cases where the cognition of one thing is invariably concomitant with the non-cognition of the other; as between *succession* and *simultaneity*. This cognition is not possible if the thing is not apprehensible.

"If that is so, then how can there be *contrariness* between *Existence* and *Non-existence*? Certainly both of these are not perceptible".

This does not affect our position. As a matter of fact, *Existence* and *Non-existence* are not cognised separately, and then they are regarded as 'contrary' on account of their exclusion of one another;—what happens is that they are cognised separately and then 'contrariness' becomes cognised. For instance, the contrariness of *Existence* and *Non-existence* is determined only in reference to one and the same thing and at one and the same time,—

not in reference to different things. Certainly the *Existence* of the Horse is not in any way 'contrary' to the *non-existence* of the Cow.—Nor is there any contrariness between *existence* and *non-existence*, if taken in reference to different points of time; for instance, if one thing did not exist at some previous time, its non-existence or existence at some future time is not deducible. It is only in regard to the same thing and the same time that both *existence* and *non-existence* are found incompatible; and not after being cognised and then found to be mutually exclusive.—It might be asked—"How can there be exclusion of what has not been cognised?"—The answer is that it is for this same reason,—i.e. because it is *not* cognised in connection with the particular thing—that its exclusion would be possible. Otherwise, how could there be any exclusion of what has been definitely cognised? In fact, this *cognition* itself of the *existence* of the thing that constitutes the exclusion of its *non-existence*; and the cognition of the *non-existence* of one thing also constitutes the exclusion of the existence of the thing other than that. Hence when the *non-existence* of a certain thing is excluded, and its *existence* is cognised,—then they must be regarded as 'perceptible'; because what is not perceptible cannot be cognised, and what is not cognised cannot have the contrary character excluded.

All this is not possible in the case of the Omniscient Person. In the first place *all men* are not perceived by any one; in view of which the presence of *non-omniscience* could be cognised in them, and the exclusion of *omniscience* could be secured; because that same man would have to be regarded as omniscient.—Thus then, there can be no 'contrariness' (incompatibility) between *omniscience* and *non-omniscience* in connection with a person who is not capable of being apprehended. It *is* possible, however, within one's own 'chain'; but there also, not with regard to the future, because the future is not perceptible at the time.—Thus the fact remains that the relation of *cause and effect* and the like is possible only in that which is perceptible.

'*As also the nature of a thing, with a qualification*'—'is possible' should be construed here. 'Nature' here stands for the character of the thing; and this is to be taken *along with its qualification*; and this qualification consists in *freedom from the three kinds of remoteness.*

'*All these non-apprehensions*'—i.e. the non-apprehensions of the 'Cause' ('Nature' and 'Pervader'),—are not capable of proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person; because the Omniscient Person can have no such relationship with anything as that of *Cause and Effect*, *of Contrariness*, and of *Pervader and Pervaded*; also because, even when there are other causes of apprehension present, the said Person cannot be perceptible.

'*Any other factor of negation, there is none*',—i.e. barring the particular kind of Non-apprehension.—(3280-3281)

The Author again proceeds to point out the Inconclusiveness of the Reason adduced by the other party,—by pointing out the incongruity involved in the putting forward of one's own 'non-apprehension', without any qualification:—

TEXT (3282).

IF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS DENIED ON THE GROUND OF MERE 'NON-APPREHENSION',—THEN YOU MIGHT ALSO DENY THE MARRIAGE OF YOUR OWN MOTHER AND SUCH OTHER FACTS.—(3282)

COMMENTARY.

'*Such other facts*'—includes the intercourse of . . . . and in that case there would be doubts regarding . . . . . .

This has been thus declared—'If, dull-visioned as you are, your non-apprehension should set aside things, then you would be damned; as it would be impossible to name your Father'.—(3282)

The following *Text* anticipates and rejects the Opponent's answer to the above:—

TEXT (3283).

IF IT BE URGED THAT—"ON SEEING THE EFFECT IN THE FORM OF THE SON, THERE IS COGNITION OF THE CAUSE OF THAT EFFECT",—THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) IN CERTAIN CASES, THE EFFECT IS FOUND IN THE ABSENCE OF THE CAUSE IN QUESTION.—(3283)

COMMENTARY.

"The mother's marriage is inferred from the presence of its effect in the shape of the Son; hence there is no non-apprehension of the said marriage; hence there is no possibility of the marriage not being there".

The inconclusiveness and doubtful character of the said Cause is pointed out—'*In certain cases, etc. etc.*'—Even in the absence of the marriage in question, and even in the absence of . . . . . a wicked woman might bring forth the effect in the shape of the Son; and the same might be the case . . . . ; so that the said Inference of marriage cannot be true; hence the doubt regarding your parentage is irresistible.

The Teacher *Dharmakīrti* also has urged this same argument.—(3283)

The following *Text* sets forth the Opponent's answer to the above and rejects it:—

TEXT (3284).

IF IT IS SAID THAT—"THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE IS NOT COGNISED, BECAUSE OTHER PEOPLE KNOW OF IT",—THEN (THE ANSWER IS) HOW DO *you* KNOW THAT OTHER PEOPLE KNOW OF IT?—(3284)

COMMENTARY.

'*Anyopālambha*'—The knowledge that other people have.

'*Tasya*'—of the mother's marriage.

'*Non-existence*'—i.e. what is cognised is not *non-existence*, but *existence*.

The answer to this is that it cannot be known what the knowledge of other people is.—(3284)

The Opponent having been asked—'How do you know?'—supplies the answer,—which is then refuted :—

TEXTS (3285-3286).

"WE KNOW IT FROM THE ASSERTION (OF OTHER PERSONS)".—THEN (THE ANSWER IS) IS THERE NOT SUCH ASSERTION IN REGARD TO THE OMNISCIENT PERSON ALSO?—THEN AGAIN, HOW IS IT THAT YOU DO NOT RECALL ANOTHER ASSERTION OF YOURS TO THE EFFECT THAT—"MEN ARE ALWAYS FOUND TO BE LIARS"? AND JUST AS THERE CAN BE NO CONFIDENCE IN THE WORDS OF MEN REGARDING PRESENT THINGS, SO ALSO THERE CAN BE NONE IN THE WORDS SPEAKING OF PAST THINGS.—(3285-3286)

COMMENTARY.

The word '*Upadēshāt*' has to be construed with '*siddha*' of the preceding *text*.

By showing the incongruity involved, the author points out the inconclusive character of what has been urged—'*Is there not, etc. etc.*'—'*Ayam*'—the assertion;—is it not present in regard to the Omniscient Person? It is certainly present. Under the circumstances, if the assertion regarding the marriage of one's mother is accepted as reliable, then why should you not regard our assertion, that 'the Omniscient Person does exist', as reliable? There is no difference between the two cases.

Further, in your words, you have declared that assertions are unreliable; this is pointed out in the words—'*How is it that you do not recall, etc. etc.*'.—(3285-3286)

So far it has been explained that the absence of one's own apprehension of the Omniscient Person cannot serve as a proof of His non-existence;—because, without a qualification, it is inconclusive, and with a qualification, it has no substratum;—now the Author proceeds to explain that the *absence of the apprehension of all men* also cannot serve as proof of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person; because such non-apprehension by all men cannot be proven :—

TEXTS (3287-3288).

OR, THERE MAY BE NO SUCH ASSERTION (REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON); NOR MAY SUCH ASSERTION BE RELIABLE; EVEN SO, YOU HAVE COME TO THE CERTAINTY THAT "THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS NOT APPREHENDED BY ANY MAN"; AND SUCH CERTAINTY COULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF THE SOULS OF ALL MEN WERE KNOWN TO YOU; AND IF ALL THESE WERE KNOWN TO YOU, THEN YOU YOURSELF WOULD BE OMNISCIENT,—AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT ABOVE.—(3287-3288)

COMMENTARY.

'*Assertion*'—i.e. the one declaring the existence of the Omniscient Person.

'*Asya*'—reliability of the said assertion.

'*If the Souls of all men were known*'—i.e. if you knew the nature of all men.

It might be said—"We do have the knowledge of the nature of all men". —The answer to this is—'*If all these were, etc. etc.*'—i.e. if the souls of all men were known to you.—(3287-3288)

TEXTS (3289-3290).

IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN, EVEN ON NON-APPREHENSION, THERE WOULD BE DOUBT ONLY (REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON),—JUST AS THERE IS REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF CERTAIN THINGS.—THERE ARE SOME SAINTLY PERSONS TOO WHO ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON.—IT IS ALSO CONCEIVABLE THAT THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, BEING SELF-LUMINOUS, PERCEIVES HIMSELF BY HIMSELF.—FOR THESE REASONS THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THE NON-APPREHENSION OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON BY *all men*.—(3289-3290)

COMMENTARY.

'*If it were not so*',—if there is no knowledge of the Souls of all men.

'*Like the existence of certain things*';—i.e. as in the case of the existence of things far removed in place or time.

What is meant is as follows:—In the case of things far removed in space and time, even when the thing is not apprehended, there is always a suspicion regarding its existence,—even though there is *non-apprehension* of the thing; in the same manner, it is only right that there should be suspicion regarding the existence of the Omniscient Person who has been apprehended (known) by other men.

Or, the meaning may be as follows :—Just as in regard to the Existence of the Omniscient Person, there is doubt, even though He has not been apprehended,—in the same manner there would be doubt, even when His omniscience is apprehended; because both are equally liable to non-apprehension due to remoteness.

Says the Opponent :—" It is only right that there should be suspicion regarding the existence of things; because even when the thing is present, there is found to be non-apprehension of it; hence there is a probability that *it may be there*; in the case of the Omniscient Person, on the other hand, it is not possible for any man with limited vision to perceive Him; and no sane person can have any suspicion regarding the existence of an impossible thing ".

The answer to this is—'*There are some persons, etc. etc.*'

'*Himself*'—This has been asserted on the basis of the doctrines of other people.—This same idea is reiterated by the phrase '*by himself*'. '*Ātmā*' —the Man.—'*Luminous*'—the Soul being of the nature of Consciousness and hence being like Light.—(3289-3290)

The same idea is further supported :—

TEXT (3291).

BECAUSE THE TERM 'ALL' STANDS FOR ALL LIVING BEINGS; AND THE PERSON HIMSELF MUST BE INCLUDED IN 'ALL'; HENCE THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THE NON-APPREHENSION (OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON).—(3291)

COMMENTARY.

'*The Person himself*'—i.e. the Omniscient Person.—(3291)

The following might be urged—" What are meant by the term 'all' are only men with limited vision, not the Omniscient Person; hence there can be no suspicion regarding His existence ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3292).

BY THE EXCLUSION OF THAT ONE PERSON ALONE, WHAT CONNECTION COULD THERE BE (OF THIS WITH THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON)? ONE'S OWN ILLNESS DOES NOT CEASE MERELY BECAUSE OTHER PEOPLE DO NOT KNOW OF IT.—(3292)

COMMENTARY.

If what is meant by the exclusion of the Omniscient Person is that the Reason for the non-existence of the Omniscient Person consists in the fact

of his not being apprehended by other people who have limited vision,—then this Reason is Inconclusive; because, like your own 'Non-apprehension', the said Non-apprehension by other men of limited vision would have no 'connection',—in the shape of invariable concomitance—with 'the non-existence of the Omniscient Person'.

The second sentence—'*One's own illness, etc. etc.*'—is meant to support the said *absence of connection.*—(3292)

So far it has been proved that 'Non-apprehension' as the proof (for the non-existence of the Omniscient Person) is 'Inconclusive' as well as 'Inadmissible'.—Now the author proceeds to show that the other Reason—'Because His body is envisaged by the only means of Cognition, Negation'—is 'doubtful—hence—inadmissible':—

TEXTS (3293–3295).

EVEN SOME MEN WITH LIMITED VISION DO APPREHEND THE OMNISCIENT PERSON THROUGH INFERENCE; AND IT IS ONLY A FEW NOTIONS OF SOME PEOPLE THAT ARE PERFECTLY CORRECT. FOR INSTANCE, THE PROOF OF THE MOMENTARY CHARACTER OF THE VEDA, THE EARTH AND OTHER THINGS THOUGH CLEARLY STATED BY US, HAS NOT BEEN UNDERSTOOD BY DULL-WITTED MEN. CONSEQUENTLY, THE MATTER IS OPEN TO DOUBT AND THE ABSENCE OF APPREHENSION CANNOT BE CERTAIN,—SIMPLY BECAUSE SOME PEOPLE ARE SURE THAT THEY PERCEIVE HIS NON-EXISTENCE.—(3293–3295)

COMMENTARY.

There are some clever men, even among men with limited vision, who do apprehend the Omniscient Person by means of *Inference*; hence the probability of His existence being there, the Reason—'because He forms the object of Negation as the Means of knowledge'—is open to the charge of being 'Doubtful—hence—Inadmissible'.—For instance, the fact of such things as the Vedic Word, the Earth, Mountains, Body, Diamond and the rest, being *momentary* and *Soul-less*—though it is not apprehended by the beastly *Mīmāmsakas*,—is *true*, as proved by us through strong reasons. So that if, in regard to the Omniscient Person, proof is not found at the present moment, yet as His existence is probable, the matter may be in doubt; hence it cannot be admitted that the said Person is subject only to *Negation*, which consists in the absence of all the other five Means of Cognition;—such a Reason being open to doubt.

'*Because*'—there being no proof of it.—(3293–3295)

Then again, it may be that all men with limited vision are not capable of inferring the existence of the Omniscient Person; even so, the Reason of the other party remains Inconclusive.—This is pointed out in the following.—

TEXT (3296).

EVEN IF THERE BE NO INFERENCE, THAT ALONE CANNOT BRING ABOUT CERTAINTY REGARDING *non-existence* (OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON); AS IN THE CASE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE FIRE WHICH HAS NOT YET BEGUN TO EMIT ITS EFFECT IN THE SHAPE OF *Smoke*.—(3296)

COMMENTARY.

It has been explained before that Proof (Means of Cognition) cannot be the *cause* of things; nor can it be their *Pervader*; how then can the absence of Proof mean the absence of the Thing? For instance, in the case of the *Fire* in the heated Iron-ball,—while its effect in the shape of *Smoke* has not begun to appear, and it is still hidden inside a hut,—there is no Inference of it, because the Inferential Indicative (in the shape of *Smoke*) is not there; and yet its *existence* does not cease (on that account),—and there can be no certainty regarding its *non-existence*; in the same manner, in the proving of the Existence of the Omniscient Person, if there is no Inference, that makes the matter only doubtful.

'*That alone*'—that is, mere *absence of Inference*.

'*Asamārabdha, etc. etc.*'—That Fire which has not begun to bring about its effect in the shape of smoke; in regard to the existence of this fire, there can be no certainty.—(3296)

In the following *Texts*, the other Party shows that in the case of the hot Iron-ball, the root of the Doubt lies in Apprehension, while in the case of the Omniscient Person, there is no Apprehension at all,—hence there can be no reason for any doubt; and thus the Reason put forward by the Buddhist is Inconclusive:—

TEXTS (3297-3298).

"IN THE CASE OF A THING THAT HAS BEEN APPREHENDED AT SOME TIME OR THE OTHER, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THERE MAY BE DOUBT; AS FOR INSTANCE, IN THE CASE OF THE POST, WHICH PARTAKES OF THE NATURE OF BOTH FACTORS (OF THE DOUBT); BECAUSE THE POST AND THE MAN HAVE BOTH BEEN SEEN SOMEWHERE, THEREFORE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE DOUBT AS TO ITS BEING THIS OR THAT. THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, HOWEVER, HAS NEVER BEEN THUS PERCEIVED."—(3297-3298)

COMMENTARY.

When a certain thing has been seen somewhere previously,—in regard to that alone, there may be doubt—e.g. in regard to the Post,—and not in

regard to anything else; because it is the Post which partakes of the nature of both (Man and Post).—If it were not so, then Doubts may arise in regard to even those things that have never been seen; so that the condition necessary for all Doubt—viz. the partaking of the nature of both factors,—would not be present.—Thus it is only right that there should be doubt in regard to the existence of Fire in the Iron-ball;—not so in regard to the Omniscient Person; as such a person has never been perceived.—(3297-3298)

The Author's answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXT (3299).

IN THIS MANNER, O CLEVER MAN, THE NON-EXISTENCE OF YOUR MOTHER'S MARRIAGE BECOMES ESTABLISHED 'FREE FROM ALL DOUBT'.—(3299)

COMMENTARY.

If the idea is that there can be Doubt only in regard to a thing that has been perceived some time or the other,—and in regard to all other things there should be certainty of *non-existence*,—then under that principle, the non-existence of your mother's marriage becomes established, beyond all doubt; because you have never before perceived that marriage; by virtue of which there could be no certainty regarding its non-existence.

The rest of the objection is to be answered as before.

'*Clever man*'—is said in derision.—(3299)

Says the Opponent—"If such be the case, then there can be no basis for Doubt at all".

Answer:—

TEXT (3300).

WE HOLD THAT THERE IS DOUBT ALSO WHEN THERE IS NO VALID COGNITION; IT ARISES IN REGARD TO *existence* AS WELL AS *non-existence*, FROM THE ABSENCE OF THE OPERATION OF ANY OF THE MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION. —(3300)

COMMENTARY.

The 'absence of the operation of any Means of Right Cognition' can always be shown in regard to both *existence* and *non-existence* of things; hence there can be no restriction in this matter. Hence our explanation is that Doubt arises whenever there is no certainty (regarding either *existence* or *non-existence*). This has been thus declared—'Doubt is that wavering judgment in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one

object is wanting,—and it is due to the uncertainty attaching to Perceptions and Non-perceptions' (*Nyāyasutra* 1. 1. 23).—(3300)

The following might be urged—"In no case is it found that the Means of Cognition are not applicable to both *existence* and *non-existence of* a thing".
The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3301-3302).

WHEN THERE IS A DEFECT IN THE EYE, THERE IS NO COGNITION, EVEN THOUGH THE THING IS THERE; AND EVEN WHEN THE EYE IS FREE FROM DEFECTS, THERE IS NO COGNITION, BECAUSE THE THING IS NOT THERE;—AS IN THE CASE OF THINGS LIKE THE JAR.—THUS, INASMUCH AS MERE NON-APPREHENSION (ABSENCE OF COGNITION) IS FOUND IN BOTH CASES, IT IS FAR BETTER TO HOLD THAT IT IS DOUBT THAT ARISES FROM THE NON-APPREHENSION OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON.—(3301-3302)

COMMENTARY.

Even when the object, Jar for instance, is there, if the man is without the Eye, he has no cognition of it;—so also, even when the Eye is perfect, if the object is not there,—in the sense that it is not close by,—*there is no cognition of it*; this clause has to be construed here also;—this is just what happens in the case of the Jar which is not there in a suitable place.

'*Mere* Non-apprehension'—i.e. non-apprehension without the qualification of 'perceptibility' of the thing concerned.

'*Found in both cases*'—i.e. in the case of *existence* and in the case of *non-existence*.

'*Tat*'—Therefore.

'*It is far better, etc. etc.*'—better than searching for a perfect source. For instance, when things have had the idea of their being due to a perfect source cut off by wrong cognition,—there may be a desire to look out for the perfect source; as has been declared in the words—'Two perceptions describe the junction, and two perceptions give rise to the desire' (?)—It is for this reason that our Teachers affirm the presence of Doubt in such cases, in the words—'If it is asked what is the proof for His existence?—the answer is that, for this same reason, let the matter remain in Doubt'.—(3301-3302)

The following might be urged—"If the Omniscient Person exists, why is He not seen by any one at any time? If the view is that He can never be cognisable by men of limited vision,—even so, why is it that no action of His is ever perceived by any one? Even though the Visual Organ itself is not perceptible, its action, in the shape of the visual perception, is not necessarily inapprehensible".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3303–3306).

THOUGH EXISTENT, HE WOULD NOT BE SEEN DIRECTLY BY DULL-WITTED PERSONS ; JUST LIKE THE CONCEPTIONS OF OTHER PEOPLE. NOR IS HE CONSTANTLY ACTIVE, JUST AS THE FIRE IN THE IRON-BALL IS NOT ACTIVE. EVEN WHEN THERE, HIS ACTIVITY WOULD NOT BE PERCEPTIBLE, LIKE THE FEELING OF LOVE ARISING IN OTHERS OUT OF THEIR FANCIES. EVEN IF HIS ACTIVITY WOULD BE PERCEPTIBLE, HIS CONNECTION WITH SUCH ACTION WOULD NOT BE COGNISED ; BECAUSE THE PERSON KNOWING ALL THINGS IS ALWAYS IMPERCEPTIBLE FOR PEOPLE WHOSE EYE OF COGNITION IS DULL. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT HIS EXISTENCE CANNOT BE PROVED BY MEANS OF INFERENCE. IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT THERE CAN BE NO 'CAUSE' OR 'PERVADER' IN HIS CASE. AND YET IT HAS BEEN SEEN THAT EVEN WHEN THE INFERENCE OF THE THING IS NOT POSSIBLE, THE THING DOES EXIST. THUS IT IS THAT THE MATTER (OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON) REMAINS IN DOUBT.—(3303–3306)

COMMENTARY.

'*Sākṣāt*', 'Directly', is to be construed with '*Nēkṣyēta*', 'would not be seen'.

As a matter of fact, there is nothing that *must* be cognised once,—on the basis of which it could be argued that "because there is no Cognition of the Omniscient Person, He cannot exist" ;—because the conception of one man, though existent, is not cognised by other men. Nor is it necessary that causes should always be bringing about their effects,—on the ground whereof it could be argued that—"as the action of the Omniscient Person is not perceptible, He cannot exist" ; because it is found that even when the Fire in the Red Hot Iron has not begun to produce Smoke, it is still seen there.

Granting (for the sake of argument) that Causes *are* constantly active in bringing about their Effects ; even so, there can be no certainty regarding the absence of those Effects ; because all the Effects that are produced are not always perceived ; and it is only if it were so, that the non-perception of the Effect could prove the *non-existence* of the Cause ; because, even when produced, the Effect is not always perceived ;—'*as in the case of the Love proceeding from fancies, in other men*' ; in the case of another person, it is found that though Love has been produced in his mind by fancies regarding the agreeable character of things,—such Love is not perceived by other men ; and yet it is not regarded as *non-existent.*

Or, even in cases where the *effect* is perceived, if its cause is something imperceptible,—and the observer is unable to perceive its affirmative and negative concomitances,—no inference of that cause is possible. Similarly even when the Omniscient Person is there, it is quite possible that His existence cannot be proved by Inference.

'*People whose eye of Cognition is dull.*' The *Cognition* is the Eye ; and those whose this eye is dull.

Then again, it has been pointed out before that the Means of Cognition cannot be the 'cause' or the 'pervader' of things; how then, can the absence of Inference—which is neither the 'cause' nor the 'pervader' of the thing in question (the Omniscient Person),—lead to the absence of that thing ?—The compound '*ahētvavyāpakam*' is Copulative—what is 'not *cause*—nor *pervader*'.

Nor can it be asserted that—"when the *Means of Cognition* called 'Inference' is inoperative,—even though it is neither the 'Cause' nor the 'Pervader' of the thing concerned,—the thing is actually found to be non-existent; and there can be nothing incongruous in what is actually seen".

In view of such an assertion, the *Text* adds—'*Even when the Inference is not possible, etc. etc.*'.—Even when the Inference is not there, the thing in question has been found to exist; as in the case of the Red-hot Iron-Ball; as has been pointed out already.—(3303–3306)

Having thus shown in detail that there is no possibility of any proof in support of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person,—the author sums up his view:—

TEXT (3307).

THUS, THEN, THERE IS NOTHING THAT CAN SET ASIDE THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON; THE PROOF IN SUPPORT OF HIS EXISTENCE IS GOING TO BE ADDUCED LATER ON.—(3307)

COMMENTARY.

It might be argued that—"as there is no proof for setting aside the Person, so you have none in support of His existence".

The answer to this is that—'*The proof in support, etc. etc.*'—(3307)

It has been argued by the other party under *Text* 3138, that—"If an attempt were made to prove that one has the knowledge of the details of all the individuals and components of the whole world,—it would be futile".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3308).

IT IS WITH A TOTALLY DIFFERENT MOTIVE THAT THE WISE BUDDHISTS MAKE AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS,—EVEN THOUGH SUCH ATTEMPT PROVE FUTILE.—(3308)

COMMENTARY.

'*With a different motive*'—with another intention.—(3308)

Question:—"What is that motive?"

Answer:—

TEXT (3309).

WHAT IS PRIMARILY AND DIRECTLY UNDERSTOOD BY US IS THAT THERE IS A PERSON WHO KNOWS THE MEANS OF ATTAINING HEAVEN AND LIBERATION ;—BUT NOT THIS ALONE ; IT IS ALSO BELIEVED THAT THERE IS A PERSON WHO ALSO KNOWS *all* THINGS.—(3309)

COMMENTARY.

What we are primarily concerned with proving is the fact that the Blessed Lord knows the means of attaining Heaven and Liberation ; as for the proving of the fact of His knowing *all* things, without exception, that is done only incidentally ; what we mean is that in matters other than Heaven and Liberation also, the knowledge of the Blessed Lord is not hampered by obstacles, and hence knowing *all* things, if He becomes Omniscient, there is nothing to prevent it. Hence it is not right for the wise to deny such omniscience ; but for those who seek to be sure of the omniscience, it is only right that they should try to secure that certainty. This is what is meant by us.—(3309)

Thus then, there being no proof against the existence of the Omniscient Person,—and clear proof of His existence going to be set forth later on,—the definite denial that you make of the Omniscient Person, whose recognition is certain, can be due only to delusion.

This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXT (3310).

THUS THEN, THERE BEING NO REASONS AGAINST, WHILE THERE IS CLEAR REASON IN SUPPORT OF IT,—WHY SHOULD DULL-WITTED PERSONS OBJECT TO THE IDEA OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON ?—(3310)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—" We deny the Omniscient Person because we think that there is no proof in support of the existence of such a Person ; and we do not deny Him through delusion ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3311).

EVEN IF THERE BE NO PROOF IN SUPPORT OF IT,—SO LONG AS THERE IS NO REASON DEFINITELY AGAINST IT,—THE MATTER SHOULD REMAIN IN DOUBT ; ON WHAT COULD THIS CERTAINTY OF THESE PEOPLE BE BASED ?—(3311)

COMMENTARY.

What is said here is on granting the position of the Opponent for the sake of argument ; in reality, there is definite proof in support, as is going to be shown later on.

'*This certainty*'—i.e. the certainty of the *Mīmāmsakas* that "the Omniscient Person does not exist".—(3311)

The following assertion has been made by you *Mīmāmsakas*—"The Veda can make known such things as the past, the present, the future, the subtle, the hidden and so forth; which cannot be done by any other Sense-organ" (*Shabara-Bhāṣya* 1. 1. 2).—This is also a mere assertion without any reason,—based upon sheer faith.—This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXT (3312).

THE ASSERTION THAT—"THE VEDA ALONE—AND NOTHING ELSE—IS ABLE TO PROVIDE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST, ETC.—COULD BE TRUE ONLY IF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE OTHER SOURCES WERE CERTAIN.—(3312)

COMMENTARY.

'*Nothing else*'—in the shape of Perception by the Omniscient Person and so forth.

'*The non-existence of other sources*';—if it were quite certain that the other source, in the shape of the Omniscient Person is non-existent,—then alone, not otherwise, could it be reasonable to make the above assertion; as any such restriction would, under the circumstances, be meaningless.—(3312)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka* under *Texts* 3140-3141 that—"By proving the existence of the Person knowing only *Dharma* and *Adharma* whom the Buddhist postulates, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3313-3314).

THE PROOF IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSON KNOWING PRIMORDIAL MATTER AND THE SPIRIT AND OTHER THINGS, AS ALSO OF THE PERSON KNOWING ALL THINGS, HAS BEEN ALREADY DECLARED BEFORE, AND LATER ON ANOTHER PROOF ALSO IS GOING TO BE SET FORTH.—HENCE IT IS NOT FOR NOTHING THAT PEOPLE TAKE THE TROUBLE OF PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF THE PERSON KNOWING THE MINUTE DETAILS OF THE WHOLE WORLD, BY MEANS OF ENTHUSIASTIC TREATISES AND DISCUSSIONS.—(3313-3314)

COMMENTARY.

When we try to prove the existence of the Omniscient Person, we do not give up all considerations regarding that Person Himself; in fact our

effort is directed towards the proving of the existence of the Person who knows the principal factor of *Dharma* itself. Thus on a previous occasion, under *Text* 3267, we have set forth the proof, in the shape of Presumption, in due accordance with your own view,—where we pointed out that 'your denial of the Omniscient Person is set aside by the acceptance of the *knower of Dharma*, on the strength of Presumption';—and we are also going to set forth another proof, in the shape of Inference.—It is not for nothing that people take all this trouble,—in fact, it is for a very right and proper purpose.—(3313-3314)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 3142, that—"Perception and the other Means of Cognition regarding the Omniscient Person having been discarded, it would follow that Morality and Immorality are cognisable through the reliable Word only".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3315).

AS PERCEPTION AND OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION REGARDING THE OMNISCIENT PERSON CANNOT BE DISCARDED, IT DOES *not* FOLLOW THAT MORALITY AND IMMORALITY ARE COGNISABLE THROUGH THE RELIABLE WORD ONLY.—(3315)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka*, under *Text* 3143, that—"this alone being sufficient to establish the doctrine of the *Mīmāmsaka*, if an attempt is made to refute the existence of the Omniscient Person, it is like an attempt to kill what is already dead".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3316).

THE DOCTRINE OF THE *Mīmāmsaka* BEING THUS DEMOLISHED, THE ATTEMPT THAT THE OTHER PARTY HAS MADE TO REFUTE THE OMNISCIENT PERSON HAS BEEN MADE THROUGH SHEER STUPIDITY.—(3316)

COMMENTARY.

'*Demolished*'—By the existence of the Omniscient Person being established.

'*Other party*'—the *Mīmāmsakas*.—(3316)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka* under *Text* 3144, that—"The Person cognisant of *Dharma* having been refuted, on the ground of his very

root being cut off,—if people go on asserting the existence of Omniscient Persons, it is like the thumping of husks ".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3317).

THE 'PERSON COGNISANT OF DHARMA' NOT BEING REFUTED, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ROOT NOT BEING CUT OFF,—IF PEOPLE HAVE ASSERTED THE EXISTENCE OF OMNISCIENT PERSONS THEY HAVE SHOWN THEIR WISDOM BY THIS.—(3317)

COMMENTARY.

There is an 'a' suppressed before '*hatē*'.

'*People*'—The Buddhists.—(3317)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāmsaka,* under *Text* 3145, that—"If the Person had the direct perception of all things, then He would have direct knowledge of such tastes, etc. also as are unclean; who could assume the existence of such an Omniscient Person ?"

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3318-3319).

IF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON HAD EXPERIENCED THE UNCLEAN TASTE, ETC. THROUGH THE CONTACT OF HIS GESTATORY ORGAN, THEN ALONE COULD HE BE REGARDED AS BLAMEWORTHY. AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER, THINGS,—EVEN THOSE THAT ARE DEPRECATED UNDER 'ILLUSION',—BECOME COGNISED BY HIM WITHOUT ACTUAL CONTACT, THROUGH THE MIND, WHOSE PERCEPTIVENESS HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE IMPRESSIONS OF PAST EXPERIENCES.—(3318-3319)

COMMENTARY.

If the Omniscient Person had direct experience of the said tastes, etc. —even then that would not detract from His being the 'knower of *Dharma*'. —If it is urged that—"He would become blameworthy",—the answer is as follows :—The man who experiences the said Taste, etc. through the direct contact of these with the gestatory organ, becomes blameworthy; the Blessed Lord, however, has no such perception; He perceives things only

through the Mind, and that also without its coming into contact with the thing ; hence He is not regarded by people as blameworthy.

As a matter of fact, there is no one who is really blameworthy ; because 'blame' is not something fixed, it is relative ; for instance, what may be 'blameworthy' for the Vedic Scholar, is not so for the low-born ; what happens in the world is that, under the spell of Illusion, Wine and such things are considered *evil*. But even so, if the Blessed Lord perceived these, He would not be 'blameworthy' ; because His perception of these is purely mental.

The following might be urged—" When other people suffer from tasting wine through its contact with the Gestatory Organ, so would He suffer from experiencing it through the Mind ".

That is not so. When the Taste, etc. are experienced through the contact of the Sense-organs, they either benefit or injure that organ and hence become sources of pain, etc. ; but they are known to be the source of pain and suffering, not for all men, but only for some men whose mind has become disordered through the influence of their past misdeeds. For instance, *Water* becomes *Pus* for only some dead people, not for all.—All this, however, is not there in the case of the Blessed Lord. Because His experiences being through the Mind, there is no possibility of injury to the Sense-organs ; specially because the Lord having all his five-fold activity free from the impurities of the 'Afflictions',—there is no possibility of his actions being influenced by the Afflictions. Nor is His Mind capable of being *disordered*, because He cognises all things in their right form and as evanescent. For these reasons, in the case of the Blessed Lord, there is no possibility of even *mental* pain, in the shape of *unhappiness*, etc. ; specially because all these have their source in delusion.

All these objections, however, arise only if the *External World* exists ; under the doctrine of *Idealism*, there is no room for all this at all.—For instance, for Idealists, there being no *Colour-phase*, there can be nothing 'unclean' for them in reality ; nor can there be any impression due to that ; because all this arises from Ideas only. All these therefore do not appear within range of the vision of persons who have realised the Highest Truth and have shaken off all impurities ; just as, on being cured of visual disorder, people do not have any illusory cognitions like the 'Hair-tuft' and the like. This has been thus declared :—'The unclean Taste and other things manifest themselves only through Ignorance ; hence they are imperceptible (for the Wise One) ; just like the second Moon'.

On the other hand, the *Brāhmaṇa* has resounding within his mouth, the words of the Veda, which, being all-pervading, are in contact with all unclean places ; as such, how can he be free from blame ?—(3318-3319)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṁsaka* under *Text* 3146, that—" The words of Buddha and others are not found to provide any knowledge of what is contained in the Vedas, etc. ;—how then can such persons be regarded as omniscient, without reason ? "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3320-3321).

IT IS BECAUSE NO WORD OF *Tāyin* ARE FOUND TO PROVIDE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS MENTIONED IN THE VEDA, THAT HE IS 'OMNISCIENT'. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE TOO THAT HE HAD KNOWLEDGE OF ALL FALSE PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINES ALSO; AS HE DOES MAKE THE DECLARATION THAT WHAT IS ASSERTED IN THE VEDA REGARDING THE SOUL AND OTHER THINGS IS WRONG.—(3320-3321)

COMMENTARY.

A man becomes 'omniscient' by knowing everything exactly as it exists, in its true or other forms; and things that are spoken of in the Veda do not exist exactly as described there; as they are found to be annulled by proofs. How then could man be a 'knower of truth' by expounding things exactly as they are taught in the Veda?—It cannot be asserted that the *Buddha* did not know these things at all—not even as *false*; because they were actually known to Him as such. For instance, it has been pointed out by Him that Animal-sacrifice and other evil paths of action lead to damnation; He says—'There is no such thing as the *Soul*, all those things that are there are the effects of causes'; where He has declared that the Soul and other things are *non-existent*. Thus it is not true that the Blessed Lord had no knowledge of the things taught in the Veda.—(3320-3321)

It has been argued by the *Mīmāṃsaka* under *Text* 3147, that—"If things not mentioned in one's own books were held to be known to him, then, by merely composing one's own poems, poets would be omniscient".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3322).

THE DOCTRINE OF 'NO-SOUL' HAS BEEN CLEARLY TAUGHT BY HIM FOR THE BENEFIT OF HIS DISCIPLES—THE DOCTRINE WHICH IS THE UNIQUE GATEWAY TO THE HIGHEST GOOD, AND THE FRIGHT OF ALL UPHOLDERS OF WRONG DOCTRINES.—(3322)

COMMENTARY.

'*Unique*,'—because not understood by other philosophers; all these being enmeshed in the false doctrines of the Soul. All these qualifications apply to the '*doctrine of No-soul*'.

'*Gateway to the Highest Good*;—it is so called because it is the means of entering *Nirvāṇa*; it is *Nirvāṇa* that is meant by the term '*shiva*', 'Highest Good'.

'*Kudṛṣṭīnām*'—Those upholding wrong doctrines, regarding the Soul and other things.—The Path taught by Buddha is the 'fright'—inspires fear in those childish people who have their faith fixed in false doctrines.—This has been thus declared—'The childish man is always beset with such fears as—*I am not, I may cease to exist, naught is mine, nothing shall be mine ;* the wise one is without fear'.

What is meant by this is that men who are obsessed with false doctrines cannot even speak of the True Doctrine, how can they understand it ?—(3322)

The following *Texts* point out that the True Doctrine has never been known before by people at the stage of the common man :—

TEXTS (3323-3324).

IT IS NOT KNOWN TO THE WORLDLY MAN ; WHEN KNOWN, IT SETS ASIDE ALL EVIL ; FOR THOSE WHO ARE DEVOTED TO ITS PRACTICE, IT IS A VERITABLE MINE OF VALUABLE QUALITIES. IF THE POETS KNOW THIS HIGHEST TRUTH, THEN WHO IS THERE WHO WOULD NOT REGARD THEM, KNOWING THE PRIMORDIAL MATTER, THE SPIRIT AND OTHER THINGS, AS *omniscient* ?—(3323-3324)

COMMENTARY.

'*Not known to*'—not practised by—'*worldly man*'—common people.

Question :—"In what way does it benefit people—that it has been taught by the Lord ?"

Answer :—'*When known, etc. etc.*'—when it becomes '*known*'—directly and realised,—it sets aside the whole lot of evils, such as the Afflictions, Birth and so forth. Even subsequently, when it is *practised*, it brings about excellent qualities.

If such a truth, leading as it does to the fulfilment of the Highest Good, is known to the Poets,—they may very well be 'omniscient'; we do not for a moment think that omniscience is confined to a single Person ; in fact, whoever is cognisant of the said Truth, he alone, no one else, is held by us to be omniscient. Such knowledge, however, does not belong to the Poets ; hence the contingency that has been urged does not arise.—(3323-3324)

The following *Texts* show that what has been just said disposes of what has been urged by the other Party under *Text* 3148, to the effect that—"There being many Omniscient Persons, imparting mutually contradictory teachings,—how can any one be singled out as the *One* Omniscient Person ?"

TEXTS (3325–3330).

THIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'NO-SOUL' AS DESCRIBED DOES NOT BELONG TO *Vardhamāna* AND OTHERS; IN FACT, ALL PHILOSOPHERS HAVE BECOME LOST IN THE DOCTRINE OF THE 'SOUL'.—ALL SUCH DOCTRINES AS THE '*Syādvāda*' AND OTHERS INVOLVING THE NOTIONS OF THINGS BEING *not-momentary*, ARE DISCARDED BY DIRECT PERCEPTION; HOW THEN CAN PERSONS WHO HAVE ASSERTED MANY SUCH UNREASONABLE THINGS BE 'OMNISCIENT'? PEOPLE WHO TREMBLE OVER THINGS THAT ARE PERCEPTIBLE AND KNOWN EVEN TO THE PLOUGHMAN,—HOW COULD THEY EVER HAVE ANY CLEAR KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS THAT ARE BEYOND THE SENSES? THUS THE FACT OF THESE PERSONS BEING NOT-OMNISCIENT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD FROM THEIR BEING ATTACHED TO WRONG DOCTRINES AND EXPOUNDING WRONG TEACHINGS; JUST IN THE SAME WAY AS ANY OTHER MAN WHO PERCEIVES THE *man* IN THE *Post* IS SAID TO BE *mistaken*.—ONE IS TO BE RECOGNISED AS OMNISCIENT ONLY WHEN HE HAS BEEN FOUND TO SATISFY ALL TESTS AND ALL REASONS, AND HAS BEEN FOUND TO HAVE THE TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS. —THUS THEN OUR REASON SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS BEING ONE WHOSE CONTRARY IS OPEN TO DOUBT.—(3325–3330)

COMMENTARY.

If the said *knowledge of Truth* belonged to *Vardhamāna*, *Kapila* and others,—then they also might be omniscient. As a matter of fact however, all these persons have been held in the clutches of the crocodile of the false doctrine of the 'Soul', which is the root of all evil,—and have taught that things are *not-momentary* and so forth, which are all annulled by Perception and other forms of Cognition;—being thus found to be tripping even in regard to things known even to the veriest child, how could their knowledge of supersensuous things ever fall within range of possibility,—in view of which it could be asked—"what proof is there that *Kapila* is not omniscient?" [as has been asked by the other party under *Text* 3149].—Because there is the following proof available which can be clearly stated:—People who are attached to false doctrines cannot be omniscient;—e.g. the man who mistakes the *Post* for the *Man*;—*Vardhamāna* and others are actually attached to false doctrines;—hence there is apprehension of something pervaded by its contradictory; as 'attachment to false doctrines' is pervaded by 'being *non-omniscient*', which is the contradictory of 'omniscience'.—The Reason here put forward cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible'; because by all sorts of tests it has been shown that all these Teachers have taught false doctrines.—Nor can the Reason be said to be 'inconclusive', on the ground of its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being doubtful; because *omniscience* has been held to depend upon the full knowledge of all things without exception; and a person who possesses True Knowledge can never have any false idea of things at all.—(3325–3330)

The following might be urged—"If these Teachers have taught false doctrines,—even so, it cannot be deduced from this that they are addicted to the false notions of things; because it is open to men to act contrary to their convictions,—the tendencies of men being peculiarly divergent; consequently, your Reason is 'doubtful—hence—inadmissible'."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3331).

IF THE ASSERTION OF THESE TEACHERS REGARDING THE '*Syādvāda*' AND OTHER DOCTRINES BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MADE WITH SOME (OTHER) MOTIVE,—THEN (WE ASK)—WHAT IS THAT FORM OF THINGS WHICH THEY HOLD TO BE REAL AND TRUE?—(3331)

COMMENTARY.

If it be said that—"it is with some other motive that these Teachers have asserted the doctrines of *Syādvāda*, etc., which are against all canons of truth";—then (our answer is that) let them assert the doctrines; we do not wish to prove that *Vardhamāna*, etc. are, by themselves, *non-omniscient*; all that we have done is to put forward the diversity of opinion among these Teachers, as a proof in answer to the question that you, taking your stand upon the mutually contradictory doctrines taught by Kapila and others, have asked—"If *Buddha* is omniscient, what is the proof that *Kapila* is not so?" Hence our Reason cannot be 'inadmissible'.

Then again, if what has been asserted by them has some other motive behind it, then it behoves you to explain what, according to them, is the *real* nature of things.—(3331)

TEXTS (3332-3333).

"THERE IS NO *soul*;—THINGS ARE MOMENTARY AND SO FORTH."—IF THAT IS SO, THESE TEACHERS *are* OMNISCIENT; BECAUSE THEY HAVE DIRECTLY PERCEIVED THE TRUE NATURE OF ALL THINGS. IN THAT CASE THEY ARE ALL OMNISCIENT, HOLDING THE SAME VIEW OF THINGS. AS FOR THE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY TEACHINGS, THEY NEVER EXPOUNDED ANY SUCH TEACHINGS,—THEY MEANT SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT.—(3332-3333)

COMMENTARY.

Being questioned as above, the other Party answers—"The correct teaching according to these Teachers is that *there is no soul, things are momentary*, and so forth".

If this is the answer, then it means that there is no difference of opinion between these Teachers and *Buddha*; hence our Reason would not be 'inadmissible'.

The Author therefore says in his reply—'*If that is so, etc. etc.*'—We do not mean to point our finger to any one Person and say that 'He is omniscient', we only assert it in a general way that 'there are omniscient persons'. If it is admitted that *Kapila* and others also have the said knowledge of truth, then you should not say—"why is there a difference of opinion between the two"?—Because under the circumstances, they would all be of the same opinion.

Then, as regards the mutually contradictory teachings of these Teachers,—it will have to be interpreted in some other way; for people holding the same opinions cannot expound contradictory teachings;—the only right view is that all of them expound only the true nature of things. Hence whenever one meets with a diversity of opinion, he should understand that its meaning is something quite different.

In case they are held to be holders of divergent opinions, there can be no room for the question—"who is the one to be selected as omniscient?" (as has been asked by the other party in *Text* 3148). Because in that case *Sugata* (*Buddha*) would be selected as the only person possessing the said knowledge and hence being *omniscient*,—and no other person could be so regarded.—(3332-3333)

Then again, if *Kapila* and others are accepted as holding the said opinion regarding things, then they become *Buddhas* themselves.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3334-3335).

THE *Buddhas* ARE OMNISCIENT ONLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE THE DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF TRUTH REGARDING ALL THINGS, AS EXPLAINED ABOVE. IF THEN THIS SAME KNOWLEDGE BELONGS TO THE OTHER TEACHERS ALSO, THEN THEY ALSO ARE '*Buddhas*' AND THEIR 'BUDDHA-HOOD' DOES NOT DIFFER FROM THAT OF *the Buddha*; BECAUSE THEY ALSO POSSESS PERFECT KNOWLEDGE, AND THIS IS THE SOLE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE *Buddha*.—(3334-3335)

COMMENTARY.

The 'Truth' whose character has been explained as consisting in there being *no Soul*, etc. etc.

'*Tēṣām*'—of *Vardhamāna* and others.

'*This*'—i.e. possessing perfect knowledge.

'*Tasya*'—of *Buddha-hood*. Because that person is called '*Sugata*' (*Buddha*) who has attained the perfect knowledge of there being *no Soul*, and has got rid of all that obscures the right view of things.—(3334-3335)

Further, even if what is proved is omniscience *in general*, by implication it becomes recognised as belonging to the Blessed Lord only.—This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXT (3336).

THUS, THOUGH THE OMNISCIENT PERSON WHOSE EXISTENCE HAS BEEN PROVED IS ONLY SUCH A PERSON IN GENERAL, YET IN REALITY, IT IS *Buddha* ALONE WHO STANDS OUT AS THE ONLY SUCH PERSON ; AS IT IS ONLY HE IN WHOM ALL THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON ARE PRESENT.—(3336)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tat*'—Thus, therefore '*As it is, etc. etc.*'; because it is only He in whom all the characteristics of the Omniscient Person are present.—(3336)

Question :—" Without such specification, how can this idea be got at ? "
Answer :—

TEXT (3337).

EVEN WHEN ONE IS SPECIFICALLY SINGLED OUT, THAT PERSON ALONE COULD BE OMNISCIENT WHO KNOWS THE WHOLE WORLD IN ITS REAL FORM OF 'BEING WITHOUT SOUL' AND THE REST.—(3337)

COMMENTARY.

Though the definition of the Omniscient Person is stated in the general form that—'That Person is *Omniscient* who knows the whole world in its real form of being *without Soul* and the rest',—it follows by implication that the particular person who fulfills the conditions of this definition is meant to be Omniscient ; and hence it is not necessary to specify that Person. As a matter of fact, it is only our Blessed Lord—and none else—who fulfills all the conditions of the said definition of the 'Omniscient Person'; as it is only He who has expounded in various ways the truth regarding what should be sought for and what rejected,—along with the means of the same, in the shape of the 'Four Truths' in their perfect form. If a man does not know a thing, he cannot expound teachings that are perfect and true as regards the real state of that thing.—This has been thus declared—'The expounding of the imperceptible to be secured and the means thereof is an extremely difficult task'.—(3337)

Question :—" Even though He knows the World as *soul-less, etc.* how does he become *omniscient* ? "

TEXT (3338).

WHEN ONE HAS PERCEIVED THE FACT OF THERE BEING *no Soul*,—NO DEFECT CAN OBTAIN A FOOTING IN HIM; BECAUSE IT IS ITS CONTRADICTORY. JUST AS WHEN THE BRIGHT LAMP IS THERE, THERE CAN BE NO DARKNESS.—(3338)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, Omniscience follows from the removal of Hindrance of Afflictions and the Hindrance of cognisable things;—it is the Afflictions themselves, in the form of Love, Hate, etc.—which obstruct the perception of the real nature of things,—which are called 'the cover of the Afflictions'; and 'the cover of cognisable things' consists in the want of capacity to discern all about things to be secured and to be rejected, and also the inability to describe them. Of these two, 'the cover of the Afflictions' is removed by the direct perception of the fact of there being *no-Soul*; and 'the cover of cognisable things' is removed by the faithful and intense and long-continued meditation upon the said *Soul-less-ness.* All these Afflictions—Love, Hate and the rest—have their root in wrong notions of the *Soul,* as has been found through positive and negative concomitance; and they do not proceed from the external things; because, even when the external thing is there, the said Afflictions do not appear without feelings of agreeableness, etc. (?); and conversely, even when the external thing is not there, they appear, when the man is face to face with agreeableness, etc. (?); and when the presence and absence of one thing do not follow the presence and absence of another thing, this latter cannot be the cause of the former; if it were so, there would be incongruities.

Nor can these Afflictions subsist in the *Soul* postulated by other philosophers; because such a Soul has been already rejected.—But even if such a *Soul* existed, there would be constant appearance of the Afflictions of Love, etc.; because the Soul, which *ex-hypothesi,* is the cause of the appearance and continuance of the Afflictions, would be always present in its perfect form; specially as the Eternal Cause cannot have any potencies imposed upon it by anything else, it could not stand in need of the help of anything else. All this has been discussed in several places.—Further, as one and the same thing has been denied to be the substratum of both the *existent* and the *non-existent,* it cannot be right to hold that these Afflictions subsist in anything.—From all this it follows that these Afflictions cannot be related to any Eternal Cause.

Nor can they proceed from the external things. They really proceed from the wrong notion of the 'Soul'. For instance, unless one has the notion of 'I', he cannot have self-love; and unless he has the notion of 'mine', he cannot have the idea of anything being conducive to bringing pleasure to himself, and he cannot be *attached* to it as his 'own'; Hatred also towards anything does not appear unless one recognises that it is conducive to

bringing pain to himself; because there can be hatred against what is not harmful to what is his *own*, or against what removes that harm.

Similarly with regard to *Name*, etc. also.

From all this it is clear that the notion of 'Soul', which has persisted from time without beginning, having been brought about, the repeated notion of similar 'Souls' is what produces the notion of 'one's own'; these two produce Love for 'one's own'; this produces Hatred and the rest; from this positive and negative concomitance, it is clearly known to all men, down to the very cowherd, that all these Afflictions—Love, etc.—have their root in the notion of 'one's own', which proceeds from the notion of one's *self* or *soul*.

Contrary to this idea of 'Soul' is the idea of 'No-Soul'; because this rests upon a form quite the reverse of the former. It is incompatible too that both these—*Soul* and *No-Soul*—should be identical or co-exist in any one 'Chain'; because these are as contrary to each other as the notions of 'serpent' and 'rope' with regard to the same object. Thus the doctrine of 'No-soul' being contrary to the doctrine of 'Soul', it becomes contrary to—incompatible with—Love, Hatred and other Afflictions also; just as Fire is contrary to the shivering caused by cold.—Consequently, when one has directly realised the doctrine of 'No-soul'—which is incompatible with all Defects and Aberrations,—its contrary—in the shape of the whole host Love and other defects—ceases to exist; just as Darkness ceases in a place flooded with light. It is in this way that the 'cover of Afflictions' becomes set aside by the realisation of the doctrine of 'No-soul'.

The argument may be formulated thus:—When the contrary of a certain thing obtains a footing at a certain place, then that thing itself cannot secure a footing,—e.g. Darkness does not secure a footing at a place flooded with lamp-light;—there is perception of 'No-soul', which is contrary to the whole host of defects, in the Person who has realised the doctrine of 'No-soul'; hence there is apprehension of the contrary.

The following might be urged—"When the mind is obsessed with the idea of 'No-Soul', there is no room for the appearance of its contrary, the idea of the 'Soul'; similarly there is no room for the appearance of the idea of 'No-soul' when the Mind is obsessed with the idea of the 'Soul'; because the incompatibility rests equally in both. Consequently (as practically all men have their minds obsessed with the idea of 'Soul') no one could have the idea of 'No-soul' at all; and to that extent your Reason is 'inadmissible'.—There may or may not be the idea of 'No-soul'; even as these two—'Soul' and 'No-soul' are not absolutely destructive of one another,—as is the case with Love and Hate, or Pleasure and Pain. Then again, what you have sought to prove is the absolute destruction (removal) of one by the other, and not mere absence of co-existence; hence your Reason is also 'Inconclusive'. As a matter of fact, too, we find Love, Hate and the rest appearing in their full force even in good men. For this reason also, your Reason is 'Inconclusive'."

It is not so,—we reply. If it were absolutely impossible for the conception of the doctrine of 'No-soul' to appear in the 'chain' of a man whose

Afflictions have not been destroyed,—then there would be no room for the appearance of the notion of 'No-soul'; as a matter of fact, however, it is a fact of common experience that the notion of 'No-soul' presents itself before all men; and when this same notion is pondered over, it reaches to high stages, —just like the conception of a young woman,—and subsequently becomes quite clearly perceptible, and ultimately reaches the stage of direct perception, —as envisaging a directly perceived thing; how then can it be impossible for the notion of 'no-soul' to appear in the mind of men?

Then again, in a place wrapped in darkness, there is possibility of light appearing after some time;—so here also why should not there be the possibility of the appearance of the notion of 'No-soul'?

It cannot be said that "the said conception of 'No-soul' cannot appear in any man;—which could lead to the appearance of the perceptional Cognition".—Because, the reason has to be pointed out why this is not possible.

For instance, what would be the reason for no use being made of the said conception? Would it lie in the fact of no one wanting it,—and all activity of sane men being accompanied by some desire?—Or, even if they desire it, the sane man does not have recourse to activity, because he has no knowledge of what has got to be avoided,—and unless a Defect is known, it cannot be avoided.—Or, even though he knows the Defect, the man knows that the Defect is permanent and hence does not put forth any effort to remove it, because what is permanent cannot be removed.—Or, even if the Defects are not permanent, one recognises the fact of their having no cause and desists from any activity towards their removal,—because what is self-sufficient can never be set aside.—Or, even though they have causes, there is no certain knowledge of such causes, and hence one does not pay any heed to the said conception,—because, as in the case of disease, it could not be removed until its cause were definitely ascertained?—Or, even if their cause is known, is it that the intelligent man knows that cause to be eternal and hence does not dare to try to remove it,—because if the cause is present in its efficient condition, the effect cannot be restrained?—Or even though the cause is non-eternal, the man, seeing that Defects are inherent in all living beings, does not make an attempt to remove them,—because what forms the very nature of the thing cannot be set aside.—Or, if the Defects do not form part of the nature of the beings, the man desists because there are no means of removing them,—because unless the *means* is there, the *end* cannot be attained;—or, even if the *means* are there, its use would be impossible, because the man does not know them,—because what is not known cannot be used.—Or even though he knows the means, he does not employ them because he considers it impossible for the conception to reach—by jumping as it were,—the highest stage, on account of there being no re-birth, and hence the conception would continue to remain at the same stage at which it has already reached.—Or even granting that the conception does reach the highest stage, and by this appearance of their contrary, the Defects become destroyed;—but even so, he thinks that, like the solidity of Copper and other metals, it may be that the Defects are bound to appear again and hence he does not try to remove them?

Now, it cannot be admitted that the man does not want it (the removal of Defects). Because those persons whose minds are beset with sufferings due to Birth and other causes, and frightened at the prospect of Births and Rebirths,—do certainly want to have peace of mind; and when these people have acquired the true understanding of Disciples, this fear of Birth and Rebirth itself becomes the cause of their desire to seek for the conception of 'No-soul'. Those people who, by reason of belonging to a particular family, are by their nature bent upon doing good to others,—when they find the world suffering from the three kinds of Pain beginning with Tendencies and Dispositions, they are moved to compassion and begin to suffer for the sufferings of others; and giving up all idea of benefiting themselves, they come to look upon all living beings as their own 'self', and then concentrate themselves upon removing their sufferings; and in the case of these men, the said compassion itself is the cause of the appearance of the conception in question. Because it is extremely difficult to know and speak of what is imperceptible and its cause.—If it is asked—"What is the use in any sane man doing what is good for others?"—the answer is that the same *doing good* is the use or purpose; as this is highly desirable in itself.—Nor will this mean dependence upon others. Because the wish to do good to one's self is based upon the assumed knowledge of the *Soul*; and doing good to others has been regarded by all good men as leading to desirable results. Then again, what the other party began to prove was the impossibility of any one wishing to proceed with the conception; well, even if he were an unintelligent person, why should he not wish to undertake even this much of activity? Hence he should have to say that "no one ever acts towards helping others, because it does not serve any useful purpose for himself". And the impossibility of such a view has been already explained.—Further, while there are some people who are found to be past masters in the art of cruelty, taking delight in injuring others, without rhyme or reason, and pleased at the suffering of others,—there are yet others who are past masters in the art of mercy, taking delight in the happiness of others, pained at the suffering of others, —without any other cause; why should this not be possible?

Nor is there no knowledge of the nature of the Defects (to be removed). Because all such Afflictions and Defects as Love, Hatred, Delusion, Pride, Arrogance, Jealousy, Envy, etc.—following upon Calamities, Disappointments, the prosperity of one's own self and that of persons related to him,—are such as have their nature fully known, as they continue to appear and disappear.

Nor are these Defects eternal; because they are always found to appear occasionally.—For the same reason, they cannot be without cause; because what has no cause does not depend upon anything else and hence cannot suffer any restrictions of time, place and character.—This same reason also sets aside the idea that their causes are eternal. Because the cause, in the shape of the Soul, etc., would be always there, and they would be independent of other things, as being eternal, they could not have any peculiar potency added to them; and under the circumstances, all the effects emanating from those causes themselves would be liable to be appearing simultaneously. From all this it follows, by implication, that their causes must be non-eternal.—And this non-eternal cause of the Defects also is one whose form is well-known.

Because the host of Defects like Love, Hatred and the like have their cause in the reverses experienced by one's own self and also by people related to himself; as they always appear in accordance with the positive and negative concomitance of these latter.

Nor can the Defects be regarded as inherent in all living beings; because those living beings themselves are not admitted; in fact there is no object in the shape of the 'living being', whose properties these Defects—Love, etc. —could be. It is only something set up by Conception as something spoken of as 'this', as the whole idea of *quality* and *qualified* is purely conceptual (fanciful).—If it be held that the Defects are to be regarded as the properties of living beings, because they are subjective in character—or because they are produced in the mind,—then also there is 'inadmissibility' and 'inconclusiveness'. For instance, if the other party wishes to regard the Defects as *objects* and the Mind as the *subject*,—then he has to admit that the Mind is of the nature of the apprehension of things; as otherwise the Mind and the Thing could not be related as *object* and *subject*. And when the Mind is admitted to be of the nature of the apprehension of things,—it will have to be asserted that it is apprehended by a part of that same nature of itself; how else could it be apprehended? If it were apprehended by a form that did not exist, then there could not be the relation of *object* and *subject*. For instance, the Object does not exist in the form in which it is envisaged by the Cognition; and the Thing is not envisaged by the Cognition in the form in which it exists; so Cognitions would become objectless, and this would lead to the absurdity of all things being unknown.—From all this it follows that the character of apprehending things in their well-known forms constitutes its very nature; and it has been explained that the well-known form of things consists in *being momentary*, *soul-less* and so forth. Thus Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of *soul-lessness*, not of the nature of the apprehension of the *Soul*.

As regards any other character of it, that can be postulated only by deluded people; and can proceed only from some adventitious circumstances; and not because that is its very nature; in fact it is like the notion of 'serpent' in regard to the Rope. It is for this reason that the host of Afflictions, even in their most blatant forms, are unable to shake the strength of the doctrine of 'No-soul'. Because being due to adventitious causes, the Afflictions are never very firm. As regards the idea of 'No-soul', on the other hand, it forms the very nature of things and is also helped by Means of Cognition; hence it is strong and firm. Hence even though the hostility rests equally in both, yet it is the idea of the 'Soul' on which its contrary fastens itself,—not so the idea of the 'Soul' upon the other, because it is contrary to that.

Even for the man who holds the view that the external world does not exist, Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of 'No-soul', not of the nature of the apprehension of the 'Soul'; because this *Soul* does not exist. For instance, if, on the ground of the object (*No-soul*) not being existent, the Cognition be not regarded as of the nature of the apprehension of that,—then it must be admitted that the Cognition is of the nature of its own apprehension. Otherwise there would be no fixity regarding the Cognition either. The Soul too can be cognised only in the form of 'No-soul',

'without a second' and so forth,—not in any other form; as there would be incongruities as before.

From all this it follows that the Defects and Afflictions are not properties of living beings.

If the mere fact of the Afflictions being produced in the living beings leads to the assumption that they constitute the nature of these beings,—then there could be no possibility of getting rid of them, because there would be nothing definite and absolute regarding them. For instance, the notion of 'Serpent' is produced in the *Rope*, and yet it is set aside by the true Cognition when it appears.

Nor is the means of destroying the Afflictions impossible; because the means is always possible in the shape of the repeated Cognition of the character contrary to the cause of the Afflictions. For instance, those Afflictions, the repeated Cognition of the character contrary to which is quite possible, are capable of having their 'Chain' entirely cut off; as in the case of the *Vrīhi* and other corns;—to this same category belong Love, Hatred and the rest;—hence the means of their destruction is quite possible.

Nor is it right that there can be no knowledge of these Means; because the knowledge of the cause of the Afflictions themselves provides the clear idea of what is hostile to them, in the form of the thing having a form contrary to those. And it has been already shown that it is the idea of 'No-soul' that envisages a form hostile to the Afflictions and destroys them.

Nor again is the upward trend rigidly fixed, as in jumping, because what is generated by each preceding repetition becomes observed in its very nature and hence indestructible, and as such it goes on producing fresh peculiarities in the subsequent efforts; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the substratum is a fixed one. Wisdom and the rest also are produced out of previous homogeneous seeds; not so jumping, etc. (?)—as is going to be explained later on.

Nor is another birth impossible; because it has been proved that the present life is an effect of the previous birth.

Nor is it possible for the Defects to come up again,—like the solidity of Copper and other metals. Because when their contrary, in the shape of the idea of 'No-soul', has become totally absorbed, it can never cease. In the case of the solidity of Copper and other metals on the other hand, its contrary consists in *Fire*; and as this can be there only occasionally, the solidity is there only when the Fire is not there; so that when the Fire disappears, it is only natural that the solidity should re-appear. The same cannot be the case with Impurities (Defects); even on the ceasing of the 'Path', the reappearance of the Defects does not always follow; as such a possibility would be annulled by the instance of *Ashes*. That is to say, after the Wood has been reduced to ashes by contact with Fire,—even if the Fire is removed, there is no reappearance of the Wood; so also in the case of the Defects. Hence your argument is inconclusive.

Then again, being adventitious, the Defects, from the very outset, are inefficient; how then could they have the capacity to set aside the 'Soullessness' that has become entirely absorbed? Certainly the

things cannot be set aside without special effort;—and no effort of intelligent men is possible towards the rejecting or acquiring of anything until the good and bad points of the things to be acquired and rejected have been duly perceived. And until the man has become very much upset, he cannot perceive good points in Defects and bad points in their contrary; for the simple reason that he has not been upset. People whose minds have not become perverted do not acquire things free from Defects *as defective*; they do not acquire the defective thing *as gold.* The idea of 'No-soul', however, can never be defective; because it is always free from all discrepancies and hence always good. For instance, when all impurities have totally disappeared, there cannot come in any discrepancies on the basis of the past perception of things;—nor can the presence of Love, Hatred and the rest bring about discrepancies in the shape of the burning of the Body and the Mind (?); nor any discrepancies relating to Birth, in the shape of Disease, etc. Because there are no Afflictions which alone bring about Birth. Nor is there any discrepancy in the shape of *insipidity*, as appears in the case of worldly pleasures; because the pleasures of calm and peace are never galling. Consequently it cannot be right to make any effort to get rid of this knowledge of 'No-soul'. In fact, if there is any effort, it should be towards not losing hold of the said knowledge; specially because the Intelligence of man is by its nature partial to what is good.—Nor should there be an effort for the acquiring of the Defects; because they are all evil, being the abode of all troubles.

Thus the conception of 'No-soul' is quite possible; and when this reaches its highest stage, it has been found to bring about the clear Cognition of things; just as in the case of the love-lorn young man thinking of his beloved; in the case of such a man, there appear such illusory words as 'I see her', 'I embrace her' and so forth, and there are corresponding bodily reactions also.

Thus then our Reason cannot be regarded as 'inadmissible'.

Nor is our Reason 'Inconclusive'; because the idea of 'No-soul' envisages a well-established fact, and is consequently more powerful than the idea of the 'Soul', which is the reverse of it and hence not strong. Thus there is hostility between these two ideas.

Love and Hatred also proceed on the basis of the notion of 'Soul' which is not well-established; and they are not hostile to one another on account of their envisaging contrary forms. It is not due to mistake; because the two are not brought about by mistakes, and yet they are themselves mistaken, wrong. Nor is the hostility of these two well recognised; specially because both have their source in the notion of the *Soul.* For instance, it is only when one has the notions of 'I' and 'mine' that there appears Hatred against what hampers those, not otherwise;—and when both proceed from one and the same cause,—and are themselves of the nature of cause and effect,—they cannot be destructive of one another; just as there is none in the case of Smoke and Fire, both emanating from the same fuel; or just as in the case of the notion of 'I' and *affection.* If it were not so, there would be incongruities.—As regards their not appearing simultaneously, that is due to the Mind not having the capacity to project

two similar mental images at one and the same time.—Nor is there any hostility between Pleasure and Pain. Because Pleasure and Pain are of two kinds—*subjective* and *objective* ;—those that are *subjective* are associated with Hatred and Apologetic Spirit, and hence stand on the same footing as Love and Hatred, and hence are the reverse of one another ; they envisage the same form of the Soul, and have their source in the idea of the same 'Soul', and they bear to each other the relation of cause and effect ; hence there can be no hostility between them.—As regards the *objective* Pleasure and Pain, they are not restricted to different causes ; hence there can be no hostility between them. Because when Pleasure proceeds from a certain thing, Pain also proceeds from the same thing when one becomes too much addicted to it ; hence their causes are not necessarily different.—It is not so in the case of the ideas of the 'No-soul' and 'Soul'.—Further, in the case of Pleasure and Pain, they are of equal strength, because both proceed under the influence of their objective,—not so between the 'Path' and the 'Defects' ; of which latter the 'Path' is the stronger, because it envisages an accomplished fact ; not so the 'Defects'. Then again, Pleasure and Pain do not continue for a long time ;—not so the idea of 'No-soul' ; because having become absorbed, it never ceases ; as has been explained above. Hence there is no falsity in our Premiss.—As for the two not appearing at the same time, the reason for this has been already explained.

It has been argued that even for those who have cognised the doctrine of 'No-soul' through Inference, Love and Hatred, etc. do appear.—But that is not right ; because the idea of 'No-soul' consists of a mere Idea, clear and distinct, directly envisaging soul-less things, non-conceptual ; and as envisaging well-ascertained things, it is not mistaken ; it serves to uproot the idea of the 'Soul' and has, on that account, been described as 'hostile' to it ; and it does not consist of the pondering of what has been 'heard' (learnt). Because the Impurities, which have become firmly rooted through repeated experience from time without beginning, go on being reduced gradually by the rise of their opposites, and hence come to be destroyed only gradually ; not by merely hearing of the teaching once ; as there is destruction of cold by the mere touch of Fire. When too the idea of 'No-soul', consisting of the cogitation of what has been heard, appears before one, the whole lot of Love and the rest do not remain there at all ; in view of which our Premiss could be false. Because the Buddhists always set aside the presence of Love etc. by thinking of them as *evil*. It is for this reason that these people become recognised as having their greatness unbesmirched. The hostility too of the Idea of 'No-soul' towards love, etc. is affirmed for this same reason ; because they become set aside as soon as the idea of 'No-soul' presents itself. When between two sets of things, one becomes set aside at the presence of the other,—then, on the rise of the latter to its very height, the former becomes absolutely and entirely destroyed ; e.g. the Fire-flame on the appearance of the rise of water ;—and the Defects are liable to destruction in the presence of the idea of 'No-soul' ;—hence when this idea reaches its height, how could the Defects continue to exist ?

Thus our Reason is not 'Inconclusive'. And because it is present whenever the Probandum is present, it is not 'contradictory' either.—(3338)

Thus the 'removal of the Hindrance of Afflictions' having been established, the Author proceeds to describe the 'removal of the Hindrance of Cognisable things'—

TEXT (3339).

ALSO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE PECULIAR CHARACTER OF THE DIRECT PERCEPTION, THE DEFECT ALONG WITH THE DISPOSITIONS CEASES FORTHWITH; AND THUS THROUGH FREEDOM FROM ALL 'OBSTACLES', OMNISCIENCE BECOMES ACCOMPLISHED.—(3339)

COMMENTARY.

'*Direct perception*'—of what?—*of the idea of 'no-soul'*; this is to be understood from the context.—'*The peculiar character*' of this Direct Perception consists in the *complete realisation* of the good and bad points of the said idea and its contrary (respectively), by a long-continued process. It is because this *complete* realisation is wanting in those who are still in the stage of pupilage, that these are not omniscient. And the reason for this lies in the fact that, on account of the absence of the said long-continued practice, the 'Hindrance of Cognisable things' has not been removed; because the said contemplation is still wanting.

The argument may be formulated thus:—That Contemplation which is carried on uninterruptedly with due faith for a long time brings about its fruit in the shape of the direct perception of things as if they were in one's palms,—as for example, the contemplation by the lover of the loved one;—the contemplation by the Merciful Lord of the doctrine of 'No-soul' is fully equipped with all the said three qualifications;—thus there is a reason based on the nature of things.—The Reason here adduced cannot be said to be 'inadmissible'; because it has been already explained that it is always possible for the Merciful one, seeking for some end (such as the welfare of mankind) to have recourse to such activity.—Nor can the Reason be said to be 'Inconclusive'; because the thing under discussion, which is the mental perception of the 'soul-lessness' of all things, is what is sought to be proved as rendered manifest by the aforesaid contemplation with the three qualifications. And the invariable concomitance of the character of the Probans with the character of the Probandum is well-known; specially because the clear manifestation of it does not need any other cause to bring it about; and from this there follows by implication, its invariable concomitance with *omniscience* also; because 'omniscience' is nothing other than the said clear manifestation of the Cognition envisaging the 'Soul-less-ness' of all things. Thus then the invariable concomitance of the contemplation with the expected clear manifestation in general being established, that with 'omniscience' also becomes established by implication. Specially because in connection with the subject in question no other clear manifestation is possible.

By this same argument all those arguments become answered which the other party had brought forward against the existence of the Omniscient Person; because the existence of the Omniscient *Person* is not something to be proved; what is meant to be proved is the clear manifestation of the thing in question in the well-known mind (of that Person).

In this way, *on account of the peculiar character of the direct perception*, the entire effects of the Defects,—in the shape of the deficiencies of Body, Speech and Mind,—become dispelled; and thus both kinds of 'Hindrance' become set aside; and all hindrances having been set aside, Omniscience becomes an accomplished fact.—(3339)

The following might be urged—"It may be that Omniscience in general has been proved; yet the Omniscience of *Buddha* has not been proved".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3340).

IN FACT, THIS (OMNISCIENCE) THAT HAS BEEN PROVED IS THAT OF *Buddha* HIMSELF, AS IT IS HE WHO, AT THE VERY OUTSET, EXPOUNDED THE DOCTRINE OF 'NO-SOUL'. THAT IS WHY HE STANDS AT THE HEAD OF ALL PHILOSOPHERS. —(3340)

COMMENTARY.

The said omniscience has been proved really as belonging to *Buddha*, not to Kapila and others.—"Why"?—*Because at the very outset, it was He who expounded the doctrine of 'No-soul'*.

What is meant is as follows:—By pointing out that all things are included among the five 'Thought Phases', *Buddha* taught, at the very outset, that there is 'No-soul'.—It is this same Teacher whose existence is proved by the Inferential Indicative in the shape of the teaching of 'Soul-less-ness'; and it is this Person who is called by us '*Sugata*' (*Buddha*). Through this teaching of His, complete knowledge of all things, obtainable and discardable, along with the means of obtaining and discarding them, becomes secured. Hence it is through His connection with this complete knowledge that He becomes recognised as omniscient and reliable; hence it is only right and proper that His existence should be proved by persons who desire to understand His teachings. His Omniscience does not rest upon His knowledge of such things as the number of insects in the world; though it is proved that the knowledge of such things also is possible for Him; as His knowledge relates to the Truth relating to all things and is lasting. For instance, by the teaching of the doctrine of 'No-soul',—which is in full accordance with Reason and proofs—His knowledge becomes established—by the teaching that this 'Soul-less-ness' has always been there and will always be there. He has shown that His knowledge of things is lasting;—specially because His teachings relating to the three kinds of Pain and allied things are in agreement with all the nine sections of the scriptures and with the teaching of the 'Three Paths'.—As He has made known the 'Four Truths' by various

means, it is inferred from this that He knows all things; specially as any incapacity there might have been there to comprehend all things has been dispelled. In fact, no one could expound such teachings, who did not know all the good and bad points of things and was not able to expound them. Nor can it be right to assert that "He has expounded these teachings after having learnt it from the Veda; as it has been shown that the Veda is the work of a human being.

From all this we conclude that the Blessed Lord stands at the head of all Philosophers, because of the superiority of His knowledge of things.—(3340)

For this same reason there can be no equality between the Blessed Lord of the superior knowledge and any one else. This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3341-3342).

THERE CAN BE NO EQUALITY BETWEEN THIS TEACHER ENDOWED WITH THE TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF TRUTH, AND OTHER TEACHERS WHO HAVE EXPOUNDED FALSE DOCTRINES. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THESE LATTER IS NOT VOUCHED FOR BY ANY MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION, AND THEIR WORD IS BESET WITH ANNULMENT; THEREFORE THE CAPACITY TO KNOW SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS MUST BE VERY FAR AWAY FROM THEM.—(3341-3342)

COMMENTARY.

There is no reason to prove that these other Teachers possess superior knowledge. If there were such reason at all, it could only be in the form of the Inferential Indicative in the form of their own Word; and their Word has been found to be asserting things contrary to all forms of valid Cognition; how then could such Word prove the presence, in them, of superior knowledge? —(3341-3342)

It might be urged that—"The word of *Buddha* also is contrary to all forms of valid Cognition".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3343).

[THE WORDS OF *Buddha* ARE] WELL-KNIT,—THEY PROPOUND A COMPATIBLE METHOD,—AND SET FORTH WHAT IS USEFUL FOR MEN; EVEN IN REGARD TO PERCEPTIBLE THINGS, THEY ARE NOT, IN THE LEAST DEGREE, ANNULLED BY THE TWO MEANS (AND FORMS) OF COGNITION.—(3343)

COMMENTARY.

'*Well-knit*',—the various sentences form one composite whole comprehending one and the same purpose; they are not disconnected, like such stray sentences as 'ten pomegranates', 'six cakes' and so forth.

A '*compatible*'—i.e. practicable—'*method*'—in the shape of meditating upon *soul-less-ness*—is taught in them; and they do not lay down such impracticable methods as the securing of the crest-jewel of the king of serpents.

'*They set forth what is useful for men*'—in the shape of Prosperity and the Highest good; they do not set forth such useless things as the investigation of the subject of the teeth of crows.

Says the Opponent—"All this is applicable to the words of *Kapila* and other teachers also".

Answer:—'*Even in regard to, etc., etc.*'—'*Perceptible*'—i.e. regarded as amenable to Perception and Inference;—'*not annulled by the two means of Cognition*'—Perception and Inference; because the real state of things is exactly as spoken of in the words.

That is to say, what is regarded as amenable to Perception is the five-fold group of *Thought-phases*—in the shape of the conceptions of (*a*) the *Blue* and other objects, (*b*) Pleasure, Pain and other Feelings, (*c*) the causes of these, (*d*) the Apprehension, (*e*) Love and Hate, etc.,—and it cannot be otherwise than what is asserted by *Buddha*; just like the *imperceptibility* of things regarded as imperceptible; so also of what other parties have regarded as perceptible,—such as the various varieties of Colour, Sound and the rest, Pleasure, etc., and Substances, Actions, Universals and Conjunctions;—also such things as functioning through the potencies of things, and the rest are regarded as amenable to Inference,—all these are exactly as asserted (by the words of *Buddha*). Similarly too, the four 'Noble Paths', which are not regarded as amenable to Inference, are actually found to be not so amenable; just as the Soul and other things which are regarded by other parties as amenable to Inference functioning through the potency of things.

The particle '*api*', also', indicates that the words are not otherwise, even in regard to things that are *not perceptible*. For instance, what the words of *Buddha* have taught, for the removal of Love, etc., is the doctrine of 'No-soul' as contrary to and counteracting the doctrine of 'Soul' which is at the root of that Love and Hate, etc. and the things emanating therefrom;—and they have not taught—like the words of *Kapila* and others—such means as Bathing, performance of the *Agnihotra* and so forth, which are not incompatible with the root cause of Love, Hate, etc.—(3343)

The following *Text* points out that it was for this reason that the Blessed Lord declared that—'This is to be accepted by the wise, after proper testing, as in the case of gold':—

TEXT (3344).

[THE WORDS OF BUDDHA] ARE FREE FROM IMPURITIES, LIKE GOLD TESTED BY 'HEATING', 'CUTTING' AND 'TOUCHING'; AND, LIKE THE GOLD, THEY DO NOT UNDERGO ANY CHANGE IN THE PROCESS OF TESTING AND INVESTIGATION. —(3344)

COMMENTARY.

Just as gold, which is free from all impurities, pure, when tested by 'Heating', etc., does not undergo any change,—so also the jewel-like words of

the Blessed Lord,—when tested—(*a*) by '*Perception*', which is like 'Heating' —(*b*) by '*Inference*' based on the capacity of things, which is like 'Touching —and (*c*) by *Inference* based on the Reliable Word, which is like 'cutting',— do not undergo any change. It is thus only right that the activity of intelligent men should proceed on the basis of such *Reliable Word* only,—not of any other. This is the purport of the Test.—(3344)

The following *Texts* point out the similarity of the Lord's Word to jewels:—

TEXTS (3345–3347).

THE JEWEL-LIKE WORD OF *Buddha*, WHOSE APPEARANCE IS CONDUCIVE TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENTIRE MASS OF THE DARKNESS OF WRONG NOTIONS, IS NEVER GOT AT BY MEN BESET WITH SINS. THAT IS WHY WISE MEN DECLARED *Buddha* ALONE TO BE OMNISCIENT, —COGNISANT OF ALL SUCH THINGS AS PRIMORDIAL MATTER AND SPIRITS; HE HAS BEEN CALLED THE 'GREAT PHYSICIAN'. —THUS THERE IS THE DEFINITELY CERTAIN COGNITION THAT *Buddha* IS OMNISCIENT, NOT *Kapila*. THOUGH THIS COGNITION HAS BEEN CLEARLY SPOKEN OF, IT HAS NOT BEEN UNDERSTOOD BY DULL-WITTED MEN.—(3345–3347)

COMMENTARY.

'*Wrong ideas*' are the 'darkness'; conducive to the destruction of that is the appearance of the Lord's Word.

'*By men beset with sins*'—i.e. by men who have no piety.

'*Spoken of*'—as brought about by the Inferential Indicative in the shape of the True Word.—(3345–3347)

It has been argued by the other party, under *Text* 3150, that—"In regard to one matter, of Arithmetic for instance, all beings are found to be truthful and no distinction is found among them, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3348).

FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, IT IS ALSO LEARNT WHEREIN LIES THE DISTINCTION OF THE 'SUPPRESSOR OF DESIRES' (*Buddha*) FROM *Ṛṣabha* AND OTHER INCOMPETENT TEACHERS.—(3348)

COMMENTARY.

The above described 'Superiority of Knowledge' of the Blessed Lord, the 'Suppressor of Māra' (Desire) having established His 'Distinction' (superiority) over *Ṛṣabha*, *Vardhamāna* and others—it is not open to you,

if you are truthful, to assert that 'no Distinction is perceived'. Such is the upshot of the whole.—(3348)

It might be urged that—"on finding, in the one domain of Arithmetic that both sets of Teachers are equally right, we assert them to be equal".—

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXT (3349).

What fool is there who will regard a Person who knows the letters of the alphabet only, as conversant with the essence of all the sciences,—merely on the ground of his possessing equal knowledge of food?—(3349)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued by the other party, under *Texts* 3151 *et seq.*, that—"The Reason that the Buddhist adduces in support of the Omniscience of one Person will be available in the case of other Persons also, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3350).

Thus then, that Reason by which the Omniscience of one Person is established is *not* available in the case of another Person;—because the essence of that Reason is absent in this latter case.—(3350)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tat*'—Therefore; thus.

'*The essence of that Reason*';—though the mere verbal expression of the Reason may be applicable,—in the form 'Because they are Teachers of the *Syādvāda* and other doctrines which are true and all-pervading [therefore *Jina* and others should be regarded as *Omniscient*]';—yet the essential factor of that Reason which is concomitant with the reality of things, is absent in such reasonings,—which therefore cannot be available for the case of *Kapila* and others. It is only when one real thing is concomitant with another real thing,—and not merely a verbal expression—that brings about the right apprehension of things.—(3350)

It has been argued by the other party, under *Text* 3152, that—"The objections that the Buddhists forcibly urge against the arguments in

support of the Omniscience of *Jina,* are also urged by the *Jainas* against the other party, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3351).

THUS, THOSE OBJECTIONS THAT THE BUDDHISTS, WITHOUT ANGER, URGE AGAINST THE ASSERTION OF THE OMNISCIENCE OF *Jina*,—THE *Jainas* ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO URGE (AGAINST THE BUDDHIST).—(3351)

COMMENTARY.

'*Without anger*'—Free from anger. In fact the Buddhists proceed to put forward those arguments only through pity for you, not, through anger or arrogance, like yourselves.

'*This*'—Because it has been shown that the *Syādvāda* and other teachings propounded by him are defective.—(3351)

It has been argued under *Text* 3153,—" How can any definite conclusion be arrived at through such reasonings and counter-reasonings, which are uncertain and swallowed by their own reflections ? "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3352-3353).

BECAUSE THE TRUTH THAT HAS BEEN FOUND IN THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE, THROUGH PROOFS WITH WELL-ESTABLISHED PREMISES,—HAS NOT BEEN SO FOUND IN ANY OTHER DOCTRINE,—THEREFORE PLEASE DRAW AS MANY DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS AS YOU CAN, THROUGH VARIOUS REASONINGS AND COUNTER-REASONINGS, WHICH ARE WELL-FOUNDED AND NOT SWALLOWED BY THEIR OWN REFLECTIONS.—(3352-3353)

COMMENTARY.

'*Yat*'—*Because.*

'*Siddhapratibandhēna*'—By means of Premises asserting identity and the causal relations, on the strength of the real state of things.

'*Tēna*'—Therefore.—(3352-3353)

It has been argued, under *Text* 3157,—" Who can reasonably accept the existence of a Person who can be regarded by such reasons as 'being cognisable', etc. etc. ? "

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3354-3355).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, BETWEEN THE CHARACTER OF 'KNOWING ALL THINGS' AND THAT OF 'BEING COGNISABLE, ETC.'—IN FACT 'COGNISABILITY' IS PROVED BY THE 'ABSENCE OF INCOGNISABILITY', NOT BY THE 'ABSENCE OF OMNISCIENCE'; THIS LATTER THEREFORE RETAINS ITS CHARACTER.—(3354-3355)

COMMENTARY.

When one desires to establish the denial of one thing by the affirmation of another, he should affirm that which may be incompatible either directly or indirectly, with what is to be denied,—and not that which is not so incompatible. If it were not so, then the affirmation of anything at random might lead to the denial of all things. In the case in question, there is no incompatibility, direct or indirect, between 'Omniscience' and 'cognisability'. For instance, incompatibility between any two things can be of only two kinds—(1) in the form of mutual exclusion, the presence and absence of one implying the absence and presence, respectively, of the other,—e.g. between *Existence* and *Non-existence*, or between *Succession* and *Non-succession*; and (2) in the form of impossibility of co-existence; e.g. between *Fire* and *Coolness*.—That the former kind of 'incompatibility' is not there between 'Omniscience' and 'cognisability' is shown by the words—'*Cognisability is proved, etc. etc.*'—It has been pointed out on a previous occasion that there is 'incompatibility' of the kind of *mutual exclusiveness* between those two things only of which the cognition of one means the non-cognition of the other; and 'cognisability' is there, as excluding, not 'Omniscience', but 'incognisability'.—(3354-3355)

The following *Text* shows that the second kind of incompatibility also is not there in the case in question:—

TEXT (3356).

OMNISCIENCE HAS NEVER BEFORE BEEN SEEN TO APPEAR ON THE APPEARANCE OF ITS COMPLETE CAUSE,—BY VIRTUE OF WHICH IT COULD BE SAID TO CEASE ON THE APPEARANCE OF THE CHARACTER OF 'BEING AN ENTITY' AND SO FORTH.—(3356)

COMMENTARY.

It is only when between two things, one does not appear even when its Cause is present in its perfect condition,—by reason of the presence of the other,—that the two are said to be 'incompatible', in the sense of *never co-existing*;—as regards the case in question, Omniscience has never before been seen to appear on the appearance of its Cause in perfect condition,—by virtue of which it could cease on the appearance of the character of 'being an entity'.—(3356)

Question :—" Why is it that Omniscience has not come into existence on the presence of a Cause ? "

Answer :—

TEXT (3357).

BEING *featureless* AND *uncognised* EVEN BY ITSELF, IT CAN NEVER COME INTO EXISTENCE. THUS IT WOULD MEAN THAT BEFORE ITS APPEARANCE, THE *Omniscience* ACTUALLY EXISTED (AND WAS NOT BROUGHT INTO EXISTENCE BY ANY CAUSE).—(3357)

COMMENTARY.

If you hold the view that " Omniscience disappears on the appearance of the character of ' being an entity ' and ' cognisability '," —then, in that case, it would mean that, before the appearance of the character of ' being an entity ', etc. the Omniscience was ' not an entity ' and was not ' cognisable ' even by itself ; and thus, (*a*) being a *non-entity*, it would be *featureless*, and (*b*) being *incognisable*, there would be no *self-cognition* of it ; which means that the *Omniscience* is never brought about, and does not exist at all ; how then can it be said to have appeared *previously* and then ceased ? Certainly there can be no appearance, coming into existence, of what is *featureless*. Nor can there be any basis for the existence of what is *not cognised* ; as all notions of the existence of things are dependent upon their being *cognised*. What is meant by all this is that the reasoning of the Opponent involves self-contradiction.

Then again, if its previous appearance is admitted, then this *appearance* itself, without any effort on our part, establishes the existence of Omniscience ; hence it cannot be right to deny it ; otherwise there would be self-contradiction.—This is what is pointed out in the Text, by the words—' *Before its appearance, etc. etc.*' ;—i.e. if it is admitted that the *Omniscience* existed before the *appearance*.—(3357)

It might be argued that—" It may be that *Incognisability* and the rest are not incompatible with *Omniscience* : even so they indicate the non-existence of the Omniscient Person."

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXT (3358).

THE AFFIRMATION OF WHAT IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE CANNOT BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS SETTING ASIDE THE OTHER. OTHERWISE THE PRESENCE OF COLOUR MIGHT MEAN THE ABSENCE OF TASTE.—(3358)

COMMENTARY.

Some people argue as follows :—" Even though ' Cognisability ', etc. are not incompatible with ' Omniscience ', yet the character of ' being

a speaker' is certainly incompatible with it; because Omniscience cannot co-exist along with 'Speakership', of which 'Conceptual Content' is the indirect Cause; because on the principle that 'one cannot utter words without previous cogitation and thinking', Conceptual Content is the cause of *Speaking*; and as all Conceptual Content is associated with verbal expression, it cannot apprehend the forms of things,—this latter being amenable to only such cognition as is free from Conceptual Content; thus during the conceptual stage, there being no apprehension of the form of things, there can be no *Omniscience.* Thus Omniscience being contrary to (incompatible with) *Speakership,* the presence of one would mean the absence of the other, due to the non-apprehension of its Cause. So that our Reason is not 'Inconclusive'.—This Reason, 'Speakership' is implied by the term '*ādi*' in the sentence 'one who has the characters of being knowable, cognisable, etc. etc.' (under *Text* 3157)."

This is the view anticipated in *Texts* 3359-3360, and answered in *Texts* 3361-3362, as follows:—

TEXTS (3359–3362).

IN THIS MATTER, THE 'SPEAKERSHIP' OF THE LORD BEING IMPLIED BY THE FIRST WORD UTTERED BY HIM, A CERTAIN PARTY THINKS THAT THERE IS AN INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SUCH 'SPEAKERSHIP' AND 'OMNISCIENCE', AND HENCE CONCLUDES THAT THERE CAN BE NO 'OMNISCIENCE'; BECAUSE THERE CAN BE 'SPEAKERSHIP' ONLY WHEN THERE IS 'CONCEPTUAL CONTENT', WHILE ONE COULD BE 'OMNISCIENT' ONLY IF THERE WERE NO 'CONCEPTUAL CONTENT'; AS A MATTER OF FACT, (HE URGES) AN ENTITY IS NEVER APPREHENDED BY A COGNITION ASSOCIATED WITH VERBAL EXPRESSION.—AS REGARDS THIS REASONING ALSO, THOSE WHO THINK THAT THE 'SPEAKERSHIP' OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON FOLLOWS FROM COGITATION AND THINKING, DO NOT ADMIT THE OMNISCIENT PERSON ON THE GROUND OF HIS BEING A 'SPEAKER'; NOR ON THE GROUND OF HIS CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE; IN CASE, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO 'CONCEPTUAL CONTENT', THERE CAN BE NO 'SPEAKERSHIP'.—(3359–3362)

COMMENTARY.

Some people hold that the 'Speakership' of the Lord is due to the appearance of the 'Conceptual Content'; while others are of the opinion that, on account of previous impetus, the Lord proceeds to speak even without any conceptual idea.

Under the former view, if what is meant to be proved is that 'there can be no Omniscience during the conceptual state', then the argument is superfluous; because these people themselves admit that in the conceptual state, the Lord is *not* omniscient.—If, on the other hand, what is meant to be

proved is the absence of Omniscience in the non-conceptual state, then the Reason adduced is 'inadmissible'; because in that state, there is no *speaking* at all; for the simple reason that in that state there is no Conceptual Content that could prompt the *Speaking*.—(3359–3362)

Says the Opponent:—"If it is held that in the *conceptual* state, the Lord is *not* omniscient,—then His words would be words uttered by one who is not omniscient, and as such, not reliable."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3363–3365).

EVEN SO, IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO REGARD HIS WORDS AS THOSE UTTERED BY ONE WHO IS NOT-OMNISCIENT; BECAUSE HIS NON-OMNISCIENCE HAS BEEN DISCARDED BY HIS OMNISCIENCE; HENCE THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT. FOR INSTANCE, HAVING EXPERIENCED HEAT, ONE SPEAKS OF IT [AND THIS SPEECH IS RECONCILED, IN AGREEMENT, WITH THE PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OR COGNITION]; FROM THIS THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT WITH THE REAL STATE OF THINGS, BECAUSE THE SPEECH IS THE OUTCOME OF THE DIRECT COGNITION OF THOSE THINGS. THUS THEN, AT THE TIME WHEN THE LORD IS OMNISCIENT, THE REASON ADDUCED BY THE OTHER PARTY IS NOT PRESENT; AND AS REGARDS THE TIME OF ORDINARY USAGE, HIS ARGUMENT WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS.—(3363–3365)

COMMENTARY.

Though at that time the Lord is not omniscient,—yet that does not mean that His words are such as have been uttered by one who is *not-omniscient*;—why?—because this *non-omniscience* has been set aside by Omniscience. It is on this account that the Words in question become *reliable* also,—having been prompted by the Conceptual Content brought about by the force of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person, and therefore connected, indirectly, with the real state of things; this *reliability* is just like the reliability of the Inferential Conception.

An example is cited in support of the said idea—'*For instance, etc. etc.*'

'*Tasmāt*'—from the speech coming after the experiencing of heat.

'*The speech is the outcome, etc. etc.*'—i.e. because the Conceptual Content has been brought about, indirectly, by the direct cognition of the Heat.

The following might be urged—"If the Omniscient Person has *Conceptual Cognitions*, then there is likelihood of His being mistaken; because, by its very nature, Conception is *mistaken*, wrong, because it appears as the Cognition of a thing as what is not that thing".

This is not so. The Lord could be mistaken, only if He did not know the distinction between the *Real* and the *Imposed* (Unreal). As a matter of

fact, however, He recognises the object of the *Conceptual* Cognition as only *imposed* (unreal), while He looks upon the real external object,—which is envisaged by the *Non-conceptual* Cognition,—as something quite different, and *real*; how then can He be said to be 'mistaken'?

"If He is not *mistaken*, why does He *impose* (fancy) things during the conceptual state?"

Not so; because He is cognisant all the time of the means whereby speech is prompted. As a matter of fact, He does not perceive anything else,—apart from the imposing conception—as prompting the speech;—nor does He apprehend any other connotation of the Words, apart from what is *imposed*; hence, knowing the means whereby speech is prompted, He takes pity on the world, and, without expounding to others the things as He has actually perceived them, He cannot sit idle; and being urged by the desire to expound them, He creates the *imposing conception*,—as the means prompting speech,—as also the *imposed*, in the shape of the connotation of Words.

All this objection the Author will bring up later on and answer it. We have introduced it in the present context, because it had some bearing upon it.

For the same reasons, it cannot be right to regard the Omniscient Person as affected by *Love*, on the ground of His *speakership*. Because speech can proceed from other causes also. Speaking, Movement and such actions are not always due to Love, etc.; they are due to the mere *desire to speak*; and this *Desire to speak* is possible also in the Person devoid of Love, being due to His mercy. Hence the Reason adduced is not true.

"*Mercy* itself is only a form of *Love*."

Not so; because Mercy does not bring about any undesirable effects; while *Love* has been described as that attachment of the mind which appertains to things beset with impurities, and which is indicated by the notion of 'I' and 'mine' and of one's 'lasting happiness'; while Hate is the desire to harm, against anything that injures the 'me' and 'mine';—and the notion of 'I' and 'mine' is sheer delusion; not so *Mercy*; because *Mercy* appears, even without any notion of 'I', through the repeated perception of particular forms of Pain and Suffering. It is on this ground that the Scriptures have asserted that Persons free from Love and Attachment are moved by Friendliness and other feelings that are based entirely upon *Dharma*, etc.—(3363–3365)

The following might be urged—"If we had wanted to prove only that the knowledge of all things is not always present before Him, then perhaps our argument might have been superfluous, seeking to prove what is already admitted. As a matter of fact however, what we mean to prove is the fact that He does not possess the capacity to know in detail the truth relating to all things; hence our reasoning is not superfluous; nor is our Reason 'Inadmissible'; because what our Reason means is the *capacity to use*."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3366-3367).

EVEN IF YOU DENY THE CAPACITY TO KNOW ALL THINGS, YOUR REASON STILL REMAINS OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF ITS PRESENCE IN THE CONTRARY OF THE PROBANDUM BEING DOUBTFUL.—EVEN IF YOU WISH YOUR REASON TO CONSIST IN THE *capacity to use*, THE SAME DEFECT, OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS PRESENCE IN THE CONTRARY OF THE PROBANDUM, PERSISTS.—(3366-3367)

COMMENTARY.

In both cases there is nothing to set aside the possibility of the presence of the Reason in the contrary of the Probandum ; and this doubt renders the Reason 'Inconclusive'.—(3366-3367)

Other Buddhists have held that words proceed from the Blessed Lord, even without conceptual content ;—with reference to this view, the Author says—

TEXTS (3368-3369).

'EVEN WHEN *Tāyin* (BUDDHA) IS FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT, HIS TEACHINGS GO ON UNDER THE FORCE OF THE INITIAL MOMENTUM, —IN THE MANNER OF THE REVOLUTIONS OF THE WHEEL' ;—EVEN AGAINST THE WISE MEN WHO HOLD THIS VIEW, THE ARGUMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY IS OF NO AVAIL.—(3368-3369)

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the Potter's wheel, even after the turning by the stick has ceased, its revolution continues under the force of the momentum imparted to it ; similarly in the case of the Blessed Lord, even after the cessation of the entire web of conceptual content, His Teaching goes on under the force of the momentum originally imparted by His previous Piety.

Such is the view that has been held by some 'wise men'—i.e. the Idealist Buddhists.

As against these also, the Reason adduced by the opponent remains clearly 'inadmissible'.—(3368-3369)

The following might be urged :—"Under the view just referred to, every thing is a mere reflection of one's own apprehension (Idea), hence there can be no *real* 'speakership' at all in the case of any man ; in fact, even when he does not speak, the reflected ideation appears in another man ; so that the person remains the dominating cause, and hence people come to regard him as the 'speaker' ; and it is this popularly conceived 'speakership' that has been adduced by us as the Reason (for *Buddha* being *not-omniscient*) ;

either the Reason or the 'subject' of our reasoning is not in accordance with our own doctrine, but in accordance with the popular notion of things. Consequently there can be no 'Inadmissibility' in the Reason adduced by us".

The answer to this is as follows :—

TEXTS (3369-3370).

THE 'SPEAKERSHIP' THAT IS POPULARLY CONCEIVED BY MEN,—IF THAT IS PUT FORWARD AS THE REASON, THEN IT WOULD BE OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF HAVING ITS PRESENCE IN THE CONTRARY OF THE PROBANDUM POSSIBLE.—(3369-3370)

COMMENTARY.

Here also, its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being doubtful, the Reason becomes 'Inconclusive'.—(3369-3370)

The following *Text* clarifies that 'Inadmissibility' which the opponent has urged against the doctrine of the Idealist :—

TEXT (3370).

"WHEN THE DOCTRINE IN QUESTION HAS NO REASON IN ITS SUPPORT, —WHAT SORT OF 'INADMISSIBILITY' WOULD THERE BE IN REGARD TO IT?"—(3370)

COMMENTARY.

The opponent argues as follows :—" Only those arguments in support of, or against, anything, are admissible which set forth ideas accepted with certainty of conviction by both parties,—not what is not accepted by either party, or what is doubtful; because arguments of the latter sort would need further arguments in support of them. When, thus, the doctrine of the Idealist is one that is not vouched for by any Means of Right Cognition, how can Inadmissibility be urged (against any Reason urged against it)? A conclusion does not become vitiated by the arbitrary assumption of admissibility or inadmissibility; it is effective only when these are vouched for by proofs; and as a matter of fact the doctrine of Idealism has not been

established by any Means of Right Cognition; in fact it has been rejected in detail".—(3370)

The answer to the above is as follows:—

TEXTS (3371–3373).

OUR ANSWER IS AS FOLLOWS:—IF 'SPEAKERSHIP' BY ITSELF, IS MEANT TO BE THE REASON, THEN IT IS ONE WHOSE *substratum is unknown*,—OR ITS 'INADMISSIBILITY' IS SUSPECTED. IN FACT, THE EXACT CONNOTATION OF THE WORD BEING DOUBTFUL, THE FACT REMAINS THAT IT IS ONE WHOSE 'INADMISSIBILITY' IS SUSPECTED. CONSEQUENTLY, IF YOU HAVE TO URGE SUCH AN ARGUMENT, YOU CAN DO SO ONLY AS A *Reductio ad absurdum*.—AND IN SUCH AN ARGUMENT WHAT HAS TO BE URGED MUST BE WHAT IS KNOWABLE ONLY FROM THE SCRIPTURES (OF THE OTHER PARTY); AND THERE CAN BE NO OTHER MEANS OF PROVING ITS EXISTENCE.—(3371–3373)

COMMENTARY.

There are only two alternative views possible—(1) 'speakership' may be a Reason, independently by itself—or (2) it may be in the nature of a *Reductio ad absurdum*.—Under the former view, the substratum of the qualification would be 'unknown'; hence the Reason would be 'unknown', 'inadmissible'. If the substratum is meant to be, not qualified, but in general,—even so, until the 'speakership' has been proved to the satisfaction of the other party, its admissibility must remain doubtful; in accordance with the principle that a reason can prove a conclusion only when it is itself admitted by both parties.

'*Asya*'—i.e. of 'speakership'.

Thus in order to avoid this difficulty, you have to admit that what you have urged is only a *Reductio ad absurdum*. But even as regards this *Reductio ad Absurdum*, what has to be put forward as the Reason is only that character which cannot bear any scrutiny and what is knowable only from the scriptures of the other party; as the putting forward of such a Reason would expose the self-contradiction on the part of the opponent;—and no attempt should be made to prove such a character; as that could serve no useful purpose.

And so far as the case in question is concerned, 'speakership' is not a character knowable only from the scriptures of the other party. So that your Reason remains 'Inadmissible' under both alternatives.—(3371–3373)

The following *Texts* sum up the author's position and point out that the assertions of the opponents are contrary to the real state of things:—

TEXTS (3374-3377).

WHEN REASONS SUCH AS 'BEING KNOWN', 'BEING AN ENTITY', 'BEING' AND SO FORTH ARE INCAPABLE OF SETTING ASIDE THE OMNISCIENT PERSON,—WHO IS THERE WHO WILL NOT ADMIT HIS EXISTENCE ?—THUS NO REASON, EITHER TEMPORAL OR SCRIPTURAL, THAT THE UPHOLDER OF THE VEDA CAN HAVE IN HIS MOUTH, IS CAPABLE OF REMOVING THE POISON OF THE AWFUL SERPENT IN THE SHAPE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE *Shākya*.—IN FACT, THE FEEBLE AND DULL-WITTED BRĀHMAṆA, EVEN WHEN MERELY GLANCED AT BY THE POISON FROM THE EYES (OF THAT SERPENT), BECOMES UNABLE EVEN TO BREATHE,—WHAT TO SAY OF SETTING IT ASIDE ! ANY REASONING, EVEN WHEN SOUND, BECOMES UGLY IN THE MOUTH OF THE VEDIC SCHOLAR,—ON ACCOUNT OF ITS ABUNDANCE IN A LOWLY SUBSTRATUM ; JUST LIKE THE STRING OF BEADS PLACED AT THE FEET.—(3374-3377)

COMMENTARY.

'*Who will not admit His existence ?*'—i.e. as a possibility. That is to say, when the mere absence of proofs to the contrary establishes that possibility.—This matter may rest here.

There is no wonder that the unsound reasoning appearing in the mouth of the Vedic Scholar does not shine ; what *is* strange, however, is that even a sound reason when asserted by you, fails to shine, on account of the defective character of its substratum.—(3374-3377)

Question :—'How so ?'
Answer :—

TEXTS (3378-3379).

HE CANNOT ASSERT EVEN THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE CONCOMITANCE BETWEEN *Smoke* AND *Fire* ; BECAUSE, UNDER HIS VIEW, *Smoke* EXISTS ELSEWHERE ALSO ; IN FACT, BEING OF THE ONE UNIFORM NATURE OF 'ENTITY', IT EXISTS IN THE OCEAN ALSO ; AND IF FIRE EXISTS THERE ALSO, THEN WHERE WOULD THE *absence* (OF THE PROBANS) LIE ?—(3378-3379)

COMMENTARY.

That the birth of Smoke is related to Fire, and that it is invariably concomitant with Fire is known even to the veriest cowherd ; and yet you, by describing the whole world as really one and uniform in the shape of 'Entity', are unable to say that Smoke is infallible in its concomitance with Fire ; because under your view, in the form of 'Entity', it is present in water also.

"Even so there would be concomitance with Fire."

Answer:—'*If Fire exists, etc. etc.*'—If it is admitted that, under the principle of all things being one and the same, the Ocean is of the same nature as *Fire*,—then, in the proving of *Fire, Water* could not be regarded as *that where the Probandam* (*Fire*) *is known to be absent*; and thus there being nothing where the Probandum is absent, on what basis would the Probans, Smoke, be non-existent where the Probandum is absent?—(3378-3379)

TEXT (3380).

WHY SHOULD NOT THEN THERE BE RECOGNITION OF THE FORM AND OF THE EFFECTS OF FIRE IN WATER ALSO?—THE ONLY OTHER ALTERNATIVE IS THAT THE NATURE OF THE TWO THINGS BEING DISTINCT, THE DIFFERENCE AMONG THINGS MUST BE REAL.—(3380)

COMMENTARY.

If the view is that Fire is really present in Water,—then why is there no recognition of the form of the Fire in Water,—or the recognition of its effects, in the shape of Burning, Cooking and the like?

If it is said that some sort of difference is also accepted,—then the answer is that '*the only other, etc. etc.*'—This has been discussed in detail, under the chapter on *Syādvāda*. So it may be allowed to rest here.—(3380)

It has been argued by the opponent under *Text* 3158, that "The man who assumes the existence of the Omniscient Person knowing all things through a single means of cognition may himself apprehend all things like taste, odour and the rest through the eyes alone."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3381–3389).

THE ONLY EVIDENCE THAT IS SUGGESTED IS THAT OF THE *mental* COGNITION OF OMNISCIENCE AS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE REPEATED PRACTICE OF THE 'TRUTH' RELATING TO ALL THINGS;—AND NOT THE ORDINARY *Visual* AND OTHER COGNITIONS. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOW CAN IT BE ASSERTED THAT THE SAID PERSON SHOULD COGNISE TASTE, ETC. THROUGH THE EYE?—AS REGARDS *Mental Cognition* OF THINGS LIKE COLOUR AND THE REST, IT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED, WITHOUT DISPUTE, EVEN BY THE OTHER PARTY; IN FACT, IT IS ON THE BASIS OF THIS MENTAL COGNITION THAT THE REMEMBRANCE OF COLOUR AND OTHER THINGS HAS BEEN SAID TO BE PRODUCED.—DURING DREAMS ALSO, THERE IS *Mental Cognition* IN THE SHAPE OF THE APPREHENSION OF ALL THINGS.—THUS THEN, THE OMNISCIENT PERSON BEING POSTULATED ON THE BASIS OF *Mental Cognition*, THE

SCOPE OF WHICH IS NOT RESTRICTED,—HOW COULD HE COGNISE TASTE, ETC. THROUGH THE EYE? THIS OBJECTION MIGHT APPLY, IF HE WERE HELD TO KNOW ALL THINGS THROUGH THE *Eye* ITSELF. AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER, HE DOES COGNISE TASTE AND OTHER THINGS COLLECTIVELY, THROUGH THE *Mind*.—EVEN IN CASES WHERE SOME SUPERIOR PECULIARITY IS FOUND (IN THE COGNITIONS OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON), IN REGARD TO THE PERCEPTION OF SUBTLE AND REMOTE THINGS,—IT IS ALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE SAID MIND AND MENTAL CONCEPTS; AND IT IS NOT DUE TO THE FUNCTIONING OF THE AUDITORY ORGAN ON *Colour*; ALL THESE UNDESIRABLE CONTINGENCIES THAT OTHER PEOPLE HAVE URGED AGAINST US ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO US AT ALL; BECAUSE ALL THE SUPERIORITY AND PECULIARITY LIES IN THE *mental cognition* ITSELF, AND IT DOES NOT LIE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS COGNITION. THUS THEN FOR US, THE THINGS THAT WERE COGNISED IN THE PAST BY CERTAIN MEANS OF COGNITION ARE PRECISELY THE SAME THAT ARE COGNISED NOW BY THE SAME MEANS OF COGNITION.—(3381–3389)

COMMENTARY.

If it had been held (by us) that the Visual and other Sense-perceptions apprehend all things, then there might have been room for the objection that has been urged. As a matter of fact, however, when we postulate the Omniscient Person we do so on the basis of the fact that at one and the same time He knows all things through *Mental Cognition*,—which apprehends all entities, and which is as good as *Perception*, on account of its distinctness and its being in agreement with the real state of things,—real *Mental Cognition* having been brought about by the Practice of Meditation upon the Truth relating to the impermanent and other characters of all things; and we do not hold that He apprehends all things through the Visual or other Sense-perceptions.

It cannot be right to assert that—"Mental Cognition is not known to apprehend all things". Because you have yourself explained that there is Remembrance of Colour, Sound and other things; and Remembrance is certainly a *Mental Cognition*.—Then again, it is a well-known fact that in dreams, there is cognition of Colour and other things; so that the denial of *Mental Cognition* is impossible. Consequently, the peculiarities in the cognition of the Omniscient Person falling well within the scope of Mental Cognition, what you have urged does not affect our position at all.—(3381–3389)

If there is an Idealist who holds the view that the Omniscient Person apprehends all things by Perception through the Eye and other sense-organs themselves,—even, under his view, all notions and impressions of disability having been removed, all cognitions become applicable to all things and consequently all-pervading; as it is only the said Disability that goes to

restrict the scope of cognitions. When, therefore, that Disability has been removed, how could there be any restriction upon the scope of Cognitions ?

With this opinion in view, the Author makes the following statement:—

TEXTS (3390–3392).

OR, ALL COGNITION, WHEN PURE, WOULD, AS A RULE, APPREHEND ALL THINGS; THOUGH IN A CERTAIN CASE, THERE MAY BE SOME PECULIARITY IN THE RESULTANT OF THE COGNITION, DUE TO PARTICULAR CAUSES. FOR INSTANCE, THE *Āmalakī* IS FOUND TO YIELD A SMALLER FRUIT; BECAUSE THE ĀMALAKĪ GROWING IN THE DESERT HAS BEEN FOUND TO YIELD A SMALL FRUIT, IT DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW THAT IT WILL ALWAYS, IN OTHER PLACES ALSO, PRODUCE FRUITS OF THE SAME SMALL SIZE.—SIMILARLY, THERE IS THE ASSERTION THAT SERPENTS HEAR THROUGH THEIR EYES.—IN FACT, THE CAPACITIES OF ACTION BELONGING TO ALL THINGS ARE WONDERFUL AND ANYTHING MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM.—(3390–3392)

COMMENTARY.

The nature of things is found to vary and become restricted under the influence of a variety of causes; it is not right therefore to deduce that a certain thing will always retain the same character that has been perceived in it once; e.g. on seeing that the *Āmalakī* fruits growing in deserts are very small in size, no sane man can conclude that in all places,—even though there may be diverse causes operating,—they would be the same.—Hence it is quite possible that even through the *Eye*,—as improved by the practice of Yoga,—a man may become able to *see* all things. Hence there can be nothing incongruous in this possibility.—(3390–3392)

It has been argued by the other party, under *Text* 3159, that—"The perception of certain things through certain causes in the past was exactly as it is found to appear at the present time".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3393).

SUCH AN ASSERTION CAN SOUND WELL ONLY WHEN PROCEEDING FROM ONE WHO HAS THE APPREHENSION OF ALL THINGS AT ALL THE THREE POINTS OF TIME, AS RESTRICTED IN THEIR CAPACITY.—(3393)

COMMENTARY.

'*With their capacities restricted*'—construe thus—'to whom all things appear as restricted in the desired manner'.—(3393)

Question :—"What is the assertion that sounds well ?"
Answer:—

TEXTS (3394–3396).

[SUCH AN ASSERTION AS THAT]—"THE PERCEPTION OF CERTAIN THINGS THROUGH CERTAIN CAUSES IN THE PAST WAS EXACTLY AS IT IS FOUND AT THE PRESENT TIME".—AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN AT THE PRESENT TIME, IT CANNOT BE KNOWN WHAT THE CAPACITY OF PEOPLE IS, BY YOU, WHO ARE A MERE ANIMAL DEVOID OF THE DEFINITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAPACITY OF ALL THINGS. IN FACT, IF YOU HAD THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAPACITY OF ALL THINGS, OMNISCIENCE WOULD INDEED BE YOURS!—NOR CAN IT BE KNOWN BY MEANS OF INFERENCE, AS THERE WOULD ALWAYS BE A SUSPICION REGARDING ITS BEING OTHERWISE.—(3394–3396)

COMMENTARY.

The following might be urged—"When we say that this should have been the same in the past, we do not say so on the basis of what we have actually *seen*, but on the basis of *Inference*; the inference being in the form—'The means of cognition that is found to apprehend certain things now must have done the same in the past, because it is a Means of Cognition'."

The answer to this is—'*Nor can it be known by Inference*';—as in the case of the *Āmalakī* just cited, peculiar effects are found to be brought about by peculiar causes; hence it might be possible that, through some cause, the Means of Cognition apprehends a different kind of things. Hence the Reason adduced would be 'Inconclusive'.—(3394–3396)

It has been argued by the other party, in *Text* 3160, that—"Those persons who have been found to be superior to others are so only on account of intelligence, memory and strength, which vary slightly with varying persons,—and not on account of the capacity to perceive supersensuous things".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3397–3401).

IT IS FOUND THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE CAPACITY TO PERCEIVE SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS ALSO, THE PRESENCE OF INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER QUALITIES IS PERCEIVED AS ARISING FROM THE FORCE OF THEIR LEARNING, ETC. FOR INSTANCE, THERE IS THE ART OF '*Īkṣaṇika*' (THOUGHT READING ?) WHICH, PROPERLY PRACTISED, BRINGS ABOUT, EVEN DURING THE PRESENT LIFE, THE KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT IS PASSING IN ANOTHER MAN'S MIND: AND (WITH ITS HELP) PEOPLE COME TO KNOW AND DESCRIBE THINGS PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, THAT

HAVE NOT BEEN EITHER *inferred* OR *heard of* DURING THE PRESENT LIFE. SIMILARLY, PEOPLE ARE DISTINCTLY AND TRULY FOUND TO BE POSSESSED OF THE CAPACITIES OF CURIOUS INCANTATIONS, NĀGAS, DEMONS AND SPIRITS OF ALL KINDS.—ALL THIS MAY NOT BE *seen*, AND YET THERE IS NO PROOF FOR DENYING IT. HENCE IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT HE DOES NOT EXIST.—(3397–3401)

COMMENTARY.

The assertion made in 3160 to the effect that—"it is not on account of the capacity to perceive supersensuous things that some people are found to be superior to others",—is not true. Because through such arts as that of Telepathy, witches and others are found to be able to read the thoughts of others, and also to have the knowledge of past, present and future things.

The term '*ādi*' 'others', is meant to include the *Gāndhāri* and others.

People have also been found to have the knowledge of supersensuous things through the obsession of various elementals, planets, etc.;—all which cannot be denied.

Granting that there is no supernormal vision anywhere,—even so, the mere fact that the Omniscient Person is not seen cannot prove His non-existence. Hence it cannot be true that He—the knower of supersensuous things—does not exist.—(3397–3401)

It has been argued under *Text* 3161 that—"Even the intelligent man who is capable of perceiving subtle things is superior to other persons, without going beyond the limitations of his own kind".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3402-3403).

THE AUTHOR OF THE VEDA HAVING BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE MANNER ABOVE DESCRIBED, YOU HAVE TO ADMIT OF THE PERSON CAPABLE OF PERCEIVING SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS. IN THIS WAY, THE INTELLIGENT MAN WOULD BE ABLE TO SEE SUBTLE THINGS, AND WHILE TRANSCENDING THE LIMITATIONS OF HIS OWN KIND, HE WOULD BE RISING ABOVE OTHER MEN.—(3402-3403)

COMMENTARY.

'*In the manner described*'—by us, under the chapter on 'the Revealed Word'.

The author states an argument in support of the above:—

TEXT (3404).

JUST AS THE CAPACITY OF THE EAR AND OTHER SENSE-ORGANS IN RELATION TO THEIR OBJECTS, BECOMES IMPROVED BY SPECIAL EXERCISE, MEDICATION AND OTHER MEANS,—SO WOULD BE THE CASE WITH THE MIND ALSO.—(3404)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, the potency of the sense-organs—Ear and the rest—relating to their objectives, becomes improved by particular exercises and by the application of particular unguents, etc.; and in the same manner it is quite possible that the capacity of the Mind also should become improved by certain special means.—(3404)

The following *Text* shows how the capacity of the Ear, etc. is improved by exercise:—

TEXT (3405).

FOR EXAMPLE, VULTURES ARE ABLE TO SEE THINGS LYING AT A VERY GREAT DISTANCE: AND PEOPLE ARE ENABLED TO PERCEIVE HIDDEN TREASURES AND OTHER THINGS BY THE USE OF UNGUENTS AND COLLYRIUM WITH MAGICAL POWERS.—(3405)

COMMENTARY.

The words—‘*People are enabled, etc.*’—point out the improvement caused by medication.

‘*Unguents, etc. with magical powers*’ is construed with ‘*is seen*’ of the previous sentence;—the Instrumental Ending connoting *cause or instrumentality*.—(3405)

Having thus shown that particular exercises and methods bring about an improvement in the powers of perception,—the author applies the same principle to the case in question:—

TEXT (3406).

IN THE SAME MANNER, THROUGH SPECIAL EXERCISES, ONE WOULD BE ENABLED TO SEE THE CELESTIAL AND OTHER BEINGS, AS ALSO THINGS SUBTLE, HIDDEN AND SO FORTH,—IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS OWN LIMITATIONS.—(3406)

COMMENTARY.

‘*In accordance, etc., etc.*’—There are such natural limitations as— [illegible] such a person turns downwards, not upwards’ and so forth;

and if, in accordance with such well-known limitations, people have the Cognition of the *Mahārajikas* and other celestial Beings,—who can prevent it?—(3406)

The following *Text* shows the superiority acquired by means of Mystic Practices :—

TEXT (3407).

THROUGH PARTICULAR PRACTICES OF *Yoga*, THE MIND OF THE MYSTICS AND THEIR COGNITIONS COME TO BE OF SUPERIOR ORDER. THERE CAN BE NOTHING INCONGRUOUS IN THIS.—(3407)

COMMENTARY.

If the superior powers among men is denied on the ground that the said practices and medication, etc. are impossible,—then such denial is entirely superfluous. This is pointed out in the following :—

TEXTS (3408-3409).

IF WHAT YOU DENY IS THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE SUPERIORITY OF KNOWLEDGE IN CASES WHERE THE SAID PRACTICE AND MEDITATION, ETC. ARE ABSENT,—THEN SUCH DENIAL IS MOST IMPROPER. AS IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT WHEN THE CAUSE IS NOT THERE THE EFFECT SHOULD NOT BE THERE.—JUST AS THE KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER SCIENCES DOES NOT FOLLOW FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF ANY ONE SCIENCE ONLY,—IN THE SAME MANNER, EACH STEP TOWARDS SUPERIORITY IS NOT GAINED IF THE CORRESPONDING CAUSES ARE NOT THERE.—(3408-3409)

COMMENTARY.

'*Superiority*'—among the celestial Beings.

This same argument sets aside what has been said by the other party under *Text* 3162, regarding the 'auditory perception of Sounds, etc. etc.'—What is meant is that mere non-perception of the said superiority cannot justify the denial of it.—(3408-3409)

It has been argued, under *Text* 3164, that—"Similarly great superiority is found among men in the matter of scientific discussions, but that does not prove that the man is an expert in *all* sciences".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3410–3413).

WHEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS ASSERTED, IT IS NOT ON THE BASIS OF HIS KNOWLEDGE OF ANY ONE PART OF THINGS,—IN VIEW OF WHICH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE VEDA AND THE ALLIED SUBJECTS COULD MAKE HEAVEN, ETC. PERCEPTIBLE TO HIM. WHAT WE FIND IN HIM IS A SUPERIOR GRADE OF WISDOM, MERCY AND SUCH QUALITIES BROUGHT ABOUT BY CONSTANT PRACTICE,—AND FROM OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THESE QUALITIES WE DEDUCE OUR KNOWLEDGE OF HIS OTHER KINDS OF SUPERIORITY ALSO. AND AS THESE ARE QUALITIES OF THE MIND, THERE IS EVERY POSSIBILITY OF THEIR RISING TO THE HIGHEST STAGE.—LIKE THE CRUELTY (OF WICKED PEOPLE), THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS REACHES THE HIGHEST STAGE, THROUGH CONSTANT PRACTICE; THUS IS THAT WISDOM ATTAINED WHICH CONSISTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS; AND IT REMAINS INCOMPLETE WHILE EVEN A SINGLE THING REMAINS UNKNOWN.—(3410–3413)

COMMENTARY.

We do not accept the view that there is knowledge of all things, on the basis of the knowledge of a single thing, in view of which you have asserted that 'merely that does not secure the knowledge of other sciences' (*Text* 3164). What we do hold is that, through constant practice, the highest stages of wisdom are reached; and from that we gather that other kinds of superiority are also brought about by the knowledge of supersensuous things, through the rising grades of that same practice. That this is so has been already proved before; it is further supported,—the argument being formulated as follows: all qualities of the Mind reach their highest stage through constant practice,—like the cruelty and other qualities of the Vedic Sacrificers (?);—and Wisdom is a quality of the Mind; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—The Reason adduced here cannot be regarded as 'Inconclusive'; because *Wisdom*, which consists in the comprehending of the nature of things, cannot reach its highest stage without the knowledge of *all things*.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as 'Inadmissible' on the ground of its qualification being unknown; because it has already been proved before in detail that constant practice is what is quite feasible.—The word '*Kāṣṭhā*' is synonymous with 'highest stage'.—(3410–3413)

TEXTS (3414-3415).

THEN AGAIN, THE GRAINS THAT ORIGINALLY GREW OUT OF THE SEEDS OF THE SAME KIND, TURN OUT GRADUALLY TO BE VASTLY SUPERIOR, THROUGH THE SUPERIOR TREATMENT THAT THEY RECEIVE. AND AS IN THE CASE OF THE *Vrīhi* AND OTHER GRAINS, SO IN THE CASE OF MERCY, WISDOM AND OTHER QUALITIES ALSO, IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT WHEN THESE LATTER, ENDOWED WITH THE SAID CHARACTER, REACH THEIR HIGHER STAGES, THERE RESULTS *omniscience*.—(3414-3415)

COMMENTARY.

Or, the grains that originally grew out of the same kind of seeds are found, on undergoing special treatment, to become vastly superior; and just as this happens in the case of grains, so it does in the case of the qualities of Mercy, Wisdom, etc. also. So this is a Reason based on the nature of things.

As before, here also the Reason is not 'Inconclusive' or 'Inadmissible'.

'*Mati*'—wisdom.

'*Endowed with the said character*'—i.e. originally growing out of the same kind of cause.—(3414-3415)

TEXTS (3416–3418).

IN THINGS THAT ARE LIABLE TO DETERIORATION IN THE PRESENCE OF THEIR OPPOSITES,—THERE COMES ABOUT AN UTTER DETERIORATION,—AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE IMPURITIES IN GOLD.—AFFLICTIONS, WRONG NOTIONS OF COGNISABLE THINGS AND SO FORTH, ARE ALL ENDOWED WITH THE SAID CHARACTER (OF DETERIORATING IN THE PRESENCE OF THEIR OPPOSITES): HENCE ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE, COGNITIONS BECOME FREE FROM IMPURITIES. IF IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THESE, ENDOWED AS THEY ARE WITH THE SAID CHARACTER, TO HAVE IMPURITIES,—THEN IT IS EQUALLY POSSIBLE FOR THEIR OPPOSITE TO UPROOT THAT IMPURITY.—(3416–3418)

COMMENTARY.

Or, things that have been found to deteriorate in the presence of their opposites are liable to utter deterioration when their opposite rises to its

highest stage of development; as is found to be the case with the impurities of gold;—Love, Hatred and the rest are found to deteriorate in the presence of the knowledge of 'Soul-less-ness';—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—The Reason adduced cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible'; because it has been proved that the knowledge of 'Soul-less-ness' is destructive of Love, etc.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as 'Inconclusive'; because when the opposite of something rises to the highest point, that thing cannot continue to exist. Otherwise, if a thing were unable to entirely uproot another thing,—how could it bring about even a slight deterioration in this latter ? For instance, the diamond, even when lying in the midst of flaming fire, does not undergo any deterioration at all.—Nor can the Reason be held to be 'Inconclusive' on the ground of the impossibility of the opposite rising to the highest stage of development; because it has been already proved in detail, that such high development is quite possible.

Or, those things that are liable to deterioration in the presence of their opposites, are likely to have opposites that are capable of utterly uprooting them,—as in the case of the impurities of gold;—the Afflictions and the wrong notions of knowable things are liable to deterioration in the presence of their opposites; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. Here also the charge of 'Inconclusiveness' and 'Inadmissibility' may be rebutted as in the previous cases.

'*Ādi*' includes the 'wrong notions of action'.—(3416–3418)

TEXTS (3419-3420).

IN SOME CASES, THERE IS ABSOLUTE DETERIORATION OF THINGS THAT OBSTRUCT THE PERCEPTION OF TRUTH, AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE EXTERNAL AS WELL AS INTERNAL DARKNESS. WHEN THERE IS DETERIORATION OF THIS, TRUE KNOWLEDGE APPEARS UNTRAMMELLED AND PROCEEDS TO APPLY TO THE WHOLE CIRCLE OF KNOWABLE THINGS.—(3419-3420)

COMMENTARY.

Or, things that serve as obstacles to the Perception of Truth are liable to absolute deterioration,—e.g. the external and nocturnal darkness,—and Afflictions and Wrong notions of things, etc. are obstacles to the perception of Truth; so that this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

That this Reason is not 'Inconclusive' is pointed out by the words—'*when there is deterioration of this, etc. etc.*'—'*of this*'—of the internal darkness (of Ignorance).—(3419-3420)

TEXTS (3421–3424).

OR, THOSE THAT SUBSIST IN A LASTING SUBSTRATUM, HAVING COME ABOUT IN IT SOMEHOW, AND—SO LONG AS THERE IS NO FORCE TO THE CONTRARY, THEY DO NOT NEED ANY FURTHER EFFORT TOWARDS BRINGING THEM ABOUT AGAIN,—THESE, BY THE EXCELLENCE OF THE TREATMENT THEY RECEIVE, REACH THE HIGHEST STAGE OF PERFECTION ;—AS FOR EXAMPLE, THE PURIFICATION OF GOLD ;—KNOWLEDGE, MERCY AND SUCH QUALITIES ARE ALL OF THE SAID KIND ; SO THAT WHEN THESE HAVE REACHED THE HIGHEST STATE OF PERFECTION, THERE IS BRILLIANT OMNISCIENCE.—NOR CAN THIS REASON BE HELD TO BE FALLIBLE (FALSE) IN VIEW OF THE TWO CASES OF *Jumping* AND *Water-heating* ; BECAUSE JUMPING FOLLOWS NOT FROM THE JUMPING ITSELF, BUT FROM STRENGTH AND EFFORT.—(3421–3424)

COMMENTARY.

Or, if there are things that subsist in a lasting substratum, and have had some peculiarity produced in them somehow,—if there is no force to the contrary,—they do not stand in need of further effort for their production; and if they receive excellent treatment, they proceed to the highest stage of perfection; as is found in the case of the purification of Gold and such things; —Knowledge, Mercy and such things (i.e. those under discussion) have the character just described—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

'*Nor can this Reason be said to be fallible, in view of the cases of Jumping and Water-heating*'; i.e. by reason of the qualifications that have been added in the above statement of the Reason. Neither Jumping nor Water-heating is produced only once; nor do they not need another effort for producing them again; nor do they subsist in a lasting substratum.

Or, it may be said that there is no 'fallibility' in the Premiss because of the further qualification that 'it should proceed from a seed of the same kind' (see *Text* 3414).—This is what is pointed out by the words—'*Jumping follows, not from the jumping itself, etc. etc.*',—i.e. the Jumping is not produced by the Jumping.

Question :—"From what then, does it proceed ?"

Answer :—'*Jumping proceeds from strength and effort*' ;—i.e. when there is strength, and also effort, then there comes Jumping; it does not come when there is *Jumping* itself. These two—Strength and Effort—have their capacities restricted and fixed; consequently, the Jumping also has its character restricted and fixed.

The following might be urged—"If Jumping proceeds from Strength and Effort, not from Jumping itself, then, the Jumping-capacity that comes to man after practice, should be his even prior to that practice".

This does not affect our position. What happens is that before the practice, the body was disabled by the presence of too much fat, and hence the same degree of Jumping could not be attained. Subsequently however, by repeated effort, the said disability gradually disappears, and the Jumping is attained exactly in accordance with the man's strength.—That such is the case must be admitted; as otherwise, the Jumping would proceed from the Jumping itself, and in that case there could be no fixity in its degree of excellence.—(3421–3424)

Or, the Jumping also being dependent upon particular causes, there can be no fixity in its degree of excellence, and hence this case could not invalidate our Reason.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3425–3427).

OR, THE JUMPING ALSO IS SOMETHING THAT IS CAPABLE OF REACHING THE HIGHEST STAGE OF PERFECTION,—WHICH WOULD PROCEED FROM ITS OWN CAUSES, THROUGH CONCENTRATED EFFORT AND STRENGTH: THIS CAPACITY IS NAMED 'MANOJAVA' (MIND-FORCE). IT IS IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH CAPACITY THAT WE HEAR (AND READ) OF SUCH FACTS AS THAT THE LORD REACHES REMOTE PLACES BY MERELY THINKING OF IT.—THE MERE FACT THAT SUCH POWER IS NOT SEEN CANNOT PROVE THAT IT DOES NOT EXIST; NOR CAN THE OPPONENT PUT FORWARD ANY REASON THAT COULD ANNUL SUCH AN IDEA.—(3425–3427)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, we also admit that, through Concentration of Mind and the use of great strength, Jumping reaches the highest degree of perfection; as for instance, we read of the Lord having the power called 'Mind-Force', by means of which one becomes as swift in his movement as the Mind: that is why it has been named 'Mind-Force'.

Nor is there any reason annulling the possibility of this Power.

Nor can mere non-perception of it justify its denial; as in that case, great incongruities would result.—(3425–3427)

Further, it is actually seen that when peculiar conditions are produced in the Receptacle, the Movement reaches very superior excellence; so that from that also we could deduce such perfect movement in the case of the Blessed Lord.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXTS (3428–3430).

THE YOUNG *Rāja-hamsa* (SWAN) IS UNABLE TO MOVE OUT OF THE HOUSE EVEN; BUT THROUGH PRACTICE, IT BECOMES ABLE TO GO BEYOND THE OCEAN ALSO. JUST AS THIS MOVEMENT OF HIS IS THE RESULT OF THE EXERCISE OF THE PARTICULAR CONDITIONS OF THE RECEPTACLE (I.E. THE BODY),—SIMILARLY, WHY CANNOT SIMILAR, OR EVEN HIGHER, POWERS BE POSSIBLE (IN THE BLESSED LORD)? AT THE PRECEDING STAGE OF THE '*Bodhisattva*', HOWEVER, HE IS NOT ABLE TO ATTAIN SUCH POWER OF MOVEMENT; BUT THE GREAT SAGE WOULD CERTAINLY ATTAIN IT ON HIS REACHING THE HIGHEST STATE OF 'COMMUNION'.—(3428–3430)

COMMENTARY.

The young one of the Swan, in the beginning, is unable even to go out of its nest; but later on, after even slight practice, its wings having grown, it flies even beyond the seas. In the same manner, it is quite possible that other people, through the exercise of the conditions attaching to the body, attain similar process of movement.

"That the bird is enabled to go to distant places, is due to the growth of wings, not to Practice".

Even after the wings have grown, the young bird is not found to fly up into the air all on a sudden. What happens is that when it begins to fly from one branch to the other of the tree, it flies, at first only to a short distance,—then, having got rid of all fear and doubt, it flies to remoter regions.

Then again, just as in the case of the swan, after it has acquired a particular substratum, it acquires the powers of movement that it did not possess before,—similarly in the case of the Blessed Lord also, it is quite possible that, though He did not possess the particular power at the stage of the '*Bodhisattva*', yet, when He attained a particular stage of Communion, He secured a particular substratum which enabled Him to acquire the movement in question.—This is all that is meant by the Text; the mention of 'Practice' has no significance.

The argument may be formulated as follows:—That Practice which is related to the receptacle of a particular condition leads up to the power of going very very far,—as is found in the case of the Practice by the young Swan;—the Practice of human beings also is capable of being related to the receptacle of a particular condition;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(3428–3430)

It has been argued above, by the other party, under *Text* 3168, that—"The man who can jump into the sky to the height of 15 feet, can never jump to the height of 8 miles, however much he may practise jumping".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3431).

[F A MAN IS ABLE TO JUMP TO THE HEIGHT OF 15 FEET, HE COULD CERTAINLY ACQUIRE THE CAPACITY TO JUMP TO GREATER HEIGHTS, THROUGH SIMILAR MEANS.—(3431)

COMMENTARY.

The following *Text* proceeds to show that the Author's Reason is not lsified by the case of the 'Heating of Water'; because of the qualifying ırase 'having a lasting substratum' (in *Text* 3421):—

TEXT (3432).

HILE THE WATER IS BEING HEATED, IT IS GRADUALLY UNDERGOING DESTRUCTION (EVAPORATION); THUS THE SUBSTRATUM BEING NOT 'LASTING', WHAT AND WHERE WOULD THE 'PERFECTION' LIE? —(3432)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—"How is it known that Wisdom and other qualities have a *ting substratum*?"

Answer :—

TEXT (3433).

mental qualities, THE SUBSTRATUM CONSISTS IN THE 'CHAIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS'; AND THIS NEVER CEASES TO FUNCTION THROUGH ITS CONNECTION WITH ITS RECEPTACLE.—(3433)

COMMENTARY.

'*This*'—i.e. The Chain of Consciousness.

'*Function through, etc. etc.*'—i.e. from functioning through its connection h its receptacle, in the shape of the *Bodhisattva*; because what is meant particular 'Receptacle'.

What is meant is as follows:—It has been proved that there is another gion' (Plane);—the *Bodhisattvas* are persons thoroughly imbued with great cy, and they live for the sole purpose of saving all beings from the meshes Birth and Rebirth; the 'Chain of Consciousness', therefore, that subsists nem is all the more 'lasting'. That 'Chain of Consciousness', on the other d, which subsists in the Disciples is not so 'lasting'; because these latter r into *Nirvāna* sooner, and hence their Mercy is not so intense; h fact leads them to make no effort to continue to live on (for the ofit of living Beings).—(3433)

Question :—"How is the second qualification (*being brought about somehow*, under *Text* 3421) known to exist?"

Answer :—

TEXT (3434).

AS THE FLOW OF QUALITIES GOES ON APPEARING IN THE 'CHAIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS', SO IT GOES ON BECOMING MORE AND MORE LUMINOUS.—(3434)

COMMENTARY.

Question :—"How is this also known?"

Answer :—

TEXT (3435).

THIS 'CONSCIOUSNESS' IS OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE 'PERCEPTION OF TRUTH', AND HENCE IT IS LUMINOUS, BY ITS VERY NATURE; BECAUSE IMPURITIES ARE ALL HELD TO BE ADVENTITIOUS.—(3435)

COMMENTARY.

All this has been explained by us already,—that all these, Wisdom, Mercy and the rest, by their very nature, are of the same essence as the Perception of Truth; and as such they constitute the nature of 'Consciousness'. It thus becomes established that, as these Wisdom, etc. are of the very essence of Consciousness—when they have been *once brought about*, they continue to function automatically.—(3435)

Question :—"How is it known that the second qualification, 'which is of the same essence as the Perception of Truth', belongs to Consciousness?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (3436-3437).

IF CONSCIOUSNESS WERE RESTRICTED TO THE COGNITION OF SOMETHING APART FROM ITSELF, THEN, AS IT ITSELF WOULD NOT BE COGNISED, THERE COULD BE NO COGNITION OF THINGS. CONSEQUENTLY CONSCIOUSNESS HAS TO BE REGARDED AS ESSENTIALLY 'SELF-COGNISED', SPECIALLY BECAUSE IT IS ILLUMINATIVE. HENCE THIS CONSCIOUSNESS REMAINS AS SOMETHING FREE FROM ALL IMPOSITION.—(3436-3437)

COMMENTARY.

Primarily, the most important form of Consciousness consists in *self-cognition*;—this has to be admitted by all parties. Otherwise, if Consciousness

were cognised by another cognition, then, as its own apprehension would be impossible, there could be no cognition of things. Consequently 'self-illumination' is the most important character of Consciousness. This 'self' of the Consciousness is something entirely ephemeral; hence, by implication, it follows that Consciousness is of the nature of the 'Perception of Truth'.—(3436-3437)

The following might be urged—"Consciousness may be of the nature of the Perception of Truth; even so, inasmuch as things destroyed are liable to appear again,—all the Reasons that have been adduced are irresistibly Inconclusive'."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3438–3440).

WHEN, THUS, THE 'PATH' HAS BECOME IDENTIFIED WITH HIM, THERE CAN BE NO SUPPRESSION OF IT BY LOVE, HATRED AND OTHER DEFECTS, SINCE THEY HAD BEEN ALREADY FEEBLE BEFORE. THE 'PATH'—WHICH IS DESTRUCTIVE OF ALL DEFECTS,—HAVING BECOME THUS IDENTIFIED,—THERE CAN BE NO LOSS OF IT WITHOUT EFFORT; AND THERE CAN BE NO SUCH EFFORT, AS ITS GOOD POINTS HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED.—THUS IT IS THAT *Jina* IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE OMNISCIENT PERSON ADORNED BY A PURE AND FIRM HOST OF GOOD QUALITIES, WHOSE SOUL CANNOT BE SHAKEN BY THE STORM OF DEFECTS.—(3438–3440)

COMMENTARY.

Even before the identification of the 'Path', the impurities of Love, etc., already feeble on account of their adventitious character, are unable to suppress that Path; how then can they suppress the Path when it has become identified and absorbed?

Further, when the quality of the Mind has become absorbed. it cannot be removed without effort; just as the cruel nature of the Vedic sacrificer and the Demon (?) cannot be removed. Nor is it possible for any wise man to make an effort to get rid of what has been found to be possessed of good qualities.—'Why?''—*Because its good points have been perceived.* This has been already explained before.

'*Apakṣāla*' is Defect.—(3438–3440)

Or again, the character of 'being an entity' and so forth, which you have put forward (under *Text* 3157 *et seq.*) as reasons for denying the existence of the Omniscient Person,—are themselves enough to prove His existence. In

order to show this, the Author proceeds to point out the Invariable Concomitance of the said characters (with *Omniscience*):—

TEXTS (3441–3443).

WHATEVER THINGS ARE CONCEIVED BECOME CLEARLY MANIFEST, AT THE COMPLETION OF THE CONCEPTION; AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE OBJECTS OF DESIRE;—ALL THINGS ARE CONCEIVED BY GREAT SAGES, FOR A LONG TIME AND SEVERAL TIMES, IN THEIR REAL FORM, AS 'VOID', 'NO-SOUL' AND SO FORTH. THAT THE 'VOID', 'NO-SOUL' AND THE REST ARE THE *real* FORMS HAS BEEN PROVED BEFORE. HENCE AS ARISING OUT OF THE CONCEPTION OF REALLY EXISTENT THINGS, THE SAID CONCEPTION HAS BEEN RIGHTLY REGARDED AS RIGHT AND VALID.—(3441–3443)

COMMENTARY.

The principal argument to be expounded later on, may be formulated thus:—Things that are possessed of the characters of 'being entity', 'being cognisable' and so forth are those that become clearly manifest in a single cognition which forms the highest stage of conception;—e.g. the loved woman, the son and the thief who are conceived of by men who are obsessed by the feelings of love, etc.,—all things are possessed of the said characters of 'being entity' and the rest;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—The Reason adduced here cannot be said to be 'Inconclusive'; because whatever thing, real or unreal, is conceived of, is always found to bring about, at the culmination of the conception, the clear cognition of that thing; e.g. the man in love has the clear cognition of the woman he loves;—all things are conceived of in their real form, for a long time, by persons who are absorbed in mercy;—hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things.

This shows that *Conception* is invariably concomitant with the resultant *clear cognition*.

Question:—The clear cognition of things is independent of other things; how is it known that the 'Void', 'No-Soul' and the rest constitute the *real* form of things?"

Answer:—'*That the Void, No-Soul and the rest, etc. etc.*'—(3441–3443)

The Author now proceeds to show that the cognition of the 'Void' and the rest is vouched for by *Perception* itself:—

TEXTS (3444–3446).

THE COGNITION IN QUESTION IS VOUCHED FOR BY 'PERCEPTION', BECAUSE IT IS CLEARLY MANIFEST, AND IS IN KEEPING WITH THE REAL NATURE OF THINGS ; JUST LIKE THE APPEARANCE OF *Blue* AND OTHER THINGS, ARISING FROM THE CONTACT OF THE EYE AND OTHER SENSE-ORGANS. THE SINGLE CLEAR APPEARANCE OF ALL THINGS IN A SINGLE COGNITION IS QUITE POSSIBLE,—WHICH PLEASE UNDERSTAND ; ALSO BECAUSE THINGS ARE SO CONCEIVED OF, LIKE THE WOMAN, THE SON AND THE THIEF ; CONCEPTION TOO IS NOT DIFFICULT TO GET AT, AS IT CAN PRESENT ITSELF BEFORE ONE BY MERELY WISHING FOR IT.—(3444–3446)

COMMENTARY.

As it is clearly manifested, it cannot be merely fanciful;—as it envisages things vouched for by means of Right Cognition, it cannot be incompatible with the reality; hence it must be regarded as a valid form of Perception, like the Visual and other perceptions.

Thus it having been proved that it arises from mere conception and is clearly manifest, it also becomes proved that all things become clearly manifested simultaneously in a single cognition; and thus the Invariable Concomitance becomes established, and we get the Premiss that 'all things can appear clearly in a single cognition at one and the same time'.—The argument may be formulated as follows:—Things that are conceived of are capable of being clearly manifested in a single cognition;—e.g. the Woman and other things;—all things are conceived of;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The Reason cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible';—this is pointed out by the next sentence—'*Conception too is not, etc. etc.*'—That is, the possibility of conception having been proved before, the Reason cannot be regarded as 'Inadmissible'.—(3444–3446)

Having thus established the Invariable Concomitance by pointing out that the *capacity of being clearly manifested* is connected with mere *conception*, the author now proceeds to point out the main purport of his argument:—

TEXTS (3447–3449).

ALL THINGS MUST BE REGARDED AS CLEARLY MANIFESTED BY THE ONE COGNITION THAT REPRESENTS THE HIGHEST STAGE OF THE CONCEPTION,—BECAUSE OF SUCH REASONS AS 'BEING ENTITIES', 'BEING EXISTENT' AND THE LIKE,—LIKE THE BELOVED WOMAN AND OTHERS.—SIMILARLY, WHEN THE CERTAINTY REGARDING A THING IS CAPABLE OF BEING PROVED BY SUCH REASONS AS 'BEING AN ENTITY', 'BEING EXISTENT', 'BEING PRODUCED' AND THE LIKE,—

—Here then is fully established the existence of the Omniscient Person, who is the crest-jewel of all *Suras* and *Asuras*, and whose single cognition comprehends all that is knowable.—(3447–3449)

COMMENTARY.

The highest stage of the development of the Conception is represented by the cognition in question. Even in the absence of co-ordination, the *Bahuvrīhi* compound is based upon the sense of the words. The meaning thus is that—all things are such as are clearly manifested in the single cognition that represents the highest stage of the Conception.—And the Person in whose one cognition all things become clearly manifested in this way is one '*whose single cognition comprehends all that is knowable*', and who is '*the crest-jewel of all Suras and Asuras*';—and this Person is thus proved to be 'omniscient'.—(3447–3449)

TEXT (3450).

Dharma and other things must have been known to some Person, without any verbal expressions,—because they have been taught by truthful men,—like the purity of gold and such things.—(3450)

COMMENTARY.

Or, things that have been taught by truthful men must have been known to some one,—like the purity of gold and such things;—and *Dharma* and other things have been taught by truthful men;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(3450)

The following might be urged—"It is possible that the Teachers have taught *Dharma*, etc. after learning it from the Veda; hence your argument is futile".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3451).

It having been proved that the Veda is the work of a human being, our argument is not proving what is already proved (and hence futile). Mere random teaching of what is not known cannot be always true.—(3451)

COMMENTARY.

Under the chapter on the 'Revealed Word', it has been proved that the Veda is the work of a human being; hence our present argument is not 'futile'.

It might be argued that—"Teachings can be imparted at random, without knowing the things taught; so that your Reason is 'Inconclusive'."

The answer to this is—'*Mere random teaching, etc. etc.*'—It is not possible that anyone, without knowledge, should go on talking, and that too against all forms of Right Cognition.—(3451)

TEXTS (3452–3453).

THE SUPERSENSUOUS POTENCY OF GESTURES, MAGIC CIRCLES AND INCANTATIONS TO CURE THE ATTACK OF GHOSTS AND WITCHES, TO REMOVE THE EFFECTS OF POISONS ;—ALSO THE SAGES AND *Garuḍa* AND SUCH BEINGS ;—IF THE CLEAR KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THESE THINGS BY DIRECT PERCEPTION, AS APART FROM WORDS AND INFERENCE, DID NOT BELONG TO THESE PERSONS, —HOW IS IT THAT THEY HAVE SPOKEN OF ALL THIS ?—(3452-3453)

COMMENTARY.

Further, the knowledge of Incantations and other things as possessing the capacity to remove the effects of Poison, etc.,—things that are entirely beyond the reach of the senses,—if these things were not directly known to *Buddha* and others, how is it that they have spoken of them ? This needs to be explained.—(3452-3453)

"It may be that they have spoken of these things after having come to know them through *Inference.*"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3454).

HIS KNOWLEDGE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DERIVED THROUGH INFERENCE, AS THERE HAD BEEN NO PREVIOUS PERCEPTION ; AND HENCE NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE COULD BE RECOGNISED.—(3454)

COMMENTARY.

Nothing can form the object of Inference of which the relationship to the Indicative has not been recognised; and it is not possible to have any definite notion of the relationship of any Inferential Indicative to a thing which is entirely beyond perception.—(3454)

TEXTS (3455–3457).

NOR COULD HE DERIVE HIS KNOWLEDGE BY HEARING IT AS ASSERTED BY ANOTHER PERSON; AS THE CASE OF THE LATTER ALSO WOULD BE OPEN TO THE SAME OBJECTIONS.—NOR CAN THE CONFORMITY (OF THE TEACHING) WITH THE REAL STATE OF THINGS BE MERELY ACCIDENTAL. BECAUSE THE TEACHING IS AVOWEDLY IN REGARD TO *Dharma*; HENCE IT COULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO ANY OTHER MOTIVE; AND IT IS ONLY WHEN SOMETHING HAS BEEN DONE WITH A DIFFERENT MOTIVE THAT SUCH 'ACCIDENT' MAY BE SUSPECTED; E.G. WHEN A THIRSTY MAN IS GOING IN SEARCH OF THE RIVER,—IF HE COMES BY A TREE, THAT CAN BE SAID TO BE 'ACCIDENTAL'.—(3455–3457)

COMMENTARY.

It might be said that—"His knowledge has been derived from the assertions of another person".—But that cannot be right, as the case of this latter also would be open to the same objections. For instance, the following consideration arises here also: How did the other person know it? There can be no teaching, without knowledge;—if he learnt it from another person;—and so on, there would be an infinite regress; thus there being a case of the blind following the blind, all would have to be regarded as ignorant, and no teaching would be right and sound. This has been thus declared.—'In regard to such matters (as *Dharma*), the assertion of man cannot be reliable, as it would be like the assertion of the blind regarding *colour.*'

The following might be urged—"The Conformity of the Teaching to the real state of things might be purely *accidental*".

The answer to this is that—'*Nor can, etc. etc.*'—The compound is to be expounded as—that of which *accidental conformity* is the character. It is only when the effort made for one thing leads one to another thing that the conformity to this latter may be accidental; e.g. when a man is going along in search of the river-side, if he comes by the shade of the tree. In the case in question, however, the Teaching has not been imparted with any other motive; as the Blessed Lord has clearly introduced His teaching with the words—'O *Bhikṣus,* I shall now teach you *Dharma*', and then proceeded to expound His Teachings regarding *Dharma* and other matters; so that it is clear that His teaching has not proceeded with any other motive.

'*Vāhinī*' is River;—'*Vidruma*' is Tree,—or Coral.—(3455–3457)

It might be argued that—"it is possible that the Teaching might have proceeded from Delusion; and hence the Reason put forward is 'Inconclusive'".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3458).

NOR IS THE TEACHING THE ASSERTION OF DEMENTED PEOPLE WITH DISORDERED MINDS; BECAUSE IT IS FOUND TO BE IN A REGULAR SEQUENCE AND IS AN EXCELLENT FULFILLER OF ITS PURPOSE.—(3458)

COMMENTARY.

Demented persons with disordered minds cannot make any such long assertions as appear in well-ordered sequence, as a connected whole accomplishing the purposes of man.

Thus it becomes established that there has been some one who possessed the direct knowledge of *Dharma* and allied matters.—(3458)

The following might be urged—"It might have been established in a general way; but even so, what you wished to prove was the fact that *Buddha* had the knowledge of *Dharma*; how is *that* proved?" ?

In answer to this, the Author proceeds to show that the Blessed Lord did possess the knowledge of *Dharma*:—

TEXTS (3459-3461).

WHEN A PERSON WHO, INTENT UPON THE TRUTH, WHICH IS NEITHER HEARD OF NOR INFERRED, EXPOUNDS IT,—SUCH AN EXPOUNDER MUST BE REGARDED AS ONE WHO HAS HAD DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THAT TRUTH; FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE MAN WHO HAS ACTUALLY SEEN WATER, POINTS IT OUT TO OTHERS;—THE GREAT SAGE, INTENT UPON THE TRUTH, HAS ACTUALLY EXPOUNDED, WITH FIRM CONVICTION, THE TRUTH WHICH HAD NEVER BEEN HEARD OF OR INFERRED,—WHICH IS BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES, THE POTENCIES OF WHICH, LIKE THOSE OF GESTURES, MAGIC CIRCLES AND THE LIKE, ARE NOT KNOWN TO OTHERS.—(3459-3461)

COMMENTARY.

The argument may be thus formulated:—One who, intent upon the Truth, teaches the truth regarding unheard of and un-inferred things, he must be regarded as being directly cognisant of the real essence of those things,—e.g. the man who, having actually seen water, points it out to others;—the Blessed Lord has actually taught such Truths;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The truthfulness of the Teachings having been already established, the Reason cannot be said to be 'Inadmissible'.—Nor is it 'Inconclusive'—as has been shown already.—And as all our Reasons are present wherever the Probandum is present, the Reason cannot be regarded as 'Contradictory'.

'*Parājñāta, etc.*'—The Gesture, etc. whose potency is not known to other people.—(3459-3461)

It has been argued by the other party, under *Text* 3169, that—"Even when the superiority of knowledge proceeds very far, it can comprehend only a little more than others, it can never comprehend things beyond the senses".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3462).

THUS, WHEN THERE IS SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE, AND IT PROCEEDS ON THE BASIS OF PROPER MEANS, IT CAN COMPREHEND ALL THAT IS MORE THAN OTHERS,—EVEN THAT WHICH IS BEYOND THE SENSES.—(3462)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued under *Text* 3170, that—"While the man is seated in a hut, the Sense-perception that he has has its range restricted within that hut, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3463-3464)

WHEN A MAN IS SEATED IN A HUT, THE SENSE-PERCEPTION THAT HE HAS HAS ITS RANGE RESTRICTED WITHIN THAT HUT, IT DOES NOT EXTEND TO ANOTHER HUT;—ALL THIS YOU COULD BE IN A POSITION TO ASSERT WITH CERTAINTY ONLY WHEN YOU HAD THE DIRECT APPREHENSION OF THE CAPACITY OF ALL THINGS; OTHERWISE, ON WHAT COULD SUCH CERTAINTY BE BASED ?—(3463-3464)

COMMENTARY.

When you made this statement you made it entirely on the basis of that assertion itself; for people of limited vision, mere non-apprehension cannot justify any certainty regarding the incapacity of *all* men to cognise supersensuous things.—(3463-3464)

The following might be urged—"When we declare the incapacity of men to cognise supersensuous things, we do not do so on the basis of mere non-apprehension; in fact, we do it on the basis of inference from such reasons as 'being human' and so forth. For instance, all men are incapable of per-

ceiving things remote, concealed, etc.,—because they are human, bec they are entities, because they are cognisable,—like myself".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3465-3466).

IF YOU DEDUCE THE INCAPACITY OF OTHER PERSONS, IN REGARD T CERTAIN EFFECT, FROM YOUR OWN EXAMPLE,—ON THE BASIS OF SUC REASONS AS 'BEING HUMAN' AND THE LIKE,—THEN YOU LAND YOURSELF IN ABSURDITIES.—IN THIS WAY, YOUR OWN STUPIDITY HAVING BEEN ASCERTAINED,—FROM YOUR OWN EXAMPLE, ALL LEARNED MEN MIGHT BE REGARDED AS STUPID.—(3465-3466)

COMMENTARY.

'*Nishchayē*', 'deduce', is to be construed with '*Kāryē*', 'in regard certain effect'.

The Reasons cited are all 'Inconclusive'; as leading to absurditie Because in this same manner, it may asserted as follows:—'All men stupid, because they are human, etc. etc.,—like yourself'.—And yet t can be no such deduction. Because *Dharma* is not found in one ma cannot be deduced that it cannot be found in any man; because men found to be differently circumstanced.—(3465-3466)

As regards *Ṛtuparṇa's* assertion, quoted under *Texts* 3172-3173—tc effect that—"All men do not know all things, etc. etc.",—that also mere assertion made without reasons.—This is what is pointed out in following—

TEXT (3467).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO LIMIT TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF M HENCE THE STATEMENT IN QUESTION IS A MERE ASSERTION MADE WITHOUT ANY REASON.—(3467)

COMMENTARY.

Or, it may be that the statement made by *Ṛtuparṇa* is in regarc men like ourselves; in that case, there being no incompatibility betw this view and our doctrine of the Omniscient Person,—it has no bearing the present discussion.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3468–3472).

OR, IT MAY BE THAT THE STATEMENT MADE BY *Ṛtuparṇa* WAS WITH REFERENCE TO COMMON DULL-WITTED PERSONS LIKE HIMSELF, WHOSE MINDS HAVE NOT BEEN PURIFIED.—IN SUPPORT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THERE BEING AN OMNISCIENT PERSON, WE HAVE ALREADY STATED THE PROOF IN DETAIL;—ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY BROUGHT FORWARD BY OTHER PARTIES HAVE ALSO BEEN REFUTED.—IN FACT, EVEN IF THE PROOF IN SUPPORT OF HIS EXISTENCE HAD NOT BEEN PUT FORWARD, THE MERE ANNULMENT OF THE ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY WOULD HAVE ESTABLISHED THE PROBABILITY OF HIS EXISTENCE. BECAUSE WHERE NOTHING AGAINST A CERTAIN IDEA IS PERCEIVED, NOR ANYTHING IN SUPPORT OF IT,—THERE ARISES A DOUBT REGARDING IT; WHICH INDICATES ITS PROBABILITY. IN FACT, IT IS ONLY WHEN THIS PROBABILITY IS THERE, THAT THERE CAN BE SUCH AN ASSERTION TO THE CONTRARY (MADE BY THE *Mīmāṃsaka*) AS THAT—"IT IS BY MEANS OF THE *Veda alone* THAT *Dharma* CAN BE KNOWN".—(3468–3472)

COMMENTARY.

'*Svasamān*'—People like—similar to—himself.—(3468–3472)

It has been argued, under *Text* 3174, that—"The capacity of Perception has never been found applicable to the future, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3473).

EVEN IN REGARD TO FUTURE THINGS, THE CAPACITY OF PERCEPTION WOULD BE APPLICABLE, IN THE CASE OF MYSTICS,—AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT IN THE CHAPTER ON 'THE THREE POINTS OF TIME'.—(3473)

COMMENTARY.

'*As has been pointed out in the chapter, etc. etc.*'—This is what has been said under that chapter:—All things, directly or indirectly, bear to each other the relation of cause and effect; the *Present* thing is always, directly or indirectly, the *effect* of the Past, and the *cause* of the Future thing. What the Mystics do is to apprehend all things by direct Perception, and thereby determine the Past and the Future entity also, on the basis of the 'chain of entities', past and future, which are related as cause and effect respectively,—by means of conceptions that are object-less and hence not entirely in conformity with reality, or purely worldly,—which follow on the wake of the said Perception.

This is what has been declared in Texts 1853–1855 under the chapter on the 'Three points of Time'—[For *translation* see, *in loco*, above].—(3473)

The above is not accepted by the *Sautrāntika* (section of Buddhists), who hold that the Blessed Lord has the direct perception of *all things*. Hence the Author sets forth the view of the *Sautrāntika* in the following—

TEXT (3474).

OR, THROUGH THE POWERS OF YOGA, THE MENTAL PERCEPTION OF MYSTICS WOULD CLEARLY ENVISAGE THE PAST AND THE FUTURE ALSO, INDEPENDENTLY OF INFERENCE AND THE WORD.
—(3474)

COMMENTARY.

When one has a true dream, even though the cognition is object-less, yet it *is* there, independently of Inference and Word,—appearing through the peculiar nature of its substratum, and it is in conformity with the real state of things. In the same manner, in the case of mystics, through the powers of Meditation and Communion, the Past and the Future thing becomes clearly perceptible, independently of Inference and Word. This Perception is held to be a valid proof (of omniscience).—(3474)

The following might be urged—"Perception has been held to envisage the *Specific Individuality* of things; there is no *Specific Individuality* that is Past or Future; then how can the knowledge of these envisage the *Specific Individuality*"?

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3475-3476).

AS APPREHENDING ITS OWN MANIFESTATION, IT ENVISAGES A *Specific Individuality*; AND AS ENVISAGING A CLEAR AND DISTINCT MANIFESTATION, IT IS HELD TO BE *Perception*.—THUS THERE *is* SOME ONE WHO PERCEIVES SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS DIRECTLY. AND AS THERE IS NO ETERNAL WORD, ONE DOES NOT PERCEIVE ANYTHING THROUGH THAT.—
(3475-3476)

COMMENTARY.

Though it is true that there is no Specific Individuality that is Past or Future, yet, inasmuch as the cognition apprehends itself, it has been declared in the scriptures to be envisaging the *Specific Individuality*; hence there is no incongruity in this.

And as this cognition is clear and distinct, and is free from *conceptual content*, and is in conformity with the real state of things,—it fulfills all the conditions of 'Perception', and hence it becomes established that it is *Perception*—(3475-3476)

Not accepting this view (that the Lord has the direct *Perception* of all things), the Author asserts the following, in answer to what the other party has asserted under *Text* 3175 to the effect that—"He alone sees things who sees them through the eternal Word".—

TEXT (3477).

THE WISE MEN HAVE DECLARED THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAGE OF SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS PROCEEDS FROM THE INFERENCE STATED BEFORE,—NOT FROM ANY REVEALED WORD.—(3477)

COMMENTARY.

The wise men—i.e. the Buddhists—have declared that the knowledge of supersensuous things, belonging to the Blessed Lord, which directly envisages all things, is brought about by the force of his meditations,—through the aforementioned Inference, independently of the Revealed Word;—and that it does not proceed from any scriptures compiled by men. Hence as this view is not accepted by us, the objection does not affect us.—(3477)

It has been argued, under *Text* 3178, that—" the beginninglessness that is asserted in regard to the composer and the utterances emanating from him is itself based upon two invalid notions, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3478-3479).

BEGINNINGLESSNESS IS NOT ASSERTED IN REGARD TO THE COMPOSER OR TO THE UTTERANCES EMANATING FROM HIM,—FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVING THEIR VALIDITY; BECAUSE BEGINNINGLESSNESS BELONGS TO THE INVALID (WRONG) COGNITION ALSO; FOR INSTANCE, THE UNBELIEVERS AND THEIR WORDS,—AS ALSO THE VEDAS AND THEIR EXPOUNDERS,—ARE NOT VALID AND RELIABLE, EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY BE BEGINNINGLESS.—(3478-3479)

COMMENTARY.

When we assert Beginninglessness, it is not as a reason for *reliability*; because such a reason, as present in the absence of the Probandum also,

would be 'Inconclusive'. Hence, the objection that you have urged has been urged by imputing to us a view that is not held by us.—(3478-3479)

Then again, it is you yourselves who assert the *beginninglessness* of the Vedas and their Expounders as a reason for the reliabilty of the Veda; so that all the objections that you have urged are clearly applicable to you.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3480).

IN FACT, THE *beginninglessness* OF THE EXPOUNDERS AND OF THE ETERNAL SENTENCES THAT IS ASSERTED BY YOU FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVING THEIR RELIABILITY, IS DENIED BY US AS A SHEER COUNTER-BLAST.—(3480)

COMMENTARY.

The compound is to be expounded as—'The expounders' *and* 'the eternal sentences'. 'Expounder' stands for those who expound the meaning of the Vedas.—(3480)

Question :—"How is the Beginninglessness denied?"
Answer :—

TEXT (3481).

THE *Expounders* STAND ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THE *Composers*; AND DEPENDENT UPON THEM IS THE RELIABILITY OF THE VEDAS; BECAUSE THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MEANING OF THE VEDAS IS DERIVED FROM THE EXPLANATIONS PROVIDED BY THE SAID EXPOUNDERS.—(3481)

COMMENTARY.

'*Dependent upon them*'—i.e. upon the Expounders.

"How so?"

Because the knowledge of the meaning of the Vedas is derived from the explanations provided by those Expounders,—therefore the validity and reliability of the Vedas are dependent upon those persons.—(3481)

Question :—"What is the harm if that is so?"
Answer :—

TEXTS (3482–3484).

IN THIS WAY, THE VEDIC SENTENCES, BEING DEPENDENT UPON OTHER THINGS, CANNOT BE RELIABLE.—AS REGARDS THE EXPOUNDERS, AS THEY DO NOT THEMSELVES PERCEIVE *Dharma*, THESE ALSO CAN NEVER BE RELIABLE. OF SUCH EXPOUNDERS, EVEN THOUGH *beginninglessness* MAY BE POSTULATED, IT WOULD BE IN A POSITION THAT IS NOT RELIABLE; AND HENCE IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER FROM THE BEGINNINGLESSNESS OF THE UNBELIEVERS AND OTHERS. THUS THERE BEING NO DIFFERENCE DISCERNIBLE, ALL THIS COMES TO BE ON THE SAME FOOTING; SO THAT NEITHER *Reliability* NOR *Unreliability* WOULD BE BEGINNINGLESS.—(3482–3484)

COMMENTARY.

'*Can never be reliable*'—That is Reliability can never be theirs.

When, in this way, the Vedic Sentences themselves, being dependent upon other things, cannot be reliable,—their Expounders would be like a group of blind people, having no knowledge of *dharma*; and as such these also would be unreliable.

Thus what has been asserted by the other party, to the effect that—"Reliability (Validity) and Unreliability (Invalidity) would thus be beginningless",—cannot be right.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'*Na mānatvāpramāṇatvē, etc. etc.*'—Only if the reliability of the Expounders and the Veda had been established, could the said Reliability be beginningless; as a matter of fact, however, that itself has not been established; hence it is not right to assert that both these are *beginningless.*—(3482–3484)

Then again, when we asserted that the Vedas and their expounders stand on the same footing as Buddha and His Teachings,—it was merely as a counterblast; as a matter of fact, there can be no equality between the Blessed Lord and His Teachings on the one hand and the Vedas and their expounders on the other; there is really a great difference between them.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3485).

IN FACT, THERE IS THIS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SAGE AND THOSE WORDS,—THAT HE PERCEIVED THE *Dharma* HIMSELF AND EXPOUNDED THEM THROUGH MERCY.—(3485)

COMMENTARY.

It has been already proved that the Blessed Lord had the direct perception of *Dharma* and taught it. Hence what the opponent has asserted (under *Text* 3179) regarding the unreliability of one who has never himself perceived *Dharma*, is 'inadmissible'.—(3485)

The following might be urged—"How is it known that the Lord Himself expounded the *Dharma*?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3486).

THAT IS DESCRIBED AS '*Dharma*' BY ALL WISE PERSONS FROM WHICH FOLLOWS 'PROSPERITY' AND THE 'HIGHEST GOOD'.—(3486)

COMMENTARY.

'*The Highest Good*'—'follows from which'—such is the construction.

'*Prosperity*' is Happiness, and '*Highest Good*' is Final Liberation.

'*This is what is described as Dharma*'—as is clear from the assertion (in the *Vaisheṣika-Sutra*) that 'Dharma is that from which follows the fulfilment of Prosperity and the Highest Good'.—(3486)

[Says the Opponent]—"It may be that *Dharma* is the means of accomplishing Prosperity and the Highest Good; but how is the Word of *Buddha* the means of knowing *Dharma*,—by virtue of which He should be recognised as 'cognisant with *Dharma*'?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3487).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHEREVER THE RULES LAID DOWN BY HIM RELATING TO INCANTATIONS AND COMMUNION AND SUCH THINGS, ARE PROPERLY FOLLOWED IN PRACTICE, ONE BECOMES ENDOWED WITH EVEN SUCH PERCEPTIBLE QUALITIES AS WISDOM, HEALTH, POWER AND SO FORTH.—(3487)

COMMENTARY.

The compound is to be expounded as—'The rules relating to Incantations and Communion' which 'have been laid down by the Blessed Lord'.

The term '*yoga*' stands for Communion.

'*And such things*' is meant to include Gestures, Magic Circles and so forth.

'*Even perceptible qualities*'—i.e. during the present life itself,—and not only in the other regions, after death. This is what is indicated by the word '*even*'.—(3487)

Having thus shown that the words of Buddha are conducive to 'Prosperity', the Author proceeds to show that they are also conducive to the 'Highest Good':—

TEXTS (3488–3494).

From the realisation of the Doctrine of the 'Soul-less-ness of all things' as taught by Him, follows the cessation of the whole mass of *Afflictions* due to the notion of things having such existence. This notion of the reality of things appears in the form of 'self' and 'things related to the self'; it is only when there are notions of 'I' and 'mine' that the whole mass of *Afflictions* becomes operative.—The said perception of 'Soul-less-ness' is the enemy of this notion of reality; hence when the former becomes duly absorbed and realised, the latter disappears; therefore the entire mass of *Afflictions* due to that notion of reality ceases, on account of the absence of its cause; and when that ceases, there is no more Birth due to that. Thus there being absolute liberation from Birth, this state is spoken of as the 'Final Goal'.—Thus the perception of 'Soul-less-ness' is the door to Unrivalled 'Good'.—All other Philosophers have held that Liberation follows from the cessation of the 'I-notion'; but if there is a 'Soul', this 'I-notion' can never cease; because its efficient cause would always be there; so the objective of that notion too would not be abrogated. If it were abrogated, there would be negation of it, which would mean a complete volte-face on their part.—(3488–3494)

COMMENTARY.

It is accepted by all that *Liberation* consists in the absolute cessation of the series of Births and Rebirths. But the only means of attaining this consists in the Teachings of the Blessed Lord; as it is only here—and nowhere else,—that we have the 'teaching of the doctrine of *no-Soul*', which is the sole destroyer of 'Afflictions' which are the source of 'Birth and Rebirth'; and all other Philosophers are wedded to the false doctrine of the 'Soul'. Thus it is the word of the Blessed Lord alone which, as being the means of attaining Prosperity and Highest Good, can be the indicator of *Dharma*; hence it is this alone that should be depended upon by all who seek their own welfare.—Such is the purport of the whole text.

The meaning of the words is now explained:—

Question:—"How do you know that the mass of Afflictions arises from the notion of the real existence of things?"

Answer:—'*The notion of the reality of things, etc. etc.*'—This has been already explained by us before.

Question:—"If the mass of Afflictions arises from the notion of the real existence of things, even so, how is it set aside by the perception of 'Soul-less-ness'?"

Answer:—'*The said perception of Soul-less-ness, etc. etc.*'—'*Notion of reality*'—i.e. the notion of existence; i.e. the idea that things are really existent,—of this, the 'perception of Soul-less-ness' is the 'enemy'—opponent.—This also has been already explained by us before.

'*The former*'—i.e. the Perception of 'Soul-less-ness';—*the latter*'—i.e. the notion of the real existence of things.

'*Due to that*'—due to the notion of real existence.

'*On account of the absence of its cause*'—i.e. on the cessation of its cause in the shape of the notion of real existence.

'*When that ceases*'—i.e. when the mass of Afflictions disappears.

'*Due to that*'—i.e. due to the Afflictions.

'*There is no more Birth*';—when the cause is not there, the effect cannot appear; if it did, it would do so without cause.

'*Absolute liberation from it*'—i.e. from the *Afflictions* or from *Birth*, there is absolute liberation, there being no more Birth; as it has been declared that 'Final Liberation consists in absolute emancipation from it'.

Says the Opponent—"Under other systems also the *Perception of Truth* has been held to be the means of 'Highest Good', and the 'Ten Noble Paths' also have been laid down as leading to 'Prosperity'. Why then should the doctrine of *Soul-less-ness* be the only way to Liberation?"

The answer to this is as follows:—'*All other Philosophers etc. etc.*—For instance, all 'thought-phases' having their source in the '*I-notion*', there is Liberation on the cessation of this notion;—on this point all men seeking for Liberation are agreed. This cessation of the 'I-notion', however, is not possible under the other philosophical systems; as they are all obsessed with the false notion of 'Soul', and this notion of 'Soul' is the very root of the said 'I-notion'. So long as this 'Soul' is there obsessing the men,—and this, in its perfect state, is the cause of the 'I-notion',—and its own objective, in the shape of the 'Soul' has not been abrogated,—how could the said 'I-notion' cease?—This has been thus declared—'So long as the Mind is beset with the *I-notion*, the series of Birth and Rebirth does not cease; and so long as the idea of the *Soul* is there, the *I-notion* does not cease; there is no other Teacher, except Thyself, who teaches the doctrine of *no-soul*; hence there is no other Path to Peace except the one declared by Thee'. The reason for this lies in the fact that the properties of the Mind cannot be pulled out like thorns and thrown away; they have arisen from the wrong notions of things, and as such they automatically cease on the cessation of their cause in the shape of the said wrong notions.

It might be argued that—"the *Yogin* does abrogate it".

The answer to that is—'*If it were abrogated, etc. etc.*'—If the 'Soul' were abrogated (and repudiated), it could be repudiated only in the words 'it does not exist'; as otherwise, there would be no point in repudiating it. Because if, after having accepted the 'Soul', one were to repudiate it as the 'source of pain', then such repudiation would be useless; because the repudiation of a thing is done for the purpose of abandoning it; and no abandoning could be possible of what one regards as his ever-lasting *self*; hence the said repudiation would be useless.—Nor can those other philosophers repudiate

the 'Soul' as being *non-existent*; because when they have regarded the Soul as *existent*, if they regard it as *non-existent*,—this would mean a complete *volte-face* on their part.—(3488–3494)

Further, there may be repudiation of it either as being the source of suffering or as something else; even so there could be no cessation of the *I-notion* whose sole root lies in the notion of the 'Soul'.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (3495).

THE NOTION 'I AM NOT' CANNOT BE RIGHT IF THE 'I' REALLY EXISTS. OR ELSE, IT IS NOT TRUE 'THAT ONE WHO KNOWS THE TRUTH MUST ATTAIN *Nirvāṇa*.—(3495)

COMMENTARY.

'*I am not*'—This idea that 'I am not' cannot be right;—'*if the I really exists*',—i.e. if the Soul exists.

Hence that your 'knower of Truth' attains *Nirvāṇa* cannot be true; because Liberation has been held to follow from the cessation of the 'I-notion', and so long as the 'Soul' is there as the object of that notion, there can be no cessation of the 'I-notion'; how then could there be Liberation?—(3495)

The following *Texts* sum up the Author's position:—

TEXTS (3496-3497).

THUS THEN, UNDER OTHER SYSTEMS, THERE IS JUST A LITTLE 'WELFARE' (PROSPERITY) SECURED THROUGH THE DESTRUCTION OF THE 'TEN SINS';—THE ATTAINMENT OF THE HIGHEST GOOD THERE IS NONE IN THE LEAST: AND THE REASON FOR THIS LIES IN THE FACT THAT ALL THESE ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE NOTION OF THE 'REAL EXISTENCE' (OF THE SOUL) AND HENCE THE ROOT OF THE 'AFFLICTIONS' IS NOT REMOVED.—(3496-3497)

COMMENTARY.

'*Through the destruction of the Ten Sins*'—These sins are—(1) Killing of life, (2) Taking what has not been given, (3) Indulgence in (sexual) desire, (4) Dishonest Behaviour, (5) Lying, (6) Backbiting, (7) Cruelty, (8) Incoherent Talking, (9) Malice or Deceitfulness, and (10) Wrong knowledge.—Or they may be the following:—(1) Not saving others, (2) Not giving, (3) Not serving, (4) Lying, (5) Harsh words, (6) Injuring others, (7) Neglect of study, (8) Faithlessness, (9) Mercilessness, and (10) [illegible]

'opposites' of these are the 'Ten noble Paths'.—When these said 'Ten sins' are destroyed, there follows *Dispassion* and thence the 'Ten Noble Paths'.

'*Just a little*'—Inasmuch as it is preceded by the aforesaid '*volte face*' —the man lapses away very quickly.

The 'root of the Afflictions' is the notion of the existence (of the Soul).—(3496-3497)

The superiority of the Lord's Teaching is shown further, even though this also brings about Welfare (Prosperity)—

TEXT (3498).

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE 'TEN NOBLE PATHS' THAT HAVE BEEN TAUGHT BY *Tāyin* (*Buddha*) ARE EMBEDDED IN TRUE KNOWLEDGE AND HENCE THEY ARE SUFFICIENTLY POWERFUL. —(3498)

COMMENTARY.

'Powerful'—as leading to lasting and excellent results.—(3498)

Question:—"Why cannot the teachings of others also be regarded as 'powerful'?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (3499-3500).

THOSE OTHERS ARE CLOTHED IN THE NOTION OF THE REAL EXISTENCE (OF THE SOUL) AND INVOLVE A '*Volte face*':—AS SUCH THEY ARE NOT PURE; CONSEQUENTLY PURE RESULTS DO NOT FLOW FROM THEM.—THUS THEN, IF ONE DOES NOT HIMSELF PERCEIVE IN THE GREAT SAGE THE TEACHER OF THE ESSENCE OF *Dharma*, AND CONSEQUENTLY REMAINS IGNORANT OF *Dharma*,—HOW CAN HE ATTAIN PEACE OF MIND?—(3499-3500)

COMMENTARY.

Pure results follow only from pure causes, not from impure ones.

'*The Great Sage*'—i.e. the Highest, Best,—among the sages of various grades (?).—(3499-3500)

It has been argued under *Text* 3185 that—"The omniscience of *Buddha* and others on the one hand, and the eternality of the Veda, on the other, are asserted as standing on the same footing, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3501-3502).

THE 'OMNISCIENCE OF *Buddha*' AND THE 'ETERNALITY OF THE VEDA' HAVE *not* BEEN DECLARED BY ANY WISE MAN TO STAND ON THE SAME FOOTING; AND THIS BECAUSE THE SAID *eternality* IS IMPOSSIBLE. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST IT HAS BEEN ALREADY POINTED OUT, AS CONSISTING IN THE INCOMPATIBILITY INVOLVED IN 'SIMULTANEITY' AND 'SUCCESSIVENESS';—BY REASON OF THIS IT CANNOT BRING ABOUT ANY SUCH EFFECTS AS *Cognition* AND THE LIKE.—(3501-3502)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tāyin*'—is the Blessed Lord *Buddha.*

If the Veda could be eternal, then alone it could be said that "the omniscience of Buddha and the eternality of the Veda (stand on the same footing)"; as a matter of fact, however, that itself is not possible; as arguments to the contrary have been already adduced above. The Author recalls the same arguments in the words, '*consisting in the incompatibility, etc. etc.*'—What this means has been already explained before.—(3501-3502)

It has been argued under *Text* 3186 that,—"The Omniscient Person is not seen by us at the present time, etc. etc."

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3503-3504).

AS REGARDS THE ARGUMENT THAT THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS NOT SEEN AT THE PRESENT TIME—BY YOU OR BY ALL MEN,—THIS HAS BEEN ALREADY ANSWERED IN DETAIL. AS REGARDS NON-PERCEPTION BY YOU, THAT, BY ITSELF, IS 'FALLIBLE', 'INCONCLUSIVE'; AS REGARDS NON-PERCEPTION BY ALL OTHER MEN, THAT MUST REMAIN ALWAYS DOUBTFUL.—(3503-3504)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued further by Kumārila (*Shlokavārtika*) that—'That *He existed in the past* cannot be presumed in the way in which it is presumed that He *did not* exist in the past".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3505).

"HIS *existence* IN THE PAST CANNOT BE PRESUMED IN THE WAY IN WHICH HIS *non-existence* HAS BEEN PRESUMED"—THIS ASSERTION IN REGARD EVEN TO THE PAST CANNOT BE RIGHT; BECAUSE SUCH DENIAL IS IMPOSSIBLE.—(3505)

COMMENTARY.

The assertion that—"The denial can be made to the effect that the Omniscient Person *did not* exist in the past,—in the same way, it cannot be presumed that He *did* exist in the past";—Such an assertion is most improper; because even in reference to the *past*, the denial of the said Person is not possible.—The term 'even' implies that it is not possible in reference to the *Present* and the *Future* also. It has been already pointed out that the mere fact that a certain thing is not seen cannot justify the conclusion that it does not exist.—(3505)

The following *Texts* anticipate and answer the Opponent's argument.—

TEXTS (3506-3507).

THE FOLLOWING MIGHT BE URGED—"THE PERIOD THAT IS PAST WAS DEVOID OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON,—BECAUSE IT WAS A PERIOD OF TIME,—LIKE THE PRESENT TIME WHICH IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED".—THIS ARGUMENT HOWEVER, IS NOT RIGHT, AS ITS CONTRARY IS OPEN TO DOUBT; INASMUCH AS THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING THE PRESENT TIME BEING DEVOID OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON.—(3506-3507)

COMMENTARY.

The argument of the other party may be thus formulated—"The Past must be regarded as devoid of the Omniscient Person,—because it is a period of time,—like the Present Time"

In this argument, inasmuch as nothing has been adduced to show that the contrary of the Probandum is impossible,—there will always be a doubt regarding the existence of such a contrary, and consequently, the Reason would remain 'Inconclusive'. The Corroborative Instance also would be 'Inadmissible', as the presence of the Probandum would be doubtful.—(3506-3507)

Granting that the Corroborative Instance is admissible (and the Omniscient Person does not exist at the present time),—even so, mere apprehension cannot rightly prove the existence of what is desired.—This is pointed out in the following:—

TEXT (3508).

IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT WHAT EXISTED IN THE PAST IS NOT THERE IN THE PRESENT BECAUSE THE WHOLE SET OF ITS CAUSES IS NOT PRESENT. WHY SHOULD IT NOT BE THAT SUCH A PERSON EXISTED IN THE PAST,—LIKE *Rāma* AND OTHERS?—(3508)

COMMENTARY.

What truth can there be in any such premiss as that 'what does not exist in the Present could not have existed in the Past'. For instance, the mere fact that *Rāma, Bharata* and others do not exist at the *present* time cannot justify the inference that they did not exist in the *past.* Thus, in view of the case of *Rāma* and others, the Reason put forward by the other party is 'Inconclusive'.—(3508)

It has been argued under *Text* 3186, that—"no Indicative is recognised as part of the Subject which could lead to His inference".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3509).

'WISDOM' AND THE REST HAVE BEEN MADE THE 'SUBJECT', AND THEN THE INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE HAS BEEN SET FORTH; HENCE IT IS NOT TRUE THAT 'NO INDICATIVE IS RECOGNISED'.—AND YET WE ARE NOT SEEKING TO PROVE THE *existence* (OF THE PERSON).—(3509)

COMMENTARY.

Under *Text* 3414 above, *Wisdom,* etc. have been made the 'subject' of the Reasoning, and the necessary Inferential Indicative has been asserted; hence it is not right to assert that "no Indicative is recognised".

But *existence* is not what we are proving; all that we are proving is the fact of there being higher stages of the *Wisdom,* etc.; it is the highest stage of such *Wisdom* that constitutes 'Omniscience'.—Consequently the objections that have been urged against the proving of the existence of the Omniscient *Person* are not applicable at all.—(3509)

It has been argued under *Text* 3187, that—'There is no scriptural declaration affirming an eternal Omniscient Person, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3510).

WE ARE NOT AFFIRMING THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON ON THE BASIS OF SCRIPTURAL DECLARATIONS. WHEN THE INFERENTIAL REASON IS AVAILABLE, WHO WOULD MAKE AN ASSERTION ON THE BASIS OF VERBAL AUTHORITY ?—(3510)

COMMENTARY.

So long as Inference on the basis of the capacity of things is available, who would seek to establish the existence of things on the basis of mere verbal assertion which is entirely dependent upon the whim of man ? It is for this reason that we are not proving the existence of the Omniscient Person on the basis of scriptural declarations;—in fact, we are doing it on the basis of *Inference*; and this has been already explained before.—(3510)

Nor is it true (as asserted by the Opponent) that—' there is no scriptural declaration affirming the eternal Omniscient Person" ;—this is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXTS (3511-3512).

BUT IF YOU REGARD THE VEDA AS RELIABLE, THEN, HOW IS IT THAT YOU, DELUDED PEOPLE, DO NOT APPREHEND THE *Omniscience* OF THE BLESSED LORD ? AS A MATTER OF FACT, IN THE VEDIC RESCENSIONAL TEXT CALLED '*Nimitta*', THE LEARNED BRAHMAṆAS CLEARLY READ OF THE REVERED GREAT SAGE AS 'OMNISCIENT'.—(3511-3512)

COMMENTARY.

For instance, there is a particular Vedic Rescensional Text under the name '*Nimitta*'; and therein, the Blessed Lord, *Shakya-Muni* is clearly spoken of as 'omniscient'.—How is it then, that you, dull-witted people, while taking your stand upon the Veda, are denying Him ?—(3511-3512)

The following *Text* points out how He is spoken of in the said Vedic text :—

TEXTS (3513-3514)

[HE IS DESCRIBED AS] ONE WHO, HAVING SHOWN HIMSELF IN A DREAM AS A SIX-TUSKED WHITE ELEPHANT, WAS BORN AS ONE GOING TO BE A *Bodhisattva*, THE OCEAN OF FINE QUALITIES, HIS FAME PROCLAIMED, OMNISCIENT, FULL OF MERCY, ATTAINING THE STATE OF IMMORTALITY, PURE, THE FATHER OF THE WHOLE WORLD.—(3513-3514)

COMMENTARY.

'*His fame proclaimed*'—i.e his fame well-known to the whole world.

'*Attaining the state of Immortality*'—i.e. on reaching the state of *Nirvāṇa*, which consists in the cessation of all Afflictions along with the Dispositions.

'*Pure*'—consisting of constituents free from all impurities. This indicates that superiority of the Blessed Lord which is conducive to his own welfare and which consists in the destruction of all Ignorance; the phrase, '*The Father of all*' indicates that superiority which is conducive to the welfare of others.—'*Father*', Teacher and Controller,—*of the world*;—because He establishes the Three forms of Right Knowledge.—(3513-3514)

The following *Texts* anticipate and answer the rejoinder of the other party, to the above:—

TEXTS (3515-3516).

IF THIS RESCENSIONAL TEXT JUST MENTIONED IS NOT ACCEPTED AS SUCH,—THEN, FOR THAT, WE CAN DISCOVER NO REASON EXCEPT SHEER HOSTILITY ON YOUR PART. BECAUSE *accentuation* AND OTHER PROPERTIES THAT BELONG TO THE VEDIC TEXT ARE ALL POSSIBLE IN REGARD TO THIS TEXT ALSO: SPECIALLY AS THESE PROPERTIES ARE DEPENDENT UPON THE MERE WHIM OF MEN.—(3515-3516)

COMMENTARY.

'*This*'—i.e. the Rescensional Text named '*Nimitta*'.

The second line beginning with—'Then, for that, etc. etc.' states the answer to the Opponent's position.—(3515-3516)

The following *text* sets forth the Opponent's rejoinder:—

TEXT (3517).

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, NO SCRIPTURAL TEXT TO THIS EFFECT CAN BE FOUND; BUT IF SUCH AN ASSERTION WERE *eternal*, THEN IT COULD BE ONLY COMMENDATORY; AND IF IT REALLY SPOKE OF A PERSON, THEN IT WOULD BE NOT-ETERNAL."—(3517)

COMMENTARY.

'*To this effect*'—i.e. speaking of the Omniscient Person.

Question:—"Why cannot it be found?"

Answer:—'*If it is eternal, etc. etc.*'—If the scriptural text speaking of the Omniscient Person is *eternal*, then it must be purely commendatory,—so that it must be taken as really having an entirely different meaning. If it is not held to be merely commendatory, then it must be *non-eternal*.—(3517)

Question:—Why should it be *commendatory*, if eternal?

Answer:—

TEXT (3518).

"IF THE SCRIPTURE IS ETERNAL, THEN THE ASSUMPTION OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS FUTILE: AS PEOPLE WOULD LEARN *Dharma* FROM THE SCRIPTURE ITSELF."—(3518)

COMMENTARY.

'*Tatkalpanā*'—assumption of the Omniscient Person.

Question:—Why is it futile?

Answer:—'*As people, etc.*'—'*Tataḥ*'—from the Eternal Scripture itself.—(3518)

The author's answer to the above argument of the other party is as follows:—

TEXTS (3519-3520).

IN FACT, *eternality* DOES NOT BELONG EVEN TO THE *Veda* WELL-KNOWN AS SUCH; BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS *Cognition following after effort, or the result of successive Cognitions* AND SO FORTH.—BUT IN CASE THE WELL-KNOWN *Veda* IS ACCEPTED AS RELIABLE, YOU HAVE TO ACCEPT THE OTHER RESCENSIONAL TEXT ALSO AS RELIABLE, BECAUSE THAT ALSO IS *Veda*.—(3519-3520)

COMMENTARY.

Though the *Ṛgveda* and the rest are well-known as *Veda*, yet it is not well known that they are eternal.

"How so?"

'*Because*, etc. etc.'; '*yat*' stands for '*yasmat*', 'because';—the Cognition after effort, or the successive Cognition, is all not-eternal; just like the Jar and other things;—so also is the Veda;—hence it is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—The charges of 'Inadmissibility', etc. against this Reason have been fully refuted under the chapter on the 'Revealed Word'; hence it is not done over again here.

'*Etasya*'—of the well-known *Veda*.—(3519-3520)

"But the fact of the other Rescensional Text (put forward) cannot be admitted"—says the Opponent.

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3521).

IT BEHOVES YOU TO PROVE BEYOND DOUBT THAT THE TEXT IN QUESTION IS NOT 'VEDA'; AS OTHERWISE, THE REASON THAT YOU HAVE PUT FORWARD (AGAINST THE OMNISCIENT PERSON) THAT HE IS NOT MENTIONED IN THE 'VEDA' BECOMES DOUBTFUL.—(3521)

COMMENTARY.

'*Otherwise*'—i.e. if you do not establish the fact that it is not *Veda*; in that case, what you have asserted regarding the Omniscient Person being not mentioned in the 'Veda', becomes open to doubt and hence 'Inadmissible' (as Reason).—(3521)

It has been argued under *Text* 3517 that—"if the Text in question refers to the Person, then it is not-eternal".—The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3522).

THE VEDA MAY BE ETERNAL; IT MAY ALSO REFER TO THE OMNISCIENT PERSON. BUT IF IT REFERS TO THE PERSON, WHY SHOULD IT, ON THAT ACCOUNT, BECOME *not-eternal*?—"BECAUSE IT WOULD, IN THAT CASE, BE ASSOCIATED WITH WHAT IS PERISHABLE" —[Says the Opponent].—(3522)

COMMENTARY.

On being asked—'Why should it become *not-eternal*?'—the Opponent replies—'*Because it would, etc. etc.*'—i.e. because it would be associated with—related to—something that is perishable, evanescent.—(3522)

The following *text* points out the 'Inconclusiveness' of the Opponent's answer:—

TEXT (3523).

IF THAT BE SO, THEN HOW ARE ALL SUCH THINGS AS CLARIFIED BUTTER, NIVĀRA-CORN AND FIRE, WHICH ARE *not-eternal*,—SPOKEN OF IN THE VEDA, WHICH IS *eternal*?—(3523)

COMMENTARY.

'*Ājya*' is Clarified Butter;—*Nīvāra* is a particular kind of Corn;—*Chāmīkarajāta*' is Fire.—'*Tēna*'—by the *Veda*.—(3523)

The following *texts* anticipate and answer the Opponent's rejoinder:—

TEXTS (3524-3525).

IF IT IS URGED THAT—"IN THESE CASES ALSO, THERE IS THE *Universal*, WHICH IS *eternal*",—THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) THAT ALSO HAS BEEN DISCARDED. THEN AGAIN, IF THE WORD EXPRESSES THE *Universal* ALONE, THEN IT CANNOT BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE PARTICULAR THINGS, CLARIFIED BUTTER AND THE REST. IF IT EXPRESSES THIS LATTER ALSO, THEN DOES IT NOT LOSE ITS *eternality*? FURTHER, IN REGARD TO THE OMNISCIENT PERSON ALSO, THE SCRIPTURAL WORD COULD RETAIN ITS ETERNALITY IN THE SAME WAY, EVEN THOUGH DENOTING THE PERSON (WHO IS NOT-ETERNAL).—(3524-3525)

COMMENTARY.

[The other Party says]—"In the case of the Clarified Butter and other things, there is the *Universal* which is expressed by the word; so that there could be no incongruity".

This cannot be right; because under the chapter on the 'Universal', the *Universal* has been rejected in detail.

Granting that the Universal is there; even so, as the word 'Clarified Butter' would express the *Universal* only, it could not bring about the notion of the Individual; and in that case, the denoting of the Universal would be useless, so far as that man is concerned who seeks to do some act that could be accomplished only through the Individual.

"The Individual is cognised because it is unseparable from the Universal".

That cannot be; because, as a matter of fact, there is no such remoteness in the Cognition. That is to say, it does *not* so happen that when the word is uttered, the Cognition that comes about first is that of the Universal,—and then later on, follows the Cognition of the Individual as inseparable from that Universal. What actually happens in ordinary experience is that the Cognition of the usefully effective thing (which is the Individual)

for the purpose of speaking of that useful thing itself. Hence it cannot be right to say that "the Cognition of the Individual does not follow from the word directly".

If the word denoted the Universal only, and not the Individual, then a sane man would not be prompted to activity by the Word which denotes something not connected with that activity,—and such a word would be like the Injunction of milking the Bull!

If, in order to avoid this contingency, it is admitted that there is denotation of the thing in its *individual* aspect also,—then how would the Veda escape from the contingency of losing its *eternality*?

Further, it may be that primarily the words denote Universals;—and there is denotation of Individuals only as inseparable from Universals. Even so, however, there would be nothing incongruous in the Scripture speaking of the Omniscient Person being *eternal*.—This is what the Author points out in the words—'*Then too, in regard, etc. etc.*' That is to say, even when the Omniscient Person is one only, a multiplicity might be assumed on the basis of varying states; and thereby it would be possible for Him to be spoken by means of a word denotative of the Universal;—what to say then when there is an immeasurable line of Omniscient Persons?—(3524-3525)

Then again, if you do not accept the Rescensional text called '*Nimitta*' as *Veda*,—yet, even so, your assertion, that "the Omniscient Person is not mentioned in the Veda", becomes doubtful at any rate.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3526-3527).

AS REGARDS THE WORDS OF THE VEDA, AS THEY ARE SELF-SUFFICIENT, THEIR MEANING COULD NOT BE ASCERTAINED FROM THE VEDA ITSELF;—NOR FROM THE LEARNER BY HIMSELF,—OR FROM SOME OTHER PERSON,—WHO MIGHT BE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DELUSION AND OTHER DISABILITIES. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY CERTAINTY REGARDING THE ASSERTION THAT—'WHAT IS MEANT BY THE VEDIC WORDS—*Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*—IS *not* THAT *Jina is omniscient*?—(3526-3527)

COMMENTARY.

The words of the Veda, on account of their *eternality*, must be self-sufficient, independent; hence what these words mean cannot be ascertained from the Veda itself; because the Veda nowhere says 'My meaning is *this*——not *that*';—nor could it be ascertained from the *learner* by himself;—or from some other person, in the shape of an expounder; because all these

men, according to you, might be under the influence of Delusion and other disabilities.—Under the circumstances, it is quite possible to take the words relating to the *Agnihotra* as meaning that 'the Blessed Lord is omniscient'.

'*Any certainty, etc. etc.*'—i.e. no certainty at all.—(3526–3527)

It has been argued under *Text* 3195, that—"It is not possible to comprehend all the things cognised by all men".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3528-3529).

THAT ONE IS 'OMNISCIENT' IS UNDERSTOOD ONLY FROM THE CLEAR TEACHING THAT HE IMPARTS REGARDING HEAVEN AND THE HIGHEST GOOD: BECAUSE THAT BEARS TESTIMONY TO HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT MATTERS. OF WHAT USE IS THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE NUMBER OF SANDS OF THE SEAS? WHAT THEN HAVE WE GOT TO DO WITH HIS KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER THINGS?—(3528-3529)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued under *Text* 3200 that—"The descriptions that are met with of Omniscient Persons in the *Purāṇas*, etc. should be understood in the figurative sense".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3530-3531).

THAT THE DESCRIPTIONS SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE FIGURATIVE SENSE, LIKE THE *Mantra* AND *Arthavāda* TEXTS,—WOULD BE RIGHT ONLY AFTER THE ACTUAL EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON HAD BEEN REJECTED.—AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER, THERE IS NOTHING TO ANNUL THE IDEA OF SUCH A PERSON; WHILE, ON THE CONTRARY, HIS EXISTENCE HAS BEEN ACTUALLY PROVED IN GREAT DETAIL. SO THAT THE IDEA OF ALL THIS BEING *figurative* MUST REMAIN DOUBTFUL: INASMUCH AS IT IS POSSIBLE FOR IT TO BE TRUE IN ITS PRIMARY SENSE.—(3530-3531)

COMMENTARY.

If the existence of the Omniscient Person had been rejected by proofs, then no other explanation being possible, the assertions in question might be taken in their figurative sense;—not otherwise, if the primary meaning were in any way possible. It cannot be right to regard the eternal Word to be mere *Arthavāda*; because an assertion is taken as an *Arthavāda* only when

some other meaning is *intended*: in a case therefore where there is no such intention, there being no speaker desiring to make the assertion,—that condition cannot be fulfilled.—(3530-3531)

It has been further argued, under the same *Text* 3200, that—"the 'untrammelled knowledge' spoken of may be taken as referring to certain particular things only, not to all things".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3532).

IN CASE THE 'UNTRAMMELLED' NATURE OF HIS KNOWLEDGE IS REGARDED AS TRUE, IN REFERENCE TO SUCH THINGS AS *Dharma* AND THE LIKE, —THEN CLEARLY THE BUDDHISTS HAVE WON THEIR CASE.—(3532)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"How have the Buddhists won their case?"

Answer:—

TEXT (3533).

BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN PROVED BEFORE THAT IT IS THE LORD'S KNOWLEDGE RELATING TO PROSPERITY AND HIGHEST GOOD, ALONG WITH THESE MATTERS (*Dharma* AND THE REST), WHICH IS 'UNTRAMMELLED':—THIS IS QUITE CLEAR EVEN TO THE VERIEST PIPER.—(3533)

COMMENTARY.

It has been proved before that the Lord's knowledge of the Highest Good is 'untrammelled'. Hence it must be known to all men, down to the veriest piper, that He possesses the knowledge of *Dharma* and allied matters; so that, by his own words, the opponent admits the "Omniscience' of the Lord, (after admitting His knowledge of *Dharma* and such matters).—(3533)

It has been argued under *Text* 3205, that—"The knowledge spoken of may be that of his own self".

But even so, as such knowledge is possible for the Lord Himself, what has been urged is nothing undesirable for us.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3534).

AS REGARDS THE KNOWLEDGE OF SELF, BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE PRACTICE OF MEDITATION,—THIS ALSO HAS BEEN ALREADY PROVED TO BE 'UNTRAMMELLED' IN THE CASE OF THOSE PERSONS.—(3534)

COMMENTARY.

'*This also*'—i.e. the knowledge of self.
'*Teṣām*'—of the revered Buddhas.
'*Already*'—Under *Text* 3434.—(3534)

Says the Opponent—"The *knowledge of self* there mentioned is that consisting in self-Cognition, not that of the Spirit functioning within. How then can our argument be futile (proving what is already admitted)?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3535).

THAT ALONE IS *knowledge of self* WHICH CONSISTS IN THE PERCEPTION OF THE PURE SELF,—AS THEREIN THE ONLY COGNITION IS THAT OF PURE CONSCIOUSNESS FREED FROM ALL ADVENTITIOUS IMPURITIES.—(3535)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"How is it known that there is knowledge of pure Consciousness only?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (3536-3537).

IT HAS BEEN SHOWN BEFORE THAT ALL COGNITION IS IN THE FORM DEVOID OF THE *Apprehender and Apprehended*; IT IS FREE FROM THE TWO ABERRATIONS. THIS IS THE COGNITION OR KNOWLEDGE THAT HAS BEEN EXPOUNDED BY THE *Buddhas*. THAT IS WHAT PROVES THESE TO HAVE BEEN POSSESSED OF VAST WISDOM AND OF KNOWLEDGE NOT CONDUCIVE TO BIRTH AND REBIRTH AND IT IS THE TEACHINGS INCULCATED UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF THESE PERSONS THAT ARE LUMINOUS TO THE PRESENT DAY.—(3536-3537)

COMMENTARY.

'*Before*'—Under the chapter (23) on the 'External World'.
'*Saṃsāra, etc.*'—i.e. whose knowledge is not conducive to Births and Rebirths.—(3536-3537)

Question :—"What are those Teachings that were promulgated under Their guidance?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (3538–3540).

IN REGARD TO THE LUMINOUS CONSCIOUSNESS, NOT MARRED BY THE TWO FORMS,—WHO COULD ENTERTAIN ANY WRONG NOTIONS, IF HIS MIND IS NOT DELUDED BY THE TWO FORMS?—AS SOON AS THERE IS RECOGNITION OF THE 'SOUL-LESS-NESS' OF BOTH,—ALL THOSE DEFECTS OF LOVE, HATE AND THE LIKE WHICH HAVE THEIR SOURCE IN THE THOUGHTS OF WOMEN AND SUCH THINGS, DISAPPEAR WITHOUT EFFORT. —THIS IS THE HIGHEST TRUTH WHICH THE 'EXPOUNDER OF UNITY' PROPOUNDED,—WHICH BRINGS ALL KINDS OF PROSPERITY, FAR BEYOND THE REACH OF *Kēshava* AND OTHERS.—(3538–3540)

COMMENTARY.

'*If his mind is not deluded, etc.*'—i.e. who has got rid of all obsession of the *apprehender* and the *apprehended*.

'*As soon as there is recognition, etc. etc.*'—i.e. the recognition of the fact that the (1) Body and (2) All other things are *without soul*;—or it may mean the recognition of the '*nairātmya*'—unreality—'*of both*'—i.e. of the *apprehended* as well as the *Apprehender*.

'*Far beyond the reach of, etc. etc.*'—'*Kēshava*' stands for *Hari* (*Viṣṇu*).—'*And others*' includes '*Īshvara*' and the rest.—(3538–3540)

Question :—"Why is not the *self-Cognition of Kēshava* and others also regarded as pure?"

Answer :—

TEXTS (3541–3543).

OTHER PEOPLE RECOGNISE THE 'SOUL' AS SOMETHING PERMANENT, RESEMBLING THE PURE ROCK-CRYSTAL; THIS IDEA OF THESE PEOPLE IS CLEARLY WRONG, AS THE EXISTENCE OF THE PERMANENT 'SOUL' HAS BEEN REJECTED. IF THE COGNITION ENVISAGING THE SOUL PROCEEDS FROM ONE'S OWN SOUL, THEN THERE SHOULD BE THE COGNITION OF ALL SOULS AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME.—IF IT DOES NOT PROCEED FROM ONE'S OWN SOUL,—OR IF IT IS REGARDED AS ETERNAL,—THEN IT COULD NOT ENVISAGE THE SOUL AT ALL:—BEING, IN THIS RESPECT LIKE THE COGNITIONS OF OTHER PERSONS.—(3541–3543)

COMMENTARY.

'*Other people*'—*Kēshava* and others.

Under the Chapter on the 'Soul', the existence of the Soul has been rejected; any Cognition of it must be wrong and hence impure.

Further, the knowledge of these people relating to the eternal Soul that is spoken of,—does this knowledge or Cognition proceed from the person's own Soul or not? These are the only two alternatives possible. In the former case, all his Cognitions should appear simultaneously, as their efficient cause would be there.—In the latter case, is the Cognition eternal or not-eternal? In both cases, that Soul would only be a replica of his own Soul, and hence, like the Cognition of other people, it could not envisage that Soul.—(3541-3543)

It has been argued under *Text* 3207, that—"His knowledge consists in the direct perception of His pure Self, and when the source of that knowledge is not pure, the knowledge itself is called *Ignorance*".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3544-3546).

HIS KNOWLEDGE DOES *not* CONSIST IN THE DIRECT PERCEPTION OF HIS PURE SELF; BECAUSE THAT IS DEVOID OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 'COGNISABLE', AS HAS BEEN PROVED IN DETAIL.—IF THE SOUL (SELF) IS HELD TO BE OF THE NATURE OF COGNITION (CONSCIOUSNESS), —THERE CAN BE NO APPREHENSION OF IT AS SUCH; BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 'SEEN' AND THE 'SEEING'.—IF THEN THE SAID COGNITION IS HELD TO BE SELF-ILLUMINED, THEN IT COMES TO BE 'SELF-COGNITION', AND AS SUCH IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE COGNITION IS AMENABLE TO DIRECT PERCEPTION.—(3544-3546)

COMMENTARY.

If the Soul is held to be *unconscious* in its essence, then the Cognition that apprehends it must be regarded as *impure*; as it has been proved under the chapter on the 'External World' that by their very nature, all Cognitions are devoid of the *apprehended* and the *apprehender.*

If, on the other hand, the Soul is held to be of the nature of Consciousness itself, then there would be non-difference between what is *seen* (cognised, i.e. the *soul*) and the *seeing* (Cognition, Consciousness); so that they could not be related to each other as the *apprehended* and the *apprehender*; which would mean that the Cognition could not be regarded as apprehending the Soul. Because it is only when there is some difference between the subject and the object that they can bear to each other the relation of the *apprehender* and the *apprehended.*

If, lastly, the idea is that, being luminous, like the lamp, the Cognition apprehends and envisages itself,—then there would be 'self-Cognition', which you do not admit; and it would set aside your idea that Cognition cannot be *perceived.* This is what is shown by the words—'*It would mean that Cognition is amenable to direct Perception*'.—(3544-3546)

It has been argued under *Text* 3208, that—"If it be held that *Brahmā, Viṣṇu* and *Shiva* are the embodiments of the *Veda,* etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3547–3549).

THERE CAN BE NO CONNECTION BETWEEN BRAHMĀ (AND OTHERS) AND THE VEDA;—(*a*) BECAUSE THERE IS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM, (*b*) BECAUSE BOTH ARE REGARDED AS ETERNAL, AND (*c*) BECAUSE THERE IS NO MUTUAL DEPENDENCE;—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF ANY OTHER THING.—THUS IT IS ABSURD TO TALK OF *Brahmā*, ETC. BEING 'EMBODIMENTS OF THE VEDA'.—EQUALLY ABSURD IT IS TO SPEAK OF THE VEDA AS 'CONSISTING OF ALL KNOWLEDGE'; FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE MEANING OF THE VEDA CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED.—IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT (FOR US) THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS RECOGNISED INDEPENDENTLY BY HIMSELF; AND HE IS NOT ASSUMED ON THE GROUND OF *Brahmā* AND OTHERS BEING 'EMBODIMENTS OF THE VEDA'.—(3547–3549)

COMMENTARY.

If Brahmā and others had any connection with the Veda, then alone could they be regarded as the 'Embodiment of the Veda'; as a matter of fact, there can be no connection between these and the Veda. Because there can be only two kinds of connection or relationship among things—(1) that of identity and (2) that of cause and effect,—as has been explained before;—as the two—Brahmā and Veda—are held to be different, the relation between them cannot be that of *Identity.*—Nor can it be the relation of Cause and Effect; because both are regarded as eternal, and as such cannot derive any benefit from one another, as neither could be in need of the other.

'*The idea of the Veda consisting of all knowledge*'—this has to be construed with '*is absurd*' of the previous sentence.

"Why is it absurd?"

Because '*the meaning of the Veda cannot be ascertained*';—if the meaning of the Veda were ascertained, then alone could it be assumed that it consists of all knowledge. This ascertainment however cannot be got at through any Cognition, as has been pointed out already.

Nor again do we accept the Omniscient Person on the strength of the Veda,—as you do. In fact, the Cognition of the Lord is self-born, and hence He is omniscient, by Himself;—as we have already explained before.—(3547–3549)

It has been argued in *Text* 3209, that—"Where on one side are Buddha and others who are mortal, where on the other are the three excellent Vedas, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is that the 'mortality' of the Lord has not been proved.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3550).

BEING BEYOND THE 'METEMPSYCHIC CYCLE' CONSISTING OF THE 'FIVE STATES', THE *Buddhas* ARE NOT HELD BY US TO BE 'MORTAL'. WHAT HAS BEEN REGARDED AS THEIR 'BIRTH' IS ONLY THE CREATION OF THEMSELVES BY THEMSELVES.—(3550)

COMMENTARY.

'Hell', 'Regions of the Dead', 'Regions of Beasts', 'Region of Celestials' and 'the Human Regions'—are the 'five states' that make up the 'Metempsychic Cycle';—the Blessed Lords all lie beyond this five-fold Cycle; so that their 'mortality' cannot be admitted.

Question :—"How is it then they are heard of as having been born in the family of *Shuddhodana* and others?"

Answer :—'*What has been regarded, etc. etc.*'—(3550)

The following *Text* supports this same idea by scriptures :—

TEXT (3551).

'IT IS IN THE DELIGHTFUL CITY OF *Akaniṣṭha*, FREE FROM THE HABITATION OF UNCLEAN BEINGS,—THAT THE *Buddhas* BECOME AWAKENED; AND WHAT IS AWAKENED HERE (IN THIS WORLD) IS ONLY THEIR OWN CREATION'.—(3551)

COMMENTARY.

'*Akaniṣṭha*' is the name of a certain region;—'free from the habitetion of unclean Beings'—'*Ashuddhāvāsakāyika*' are celestial beings;—here only such people dwell who are noble and pure;—on the top of this rests the *Māheshvara-Bhavana* (the Palace of the Supreme Lord);—it is in this Palace that there appear the *Bodhisattvas* who have passed through the 'ten stages' and reached the highest;—what is perceived here in the world is only what is created under their supervision.

Such is the assertion met with in the scriptures.—(3551)

It might be argued by the Opponent that—"We do not admit of what has been asserted here".

The answer to that is as follows:—

TEXTS (3552-3553).

HOW TOO DO YOU ASCERTAIN, INDEPENDENTLY, THE SAID 'MORTALITY'? CERTAINLY NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE 'SCRIPTURE' OF OTHER PEOPLE; AS WHAT THAT SCRIPTURE SAYS HAS JUST BEEN POINTED OUT.—NOR DO WE POSTULATE OUR 'OMNISCIENT PERSONS' AS RIVALS TO THE 'OMNISCIENT PERSONS' POSTULATED BY OTHERS; WHO COULD EVER CONCEIVE OF ANY RIVALRY BETWEEN REAL ENTITIES AND 'SKY-FLOWERS'?—(3552-3553)

COMMENTARY.

If you hold to the 'mortality' independently, then your Reason is doubtful—hence—Inadmissible'. In fact, you have no proof in support of the idea of the Blessed Lord being *mortal*,—by virtue of which the said mortality could be regarded as independently ascertained. Hence the 'mortality' has to be asserted by you on the basis of the scripture of the other party; and what the scripture of the other party has to say on the point has just been shown.—Thus the 'mortality' of the Blessed Lords remains 'unproven'.—(3552-3553)

Question :—"How is it known that these other Omniscient Persons are like *sky-flowers*?"

Answer :—

TEXT (3554).

IT HAS BEEN PROVED BY US THAT ANY *Eternal* BEINGS, BEING DEVOID OF ALL CAPACITY, MUST BE FORMLESS. HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT THE 'THREE-EYED DEITY' AND OTHER SUCH BEINGS, WHO ARE HELD BY OTHERS TO BE OMNISCIENT, DO NOT EXIST AT ALL.—(3554)

COMMENTARY.

The other party holds *Shaṅkara* and others to be Eternal Beings;—and it has been proved by us that eternal entities cannot have any capacity at all; as any effective action on their part,—either successively or simultaneously—would be incompatible;—'being devoid of all capacity' again is what characterises *non-existence*; hence it follows that *Shiva* and other eternal beings posited by the other party are *non-existent*. Thus it is that it is known that they are 'like sky-flowers'.

'*Tryambaka*', 'Three-Eyed Deity', is *Shaṅkara, Shiva*.—(3554)

Further, *Shiva* and others may be there. Even so, they belong to a very inferior order; hence we are not making any comparison between these and the Blessed Lords.—This is pointed out in the following :—

TEXTS (3555-3556).

THEN AGAIN, THE KNOWLEDGE OF THOSE PERSONS IS ALL WRONG, BECAUSE IT INVOLVES NOTIONS OF THE 'SOUL' AND SUCH OTHER THINGS. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE *Buddhas*, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS *not wrong*; AS HAS BEEN EXPLAINED IN DETAIL. THERE IS THEREFORE NO COMPARISON MADE BETWEEN THESE TWO SETS, ON THE GROUND OF GREATER OR LESS PROXIMITY; WHO COULD INSTITUTE ANY COMPARISON BETWEEN THE BLIND AND THE MAN WITH PERFECT EYES?— (3555-3556)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(3555-3556)

It has been argued under *Text* 3210, that—"the three Deities, Brahmā and the rest, are mentioned in the eternal scripture of the Veda; and the eternality of these does not militate against the eternality of the Vedas".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3557).

IN FACT, THE ETERNALITY OF ALL SUCH THINGS AS QUALITY, ACTION, GOD, AS ALSO OF THE VEDAS, HAS BEEN TOTALLY REJECTED. CONSEQUENTLY WE DO NOT ADMIT OF ANY ETERNAL 'SCRIPTURE'.—(3557)

COMMENTARY.

By establishing the 'Perpetual Flux' as affecting all things, it has been proved that nothing can be *eternal*. Hence all this (about *eternality*) is wholly irrelevant.—(3557)

It has been argued under *Text* 3215, that—"If any person were seen at the present time to be *similar* to the Omniscient Person, then the existence of that Person could be cognised through Analogy".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3558–3561).

WE DO NOT HOLD THAT THE EXISTENCE OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON IS PROVED BY ANALOGY; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT ANALOGY IS NOT A RELIABLE MEANS OF COGNITION. HENCE THE SAID *existence* COULD NOT BE PROVED BY IT. IT IS ONLY WHEN THE *existence* OF A THING HAS BEEN COGNISED, THAT ITS SIMILARITY CAN BE PERCEIVED; AND WHAT IS DESIRED TO BE PROVED IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT IS THE *existence* OF THE *all-knowing Person*;—AND THIS CANNOT BE PROVED BY MEANS OF ANALOGY. HENCE YOUR DENIAL OF THIS (IN REFERENCE TO THE SAID PERSON) IS ENTIRELY FUTILE.—IF *all men* HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED BY YOU TO BE *not-omniscient*,—THEN *omniscience* BELONGS TO YOU YOURSELF, SINCE YOU PERCEIVE ALL MEN, THOSE NEAR YOU AS WELL AS THOSE REMOTE;—AND SINCE YOU PERCEIVE THE CAPACITY OF COGNITIONS APPEARING IN THE 'CHAIN' OF ALL OTHER MEN.—(3558–3561)

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact, no reliability attaches to Analogy, as a means of cognition,—by virtue of which the Buddhist could seek to prove the existence of the Omniscient Person by its means.—Even if Analogy were reliable, it would be of no use in the proving of the said *existence.* Because all that Analogy proves, for instance, is merely the similarity of the *Gavaya* in the well-known object, *Cow*; in the case in question, however, the Omniscient Person is not a *well-known object,*—as, according to you, He is still to be proved; consequently when, under your view, the *Existence of the Omniscient Person* is put up as what is to be proved,—there can be no room for *Analogy*; so that, there being no possibility of its applying to the case in question, your denial of it is entirely futile; as it is only what is regarded as possible that is denied.

It has been argued under *Text* 3216, that—"Having found that all men of the present day are *not-omniscient,* it is definitely concluded, through Analogy, that all men are *not-omniscient*".—The answer to this is that—*If all men, etc. etc.*'—If *all* men have been *seen* by you, then your denial of the Omniscient Person involves self-contradiction. Because, when you admit that you yourself see all men, far and near,—and also that you have definite knowledge of the cognitive capacity of the 'chain' of other men,—you clearly attribute *Omniscience* to yourself; because your said admission would imply your perception of all things far removed in time, place and nature; as such perception can never belong to one who is not omniscient. And yet in denying such Omniscience, you are putting forward arguments, and are actually denying it; so that there is self-contradiction on your part; just like the assertion 'your mother is barren'.—(3558–3561)

The following *Text* points out that the Person also that is adduced by the other party is 'Inadmissible', 'Unproven':—

TEXTS (3562–3564).

EVEN IF THE PERSON WERE STANDING BEFORE YOU, HOW COULD YOU HAVE THE CERTAINTY THAT 'HE IS NOT OMNISCIENT'? IF YOU HAD THIS KNOWLEDGE, YOU WOULD BE COGNISANT OF THINGS BEYOND THE SENSES!—IF YOU DEDUCE THE FACT OF ALL PERSONS BEING NOT-OMNISCIENT FROM SEEING THAT YOU YOURSELF ARE NOT SO,—THEN, THERE WOULD BE THIS INCONGRUITY THAT (YOUR) BRAHMĀ AND OTHER DEITIES WOULD DEDUCE THE *omniscience* OF ALL PERSONS FROM THEIR OWN OMNISCIENCE.—IF IT BE URGED THAT—"THERE IS CONVICTION REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF SUCH QUALITIES IN ALL MEN ONLY WHEN WE DO NOT PERCEIVE ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY", THEN OUR ANSWER IS THAT IN REGARD TO THE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION, THE MERE SUSPICION TO THE CONTRARY HAS THE SAME EFFECT AS THE ACTUAL PERCEPTION OF THAT CONTRARY.—(3562–3564)

COMMENTARY.

That is, even when the man is standing before one, one sees only his body, and if the observer is himself not-omniscient, he cannot know that the man before him is *not-omniscient.*

'*Bhāvē*'—i.e. if there were the certainty that the man is not-omniscient.

If, in order to save the Reason from being 'Inadmissible', the conviction regarding all men being not-omniscient be taken as deduced from one's own *non-omniscience;*—then there would be incongruities and the Reason would become 'Inconclusive'.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'*If you deduce, etc. etc.*'.—The compound '*ātmāsarvajñatādṛṣṭau*' is to be expounded as—'*dṛṣṭau*'—from the perception—'*asarvajñatāyāḥ*—of non-omniscience—'*ātmani*',—in yourself.

The following might be urged—"In the case of the proving of the presence of a certain quality in all men, the idea is rendered impossible by the perception of the diversity of wisdom, etc. among men; hence no attempt is made to prove it; in the case of *non-omniscience,* however, the idea is not rendered impossible by anything; hence there could be no such incongruity as has been indicated".

This is not right. Just as a Reason cannot prove that of which the contrary has been perceived, similarly it cannot also prove that of which the contrary is suspected; and in this respect, the *suspicion* of the contrary does not differ from the *perception* of the contrary. Consequently, there can be no proving of *non-omniscience,* because its contrary is open to suspicion.—(3562–3564)

It has been argued, under *Text* 3217, that—'the teaching of *Buddha* and others is capable of another explanation also, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3565).

WHO ELSE EXCEPT THE FOOL CAN REGARD THE TEACHING OF THE *Buddhas* AS HAVING ITS SOURCE IN DELUSION,—WHEN IT HAS BEEN PROVED TO BE THE FLAWLESS EXPOSITION OF THE PATH TO HEAVEN AND THE FINAL GOAL?—(3565)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be admitted that the Teaching is capable of another explanation. Because the flawless exposition of the Path to Heaven and Final Liberation cannot have its source in Delusion;—and that the Teaching of the Blessed Lord is flawless has been proved by all the investigations and tests herein made.

'*Fool*'—i.e. *Kumārila.* He is a fool if he entertains the idea referred to. —(3565)

It has been argued, under *Text* 3225, that—"The teaching of Buddha, etc. might have been for the purpose of deluding their disciples, etc. etc.". The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3566).

IT IS INDEED A GREAT DELUSION THAT HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY BUDDHA IN HIS DISCIPLES WHO, DURING THE PRESENT LIFE ITSELF, HAVE ATTAINED, THROUGH IT, PROSPERITY, AS ALSO THE HIGHEST STAGE OF THE ALLEVIATION OF ALL AFFLICTIONS OF THE MIND!—(3566)

COMMENTARY.

'*Driṣṭē*'—during the present life.

'*Prosperity*'—in the shape of lasting health, vigour and so forth;—these '*they have attained*'—such is the construction.

'*Alleviation of all afflictions of the Mind*'—i.e. the cessation of Love, Hatred and other defects.

'*Through it*'—Through the proper following of the Teachings of the Lord, regarding Mantras, Meditations, etc.

'*A great delusion has been brought about*'—This is figurative; the sense is—if you regard this as 'delusion', then it is you yourself who are deluded,—inasmuch as you regard what is *not delusion*, as *delusion.*—(3566)

It has been argued, under *Text* 3226, that —"If it were based upon the Veda, then they should have imparted it to the expounders of the Veda itself, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3567).

THE TEACHING OF THE *Buddhas* IS CERTAINLY NOT BASED UPON THE VEDA; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS 'FLAWLESS', WHILE THE VEDA IS FULL OF FLAWS.—(3567)

COMMENTARY.

It cannot be possible for the *flawless* Teaching to be based upon what is *full of flaws*.—(3567)

It has been argued, under *Text* 3227, that—"Because the Teachings were imparted by them to the illiterate *Shūdras*, therefore it is concluded that they are defective and illusory".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3568-3569).

THE SAID TEACHING OF THE *Buddhas* IS NOT FOR ANY SELFISH PURPOSE; IN FACT, THE WHOLE EFFORT WAS MADE FOR THE BENEFIT OF OTHERS. THUS IT WAS THAT THE ALL-MERCIFUL BUDDHAS TAUGHT THAT PATH TO ALL MEN,—HAVING MADE UP THEIR MINDS TO BRING ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE WORLD, AND THUS BEING THE DISINTERESTED WELL-WISHERS OF ALL BEINGS.—(3568-3569)

COMMENTARY.

'*Padam*'—this is the name given to that Path to Prosperity and Highest Good which consists in the cultivation of all good qualities.—(3568-3569)

The following *text* shows that it is in the case of *Manu* and other teachers, who imparted the teaching to Vedic scholars alone, that it is possible for the teachings to have been propounded for the purpose of deluding those people:—

TEXT (3570).

THOSE TEACHERS WHO WERE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF GREED, FEAR, HATRED, JEALOUSY, ETC. AND WERE DEVOID OF MERCY,—IT IS THE TEACHING OF SUCH PERSONS WHICH COULD BE PARTIAL AND LOCAL.—(3570)

COMMENTARY.

On the other hand, the Teaching of the Blessed Lord was imparted to all men down to the veriest child;—and such Teaching only bears testimony to their high-souled character.—This is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3571–3573).

THOSE TEACHERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHO WERE LED BY MERCY ALONE,—WHO HAD A CLEAR PERCEPTION OF THE TRUTH,—WHO HAD NO FEAR OF ANY CONTRADICTION,—IMPARTED THEIR TEACHINGS TO ALL. AS A MAN, THROUGH IGNORANCE, GOES ON BEING AFFECTED BY DEFECTS, SO THERE GROWS IN THE LORDS, MERCY TOWARDS HIM. —THEY DO NOT DESIRE TO ESTABLISH ANY SUCH CONNECTION WITH MEN AS THAT OF *Vivāha* (MARRIAGE) OR *Āvāha* (HOME-COMING OF THE BRIDE) AND SO FORTH; THE ONLY THOUGHT IN THEIR MIND IS THAT OF DOING GOOD TO OTHERS. THAT IS WHAT HAS BEEN SO WELL SUNG OF.—(3571–3573)

COMMENTARY.

'*Āvāha*'—is the coming of the Bride to the house of the Bridegroom.—(3571–3573)

Question :—"What has been so well sung of?"
Answer :—

TEXT (3574).

'THE WISE ONES VIEW WITH EQUAL REGARD—THE BRĀHMAṆA EQUIPPED WITH LEARNING AND CHARACTER, THE BULL, THE ELEPHANT, THE DOG AND THE DOG-EATER.'—[*Bhāgavadgītā*].—(3574)

COMMENTARY.

In fact, by having openly and arrogantly used the expression "to illiterate *Shūdras*", through pride of caste, you have yourself shown your own great illiteracy and stupidity. For instance, (1) do you put forward the assumption that there is a distinct genus of the name of '*Brāhmaṇa*' and thereupon you, Brāhmaṇas carry on your backs a million loads of superiority? Or (2) is it on the basis of your superiority in the matter of having had all your Birth and other Sacraments duly performed? Or (3) on the basis of your having been born of a *Brāhmaṇa* Mother and *Brāhmaṇa* Father?—If it is the *first*, then this ornament of yours is only like that caused by the 'sky-lotus'.—This is what is pointed out in the following :—

TEXTS (3575–3577).

HUNDREDS OF TIMES HAS THE 'GENUS' (UNIVERSAL) BEEN REJECTED; WHENCE THEN IS THIS PRIDE DUE TO 'CASTE' (GENUS)? SPECIALLY WHEN NO SUPERIORITY OVER OTHERS IS PERCEIVED IN IT, WHY SHOULD IT BE REGARDED AS *superior*? IN FACT, MEN BELONGING TO OTHER CASTES ALSO ARE FOUND, ON THE PRESENCE OF PARTICULAR QUALITIES, TO BE THE RECEPTACLE OF QUALITIES OF *Self-control* AND FREE FROM ALL IMPURITIES. IF, BY REASON OF THEIR CONNECTION WITH THE PARTICULAR (BRĀHMAṆA) CASTE, THEY HAD BEEN SUPERIOR TO OTHERS, IN THE MATTER OF POSSESSING THE SAID QUALIFICATIONS, THEN ALONE COULD THEY BE ADMITTED TO BE REALLY SUPERIOR,—NOT IF THEY MERELY BELONGED TO THE *Brāhmaṇa* CASTE, BUT IN ACTUAL LIFE WERE LIKE FOWLERS, AND OTHERS.—(3575–3577)

COMMENTARY.

We grant that there is such a 'caste'; even so, your pride would be justified if there were some superiority perceptible in you, due to that caste. As a matter of fact, however, we do not perceive any such superiority in you.—This is what is pointed out by the words—'*specially when no superiority, etc. etc.*'—'*others*'—i.e. people other than *Brāhmaṇas*,—i.e. the *Shūdra*, etc. —superiority over these—none is perceived. That is to say, in the *Brāhmaṇa*, we do not find any superiority over the *Shūdra*, etc. in regard to their Intelligence, Memory, etc., or to their Blood, Urine, etc.; thus no superiority being perceptible, how could the caste be regarded as superior on the basis of tnat superiority',—by virtue of which, through arrogance born of your caste-pride, you assert that 'they should have imparted it to the Vedic scholars alone—not to *Shūdras*'?—In case, by belonging to the Brāhmaṇa-caste, you were, by your very nature, superior persons, endowed with such powers as self-control, fulfilment of wish, Mercy and so forth, and had all evils removed from you,—then you would certainly be superior beings; otherwise, if you simply belonged to the Brāhmaṇa-caste and led the life of the Fowler, the Fisherman, the Cobbler, etc.,—what superiority could be yours?—(3575–3577)

The following *Text* points out the objections to the second alternative (the superiority of the Brāhmaṇa in the proper performance of his sacraments):—

TEXT (3578).

AS REGARDS THE WELL-KNOWN SACRAMENTS OF THE *Birth-rite* AND THE REST,—THEY ARE ALL PURELY ILLUSORY (ARTIFICIAL) AND ARE TO BE FOUND EVEN AMONG OTHER PEOPLE,—EVEN THOSE WHO ARE ARTIFICIAL BRĀHMAṆAS.—(3578)

COMMENTARY.

'*Among others*'—i.e. among the artificial Brāhmaṇas.

'*Illusory*'—purely artificial, like the *Naming-rite*.

Under the *third* alternative also (that of superiority being due to birth from *Brāhmaṇa* parents),—no pride is proper; because, as has been pointed out before, there is no difference between the body of the Brāhmaṇa male and female and that of the *Shūdra* male and female,—both consisting of the same unclean ingredients of Semen, Blood and so forth.—(3578)

Then again, the fact of your being born of a Brāhmaṇa Father is always open to doubt; hence there should be no pride on that score also.—This is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3579-3580).

A VERY LONG TIME HAS ELAPSED AND WOMEN ARE VERY UNSTEADY; HENCE IT CANNOT BE CERTAIN IF THERE IS *Brāhmaṇa-hood* IN YOU. FOR YOU, THERE IS NO ONE WHO IS COGNISANT OF SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS; NOR HAS EVEN THE VEDA DECLARED THE PURITY OF YOUR GENEALOGY.—(3579-3580)

COMMENTARY.

After the lapse of a long time, it is just possible that though not belonging to a Brāhmaṇa family, you may have become a *Brāhmaṇa.*—Or even if your ancestors were Brāhmaṇas, your . . . . . ; so that it is possible that your birth may be defective. Because, as a rule . . . . . You do not admit that there is any man capable of perceiving supersensuous things,—through whom certainty on this point could be obtained. Nor lastly, does the Veda declare the purity of your genealogy.—(3579-3580)

Then again, it is not only for yourselves that it is not right to indulge in arrogance due to your Brāhmaṇa-hood, which is open to doubt; as regards Manu and other teachers also,—as they could not know who were real Brāhmaṇas, the Teachings, if imparted to Brāhmaṇas alone, must have been imparted under a delusion.—This is pointed out in the following—

TEXT (3581).

THUS, *Manu* AND OTHER TEACHERS, NOT KNOWING WHO WERE REAL *Brāhmaṇas*, COULD NOT HAVE IMPARTED THE TEACHINGS TO *Brāhmaṇas* ALONE: BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT BE SURE OF IT.—(3581)

COMMENTARY.

'*Avijñāta*'—Those who could not be sure of the *Brāhmaṇa-hood* of any one.

'*Tadanishchayāt*'—Because they could not be sure of people being *Brāhmaṇas*.—(3581)

Then again, the fact that *Manu* and others imparted their teachings to you alone does not redound to your credit; in fact, it only indicates the dullness of your intelligence.—This is pointed out in the following:—

TEXTS (3582-3583).

WE SUSPECT THAT *Manu* AND OTHER TEACHERS, FOR SOME REASON, CAME TO REALISE THAT WHAT IS STATED IN THE VEDA IS NOT QUITE REASONABLE AND NOT QUITE COMPREHENSIBLE BY ITSELF,—AND ALSO THAT THE BRĀHMAṆAS, HAVING BECOME DULL-WITTED BY THE READING OF THE VEDA, WERE INCAPABLE OF DISCRIMINATING THINGS FOR THEMSELVES;—AND IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT THEY EXPOUNDED THEIR TEACHINGS TO THE *Brāhmaṇas* ALONE.—(3582-3583)

COMMENTARY.

'*Vedādhītijaḍa*'—Those who have become '*jaḍa*'—dull-witted—by the '*adhīti*'—reading—of the Veda; i.e. those whose powers of discriminating things had been set aside by the reading of the Veda.

'*For some reason*'.—Somehow.—(3582-3583)

It was for this reason that *Manu* and others, realising the irrationality of the Veda, etc., declared, in reference to their own words, that they were to be regarded as so many 'commandments' (to be obeyed without question).—This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (3584-3585).

[THEY HAVE DECLARED THAT]—"THE *Purāṇa*, THE *Dharmashāstra* PROPOUNDED BY *Manu*, THE VEDA WITH ITS SUBSIDIARIES, AND THE SCIENCE OF MEDICINE,—THESE FOUR ARE SELF-SUFFICIENT COMMANDMENTS, AND SHOULD NEVER BE ATTACKED WITH REASONINGS",—THIS THREAT, IN REGARD TO THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THEIR AUTHORITY, WE THINK, WAS PRONOUNCED BY THEM TO THE DULL-WITTED PEOPLE FOR THE SAME REASON. OR ELSE, HOW COULD A MERE VERBAL STATEMENT MAKE ANYTHING SELF-SUFFICIENT IN ITS AUTHORITY?—(3584-3585)

COMMENTARY.

'*Purāṇa*'—the literary works known under that name;—'*mānavo dharmaḥ*'—the code composed by *Manu*;—'*the Veda with its subsidiaries*'—

i.e. with its six subsidiaries, Grammar and the rest.—'*Chikitsitam*'—the science of Medicine.

'*For the same reason*',——i.e. on account of having found that the teaching of the *Purāṇa, etc.* was irrational and that your *Brāhmaṇas* were dull-witted.—(3584-3585)

TEXTS (3586-3587).

THOSE GREAT TEACHERS ON THE OTHER HAND WHO WERE QUITE SURE OF THE REASONABLENESS OF THEIR OWN TEACHINGS AND WHO WERE CONFIDENT ALSO OF THEIR OWN POWERS TO EXPOUND THOSE TEACHINGS,—HAVING SHAKEN OFF ALL FEAR, AND BRINGING ABOUT THE LOWERING OF THE ARROGANCE OF THE MADDENED ELEPHANTS IN THE SHAPE OF THE FALSE PHILOSOPHERS—ALWAYS ROAR LIKE LIONS, AS FOLLOWS.—(3586-3587)

COMMENTARY.

The 'false Philosophers' are likened to the 'maddened elephants'; and the Roaring has the capacity to bring about the lowering of the arrogance of these elephants.

'*Thus*'—i.e. as described below.—(3586-3587)

Question :—"What is that lion-like roar?"

Answer :—

TEXT (3588).

'O *Bhikṣus*, MY WORDS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE WISE, NOT OUT OF REGARD FOR ME, BUT AFTER DUE INVESTIGATION,—JUST AS GOLD IS ACCEPTED AS TRUE ONLY AFTER HEATING, CUTTING AND RUBBING'.—(3588)

COMMENTARY.

Further, even the Blessed Lords have imparted their teachings to *real Brāhmaṇas*;—this was not done by *Manu* and others.—This is pointed out in the following :—

TEXTS (3589-3590).

THOSE WHO ARE BRĀHMAṆAS *in reality*, BY REASON OF HAVING REMOVED ALL THEIR SINS, AND WHO HAVE PRACTISED THE TEACHING OF 'NO-SOUL',—ARE ALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE GREAT SAGE HIMSELF; IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT IT HAS BEEN DECLARED THAT 'HEREIN IS THE SHRAMAṆA' WHO HAS BEEN DESCRIBED UNDER FOUR CLASSES; AND THE TEACHINGS OF OTHERS ARE ENTIRELY DEVOID OF THE *Shramaṇa-Brāhmaṇas*.—(3589-3590)

COMMENTARY.

The connotation of the term '*Brāhmaṇa*' is 'one who has removed all sins'; and such *Brāhmaṇas* are possible only under the teaching of the Great Sage, where they are taught the practice of 'Soul-less-ness'; this is not possible under any other teachings, as these latter do not provide any means for the destroying of sins.—It is for this reason that the Blessed Lord has declared that 'It is here that there is *Shramaṇa*',—the *Brāhmaṇa*—and the teachings of others are devoid of real *Brāhmaṇas* in the shape of *Shramaṇas*.—Of these *Shramaṇas*, there are four classes—'*Srotāpanna*' (joined the stream) and the rest; and Brāhmaṇas also, with the same characteristics, are of the same four kinds.—(3589-3590)

It has been argued under *Text* 3230 that—"If proofs were adduced to prove that there is someone who is omniscient, then this would fall short of your Proposition".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3591).

IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT THE PROVING OF THE PROPOSITION THAT 'THERE IS SOME MAN WHO IS OMNISCIENT' IS NOT VITIATED BY THE DEFECT OF FALLING SHORT OF OUR PROPOSITION.—(3591)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"By what part of your work has this been explained?".

Answer:—

TEXT (3592).

This has been explained by us above (under *Text* 3308) where it has been asserted that—It is with a totally different motive that the wise Buddhists make an attempt to establish the knowledge of all things, even though such attempt prove futile.—(3592)

COMMENTARY.

Then again, we are not proving the existence of the Omniscient Person with a view to ascertain that a certain teaching has been propounded by the Omniscient Person, and then and therefore to follow that teaching in practice. In fact, we ourselves seek to attain the position of the Omniscient Person and to that end we seek to prove that it is possible to get rid of the Defects and attain the excellent qualities (that mark the Omniscient Person). And the reason for this lies in the fact that the Buddhists have recourse to activities tending to the fulfilment of the several aims of man,—not on the strength of mere words, but on the basis of Inferences from the capacity of things. It has already been explained in what way such reasons as 'cognisability' and the rest can lead to conclusions.

It has been argued under *Text* 3238, that—"When He has passed through the Ten Stages, and Love and other Defects have become destroyed, then rapt in meditation.... He would not be able to impart any teachings"—The answer to this is that this argument also has been put forward by you, through your ignorance of our doctrine. The Blessed Lord is not held by us to be standing upon the *Ten Stages*; what we hold is that the *Ten Stages* are occupied during the *Bodhisattva-Stage*, and beyond and above that lies the *Buddha-Stage*, the state of Perfect Enlightenment, *Buddha-hood*.—(3592)

It has been argued under *Text* 3240, that—"What has been asserted by one who knows only a part cannot be the assertion of the Omniscient Person".

The following *Text* points out that this also has been already answered:—

TEXT (3593).

As regards the argument that "what is asserted by one who knows only a part cannot be regarded as the assertion of the Omniscient Person",—the answer to this has already been given, that it would be due to the actual presence of the knowledge of all things. —(3593)

COMMENTARY.

The same explanation is reiterated in the following—

TEXTS (3594-3595).

THE MAN OF LIMITED VISION, HAVING PERCEIVED A FEW DESIRABLE THINGS, FIXES THEM IN HIS MIND, AND SUBSEQUENTLY DESCRIBES THEM, ON THE BASIS OF THOSE PERCEPTIONS ;—AND YET IT IS NOT THAT HIS WORDS DO NOT PROCEED FROM HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THOSE THINGS; THE SAME WOULD BE THE CASE WITH THE ASSERTION OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON; THE DIFFERENCE WOULD LIE IN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BASIS OF THE TWO ASSERTIONS.—(3594-3595)

COMMENTARY.

'*The man of limited vision*'—i.e. one who is not omniscient.

'*Proceed from his knowledge, etc. etc.*'—the knowledge of those things—Heart, etc.—from which proceeds the assertion. The two negatives '*na-na*' indicate that the words *do* proceed from the said knowledge of the things.

'*The same, etc. etc.*'—That also would be reliable as proceeding from the said actual knowledge.

Question :—"If this is so, then what would be the difference between the words of the man who knows little and the words of Buddha, the Omniscient?"

Answer :—'*The difference would lie, etc. etc.*'—(3594-3595)

The same idea is further clarified :—

TEXT (3596).

WHAT FORMS THE SOURCE OF THE WORDS (OF *Buddha*) IS THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS; WHILE THE SOURCE OF THE WORDS OF THE OTHER PERSON CONSISTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF ONLY A FEW THINGS.—(3596).

COMMENTARY.

'*Asya*'—of the words of *Buddha*.

'*Tasya*'—of the words of the man who knows only a part of things.—3596)

The opponents urge the following objection :—

TEXT (3597).

"THERE BEING NO CONCEPTUAL CONTENT IN HIS CASE,—HOW COULD THERE BE ANY DESIRE IN HIM *to speak*? INASMUCH AS HE HAS RENOUNCED ALL ACTIVITY, THERE CAN BE NO CONCEPTUAL CONTENT FOR HIM."—(3597)

COMMENTARY.

There can be no 'desire to speak' on the part of a person in whom no Conceptual Content is possible; because the said desire is only a form of Conceptual Content. The Desire thus being invariably concomitant with 'Conceptual Content', how could it exist in the absence of this latter? Certainly when the 'tree' is absent, the '*Shimshapā*' cannot be there. For the Omniscient Person, any Conceptual Content is impossible; because all obstacles in the shape of the Afflictions, etc. have disappeared, and Conceptual Content is, by its nature, *wrong, mistaken.* Consequently if He had the Conceptual Content, the Omniscient Person would have to be regarded as 'mistaken'.—(3597)

The Author answers this objection in the following—

TEXT (3598).

IT CANNOT BE SO; BECAUSE, AS REGARDS THE CONCEPTION THAT IS BESET WITH AFFLICTIONS, NO SUCH IS POSSIBLE IN HIS CASE, AS ALL 'OBSCURATION' HAS DISAPPEARED FROM HIM. WHILE THAT CONCEPTION WHICH IS FAVOURABLE TO THE WORLD'S WELFARE AND HENCE 'HEALTHY',—WHO WOULD PREVENT THAT?—(3598)

COMMENTARY.

Conceptual Content is of two kinds—(1) that which is favourable to troubles, and hence 'beset with Afflictions', and (2) that which is favourable to the appearance of 'freedom from greed' and such qualities, and hence 'Healthy'.—Of these that which is 'beset with Afflictions' can never be present in persons who have got rid of all obscurations in the shape of the Afflictions,—because the cause of this is not present there; while that which is 'Healthy', that is not incompatible with the man who has got rid of the obscurations; hence if this 'healthy' Conceptual Content does appear, through the mercy of the Blessed Lord,—as it would be favourable to the welfare of the world and hence 'healthy', why should any one object to its appearance? —(3598)

The following might be urged—"As a matter of fact, all Conceptual Content, by its nature, appears in the form of the conception of a thing

as *beneficial*, when it is *not beneficial*,—and hence it is wrong, mistaken; consequently any appearance of it would be incompatible with the character of the man who has got rid of his obscurations".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3599-3600).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, HE DOES NOT RECOGNISE THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AS BENEFICIAL (USEFUL); HE KNOWS IT TO BE BASELESS; HE IS LIKE THE MAGIC-PERFORMER. THE MAGIC-PERFORMER KNOWS THAT THE IDEA THAT HE HAS PRODUCED ENVISAGING THE REAL HORSE IS REALLY WITHOUT AN OBJECTIVE BASIS; AND HENCE HE HIMSELF DOES NOT BECOME MISTAKEN OR MISLED BY IT.—(3599-3600)

COMMENTARY.

If He had apprehended the Conceptual Content, which is devoid of objective basis, as having an objective basis, then alone He would be regarded as *mistaken*. As a matter of fact, however, He is like the magic-performer, and regards the Conceptual Content only in the form of the conception itself; how then can He be regarded as 'mistaken'?—(3599-3600)

It has been argued, under *Text* 3243, that—"such assertions sound well only when addressed to people imbued with faith,—we, however, are wanting in that faith, and hence ask for reasons".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3601).

WHEN THE *Brāhmaṇa* (OPPONENT) HAS ASSERTED—THAT "SUCH ASSERTIONS SOUND WELL ONLY WHEN ADDRESSED TO PEOPLE IMBUED WITH FAITH",—HE HAS NOT SAID ANYTHING RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION.—(3601)

COMMENTARY.

Question:—"Why? What is the *subject under consideration*,—to which our remark is not relevant?"

Answer:—

TEXTS (3602–3605).

THE SUBJECT UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS THE STATEMENT THAT "THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, BEING EXCLUDED FROM ALL THINGS, COULD NOT BE ABLE TO IMPART TEACHINGS".—TO THIS, THE WISE MEN MADE THE ANSWER—'IF HE HAD NO POWER TO IMPART TEACHINGS, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN?'—THE PROPER REJOINDER FOR YOU SHOULD HAVE BEEN THAT—"IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD BE NO RELIABLE SCRIPTURE".—WHAT YOU HAVE ASSERTED IS—"IT MAY BE SO, BUT HAVE YOU SEEN HIM ACTUALLY SPEAKING?"—NOW IF, IN THIS, YOU ARE URGING A *Reductio ad Absurdum* AGAINST US, THEN IT SHOULD ONLY MEAN AS FOLLOWS:—"IF HIS SPEAKERSHIP IS NOT ADMITTED, THEN THERE COULD BE NO GETTING AT THE SCRIPTURE; HENCE IF THE SCRIPTURE COMPOSED BY HIM IS ADMITTED, HIS *speakership* ALSO WILL HAVE TO BE ADMITTED."—(3602–3605)

COMMENTARY.

The Author thinks that the Opponent will say that—"what I have asserted is only a *Reductio ad Absurdum*, and not an independent argument by itself";—and consequently he proceeds to lend support to the idea that what the Opponent has urged is a *Reductio ad Absurdum*, with the words '*what you have asserted, etc. etc.*'—What you have asserted is that—"Being excluded from all things, the Person could not have the capacity to teach"; in connection with this, you have to be asked—He may not have the capacity to teach, what is the harm in that?—Being thus asked, what the Opponent would say, the Author himself states—'*The proper rejoinder for you should have been that in that case there would be no reliable Scripture*'.—The answer to this rejoinder is—There may be no reliable Scripture, what is the incongruity in that?—He has not been seen speaking, by which there would be incompatibility with a perceived fact.—Being thus questioned, you should have said—"I am not proving His *speakership* after having myself seen that the Scripture had been composed by Him; you yourself regard your Scripture as composed by Him; and this is not possible if you do not admit His *speakership*; hence when you must insist upon the fact of the Scripture having been composed by Him, you must admit His *speakership* also".—This is the undesirable contingency that is presented to the Buddhist by means of the *Reductio ad Absurdum.*—(3602–3605)

Having thus supported the idea of the *Reductio ad Absurdum*, the Author now proceeds to show how the putting forward of this *Reductio ad Absurdum* is not pertinent to the subject under consideration:—

TEXTS (3606–3610).

IF THAT IS SO, THEN, THE PRINCIPLE ACCEPTED BY ALL RELATIONALISTS IS THAT A *Reductio ad Absurdum* (IN THIS CASE) CAN BE URGED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF A CHARACTER THAT IS ACCEPTED ON MERE FAITH; IF IT WERE BASED UPON WELL-KNOWN REASONS, THERE WOULD BE INDEPENDENT (DIRECT) ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE SCRIPTURE THAT IS POSTULATED BY THE OTHER PARTY (THE BUDDHIST) AS COMPOSED BY THE OMNISCIENT PERSON, IS AS THUS DESCRIBED—'WITHOUT ANY APPURTENANCES, THE TEACHINGS OF THAT PERSON PROCEED FREELY EVEN FROM THE WALLS,—AS IF THEY WERE COMING OUT OF THE *Chintāmaṇi* GEM '.—THUS THEN IT IS PURELY THROUGH *supervision* THAT HE IS REGARDED AS THE 'COMPOSER' OF THE TEACHINGS; HENCE HIS *speakership* NEED NOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH ANY CONCEPTUAL CONTENT.—THUS THEN, WHEN YOU ASSERT THAT—"WE ARE WANTING IN THAT FAITH AND HENCE ASK FOR REASONS"—YOU DO SO WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT IS MEANT BY *Reductio ad Absurdum*.—(3606–3610)

COMMENTARY.

That character which the other party admits on the basis of the Scripture alone,—that alone should be urged in the *Reductio ad Absurdum*;—such is the well-recognised principle. Now, if the other party (Buddhist) had held the fact of the Scripture being composed by the Person on the ground of His *speakership*,—then there could be some point in urging that—"if He is not the *speaker*, then the Scripture could not have been composed by Him". As a matter of fact, however, when *Buddha* is regarded as the composer (Author) of the Scripture, it is only as a *Supervisor*, an over-lord,—not as the actual *speaker*.—Consequently, the argument that you have urged in the form of the *Reductio ad Absurdum*,—that "if He is the *composer* of the Scripture, He must be the *speaker*",—is one that has been urged by you without knowing what is meant by '*Reductio ad Absurdum*'.—(3606-3610)

It has been argued, under *Text* 3244, that—"Teachings issuing from walls could not be accepted as taught by a Reliable Person".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3611).

WHY SHOULD WORDS ISSUING FROM THE WALLS *not* BE ACCEPTED AS TAUGHT BY A RELIABLE PERSON,—WHEN THEY ARE PROMPTED BY HIS OVER-LORDSHIP ?—(3611)

COMMENTARY.

If the teachings had not been prompted by the over-lordship of the Omniscient Person, then they might not be accepted as those of a Reliable

Person. When, however, it has been admitted that they do proceed under His supervision, then why should not they be regarded as taught by Him? —(3611)

It has been argued, under the same *Text* 3244, that—"there would be no confidence in these Teachings".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3612–3619).

BEING DEVOID OF TEACHINGS OF MIXED CHARACTER AND THOSE OF *slaughter* AND SUCH OTHER EVIL THINGS,—HOW COULD THESE TEACHINGS BE THE WORK OF SPORTIVE GOBLINS AND OTHERS? IN THEM, THERE IS NO TEACHING OF MIXED CHARACTER; NOR OF SLAUGHTER AND OTHER EVIL THINGS, WHICH ALONE COULD BE THE WORK OF SPORTIVE GOBLINS AND OTHERS.—ALL THAT LIES WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE TWO MEANS OR FORMS OF RIGHT COGNITION IS IN STRICT ACCORD WITH THESE; AND NOTHING OF THE SLIGHTEST THING CONTRARY TO THEM IS VOUCHED FOR BY THE TWO MEANS OF COGNITION. EVEN IN REGARD TO ABSOLUTELY SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS, THE SAID TEACHING IS NOT ANNULLED BY ANYTHING PAST OR FUTURE; IT PROMPTS THE MANIFESTATIONS OF SUCH QUALITIES AS COMPASSION AND THE LIKE; IT IS ENDOWED WITH ALL FORMS, EXPOUNDS RIGHT BEHAVIOUR; IT IS CONDUCIVE TO VARIOUS FORMS OF WELFARE HERE AND ELSEWHERE; IT TEACHES THE ANTIDOTE TO ALL KINDS OF LOVE, HATRED AND THE REST; IT OPENS THE GATE TO THE CITY OF *Nirvāṇa*.—IF SUCH TEACHING COULD BE THE WORK OF PLAYFUL PERSONS OR DEMONS, THEN THESE SAME MAY BE THE 'ENLIGHTENED BEINGS', AS FULFILLING ALL THE CONDITIONS OF 'ENLIGHTENMENT'! MERELY BY GIVING A DIFFERENT NAME TO A THING, ITS REAL FORM DOES NOT BECOME ALTERED. IN FACT, IF A MAN WERE TO CALL THE *cultured* 'UNCULTURED',—HE HIMSELF WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE DERISION OF ALL GOOD PEOPLE.—(3612–3619)

COMMENTARY.

If there were teaching of dancing, music, slaughter, incest and such things—as to be done,—then, in as much there would be found the work of playful goblins and such persons,—it might come within the range of possibility to think of it as the work of these persons; as a matter of fact, however, the words of the Blessed Lord are found to be—not incompatible with any forms of right cognition,—free from self-contradictions,—fit for noble people,—prompting men to Compassion and other such qualities,—conducive to the attainment of Heaven and Final Liberation;—all this has been fully explained before.—How could such teaching be the work of playful goblins? —If you apply the name 'goblin' to *men* also, you may do so; but mere nam-

ing does not deprive the thing of its nature. On the contrary, you yourself, by behaving like an uncultured person towards the highly cultured Blessed Lord, would be open to the derision of good men.

Such in brief is what is meant by the *Text* as a whole. The meaning of the words is as follows—'*Teachings of mixed character*'—e.g. those of singing, etc;—'*slaughter*'—killing of animals;—'*evil things*'—like sensuality, dishonesty and the like.—'*In accord with the two means or forms of right cognition*';—the *two* means are Perception and Inference; '*accordance with these*'—is saying nothing contrary to these;—'*matam*'—found to be;—'*in all matters contained therein*'—matters within the purview of the two Means of Right Cognition,—it is in strict accord with these latter; such is the construction of the sentence.—'*Right behaviour*'—which is excellent, in the beginning, middle and end; such as Continence and the like.—'*Sarvānushayasandoha*'—the entire mass of perception, thoughts and 'Afflictions'.—'*Fulfilling all the conditions*'—Having all the characteristics of the 'enlightened Person'.—This has been thus described—'When all that had to be known becomes known, all that had to be reflected upon has become reflected upon, all that had to be abandoned has become abandoned,—then the Person is said to have become *Buddha, Enlightened*'.—(3612–3619)

On the contrary, it is the Veda that is liable to be regarded as the work of playful goblins,—in as much herein we find the teaching of incest and other improper acts in connection with the *Gosava* and other sacrifices.—This is what is pointed out in the following—

TEXTS (3620-3621).

IN FACT, IT IS IN THE CASE OF WORDS THAT ARE MARKED BY THE MENTION OF SEXUALITY, DISHONEST BEHAVIOUR, ANIMAL-SLAUGHTER AND SO FORTH, AND WHICH SPEAK OF MANY BARBAROUS ACTS,—THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR SUSPICION REGARDING THEIR BEING THE WORK OF ROGUES, DEMONS AND THE LIKE. SUCH WORDS ARE LIKELY TO PROCEED ONLY FROM PERSONS WHO ARE ADDICTED TO SUCH PRACTICES.—(3620-3621)

COMMENTARY.

'*Bhujanga*'—is *Rogue.*—(3620-3621)

It has been argued, under *Text* 3249, that—"One and the same cognition has never been found to apprehend such mutually contradictory things as the pure and the impure and so on".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3622).

THE SIMULTANEOUS APPREHENSION BY ONE AND THE SAME COGNITION OF MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY THINGS,—LIKE THE PURE AND THE IMPURE AND SO FORTH,—HAS ACTUALLY BEEN FOUND. BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH *Cognition*.—(3622)

COMMENTARY.

Even though there are some things that are mutually incompatible, yet, they are quite compatible with the *Cognition*; as is clear from the fact that several mutually incompatible things are actually perceived at one and the same time.—(3622)

The same idea is further clarified:—

TEXTS (3623-3624).

IN THE CASE OF THINGS THAT ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE BY THEIR NATURE, OR IN THOSE THAT CAN NEVER COEXIST,—THERE MAY BE *incompatibility*; BUT THERE IS NO *incompatibility* IN BOTH FIGURING IN THE ONE AND THE SAME COGNITION; BECAUSE THERE IS PERCEPTION THROUGH THE EYE OF SUCH CONTRARIES AS (*a*) THE PURE AND THE IMPURE THINGS, (*b*) THE SERPENT AND THE PEACOCK AND SO FORTH.—(3623-3624)

COMMENTARY.

Incompatibility among things is of two kinds—(1) mutual exclusiveness, and (2) non-coexistence. Those things that are *mutually exclusive*,—their unification is clearly incompatible; those again that are *non-coexistent*, their *coexistence* is incompatible. But by figuring in the same cognition, things do not become either *unified* or *coexistent*. Hence there is no incompatibility in their figuring in the same cognition. In fact, it is actually seen that even incompatible things figure in the same cognition; for instance, the Pure and the Impure things, which are mutually exclusive,—and the Serpent and the Peacock, which can never live together,—are perceived, through the Eye, at one and the same time.—'*And so forth*' includes such pair of opposites as *Light and Shade* and the rest.—(3623-3624)

Says the Opponent—"If then, there is nothing incompatible in contraries figuring in the same cognition, then it should be possible for *Pleasure and Pain*, or *Love and Hate*, to figure in the same cognition".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3625).

THAT THERE IS NO SIMULTANEOUS COGNITION IN THE CASE OF PLEASURE AHD PAIN,—THAT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE DUE TO THE REQUISITE CAUSE BEING ABSENT; THERE IS NOTHING INCOMPATIBLE IN IT.—(3625)

COMMENTARY.

'*Should be understood*';—That Pleasure and Pain are not cognised at one and the same time is due to the fact that they do not appear at one and the same time, on account of the causes of both not being present,—not on account of any *incompatibility*.—This is what should be understood to be the case.—What is meant is that the cause of the non-cognition of both lies in the absence of their causes, not in their mutual incompatibility.—(3625)

In the case of those things also where the Incompatibility is real,—and not merely conceptual, as in the case of Pure and Impure,—there is figuring in the same cognition.—This is what is shown in the following—

TEXT (3626).

THE VARIOUS COLOURS,—BLUE, YELLOW, WHITE, ETC.—THOUGH MUTUALLY INCOMPATIBLE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCES OF PLACE, ORIGIN, ETC.—ARE ACTUALLY SEEN AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME.—(3626)

COMMENTARY.

The construction is—'*incompatible, on account of the differences of place, origin, etc.*'—'*Difference of place*' consists in both not occupying the same point in space;—'*difference of origin or nature*'—'nature' in the shape of the *Blue*, etc. and 'origin' in the shape of the *blue components*.—(3626)

It has been argued under *Text* 3250,—"Who can apprehend each one of the endless things, past, present and future,—even in hundreds of years?"
The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3627).

THE OMNISCIENT PERSON WHOSE EXISTENCE WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IS ONE WHO COMPREHENDS WITHIN A SINGLE COGNITIVE MOMENT THE ENTIRE ROUND OF ALL THAT IS TO BE KNOWN; IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT NO *succession* IS ADMITTED IN THIS CASE. —(3627)

COMMENTARY.

In this connection some people belonging to our own party, while supporting the opinion of the Idealist, argue as follows:—If the entire round of cognisable things is embraced within a single cognitive moment, then that would imply a limit on the number and extent of things; and this would militate against the accepted idea that the number and extent of things

are endless. Because when all things would be embraced within the orbit of a single cognition,—how could they be saved from the contingency of not being endless?—This has been asserted thus—'Being embraced within a single cognition, there is nothing outside that limit; and thus the idea being that things are only *so many*, they cannot be endless, they become limited'.—Under the circumstances, the idea of the *simultaneous* cognition of all things would be open to the same objection that has been urged against the idea of their *successive* cognition.

There is no force, however, in this argument. If this argument is put up on the basis of the opinion that Cognitions are formless,—then it is all irrelevant. Because, whenever a thing, on becoming cognised, thereby acquires *existence*,—all that is comprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person is that it is *existent*, and is, therefore, said to be embraced by it; and it is not meant by this that it covers the place occupied by the thing, in the way that the cloth covers a number of jars. The mere fact that certain things are apprehended by a single cognition does not deprive the things of their own nature or character; whereby, by reason of being apprehended by a single cognition, they would renounce their endless character. When various things, like the Blue, the Yellow and so forth, appearing in a single picture, become apprehended by a single cognition,—they do not cease to be *many*; nor do they become merged into one another; in fact, they are apprehended by the cognition exactly as they are,—not in any other form. In the same manner, the World which has *existence* is apprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person exactly as it *exists*.—As a matter of fact, there is no end to the extent of the worldly region in any direction; hence it is apprehended as limitless,—not as limited. How then could it be regarded as having an end?

It might be urged that—"If the apprehension of the entire world is admitted, then, how could there be no apprehension of the limits?"

It is not so, we reply. Where is there any such universal Proposition that 'wherever there is apprehension of the entirety of things, there must be apprehension of the limits also'? As a matter of fact, of all the things that exist, there is not one which has existence and has its form unapprehended by the cognition of the Omniscient Person; in fact all things appear and disappear only as having their forms apprehended by the consciousness of the Omniscient Person; not a single thing is left out. This is what is meant by His apprehending 'all things in their entirety'. This also is what is meant by all things being 'embraced in a single cognition'; otherwise, the fact of all things being spoken of as 'all' may also be not admitted,—in order to avoid their having limits. So there is nothing in this.

It has been argued that—"on account of the things being all included under a single cognition, there would follow the corollary that there is nothing apart from all these; how then would it be denied that the said things have their limit?"

This also is not right. Under the view of people who regard *Cognition* as *formless*, there can be no actual 'inclusion' of things within the Cognition; all that happens is that they become indicated by the Cognition merely as

existing.—Nor has the 'endlessness' of things been accepted on the ground of their not being comprehended under Cognition; by virtue of which, if they became apprehended, they would come to have limits. All that has been held is that the extension of space being limitless, the Region 'containing' the things is 'limitless', 'endless'; as the Region of pure 'Existence' is 'endless', also because there can be no limits to the *enumeration* (of things). Nor is there any incompatibility between 'being apprehended' and the 'absence of limits' for the filling up of space;—on account of which 'incompatibility', things would have to be regarded as 'not apprehended'.—If it is asked—"If He does not comprehend all things within His Cognition, how can He be omniscient?",—the answer is that, it would be so, for that very reason; that is, it is just because He does not apprehend things as *limited* that He becomes omniscient; otherwise, if He had apprehended the *limitless* things as *limited,* He would be clearly *mistaken.* Because one is called "omniscient' only when He apprehends *existing* things as *existent,* and *non-existing* things as *non-existent;*—and to the Region of *existence,* there is no limit at all. Hence if one apprehends as *non-existent,* the limit, which does *not exist* in the form of *movement,*—and if he apprehends as *existent,* the Limit, which does *exist* in the form of being cognised by the Omniscient Person,—why should He be regarded as 'Not-Omniscient'?

The following might be urged—"Under the view that Cognition is *formless,* there can be no apprehension of objects; because such Cognition would be indistinguishable. Consequently, no differentiation of particular things and functions being possible,—this view of Cognition being formless should not be put forward at all; as it would be always open to objection".

This is not right. In regard to the Cognition of the Omniscient Person, no differentiation of things and their functions is admitted; because the said Cognition envisages *all* things: because the idea is that the said Cognition (of the Omniscient Person) envisages, not the *Blue* only, nor the *yellow* only, but *all things.* In the case of men with limited powers of vision, their Cognition envisages only particular things; hence as in his case,—under the view that 'Cognitions are formless',—all things would stand on the same footing, the impossibility of well-known distinctions is declared to be open to objection. Because, as there could be no such distinction as 'this is the Cognition of *Blue*', 'that is the Cognition of *Yellow*'—even common people would be equally omniscient; this is what is urged against this view; as regards the Omniscient Person himself, such non-distinction would be only right; hence how could the said contingency be urged as an undesirable one?—Thus in the state of Omniscience, it is only right and proper that the Cognition should be *formless* and brought about by the powers of mysticism.

It might be argued that—"In that case things could not be distinguished as (1) those to be acquired, and (2) those to be abandoned".

Not so, we reply. If in the event of the limitless number of things appearing in consciousness at one and the same time,—there were incompatibility with the things being cognised as (1) to be acquired and (2) to be abandoned,—and if there were no such incompatibility with other things, and there were some loss of character on the part of the things to be acquired and

things to be abandoned as they appear in consciousness,—or even thi lost character were not distinguished,—, or even when they appeared in consciousness, if there came about no ordinary Cognition envisaging them,—then, under these contingencies, there might be room for asserting what has been asserted. As a matter of fact, however, when the entire world appears in consciousness, even the thing to be acquired and to be abandoned appear in consciousness without any incongruity, and without losing any of their essential character; and subsequently, it all becomes apprehended by the pure ordinary Cognition brought about by the force of the Cognition of the Omniscient Person. Why then, can there be no Cognition of things as distinguished from one another ?

Thus it has been proved that there is no room for the objection as against the view that Cognitions are *formless.*

If then, the objection is meant to be urged against the view that Cognitions have forms,—then, also there is no such incompatibility as has been urged. Because as the limit-less things, manifesting themselves in endless forms, come into existence,—so also does the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person, which appears as envisaging the forms of all those limitless things; and there is no incongruity in this; as there is nothing incompatible in a single Cognition envisaging the forms of several things.

"Certainly, if what is *one* envisages *many forms,*—there is incongruity".

Not so; because the *forms* are *unreal.* If the one thing had several *real* forms, then there would be incompatibility between the *one* and the *many.* As a matter of fact, however, the view that is held is that the many forms do not really belong to the one thing.

"If that is so, then the Cognition of the Omniscient Person would be associated with a wrong Cognition; and thereby the Omniscient Person would be *mistaken*".

Not so; as He would cognise things as they are, there would be nothing wrong in it. He would be 'mistaken' if He had cognised as *real* what is really *unreal.* When, however, He cognises the *unreal forms* as *unreal,*—then, how can He be said to be 'mistaken' ?

"When all things are embraced within a single Cognition,—and yet He treats them differently, as 'seen' and the rest; how then can He be regarded as *not-mistaken* ?"

There is no force in this; because, He is cognisant of the right means, He could be *mistaken,* if he neglected the right means of apprehending the thing, and apprehended it by some other secondary means. In fact however, according to the view that Cognitions have forms, there is no means of apprehending a thing except the apprehension of the form of its Cognition; how then could the Person be *mistaken* if He apprehended the thing by the right and proper means ?

Thus then, just as in the case of the knowable things, so in the case of the Cognition also, there is apprehension of the forms of limitless things,—and on that account it is said that 'limitless things' are embraced by it.

When things enter into the Cognition in certain forms,—in those same forms they become recognised by the representative consciousness that

appears later on. And so far as the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person is concerned, things do not enter into it as appearing in a limited number of diverse forms, but everything that happens to be existent enters into it. Because the capacity of the Person is such that in becoming the substratum of the Cognition of all things, it is not trammelled in any way; specially as mental Cognition envisages all things. Thus then, there being no incongruity in the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person apprehending the forms of limitless things,—and any ordinary cognition that comes later on cannot apprehend things to the farthest limit,—how could there be any Cognition such as 'so many are the things'? And it would be only if such a Cognition were there, that there could be a limit or end to the number of things.

If, again, the representative Cognition appears in the form that 'there is nothing beyond what has actually appeared in consciousness',—even so, it would not be possible for the things to be so limited. Because if all that appeared in the non-conceptual Consciousness of the Omniscient Person appeared as *limited* in extent,—then the representative Cognition following upon that might apprehend the things as so limited [Read '*antavattvam*' for '*anantatvam*'], and this Cognition would deprive the things of their *limitlessness*. As a matter of fact, however, what appears in the Consciousness of the Omniscient Person appears actually as *without limit*,—because the capacity of the Omniscient Person has no limitations; consequently anything else that appears in consciousness must be *limited*; and it is only this that is apprehended by the representative Cognition; so that you have more clearly than ever established the *limitlessness* of things. Hence there is no force in what has been urged.

There are some people who hold the view that the whole Consciousness of the Mystic is devoid of objective basis, and resembles the true dream, whence, being in conformity with the real state of things, it is reliable.—As against these people, there is much less room for the objection regarding things becoming *limited*.—We have had enough of this!—(3627)

There are some people who hold that there are Persons who become omniscient at will; under their opinion also, there is no incongruity in what has been said above.—This is what is shown in the following:—

TEXTS (3628-3629).

WHATEVER HE WISHES TO KNOW HE COMES TO KNOW IT WITHOUT FAIL;—SUCH IS HIS POWER, AS HE HAS SHAKEN OFF ALL EVIL. HE KNOWS THINGS EITHER SIMULTANEOUSLY OR IN SUCCESSION, JUST AS HE WISHES; AND HAVING SECURED THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS, HE BECOMES THE LORD.—(3628-3629)

COMMENTARY.

The following *Texts* point out that there is no incongruity even under the view that the Lord's Cognition of things is *successive*:—

TEXTS (3630-3631).

OR, HE KNOWS ALL THAT IS KNOWABLE, IN THE SHAPE OF THE 'FOUR TRUTHS', BY MEANS OF HIS SIXTEEN 'COGNITIONS', IN SUCCESSION, AND ON THAT ACCOUNT HE IS *omniscient*. WHEN THIS COGNITION OF THE LORD THUS APPEARS IN SUCCESSION—NOT EVEN A SINGLE MOMENT HAS TO BE AWAITED; WHAT TO SAY, MY FRIEND, OF A HUNDRED YEARS!—(3630-3631)

COMMENTARY.

'*By means of Sixteen Cognitions*'—i.e. by Forgivenesses' and 'Cognitions': There are *eight* 'Forgivenesses',—in the shape of the Forgiveness of Pain, *Dharma*, Knowledge and so forth;—and there are *eight* 'Cognitions', in the shape of the cognition of Pain, *Dharma*, Knowledge and so forth;—all this is clear from the declaration that—'The Truth is divided sixteen-fold'.

'*Even a single moment*'.—The lowest measure of time is called '*Kalā*'; 120 *Kalās* make one *Kṣaṇa*; 60 *Kṣaṇas* make one *Lava*.

'*My friend*'—is a form of address.

'*Abda*'—is *year*.—(3630-3631)

It has been argued under *Text* 3251, that—"Even if the Person by his own undiversified nature, apprehends all things, he cannot apprehend the specific individualities of all things".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3632).

THE PERSON WHO APPREHENDS ALL THINGS IN THEIR OWN UNDIVERSIFIED FORM, KNOWS THE VERY FORMS OF ALL THINGS.—(3632)

COMMENTARY.

Says the Opponent:—"In the scriptures it is said that the Cognition of the Mystics, free from all impurities, appertains to *Universals* only,—not to *Specific Individualities*; how do you say that the Consciousness of the mystics, which envisages *Universals*, apprehends the very forms of all things?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3633-3634).

IT IS THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' ITSELF, AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM HETEROGENEOUS AND NON-MOMENTARY THINGS, WHICH IS SPOKEN OF HERE AS 'UNIVERSAL', ON THE GROUND OF ITS LEADING TO CALMNESS AND DISPASSION.—THE COGNITION THAT APPREHENDS THIS AND IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE FORCE OF MEDICATION, AND APPEARS ONLY IN GREAT MYSTICS, ENVISAGES THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY ITSELF.—(3633-3634)

COMMENTARY.

That same 'Specific Individuality', which, differentiated from things of other kinds, becomes the basis of the notion of 'Uniformity', and is then called the 'Universal'. Hence the consciousness of the Mystic which apprehends it and which becomes clearly manifested by the force of his Meditation, envisages the Specific Individuality itself; hence there is nothing incongruous in the same Cognition apprehending the *Universal* as well as the *Specific Individuality*.

It has been argued under *Text* 3253, that—"the said uniform cognition would be either true or false; if it is true, it goes against perceptible facts, as it makes all things *one*".

All this also has been answered by what has been just explained; because what the mystic consciousness apprehends is the *Specific Individuality*.—(3633-3634)

If what is meant by Mystic Consciousness envisaging *Specific Individuality* is that it apprehends that Universal which we have declared to be 'illusory', not capable of being described as *that* or *not-that*,—and which other philosophers have regarded as *real*,—then the said idea cannot be accepted.

This is what the Author points out in the following :—

TEXT (3635).

WHAT IS APPREHENDED BY THE MYSTIC CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT THAT UNIVERSAL WHICH IS INCAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF AS 'THAT' OR 'NOT-THAT' AND SO FORTH, AND WHICH OTHER PEOPLE HAVE REGARDED AS *real*'.—(3635)

COMMENTARY.

'*And so forth*' is meant to include 'eternal' or 'non-eternal', etc. etc.—(3635)

Question :—"Why cannot there be apprehension of that Universal?"
Answer :—

TEXT (3636).

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE MYSTIC IS FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND IS NOT ERRONEOUS; AND IF IT APPREHENDED THE SAID UNIVERSAL, IT WOULD BE SOMETHING BESET WITH CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND ERROR.—(3636)

COMMENTARY.

The Mystic Consciousness has been held to be *valid Perception,* because it is free from Conceptual Content and is not erroneous. If however, it envisaged the Universal as described above, then it would apprehend an illusory thing and thus become beset with *Conceptual Content;* and as apprehending the *unreal* thing in the shape of the Universal as assumed by other people, it would become beset with *Error* also.

Or both being taken as referring to both, there are two objectionable features.—(3636)

It has been shown that the Cognition in question, as apprehending an unreal and purely fanciful thing, becomes beset with Conceptual Content and Error. It is next shown in another way, that it becomes beset with Error for the following reason also:—

TEXT (3637).

BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED THAT THE UNIVERSAL WHICH CONSISTS OF THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND IS INCAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF, AND IS IN THE FORM OF PERMANENT CONTIGUITY,—IS FORMLESS (FEATURELESS).—(3637)

COMMENTARY.

It has just been said that the Universal, which is incapable of being spoken of'—that is, the Universal which cannot be spoken of as either 'this' or 'not-this',—forms the very essence of *Conceptual Content*;—'*because*'—inasmuch as—this has been already explained under the section on '*Apoha*',—'*therefore the said Consciousness becomes beset with Conceptual Content*';—such is the connection with what has gone before (in the preceding *text*).

The reason for this is as follows:—As the Universal is of the nature of Conceptual Content, the Mystic Consciousness that envisaged it would also be of the nature of Conceptual Content; because it is apprehended as of that nature. As regards the Conceptual Content, wherever it appears, it presents as *good* and *desirable,* what is *not-good* and *not-desirable;* hence it is always *wrong;* hence the said Apprehension becomes beset with *Error.*

As regards the *Universal* postulated by other people, in the form *perpetual contiguity*,—that also has been shown, under the chapter on 'the Universal', as being entirely feature-less, characterless. So that if the Apprehension envisages this Universal it becomes all the more clearly 'beset with Conceptual Content and Error'.—(3637)

It has been argued under *Text* 3256, that—"If the Omniscient Person is held to be that Person who knows all things and their causes, through a single abnormal Cognition,—then there can be no Means of Cognition to vouch for His existence, etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3638-3639).

THAT PERSON IS CERTAINLY CALLED 'OMNISCIENT' WHO KNOWS ALL THINGS ALONG WITH THEIR CAUSES, THROUGH A SINGLE ABNORMAL COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY COMMUNION. THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A PERSON HAS BEEN ALREADY ESTABLISHED BEFORE, BY MEANS OF INFERENCE. THUS THERE IS A DISTINCT MEANS OF COGNITION VOUCHING FOR HIS EXISTENCE. HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SUCH A ONE REALLY EXISTS.—(3638-3639)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued under *Text* 3258,—"Whether simultaneously or successively, how could there be any Inference, without an effect ? etc. etc.".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3640).

SIMULTANEOUSLY OR SUCCESSIVELY, THERE IS COGNITION FOLLOWING FROM THE EFFECT THAT IS MANIFESTED. WHEN HE IMPARTS THE TEACHING, HE HAS THE REQUISITE CAPACITY ALSO.—(3640)

COMMENTARY.

This is easily understood.—(3640)

It has been argued under *Text* 3260, that—"The idea that there is one Person who has acquired special powers not common among men and He knows all things,—is entirely baseless".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXTS (3641–3644).

THAT PERSON WHO HAS PROPOUNDED THIS TEACHING—WHICH IS PURE AND WHEREIN THE DHARMA OF 'NO-SOUL' HAS BEEN REITERATED,—AND WHICH HAS BEEN SUPPORTED BY THE WHOLE OF THIS WORK AND NOT TRAVERSED BY ANY FORM OR MEANS OF VALID COGNITION,—WHICH IS NOT KNOWN TO WORLDLY MEN,—WHICH IS BEYOND THE KEN OF *Kēshava* AND OTHERS,—WHICH IS HIGHLY BORNE ON THE HEAD BY ALL WISE MEN,—WHICH DESTROYS THE ENTIRE HOST OF ENEMIES IN THE SHAPE OF EVILS,—AND IS THE CAUSE OF VARIOUS KINDS OF PROSPERITY AS ALSO OF THE ATTAINMENT OF *Nirvāṇa*,—SUCH A PERSON ACQUIRED SPECIAL POWERS NOT COMMON AMONG MEN, WHICH DISTINGUISHES HIM FROM ALL OTHER MEN, AND HE ALONE IS *Omniscient*;—THIS IS ENTIRELY VOUCHED FOR BY MEANS AND FORMS OF RIGHT COGNITION.—(3641–3644)

COMMENTARY.

'*Samashāstrēṇa*—by the whole of this work, the *Tattvasangraha.*

'*Which is not known to worldly men*'—i.e. the Teaching which envisages knowledge that is not easily attained by worldly men.

'*Beyond the ken of Kēshava, etc. etc.*'—Though this word is in the Masculine Gender, yet it qualifies the word '*Dēṣhanā*' (Feminine).

'*Which destroys, etc. etc.*'—The evils themselves are the *enemies*;—and their hosts are destroyed by it.

'*Is the cause of various kinds, etc. etc.*'—the word '*Kāraṇa*' is to be construed with each of the two members of the compound.—(1) It is the cause of the various kinds of Prosperity, and also (2) it is the cause of the attainment of *Nirvāṇa.*—(3641–3644)

It has been argued under *Text* 3261—"Thus, no omniscient Person of any kind is conceivable; consequently no human assertion could be the means of providing the knowledge of *Dharma*".

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3645).

THUS, AS IT IS QUITE CONCEIVABLE THAT THERE IS AN OMNISCIENT PERSON, HUMAN ASSERTION CAN CERTAINLY BE THE MEANS OF PROVIDING THE KNOWLEDGE OF *Dharma.*—(3645)

COMMENTARY.

'*An Omniscient Person*'—i.e. *Buddha* Himself alone; not *Kapila*, or any one else; as already established before.

As regards the objection that has been urged regarding Cognition being *formless* or *with form*,—that has been answered by us already.—(3645)

Says the Opponent—"It has been asserted (by Buddhists) that—'Cognition never apprehends the external object,—either as manifested or as unmanifested or as envisaging something else'. But how can both views be free from objections ?"

The answer to this is as follows:—

TEXT (3646).

ANY DISCUSSION REGARDING *formlessness* AND THE REST IS OF NO USE IN REGARD TO THE OMNISCIENT PERSON. IN FACT, JUST AS YOUR COGNITION APPEARS IN REGARD TO A CERTAIN OBJECT, SO DOES THE OTHER (SUPERIOR) COGNITION ALSO.—(3646)

End of Chapter.

Thus ends the TATTVASAṄGRAHA by *Shāntarakṣita.*

COMMENTARY.

The discussion that we carried on earlier, regarding the Cognition being *formless*, etc. etc., from the Idealistic point of view,—can serve no useful purpose on the piesent occasion, as against you *Mīmāmsakas* who are wedded to the External World, when we are proving the existence of the Omniscient Person on the understanding (for the sake of argument) that the external world exists.

Question :—"Why ?"

Answer :—'*In fact, etc. etc.*'—You must assert that there is Cognition of the External object,—whether the Cognition be *formless* or *with form*; as otherwise the whole external world would disappear. So that, just as there comes about *your* Cognition of a certain thing,—in the same manner would come about also the other—and the superior—Cognition *of the Omniscient Person* (which is to be construed heie).—So that the objection that has been urged has no force at all and should not have been urged.—(3646)

This excellent and extensive, pure and lasting, (Teaching) that has been secured by me,—may it become the abode of the magnificence of the unrivalled *Jina*; and with its effulgence, may it delight the hearts of all men!—May thereby the whole of mankind become like the Buddhist *Kamalashīla* (or, may all men attain the character of the Lotus as blooming under the rays of the sun of the Great Teaching)!

End of the Commentary

by

Kamalashīla.

END.

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